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Third Parties, Elections,and Roll-Call Votes: The Populist Party and the Late Nineteenth-Century U.S. Congress

What effect do electorally successful third parties have on congressional roll-call votes? There is widespread belief among scholars that third parties influence the policies of the major parties, but there is little systematic evidence of this influence. I exploit the unique historical context surrounding the Populist Party formation in 1892 to examine the effect of the Populist Party's electoral success on congressional roll-call votes related to Populist issues. The results are consistent with two claims. First, co-optation of the Populist Party's issues occurred even before the formation of the party. Second, the co-optation of Populist policies does not appear to be correlated with the electoral success of the Populist candidates.

The appearance of new political parties is a common phenomenon in all democracies. The conventional wisdom is that these new political parties enter when the established parties are unresponsive to the interests of particular segments of the electorate (Hug 1996; Inglehart 1977, 1990; Kitschelt 1989, 1994; Mazmanian 1974; Rohrschneider 1993; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984; Sundquist 1983). The new political parties gather electoral support by offering policies to meet the demands of the electorate unsatisfied with the policy alternatives offered by the established parties. Thus, the new political parties can potentially help ensure that the policies of candidates do not stray too far from the preferences of the electorate.

Even in the United States, which has a stable two-party system, new political parties are argued to affect representation. Empirically, third-party candidates have appeared in elections to different levels of the U.S. government, with varying electoral success (Bibby and Maisel 2003; Gillespie 1993; Haynes 1916; Herrnson 2002; Hirano and Snyder 2007; Winger 1997). Although these third parties often disappear after a few electoral cycles, the conventional wisdom in the American politics literature is that third parties influence policy by inducing the major-

party candidates to adopt policy positions that address the third party's demands (Herrnson 2002; Hicks 1933; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984). Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus have articulated this wisdom: "Third parties usually lose the battle but, through co-optation, often win the war" (1984, 44).

A common claim in the literature is that the major parties will co-opt a third party's policies only after the third party has won a substantial number of votes. As historian John Hicks (1933) writes, "Let a third party once demonstrate that votes are to be made by adopting a certain demand, then one or the other of the older parties can be trusted to absorb the new doctrine" (26).[1] The third party's electoral success provides a signal to major parties about the appeal of third-party policies.[2]

Although numerous anecdotal accounts from presidential campaigns and party platforms support the perception that third parties are the "tail that wags the dog," there is little systematic empirical evidence to identify third-party candidates as the cause for the co-optation of a third party's policy positions by major parties.[3] The lack of evidence that co-optation would not have occurred in the absence of a third party has led to some questions regarding whether or not a particular third party really was the force behind the adoption that party's policies by one or more of the major parties. For example:

The issue is whether or not the Socialists' advocacy for twenty or thirty years of such measures as a minimum wage had anything to do with its enactment in the 1930s. Unfortunately, there is no way of testing what might have happened had there been no Socialist Party. The evidence suggests, however, that the major parties grasp new programs and proposals in their "time of ripeness," when large numbers of Americans have done so and when such a course is therefore politically useful to the parties.[4] (Beck 1997, 49)

Thus, whether or not third-party formation is necessary for major parties to adopt third-party policies remains an open empirical question.

Unlike previous studies, which have focused on presidential campaigns and party platforms, this article explores the effect of third parties on major-party policy positions by examining congressional behavior. Presidential elections provide only one observable third-party challenge per election and few observable measures of changes in the presidential candidates' policy positions. In contrast, the cross-sectional variation in congressional districts allows us to test for systematic differences between particular types of representatives and the decisions to co-opt third-party issues. Moreover, congressional roll-call-voting patterns provide an observable measure of whether or not legislators change their positions on third-party policies after a third party is formed.

Here, I focus on a particular case of third-party entry: the Populist Party's entry into U.S. congressional elections in the late nineteenth century. The Populist Party is often used as an example of how third-party electoral success at the national level can lead the major parties to adopt a third party's policies (see, for example, Hicks 1933).

The research design in this article examines the effect of third-party formation and electoral success by exploiting several features unique to the historical context surrounding the Populist Party's entry. From a measurement standpoint, the Populist case is attractive because the constituencies that supported the Populist policies are often associated with certain socioeconomic measures. More importantly, the events leading to the party's formation provide a situation close to the counterfactual of what would have happened if the third party had not been formed.[5]

The results of this analysis combined with descriptive accounts in the historical literature suggest that the articulation of specific demands and activities such as mobilizing and educating the electorate (which are not necessarily connected to the electoral success of third-party candidates) are likely to be large parts of what causes established parties to co-opt third-party policies—not the entry and electoral success of third-party candidates. There is robust evidence that legislators who represented districts with socioeconomic characteristics commonly associated with support for Populist policies adopted more Populist roll-call-voting positions during the period that Populist issues became more salient. Contrary to claims in the literature, the Populist Party's formation influenced congressional roll-call-voting patterns even in districts without an electorally successful Populist candidate. Furthermore, legislators began adopting the Populist policies in their roll-call votes even before the national Populist Party formed.

There is some evidence consistent with the argument that actual entry of a third party also affects the existing actors' policy positions. My results do show that congressmen adopted roll-call-voting positions more favorable to the Populist Party after the party's formation. Since the Populist Party was formed a full election cycle after the interest groups favorable to the Populist position began their mobilization and education campaigns, this further movement in congressional roll-call-voting patterns after the Populist Party's formation is consistent with the idea that third-party formation and events correlated with the party's formation may facilitate the co-optation of third-party policies.

The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. Section 1 provides a brief description of the historical context for the Populist Party's entry in 1892, highlighting some of the features of the Populist

case that allow us to test the various claims. Section 2 describes the different measures for district Populist preferences and the Populist electoral threat. Section 3 presents the specification and results. The final section concludes with a discussion of the results and what this study of the Populist Party may contribute to our general understanding of the influence that third parties wield.

1. The Populist Party Case

The research design discussed in this article takes advantage of the historical events leading up to the Populist Party's formation in 1892 to examine if the formation of a third party was sufficient to change legislators' roll-call-voting patterns. In particular, this study uses the fact that the core interest groups supporting the third-party movement raised the Populist policy demands more than two years before the Populist platform was even written. The announcement of the policy demands coincided with an effort to mobilize and educate the electorate about the demands. This interim period between the clear articulation of the Populist demands and the Populist Party's formation provides a unique opportunity to examine how congressmen responded to the electoral pressure to adopt the third-party demands without having the third party present. One can therefore test whether or not the social and political environment prior to the Populist Party's formation provided sufficient incentives for the established political actors to co-opt the Populist policies, even without the Populist Party being present.[6] If third-party formation is not required for co-optation, then congressmen representing districts with Populist preferences should have adopted the Populist roll-call-voting position during the interim period before the official Populist platform was articulated.

This sequence of electoral mobilization and Populist demand articulation prior to the party's formation also provides a framework for examining whether or not third-party entry facilitates the adoption of third-party roll-call-voting positions by legislators. According to the historical literature, the electorate was largely mobilized and educated about Populist issues around the 1890 congressional election. If we assume, given historical accounts, that the main difference in the electoral pressures facing congressmen before and after the 1892 election was the Populist Party's formation, then the changes in congressional roll-call-voting patterns following the 1892 election may reflect congressmen's response to the Populist Party's formation. This evidence would only be suggestive, since the identification rests upon some strong assumptions.

Historical Background of the Populist Movement

According to most historical accounts, the Populist movement was an agrarian one. The Populist Party was largely perceived to be an outgrowth of the political and economic turmoil surrounding the rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth century (Clanton 1991; Goodwyn 1976, 1978; McMath 1993; Nye 1959; Sanders 1999). During this period, members of the agrarian sector perceived themselves as being exploited by the East Coast financial and industrial establishment that controlled the credit supply, the transportation lines, and the land surrounding the transportation lines.[7] The high fees on railroad usage and high interest rates on farm mortgage loans were viewed as evidence that the East Coast establishment was extracting monopoly rents from farmers. This tension between the agrarian and the industrial sectors was aggravated by the long-term decline in the prices of agricultural goods and the short-term economic downturns in the late 1880s. The Populist Party platform appealed to discontented agrarian interests by offering policies, such as regulating business and expanding the money supply, that addressed specific agrarian grievances.

The Populist Party attracted the discontented agrarian interests largely through the grassroot agricultural and labor groups that organized and mobilized supporters for the Populist cause. In particular, the National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, hereafter referred to as "the Alliance," devoted substantial resources to educating the electorate about government policies that would help the economic situation of farmers. The main policies advocated in the Populist platform originated from policies promoted by the Alliance. With the help of the Alliance, the electorate in agricultural regions was informed not only about how specific government policies could affect their economic condition, but also about how their representatives were voting on issues relevant to agrarian interests.

Although the conditions underlying the agrarian discontent had been building for many years prior to the Populist Party's formation, there were two key turning points particularly relevant for this study. The first turning point was the articulation of the 1889 St. Louis demands and the 1890 Ocala demands, and the mobilization of Populist interests that followed these demands. After this point, the major-party actors faced tremendous interest group and constituency pressure to adopt Populist policies. The second turning point was the formation of the Populist Party platform in 1892. Thereafter, the actual political party activities had commenced, and the major-party actors faced credible third-party challenges.

The St. Louis and Ocala demands were separate events, but the same groups attended the meetings and articulated essentially the same policy demands. In December 1889, the agrarian interests, together with labor organizations such as the Knights of Labor, met in St. Louis and agreed upon a set of policy demands that were made to the national political parties. Their demands included: (1) abolition of national banks; (2) prohibition of futures in agricultural and mechanical productions; (3) free and unlimited coinage of silver; (4) prohibition of land ownership by foreigners and seizure of unused land held by railroads and corporations; (5) taxation that does not favor one class over another and economy in government spending; (6) increased paper money circulation; (7) government ownership of communication and transportation (Hicks 1961, 427–28). In December 1890, the agricultural and labor organizations met again in Ocala to reaffirm their commitment to the St. Louis demands, with a few minor changes.[8] After the St. Louis and Ocala demands were articulated, the agrarian and labor interests had a clear set of issues and policies with which to mobilize their members and to judge the major-party politicians.

During and after the 1890 elections, the Alliance became particularly active in promoting and educating the public about the St. Louis and Ocala demands, as McMath (1993, 141) explains:

Virtually the entire spectrum of Alliance leadership embraced President Leonidas Polk's call to field paid lecturers in each congressional district in 1891. Delegates approved both the district lecture system and a network of Alliance and labor newspapers (the National Reform Press Association), which, jointly, would provide the informational base of a third party, with or without the name.

The Alliance also educated voters about whether or not particular incumbent politicians were supporting the Alliance's policy positions.

[I]n April, 1890, the state Alliance Executive Committee drew up a list of eight principles by which it asked Alliancemen to judge political candidates. Did the candidate endorse railroad reform, the subtreasury plan, better schools, lower taxes, prison reform, and an end to national banks, trusts, and speculation? If not, the committee urged farmers to vote against him. (Shaw 1984, 27)

The Alliance claimed responsibility for electing three governors and numerous congressmen in the November 1890 election (Haynes 1916).

Thus, to the extent that congressmen felt electoral pressure from their constituencies to adopt Populist demands, one could argue that this influence had largely occurred by the 1890 election or shortly thereafter. The economic grievances of the agrarian community were clearly being felt and voiced. Legislators felt pressure from their constituents to co-opt the Alliance issue positions before the Populist

Party was even formed. Josephson described the mood in Congress after the 1890 election:

[I]n the House . . . the same majority of Republicans who had voted reactionary measures in perfect discipline a year before now came close to passing a free-coinage bill, the resistance of the iron-willed Speaker, Reed, staving this off at the last hour. The rank-and-file politicians in Congress seemed unnerved by the uproar among their constituents. (1938, 480–81)

By 1890 the Alliance claimed that it had a membership of 3,000,000 (Haynes 1916, 231).

    The second key event for the empirical analysis is the July 1892 endorsement of the Populist Party platform. According to most historical accounts of the period between the 1890 election and July 1892, agrarian interests differed as to whether a third party should be formed or whether interest groups should continue to pressure the established parties. The Alliance leadership was generally against forming a third party (Hicks 1961). An editorial in the *National Economist* stated, "A third political party will not be formed by these organizations. It is a nonpartisan movement in which each member may remain true to his party, but each one will see to it that this party continues true to him."[9] Up until the national convention, many in the South continued to believe that the Democratic Party would adopt the Alliance demands. As Hicks (1961, 240) explains,

Repeatedly President Polk of the Southern Alliance had declared his willingness to hold in line for the Democratic party the farmers under his control if only that party would "come out and take a stand squarely on the Alliance platform"; and with this pronouncement in mind many southern Alliancemen awaited the outcome of the Democratic nominating convention of 1892 before making their decisions.

Nevertheless, in 1892 both parties nominated presidential candidates perceived by the agrarian electorate to be insufficiently sympathetic to the Populist cause. Furthermore, even officeholders elected with Alliance support were perceived to be more conservative than the Alliance membership (Sanders 1999, 128). Failing to sufficiently change the policy positions of the established parties, the agrarian and labor organizations met again in Omaha to formulate the Populist Party platform.[10]
    The 1892 Omaha Platform gave birth to the Populist Party but not to new issues or to an observable change in mobilization strategies. The Omaha platform essentially incorporated most of the St. Louis and Ocala demands. The historical literature, to my knowledge, does not indicate that there was any sudden change in preferences or voter mobilization activities other than what was associated with the introduction of the Populist Party. Thus, changes in congressional roll-call

votes related to Populist issues between the Congress elected in 1890 and the Congress elected in 1892 may arguably reflect the increase in the Populist electoral threat associated with the Populist Party's formation.

The credibility of the Populist electoral threat after 1892 is evident in the number of Populists successfully elected to nonpresidential offices across different states. Between 1892 and 1896, the Populist Party won more than 40 House of Representative elections in about ten different states.[11] The Populist Party had enough support to control the state legislatures in two states (Kansas and Nebraska) and to win gubernatorial elections in four states (Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and South Dakota).

2. The Populist Electoral Threat

The main independent variable of interest is the degree to which legislators faced electoral pressure to support Populist policies. Two types of electoral pressure are of particular interest. The first is the direct electoral threat, which is related to the Populist candidates' vote shares. Third-party candidates' vote shares reveal not only the popularity of third-party policies but also whether or not the third-party vote could potentially change the electoral balance between the established parties. The second type of electoral pressure is the latent electoral support, which is related to the socioeconomic characteristics of a district's electorate. The latent electoral support is the degree to which a district's constituency could be mobilized to elect candidates favoring Populist policies.

I measured the direct electoral threat in three ways. The first measure is simply the vote share of the Populist candidate in a particular district.[12] This measure can be used to test the claim that established parties only co-opt third-party issue positions when the third party reveals that such positions can attract votes. A Populist congressional candidate who wins a large vote share reveals that the Populist issue is "ripe" for co-optation by the established-party representative in that particular district.[13]

My second measure of the direct electoral threat is a dummy variable indicating when the Populist candidate's vote share could provide the swing vote between the two major-party candidates. When the Populist candidate's vote share is larger than the difference between the established parties' vote shares, established-party candidates have an incentive to co-opt the Populist position or risk losing the votes to the other established-party candidate in the next election.

The third measure of the direct electoral threat is a dummy variable indicating when the Populist candidate had the second-highest vote total. When a Populist candidate had the second-highest vote total,

the Populist issues would have been the main dimension of partisan conflict, leading the established-party candidate to respond to the electorate's demand for Populist policies. The electoral data that I used to calculate the direct electoral threat measures come from Michael Dubin's (1998) *United States Congressional Elections, 1788–1997: The Official Results of the 1st through 105th Congresses.*[14]

I measured latent Populist electoral support in two ways.[15] The first measure is the interest rate on farm mortgages. In the economic history literature, the agricultural unrest at the turn of the twentieth century is often closely tied to the high interest rates on farm mortgages (Eichengreen 1984; Sanders 1999; Stock 1984). Areas with high farm mortgage interest rates may be correlated with high Populist Party support for two reasons: First, agricultural interests viewed the high mortgage rates as part of the eastern establishment's efforts to extract monopoly rents from the vulnerable farmers. Second, the variation in interest rates reflects the variation in economic uncertainty and risk across regions. The agricultural protest during this period is commonly argued to be correlated with economic uncertainty (Eichengreen 1984; McGuire 1981; North 1974). The county-level dataset comes from the *1890 Report on Farms and Homes* (U.S. Census Office 1896)**.**

The second measure is an index of economic development discussed by Bensel (2000). The Bensel index of economic development includes four components that Bensel has found to be associated with electoral support for the Populist Party: value added in manufacturing, patent activity, farm and home mortgage interest rates, and accumulated wealth.[16] The county-level data come from *ICPSR I00003 Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790–1970*, the *Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation at the Eleventh Census: 1890*, and the *1892 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents* (U.S. Census Office 1892.)

If legislators are responsive to their district preferences, then changes in roll-call voting that were due to increases in Populist Party threats must be separated from changes in roll-call voting due to changes in district characteristics. The two changes in district characteristics that are most relevant to this article are shifts in demographic characteristics and in economic conditions. These changes could occur naturally over time, as a result of redistricting, or both.

Because the Populist platform appealed primarily to agrarian interests, the main demographic shift of interest is the change in the proportion of the electorate engaged in agriculture versus manufacturing. An increase in agricultural intensity or a decrease in manufacturing intensity should have led legislators to be more responsive to demands

for Populist policies. Unfortunately, data on intertemporal changes in agricultural intensity are not available for this time period, so the only measure of demographic change I have included in this analysis is the change in the proportion of the population engaged in manufacturing.[17]

Analysts commonly perceive negative economic conditions to be correlated with an increase in voter discontent with the established parties. Thus, we might expect poor economic conditions to increase the propensity for voters to vote for the Populist Party (Bibby and Maisel 2003; Gillespie 1993; Hicks 1961; McConnell 1953; Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984; Stedman and Stedman 1950). Here, intertemporal change in economic output is measured both by changes in farm output per farm and by changes in manufacturing output per manufacturing employee.[18]

The data used to measure the district characteristics come from *ICPSR I00003 Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790–1970* and from the 1890 census. The county-level data on district characteristics are available only in ten-year intervals, and thus only capture long-term trends in district characteristics. Again, I aggregated the county-level data up to the district level and omitted districts for which county-level data were unavailable.

Additional variables are included to capture the change in districts' latent Populist electoral threats after redistricting. Legislators who represented districts with a higher latent Populist electoral threat after redistricting may have been more responsive to the Populist policy demands. Since redistricting was not likely to be done at random, it is possible that district boundaries were redrawn to diffuse the Populist threat. Such strategic redistricting would suggest that an increase in the Populist threat due to redistricting may not necessarily have led to a change in roll-call voting patterns. A much larger proportion of the congressional districts were redistricted in 1892 than in 1890.[19]

Two measurement problems arise from aggregating county-level data to the district level. First, a number of districts had boundaries that did not match the county boundaries. This discrepancy was particularly a problem for more-populated areas, such as the urban counties. Only districts for which 90% of the district vote shares could be accounted for by complete counties were included in the analysis. The county-level data were aggregated to the district level using *ICPSR Study I0001 Historical Election Returns* and Martis's (1982) *Historical Atlas of United States Congressional Districts*.[20] Second, a number of districts whose boundaries were changed because of redistricting could not be matched across Congresses. Only districts for which at least 50% of the population was the same across Congresses were included in the analysis.

TABLE 1
Roll-Call Votes Used to Make the Populist Score

| Issue Area	51st Congress		52d Congress		53d Congress	
	Bill No.	Date	Bill No.	Date	Bill No.	Date
Silver/Coinage	H511188	6/7/90	H521047	3/24/92	H531010	8/28/93
	H511212	6/25/90	H521049	3/24/92	H521137	6/29/92
			H521180	7/13/92	H532092	3/1/94
					H532093	3/1/94
					H532095	3/1/94
					H533023	**2/7/95**
					H532256	8/13/94
Railroad Regulation	H511259	7/17/90	H521049	3/24/92	**H533007**	**12/11/94**
	H511356	9/8/90	H521137	6/29/92	**H533020**	**2/2/95**
					H533040	**3/1/95**
Tariff/Tax Votes	H511169	5/21/90	H521092	5/2/92	H532257	8/13/94
	H511175	5/21/90	H521071	4/9/92		
	H511335	8/21/90	H521047	3/24/92		
Banking/Circulation	**H512011**	**12/3/90**	H521119	6/6/92	H532003	12/8/93
	H511019	1/28/90				
Bankruptcy/Debt	H511065	2/15/90				
	H511270	7/24/90				
	H511271	7/24/90				
Options/Futures			H521117	6/6/92	H532201	6/22/94
					H532202	6/27/93

Note: Boldfaced entries indicate roll-call votes that were held after the election for the next Congress.

3. Populist Entry and House Roll-Call Votes

The dependent variable of interest is the legislator's votes on roll calls related to Populist issues. Each legislator has a Populist score for each Congress,[21] measured as the proportion of times that the legislator voted in the Populist direction on roll-call votes related to Populist issues.

The main challenge in creating this measure was to differentiate Populist from non-Populist roll-call votes.[22] I identified the Populist roll-call votes using five criteria: (1) the roll-call vote was related to the demands that were included in the St. Louis, Ocala, and Omaha conferences; (2) the debate in the Congressional Record indicates that the roll-call vote had some connection to the Populist demands; (3) the known Populist or Populist-type legislators voted as expected on the roll call; (4) exploratory factor analysis shows that the roll-call votes all load on a similar dimension; and (5) the roll-call votes took place before the election to the next Congress.[23] Only those roll-call votes that satisfied these criteria were used for this article (see Table 1).

FIGURE 1
Distribution of Congressmen
on the Populist Dimension by Party

Note: This figure presents box plots of the congressmen's Populist scores in the 53d Congress broken down by party. The Populist scores of Democratic congressmen appear closer to the Populist congressmen's Populist scores than the Republican congressmen's Populist scores.

The selection process is relatively conservative in designating roll-call votes as Populist-type votes.[24] The substantive findings are robust to minor changes in the roll-call votes classified as Populist.

Figure 1 presents a box plot of the Populist roll-call scores of the legislators in the Congress elected after the articulation of the Populist platform in 1892. The legislators are grouped by partisan affiliation.[25] This figure shows that the distribution of the Democratic legislators is closer to the Populist position than the distribution of Republican legislators. The positions also match the descriptions of the parties in the historical literature.[26]

The Populist roll-call scores do not merely provide a measure of the partisan divide, but also reveal an issue cleavage that crosses partisan boundaries. Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the Populist roll-call scores against first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, also for the Congress elected after the articulation of the Populist Platform in 1892.[27]

FIGURE 2
Scatterplot of Congressmen's Populist Roll-Call Scores
against Their DW-NOMINATE Scores

First Dimension Poole/Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE Scores

Note: This figure illustrates that the variation in the congressmen's Populist roll-call scores differs from the variation in the traditional measures of legislator partisanship or ideology.

The DW-NOMINATE scores are often interpreted as ideology or the main dimension of partisan conflict. Figure 2 illustrates that the variation in the Populist roll-call score differs to a certain degree from the variation in the DW-NOMINATE scores.[28] The substantive interpretation of some of the results is sensitive to whether or not the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE is included as a covariate.[29]

One potential methodological concern is that the presence of abstentions may bias the location of a legislator's Populist position if members' abstentions were not random. Roll-call votes with more than a quarter of the members abstaining were common during this period. Abstentions were a possible strategy to deal with potential Populist threats.[30] In the on-line Appendix <http://www.uiowa.edu/~lsq/Hirano_Appendix>, I discuss the potential biases that could occur from nonrandom abstention. Although I found the abstentions to be uncorrelated with the threat measures used in this article, to ensure more accurate estimates of congressmen's Populist positions, I dropped

members from the analysis if they abstained on more than half of the roll-call votes used to calculate the Populist position.[31]

The relationship between Populist electoral threats and members' roll-call votes on Populist issues is estimated using a simple linear specification. Let i index district and let t index Congresses. Let P_{it} be the proportion of times the legislator in district i votes in favor of the Populist position in Congress t. Let T_i be a measure of the Populist electoral threat in district i. The specification is as follows:

$$P_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 P_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 T_i + \alpha_3 D_i + \alpha_4 R_i + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

The model is estimated for Congresses before and after the St. Louis and Ocala demands (1889/1890) and the Congresses before and after the Omaha platform (1892) separately. This model includes variables that measure changes in district characteristics between 1880 and 1890, D_i. The model also includes variables that measure changes in electoral threats due to redistricting, R_i. Shifts and stretches in the Populist roll-call measures are accounted for by the constant term, α_0, and the coefficient on the Populist roll-call score from the previous Congress, α_1.[32,33]

I estimated the specification separately for Democrats and Republicans. Only those districts where the parties retained control over the district across elections were included in the analysis.

Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the regressions of the Democratic congressmen's Populist roll-call voting positions after the St. Louis/Ocala demands on the congressmen's Populist roll-call voting positions before the St. Louis/Ocala demands, the various electoral threat measures, and changes in district characteristics measures. Huber-White standard errors are reported in the table.[34]

The statistically significant coefficient on Populist roll-call voting position in the previous Congress suggests that there was some stability in these members' roll-call voting positions across these two Congresses. The coefficients on interest rates on farm mortgages are statistically significant in models (1) and (4). The estimated on economic development is statistically significant in model (2). The vote share for third parties potentially related to the Populist movement is also included in models (3) and (4), but the coefficients on this variable are not statistically significant.[35] These results are consistent with the claim that the formation of a third party is not necessary for legislators to co-opt third-party policies in their roll-call votes.

The statistically significant coefficients on both farm mortgage interest rates and economic development are consistent with the claim

TABLE 2
Democratic Congressmen's Roll-Call Voting
Pre- and Post-St. Louis/Ocala Demands

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Score 51st Congress	0.601*	0.563*	0.748*	0.582*
	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.126)
Farm Interest Rates	0.045*			0.040*
	(0.012)			(0.017)
Economic Development		−0.061*		−0.013
		(0.020)		(0.029)
Populist Vote Share			−0.034	−0.031
			(0.118)	(0.114)
%Δ Mfg Output per worker	−0.131	−0.085	−0.088	−0.126
	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.076)
%Δ Farm Output per farm	−0.110	−0.032	−0.054	−0.097
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Δ Mfg Population	−1.827	0.784	−2.359	−1.241
	(1.129)	(1.628)	(1.373)	(1.733)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist	−0.186			−0.146
	(0.218)			(0.279)
Δ Econ Dev Redist		−0.012		−0.003
		(0.103)		(0.135)
Constant	−0.060	0.435*	0.167	0.025
	(0.103)	(0.145)	(0.110)	(0.235)
R^2	0.454	0.422	0.356	0.455
Observations	99	99	99	99

Note: Huber-White standard errors appear in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

that Alliance activities or the potential third-party threat, or both, mobilized the electorate in districts with high interest rates, low economic development, or some combination thereof. As discussed in Section 1, electoral mobilization increased after the 1889–90 St. Louis/ Ocala demands. The stronger correlation between interest rates and Populist roll-call votes than between economic development and Populist roll-call votes is consistent with the idea that the electorate in areas that felt most exploited by the eastern establishment were more likely to be receptive to Populist policies. The difference in statistical significance of the coefficients on farm mortgages and economic development may also indicate that the members' votes on Populist roll calls were particularly responsive in districts where the agricultural interests faced severe economic hardship.

TABLE 3
Republican Congressmen's Roll-Call Voting
Pre- and Post-St. Louis/Ocala Demands

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Score 51st Congress	0.249	0.240	0.151	0.079
	(0.204)	(0.267)	(0.199)	(0.291)
Farm Interest Rates	0.040			0.032
	(0.031)			(0.029)
Economic Development		−0.038		−0.006
		(0.057)		(0.054)
Populist Vote Share			1.512*	1.412
			(0.694)	(0.783)
%Δ Mfg Output per worker	−0.003	0.023	−0.171	−0.154
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.129)	(0.167)
%Δ Farm Output per farm	0.199	0.190	0.170	0.127
	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.127)
Δ Mfg Population	−1.290	−1.029	−2.350	−1.946
	(1.802)	(2.147)	(1.845)	(2.311)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist	−0.900			−1.613
	(0.678)			(1.000)
Δ Econ Dev Redist		−0.051		−0.209
		(0.060)		(0.133)
Constant	−0.061	0.334	0.204*	0.022
	(0.204)	(0.194)	(0.059)	(0.282)
R^2	0.277	0.244	0.369	0.422
Observations	40	40	40	40

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 3 presents the same set of estimated coefficients as in Table 2 but for Republican legislators. There is little evidence that farm mortgage interest rates or economic development are correlated with the change in members' Populist roll-call voting positions. There is some evidence in model (3) that vote share for third parties potentially related to the Populist movement may be correlated with a change in Populist roll-call voting for Republicans. This result primarily reflects the success of Populist-type candidates in Kansas. These results should be viewed with some caution, however, in light of the small sample size.[36]

Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients from the regression with Democratic members' Populist roll-call votes after the 1892 Omaha Platform articulation as the dependent variable. The models in Table 4 include several different measures of the direct effect of the Populist electoral threat. The results in Table 4 show no statistically

TABLE 4
Democratic Congressmen's Roll-Call Voting
Pre- and Post-Omaha Platform

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Score 52d Congress	0.725*	0.609*	0.807*	0.826*	0.804*	0.799*	0.615*
	(0.143)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.162)	(0.156)
Farm Interest Rates	0.049*						0.012
	(0.017)						(0.021)
Economic Development		−0.095*					−0.096*
		(0.026)					(0.036)
Populist Vote Share			0.123				−0.164
			(0.150)				(0.142)
Pop Vote > Close				0.019			
				(0.046)			
Populist 2d Place					0.062		
					(0.043)		
Close or 2d Place						0.039	
						(0.047)	
%Δ Mfg Output per worker	−0.008	0.029	−0.048	−0.047	−0.040	−0.048	0.047
	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.087)
%Δ Farm Output per farm	−0.298	−0.189	−0.227	−0.218	−0.224	−0.229	−0.187
	(0.160)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.140)
Δ Mfg Population	−5.022*	−1.738	−5.255*	−5.411*	−5.442*	−5.250*	−2.016
	(1.329)	(1.942)	(1.279)	(1.283)	(1.305)	(1.312)	(2.067)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist	0.018						0.059
	(0.192)						(0.193)
Δ Econ Dev Redist		−0.026					0.000
		(0.090)					(0.091)
Constant	−0.167	0.488*	0.116	0.114	0.126	0.120	0.425
	(0.123)	(0.171)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.272)
R²	0.477	0.506	0.433	0.430	0.437	0.433	0.510
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	128	128

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

significant correlation between the changes in Populist roll-call voting patterns and direct electoral threats from Populist candidates. The absence of an association remains even when the Democratic legislator faced a Populist candidate with a high vote share, a Populist candidate with a vote share greater than the difference between the major-party vote shares, or a Populist candidate who won the second-highest vote share. These results are not consistent with the claims in the literature that co-optation occurs in response to third-party actors who reveal the demand for third-party issue positions by attracting a large number of voters during the elections.

TABLE 5
Republican Congressmen's Roll-Call Voting
Pre- and Post-Omaha Platform

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Score 52d Congress	0.446*	0.643*	0.551*	0.611*	0.703*	0.495*
	(0.207)	(0.192)	(0.196)	(0.180)	(0.199)	(0.227)
Farm Interest Rates	0.127*					0.096
	(0.035)					(0.058)
Economic Development		−0.126*				−0.082
		(0.047)				(0.077)
Populist Vote Share			0.569*			−0.081
			(0.277)			(0.326)
Pop Vote > Close				0.196		
				(0.103)		
Populist 2d Place					0.224	
					(0.133)	
%Δ Mfg Output per worker	0.160	0.216	0.085	0.099	0.058	0.199
	(0.133)	(0.170)	(0.163)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.123)
%Δ Farm Output per farm	−0.328*	−0.275	−0.283*	−0.265	−0.250	−0.312*
	(0.130)	(0.163)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.125)
Δ Mfg Population	−0.234	1.182	−0.670	−1.573	−0.957	2.175
	(2.129)	(1.906)	(2.677)	(2.865)	(2.799)	(2.014)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist	−0.558					−0.971*
	(0.451)					(0.410)
Δ Econ Dev Redist		−0.409*				−0.400*
		(0.199)				(0.182)
Constant	−0.700*	0.491*	0.064	0.091	0.060	−0.271
	(0.218)	(0.204)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.627)
R^2	0.538	0.465	0.426	0.390	0.387	0.608
Observations	37	37	37	37	37	37

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 4 shows that the coefficient on farm mortgage interest rates is positive and statistically significant only in model (1). The coefficient on economic development is negative and statistically significant when included in the model, whether or not the other direct or indirect threat measures are included. Assuming that the mobilization and education of Populist policies had largely occurred by 1891—which is the impression given by historical accounts—it is possible that one of the primary changes affecting roll-call votes on Populist issues in the Congress following the 1892 election was the introduction of the Populist Party. With this claim, the coefficients on farm mortgage interest rates and economic development may reflect the impact of the Populist Party on Democratic representatives' roll-call

votes. The results in Table 4 are consistent with the idea that the activities associated with third-party entry have an additional mobilizing and educating effect on the electorate and also potentially increase the credibility of a third-party threat in the next election. The stronger correlation between economic development and Populist roll-call votes than between farm interest rates and Populist roll-call votes may suggest that Populist Party formation broadened the appeal of the party's policies to a wider audience of constituents facing economic difficulty.

Table 5 presents the same set of estimated coefficients as in Table 4 but for Republican members. The coefficients on farm mortgage interest rates, economic development and Populist vote share are statistically significant in models (1) to (3). These three measures are highly corre-lated, making it difficult to determine to which threat the Republicans were being most responsive. When all three measures are included, as in model (6), none of the coefficients on these variables are statisti-cally significant. Like the Table 3 results, the results in Table 5 should be viewed with caution because of the small sample size.

In most of the models, the coefficients on the long-term changes in district socioeconomic characteristics are statistically insignificant. One exception is the negative coefficient on change in manufacturing population in Table 4, a result consistent with the claim that areas with growing manufacturing populations had fewer voters who supported Populist positions. Another exception is the negative coefficient on percent change in farm output per farm in Table 5, which is consistent with the claim that voters supported Populist policies in areas where the agricultural industry was economically depressed. The main substantive findings regarding the Populist threats are robust to inclu-sion and omission of the long-term socioeconomic change variables.[37]

Populist Entry, Roll-call Votes, and the Australian Ballot

In this section, I explore whether or not the introduction of the Australian ballot affected legislators' reaction to the Populist Party threat. In the 1890–1892 period, states were beginning to introduce the Australian ballot. The analysis exploits this variation to determine if this reform is correlated with how the congressmen responded to third-party electoral threats. There is some debate in the literature, however, as to whether the introduction of the Australian ballot increased or decreased the third-party electoral threat.

One view is that the introduction of the Australian ballot increased the third-party threat to individual legislators by allowing voters to split their tickets and vote for Populist congressional candidates when

TABLE 6
Democratic Congressmen's Roll-Call Voting,
Including the Australian Ballot

Variable	Pre-/Post-Ocala		Pre-/Post-Omaha		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Score 52d Congress	0.568*	0.517*	0.717*	0.607*	0.807*
	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.154)
Farm Interest Rates	0.053*		0.058*		
	(0.013)		(0.025)		
Farm Int Rate * Australian Ballot	−0.027		−0.017		
	(0.029)		(0.028)		
Economic Development		−0.072*		−0.101*	
		(0.020)		(0.027)	
Econ Dev * Australian Ballot		0.051		0.010	
		(0.038)		(0.034)	
Populist Vote Share					0.113
					(0.225)
Populist Vote * Australian Ballot					−0.001
					(0.347)
Australian Ballot	0.188	−0.113	0.127	−0.003	−0.008
	(0.230)	(0.086)	(0.214)	(0.087)	(0.072)
%Δ Mfg Output per worker	−0.144	−0.079	−0.006	0.037	−0.049
	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.092)
%Δ Farm Output per farm	−0.134	−0.028	−0.314	−0.163	−0.235
	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.177)
Δ Mfg Population	−1.846	0.707	−5.096*	−1.934	−5.222*
	(1.106)	(1.628)	(1.378)	(2.103)	(1.407)
Δ Farm I.R. Redist	−0.175		0.019		
	(0.243)		(0.194)		
Δ Econ Dev Redist		0.040		−0.018	
		(0.109)		(0.092)	
Constant	−0.089	0.500*	−0.231	0.496*	0.121
	(0.104)	(0.146)	(0.168)	(0.182)	(0.130)
R^2	0.460	0.433	0.478	0.508	0.433
Observations	99	99	128	128	128

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

they did not support the full Populist ticket. Evans (1917) suggests that the party ballots benefited the established party machines. Harvey and Mukherjee (N.d.), Rusk (1970), and Ansolabehere, Hirano, and Snyder (2007) have all found that split-ticket voting was more likely to occur under the Australian ballot, providing evidence consistent with the idea that the Australian ballot could be correlated with the third-party electoral threat.

     The alternate view is that the Australian ballot restricted ballot access (Bibby and Maisel 2003; Epstein 1986; Kousser 1974) and that third parties in the past may have benefited from being able to print their own ballots (Holt 1999, as cited in Bibby and Maisel 2003).[38] Reynolds and McCormick (1986) argue that split-ticket voting was more prevalent than previous studies suggest because local party organizations had more control over the ballots than under the Australian ballot system.

     To determine if legislators' responses to the Populist electoral threat differed in states with and without the Australian ballot, I included an indicator variable for whether or not the legislator's state adopted the Australian ballot and then I interacted this indicator variable with the Populist electoral threat measures. Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients.

     These results suggest that adoption of the Australian ballot did not have a statistically significant association with changes in legislators' roll-call votes on Populist issues. The congressmen's response to the Populist electoral threat may not have differed significantly between the states with and without the Australian ballot.[39] Nevertheless, further research should be done on how the ballot form may affect legislator response to third-party electoral threats.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

     Do electorally successful third parties influence roll-call votes on third-party issues? The results discussed in this article show that the influence of third parties on roll-call voting is not necessarily through the electoral success of these parties, as has been suggested in the literature. There is little evidence that legislators adopt more Populist-type positions in their roll-call voting after they have faced an electorally successful third-party candidate. Furthermore, the results show that actual party formation is not necessary to lead legislators to co-opt third-party issues.

     The results are consistent with the idea that third parties influence policy both by mobilizing and educating the electorate and by

providing a potential electoral threat. The mobilization and education could also be accomplished by interest groups, but third parties differ from interest groups because they can potentially provide a direct electoral threat when the established parties are unresponsive to third-party issues. This distinction would suggest that interest group activities are less likely to be influential without the shadow of a third-party threat.

Although the article focuses on one particular third party, the idea that major parties respond to the mobilization and education activities *and* the electoral threats of third parties—not only to the actual electoral success of third parties—is not likely to be unique to the Populist Party case.[40] The findings of my study are consistent with predictions from the general models of entry in the political economy and industrial organization literatures: the threat of competition from new actors should provide sufficient incentives for the established actors to adjust their behaviors even before the new actor enters. Thus, for observers concerned by the noticeable absence of electorally successful third parties in recent U.S. elections, the results in this article suggest that the presence of third parties is still likely to be felt even when the actual third parties themselves do not materialize.

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NOTES

1. Fred E. Haynes (1916) concurs: "The larger the number of votes cast for a third party, the greater the probability that its issue will be adopted by one or both of the great parties rather than that its manifest strength will help it to displace or take a place alongside the established parties" (3). Similarly, Daniel A. Mazmanian (1974) writes, "Usually after a strong showing by a minor party, at least one of the major parties shifts its position, adopting the third party's rhetoric if not the core of its programs" (143). More recently, Paul Herrnson (2002) writes, "When a minor-party or independent candidate introduces an issue that proves to be popular, Democratic or Republican leaders are quick to co-opt it" (18).

2. Hug (1996) provides a formal model showing how the electoral support of third parties can solve the informational asymmetry between interest groups and established parties.

3. Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1984) present a number of anecdotal accounts of presidential candidates adopting third-party policies. For example, Henry Wallace's entry in the 1948 presidential election is thought to have made Harry Truman take a more-liberal stance on civil rights. George Wallace's entry into the 1968 presidential election is perceived to have softened Richard Nixon's stance on racial integration. And Ross Perot's entry in 1992 may have induced Bill Clinton to co-opt the Reform Party's tough stance on deficit reduction.

4. Beck (1997, 50) goes on to write,

Continued dissatisfaction with the major parties certainly provided an opening for a formidable third party. When this occurs, however, the normal workings of the American electoral system make it likely that the "third" party will displace one of the major parties (as the Republicans did with the Whigs) or be absorbed by changes in one of the major parties (as happened with the Democrats in 1896 and 1936).

Even in this statement, however, Beck is not clear as to whether or not the third party is the cause for the major parties' absorption of the third party's policies.

5. Focusing on one case of third-party entry limits the generalizability of the results, but the unique features of the historical context surrounding the Populist Party's entry allowed me to test several general hypotheses about the impact of third-party entry that could not be readily tested using other cases of third-party entry.

6. There are multiple reasons why congressmen would have had an incentive to co-opt Populist policies even without the Populist Party being present. Powerful interest groups, such as the Farmers' Alliance, raised issues and influenced public sentiment in favor of Populist policies. There may have simply been an exogenous shock to voter preferences. The game-theoretical models of elections with an endogenous number of candidates find that the established actors should respond to third-party electoral threats even before the third party actually enters (Feddersen, Sened, and Wright 1990; Osborne 1993; Palfrey 1984; Shepsle 1990).

7. According to Nye (1959, 9), one farm journalist wrote, "I cannot recall another conspiracy in the history of mankind quite equal in colossal and criminal splendor to the profound and universal plot of Wall Street," a plot "to reduce the Midwest to vassalage." Similarly, Hicks (1961, 55) observed, "More and more the conviction settled down upon the farmer that he was the victim of 'some extrinsic baleful influence.' Someone was 'walking off with the surplus' that society as a whole was clearly building up and that in part at least should be his."

8. Among the changes was the inclusion of a demand for a tariff reduction (Haynes 1916, 233).

9. Quoted in Hicks 1961, 205.

10. The sudden rise in attention to Populist issues in 1890 and 1892 is evident in the newspaper coverage. A ProQuest search of articles in several historical newspapers for the keyword(s) *Democrat* or *Republican* and *Populist* or *People's Party* or *Farmer's Alliance* yields a sudden increase in these articles as a percentage of all articles that contain the key word(s) *Democrat* or *Republican*. The percentage of articles rises from less than 1% in 1889 to 3% in 1890 to 8% in 1892. The newspapers available through

ProQuest include the *Atlanta Constitution*, the *Boston Daily Globe*, the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal,* and the *Washington Post*.

11. There is some discrepancy in various sources as to which congressmen should be considered Populist. A number of congressmen ran on fusion labels or labels very close to Populists, so it is unclear how these legislators should be counted. Clanton (1998) and Gillespie (1993) list the numbers of Populist candidates and state of origin of the Populist congressmen. With a few discrepancies, these two sources report Populists winning seats in Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.

12. I considered major-party candidates who had a fusion label with the Populist Party to be Populist candidates. I also constructed this measure by only including candidates who only had a Populist label.

13. It is possible that voters simply voted against the status quo and not necessarily for the Populist Party's policies. But unless the established-party congressional candidates could differentiate between the protest and policy preference votes, it seems reasonable to assume that these candidates viewed the Populist candidates' vote shares as measures of direct electoral threats.

14. The nonrandom assignment of Populist candidates creates a potential problem with estimation and may bias the results. Unfortunately, in the absence of variables that satisfy the relevant exclusion restrictions, the Heckman selection model would only be identified by the functional form assumptions. Rather than presenting a poorly identified selection model, I have chosen to present only the single-equation regression results.

15. In previous versions of this paper, I included two additional measures but chose not to include them in this article. Since the Populist Party was also perceived as drawing support from groups that had supported third parties in the past, representatives might have felt more threatened by Populist candidates if their constituents had supported other third-party candidates previously. I measured propensity to vote for third parties with the average vote for third-party presidential candidates in the 1880, 1884, and 1888 elections. The results from this measure were statistically insignificant.

Because the Populist Party platform incorporated many demands by agricultural interests and the main organizations supporting the party were agricultural interests (e.g., the Alliance), we might expect areas with a large portion of the electorate involved in agriculture to be particularly receptive to Populist appeals. The county-level data come from the *1890 Census Statistics of Agriculture* and *ICPSR I00003 Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790–1970*. The results using this measure suggested that there might be some relationship between agricultural intensity and legislators' roll-call votes on Populist issues.

A third possible measure would be constituent participation in the major organizations supporting the Populist movement, such as the Alliance or Knights of Labor, but these data have not been uncovered at the level of disaggregation necessary for this study.

16. Bensel (2000) also includes illiteracy in his economic development measure, but he later shows that there is no clear association between illiteracy and support for the Populist Party.

17. The number of families involved in farming is only available for the 1890 census, not the 1880 census. I measured changing manufacturing intensity as [*Mfg workers* (1890) / *Total Pop* (1890)] – [*Mfg workers* (1880) / *Total Pop* (1880)].

18. [(*Farm Output / Farm* (1890)) – (*Farm Output / Farm* (1880))] / (*Farm Output / Farm* (1880)) and [(*Mfg Output / Worker* (1890)) – (*Mfg Output / Worker* (1880))] / (*Mfg Output / Worker* (1880)). The number of families involved in farming in 1880 is not readily available. The figure for farm output per farm is potentially misleading, since several families may have worked on the same farm. Comparison of the number of farms versus the number of farm families in 1890 indicates that few counties had much discrepancy between the two.

19. The statistical significance of the results for the pre-/post-Omaha platform results is somewhat sensitive to whether or not the set of districts is limited to those that were not redistricted. The statistical significance of the results for the pre-/post-St. Louis and Ocala demands is robust to dropping the districts that were redistricted.

20. The ICPSR data and the Martis (1982) data differed with respect to the counties contained in some electoral districts. I studied the discrepancies and ultimately decided to use the measure that allowed the county-level data aggregated to the district level to most closely resemble the district-level data provided by Dubin (1997). When the aggregated county-level data differed significantly from the Dubin data, I omitted the district.

21. The roll-call votes can be combined into an index in any number of ways described in the cottage industry of scaling methods: NOMINATE, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), Heckman-Snyder, and Clinton-Jackman-Rivers. There is surprisingly little variation in the roll-call voting scores obtained from these different scaling methods (Burden, Caldeira, and Groseclose 2000; Clinton, Rivers, and Jackman 2004; Heckman and Snyder 1997). For the purpose of this article, which requires an estimate of a dimension with a specific substantive interpretation over time, the count method is likely to outperform the existing more computationally intense methods that do not account for the substantive interpretation of the indices.

22. Because the Populists never controlled the agenda in Congress, the only roll-call votes that made it to the floor were those that originated and were supported by one of the major parties. Thus, we cannot create a purely Populist index.

23. During this period, a number of roll-call votes were taken after the election for the next Congress had already been decided. Those members who were not reelected would most likely have had different incentives when voting on these roll calls. I excluded from this study those roll calls that were held after the election to the next Congress, but the results do not differ if these roll-call votes are included.

24. Whether or not tariff reduction should be included as a Populist issue is a matter open to debate. Tariff reduction was clearly viewed as being in the interests of the constituencies targeted by the Populists. Tariff reduction was even included in the Ocala demands in 1890. William A. Peffer (1891) devotes a chapter of his book *The Farmer's Side* to presenting the negative effect that tariffs had on the agricultural community. Nye (1959, 8) writes, "The farmer sold in an unprotected market and bought in one protected by a tariff whose schedules were set in favor of Eastern industrial and financial interests." The main argument against including tariff reduction as a Populist issue is that it was one of the main issue cleavages between the Democrats and Republicans (Bensel 1984, 2000). Although tariff reduction aligned with Populist interests, tariff reduction was not promoted as a Populist issue in an effort to separate

the Populists from the established parties' platforms. I performed the analyses both including and excluding tariff-related roll-call votes. If the tariff roll-call votes are completely partisan, then they will not affect much of the following analysis, which focuses on estimating changes in legislators' roll-call voting relative to the roll-call voting of other legislators within the same party.

25. Fusion candidates are not represented in the figure.

26. Although the Republican Party in the West had previously been viewed as favorable toward reform, by the late 1880s the perception of the party had changed to one more closely connected to industrial and financial interests, as indicated by a December 1892 editorial in *The Review of Reviews:*

The Republican party was condemned because the voters believed that its policies had come to be too favorable towards the concentration of wealth. . . . In the West, the Republicans were accounted more closely connected than the Democrats with corporate wealth in railroads, banks and capitalistic undertakings in general, and the Republican party suffered accordingly. (cited in Haynes 1916, 269)

Although the Democratic Party was also viewed as having connections to industrial and financial interests, the party was known for containing factions that supported the Populist cause.

27. See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for an explanation of DW-NOMINATE scores. Using Heckman-Snyder first-dimension scores in place of the DW-NOMINATE scores produces essentially the same scatterplot.

28. With a few exceptions, the correlation between the DW-NOMINATE score and the Populist score is mostly in the 0.4 to 0.6 range, depending upon the years and parties being correlated.

29. The statistical significance of the pre- and post-Omaha results for the Democratic Party is sensitive to the inclusion of the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score from the 53d (post-1892 election) Congress. In contrast, the statistical significance of the results for the Democratic Party are robust to including the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score from the 52d (post-1890 election) Congress. The statistical significance of coefficients on the Populist threat variables in the pre- and post-St. Louis/Ocala analyses are robust to the inclusion of 51st or 52d DW-NOMINATE scores.

30. For example, members who did not wish to fall out of favor with their Alliance constituency or the railroad interests, or both, may have chosen simply to abstain.

31. Another potential methodological concern with using roll calls as a measure of legislators' positions on Populist issues is the distribution of the roll-call cut-points. The distribution of the cut-points affects the degree to which legislators' Populist positions can be differentiated. The more evenly the cut-points are distributed across the Populist dimension, the more specific we can be about the members' Populist positions.

32. I also estimated a separate model that interacts the threat variables with incumbency status to take into account the possibility that incumbents and replacements may have reacted differently to the third-party threat. The conventional wisdom is that changes in roll-call voting behavior are more likely to occur through replacement than through incumbents changing their policy positions (Clausen 1973; Fiorina 1974; Poole 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Stone 1980). The results of this model show that there was no statistically significant difference between incumbents' and challengers' responses to the Populist electoral threat measures.

33. Although the quantity of interest is change in Populist roll-call score, I included the lagged Populist roll-call score instead of letting the dependent variable be the change in the Populist roll-call score. This technique allows flexibility; the Populist scores may not have exactly the same meaning in the two Congresses. For discussion of why this method is important, see Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999.

34. The results remain statistically significant when the standard errors are clustered by state.

35. I coded the candidates running under a Farmer's Alliance, Union Labor, or Reform party label as Populist-type candidates.

36. The small sample of Republican legislators reflects the large partisan shift in Congress that occurred during this period.

37. The statistical insignificance of coefficients on the long-term socioeconomic change variables may reflect poor measurement more than the lack of effect of these changes in district characteristics. The long-term trends may already be incorporated into the members' positions on Populist roll-call votes, since the variables measure the changes in socioeconomic characteristics between 1880 and 1890. Or these characteristics may not have changed very substantially over the course of two congressional sessions.

38. Upon reviewing the literature on the Australian ballot and third parties, Reynolds and McCormick (1986, 837) wrote, "According to those investigations, Democrats in the South and Republicans in the West commonly used the Australian ballot to discourage illiterate voters and to make it difficult for Populist candidates to gain electoral support."

39. In a separate analysis, I lagged the Australian ballot indicator variable by one year (i.e., if the Australian ballot passed was passed in year *t*, the indicator variable was 1 for the years after year *t*). Candidates and voters may have needed a year to adjust to the new ballot form. The coefficient on the interaction term between the lagged Australian ballot indicator variable and the farm interest rate variable is positive and statistically significant in the pre- and post-St. Louis/Ocala regression. This finding provides some evidence that the Australian ballot may have increased the Populist Party threat even before the party was actually formed.

40. Some preliminary analyses of the Green Party and Progressive Party movements suggest that there is little or no correlation between the electoral success of these third-party congressional candidates and the roll-call voting behavior of the major-party legislators. Still, further analyses should be conducted for these and other third parties.

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