



Democratic Transitions

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In the News...

- Building democracy is getting new levels of scrutiny in the popular press
 - Afghanistan
 - Built off existing institutions (loya jirga)
 - Still, no real national government (“warlords”)
 - Iraq
 - One justification for war was to establish a democratic government in the Middle East
 - But a long interim gov’t may be needed first



Big Questions

- How do you establish democracy?
- What keeps democratic governments from sliding into autocracy/chaos?
 - “Home-grown” vs. Imported democracy
- How do you get non-violent transitions?
- If democracy=elections, is this even a good thing for developing polities?
 - Zakaria – “Illiberal Democracies”



Institutions vs. institutions

- We have certain outcomes that we want a political system to deliver
 - Policy that reflects public opinion
 - Public officials responsive to their constituents
 - Protection for minorities, esp. ethnic
 - Rule of Law via a fair, efficient court system
 - Uncorrupt bureaucracy
- These are Institutions
 - Really, objectives of the system



Institutions vs. institutions

- We know little about what institutions can provide these in different settings
 - Parliamentary vs. Presidential systems
 - Federalism and/or corporatism
 - Electoral rules and campaign finance laws
- Like economic institutions in China
- We have some examples of what fully developed, stable democracies look like
 - But how to reach this destination?



This Paper

- Try to look at how countries have democratized in the past
 - Review existing theories
 - Present some new data and methods
 - Look at the results and their implications
- Speculate about how these trends are changing in the 21st Century
 - What, if anything, can the international community do to help?



Quick Peek at the Results

- Results

- Modernization theory holds up well
 - Positive income effects at all levels of democratization
 - Also some support for inequality effects
- Casts spotlight on partial democracies
 - Numerous
 - Most volatile
 - Hardest to predict/understand



Modernization Theory

- Lipset (1959) – Money matters
 - Higher income per capita is associated with democratic governance
 - Supported by evidence until...
- Przeworski, et. al. (PACL, 2000)
 - Positive results were due to over-aggregation of data
 - Separate into democracies and all others
 - Nothing predicts transitions up
 - Once up, per capita income of over \$4,000 helps keep things stable



Other Theories


- Acemoglu & Robinson (2003)
 - Transitions are economically based, as they redistribute income from rich to poor
 - Nonlinear impact of inequality on transitions
- Rosendorff (2001)
 - Inequality as well, plus increases in workforce and capital stock make revolutions less likely
- Haggard & Kaufman (1995)
 - Inflation & low growth: transitions out of autocracy
- Schmitter, O'Donnell – Consolidation
 - Factors promoting transition could make it fragile




Data: Partial Democracies

- PACL employ a dichotomous regime type
 - Democracy if:
 - Chief executive elected
 - Legislature exists and is elected
 - More than one political party
 - At least one successful transition of power
 - Autocracy otherwise
- We employ a trichotomous measure, including partial democracy


Distribution of Polity Scores




Distribution of Polity Scores




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
Distribution of Polity Scores




World Democratization Trends, 1955-2000




Regional Democratization Trends, 1955-2000




Africa




Asia




Australia



Europe



North & Central America



South America

Transition Frequencies

1-Year

	A	P	D
A	97.47	1.89	0.63
P	5.12	91.97	2.90
D	1.00	0.87	98.13

Transition Frequencies

1-Year


	A	P	D
A	97.47	1.89	0.63
P	5.12	91.97	2.90
D	1.00	0.87	98.13

5-Year


	A	P	D
A	89.64	7.13	3.24
P	20.43	65.76	13.81
D	3.84	4.13	92.03

Transition Frequencies by Type and Year


Autocracy




$A \rightarrow P$




$A \rightarrow D$




$P \rightarrow A$



$P \rightarrow D$



$D \rightarrow A$



$D \rightarrow P$


Democracy



Data: Previous Transitions

- Previous attempts at transition may affect success of current attempt
- Is it like:
 - Trying to quite smoking (+); or
 - A sign of structural instability (-)
- Hard to capture this systematically
- We use “Sumdown,” the sum of previous downward Polity movements
 - Example: Turkey, 1955-2000

Illustration of Sumdown Variable for Turkey, 1955-2000






Data: Inequality

- Plays a big role in many stories, including Acemoglu and Robinson
- Previous measures are rather incomplete
 - Even Denninger and Squire agree with this
- We create a new measure
 - Idea: infant mortality is caused by both health conditions & inequality
 - So regress IM on health correlates and take the residual as a measure of inequality

Infant Mortality Residual vs. Gini Coefficient





Econometric Approaches

- Tobit
 - Traditional regression approach, using full data range
 - But with limits at -10 and 10
- Markov
 - Breaks data into three categories: autocracy, partial democracy, full democracy
 - Looks at impact of variables on transition probabilities
- Duration Analysis
 - Analyzes length of time until a given transition occurs



Predictions

- Modernization: GDP/capita (+)
- Acemoglu & Robinson: Inequality (-),
Inequality² (-)
- Rosendorff: Inequality (-),
 Δ Workforce (-), Δ CapitalStock (-)
- Haggard & Kaufmann: GDP growth (+),
inflation(-)
- Consolidation: non-monotone hazard






Markov Analysis

Autocracy




Partial

Democracy



GDP/cap



Inequality





Previous Attempts






Duration Analysis

- Question: What prevents newly democratized countries from backsliding?
 - Different from the question of what gets them democratic in the first place
- Can ask this for full or partial democracies
 - I.e., most newly democratized nations will start off as partial democracies
- Tricky estimation, since we have repeated events (can democratize more than once)



Graphs by highgdp

Smoothed Hazard Estimate, Adjusted for Per Capita GDP





Conclusion

- Modernization theory holds up well
 - With 3-way dependent variable, income level does predict transitions out of autocracy
 - Helps keep partials from backsliding
- Acemoglu and Robinson get some support
- Focus debate on partial democracies
 - Increasingly common
 - Most volatile
 - Hardest to predict



Markov Analysis

