Amy Widsten's Research

For dissertation synopsis and copies of chapters, send a written request to alw38@columbia.edu

 

Dissertation Abstract

Previous research has examined the impact of the democratic regime type on the impact of international bargaining, with some arguing that democracies tend to make more credible commitments.  Yet the specific mechanisms by which democracies commit are less well-explored.  In addition, a burgeoning literature on delegation seeks to explain why, rather than being captured by special-interest, protectionist politics at the domestic level, democratic countries commit to policies designed to promote free trade.  This dissertation argues that political parties play an important role in both domestic-coalition building, and international signaling processes in international trade bargaining.  At the domestic level, political parties operate as mechanisms of preference aggregation and coalition-building, leading trade-related interest and lobby groups to contribute on the basis of expected future gains from behavior expected in trade dispute settlement cases.  I posit that political parties operate internationally as signaling devices which indicate to trade partners or opponents what kinds of policies and disputes may be expected in the trade arena while a particular government is in power.  Whether a state will promote protectionist or liberal policies depends on whether the governing coalition is left or right-leaning. Left-wing governments will support protectionist policies, and right-leaning governments tend to favor trade-opening or export-promoting policies.  Domestically, political parties link pre-and post- electoral behavior, providing a brand-name upon which domestic constituencies and international trading partners can make solid predictions about future behavior.  The impact of international trade institutions to more stringent mechanisms (GATT/WTO) has been a delegation process that contributes to a lasting free trade regime; providing the potential for a stable equilibrium for trade policy-making.

Part I: Introduction and Summary

This dissertation is concerned with cooperation, credibility, and coalitions on bargaining and negotiation strategies and outcomes between countries in international trade policy-making.  Cooperation between countries is aided by the development of international institutions designed to settle disputes and enforce rulings regarding trade in the international economy.  By delegating authority for enforcement of international trade rules to an international body, governments have taken a major step to overcome “capture” by special interests in international trade policy.  This institutional innovation promotes free trade in the aggregate; but is in no way as a panacea for trade conflict.  Domestic interest groups continue to lobby, and to press for policies that serve their particularistic interests at the expense of free trade.  However, they find it more difficult to lobby directly to governments, since policy is also now set a higher level.  Moreover, since governments are the only institutions with standing in international trade adjudication; lobbies find it necessary to channel more of their influence through larger institutions, such as political parties, which aggregate preferences at a higher level and strategically interact in such a way as to account for the preferences of groups and individuals lower on the pyramid (also known as “Stackelberg leaders”); while these groups still attempt to influence government directly, through the bureaucracy and lobbying executive institutions.

Section I: Campaign Contributions and Party Policy Outcomes

 This dissertation seeks to accomplish several things.  First, I am interested in the dynamics of campaign contributions on party policy outcomes.  I seek to test the Magee, Brock, and Young “contribution specialization theorem” specifically on trade policy.  This theorem predicts that lobbies and individuals will specialize their contributions on single parties rather than engage in “double-giving” practices that will end up canceling out their influence (in the event the non-favored party wins).  I expect that parties divide along a left-right spectrum, with left-wing parties favoring protectionist policies, such as import-protection; and right-wing parties favoring liberalization (as well as export-promotion).  I expect the observable implication that left-wing governments will tend to launch more protectionist trade disputes (since the government serves as a screening mechanism through which petitions for redress of trade grievances are heard).

Section II: Party Dynamics and Bargaining Outcomes

Next, I expect that political parties, as signals of government type and credibility, as well as preference aggregation, will affect the bargaining process (duration), and outcomes of disputes.  In disputes aimed at protection, left-wing governments are strong opponents- they are willing to bargain hard for the dispute, since they are backed by interests who favor the dispute; a right-wing plaintiff in such a dispute is a weaker opponent, since the right tends to favor freer trade rather than protection.  Also to be considered is that a left-wing defendant in a trade opening dispute is likely to be a strong defendant; with a right-wing defendant in such a dispute being weaker (i.e. the right would actually prefer to lose the dispute, if it favors trade opening).  This model makes predictions not only about which preferences parties will assume in trade policy, but also how this will be affected by where they are positioned (as defendant or plaintiff) in a particular dispute.

Section III: Commitment, Compliance, and Enforcement in International Trade

Finally, I am interested in dynamics of commitment, compliance and enforcement in international trade dispute settlement.  In international trade, governments commit to the international trade apparatus (GATT/WTO) to be bound by its rules.  They also negotiate for multilateral trade agreements that become codified in international law, and become the basis upon which states bargain to resolve future disputes.  Finally, they agree to enforce and/or implement international trade law by agreeing to negotiated terms or legal rulings that commit them to a course of action in which their behavior is monitored and in which non-compliance would receive the sanction or condemnation of the international community.  How well does this process work?  I seek to test how and whether countries implement the rulings to which they have committed to abide.  What is the track record of countries who utilize dispute settlement?  How effective is it at achieving mutually satisfactory outcomes and policy change?  Knowing the answer to these questions will illuminate whether the growth of international institutions is effective in reducing the impact of particularistic interests (non-cooperative or public goods harming) on endeavors for international cooperation.

Empirical Testing

In order to test these hypotheses, I have gathered data on trade disputes between advanced industrialized countries; and use the Comparative Manifestos Project data on political parties.  The data consists of directed dyads.  In addition to examining the importance of parties on trade dispute initiation, duration, and outcomes; I control for the influence of relevant economic and political factors, including domestic political institutions, such as electoral institutions and divided government, economic conditions, such as the terms of trade, comparative GDP, etc., and the expansion of international institutions on trade policy.  The time period examined is the post-World War II period, with some specific data spanning the period 1970-2002; the scope is the set of advanced industrialized countries (25) collected for the CMP. After displaying and interpreting my statistical results I process-trace three cases of dispute bargaining episodes between the United States and Europe.