AQUINAS ON LAW ¹

QUESTION XC: OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (IN FOUR ARTICLES.)

We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the First Part (Q. CXIV.). But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.

Concerning law, we must consider(1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason? (2) Concerning the end of law. (3) Its cause. (4) The promulgation of law.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 23): I see another law in my members, etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.

Obj. 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q. LVII.). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

Obj. 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above (Q. IX., A.I). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will: according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. I. ff., De Const. Prin. leg. I.): Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law.

On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. r). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for lex (law) is derived from ligare (to bind), because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q.I., A. I ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. Ii.). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called the law of the members.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e., to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (Q. XIII., A. 3; Q. LXXVI., A. I) and as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii. 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Suchlike universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

Reply Obj. 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (Q. XVII., A.I): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE LAW IS ALWAYS DIRECTED TO THE COMMON GOOD?

We Proceed thus to the Second Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.

Obj. 2. Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v. 3): If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law. But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed to private good. Therefore the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. 21) that laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens.

I answer that, As stated above (A. D, the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q. II., A. 7; Q. III., A. I). Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v. I) that we call those legal matters just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic: since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. I. I.

Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.

Reply Obj. 1. A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.

Reply Obj. 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT TO MAKE LAWS?

We Proceed thus to the Third Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. ii. 14) that when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, . . . they are a law to themselves. Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.

Obj. 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. II. I,) the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue. But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.

Obj. 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. 10): A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty.

I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the vicegerent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. I ad I), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on: Who show the work of the law written in their hearts.

Reply Obj. 2. A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x. 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to wham it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q. XCII., A. 2 ad 3; II.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.

Reply Obj. 3. As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to Polit. I.I. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER PROMULGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO A LAW?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.

Obj. 3. Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since laws are binding in matters of the future, as the jurists say (Cod. I., tit. De lege et constit. leg. vu.). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.

On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that lams are established

I answer that, As stated above (A. I), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.

Reply Obj. 1. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.

Reply Obj. 3. The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v. 3; ii. IO) that lex (law) is derived from legere (to read) because it is written.

QUESTION XCI: OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (IN SIX ARTICLES.)

We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is an eternal law? (2) Whether there is a natural law? (3) Whether there is a human law? (4) Whether there is a Divine law? (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several? (6) Whether there is a law of sin?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1, It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

Obi. 3. Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal Therefore no law is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. I. 6): That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. I ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the First Part (Q. XXII., AA. 1, 2), that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. viii. 23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

Reply Obj. 1. Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, in as much as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rom. iv.17 Who calls those things that are not, as those that are. Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

Reply Obj. 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Reply Obj. 3. The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively, -- that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end, -- except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW?

We Proceed thus to the Second Article --

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. I.) that the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly. But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Obj. 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Obj. 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. u-14: When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, comments as follows: Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. I ad I), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures: in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (A. I); it is evident that a]L1 things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: an(1 this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. Iv. 6): Offer up the sacrifice of justice, as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: Many say, Who showeth us good things? in answer to which question he says: The light Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us: thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above (Q. X., A. I): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Reply Obj. 3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Q. XC., A. I). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (A.2). Now through the eternal law all things are most orderly, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. I. 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.

Obj. 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (Q. XC., A. I). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x., text.5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

Obj. 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x., text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. ix. I4: The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason

On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. I. 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. I, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (ibid.). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (Q. XC., AA. 2, 3, 4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii.) that justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law.

Reply Obj. 1. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.

Reply Obj. 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW?

We Proceed thus to the Fourth Article. --

Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above (A. 2), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above (A.1). Therefore there is no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. xv. 14) that God left man in the hand of his own counsel. Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. 1). Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.

Obj. 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps. cxviii. 33): Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord.

I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction on the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is proportionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q. V., A. 5), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. I. 5, 6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. cxviii. 8, where it is said: The law of the Lord is unspotted, i.e., allowing no foulness of sin; converting souls, because it directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, because of the certainty of what is true and right; giving wisdom to little ones, by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Reply Obj. 1. By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

Reply Obj. 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the nabura1 law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law. Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails.

FIFTH ARTICLE: W HETHER THERE IS BUT ONE DIVINE LAW?

We Proceed thus to the Fifth Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. xlvi. 8: God is the King of all the earth. Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Obj. 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since according to I Tim. ii. 4: He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Obj. 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. vii. 2): The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law. But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz., the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, namely, the Old Law and the New Law.

I answer that, As stated in the First Part (Q. XXX., A. 3), distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g., a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g., a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. iii. 24, 25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child under a pedagogue; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is no longer under a pedagogue.

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananeans (Exod. iii. 8, I7). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Matth. iv. I7): Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv.) that promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament.

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness (A. 4): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Matth. v. 20: Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Hence the saying that the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind (3 Sentent., D xl.).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii.) that there is little difference 2 between the Law and the Gospel -- fear and love.

Reply Obj. 1. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

Reply Obj. 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts iv. I2: There is no other name. . . given to men, whereby we must be saved. Consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Reply Obj. 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

QUESTION XCII: OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (IN TWO ARTICLES.)

We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good? (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?

F1RST ARTICLE: WHETHER AN EFFECT OF LAW IS TO MAKE MEN GOOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. u. 6 is that which makes its subject good. But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who works it in us without us, as we stated above (Q. LV., A. 4) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Obj. 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Obj. 3. Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the business of the law to make men good.

Obj. 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii. 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. I) that the intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. 1 ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly the virtue of every subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler, as the Philosopher says (Polit. I.). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are

Reply Obj. 1. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

Reply Obj. 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts iv. 2: There is no other name. . . given to men, whereby we must be saved. Consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Reply Obj. 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

QUESTION XCII: OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (IN TWO ARTICLES.)

We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good? (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER AN EFFECT OF LAW IS TO MAKE MEN GOOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii. 6 is that which makes its subject good. But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who works it in us without us, as we stated above (Q. LV., A. 4) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Obj. 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Obj. 3. Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the business of the law to make men good.

Obj. 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii. 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. I) that the intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., A. 1 ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly the virtue of every subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler, as the Philosopher says (Polit. I.). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is that which makes its subject good, it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q. LXIII., A. 2), viz., acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. II.) that lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictate of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above (Q. LXIII., A. I).

Reply Obj. 3. The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Conf. iii.) that unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole. Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. iii. 2) that the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man.

Reply Obj. 4. A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular government.

QUESTION XCIV: OF THE NATURAL LAW (IN SIX ARTICLES.)

We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is the natural law? (2) What are the precepts of the natural law? (3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law? (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all? (5) Whether it is changeable? (6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS A HABIT?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. 5), there are three things in the soul, power, habit, and passion. But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through natural law is a habit.

Obj. 2. Further, Basil says that the conscience or synderisis is the law of our mind; which can only apply to the natural law. But the synderesis is a habit, as was shown in the First Part (Q. LXXIX., A. 12). Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Obj. 3. Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on (A. 6). But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi.) that a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary. But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.

I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (Q. XC., A. 1 ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.

Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz., powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus to will in in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.

Reply Obj. 2. Synderesis is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually: and this is granted.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL PRECEPTS, OR ONE ONLY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above (Q.XCII.,A.2). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.

Obj. 2. Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.

Obj. 3. Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Q. XC., A. I). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.

On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XCI., A. 3), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, Man is a rational being, is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says man, says a rational being: and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, Every whole is greater than its part, and, things equal to one and the same are equal to one another. But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is being, the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not- being: and on this principle at others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv., text. 9. Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and ensued, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of the inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all animals,4 such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Reply Obj. 1. All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, in as much as they flow from one first precept.

Reply Obj. 2. All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.

Reply Obj. 3. Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason.

THIRD ARTICLE. WHETHER ALL ACTS OF VIRTUE ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE NATURAL LAW ?

We Proceed thus to the Third Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual as is evident especially in regard to acts of private good of the individual, as is evident especially in regard to temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.

Obj. 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins.

Obj. 3. Further, those things which are according to nature ale common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all, since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.

On the contrary, Demascene says (De Fide Orthod iii. 4) that virtues are natural. Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.

I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated (A. 2) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e., in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living.

Reply Obj. 1. Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.

Reply Obj. 2. By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man --and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as states (De Fide Orthod. II. 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.

FOURTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS THE SAME IN ALL MEN?

We Proceed thus to the Fourth Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. I.) that the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel. But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. x. 16), all do not obey the gospel. Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Obj. 2. Further, Things which are according to the law are said to be Just, as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Obj. 3. Further, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. 4): The natural law is common to all nations.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. I. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. That it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g., if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi.).

Reply Obj. 1. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that the natural law * what is contained in the Law and the Gospel, adds at once, by way of example, by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would he done by.

Reply Obj. 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.

Reply Obj. 3. As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.

FIFTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE CHANGED?

We Proceed thus to the Fifth Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on Ecclus. xvii. 9, He gave them instructions, and the law of life, the gloss says: He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the law of nature. But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Obj. 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. xxii. 2); and when He ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Exod. xii. 35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself a wife of fornications (Osee i. 2). Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v. 4) that the possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law. But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v.): The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable.

I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws.

Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said (A. 4), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above (A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1. The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.

Reply Obj. 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings ii. 6: The Lord killeth and maketh alive. Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. --In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God is neither adultery nor fornication. - The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the First Part (Q. CV., A. 6 ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3. A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g., that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, the possession of all things in common and universal freedom are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.

SIXTH ARTICLE: WHETHER THE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE ABOLISHED FROM THE HEART OF MAN?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on Rom. ii. 14, When the Gentiles who have not the law, etc., a gloss says that the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace. But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out

Obj. 2. Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Conf. i .): Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not. But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 4, 5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q. LXXVII., A. 2)._But as to the other, i.e., the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rom. I.), were not esteemed sinful.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust.

QUESTION XCV: OF HUMAN LAW (IN FOUR ARTICLES.)

We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Its utility. (2) Its origin. (3) Its quality. (4) Its division.

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR LAWS TO BE FRAMED BY MEN

We Proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (Q. XCII., A. I). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.

Obj. 2. Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 4), men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice. But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which is contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Obj. 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q., XC., AA. r, 2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matters pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. 20): Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm. But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXIII., A. I; Q. XCIV., A. 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz., his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive the training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore, in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. I. 2), as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.

Reply Obj. 1. Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1. 1), it is better than all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges: and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. -- Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. -- Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply Obj. 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law have necessarily to be committed to judges, as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, concerning something that has happened or not happened, and the like.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW?

We Proceed thus to the Second Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 7) that the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference. But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not all derived from the natural law.

Obj. 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v. 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v., loc. cit.). But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q. XCIV., A. 4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.

Obj. 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 7) that the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere. If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.

Obj. 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers, as the jurist says.5 Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhetor. ii.): Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i. 5), that which is not just seems to be no law at all: wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (Q. XCI., A. 2 ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g., that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man: while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g., the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way is not directly by natural law but is a certain determination of it.

Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.

Reply Obj. 3. The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.

Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi. 11) that in such matters, we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations.

QUESTION XCVI: OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (IN SIX ARTICLES.)

We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community? (2) Whether human law should repress all vices? (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue? (4) Whether it binds man in conscience? (5) Whether all men are subject to human law? (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE FRAMED FOR THE COMMUNITY RATHER THAN FOR THE INDIVIDUAL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 7) that the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of decrees, which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the community, but also for the individual.

Obj. 2. Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above (Q. XC., AA. I, 2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather for the individual.

Obj. 3. Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above (Q. XC., AA. 1, 2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual cases.

On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. tit. iii., art. ii., De legibus, etc.) that lams should be made to suit the majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case.

I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says (Etym. v. 21) that law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens. Hence human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii. 21; xxii. 6).

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. v. 7) divides the legal just, i.e., positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer: as the fixing of the ransom of a captive.-- Some things affect the community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called privileges, i.e., private laws, as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these, he adds, and further, all particular acts of legislation. -- Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds all matters subject to decrees.

Reply Obj. 2. A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x., text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above (Q. XCII., A. 2, Obj. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things (Ethic. i. 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it 1S enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less frequently it fail.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO REPRESS ALL VICES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices For Isidore says (Etym. V. 20) that laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man audacity might be held in check. But it would not be held in cheek sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. Therefore human law should repress all evils.

Obj. 2. Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices.

Obj. 3. Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. 2). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore hum law should repress all vices.

On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i. 5: It seems to me that the law whic1l i written for the governing of the people rightly permits these things, and that Divine providence punishes them. But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices Therefore human law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC., AA. 1, 2), law is framed as a rule o measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x., text. 3, 4, since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. V. 21), law should be possible both according to nature, and according to the customs of the country. No possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible t one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.

Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and suchlike.

Reply Obj. 1. Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Prov. xxx. 33): He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood; and (Matth. ix. 17) that if new wine, i.e., precepts of a perfect life, is put into old bottles, i.e., into imperfect men, the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, i.e., the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break out into evils worse still.

Reply Obj. 3. The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i. 5): The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does. Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natural law.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER HUMAN LAW PRESCRIBES ACTS OF ALL THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (A.2). Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 1) that the law prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man, . . . and the acts of the temperate man, . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the former, forbidding the latter.

I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as explained above (Q. LIV., A. 2; Q. LX., A. 1; Q. LXII., A. 2). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above (Q. XC., A. 2) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common good,-either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good,--or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.

Reply Obj. 1. Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue.-Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.

QUESTION XCVII: OF CHANGE IN LAWS (IN FOUR ARTICLES.)

We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether human law is changeable? (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs? (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law? (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY?

Objection 1. It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change. |

Obj. 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v. 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human acts, as stated (Q. XC., AA. r, 2). Therefore it should remain without change.

Obj. 3. Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above I (Q. XCV., A. 2). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i. 6): A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XCI., A. 3), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early philosopherswas imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who first endeavoured to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.

On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i. 6): If the People have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few good men.

Reply Obj. 1. The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (Q. XCI., A. 2), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change.-Moreover the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts, according to various emergencies.

Reply Obj. 2. A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 3. In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD ALWAYS BE CHANGED WHENEVER SOMETHING BETTER OCCURS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human reason, like other arts. But in other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs.

Obj. 2. Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted.

Obj. 3. Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by experience, which requires time, as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur for legislation.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii. 5): It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions to be changed which we received from the fathers of old.

I answer that, As stated above (A. I) ~, human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great and very evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says6 that in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just.

Reply Obj. 1. Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto should be changed. But laws derive very great force from custom, as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii. 5): consequently they should not be quickly changed.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third Objection.

THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER CUSTOM CAN OBTAIN FORCE OF LAW?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and from the Divine law, as stated above (Q. XCIII., A. 3; Q. XCV., A. 2). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law.

Obj. 2. Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law.

Obj. 3. Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi.): The customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered as lams. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.

I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver, the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both chanced and expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions7 the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.

Reply Obj. 1. The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for Isidore says (Synon. ii. 16): Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. XCVI., A. 6), human laws fail in some cases; wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law falls; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be included by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, the same reason remains, for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not possible according to the custom of the country, which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people.

Reply Obj. 3. The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, than does the authority of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people: because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom.

QUESTION LXVI OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (IN NINE ARTICLES.)

We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery. Under this head there are nine paints of inquiry: (1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things? (2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own? (3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property? (4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft? (5) Whether every theft is a sin? (6) Whether theft is a mortal sin? (7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity? (8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin? (9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER IT IS NATURAL FOR MAN TO POSSESS EXTERNAL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It would seam that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. xxiu. 1, The earth is the Lord's, etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things.

Obj. 2. Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke xii. 18), I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods, says:8 Tell me: which are thine? where did you take them from and bring them info being? Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Ambrose (De Trin. i.9) dominion denotes power. But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. viü. 8): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.

I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above (Q. LXIV., A. x). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i. 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gen. i. 26) by the words: Let us make man to Our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, etc.

Reply Obj. 1. God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them.

Reply Obj. 2. The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from God.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO POSSESS A THING AS HIS OWN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to to natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.

Obj. 2. Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (A. I, Obj. 2), says: The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use. Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.

Obj. 3. Further, Ambrose says, [10] and his words are quoted in the Decretals: [11] Let no man call his own that which is common property: and by common he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Hares., haer. 40): The 'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit info their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church. Now the reason why these people are heretics was because, severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.

I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.

The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 17, 18): Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others, etc.

Reply Obj. 1. Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common, and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above (Q. LVII., AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.

Reply Obj. 2. A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (ibid.): Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?

Reply Obj. 3. When Ambrose says: Let no man call his own that which is common, he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: He who spends too much is a robber.

SEVENTH ARTICLE: WHETHER IT IS LAWFUE TO STEAL THROUGH STRESS OF NEED?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three weeks. Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. 6) that there are some actions whose very name implies wickedness, and among these he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy a need.

Obj. 3. Further, A man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii.), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.

On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for need has made it common.

I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established by Divine providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason Ambrose says, and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii., can. Sicut ii.): It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man's ransom and freedom.

Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.

Reply Obj. 1. This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another's property in a case of extreme need because that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.

Reply Obj. 3. In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.

QUESTION 42: OF SEDITION (IN TWO ARTICLES.)

We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE: WHETHER SEDITION IS A SPECIAL SIN DISTINCT FROM OTHER SINS?

We proceed thus to the First Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore, "a seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds and begets discord." Now by provoking the commission of a sin a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seams that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.

Obj. 2. Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above. Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of schism.

Obj. 3. Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins is either a capital vice or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices nor among those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moralium xxxi. 45, where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins.

On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins.

I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on II Corinthians xii, 20 says that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another; whereas strife is between one individual and another or between few people on one side and few on the other, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between the mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely, the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.

Reply Obj. 1. A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord it follows that a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately.

Reply Obj. 2. Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, viz., ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance, of a city or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a material fight as sedition does, but only a spiritual dissent.

Reply Obj. 3. Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between the parts of a multitude.

SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER SEDITION IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: --

Objection 1. It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight" according to the gloss quoted above (A. 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin; indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above. Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A. I ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.

Obj. 3. Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition without mortal sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle forbids sedition together with other things that are mortal sins.

I answer that, As stated above (A. Iad 2), sedition is contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz., the people of a city or kingdom. Now Augustine says that "wise men understand the word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good; whence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.

Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly, it is those who are led by them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good and withstand the seditious party are not themselves seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 1. It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good, as stated above. But sedition runs counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Discord from what is not evidently good may be without sin, but discord from what is evidently good cannot be without sin; and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.

Reply Obj. 3. A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states. Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the ruler and to the injury of the multitude.

AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS

12 QU. 92. THE CREATION OF WOMAN

1 SHOULD WOMAN HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE ORIGINAL CREATION?

Obj. 1. It seems that women should not have been made in the original creation, for the Philosopher [Aristotle] says that "A woman is a misbegotten man." Nothing misbegotten or defective should have existed in the original creation. Therefore woman should not have been made in the original creation.

Obj. 2. Subjection and inferiority are the result of sin, for it was said to woman after she sinned, "Thou shalt be under the power of man''l3 and [Pope] Gregory says, "Where we have not sinned we are all equal.''l4 Now women by nature are of less virtue and dignity than men, for "That which acts is more honorable than that which is acted upon" as Augustine says.l5 Therefore woman should not have been made in the original creation before man's sin.

I answer that it was necessary for woman to be made, as Scripture says, as a "helpmate" to man-not to help him in other work as some have saidl6-since he can get more effective help from another man-but as a helpmate in procreation.

This can be seen more clearly if we look at the pattern of reproduction among living things. Some things have no active reproductive power in themselves but are reproduced by the action of another species, for example, plants and animals that reproduce without seeds as a result of the action of heavenly bodies upon suitable matter. Others have both the active and passive powers of reproduction as in the case of plants that reproduce from seeds. This is because the noblest activity of plants is reproduction so that it is appropriate that the active power to reproduce should be permanently joined to the passive power to do so.

Perfect animals however possess the active power of reproduction in the male sex and the passive power in the female sax. And because animals possess a vital activity that is more noble than that of procreation, towards which their lives are principally directed, the male sex is not permanently joined to the female sex in perfect animals but only at the time of mating-so that we may think of male and female as becoming one in sexual intercourse in the same ways as plants in which the male and female principles are permanently united, although in some one of them predominates and in some the other. Man however is directed towards a still nobler vital activity, which is knowledge. Therefore there was a stronger reason for the distinction between the sexes according to which the female is produced separately from the male but they are joined together as one flesh in the work of procreation, so that immediately after woman was formed, it was said "They shall be two in one flesh.''l7

Reply to Obj. 1. With respect to her particular nature woman is somewhat deficient and misbegotten. For the active power in the male seed tends to produce a perfect male like itself while when a female is produced it is because of a weakness of active power or some material indisposition or some external change such as a moist south wind as appears in The Generation of Animals.18 However with respect to nature in general, a woman is not something misbegotten but intended by nature to be directed to the work of procreation. What is intended by nature in general derives from God who is the universal author of nature. Therefore when he established nature, he produced both male and female.

Reply to Obj. 2. Subjection is of two kinds. There is that of the slave in which a superior uses someone subject to him for his own benefit, and this kind of subjection is the result of sin. However there is another type of subjection which is that of the household or the citizen in which the superior makes use of his subjects for their benefit or good. This subjection existed before men sinned. For there would have been a lack of proper order in human society if some were not governed by others who were wiser than they. Woman is naturally subject to man in this kind of subjection because by nature man possesses more discernment of the reason. Inequality among men also existed in the state of innocence, as we will explain below.

QU. 96. DOMINION AMONG MEN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE

3 WOULD ALL MEN HAVE BEEN EQUAL IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE?19

There would have been some inequality in the original state-at least as sex since reproduction could not have taken place without the difference between the sexes. Also with respect to age since some would have been born from others and those who were born would have produced children. 3

There would also have been differences of goodness [justice] and knowledge in the soul, for man would have functioned on the basis of free will, not by necessity. Therefore he could give greater or lesser attention to the development of his moral and intellectual faculties. Therefore some would have advanced further in goodness or knowledge than others.

There would also have been physical differences. For the human body was not totally exempt from the law of nature so as not to receive more or less useful and helpful things from outside, and it also needed food to sustain life. And so nothing prevents our saying that depending on the climate or the movements of the stars some would have been born more robust in body than others, and taller or more beautiful or of a better constitution. However there would have been no defect or sin either of soul or body in those who had less of these qualities.

4 WOULD ONE MAN HAVE BEEN LORD OVER ANOTHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE?

Lordship (Dominium) has two meanings. In the first meaning, it is contrasted with slavery and a lord is someone who has another person as his slave. In another sense it is commonly understood in relation to any kind of subjection so that someone who has the office of governing and directing free men can be called a lord (dominus). In the state of innocence one man would not have been lord over another in the first sense, but in the second sense one man could have had dominion over another. The reason for this is that a slave differs from a free man in that a free man acts for himself (literally-is his own cause) as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics but a slave is ordered to another.20 Someone is under the dominion of someone else as a slave when the lord controls him for his own benefit. Since everyone seeks his own good and consequently finds it painful to yield to the decisions of another what should be one's own, this kind of dominion could only be a punishment for those subject to it. Therefore in the state of innocence this kind of dominion of one man over another could not have existed.

However someone can have dominion over another person as a free man, when he directs him to his own good or to the good of the community. There are two reasons that this kind of dominion of man over man would have existed in the state of innocence. First, because man is by nature a social animal so that men in the state of innocence would have lived in society. Now people cannot live in society unless someone is in authority to look after the common good, for the many as such seek different objectives, while one person seeks only one. Therefore the Philosopher [Aristotle] says that when many things are directed to one goal we always find one person at the head to direct them.21 Secondly, because if one man were superior to the others in knowledge and justice it would not have been appropriate for him not to exercise this superiority for the benefit of the others.

98. THE PRESERVATION OF THE RACE (SPECIES)

IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD PROCREATION HAVE TAKEN PLACE THROUGH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE?

God made mankind male and female before sin, as Genesis says.22 Now God does nothing in vain. Therefore, even if man had not sinned sexual intercourse would have taken place because this is the purpose of the differentiation between the sexes. * * * What is natural to man was neither taken away nor added to him by sin. It is clear that as to the animal life that man had before he sinned, it is natural for him to reproduce through sexual intercourse, as it is in the case of other perfect animals. This is proved by the natural members that are assigned by nature to this purpose. Therefore we should not say that these natural members would not have been used before man sinned, just as in the case of his other members.

Sexual intercourse as it exists in this present life should be considered from two points of view. First by nature there is a union of the male and female for the purpose of procreation. In every kind of reproduction there is an active and a passive principle. Since in all things in which there is a difference between the sexes, the active principle is in the male and the passive in the female, the order of nature demands that the male and female reproduce by sexual intercourse.

We can also consider it from the point of view of the deformity produced by excessive desire which would not have existed in the state of innocence because the lower powers would have been subordinated to reason. * * * Beasts are without reason. When man engages in sexual intercourse he becomes like a beast because the reason can not moderate the pleasure of sexual intercourse and the heat of desire. In the state of innocence this would have been moderated by reason not because there would have been less sensual pleasure as some say23- for the sensual pleasure would have been greater because it would have been i purer in its nature and the body more sensitive-but because the force of desire would not have flowed out in such a disordered way in this type of pleasure since it would have been moderated by reason which does not lessen sensual pleasure but prevents desire from holding to the pleasure in an immoderate fashion. * * Thus a sober man who eats in moderation has no less pleasure than a glutton, but his desire lingers less over this kind of pleasure. * * * Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, but it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it prevents reproduction but because it eliminates disordered lust. In the state of innocence, however, reproduction would have taken place without lust.

QU. 154. THE TYPES OF LECHERY

2 IS ORDINARY FORNICATION A GRAVE SIN?

A mortal sin is any sin that is committed in direct opposition to human life.24 Now ordinary fornication involves a disorder that leads to injury to the life of that which would be born as a result of such an act of sexual intercourse. In the case of animals in which the care of the male and female is required to bring up the children we observe that their mating does not take place promiscuously but involves the union of a male with one specific female, or several of them as in the case with birds. This is not the case with animals where the female alone is sufficient to rear the offspring, such as dogs and the like whose intercourse is promiscuous. It is clear that to bring up a child requires both the care of the mother who nourishes him and even more the care of the father to train and defend him and to develop him in internal and external endowments. Therefore promiscuity is contrary to the nature of man. The intercourse of the male must be with a specific female and he should stay with her not for a little while but for a long period of time or even for a whole lifetime. This is why there is a natural human concern among men to be certain about their offspring because they are responsible for the education of their children. They would not have this certainty if sexual intercourse were promiscuous. This commitment to one woman is called matrimony and therefore is considered to be part of the natural law. * * *

Hence since fornication is promiscuous intercourse outside of marriage it is contrary to the good of the upbringing of offspring, and therefore is a mortal sin. It makes no difference if a person who commits fornication makes some provision for the upbringing of the child since the law provides on the basis of what ordinarily occurs rather than of what might happen in a specific case.

4 MAY CARESSES AND KISSES BE MORTALLY SINFUL? A sin may be mortal in two ways. The first is in itself, and kisses, embraces, and caresses are not mortal sins in themselves, since they can take place without libidinous desire or because of the custom of the country or for some requirement or good reason. On the other hand something can be a mortal sin because of its purpose. For example someone who gives alms in order to persuade someone to embrace heresy commits a mortal sin because of his evil intention. We have already said that consent to the pleasure of mortal sin, not merely to the act itself, is a mortal sin. Therefore since fornication is a mortal sin and still more other lustful acts, it follows that consent to the pleasure of these sins is a mortal sin, and not merely consent to the acts themselves. Therefore in so far as kisses and embraces of this kind are engaged in for the purpose of this kind of pleasure it follows that they are mortal sins-and only in this case are they called lustful. Therefore those actions to the degree that they are lustful are mortal sins.

8 IS ADULTERY A SPECIFIC KIND OF LECHERY?

In adultery one acts in a way that is contrary to chastity and to the good of the continuation of the human race. First, one has sexual relations with a woman who is not joined to oneself in matrimony which is a requirement for the good of the proper upbringing of offspring. Secondly, one has sexual relations with a woman who is joined to someone else in matrimony, thus injuring the offspring of someone else. The same applies to a married woman who is corrupted by the adultery. * * * And so adultery is clearly a specific kind of lechery since it manifests a special disorder in sexual activity.

11 IS UNNATURAL VICE A KIND OF LECHERY?

A particular kind of lechery takes place when a special quality of disorder makes a sexual act indecent. This can happen in two ways-first when it is opposed to right reason which generally is the case with all types of lechery, and second because when in addition it is opposed to the natural order of the sex act itself that is appropriate to mankind-and this is called unnatural vice.

This can happen in several ways. First, if orgasm is induced for the sake of sexual pleasure without intercourse, and this is the sin of uncleanness [masturbation] that some call "the softness." Secondly, when intercourse is carried out with a thing belonging to a different species and this is called bestiality. Thirdly, if intercourse is with a person of the same sex, male with male or female with female, as the Apostle [Paul] says and this is called the vice of sodomy.25 Fourthly, when the natural method of intercourse is not observed either as to the proper organ or utilizing monstrous or bestial techniques of intercourse.

12 IS UNNATURAL VICE THE WORST SIN OF ALL THE TYPES OF LECHERY?

The principles of reason are those that are in accordance with nature. * * * Reason begins with principles that are based on nature and on the basis of what has been determined by nature determines what it is proper to do. This is true both for the speculative and practical reason. Just as in the area of theory (speculative reason) an error as to the principles that are instilled in man by nature is most serious and reprehensible, so in the area of practice (practical reason) actions that are in violation of what has been determined by nature are also serious and reprehensible.

Since therefore in the case of unnatural vice man violates what has been determined by nature concerning sexuality, this is the most serious sin. After it comes incest which violates the natural reverence which we owe to members of our family. * * * Among the unnatural vices, the least serious is the sin of uncleanness which consists only in not having intercourse with another person. The most serious is that of bestiality because it does not involve the right species. Thus the Gloss on Genesis, "He [Joseph] accused his brothers of the worst sin" says that "They had relations with cattle."26 After this comes the vice of sodomy since it does not involve the right sex. After this is the sin of not using the right method of sexual intercourse-which is worse if it is not in the right place than if it relates to other aspects of the method of intercourse.27

1. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province

2. The little difference refers to the Latin words timor and amor -- fear and love.

3. Damascene, De Fide Orthod. IV. 22.

4. Just. 1., tit. I.

5. Pandect Justin. lib. I. ff., tit. iii., art. v., De Leg. et Senat.

6. Pandect. Justin. lib. i. ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.

7. Cf.Q.XCV.,A.3.

8. Hom. in Luc xii. 18.

9. De Fide, ad Gratianum, i. 1.

10. Serm. lxiv., de temp.

11. Serm. lxiv., de temp.

12. Translated and edited by Paul E. Sigmund.

13. Genesis, 3:16.

14. Gregory, On Pastoral Care, 2, 6. St. Gregory the Great was pope from A.D. 590 to 604.

15. Augustine, On the Words of Genesis, 12,16.

16. Augustine, On the Words of Genesis, 9, 3.

17. Genesis, 2:24.

18. Aristotle, The Generation of Animals, [V, 2.]

19. "The state of innocence" refers to the condition of man before the Fall, (i.e., in the Garden of Eden). For other statements on the natural inferiority of women, see S. T., 1, qu. 98, a.2 (p. 40) and Supplement, qu. 52, reply to obj. 2 (p 82).

20. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1, 2.

21. Aristotle, Politics, 1, 2.

22. Genesis, 1:27;2:22.

23. St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) Commentary on the Sentences, II, D. 20, qu. 3, Alexander of Hales (1180-1245), Summa Theologica, I-II, n. 496.

24. A mortal sin means the death (mors) of grace in the soul.

25. John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), makes an unconvincing-if not specious-argument that Aquinas's condemnation of homosexuality represents a relatively late development in Christian attitudes. He does this by, a) misrepresenting St. Paul's rejection of homosexuality in Romans, 1:26-27 as applying only to such conduct by heterosexuals, b) claiming that the sin of Sodom (Genesis 19) was not sodomy but a breach of hospitality (pp. 92-98) and c) interpreting Aquinas's argument from nature as based on a comparison with the behavior of animals, ignoring the obvious teleological character of his understanding of nature (pp. 318-330). Boswell admits that homosexuality is condemned in the Old Testament (Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13) but dismisses the condemnations as denunciations of "ceremonial uncleanness" (pp. 100-102).

26. Genesis, 37:2. The Gloss was the generally accepted line-by-line commentary.

27. The ranking of the seriousness of various sexual sins was based on the application of teleological or purposive understanding of nature. It was useful to confessors in assigning the appropriate penance.