Internationalized Domestic Politics in Latin
America
The Institutional
Role of Internationally Based Actors*
Douglas A Chalmers
Columbia University, 1993
Latin Americans have long had to deal with people in their midst who, in playing domestic politics, could call on power resources beyond the territorial limits of their countries. Representatives of foreign governments, the Vatican, large foreign corporations, supranational organizations, international political movements, charitable and developmental organizations, and many others have been involved in varying degrees in the day-to-day politics of almost all countries in the region. Some are foreigners, and some are citizens who become tied with international interests. Some foreigners are temporary interlopers, such as visiting politicians or briefly occupying military forces, and their presence does not produce enduring, regularized relationships. Others are migrants who become citizens, largely losing their political identification with their foreign base, and integrating into established domestic institutions.
But many foreign-linked businessmen, diplomats, political and labor organizers, and religious proselytizers stay involved over a period of time, still identified with international sources of power. These latter, whom I will call 'internationally based actors', become built into the political institutions of the country. When these are a significant presence, I will call the political process that results 'internationalized domestic politics,' 'Internationalized' because of the presence of these actors, and 'domestic' because this is not a question of foreign policy or interstate relations, but of making decisions about local issues, and concerning the relations between actors within the system.
Analyzing politics of Latin American countries as internationalized politics requires some adjustment to our usual conceptual approach.[1] Often, particularly in analyzing larger countries, analysts ignore international factors, or consider them as part of the context only. When attention is given it is under such rubrics as intervention, dependency, subversion and foreign aid. These images catch the notion of foreigners acting over a period of time in Latin American countries, but they conceptualize it as either constituting an external constraint on the system, or as a kind of simple penetration, in which the actors remain outsiders even as they act within the country. But many internationally based actors are as much a part of the system as many citizens, whose loyalty, participation and even attention to national politics may be slim. The norms and procedures linking internationally based actors to other political actors and to the processes of decision making are at least as stable as those which link many domestic actors.
I want to explore the possibility of considering those internationally based actors as part of the system, and to analyze them not only in terms of their goals and resources, as we might an actor who penetrates the system without becoming part of it, but also for the institutional relationships which are built around them. We should be interested not only in whether they achieve their goals, but also for their effect on participation, whether they enter into stable coalitions or whether the hinder or promote realistic dialogue on the issues.
The term 'institution' is used in its broad sense to refer to any set of settled routines, norms and procedures which are recognized by the participants in allocating authority, establishing ways of resolving conflicts, and setting the broad procedural terms for arriving at decisions.[2] Institutions include both those which are legally established or regulated, as well as those emerging from practice or even habit. In fact, unless they are somehow brought under the umbrella of diplomatic institutions, the political dimensions of the arrangements with foreigners are more likely to be informal. Non-diplomatic, foreign based organizations are often outwardly 'non-political', to conform with the common conventions of sovereignty and non-intervention. But that does not prevent them from becoming involved in all the activities which go into politics, mobilizing people, shaping agendas, bringing pressure on decision makers, and influencing public opinion.
The arrangements that link internationally based actors to politics have come in many forms. Ignoring the legal fiction that colonies and their metropolis were a single unit, we may say that during the three hundred years after the arrival of the Spaniards, relations between locals and internationally based actors were regulated by the institutions of colonialism.
With Independence comes the norms and institutions of the modern state system. In the world of sovereign nation states, the institutions governing the interaction between internationally based actors and local groups has 'ideally' been subsumed under the rubric of diplomacy and channeled through the head of state. If nations are meant to be legally equal and autonomous politically, then it is appropriate that they deal with the outside world with one voice, through official representatives. Diplomatic institutions were at once a very powerful form of regulating the way in which outsiders became involved in local politics, and the expression of what became a strongly held paradigm for what should be the relationships of foreigners to domestic politics, a paradigm that I will call the 'conventional model'.
The conventional model is that of a self-contained political system within territorial borders. To deal with the world beyond its borders it develops a foreign policy executed by, or in the name of the head of state through diplomatic channels. This world beyond has an economic and political structure, but the other agents that one deals with are other states. This model implied a monopoly for heads of state over the management of influences that cross borders. It also suggests an at least formal equality between the different states.
But diplomatic channels are never the exclusive procedures, practices and norms regulating the role of internationally based actors in domestic political systems. All sorts of other kinds of formal and informal arrangements exist. In the Latin American cases, personalistic ties with government leaders has long been a prominent pattern for ambassadors and internationally based businessmen. US Military Advisory Groups and USAID for many years had close working bureaucratic relationships with Latin American counterparts. Multinational corporations enter into informal alliances with domestic producers and bureaucrats which may play an important role in shaping the economic decisions of states.[3] The representatives of the several internationally organized Socialist and Catholic political parties established close working ties with political parties and unions in Latin America to mobilize people and, indirectly participate in governing coalitions. And there are obviously many others.
Although any good historical description or journalistic treatment of politics in Latin America will give these ties with foreigners considerable prominence, analytic and theoretic works have been less imaginative in incorporating them. Perhaps because of the force of the conventional model, or the interests of the dominant elites, these arrangements have been treated as part of state-to-state relation (e.g., US corporations treated as a part of US Government policy), as context (e.g., multinational corporations representing the international economic system), ignored, (e.g., the actions of many charitable and development NGOs) or treated as exceptions.
My purpose in this paper is to focus on the institutional aspects of these internationally based actors, and explore how making them analytically visible may help to solve some puzzles about Latin American politics.
In some periods and for some countries, it probably does little harm to approach questions of international influences through the conventional image of separate states dealing with the outside world through it leaders acting in diplomatic channels. If countries are large, or highly centralized, or relatively isolated, or if the international environment is particularly dominated by state actors, the conventional model may be a good first approximation in understanding that country's politics. Many of the larger countries of South America might have fitted this description in an earlier time, but many never did, and now there are trends which make the adoption of a different approach necessary for the rest.
One of these trends is the decline of the Cold War which has led to a diversification of international connections. During the Cold War the major axis of international action concerned state-to-state relations. The US brought pressure to bear on governments, and occasionally intervened, to secure the adoption of political institutions which would deny the Left access to power. Other sorts of links, for example foreign economic aid, whether carried on through official agencies like USAID, or through friendly non-governmental organizations, could be thought of as, and often were, subordinate to this state interest. The Soviets and the Cubans acted similarly, engaged in supporting opposition groups whose aim was seizing power and becoming another state member of the socialist bloc. The conventional approach's concentration on state interests was, to a certain extent descriptive of what was going on.
In the post-Cold War situation, however, the conventional approach is less plausible. State interests are not so clear, and the US Government, among other states, is playing a role more like that of a manager and coordinator of varied public and private concerns than of the 'leader of the free world'.[4] the various internationally based actors in Latin American politics are freer to pursue their own interests. Understanding their impact on politics in Latin America needs a more flexible approach.
The new role of the state in society has also rendered the conventional view less useful. The prolonged fiscal crisis and enormous international debt has meant that states have little to spend. Newly revived liberal doctrine convinced many that states shouldn't spend money, even if they had it. Further, a vigorous revival of cynicism about the effectiveness and honesty of bureaucrats and politicians has weakened state action.
Whatever the reason, many traditional instruments of state policy have been weakened: tariffs, subsidies, public investment, price and wage controls. And other more directly political tools of the state as well: corporatist control of labor unions, social welfare programs, control of provincial and local governments, military action for political purposes, and blatant electoral manipulation. Although it will take years to assess the results of these shifts, it seems certain that there is no withering away of the state. There does, however, seem to be a redefinition of its role, stressing management of complex social processes and markets, rather than direct control of social organization and production.
There are several ways in which these changes in the state bear on the question of international influences. The first is that privatization often means internationalization. The usual way in which liberalization is described implies that shifts from state to market decisions and private initiative are taking place within a national society. But the markets that are given more emphasis are increasingly international, and the private initiative in question sometimes comes from abroad. State-owned firms are often sold to foreign companies (or, ironically, even to other states), or to companies with foreign financing. The state's withdrawal from major expenditures to combat poverty and promote community development has increased the importance of the contributions made by internationally based relief and development organizations.
Another implication of economic and social liberalization is to diminish the significance of state-to-state flows for the economy. Massive foreign aid for projects administered by Latin American states is less common. States are still the agencies with superior fund-raising abilities Ñ through taxes Ñ but more and more flows from outside are channeled through international organizations or non-governmental organizations. The IMF, the World Bank and other internationally-based financial institutions enter the public arena in Latin American countries to give advice and provide financing. Multinational corporations, as a result of the diminished trade, ownership and financial restrictions, are a more independent presence. Non-governmental organizations devoted to social and developmental goals are becoming more numerous, and not only channel significant resources, but become established as mediators between social development and state action. State to state relationships are still very important, but it turns less on the flow of resources, and much more on establishing the legal frameworks for trade, debt management, and other flows, in which the state's direct participation may be small.
The conventional approach which sees international influences as either the result of the foreign policies of other states, or the constraints of the international system, cannot give us much access to the new situation. Even analyzing a classic topic such as the foreign policy of the US Government needs to be not so much a discussion of its policies towards states in Latin America as its efforts to build alliances with groups within the country in question, within the US, and among US-based international organizations and agencies. Analyzing politics within liberalized Latin American countries will, in general, no longer be able to rely as much as in the past on national decision-makers, their clients, supporters and opposition, but must increasingly differentiate among the various arenas within economy and society, and analyze shifting coalitions of private and public entities. In particular, to take account of international influences, it will not be enough to analyze what the government has been able to secure abroad, but will have to look at the many and varied channels of resources, personnel and ideas which enter without going through the state apparatus. The continued legal control that local states no doubt maintain over cross border flows (except for the drug trade) is still very important, but the political dynamics are no longer as centered on actors in the national government as they were. Once again, an approach which conceptualizes important internationally-based actors as part of the system, i.e., the internationalized politics approach, becomes more appropriate.
The subtle effect of improved communications, such as telephones, facsimile transmission, electronic mail, satellite television and frequent inexpensive air transportation is so pervasive that sometimes it escapes our attention. For example, the spread of international, and especially US television among the better-of social circles of many Latin American countries is quite astounding. Much of it is entertainment, and although there is no doubt a subtle internationalization of culture, it is hard to read its political effects. In a country like Mexico, where these transmissions often include news broadcasts and is supplemented by the ready availability of US print media, an impact on politics through the shaping of opinions seems very probable, although very hard to measure.[5]
One consequence of rapid communication and travel is to expand the range of groups from abroad who can become involved in the politics of countries in Latin America without losing their links to the international community and their home country. Cheap and efficient communication has brought the task of maintaining a political presence in many countries within the capabilities of non-governmental and non-business organizations. Because of this, and reinforced by the general revival of civil society, there has been a significant broadening of the types and number of groups actively penetrating Latin American societies. The four classic types of internationally-based actors: other states, multinational corporations, the Catholic church and international political movements, have been joined by a wide range of advocacy groups, non-governmental organizations, and international agencies.[6] Independent human rights monitoring organizations, United Nations organizations devoted to a wide variety of causes and topics, election observers with and without official support, charitable, developmental and relief organizations, internationally-connected environmental groups and many others have increased the diversity of international connections, and probably its density as well.
Not only can the personnel in the field maintain constant contact with offices in their home countries (or international headquarters), but the possibility of mobilizing international opinion on an on-going basis has become a practical possibility. In analyzing the role of internationally-based human rights groups in the democratic transitions in Latin America, Kathryn Sikkink evolved the notion of 'policy networks' that stretch across borders.[7] Without rapid communication to disseminate information about abuses, and to bring mobilized 'world opinion' to bear, such networks would be impossible. Many elections in Latin America have become international media events, with the scrutiny of journalists being supplemented by formal and informal, public and private international election observation. Media coverage of national disasters such as earthquakes mobilize funding for, and legitimize the presence of relief agencies.
Using the conventional approach to analyze the manifold flows of information, personnel, resources and ideas made possible in part by the exponential growth of communications technology is awkward, at best. Pressure for adherence to international norms for the protection of human rights might be subsumed under the category of international constraints on governments. That approach does not, however, take account of the relationships which human rights organizations have to the political situation in particular places. The work of election monitors in influencing elections might be seen, again, as the enforcement of an international norm, or the execution of a policy of the United States, but that would diminish the role of individual organizations, and miss the interactions that begin to take place between government, oppositions and observers, and the effects on the strategies of all three in the expectation that observation will continue. The internationalized politics approach promises, by looks at the role of internationally-based actors as part of the political process in these countries.
Although I have implied it strongly before, I want to reemphasize that the grounds for adopting an internationalized politics approach is not based on a belief that the presence of internationally-based actors is new, nor that they are increasing in their ability to dictate what happens in Latin American countries. Internationally-based actors have been prominent in Latin America for a very long time, at least since the Conquest. The new non-governmental and international organizations are reshaping the links with the outside world, not creating them.
I am also not arguing that internationally-based forces are becoming more dominant. When I discuss internationalized politics with colleagues they most often seem to assume that this is what I am arguing. This illusion is no doubt reinforced by the tendency to speak of internationalization of politics, and to dwell on areas where new forms are occurring, such as the growth of internationally-based non-governmental organizations and the new aggressiveness of international organizations such as the OAS and the Inter American Human Rights Commission. But it is important to realize that other forms of international influence are weakening. The US Government is probably less capable of decisively shaping the politics of countries in Latin America than it was in the eras of massive aid programs and active CIA involvement. The influence of the big internationally-based mining and petroleum firms is also weaker, if only because of the diversification of foreign interests and the increasing sophistication in the controls of Latin American governments.
The relative strength of 'national' and 'foreign' or international forces is an old and contentious question. It is probably true that in the 1950s and 1960s US political scientists tended to underestimate foreign influence by simply leaving it out, as they imported and imposed analytical models of European political systems on the region. Some dependency and nationalist approaches in the 1960s and 1970s no doubt seriously overestimated the degree to which all political processes in Latin America are determined by internationally-based actors, particularly the United States and multi-national corporations. The issue is confused because of the confusions of interdependency and dependency, between the international system and particular international actors (such as the US, or the superpowers), and between constraints on goal setting and constraints on goal-achieving.
The issue of which is more powerful, domestic or international factors, is tangled, and I am not sure it is worth unraveling to the point where a single answer would become possible. In any case, it is not necessary, The shift in approach I am proposing has little if anything to do with the argument as to whether international or domestic forces are more influential in shaping politics in the region. The adoption of the internationalized politics approach is based on the need to deal with the restructuring of international influences on the politics of the countries of Latin America, not their dominance, and to see the international and the domestic as part of the same thing.
In this age of globalization, there is something of a boom in studies of the interactions between domestic and international politics. Looking briefly at a few will help sharpen the approach being developed here. A number of theories of the international-domestic links are not helpful because they ask about the factors shaping the international system, not what shapes 'domestic' politics. These include studies of transnationalism and international regimes,[8] international integration,[9] the general fate of 'sovereignty' in the international system,[10] the domestic determinants of foreign policy,[11] and studies of global changes[12]. All of these include analyses of the impact of domestic actions on the international system, but not much about the other direction.
Another set of approaches deals with the impact of international forces on domestic politics, but takes general structural aspects of the international system as the 'independent variable', rather that the activities of internationally-based actors.[13] The most influential of these focus on international political economy, many of which owe a good deal to the classic ideas of Gershenkron.[14] In the Latin American context, this type of analysis has been very important in the 'dependency' school,[15] which, however, was much more likely to talk about the impact of the international system on economic development than on political characteristics, although there is often an implication that authoritarian, or at least elitist regimes are much more likely in highly dependent countries.
This cluster of theories seek to show how specified international 'conditions' have determinant effects on politics within countries. Interesting results emerge, but the level of analysis is rather gross for many questions, particularly for the questions about the shaping and operation of political institutions. For example, Rogowski, in his study of the way the availability of various economic factors conditions dominant political coalitions in response to demands from the international market, can make intelligent probabilistic statements about the sort of coalition that will emerge under varying conditions.[16] But the political forms through which the coalition will exercise power, or the stability of that regime, are not his concern.
Perhaps the most influential of the political analyses along these lines was the explanation of the wave of 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.[17] The economic crisis in the import substitution development model that O'Donnell pinpointed as a cause was a crisis in the relation of local economies to the international one, generated by the constraints that the latter placed on countries in Latin America. Despite criticisms,[18] it still stands as one of the most successful efforts linking regime types with international systemic factors. But this mode of analysis is still not very differentiated, and it is noteworthy that there is no successor to it in explaining the transitions away from bureaucratic-authoritarianism at the same level of analysis. Most attempts to analyze the international factor involved in democratization does not attempt to address the level of general economic or political factors at all.[19]
Approaches which look for political consequences of structural characteristics of the international system, or the character of the relationship of a country to that system are undoubtedly useful, but they constitute less of a 'general theory' than is sometimes believed. At a minimum they must be supplemented with approaches which look at actions by the agents or carriers of international forces and conditions. The internationalized politics approach, by highlighting internationally based actors seeks to do that.
Another approach to domestic-international interactions which does emphasize the character and choice was suggested by Robert Putnam, when he sought to connect the choices being made by chief executives in the domestic sphere with the choices they make in the international sphere.[20] A 'two-level game' results, in which there is interaction between domestic and international factors because the chief executive has to balance the demands of both.
But although the 'two-level game' image does help in examining how domestic choices can be contingent on international goals and conditions, but it is limited. Putnam's analysis focuses on the content of policy, and not on many other questions of interest, including the governability, stability or justice of the domestic system. By focusing on the chief executive, it allows us to talk, say, about institution building only in those cases where the dominant choices are in his or her hands. The chief executive's role may be crucial in many cases, but one of the characteristics of the current political scene is the multiplication of non-state actors. The two-level game emphasis on the choice of a single individual or agency seems to move in the wrong direction. Further, the conceptualization of the two games accepts without analysis the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign arenas without inquiring into the boundary between them. This is not a problem for the sort of questions Putnam is analyzing, which deal mostly with the determinants of state foreign economic policy, but it is not very useful in analyzing the emerging structures of domestic politics in an era of diversification of cross-border flows. Again, the internationalized politics approach takes those into account, without concentrating exclusively on forces that are channeled through the chief executive.
The concept of ÕinterventionÕ is the subject of another sort of analysis of international involvement, and on the surface seems much more closely related to our approach. Intervention as the term is used legally, and often politically, invokes the right images in the sense that it is externally based actors who intervene in other countries, not international structures, and such intervention is often concerned with the impact of such actors on political institutions.
'Intervention' is both a politically loaded term and the subject of international law, and so the analysis of intervention tends to be normative and interpretive. ÕIntervention', in legal and conventional discourse, does not mean any kind of involvement but only illegitimate involvement, since the presumption of most analysis is that intervention is by definition to be proscribed.[21]
Legal analysis of intervention throws light on our topic, particularly when it analyzes not only legal documents but the practice of states and international organizations in setting the limits of state action which are deemed acceptable. For example, there is an interesting analysis of changes in the limits of acceptable action by legal scholar Lori Fisler Damrosch who looks not only at documents and legal writings, but also at reactions to the practices of states in influencing elections, and using economic pressure to shape politics.[22]
For purposes of assessing the role of internationally-based actors in Latin American politics, however, the literature on intervention is usually too narrow. Focusing on what should be proscribed tends to place great emphasis on the norm of (national) autonomy, and usually fails to assess such other relevant norms, such as the effectiveness of the intervention, the degree to which it promotes democracy,[23] or the degree to which any particular interventive action accurately reflects the interests of the nation whose government is doing the intervening.
Further, given its grounding in international law, intervention usually refers only to the activities of foreign states. The focus in political rhetoric on multinational corporations, international relief agencies or international organizations tends to be much less rigorous. In an era of pluralization of international influences, that is a major drawback.
Finally, a preoccupation with intervention from a political point of view, often leads to analyzing outsiderÕs roles, and particularly that of the United States in Latin America, with a sense of outrage merely because it is there, and not on the basis of its real consequences, which are sometimes worse, but sometimes better than the norm would imply. Much of the literature on this topic dealing with Latin America is concerned with exposing the illegality of US intervention. Often, demonstrating the fact that the US is trying to influence the politics of a country is taken as the end of the argument, without exploring what interests such intervention promoted, and how effectively. Without going on to the latter questions, it is impossible to make serious judgments about the impact of the involvement of states in other people's politics. It is also impossible to evolve meaningful norms about how the US should behave when it is involved in other countries. Despite the outrage, and despite its signature on treaties which seem to promise that it wont intervene, it surely will.
The internationalized domestic politics approach accepts the inevitability of intervention, and as such, moves away from both the legal and the rhetorical preeminence which is given to the nationalist definition of borders. It does so, however, in a way which shifts the normative discussion from the fact of intervention, to the structure and consequences of it. It makes possible a shift in the normative debate from 'should the US (or any other internationally based actor) be involved?' to 'by what standards should that involvement be judged?' To put it baldly, there are obviously 'good' and 'bad' interventions. If we stay with the conventional analysis of the topic, we cannot rationally make that distinction.
Clarifying this point is logically linked to the tangled issues around the term 'sovereignty'. The most viable notions of sovereignty are closely tied to the notion of territorial borders. Within its borders, the laws and policies of a sovereign state are absolute.[24] Although there have been significant changes over the years,[25] the existence of a sharp delimitation of spheres of authority on territorial lines is remarkably constant in the modern age. The existence of internationalized politics in the sense described here does not change sovereignty based on borders, since the decisions taken by the state are not rendered any the less authoritative in the national territory by virtue of having been influenced by internationally based actors.
Many uses of the term sovereignty, particularly in political rhetoric, associate it not only with exclusive territorial jurisdiction, but also with autonomy, which may involve something like freedom from outside influences in making decisions. This has always been a questionable formulation, since even if one confines oneself to the 'structural' influences from international system factors, autonomy in this sense is always relative. If one instead eliminated the notion of 'outside influences', but defined sovereignty in terms of the integrity of the political institutions, then the important distinction is not a question of influence, but whether the 'outside' influences were integrated into, and made subject to the discipline of those institutions. The internationalized politics approach does not assume that all international actors will, in fact, adhere to the norms of those institutions, but it makes room for the possibility that many in fact do accept that discipline. Sovereignty, with this approach, would then be possible in an increasingly transnational and globalizing world, in which outside influences are inevitable, but would depend not on the fact of foreign influence, but on its institutionalized character.
One way of moving towards a more flexible view, which does not depend on the conventional model of sharply separated nation-state units, is to dissociate two concepts of limits, the concept of 'borders,' which refers to limits of legal jurisdiction, from that of 'boundaries,' which indicates the limits of the regular interactions that become the basis for institutionalization.[26] Borders, with some minor variations to take account of extraterritoriality, are almost always congruent with the physical line established at a country's frontier. Boundaries is an analytical concept for which the frontier is barely irrelevant.
The boundaries of the political system which decides which laws and policies are adopted within these borders, however, is another matter. If we want to identify those units which, in their regular structured interaction, shape the institutions and other qualities of the polity, then it is clear that the boundaries of the political system, the analytical 'line' drawn around these actors and institutions, is only rarely congruent with the borders delimiting legal jurisdiction. First, it is clear that there are always segments of the population within a territory which do not have meaningful political participation. Second, and more to the point of this paper, the set of actors regularly involved in a structured way often includes non-citizens operating both within the territory and outside it.
Paying too much attention to borders in discussing the structure of a political system can weaken analysis by artificially dividing up essentially coherent actors. Internationally-based actors and domestically based actors are often linked, and groups and organizations are often hard to classify as one or the other. In the internationalized politics approach, it is not necessary to do so. For example, there are domestic actors who act as agents for other countries, international alliances, or multinational corporations.[27] Other actors, including, for example, environmental and human rights organizations, may be essentially domestic actors, but whose strength lies in their ability to mobilize international forces. Sometimes an interactive pattern emerges in which it is not clear just where the decision making center of a group lies. International relief, charity and development organizations, for example, have been challenged by counterpart organizations in the developing world over setting priorities.[28] Domestic environmental groups in Latin America have insisted on the need for development as well as conservation, and have influenced the policies of internationally-based groups. The result is a complex alliance of international and domestic groups.[29] In the internationalized politics approach, these groups are treated as single entities, with their internal divisions and conflicts handled in much the same way as those of domestic actors are handled.
Although abandoning the border as a criteria for deciding who is in, and who is outside the system may appear to make it difficult to define the system at all, the contrast is somewhat illusory. Any consequential analysis of a domestic system, even when it disregards internationally based actors, has the same problem. There are many citizens who are not part of the 'system' that one would define to analyze a particular problem. In both the conventional and internationalized types of analysis, semi-arbitrary lines must be drawn, presumably on the basis of the regularity of the interaction of the groups involved with others in the system.[30] the internationalized politics approach does not make the situation more complicated, although it does make the problem more visible, since in the conventional view the issue is not raised. We have become too comfortable with the illusion that the national borders somehow define a coherent system.
Extending the boundaries of the political system is reasonably straightforward (at least analytically) when dealing with actors, but it also relates to institutions. They, too, may exist beyond national borders, a fact with particular importance in the Western Hemisphere. In cases where foreign governments are important, and when those governments come from political systems which are open to influence from abroad, the political system of that country may become a secondary arena for political maneuvering within the primary state. In this fashion, the US political system has become a secondary arena of Mexican, Chilean, or Nicaraguan politics, and many others. I use the term 'secondary arena' to mean the institutions of an authoritative decision-making body, such as a state or an international organization, in which actors from another country are active in order to influence that government or its citizens as actors in their country.
Because US elections, legislation and executive orders are important to politics in many Latin American countries, the arenas where they are decided are of interest not only to US domestic forces, but official and non-official foreigners as well. The most obvious form of foreign involvement, and one which still fits easily under the conventional types of analysis, concerns the activity of the diplomatic representatives of the foreign government in pressing through diplomatic channels for actions favorable to his or her country. But diplomats go outside of diplomatic channels, lobbying before Congress and hiring public relations agencies to influence public opinion. The actions become even more complicated when not only the Ambassadors and Consuls, but members of the cabinet, and even leading private figures in the country engage in lobbying.
The importance of this politicking begins to transcend the boundaries of even a very flexible conventional approach when not only members of the government from the primary country, but also representatives of the opposition begin to lobby and court public opinion in the secondary arena. Pressures may be applied not only to affect the secondary state's foreign policies, but to affect political outcomes within the primary country directly. The process becomes even more complicated when members of government and opposition campaign for support from citizens in the secondary arena whose national origins are in the primary country, and seek to recruit them to influence politics in the primary country (where they may or may not have the vote, but at least have influence over their relatives and friends back home).
All these forms of action have been characteristic of the US as a secondary arena for Latin American politics. A dramatic recent expansions of activity in the secondary arena has come with Mexican involvement in US politics. The drama comes in part because the Mexicans, very much devoted to maintaining the principle of non-intervention, have always been very reluctant to engage in frank politicking in the US, presumably for fear of justifying further intervention by the US in Mexican politics. In the past few years, however, this has changed dramatically. Mexican government and opposition leaders have campaigned in the US to influence the decisions on NAFTA.[31] Other examples concern the new support from the Mexican government for Mexican-American communities in the US, including the undocumented workers, and the campaigning by both government and opposition officials for support among Mexican-Americans, particularly after the surprising showing of the opposition in the 1988 election.
Secondary arenas are not always highly developed, nor always important, and they involve other Latin American countries and international organizations, as well as the US. But because of the important role of the US in Latin America, and of the peculiarly porous quality of the US political system, it is an important part of the internationalized political system in many Latin American countries.
Focusing on the institutional dimensions of the involvement of internationally-based actors suggests new ways of dealing with familiar questions. In the pages that follow, I want to suggest the utility of the approach by applying it to several different kinds of problems, a major historical political change (transitions from authoritarianism), a policy failure (drug policy), major political institutions (elections, and 'emergency rules' for dealing with crises of executive authority), and a basic political process (popular mobilization). These will take the form of hypotheses and suggestions for research, but even at that preliminary level, I believe the approach demonstrates its utility.
There are many aspects of the transitions that might be discussed, but I will only deal with two very general ones: the relationship of the authoritarian regimes to popular opposition, and its relationship to economic policy making circles.
The military governments of the Southern Cone had all rather successfully cut the links between local popular groups and the internationally based left movements through a combination of purges, repression, exile, and surveillance. The initial consequence was to force these connections underground and to move to guerrilla warfare the conflicts that had taken place in elections and through mobilization in the streets, trade unions and universities, to guerrilla warfare. In contrast to Central America and the Andes, counter-insurgency was ultimately effective in the Southern Cone and Brazil. The guerrillas faded, and, aided by the weakening of the Socialist Bloc, links with international leftists movements weakened.
These steps, however, stimulated, or failed to prevent, a new set of international actors who became linked to popular movements in a new way. Significant sectors of the Catholic Church, which for five hundred years has been a type of internationally based actor on its own, became a source of opposition, in part fueled by its ability to mobilize international support, erratically from the Vatican, but also from world-wide networks of lay groups. Human rights organizations also emerged, becoming part of a new 'international issue network'.[32] In later stages, charitable and relief organizations became more prominent, often with less overt political goals, but significantly beginning their transformation into 'grass-roots' mobilizers with a distinctly oppositional stance.[33]
Although not free from repression (particularly in Chile and Argentina) the newly mobilized segments of civil society proved able to evade pressures from the military governments, in part because of their new forms of action, and in part because the military was not able to redefine them to be simply another manifestation of international communism. Among other things, they proved to have some effectiveness in mobilizing in secondary arenas, particularly in Europe and the US congress, which gave them in some way more potent support, than that provided to other groups by Cuba and the USSR.
This transformed network of international connections with the popular sectors in the Southern Cone was by no means the only factor, and perhaps not the most important one in forcing the transitions from military rule, but it deserves analysis. It should be studied not only as a causal element, however, but because it has begun to shape the outcomes of the transitions by creating a robust set of organizational links with a new set of internationally based actors, quite different from those supporting the revolutionary mobilizations of the pre-authoritarian period. I will return to this point in discussing the international dimensions of popular mobilization.
On the economic side, altering the structures of economic policy making was an important part of the military-authoritarian agenda in the Southern Cone and Brazil, and the international linkages involved were also significant. The 'tecnicos' who received significant authority to reform economic policies and structures were a major channel linking domestic politics and international organizations. In Chile, the name given to the new influentials, the 'Chicago boys' made this very clear, although in all of the Southern Cone and Brazil, the links of major economic policy makers to international financial institutions and other entities was also strong. A new international 'epistemic community' was being built into the political systems of these countries.[34] To handle an economic problem with a strong international dimension, the military centralized power and gave a relatively free hand to a set of internationally connected economic policy makers.
The economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, associated with the world wide recession and the growth of Latin America's international debt was the context for the end of authoritarianism. A consensus appeared to emerge in the international economic community against any continuation or 'deepening' of the state-led developmental model that was characteristic of the populist regimes before the military, and, in modified form, the model of the first, and apparently the most economically successful of the military governments, in Brazil. The Chileans, who started later, set out early with an anti-statist position, and the Argentines followed with a switch in 1976.[35] This switch in strategy, reinforced if not forced by the policy makers' international links, created a whole new situation for the military-authoritarian regimes.
The authoritarianism of some regimes, and particularly that of Chile, was probably helpful to enforce some of the most difficult structural adjustment programs.[36] But the question that emerges in the transitions is whether the management of a liberalized economy can be accomplished through authoritarian methods, at least of the style of military government prominent in the Southern Cone.[37] This is a controversial generalization about domestic politics, but the perspective we are discussing here, asks whether it might not also be true for the internationally connected actors. Conventional wisdom suggests that when 'outsiders' seek to influence economic policy making, 'they' find it much easier to do so through a single powerful political chief. The internationalized politics approach emphasizes that there are multiple institutionalized links, with the IMF, private banks, multinational corporations, multiple states and a rather diffuse 'epistemic community.' The economic policy making structure is too complicated to be managed successfully by a single authority, especially one based in a non-political entity such as the military.[38]
The internationalized politics perspective, in other words, leads us to ask whether as part of the transition from authoritarian regimes, opening the political system to wider, more competitive debate was not so much a political demand of influential foreigners, but rather a logical outcome of the effort to institutionalize a wide variety of diverse international economic actors into the liberalized economy policy making apparatus.
Policy aimed at controlling production, trafficking and consumption of illegal drugs has obvious international dimensions since a large part of the production takes place in a country other than that in which it is consumed. In this it is like others issues in international trade. It is a special case of trade, however, because neither producing nor consuming states have the ability to control the cross-border flows to limit its availability or tax it. The same inability holds for controls over the flow of money from the consuming countries to the producing ones. Neither government seems capable of doing more than harassment.
This result seems to flow from the high ratio of value to bulk of the product, the extraordinarily high and inelastic demand for drugs, and, ironically, from the fact of its criminalization. Even though the latter is meant to be an element in the control of the drug trade, given the other factors it seems to have made it more difficult to control.
For this reason, and perhaps others, the conventional manner of dealing with international trade issues, which involves an arrangement between states, either by agreement or by unilateral action of one or both states, does not work. In order for society to make effective policies to control drug trafficking, decision making and enforcement has instead to take place within each of the countries, and for the interests of those in one country to be defended effectively, they need to be represented there. It is thus a problem which eminently calls forth problems of internationalized domestic politics.
The control of drugs within the producing and consuming countries is probably achieved in some historical periods through relatively informal community pressures, which involve 'social pressures' to prevent abuse, and control of 'trafficking' through the medical profession. But such community controls seem ineffective in this period, to say the least. The need for state action is apparent. But, even aside from the international complications, state action is rendered difficult both by the lack of consensus on the goal, the ineffectiveness of coercion to suppress it. Despite extensive criminalization and agreement that abuse is common and serious, there does not seem to be a general consensus on the simple question of whether taking drugs is a bad thing in itself, or what level is acceptable. Opinions vary from time to time and from place to place. And as for coercion, the same factors which render it difficult or impossible to establish controls of cross-border flows seem to make police control not only costly, but very frustrating.
If it were not for the international dimensions, these problems in the control of drugs might not be so debilitating. After all, many social problems, such as racial discrimination and ethnic tensions, environmental destruction and problems in primary education, are also characterized by the inability of local communities to deal with them, the lack of a consensus on goals and the ineffectiveness of coercion. In those cases, problems are kept within tolerable bonds by political decisions, that is, by a process through which all, or most of those who are affected by the process are involved in arriving at a decision, and as a result are significantly bound by the decisions which are taken. It is, of course, a political process in constant motion, as it adapts to new conditions, and the changing sense of need and opportunity by the participants. But it is a major way in which societies work in the face of dissensus and the lack of, or rejection of an overpowering authority.
Since the interested parties in the drug trade are spread out over many countries, and since the usual international agreements are not effective in this case, the political process which might control drugs would have to be either through some international authority, which doesn't exist, or through the internationalization of the political processes in the several countries. In other words, the consumers the affected communities in the consuming countries like the United States have to be represented in the producing countries like Peru and Colombia. And, the producers in those countries have to be represented in the political process of the United States.
The failure of the war on drugs and, in general, the weakness of all collective efforts to control drugs might be said to be due to the weaknesses of the political structures in the various countries, weaknesses from the point of view of securing the consent and compliance of the actors. There are three identifiable problems. First, the US decision making process which is crucial because of its relationship to the enormous demand, as well as its enforcement practices at home and abroad, has only a very imperfect participation of significant groups in the producing countries who are affected by the drug trade. These would include the producers (not to be confused with the traders) the more diffuse group who are damaged by the enormous flow of money in illegal channels which has corrupted officials, financed armed insurgencies and, on the other side, provided resources for investment and balancing trade gaps. Policies made in the United States may get some input from representatives from these countries, but they are arguably much too weak to secure the kind of compliance that such an explosive set of policies requires.
Secondly, the US government represents the interests of US communities and consumers in the Latin American producing countries. It is more than a diplomatic effort. It has involved the use of military force and substantial financial resources. The accountability of the US is questionable, not so much to the US constituents, who have the capacity to control them through the Congress, but to the citizens of Columbia, Bolivia, Peru and the other countries in which it is operating. Funds for eradication are being used in ways which yield small results, or are channeled into the hands of corrupt officials. This is a 'waste' for US taxpayers, but potentially a much more serious cost for local citizens. The same sort of thing might be said about military support, which is turned from the drug war to guerrilla war, or local factional struggles in Colombia.
Finally, and least tractable, by virtue of the criminalization of the trade, and by this time the creation of 'drug lords' with enormous profits gained from it, a whole class of people are generally left out of the political process, the drug traffickers, dealers and even consumers. They are defined as criminals and obviously have little in the way of representation. But in the case of the drug traffickers, we are talking about people who are not marginal in other than the legal sense, since they have enormous resources, which are easily transferred to new actors. The level of coercion that would be necessary to act without cooperative agreement seems prohibitive.
In summary, then, the tragedy of the experience with drug policy is that the internationalized domestic political processes of both the producing and the consuming countries have to be relied on to secure compliance, but for various reasons, they are unable to do so in either. Securing compliance through a common process of arriving at an acceptable decision is very unlikely.
Elections are an interesting arena to explore internationalized politics because of their renewed prominence in Latin America, because of the interest in them by governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and because they are institutions which, superficially, exclude foreigners. The right to register to vote is often a rough guide to who is a citizen. With relatively few exceptions, non-citizens do not have the vote.[40] The conventional image is that elections are a domestic political institution, and foreign actions such as financially supporting a candidate, are inappropriate forms of intervention. However, in varying degrees, and with varying consequences, internationally based actors have long been a part of Latin American elections. And this involvement seems bound to increase, since, in a certain sense, the move to freer elections can be seen as a process of internationalizing the electoral process.
Direct aid to parties and candidates in the form of financial support and technical campaign assistance has long been practiced by many different groups. The various socialist internationals have supported co-religionists. On their model, in Europe and the United States political foundations linked to political parties and funded by their governments have given direct aid to what they see as sympathetic parties.[41] The United States has often engaged in direct support, going back to early days of the 20th century when the US backed favored candidates in such countries as Cuba, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. A highly publicized case of direct US government aid in the last few decades was the support given in the late 1960s and early 1970s to the Chilean Christian Democrats.
More indirectly, the aid flows from developmentalist groups to organize local communities must have some impact on elections. Although the aim is usually not partisan, the mobilization of groups for the purposes of making demands on the state no doubt affects elections by strengthening the organizational capacity of some groups who participate in elections.[42]
Internationally-based actors have also been prominent in promoting and shaping the institution of elections as such. US foreign policy has long been in principle for the establishment of elections where they do not exist, and for more honest elections where they do. These goals have often been overridden, explicitly or implicitly in the face of competing demands, but the impact has not been negligible.[43]
A new way in which internationally-based actors are built into elections in some Latin American countries is through election 'observation'. At one level observation is accomplished through the rather amorphous, yet sometimes potent practices of the media. The impact is diffuse and hard to pin down. It affects depend on anticipated reactions of the candidates and voters. In a country with free elections, public opinions polls and mainly domestic coverage, such as the US, the loop is reasonably tight and transparent, although still difficult to measure. In countries with less complete coverage, fewer polls and more controlled elections, and when the loop includes the sometimes erratic attention of the international media, it is less certain what the results are.
But the international media appears to have been a factor in shaping elections in several ways. Politicians in countries heavily dependent on the US have long worried about the impact of elections in the US as a secondary arena, since the sort of press they receive there might influence US foreign policy. That elections were held at all by personalist authoritarian rulers such as Somoza and Noriega probably had something to do with that factor. When the foreign media is read or watched by local populations, its greater freedom from influence by the candidates allows it to expose blatant manipulation. The sharp reactions in the US press to the fraudulent elections in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua under President De La Madrid probably had a role in shaping the Salinas administrationÕs search for more acceptable ways of ensuring their victory, not only because of the real fear of hostile US reactions, but because of the impact US coverage had on the legitimacy of the elections in Mexico itself. The Mexican case may also illustrate another complex interaction, as the activity and support of the foreign press has apparently been at least a small factor in encouraging the local media to become more aggressive. Newspapers in Mexico have become a vivid forum for exposure of claims of fraud in recent elections.
International observation also takes a much more institutional form through delegations from international organizations such as the UN and the OAS, or from unofficial organizations, such as human rights organizations, the Carter Center, or the Latin American Studies Association. This is a rapidly changing field, in which delegations have become much more thorough in observation, going far beyond the simple witnessing of activity at the ballot box, to assessments of campaign techniques, registration procedures, counting ballots (including parallel counts) and training participants. The commitment in time and resources is substantial, and the level of professionalism rising. This is one area in which the status of internationally-based actors as non-citizens is an advantage in that many of the time-honored ways of manipulating elections, including intimidation and repression, are not as effective against non-citizens. Observers also have the disadvantage of being relatively less familiar with the culture and the institutions of the country, knowledge of which is at a premium in elections, which often call forth a very high level of subtle manipulation by those who have been practicing for many years.[44]
Observers played a well reported and very significant role in elections in Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador and Chile. It is noteworthy that these have so far been almost all in ÔfoundationÕ or ÔdemocratizingÕ elections, which took place following periods of authoritarian rule. In these cases the dangers of manipulation, and the weakness of local ÕwatchdogsÕ is at a maximum. Whether such observation continues to be focused on transitional elections, or becomes institutionalized as part of 'normal' election procedures remains to be seen. On the one hand, the discourse of sovereignty and the peculiarly national quality of elections may lead to a reassertion of the ÔrightÕ of governments to exclude observers once elections have been established. But a perhaps modified form of international poll watching may well become a permanent feature of elections, particularly in smaller countries. Given that the stakes in elections are international as well as national, the logic of internationalized politics would suggest that such 'poll watchers' would be a logical development.
From the internationalized politics perspective, a range of hypotheses about the consequences of international involvement deserve to be explored. An obvious area for examination is the way in which external support of candidates shapes which issues are debated in the election. Obviously, the participation of the international left and right in elections in the Cold War era not only made the Cold War definitions of political issues more important in elections, sometimes distorting the social and political issues facing the country internally, but also made the elections, to some extent, a referendum on foreign policy. The end of the Cold War and the multiplication of internationally based actors makes it harder to generalize, and perhaps made the influence more diffuse. On the one hand, elections observers among others have helped make the issue of elections and their honesty more of an issue. When observation works, it may be that this issue, the honesty of the elections themselves, becomes part of the election debate. But note that this is an election issue not resolved by the votes, but rather is verified by the domestic and international observers themselves.
The more diffuse impacts of 'outside' pressures for open elections suggest another set of questions about longer term, and sometimes rather negative effects. First, the diplomatic pressure for elections may produce 'show' elections which can delegitimze them, something which arguably happened in the past with US pressure on Central American and Caribbean dictators to hold elections. International observation without a full scale commitment to discovering and pursuing violations may lead to validating fraud, or, as in the recent case of Haiti, may contribute to a violent breakdown of order. In a more subtle effect, the impact of foreign Ôtechnical assistanceÕ in campaigns, and the models of elections that the foreign press, most particularly from the United States, may also be responsible for contributing to the kind of media-driven, image-based, issue-trivializing, personalistic elections which are common in the US, and seems to be becoming more common in Latin America.
There is also a self-reinforcing effect of international involvement. Efforts to promote open elections also promote the possibility of access by internationally-based actors to the political process. When international groups directly support political parties, this is obvious. The help of the Communist International was transparently an effort to use electoral procedures to establish a basis for future influence, not only for the supported parties in the country, but also for the leaders of the International. The same was true of the aid given to parties by the US Government and, later, the party-related foundations in Europe and the United States. US Government support for the Chilean Christian Democrats in the late 1960s was intended to keep its lines of influence open, particularly in the face of the threat of being locked out in the event of Allende's victory.
Support for free and honest elections by governments, the media and observer groups can also be seen in the same way, however. It is no doubt true that many of the official and non-official internationally-based actors firmly believe in democratic norms. But it is also true that elections in which voters are properly registered, votes are accurately counted and opposition parties have access to the media, is an election which maximizes the opportunities for groups with well-endowed organizations, access to the media and technical skills. these are qualities which characterize only some of the purely domestic competitors, but almost all of the internationally-based actors. In part, the commitment to free elections is a commitment to the internationalization of elections.
A foreign government's strategy (such as that of the US) for ensuring it long term influence may be better served now by free elections than by backing a favorite candidate. The trouble with backing a candidate, even a successful one, is that he may turn against you.[45] It is true that opening up the electoral system means that internationally-based actors, like pure domestic ones, are required to actively generate support through on-going political action. Such action may be more time consuming and attention-demanding than making a deal with a powerful individual or party, but it also may provide more channels of influence and more fail-safe devices in case things go wrong.
That free elections are to some extent internationalized elections probably plays a role in CastroÕs reluctance to allow them in Cuba. The chances that Castro, in an open election, could gain majority support from those in Cuba are probably still better than most hostile observers believe. But if he were to open up the electoral process, he would not be able to avoid heavy participation by many internationally-based actors , including many groups in the US, including the US Government (through the media, at least) as well as the Cuban-Americans now living in the United States. Even if the participation were kept informal, i.e., even if the foreigners could not vote, the chances for Castro would change significantly.
A less obvious set of institutions are embodied in those routines and procedures invoked at the time of the collapse of executive authority. In contrast to elections, these deal with (usually) less frequent occasions which are defined as crises. The understandings and procedures are not usually included in any standard list of political institutions, although their functioning may be crucial for the survival of the state.
There is clearly more than one type of crisis of authority. The cases I wish to discuss are those in which the political elites decide that the executive, typically the President, cannot govern and must be replaced. Such cases are to be distinguished from emergencies which are met by strengthening the executive to meet a crisis, or revolutionary situations in which the coherence of the political elites and the whole governing structure collapses. The former case is often dealt with through constitutional procedures, such as 'states of emergency.'[46] In the revolutionary situation there is, by definition, no institutions for dealing with the crisis. The boundaries between these types of emergencies are fluid, and what starts as one may escalate to something more serious, but a crisis of executive authority is common enough to warrant separate treatment.
Sometimes these can become quite routine. One of the most important differences between parliamentary and presidential systems concerns these rules. To simplify greatly, parliamentary systems can, and often do, replace executives by a vote of confidence, while presidential ones must use impeachment or forced resignation. The great advantage of parliamentarianism, and its great weakness at the same time, is that it can change executives easily, with relatively predictable outcomes.
A very different sort of rules for emergencies were common in many Latin American countries, where the military takeover has been part of the regular expectations of political elites. Military coups are often thought of as the antithesis of institutions and rules. Yet there is usually a constitutional basis for military intervention and a reasonably coherent set of expectations about what the military will do when it takes power, even when such rules are not written down.[47]
Now, in most countries of the region, the military appears to have lost its capacity to play the role as chief domestic executor of the emergency rules. For the moment at least, the military seems to have been reduced to being a part of the process, as a tool for maintaining order, as in Peru after the auto-golpe of Fujimori, or as a potent source of symbolic protests, as in the failed coups in Venezuela. In no recent cases does it appear that civilians called in the military to take over. The reasons for this situation are unclear. Contributing factors might include a general revulsion against the excesses of the recent military past, the military's own desire to avoid the exposure of its institution, or because the sorts of crises occurring no longer appear to call for a single-minded and coercive implementation of a policy. The demands for crisis management now run to mobilizing some sort of consensus, not forcing decisions against popular opposition. In any case, and for the time being, the emergency rules appear to be moving away from military solutions.[48]
Leaving aside the serious question of the adequacy of various forms of emergency rules,[49] I now want to turn to the role of internationally based actors. International involvement in emergency rules in Latin American countries is an old pattern. Reconstituting executive power always involves the question of international recognition, so even using a conventional approach emphasizing interstate relations, foreigners have a role. But internationally based actors have gone far beyond simple diplomatic maneuvers in Latin America.
The most obvious earlier cases concern the role of the United States in several Caribbean and Central American countries. In the early twentieth century, the US Ambassador sometimes had a 'proconsular' role, and sometimes the US used the Marines. The US became the self-proclaimed agent for resolving executive crises when it felt it was in its interest to do so. In many of these countries, a set of expectations was set up which amounted to the institutionalization of such a role. Political factions vied in either drawing the US in, or capitalizing on nationalist revulsion against its intervention. The famous Platt Amendment imposed on Cuba, which allowed the US to intervene when it judged it necessary to preserve order, even enshrined this role in law.
Many crises of executive authority in the present era seem unlikely to engage serious international involvement. The crisis in Brazil over the corruption surrounding the President seems to have been resolved through a costly but effective process of impeachment. The serious loss of confidence in the President of Venezuela, due to corruption, social and economic problems and complicated by a severe economic readjustment program, is being dealt with, or temporized, at considerable cost, with referenda, promises of elections and various sorts of political maneuvering.
Other crises have more directly involved international action, although the institutional patterns are not clear nor stable. Some have involved the US, others are beginning to define a new multinational role. As an impasse grew in Panama (in part because of US actions) the US assumed a direct, military role in ousting Manuel Noriega, with still controversial results. A case can be made that the US was acting in a sort of 'emergency' procedure, not far from the expectations, if not necessarily the desires of the Panamanians. There was at least a slight justification for assuming that the US might play this role, in part because of the historic involvement of the US in Panama, but also because of the close connection between the US Government and Noriega himself. In a violent and costly fashion, the US was cleaning up its own mess.[50] Many in Latin America saw it as intervention in the old fashioned sense, and feared an effort to reestablish a Platt Amendment type of right by the US in other situations. This seems to be unlikely, since the situation in Panama was unlikely to be reproduced elsewhere.
In Peru, the decay of state power and the challenge from the Sendero Luminoso created another type of situation in which internationally based actors have tentatively become part of the emergency rules, although it would now appear that this will remain substantially within the framework of diplomatic relations. Fujimori's seizure of power with the support of the military triggered a series of international economic and diplomatic sanctions, which may had some effect in forcing Fujimori to hold elections. Despite the fact that the goal of economic sanctions is to bring about changes in the Ôdomestic' political regimes of these countries, they represent the international community acting as a unit outside of the political system in crisis. Economic sanctions, like diplomatic isolation, involves the manipulation of the international system in order to constrain the leaders of a state. Although it seemed unlikely as recently as a few months ago, it may be that Fujimori has prevented the escalation of the crisis from the one he defined it as, involving merely the strengthening executive power, to one in which the executive himself would be changed. It thus should not perhaps be included here, although it is a good example of how international actors are playing a role in other emergencies.
The bloody paralysis in Haiti following the military ouster of Aristide is a different example. The Haitian military, which had perhaps exercised the emergency function in the past, has clearly become part of the problem more than the solution. The case is currently becoming one of the test cases in Latin America for multilateral involvement. Both the UN and the OAS has been trying to evolve a useful role. Some still hope that international involvement can refrain from intervention, with international organizations confining themselves to measures such as economic sanctions, mediation, and a narrow form of peacekeeping. But given the relatively strong stands taken against the military, and the apparent commitment to restore Aristide to the Presidency, a much more intrusive involvement of these internationally based actors in Haitian political system seems to be a fact, and probably a necessity to break the impasse. As I write, the possibility of a military presence in Haiti is more and more likely. What is at stake is the development of an international equivalent of a form of military coup, justified as an exercise of an international poder moderador.
Another aspect of the Haitian case is worthy of note. If, as I am arguing, the development of an international capacity to respond to executive crises in the country should be considered as part of the institutions of the political system of Haiti, then the actions of Aristide in winning support in Venezuela, the United States and in the UN and the OAS constitutes a part of the Haitian political process. As we allow for the internationalization of the domestic political process, it is apparent that there are other, secondary arenas which develop beyond the main arena in the national capital. These are the policy-making centers which have the capacity to shape the actions of internationally based actors who operate more directly within the system. Aristide lobbies for action by the United States, both directly, and within the UN and OAS. This might all be seen as part of the dynamics of UN politics, and be part of an inquiry into the changing policies and operative coalitions in that body. But for our purposes, if the UN acts, it is essentially playing a role in the Haitian political system, and needs to be analyzed as such. From this perspective, the UN General Assembly and Security Council are secondary arenas of Haitian politics.
The normative situation with regard to the role for internationally based actors in resolving crises of executive authority is obviously in transition. If one maintains the conventional image of separate nation-states, the problem takes the form of continually redefining the limits of intervention. The internationalized domestic politics perspective that I have been discussing, however, holds out the promise of a more realistic, although no less difficult, approach to this normative problem.
Under this approach, the emphasis would shift from, "How much should states and international organizations overstep the strict prohibition on interference?" to "What obligations does this sort of actor have when participating in the political process?" It suggests a shift from an emphasis on international law, to an emphasis on the political rights and obligations of participants. It suggests that the right to participate is, in the end, less problematic, than the obligation to act responsibly.[51]
The normative question facing the UN and the OAS, I believe, is of this kind. The important question is not whether it should do something, but what it should do that would be effective, and how it should do it. It is possible to stay with the conventional image, and say that there is an emerging international norm justifying intervention on the basis of preserving democracy.[52] But it makes more sense, I believe, to find a way of taking account of the interests, many of which are legitimate, of the 'interveners', and to talk about how these actors, as much as any actor within the system, should be disciplined by the norms of the system and the good of the whole. For this, an internationalized domestic politics approach of the type I have been describing seems essential as a starting point.[53]
The standards on which one should judge the actions of international organizations, and particularly of the United States, has suffered, I believe, from an inability to get beyond the question of whether it should be involved at all, to the question of whether it is acting correctly, effectively and within the norms of that society and political system. the questions that should be raised about the US role in Panama, for example, should be centered around the questions not only of whether too much life was lost, but also whether the US was adequately assuming its share of the responsibility it had taken on for developing a truly effective political process. The answer to that question is not obvious, and should be asked more insistently. These questions are tougher and more important, and require that we think of these externally based actors as part of the process, not interlopers.
In general, the role of international organizations in executing emergency rules seems more acceptable than it has for a long time. The declining legitimacy of national military forces, as discussed above, has left something of a vacuum, which, in many countries, has yet to be filled by more conventional, domestic procedures. The end of the Cold War has reduced, a bit, some suspicions and many international complications. The situation might change again. Internal emergency rules might be strengthened, or, on the other hand, a botched international involvement in, Haiti, or even Bosnia-Herzogovina, for example, might set back the process considerably. At the moment, however, it appears that internationally based actors may well be playing an increasing role in the institution of emergency rules in Latin America.
For our last example of applying the internationalized domestic politics perspective we turn from major events, policies and political institutions to a major political process, that of popular mobilization. Getting people involved and shaping the organizations which channel their energies is obviously a central set of processes in any political system. It shapes the cleavages, influences the terms of political debate, and strongly conditions how elections, parliaments and other institutions work. This is true for all sectors. Whether in this new neoliberal era the business communities are mobilized along partisan or sectoral lines, or around clientelistic ties to the government or independently, for example, will no doubt influence the character and success of democracies in many Latin American countries.[54]
The mobilization of popular sectors, however, is particularly important as a major part of politics in this century.[55] In a region still marked by severe inequalities, how the less advantaged are organized and linked to the political process is central to the possibilities of achieving justice, and has major consequences for political stability. Social conditions, the levels and forms of consciousness, economic factors and legal arrangements within each country no doubt explain most of the important variables in this area, but internationally based actors have been involved for centuries.
The Catholic Church has, in most countries of the region, been a major channel through which foreigners have mobilized (or demobilized) and shaped politically relevant organizations at least since the Conquest. From the turn of the 20th century, political movements in other countries or organized internationally have organized and agitated in Latin America. The international struggle among anarchists, syndicalists, socialists, communists, Christian democrats and their enemies was often transmitted into Latin America by various sorts of internationally based agents, becoming, as it was in Europe, a central cleavage line. When that international cleavage became the Cold War, the United States Government weighed in, seeking to directly influence popular organization by direct pressures though its embassies, the CIA and such semi-official organizations such as the US labor union related AIFLD. In the Alliance for Progress era, the US developed a substantial bureaucracy (USAID, USIS and others) which sought to shape popular mobilization through reforms carried out in cooperation with Latin American governments.
In each of these cases it pays to look at the international involvement, not only to decide what the policies of these internationally based actors were, and how many resources they brought in, but also what unintended consequences for the stability, efficiency and justice of the system they produced, and what other options were foreclosed. In other words, as in the previous arenas, an approach which sees their involvement as representing part of each country's political institutions is needed.
The small piece of this sort of analysis that I will point to here concerns a more recent development, the involvement of rapidly multiplying non-governmental, and nominally nonpartisan organizations in the area of popular mobilization. In the last couple of decades several interrelated processes have been going on which are changing the international connections involved in popular mobilization. First, a number of changes have rendered the cleavage patterns among political groups quite fluid, or at least in a state of transition. Neoliberal policies have weakened the corporatist ties that bound some popular groups, especially labor, to governments in countries like Brazil and Mexico. The end of the Cold War and the severe blows to the socialist aspirations has severely weakened the cleavage alignment around socialism and communism. The result has been to create considerable more space for politically relevant popular groupings which are more independent of parties and the state.
Second, there has been a resurgence of locally based organizations which is doing something to fill this space, some of which emerged from the human rights and political reform movements of the anti-authoritarian phase, and others which emerged from self-defense organizations responding to the economic crises.
Third, the pattern established in the 1960s of state-to-state assistance as the central channel of 'foreign aid', chiefly from the United States to Latin American Governments is changing and diversifying in a number of ways. Other countries, chiefly European, have become donors. Non-governmental channels for raising and disbursing development assistance have emerged to form a small, but significant proportion of the flow of resources. And many governments are choosing to give assistance through non-governmental organizations, rather than directly to governments.[56]
The result of these trends varies from country to country, but it has created a small, but growing and potentially quite significant institutionalization of multiple and diverse international NGOs in many countries of Latin America which are directly involved in popular mobilization. The overall impact of this development is still very much in doubt, but the possibilities are intriguing.
The basic structure of this involvement is still evolving, but some elements seem clear. In the language which seems to have become common in this sphere of international activity, the 'donors' are increasingly establishing links with 'grassroots' organizations. Since 1985, for example, the World Bank has made a significant commitment to working with grassroots organizations. Semi-governmental agencies such as the US Inter American Foundation have long been active with such groups. And private foundations, including such groups as Oxfam have done the same.[57] There appears to be a trend towards working not directly with these groups but with various forms of locally based 'intermediate NGOs'[58], and with local governments.[59] It would be wrong to assume that these links are going on totally independent of the states in Latin America, and, in fact, there have been efforts by states to coordinate, and perhaps, take over, this area of the delivery of services to the poor, and also of popular mobilization.[60]
The goals and orientation of the international organizations involved appears to be resolutely 'non-political', but this seems to mean only 'nonpartisan'. The focus on grassroots mobilization, participation and developing 'group capacity', while nominally directed principally at the mobilization of local energies and skills in the decision-making and implementing phases of the development programs themselves, clearly have a political consequence. Organizing local people so that they can not only undertake projects, but also effectively make demands on local and national governments has long been a goal of these groups. Sometimes, as well, there is a strong ideological sense of mobilizing support outside of government in order to promote democracy as such, and a version of neoliberal policies, in which the state is no longer seen as the main provider of goods.[61]
It is not clear what the long term impact of this multiplication of international channels to a large number of 'civil society' groups in Latin America will be. It is possible that Latin American states will become more sophisticated in taking over these groups, that private sources of international aid will dry up, or that Latin American states will effectively force aid to be channeled through official, diplomatic channels. For the time being, however, internationally based actors appear to be stimulating, and building themselves into a kind of pluralistic political structure on social policy in many Latin American countries, and it seems plausible to expect that this will have significant long term consequences.
A final consideration with respect to the development of a 'pluralistic' structure of international NGO involvement in Latin American politics concerns the norms which are appropriate to judge their action. It obviously comes up in a different way than, say, in the question of US or UN 'intervention' to resolve political crises, or in the case of multinational corporations. The problem in those cases is how to balance the very evident self-interest with some commitment to the prosperity and justice of the 'target' country. The case of the NGO's is more interesting, although perhaps not as dangerous. The internationally based organizations have been accused on having their own, or their government's agenda,[62] but the fact is that many, and probably most of the individual and groups involved are very dedicated to helping those in the system. The ethical question arises not on the question of selflessness, but rather whether the good things that they see themselves are bringing are in fact good for the people. The literature on the developmentalist NGOs is full of discussion about whether bringing major change to traditional communities is in fact a good thing to do. And rather than relying on external texts as others have done, such as the Bible, or the theoretical writings of either Marxists or modernization theorists, they have turned to participation of the people being served. Indeed, it appears that one of the reasons for the common emphasis on democratization and participation is to solve the ethical dilemma by 'letting the people decide.' As the impact of the developmental activities grows, however, it is clear that the question of 'which people' will also become more insistent. Because of corruption and disarray, or simply alien ideologies, many of these groups have been reluctant to let themselves be guided by the decisions of the whole political process, and therefore by the state. But participation means not only identification with the people served, and listening to the specific 'clients', but also with the whole system.
In adopting an internationalized domestic politics approach we make two unconventional conceptual moves. First, political systems are defined to include internationally based actors as normal parts of the system, not actors external to it. Neither the territorial borders which demarcate sovereign jurisdiction nor the legal concept of citizenship provide guides to the set of significant, regularly interacting entities which make up political systems. Any group, if it is regularly involved in the politics of a country, is considered as part of the system.
Secondly, the internationally based actors within Latin American political systems need to be studied not simply in terms of their policy choices and power, but for the way in which their activities and organizations fit in the system. If we are interested in the consolidation of democracy in Latin American we need to be interested not only in whether, say, the US government's policy has been to promote democracy, and if it has the will and resources to carry out that policy, but also whether the way in which behaves and is linked with other actors is democratic, and encourages democratic behavior. For example, does its intervention to resolve political crises not only depose dictators (e.g., Noriega) but also promote the building of an effective new coalition to govern. Not only should we question whether US intelligence services are supporting groups in Latin America which are pro-democratic, but also whether operating in secret is not undermining the possibility of building democracy. With regard to the activities of private international development organizations, we should ask not only whether their goals are to promote popular participation, but whether their style of isolating individual groups and encouraging them to focus on their immediate problems doesn't hurt democracy by fragmenting broader coalitions and inhibiting their mobilization by responsible political parties. The policies and intentions of internationally based actors are clearly important in answering that question, but they are by no means the only dimension. In other words we need to study the institutional aspect of the role of internationally based actors, not just their policies.
Making these two moves will help us to approach more realistically the description and interpretation of puzzling trends in a globalizing world, help us to better explain some important aspects of Latin American politics, and clarify some knotty normative questions.
For example, to take one very broad descriptive and interpretive problem, it is obvious that the peoples of the world are being brought more closely together by improved communications and globalization of production. Globalization appears, under conventional views, to imply loss of nation-state sovereignty. But states seem no less central and active, and while there is some progress in building the authority of international organizations, that success seems to be measured in how well these organizations do in managing states, not superseding them. Even in the most hopeful area, Europe, the process of transferring sovereignty is proving to be slow. How can the facts of globalization and yet the persistence of states be understood?
The approach suggested here allows us to see that although legal jurisdiction over a territory remains very much an exclusive right of states, and authoritative power for implementing decisions still remains centered in state apparatuses, the process for making those decisions includes many internationally based actors. Although this has always been true, globalization is making it a more general and more complex phenomenon. Although it may be leading to some increasing strength of international regimes and organizations, a prime consequence of globalization is in the way it is affecting the internationalization of domestic politics, which, in a certain sense may be strengthening states.[63]
Causal explanations of particular political events in Latin America do, as I have said, often include international influences. Dependency theorists, for example offered a very important set of causal explanations of limits or 'deviations' of development of Latin American countries, however complete or accurate those explanations might have been. But some questions, such as those surrounding the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, or the current concern with the conditions under which democracy can be consolidated, require, I believe, an internationalized politics approach. Foreign pressures, thought of in the usual way, e.g., the foreign policy stance of the US, does not seem sufficient to explain the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. And yet many of the steps often cited as being part of democratic transitions, including splits in the authoritarian elites, pacts made among major social groups, and the mobilization of civil society, all were significantly shaped by the participation of groups supported by, or linked to international groups. These have included human rights issue networks, multinational corporations dissatisfied with state corruption and inefficiency, international political and developmental foundations, and international election observer teams. Approaching the problem of explaining authoritarian breakdown from an internationalized domestic politics perspective allows one to see that their impact was important, if not definitive, not through pressure from the outside, but by shaping politics within, as part of the emerging system.
Predicting the conditions under which democracy may be consolidated, particularly in smaller countries, too, requires understanding how the new institutions can represent and discipline international forces. The success of the consolidation of democracy in Nicaragua, for example, requires not only establishing a way for ex-Contras and Sandinistas to work together. It also requires some way of ensuring that the international financial agencies, the various non-governmental organizations and international agencies are effectively integrated into the new political system.
As for normative analysis, the adoption of the internationalized politics approach will both enhance relevance, and force some careful new thinking. The presence of internationally-based actors within the political system suggests the need for a series of revisions of what one means by democratic government.[64] Most of the abstract discussion of democratic norms take for granted that the body of people who are meant to be effectively represented in the system is the citizenry. The presence of internationally-based actors suggests new problems. The question of the representation of aliens in the form of migrants who remain non-citizens is a problem.[65] The right to vote, to be heard and to have one's interests taken into account in decisions no doubt requires some level of commitment to the community, but it is not clear that being a citizen is the appropriate test for the exercise of that right. The right of non-governmental organizations promoting local development, and the protection of human rights or the environment may base their right to be heard on the existence of international norms, but the strength of their arguments is much greater, I believe than the weak international consensus would support. Their ultimate claim to a voice is that they have shown by their actions that they are committed to the welfare of the state and community in which they are operating, and that they can engage meaningfully in a debate and dialogue with other forces in the community. Their right to be heard derives at least in part from this commitment and engagement.
But democratic norms not only require representation of interests and civic freedoms, but also accountability. Foreign governments, non-governmental organizations and international organizations are not, usually, in danger of being underrepresented, but there is often no formal way of holding them accountable to the other members of the political system. I would make the argument that as a long-time participant in Panamanian politics, and because it was heavily responsible for the impasse represented by Noriega's rule, the US had a right, and maybe a duty to act to overthrow him. The normative question is not the right of intervention, but rather whether the US acted responsibly in the manner of its intervention through invasion, and whether it ultimately contributed to building a new, more just political system. From an internationalized politics perspective, the question is not whether the US violated an international diplomatic norm, but whether its participation was responsible, and whether it could be held accountable by all the other actors, domestic and internationally based, in Panama.
For all these reasons