CHAPTER 7

The Social Psychology of Respect: Implications for Delegitimization and Reconciliation

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In both the popular press and modern identity politics, societal groups are clamoring for respect, often in lieu of economic redistribution (see, for example, Fraser, 1995; Honneth, 1995, 2001; Miller, 1993; Taylor, 1994), and individual citizens are calling for respect in civil discourse (e.g., Carter, 1998). "History echoes with passionate pleas for justice and charity, but in our times, increasingly, what we hear are demands for *respect*" (Hill, 2000, p. 59). Political leaders around the world recognize its importance when meeting with the opposition, and reconciliation is often premised on its presence. Respect has become a valuable political and economic resource. Thus, Iran's reform-minded past President Khatami noted, "The first requisite to any dialogue is the mutual respect between two parties" (Landler, 2004, p. A5). Similarly, two university presidents—one Palestinian and the other Israeli—jointly maintained "it is through cooperation based on mutual respect, rather than boycotts or discrimination, that our common goals can be achieved" (Cowell, 2005, p. A9). And in attempting to improve relations with disgruntled faculty, Lawrence Summers, Harvard's past president, promised to temper his style in ways that paid them greater respect (Rimer & Healy, 2005).

In his classic book, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), political philosopher John Rawls claims that respect is a primary good—perhaps the primary good—in

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human society, and thus perhaps it is not surprising that it is often at the heart of controversies in American public life today. As noted by Miller and Savoie (2002), respect is implicated in racism, sexism, ageism, classism, homophobia, harassment, hate speech, police treatment, and cultural wars. Rawls (1971) goes on to argue that justice is actually a public expression of people's respect for one another, and recent work on justice by social psychologist Tom Tyler and colleagues (see, for example, Tyler & Blader, 2003; also see Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999) echoes this fundamental association between justice and respect. In potentially violent conflicts, respect inhibits aggression (Pruitt & Kim, 2004), and in more private settings too, it appears to be a highly valued bestowal. After years of working with couples, marital researcher John Gottman (1994; also see Markman, Stanley, & Blumberg, 1994) notes that people want "just two things from their marriage—love and respect" (p. 18).

From marriage to politics to international conflicts, the word *respect* arises again and again and seems crucial for better understanding how to break down partisan divides and maximize possibilities for interpersonal and intergroup reconciliation. Yet investigations into the nature of respect are rare (cf. Frei & Shaver, 2002). For example, despite Gottman's recognition of the importance of respect to marriage partners, he has not studied it directly, but rather has measured expressions of contempt. In studies of justice and fairness, respect has not been the focus of investigation, and in the few cases of research involving respect, respondents have typically been asked simply to indicate the extent to which they feel respected or react to manipulations intended to reflect respect or disrespect (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2002; Boeckmann & Tyler, 2002; Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; De Cremer, 2002; Simon & Sturmer, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003). Moreover, in the area of social conflict, respect has received virtually no attention. A gaping hole currently exists in our understanding of respect, and we are left with fundamental questions regarding this valued resource in private relationships and public politics: What is respect? Why do we seek it so intensely?

In the pages that follow, we hope to provide an understanding of respect and disrespect, and their implications for delegitimization and reconciliation processes. Toward this end, we first distinguish between two types of respect, one largely intergroup and the other primarily intragroup in nature, and discuss the attributional components of these appraisals. We then move to a discussion of disrespect and its implications for delegitimization, from invisibility to dehumanization, which is of paramount importance in the course and escalation of social conflict; the attributional elements of respect provide an important window for viewing these degrading processes. The bulk of the chapter is an attempt to theoretically unpack the concepts of respect and disrespect. In the final section, however, we turn to practical considerations and

conclude with some implications of our analysis for reconciliation, focusing particularly on respect-enhancing strategies in intense social conflicts.

Two Types of Respect

Respect is fundamentally tied to our existence as social beings who live and survive in groups. We propose that there are actually two types of respect, one that is basically intergroup in nature and based on our membership in an in-group, and another that is primarily intragroup in nature and based on our standing within that group (see Darwell, 1977). For reasons that will hopefully become apparent, we label the former *categorical respect* and the latter *contingent respect* and discuss below their distinct functions and criteria.

Categorical Respect

Within academia, moral philosophers rather than psychologists have attempted to provide some understanding of respect (Frankfurt, 1997; French, 1979; Harris, 1997; Hill, 2000; Reiman, 1990; also see the more popular treatments by educator Lawrence-Lightfoot, 1999, and sociologist Sennet, 2003). Their discussions generally focus on a universal, essentially prescriptive bestowal that follows from Kant ([1782] 1993), who argued that all people are due respect by virtue of being moral agents and reasoning beings. Interested in normative ethics and justifications for ethical behaviors, moral philosophers typically treat respect as a form of recognition that acknowledges we are equal participants in a common ethical world; we automatically owe it to one another by virtue of our human status.

From this perspective, respect is granted to another based on membership in a common community—in Kant's case the human community. Categorical respect is based on group membership (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler, 1989) and is equally accorded to all members of one's group. The essential determination in granting this form of respect is in-group versus out-group status: to grant others categorical respect is to regard them as in-group members. Comembership in the human community is the minimal respect that is due another person. When our in-group is the human community, we are drawing the boundaries of social membership most broadly. Yet we are members of many groups, as social identity theory and self-categorization theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987) make clear, and our in-groups are typically conceptualized more narrowly, often in terms of national, ethnic,

political, and religious boundaries. In these cases, too, categorical respect is granted to coparticipants of these more restricted communities—to others recognized as in-group members.

Paradoxically, we often become aware of the significance of categorical respect in situations and times that highlight its absence. This is perhaps most evident when dealing with our most inclusive group—the human community. By placing people outside the bounds of this community, people can perpetrate heinous acts of degradation, extreme humiliation, and physical violence. Victims are perceived as expendable nonentities; as an insightful journalist wrote in response to photos of American guards at Abu Ghraib Prison: "The Americans in the photographs are not enacting hatred; hatred can coexist with respect, however strained. What they display, instead, is contempt: their victims are merely objects" (Sante, 2004, p. A27). By denying others membership in the human community, we subject them to moral exclusion and dehumanization. They are now outside of our *scope of justice*, barred from the protections of community membership, and thereby perceived as justifiable targets for exploitation and violence (Bar-Tal, 1990; Kelman, 2001; Opotow, 1990, 2001; Staub, 1989).

In the case of categorical respect, the focus is on rights of membership— shared entitlements of all members. These are accorded by virtue of being a group member. Thus categorical respect is at the foundation of human rights work, and our rights as comembers of the all-encompassing human community are apparent in the United Nation Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which begins: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world" (United Nations, 1948, p. 1). And Article 1 specifically states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience" (United Nations, 1948, p. 2).

The fundamental right conferred by categorical respect is participation in the group—having a say, being recognized as a group member. In other words, categorical respect grants people a voice; they are neither discounted nor invisible. Interestingly, in cross-cultural comparisons, Thailand is regarded as a culture in which respect is accorded to all societal members. Bonta and Fry (2006) note that this includes respect for children within the family, and they discuss how parents "respect the essential dignity of their children, even babies." When parents are unable to convince their children to behave through coaxing or persuasion, the adults "will simply give up and admit that the children have the right to decide what they will do. Their will must be respected" (p. 184). Even within the small family group, respect is having a voice.

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As members of a society or particular in-group—be it a community group, a local club, a team, a larger ethnic, racial, or religious group, or a nation—people desire a voice as an indication of their inclusion (Folger & Cropanzo, 1998; Miller, 2001; Tyler, 1987). Recent theory and research on procedural justice suggests the profound importance of feeling recognized and having input. Having a voice in proceedings—that is, having an opportunity to have your say—positively impacts people's perceptions of fairness (Tyler, 1987, 1990; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997), and this is even the case when there is little possibility that it could affect the outcome (e.g., the opportunity to express oneself follows the actual outcome decision; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990).

Procedural justice not only acknowledges the importance of voice and visibility, but also encompasses consistency, neutrality, lack of bias, and representativeness (see, for example, Leventhal, 1980). Such fair treatment communicates respect. It implicitly recognizes (through explicit procedures) that parties should be treated the same, as valued members of society. Tyler and his colleagues have empirically demonstrated the crucial role of procedural justice in people's evaluations of fairness and the legitimacy of social authorities (Tyler, 1989, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Huo, 2002). And interestingly, the UN Declaration of Human Rights guarantees everyone not only the right to "recognition everywhere as a person before the law" (United Nations, 1948, p. 2), but also the right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal. Rights, voice, and fair treatment all reflect categorical respect, for they imply in-group inclusion and valued participation.

Contingent Respect

In contrast to categorical respect, which reflects membership in a group, contingent respect is associated with standing in a group—in-group status rather than inclusion. Contingent respect is primarily intragroup, not intergroup in nature, for it is based on comparisons across group members, rather than on membership per se. As noted by Brewer (1999), humans are characterized by obligatory interdependence; we must rely on one another for information, aid, and shared resources. Just as differentiation between in-groups and out-groups may contribute to cooperative interdependence by minimizing the risk of excessive costs (Brewer, 1999), so too differentiation within groups may contribute by minimizing risks as well. That is, we are motivated to find the best people within the group to provide guidance, information, and direction. These are the people who are most respected, the individuals granted the strongest voice and most influence over the group. In this sense, contingent respect accords status or standing within the group (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003;

also see Jackson, Esses, & Burris, 2001); it is a valuation associated with one's position of earned influence in one's in-group.

In contrast to categorical respect, which is unranked and nonhierarchical, contingent respect is variable, ranked, and based on appraisal processes; it involves people's attributions about another's value along particular dimensions. Whereas procedural justice is primarily associated with categorical respect, distributional justice and the equity principle appear more generally associated with contingent respect, involving differential allotments across people based on proportional determinations for selected societal criteria. Contingent respect is earned or achieved rather than assumed or automatically given. A person granted contingent respect is necessarily also granted categorical respect, with the rights and voice accorded to in-group members.

The differences between contingent and categorical respect to some extent parallel the distinction drawn by sociologists between achieved and ascribed status. Achieved status is based largely on how well one performs (e.g., in a family or organization), whereas ascribed status is based on inherent characteristics rather than personal characteristics or achievements. Categorical respect, like ascribed status, is not earned; it is not based on a person's efforts, personal strengths, successes, or contributions. It is based on one's membership in a group. In contrast, like achieved status, contingent respect is earned.

Contingent respect is important social currency, whether in the dyad, group, or larger society. Granted to in-group individuals or societal subgroups perceived as most apt to contribute to the collective's welfare and future success, those who have it are in turn accorded greater social standing; they not only have a voice, but have influence. Their voices are loud, heard, and hold sway. It is interesting to speculate that one of the reasons respect has begun to be discussed a great deal by groups in the United States in recent decades is that for many groups in society, expansion of rights through laws during and after the 1960s has not automatically translated into respect in the sense of greater influence. Groups feel they have attained the rights of membership (categorical respect)—they can participate and have a voice (e.g., vote, speak up in the political process), but their influence and impact is nevertheless severely limited. When groups cry out for respect these days in identity politics, they are asking not only to be recognized and to have a voice, in the sense of being considered members of the greater society (i.e., categorical respect). They want to have an impact as well; they are asking for greater standing, more influence, and a stronger voice in the political and social arenas (i.e., contingent respect).

From our smallest to our largest in-groups, individuals and groups want not only to be heard but also to impact outcomes. In close relationships we want our partners to take into account our perspectives, and in a given nation groups want to influence political decisions and the future direction of the society.

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Categorical and contingent respects are linked but distinct appraisals, which are associated, respectively, with our constructions of membership and standing within groups. In his book *The Decent Society* (1996), Margalit claims that a decent society is one that respects its members, but he claims that it is difficult to get direct evidence of respect. Margalit therefore turns to instances in which respect is absent and argues instead that a decent society is one in which institutions don't humiliate society's members; he maintains that we know humiliation when we see it, whereas we don't know what to look for in the case of respect. Yet respect may not be as mysterious and inscrutable as might appear at first glance; having a voice, being heard, and participating in the wider community provide evidence of categorical respect, a minimal form of respect due to another; having an influence and an impact provide evidence of contingent respect, a maximal form of the appraisal. Nevertheless, we often are most aware of respect when we recognize its absence—when others are ignored, demeaned, and physically harmed, as occurs in conflict situations. These instances of disrespect can be better understood by first understanding the bases on which individuals and groups are typically granted respect; we can then turn to a consideration of disrespect and delegitimization.

The Attributional Components of Respect and Disrespect

We propose that two primary domains are the basis for evaluations of respect: morality and competence (see Wojciszke, 1994, 1997, on the importance of these dimensions in impression formation). Although these components may be implicated in both categorical and contingent respect, we believe that they are differentially weighted in the two cases. For reasons discussed below, categorical respect entails an emphasis on morality appraisals, whereas contingent respect entails an emphasis on competence appraisals, and these lead to different types of delegitimization through disrespect.

In a recent exploratory study, we attempted to tap the primary elements of respect appraisals. We assumed that asking people what they mean by respect and using a prototype approach would most likely generate a series of synonyms (see Frei & Shaver, 2002), but would provide little insight into respect appraisals. Instead we asked respondents to choose a person they respect and tell us why; and then to choose a person they disrespect and explain this as well.[1] About half of the 305 respondents were asked to choose a family member or friend in picking their target person, and the others were asked to choose a public figure. Regardless of condition, approximately 90% of the descriptions

reflected appraisals of either morality (e.g., altruistic, self-reliant, honest) or competence (e.g., intelligent, successful) in the case of the respected target and immorality (e.g., selfish, dishonest, abusive of others) or incompetence (e.g., unintelligent, unsuccessful) in the case of the disrespected target. Over 35% mentioned both morality and competence in describing the respected target; the perception of incompetence or immorality alone was clearly sufficient to render a judgment of disrespect, for only 10% of the sample mentioned both in this case. The centrality of these two domains in the open-ended responses was confirmed in subsequent research we conducted that manipulated these elements in a person perception task: again both morality and competence were strongly associated with respect appraisals.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the link between respect, voice, and influence, these two factors parallel those deemed most important by social psychologists in perceiving a source as credible: one involves expertise, knowledge, or ability, and the other involves trustworthiness, honesty, or objectivity (for a review, see Petty & Wegener, 1998; also see McGuire, 1969). Knowledgeable, honest communicators are most likely to be persuasive—their messages are regarded as worth listening to. Similarly, research on perceptions of presidential character suggests the importance of two core dimensions—competence and integrity (Kinder, 1986; also see related work by McGraw, 2001; Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986; Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, & Sullivan, 1991); those high on these dimensions of competence and morality are people we believe should legitimately have the strongest voice in a nation's deliberations and decisions.

Morality and competence appear to be the primary attributional elements of respect. Morality attributions may be relatively cross-situational, in that working for the welfare of the group and minimizing selfishness are presumably valued regardless of the particular identity of a social group. Here we are most concerned with others' intentions vis-à-vis one's group. Do the person's intentions reflect the interests of the larger group? Can the person's word be trusted? To what extent does the person minimize self-interest in the service of greater social interests? Morality involves our regard (or lack of same) for the interests of others (e.g., Pincoffs, 1986); as Schulman (2002) notes, when we call an act moral, it is because we have inferred some good intention behind it.

Assessments of competence involve assumptions about others' knowledge and skills—the extent to which their abilities and expertise can positively contribute to the guidance and direction of the group. When the group in question is society at large, cultural assumptions about competence play a major role; in Western culture we presumably make inferences about competence based not only on perceived knowledge and skills, but on such variables as education and occupation, which are regarded as indices of success. Nevertheless,

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we are members of many groups, and one's perceived competence is likely to vary with the values and purposes of the group in question. Thus, competence in athletic groups is apt to be assessed in terms of athletic success, and competence in musical groups in terms of one's musical talent. We have a general social standing in society, but our numerous social identities can provide us with opportunities for respect based on other competence-related categories; competence is essentially defined by the in-group's goals and values.

Although morality and competence are important in appraisals of respect, a closer look at these domains suggests they may be differentially related to categorical versus contingent respect. Recall that in the case of categorical respect, we are making an intergroup (i.e., in-group vs. out-group) evaluation, for we are determining whether the other is a comember of our in-group. In the case of contingent respect, we are making an intragroup evaluation; that is, we are comparing the target to others in the same group and in turn conferring standing within the group. Regarding the attributional components of respect, morality is apt to be weighted more heavily when the determination is about in-group–out-group status; and competence is likely to be weighted more heavily when the determination is about intragroup status. In determining in-group–out-group status, we are interested in knowing whether the other is well-intentioned, can be trusted, and is on our side. If we believe this to be the case, we are likely to deem the other a member of our in-group. Morality and good intentions are an essential basis for in-group categorization, but it is equally likely that once a person is granted in-group membership, he or she is automatically regarded as generally moral and well-intentioned. These are reciprocal processes, no doubt operating in both directions, in support of Deutsch's (1973) observation in his Crude Law of Social Relations that "characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship tend also to elicit that type of relationship" (p. 365). In other words, conditions that provoke an outcome are also triggered by the outcome; attributions of morality encourage in-group categorization, and conversely, in-group membership encourages attributions of morality.

Perceived competence becomes more important once membership status is conferred. Appraisals of contingent respect involve targets who generally are already considered in-group members and have thereby been granted a threshold level of morality. Thus, morality sufficient for in-group membership is assumed (until evidence to the contrary is provided), and the basis for the conferral of contingent respect then rests on perceived competence. Not surprisingly, then, high status groups within a given society are those regarded as most competent (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). Perceptions of morality primarily determine inclusion in the group, and therefore rights of voice and participation; and perceptions of competence primarily determine standing in the group and the privilege of influence.

Analogous to our appraisals of respect, in disrespecting others we turn to attributions of immorality and incompetence; here again, their relative significance seems to depend in part on whether we are making intergroup or intragroup judgments. In the most serious social conflicts, it is clear that the significance of immorality trumps incompetence, for these are situations in which the targets of appraisals are unquestionably defined as out-groups. With this in mind, we now turn to a closer examination of the elements of disrespect.

Disrespect and Delegitimization

In popular slang, the term *dis*, derived from the word disrespect (according to the Online Slang Dictionary), means to insult or put someone down. If, as suggested above, respect is associated with having a voice through group membership (minimally) and having influence (maximally), disrespect is essentially equivalent to discounting another. Such discounting not only renders another person or group powerless and relatively invisible, but in cases of conflict, the object of ridicule and humiliation, and most seriously, violence and destruction. Perceptions of immorality and incompetence play an important role in foreclosing respect and promoting delegitimization of others. Yet although incompetence is heavily weighted when in-group members are disrespected, leading to invisibility and disempowerment, it is the perception of immorality that is of primary importance in the most dramatic instances of disrespect—out-group delegitimization that may lead to extreme degradation and violence.

Out-group Delegitimization: Enemy Images and Perceived Immorality

Paralleling the automatic attribution of morality and good intentions to in-group members (categorical respect), we appear to automatically attribute immorality and bad intentions to out-group adversaries. Thus, in their work on naïve realism, Ross and Ward (1996; also see Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995) have demonstrated that once differences of opinion cannot be attributed to lack of information, we regard others' dissenting views as biased or based on self-interested motives. We also believe our own views are generally unbiased and uninfluenced by ideology (e.g., Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). Similarly, Reeder, Pryor, Wohl, and Griswell (2005) found that respondents attributed

negative, selfish motives to others who disagreed with their positions. Reeder et al. (2005) suggest that attitudinal similarity serves as a basis for group boundaries and therefore intergroup differentiation (see also Kenworthy & Miller, 2002); those who share our attitudes are perceived as a coherent, unified group and are members of our in-group (also see Turner, 1987, on self-categorization and Tajfel & Turner, 1986, on social identity theory), whereas those who disagree are perceived as a homogeneous out-group (see, for example, Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). Once we categorize others as out-group members, we are likely to deny them categorical respect and regard them as biased, self-interested, and selfish.

Perceptions of out-groups are heavily laden with attributions of immorality and bad intentions. These are evident in Campbell's (1967; Le Vine & Campbell, 1972) notion of a *universal stereotype* applied by all in-groups; that is, in-groups believe they themselves are honest, cooperative, peaceful, and trustworthy, whereas out-groups are dishonest, uncooperative, quarrelsome, and untrustworthy. When the out-group is an enemy—viewed as threatening, and with hostility—these perceptions of bad intentions take on a particularly antagonistic, negative tone and become hardened perceptions of the other. Pruitt and Kim (2004) describe the perceptions that are "particularly characteristic of escalated conflict" as follows:

> Other tends to be seen as deficient in moral virtue—as dishonest, unfriendly, or warlike. Other tends to be seen as different from Party in basic values, and most particularly to be selfish and inhumane (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Other also tends to be distrusted; party believes Other to be hostile to Party's welfare, and sometimes as having unlimited goals of defeating or even destroying Party. In addition, Other may be seen as lacking in ability for achievement (Blake & Mouton, 1962),though this kind of perceptual distortion is less likely because of the greater availability of sound evidence about these characteristics (Brewer, 1979). In contrast, party usually sees itself as more moral than Other and often as a victim of Other's aggression. (Hampson, 1997; White, 1984, p. 106)

These are the perceptions that characterize our view of the enemy; we maintain a moral self-image and regard the out-group as diabolical (White, 1984; also see Silverstein, 1992, on "enemy images"). Labels such as *ruthless, devious*, and *aggressive* are particularly common in delegitimization of the out-group, and these perceptions tend to be reciprocal (Bar-Tal, 1990; also see Bronfenbrenner, 1961, on mirror-image perceptions). As Bar-Tal (1990) notes in his review of leaders' speeches and interviews during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war,

Iranians labeled Iraqis "criminals," "aggressors," "archsatans," and "Saddamist mercenaries," "inhuman", and "diabolical"; and the Iraqis labeled Iranians "criminals," "aggressors," "neofascists," "deceitful diabolical entity," and "harmful magi insects."

Given these perceptions, a conflict becomes framed as a war between good and evil; thus, Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," and G. W. Bush referred to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the "axis of evil." Such framing changes the nature of conflictual issues from specific to general, such that enemies are no longer dealing with a particular threat, but with an "immoral enemy" (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). In the face of these perceptions, it is typical for communications to plummet and conflicts to escalate.

The tragedy of such conflict escalation is that it is so often based on misattributions that follow directly from biased perceptions (see, for example, Bar-Tal, 1990; Pruitt & Kim, 2004; Silverstein, 1992; White, 1984). People generally underestimate the power of the situation, and this is particularly marked in the case of enemies (see, for example, Pettigrew, 1979). The absence of any attributional charity coupled with an assumption of other's bad intentions results in misattributions for the enemy's actions; these actions are not perceived as defensive, or based on extenuating circumstances, but as punitive and aggressive. The appropriate response thereby seems to be defensive escalation, which in turn is perceived by the other as hostile. A conflict spiral of escalation results (Jervis, 1976; Pruitt & Kim, 2004).

In the context of these negative perceptions, even peaceful actions of other groups are likely to be attributed to hostile intentions; there is an utter absence of trust. As Silverstein (1992) notes, "a proffered peace treaty may be viewed as crass propaganda, an attempt to increase tensions among allies, or a trick to allow enemies to maintain or increase military superiority" (p. 151). The work on reactive devaluation echoes this suspicion and discounting of an enemy's well-intentioned efforts (see, for example, Ross, 2005). Thus, lack of trust seriously undermines efforts at de-escalation and conflict resolution.

In addition to contributing to a conflict spiral through misattributions, the perception of the enemy as immoral also minimizes inhibitions against aggression and retaliation. As Pruitt and Kim note (2004), "Party is reluctant to aggress against an Other who is liked and respected . . . , but party is quite willing to aggress against an Other who is not liked or respected. . . . Furthermore, there is an easy explanation that makes empathy seem unnecessary: other's actions stem from evil motives" (p. 108). The enemy is delegitimized, dehumanized, and placed outside the bounds of the human community; such denial of membership translates into the legitimization of violence and extreme degradation. In the absence of categorical respect, perceptions of immorality

define our views of enemy out-groups and establish seemingly insurmountable obstacles to conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Intragroup Disrespect: Delegitimization and Perceived Incompetence

Certainly the most devastating type of delegitimization is manifested as violence between enemy out-groups; this is the extreme case of disrespect—not only failing to recognize the morality of the enemy, but discounting the humanity of the other. However, disrespect has seemingly more benign manifestations that are nevertheless extremely challenging and demeaning for the groups involved. Here we are referring primarily to disrespect among in-group members, most specifically in this case, groups who perceive themselves as members of a single society (i.e., societal subgroups).[2] Although not typically associated with escalated conflict and punitive aggression, such delegitimization has a powerful yet insidious effect on social and economic equality and often serves to justify poverty, discrimination, and powerlessness. Such disrespect often becomes fixed and perpetuated within a given society through damaging group stereotypes and legitimizing myths (see, for example, Jost & Major, 2001).

The social conflicts reflected in these intrasocietal patterns of disrespect may concern in-group resources, but are also fundamentally about recognition, participation, and influence (Fraser, 1995; Honneth, 1995). This is the realm of modern identity politics. Within a given society (intragroup), where comembership in a larger social structure is sought, disrespect of other individuals or subgroups involves denying them status, and, relatedly, adequate input into social and political decisions. From this perspective, to disrespect is to delegitimize other people or groups by placing them outside the sphere of influence and discourse—to deny others the right of meaningful participation.

Recall that in the case of intragroup judgments (i.e., contingent respect, in contrast to in-group or categorical respect based on intergroup considerations), competence is heavily weighted in people's appraisals. It is not that morality is irrelevant, but it is typically assumed through in-group (vs. out-group) status. Yet in-group members can be readily discounted and derogated by virtue of their perceived incompetence. In the work of Fiske et al. (1999, 2002), these are groups that are the object of paternalistic prejudice—liked, but not respected.[3] Following from this perspective, it is likely that nondominant societal groups

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are delegitimized not through immorality, but primarily through perceived incompetence; that is, they are viewed as relatively high on morality, but low on competence. As such, they are fairly low-status groups that are granted minimal contingent respect. They are denied influence because they are perceived as lacking the knowledge, information, and skills to provide proper guidance and direction for the larger society. In a given society, social hierarchies are maintained by delegitimizing socially disadvantaged groups (Jost & Major, 2001), and in these cases it is largely the competence domain that is implicated.

It is interesting to consider the second type of prejudice discussed by Fiske et al. (1999, 2002). Envious prejudice is directed towards groups accorded high levels of status. These are groups that are regarded as highly competent, but whose morality is questioned. They are rated as lower on morality than the paternalistic groups, although typically not exceedingly low (i.e., not very immoral); they are still comembers of one's larger society—in-group members—and therefore are generally accorded a threshold level of morality. Fiske et al. note that these groups, the object of envious prejudice, exist across cultures. In our society, they are high status groups such as Asians, Jews, and the rich. We believe that the perception of relatively low levels of morality (compared to competence) allows dominant societal group(s) to moderate what might otherwise be excessive levels of influence by these very competent, high status groups. If questions can always be raised about the group's intentions, self-interest, altruism, and honesty, even these high status, "respected" groups can be "managed" and kept from wielding too much influence.

It is fascinating and distressing to recognize what happens to these groups in times of considerable societal upheaval and stress. These envied groups may become targeted for out-group status—enemies of the society. In the dramatic change from in-group to out-group, the role of morality, or more precisely immorality, becomes paramount. When the focus is on the other as an in-group member (coparticipant in society), competence functions as a basis for respect, with morality generally assumed; when the focus is on the other as out-group adversary, the morality basis for respect becomes paramount, echoing the differences between contingent (intragroup) and categorical (intergroup) respect. The concern is no longer with denial of influence, but denial of in-group membership. The earlier high status target group (e.g., intellectuals in Pol Pot's Cambodia, Jews in Nazi Germany, Chinese in Indonesia) is now perceived as an out-group, and immorality—bad intentions, dishonesty, selfishness—becomes the basis for delegitimization, often in its extreme form, dehumanization. The competence that is a basis for respect while considered an in-group member—and thereby confers

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influence and status—is now feared in the out-group enemy, and coupled with the perception of immorality becomes a justification for degradation, abuse, and violence.

Some Implications for Reconciliation

From rivalries and derogation based on societal hierarchies to violence and war based on seemingly intractable intergroup conflicts, respect seems to be a natural antidote to the devaluation and delegitimization that characterize antagonistic, adversarial relationships. Respect is an attitude and appraisal we have the power to grant another, and finding ways to facilitate such bestowals may be a key to reconciliation. When we speak of reconciliation colloquially, we are concerned with settling disagreements and restoring relationships. From the perspective of work on intergroup conflict and peace building, reconciliation is defined as "the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between two antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups" (Kriesberg, 1998, pp. 1-2) or "a postwar reconstruction policy, designed to build peace among peoples with long-standing animosities" (Ackermann, 1994, p. 230).

Respect facilitates and promotes reconciliation; it allows for the possibility that legitimacy may lie in more than one's own perspective. It involves treating adversarial others as equal participants even if you do not like their views. It calls for a sort of attributional generosity in interpreting the words and intentions of the other, holding one's harshest delegitimizing appraisals in abeyance, and allowing for inputs and influence by all parties to the conflict. Yet given the unique ecology of social conflict, the very situations most in need of respect are precisely those in which it is least apt to be (re)established. In these instances, conflicting parties perceive each other as morally deficient; they view each other with contempt. Contempt is a deep dismissal, a signal that the conversation is over, and a denial of any prospect for reconciliation (Hill, 2000). On the path to reconciliation, then, how can we build respect for others we regard with contempt?

Given the powerful in-group–out-group divisions in perceptions of adversaries and the hostile us-versus-them nature of enemy interactions; it is categorical rather than contingent respect that demands our attention in intense social conflicts. Here the emphasis is on attributions of immorality and perceptions of seemingly unyielding intergroup (vs. intragroup) distinctions. Violent conflicts, involving the pain and memories of devastation, cruelty, and loss, are particularly likely to produce hardened negative, dehumanized images of

rather than violent conflict, common in-group-identity theory points to the positive impact of recategorizing out-groups as in-groups ("separate groups on the same team") through a superordinate identity that can subsume other (often antagonistic) identities. Such recategorization has been found to enhance intergroup trust, reduce prejudice, and contribute to the development of positive attitudes towards the other group. Clearly, such a new common identity may be very difficult to establish in the case of violent conflict, but it is nevertheless a potentially powerful strategy, and one that is consistent with the goal of a single, inclusive society.

As a common in-group identity grows, attributional generosity and perceptions of morality are likely to follow. Conversely, minimizing attributions of immorality and increasing perceptions of positive intentions can serve to break down in-group–out-group boundaries (recall Deutsch's, [1973] Crude Law of Social Relations). This is one potentially positive result of intergroup contact. Such intercommunal contact is most apt to happen within a single society, where people can actually confront each other during the course of daily living. It is far less likely in the case of two separate societies aiming for peaceful coexistence. Here the contacts are generally more formal of necessity, often involving special efforts to bring together groups from each society; although there may be opportunities to establish some interdependence (e.g., economic ties), most intergroup contact is likely to occur between leaders working on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and political affairs.

When living together in a single nation, enemies are more likely to have opportunities to interact; this may present possibilities for both maximal breakdown of peacemaking efforts as well as maximal success. Clearly, contact and communication are not panaceas; between intense enemies they can serve to intensify in-group identification and intergroup hostility (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). But reconciliation is a long-term process, not an overnight conversion. And over time contact, at least certain types of contact—equal status and noncompetitive, with opportunities for cross-group friendships (Pettigrew, 1998)—may provide opportunities to observe the humanity of members of the other group, recognize similarities, and alter attributions of immorality, selfishness, and dishonesty. Informal contacts and interactions through civic association, local government groups, schools, and ultimately residential areas, where individuals may be required to work together on common issues, are apt to be most beneficial.[4] Over time, reevaluations of individual out-group members can serve to undercut automatic negative attributions and hostile perceptions of the group as a whole (see, for example, Pettigrew, 1998; Pettrigew & Tropp, 2000).

In addition to contact and a new national identity, which aim at breaking down group and attributional boundaries, respect-enhancing strategies include specific procedures that are directly aimed at fostering the recognition

and visibility so central to categorical respect. These are often evident in the institutions and processes established for dealing with the horrors of a violent conflict; they enhance prospects for respect and reconciliation to the extent that they offer the possibility of dignity that was unavailable to whole segments of the population during the conflict itself. Institutions established for dealing with victims and perpetrators (who typically also regard themselves as victims; see Ramsbotham et al., 2005) should strive to maximize procedural justice. In the administration of justice, procedures that are consistent, open, unbiased, equally applied, and available to all maximize participants' feelings of respect and sense that they are valued by the larger society (Tyler, 1989, 2001).

Opportunities for voice within these postconflict institutions also foster respect and ultimately reconciliation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in South Africa in 1995 engaged communities in a process of collecting statements from local victims and providing community hearings (see, for example, Gibson, 2004; Van der Merwe, 2001). There were new forums for listening, and victims were given an opportunity to tell their stories; in essence, they were given a voice. Not only did this help them discover what in truth happened to their loved ones and possibly help unburden their own grief, but it had powerful symbolic value. The hearings were essentially *respect rituals*, for victims were receiving recognition from their new nation— recognition of their humanity, their inclusion in the new South Africa, and acknowledgement that they had been harmed and wronged. Regardless of one's position on the question of amnesty, the wisdom of establishing such avenues for respect seems uncontroversial.

Within a single society, such processes and institutions that recognize the importance of voice and procedural justice also serve to foster a newfound sense of societal inclusiveness for past victims as well as perpetrators. Although similar structures could be established in the case of separate societies or nations (e.g., war tribunals, truth commissions), they would lack the added benefit of providing strong evidence of a new, inclusive, respect-based society. Reconciliation between two nations presents special challenges and may rest primarily on the interactions between leaders, as symbols and representatives of their nations. In such instances, unilateral conciliatory gestures of leaders (Osgood, 1962) may be particularly instrumental vis-à-vis reconciliation, for they may jump start a reconsideration of an antagonist's intentions. The importance of such unilateral gestures was evident, for example, in the power and success of Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem. His actions were unexpected and irreversible, and no doubt involved personal costs due to the negative reactions of the Arab world. In spite of great suspicions, his visit led Israelis to begin to question and rethink Sadat's (i.e., Egypt's) presumed hostile motives. From a respect perspective, Israelis began to see Egyptians as *probationally*

more well-intentioned and moral, and hence more deserving of categorical respect.

On the road to reconciliation, there is a need for each side to curb its own moral arrogance (Hill, 2002). This may be particularly important for those who come to the table with greater power. Some form of "respect ritual" would be particularly useful between leaders, as representatives of their groups. One candidate for such a display would be the apology, which not only renders a transgression less offensive but also has potent symbolic value, because it provides evidence that the offender acknowledges the moral worth and social standing of the other. Although research to date has focused on interpersonal rather than intergroup relations, findings nevertheless suggest that apologies are associated with greater empathy for an offender, as well as less revenge, anger, aggression and avoidance by victims (McCullough et al., 1998; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). In the context of efforts at reconciliation and peace building, apologies are likely to signal respect for the other. When offered by the more powerful party, apologies may also help create a more level playing field (for negotiations), for implicit in apologies is a recognition of status equality (see Abel, 1998).

Most generally, respect is conveyed through listening to what the other has to say and allowing for the possibility that reconciliation is possible. Whether within a single society or across nations, between ordinary group members or leaders, such openness to another's perspective is crucial on the road to reconciliation; *civil* as opposed to *confrontational* listening, involves acknowledging the mere possibility that the other is right (Carter, 1998). By focusing first on listening, on mutual opportunities to influence, and on the possibility of balanced inputs, participants may come to see their adversaries as worthy of such respect. Going through the motions of respectful treatment—and being the recipient of such treatment—may over time transform appraisals of the other and, in turn, promote true reconciliation between adversarial groups.

It is important to recognize that in respecting another, we do not have to agree. Here we are reminded of the multiyear meetings held by three ardent prolife and three ardent prochoice community leaders in an effort to understand each other. After 3 years, these women reported that they developed a deep respect for their opponents, whose *dignity and goodness* became very apparent; over time, they learned to hear the other perspective without overreacting or disparaging the other side. Yet the women were able to accomplish this without changing their minds on the topic of abortion (Fowler et al., 2001).

Respect does not mean agreeing, but rather listening and acknowledging that the other has a right to shape outcomes as well. Certainly, it is not easy to establish, particularly in the aftermath of violent conflicts. Yet respect may be far easier to encourage and promote than sympathy, empathy, and altruism

on the path to reconciliation. Respect has unique value and appeal in enabling intergroup communication, accommodation, and peace building. As Reiman (1990) notes,

> Respect involves a certain regard for the interests of others, but not so much as adopting them as one's own. Respect is altruism's cooler cousin. It shows its solicitude for the interests of others in its reserve rather than its enthusiasm. One can have respect for one's adversaries or even one's enemies without having sympathy for their ends or actively adopting them. Respect is characteristically exhibited by…making way for others to promote their ends rather than promoting them oneself.

Notes

1. The type of respect was left unspecified, for the distinction would not be meaningful to respondents. We assumed responses would be somewhat more likely to reflect contingent respect, in that participants were essentially asked to choose someone they ranked high on respect. Nevertheless, we believed categorical respect would largely be assumed (as it generally is in the case of contingent respect) and that responses would therefore contribute to an understanding of the attributional elements of both types of respect.

2. It is important to recognize the fluidity of social identity and, therefore, in-group versus out-group identification. Thus societal groups, such as ethnic or racial groups, may be considered in-groups when considering one's nation or society as whole (e.g., in contrast to other nations), but may be considered out-groups when considered in light of (i.e., in contrast to) one's own ethnic or racial group. Similarly, other nations (e.g., European countries) are apt to be considered out-groups when we think about politics, but may be regarded as in-groups when we consider economic cooperation around joint business ventures. In the case of the Chinese, we may view them as an out-group when we are thinking about economics, but may perceive them as an in-group member when we are thinking about negotiations with the North Koreans. In other words, our in-group–out-group designations are somewhat fluid. Nevertheless, when we perceive others as out-groups we are most apt to focus on these groups' morality and intentions, whereas when we think of them as in-groups—on our team—we are more apt to focus on their competence and ability to influence joint outcomes.

3. In their research, Fiske et al. (1999, 2002) assessed perceptions of groups' warmth and competence. Respondents rated groups on a series of adjectives, and the warmth adjectives included not only *warmth* and "*good natured*," but *sincere*, *trustworthy*, and *well-intentioned*, seemingly reflecting both warmth and morality. In order to more directly test whether morality would be used as a basis for delegitimizing out-groups, we (with Tracy Kirschen) conducted a replication and extension of the research by

Fiske and her colleagues and asked participants to rate societal groups on adjectives selected as indices of competence, morality, and warmth. The morality adjectives were ethical, well-intentioned, trustworthy, honest and sincere, and the warmth traits adjectives were sociable, warm, good-natured, approachable, and friendly. Morality and warmth emerged as separate factors, but they nevertheless resulted in the same societal clusters when separately combined with competence ratings, and these clusters replicated the findings of Fiske et al. (1999, 2002). It appears that although we can distinguish between warmth and morality, they appear to serve as indicators of the same human attributes and behaviors. It is likely that the positive orientation towards others expressed as warmth and friendliness gets interpreted as positive intentions, selflessness, generosity, and interest in the group's welfare; thus warmth may serve as a cue for morality, or more generally others' intentions regarding the group.

4. The crucial role of groups' informal interactions through civic associations is discussed by Ashutosh Varshney, a political scientist who studied the pattern of violent conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India (see Bass, 2006). He found that riots occur only in certain cities. In riot-prone cities, Hindus and Muslims do not come together in daily social and economic life, whereas in nonriot-prone cities, they mix in trade unions, business associations, and professional organizations.

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