Digging Up Worms, Herding BotNets

Daniel Medina Academic Information Systems Columbia University





Introduction

26 April – 30 April, 2004

Scan and 'sploit via tcp 80, 135, 445, 1025, 2745, 3127, 5000, 6129...

Phatbot variant – malicious bot software, not mindless worm!

Encrypted, distributed communications back to C&C

POST to www.stanford.edu, www.rit.edu, nitro.ucsc.edu, others

Special attention to .edu hosts

prints netinfo when the bot is .edu irc.getedu
makes the .edu bots join channel you want irc.getedu.join
exec command if bot is an edu logic.ifedu





Overview

Network Overview

Detection

Reporting





Network Overview

Internet2-connected

OC3, to be upgraded this summer

NYSERNet member

Multiple Commodity Providers

ASN: Autonomous System Number, aggregates your subnets

OC3 to Broadwing (AS 6395)

T3 to Qwest (AS 209): upstate campuses and backup link

100 Mbps RCN private peering (AS 6079)

5/16s networks (aka Class Bs, ~64K addresses), plus some others





Network Overview

ResNet

RHNO (undergraduate dorms), ~5000 students

AptNet (university housing: profs, grad, staff), ~2500 students

Not segregated by any policy

Same Internet connection as the rest of campus

No login, No registration

Been discussed, but our logging is good





NetFlow

Flow records exported by routers – Ciscos, Junipers, others

"flow":

Protocol

Source IP address and Source Port

Destination IP Address and Destination Port

Start and End time

Aggregated Packet and Byte counts per flow





FLOW (actual flow dump from binary data)

```
10.0.0.6
router:
                192.168.59.218
src IP:
dst IP:
                172.16.0.28
src port:
                53
dst port:
                53
pkts:
                237
bytes:
                10.0.5.6
IP nexthop:
start time:
                Fri Mar 15 00:52:04 2004
end time:
                Fri Mar 15 00:52:15 2004
protocol:
                17
tos:
                0x0
src AS:
dst AS:
                4538
TCP flags:
                0x0
```

Useful abstraction of traffic





Hardware

Early 2002: 500 Mhz

Fall 2002: Xeon 2.5 Ghz

Fall 2003: Dual Xeon 3 Ghz

Records

No students, ~500K flows / 5-minute sample

Students, ~1M flows / 5-minute sample

Outbreak, much higher





Flowscan

Released by Dave Plonka, U. Wisconson

For each flow record, call external modules

CU Modules:

Top-N and Grapher

Bandwidth usage tracking

Find infected hosts

http://www.columbia.edu/acis/networks/advanced/CUFlow/





Find infected hosts

```
flows / second / host
```

Simple signatures: protocol # (udp, tcp, etc), port, byte size

```
$SIGNATURE{17}{1434}{404} = "SQL Slammer";
$SIGNATURE{6}{135}{0} = "MS RPC";
```

Locate C&C (Command and Control) nodes

Host A is scanning for 3127/tcp and talking to C on 7000/tcp

Host B is scanning for 3127/tcp and talking to C on 7000/tcp

Host C is probably C&C – who else talking to it?





List infected hosts

2004-03-18 01:19:43

Src Addr	Incident	Count	Src MAC	Hostname
160.39.201.174	445/tcp	26924	00000088391F	dyn-carl-201-174.dyn.columbia.edu
160.39.201.174	6667/tcp	3	00000088391F	dyn-carl-201-174.dyn.columbia.edu
160.39.202.41	445/tcp	12282	000046CD8D2E	dyn-carl-202-41.dyn.columbia.edu
160.39.202.41	6667/tcp		000046CD8D2E	dyn-carl-202-41.dyn.columbia.edu

Security / Support services quarantine identified infected hosts User receives notice of incident via web, directions for cleanup





Strange destinations

Hosts talking to "dark" networks

209.2.224.0/20 valid, announced destination of ~4K addresses

Not connected

(CAIDA at UCSD uses /8 for "network telescope")

Bogons


Non-announced, non-allocated (non-permitted) destinations

Includes RFC1918 addresses





Darknet monitoring







DNS Logs

```
logging
{
    channel query_logs
    {
       file "/var/log/named_queries";
       severity debug;
       print-time yes;
      };
      category queries { query_logs; };
};
```

What were infected hosts trying to resolve – C&C nodes

```
client 10.0.202.5#1028: query: ph4t.b0t.central.org IN A client 10.0.209.132#1028: query: ph4t.b0t.central.org IN A
```





Send some mail

Automated reporting?

Contact abuse@ before WHOIS contact

Alter contact as requested

Silence reporting if requested

Don't let signatures go stale

Give the required details

Timestamp + Timezone (UTC preferred)

Give methodologies or helpful links when possible

Send text-based logs





Cymru WHOIS

Translate IP to ASN

Talk to upstream when primary ignores you

Team Cymru has lots of other good stuff





Operational forums

ISP/NSP operators

Regional Internet2 operators

Reporting agencies

REN-ISAC

Homeland Security NIPC, chartered ISAC for Internet2

CERT

Communications

INOC-DBA – VOIP call-by-ASN: 14*DAN





Finding your own reports

MyNetWatchman –

http://www.mynetwatchman.com/ListIncidentbyASSummary.asp?AS=14

Responding to reports

Who wants abuse@?

What does our network look like normally?

Who gets to look at the data we find?

Small incidents sometimes become big – feds can take an interest





Questions?

Time?





Credits

Contact

Daniel Medina – medina@columbia.edu
http://www.columbia.edu/~medina/
Here all weekend, just find me!
Looking to chat about
networking, e-mail, security, disaster preparedness, etc

Thanks to...

Folks who have answered questions for me: Dave Plonka (U. Wisconson) Rob Thomas (Team Cymru) Bill Owens (NYSERNet) Doug Pearson (REN-ISAC) Phil Rodrigues (NYU)





More Information – NetFlow

http://www.columbia.edu/~medina/

Links to this presentation and other documentation

http://www.cisco.com/go/netflow

Cisco NetFlow starting site

http://www.linuxgeek.org/netflow-howto.php

Getting things set up

http://net.doit.wisc.edu/~plonka/FlowScan/

FlowScan, Perl package and tools

http://www.columbia.edu/acis/networks/advanced/CUFlow/

Top-N reporting and Grapher modules

http://www.columbia.edu/acis/networks/advanced/FlowMonitor/

Bandwidth quota system

Send me some mail!

medina@columbia.edu





Other information...

http://www.internet2.edu

Internet2 offers many useful forums (security, VOIP, etc)

http://www.ren-isac.net

Research and Educations ISAC

http://www.mynetwatchman.com

Logs from distributed firewalls

http://www.cymru.com/

Team Cymru – building darknets, WHOIS server, and more

http://www.pch.net/inoc-dba

Call-by-ASN SIP proxy server

http://www.caida.org

CAIDA, home of the network telescope



