Iconoclasts and Their Motives

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In 1791 James Gillray published a little-known print satirizing John Boydell's Shakespeare Gallery. Like others, Gillray was irritated by Boydell's ambitious project of publishing - by subscription - a set of prints illustrating Shakespeare after paintings especially commissioned for this purpose. His aim was to encourage the growth of an English School of History Painting; but his motives were not felt to be entirely free of the desire for financial gain. So when some of the pictures were cut, a "malicious report was started that he had done it to excite public sympathy." "There! There! There's a nice gash! - there! - ah, this will be a glorious subject for to make a fuss about in the Newspapers... O, there will be fine talking about the Gallery; and it will bring in a rare sight of Shillings..." exclaims the allegedly rapacious Boydell as, with a mad gleam in his eyes, he sets about his work. As it happens, the project was not to be an immediate financial success. Nonetheless, the point about the relation between publicity and iconoclasm is clear. We will return to it later.

The issue goes far beyond satire. One has only to consider the number and importance of the works that have been the target of iconoclastic acts in the present century to appreciate its gravity. The subject compels our attention; and it engages complicated emotions. "The assailant and his motives are wholly uninteresting to us; for one cannot apply normal criteria to the motivations of someone who is mentally disturbed." This is what the Director of Public Relations at the Rijksmuseum is reported to have declared after the attack on the Nightwatch on September 14, 1975.

We must take courage in order to make some sense of a phenomenon that no history of art can justifiably ignore, but which has so persistently affected those objects which stand at the centre of our fundamentally materialist discipline. "Take courage" because this is self-evidently an emotive subject; because it threatens the very existence of objects
which we cherish; because we quail at the thought of analyzing the actions of those who appear to be mentally disturbed; and because we ourselves know the experience of powerful but indefinable emotions in the presence of objects. With us, those emotions – of catharsis, of warmth, of calm, of difficulty, even of frustration – are channelled, however inexplicably, along safe and generally rewarding lines. We too may be disturbed and troubled by specific images; but can it be that such feelings, which we know how to sublimate or transmute, often beneficially so, are somehow akin to the overdemonstrative, violent and ultimately damaging behaviour of iconoclasts? Let us leave this thought in abeyance; it is perhaps worth recording, instead, the following view: that too much talk about iconoclasm might actually encourage further acts of violence, that one might somehow put ideas into people’s heads. Such apprehensiveness is wholly understandable, particularly from the standpoint of those most intimately concerned with the conservation of objects; but it is easy to see why the matter is a delicate one, and why one might well be inclined to shrink from public discussion and analysis.

On the other hand, the purely art historical case for the study of iconoclasm is clear. It seems inexplicable that so significant an element in the history and fate of images should so persistently have been neglected, other than on the grounds of the apprehensiveness just outlined. Furthermore: iconoclasm crucially exposes the dialectic of the relationship between image as material object and beholder, and painfully sears away any lingering notion we may still have of the possibility of an idealistic or internally formalist basis for the history of art. Perhaps that is why the history of art as it is traditionally conceived has evaded analysis of one of the most dramatic and striking forms of response to real images, one of the few kinds of response to manifest itself on an obviously behavioural level. There are others, of course, like sexual arousal, tears, long journeys, and physical contact of one form or another, which have almost equally been passed by; and they too expose the banality of approaches to the subject which are predicated on wholly intellectualizing conceptions of immanence – whether immanence of quality, of formal relationships, or merely of the fallacious assumption of emotion within the image itself. A history of art that does not take account of the historical and biological presence of the beholder (or groups of beholders) degenerates into the practice of criticism; how then do we grant authority to the individual critical sensibility, on what grounds do we privilege the particular critic? Of course we may at least partially validate his judgement on the basis of intersubjective comparison; but then we do phenomenology tout court, not history (and not even the kind of historically responsible phenomenology which may well, it is true, aid us in our analysis both of the past and of the cognitive processes of men and women).
Without real images, on the other hand, we become theologians, or historians of literature and rhetoric – as when we deal with Achilles' shield, Zeuxis' grapes, Myron's cow; with Virgil, Pliny, Philostratus and Callistratus, or any one of the many species of ekphrasis to be found from antiquity onwards. But even then we cannot relinquish the interlocking relationship between perception and description on the one hand, and the hermeneutically assumed image on the other. With the analysis of response, however, we take into full account the dialectic between material image and beholder; thus the history of images reclaims its rightful place at the crossroads of history, anthropology and psychology. The task may be a difficult one, but with iconoclasm the processes of cognition and response terminate in palpable and dramatic symptoms which the historian of material objects may well be in the best position of all to describe, analyze, and classify – provided he or she remains aware of the social and psychological issues that are always at stake.

The title of this essay – "Iconoclasts and Their Motives" – addresses itself to the very heart of the matter, at the most difficult but arguably the most crucial aspect of all. It is a fairly straightforward task to document what specifically is affected by iconoclasm in the way of pictures and sculptures; and it is not too complicated to unravel the political and social circumstances of iconoclasm when it occurs above the level of the individual – even though it is sometimes not easy to decide how much relative weight to attach to such circumstances. Assailants can be identified, theoretical writings examined, and material consequences assessed.

All this may be found in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century, where the documentary and literary sources are profuse – from the Council of Troubles to Carel van Mander and local chroniclers – and where anti-image theory is abundant. Significantly, the analysis of the first group of sources has been left to historians, while the theological material has received increasing attention in recent years. But when it comes to motivation, the matter is much more complicated indeed. First, what is the relation between individual and personal motives and those which are written down or publicly expressed? In the course of the great debate about images in the sixteenth century, a huge amount was written and said against images; but what kind of role can we say this played in individual motivation? And secondly, are not such motives too idiosyncratic, too personalized and too disparate to merit any kind of general statements at all? In other words, are we not dealing with isolated neurotic acts, as the Director of Public Relations would have it, rather than anything remotely related to normal behaviour? If one surveys the great iconoclastic movements – above all, those of the eighth and ninth centuries, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and of the French Revolution – it does seem possible to discern general
structures and overall patterns. But what of the unrelated individual deed? Perhaps it is this which is most revealing about the interaction between people and images, more revealing, that is, than when people act in groups, than when they have evident and joint political and social resentments, when they are organized, when they have heard the theory (in however etiolated a form).

In the case of the Netherlands of the sixteenth century, for example, the overall political motivation seems reasonably plain. We know that the iconoclasts were small bands of organized men; that many had heard the hedge-sermons, even if they had not read the writings themselves; that iconoclasm caught on like a craze, especially after news came through – and how quickly it arrived in places like Breda – of the great destruction in Antwerp on August 20, 1566. That event, above all, seemed to provide the ideal mode of expressing antipathy towards the Spanish regime and the Church of Rome, of a symbolic and then a real fracturing of power; and so it became the accepted mode all over the Northern Netherlands as well (though not, of course, everywhere). Often there were clear motives, like the Protestant desire for clean white churches in which to worship, as in Groningen, Leeuwarden, Culemborg, Limburg and Middelburg; sometimes the whole business got caught up in an orgy of destruction. We know that in some cases images were spirited away to safety before the storm broke; that in others the town council itself closed the churches (either to forestall further trouble or to give iconoclasm the appearance of legitimate authority); and that in others the rage did indeed get out of hand and could involve surprising members of the community, including ministers and schoolmasters. All this is most revealing about the spirit of the movement as a whole; but how much does it really illuminate the nature of people’s relations to the image itself? In order to find that out, one has to turn to the individual act, sometimes a part of a larger movement, but preferably where it is indeed isolated from any kind of socially acceptable behaviour. Such acts may not interest the straightforward historian, but it must remain central for the historian of images, as well as central to the interrelation and interdependence of images with men and women.

It would be comfortable simply to concur with claims like this: “For a person who cares for beauty, it is hard to imagine that anyone would wilfully alter – let alone mutilate – a work of art.” But we do not have to look far into ourselves to know that the matter is more complicated – and more precarious – than that. In terms of motivation tout court there is much that is easily recognized. Indeed, many of us may share the iconoclast’s resentment of the figure or authority represented, we too may be frustrated by the apparently immoral expenditure of money on art when all around are hungry, and we too
Het stormen der Belforten in Vlaanderen en Brabant 1788, begonnen, en terstond door geheel Nederland verspreid.
may be moved to anger at the purchase or display of that which does not appear to conform to our notion of art at all (or that which any child could do); but we are not, by and large, moved to the destructive deed. It would be just as well, at this stage, to articulate the basic principle of what follows. Instead of surveying iconoclastic movements, our aim is to look at several of the most striking instances of individual assaults on well-known, publically displayed objects in our century, with particular reference to the last thirty years or so. Curiously — and significantly — enough, these examples have not hitherto been collected. Now it could be argued — and this I think would be the commonly held view that one is here dealing with isolated neurotic acts, too idiosyncratic and too peculiarly symptomatic to reveal anything beyond the deranged minds of individuals whose mental operations bear little if any relation to normal psychology. But this, as has already been implied, is precisely the opposite of the case to be made here. The symptoms of such operations may have little to do with normal behaviour, but what lies behind them may well, in however heightened or acute or distressed a form, provide a telling index of the relations between people and the figured objects before them. To put it bluntly, apparently neurotic behaviour seems to be capable of providing clues to everyday thought processes in all of us. The fear (to which allusion has been made above) that talk about such matters may actually encourage the violent symptoms that terminate in iconoclasm is in itself testimony of such an awareness, however reluctant and however subliminal it may be. Furthermore, the reports of such acts turn out to be revealing not only about the iconoclasts themselves, but also — to an unexpected and surprising extent — about public and social attitudes which are both embodied in and conditioned by patently individual ones. The individual attitude is found to be intersubjectively valid, as emerges clearly from the press reports about iconoclastic events and deeds.

In most cases, the assault is seen to be the act of one who is regarded as mentally disturbed, and this is borne out by psychiatric reports on or psychological imputation to the assailant following the deed. Certainly we are not likely to suffer from the kind of delusions evinced by those who upon attacking an image declare "I am Christ," like the man who smashed Michelangelo's Pietà in 1972, or "I am the Messiah," in the case of the Nightwatch in 1975, or insist that they do it because they have been impelled or instructed by some higher, usually divine force. Nor do we normally seek to resolve grudges in this way, as did the sailor-cook who felt he had unjustly been prevented by the State from getting employment, and then attacked the Nightwatch (the State's most prized possession) in 1911. And we generally refrain from attempting to gain publicity for our acknowledged ideas and theories, as with the man who believed his message to the world was being
ignored and then threw acid at Rubens' *Fall of the Damned* in 1959, and threatened even more hostile anti-image behaviour in 1969–1970. We all recognize that these elements of motivation are delusions on a scale which grossly exceeds normal feelings of this kind; and it cannot be claimed that the expression of such notions is likely to have much bearing on the normal perception of images. But the question still remains as to why it is that images – paintings and sculptures – are chosen as the objects of such attention-seeking acts; why the neurosis manifests itself in this way, rather than in any one of innumerable other ostentatious possibilities; or why, as in other cases, an attack on an image should seem to be an appropriate mode of making a political point. Let us look more patiently at some of the better known attacks and examine both these and some of the other motives that come to the fore. Although it may be that the following summaries will be regarded as an invasion of individual psychological privacy, the aim will be as much to review and consider public response to specific acts as to deepen the enquiry into motivation.

The man who in 1975 slashed the *Nightwatch* with a common eating knife (which he had stolen from a restaurant earlier in the day) had previously received psychiatric treatment and later committed suicide. It is clear that immediately following the deed he was in a shocked and incoherent state, and this is to some extent reflected in the accounts of his own apparently confused statements about his motives. "I was commanded by the Lord; God himself instructed me to do it," runs one version; "I am the Messiah; I wanted to do something spectacular so that my message to the world would appear on television," runs another. On the previous day, a Sunday, he had attended a service in the Westerkerk, Rembrandt's burial place, and after some mildly aberrant behaviour, is reported to have said to a couple of congregants that he would make front-page news the next day. Now the justification on the grounds of possession by superior powers and the desire for publicity on a grand scale is common enough in cases like these; but there are some further explanations of his act which he himself seems to have offered and which are of a more unusual order: "Adam was the Light, Eve darkness; Rembrandt was the master of light, but when he painted the *Nightwatch* he was under the influence of the dark." This view of the symbolic contrast between light and darkness even appears to have some role in determining the very loci of his slashes; he seems to have looked upon Banning Cocq, dressed in black, as a personification of the devil, with Ruytenburgh beside him in yellow, as an angel (or possibly himself); and it was precisely at Cocq that he directed his manic blows.

Poor Banning Cocq – admittedly in the very centre of the picture – had already been the recipient of the most consequential damage when the *Nightwatch* was attacked in 1911. But for that occasion there seems to have been a rather different set of motives. The
assailant believed that the state had deliberately stopped him from getting a job after he had been dismissed from his post as a corporal cook in the Navy. "Did you plan to damage the Nightwatch that Friday afternoon when you set out?" the reporter asked him.

"No. But when I went for a walk and entered the Rijksmuseum, I suddenly had the idea of avenging myself on the painting, to cool my anger on it. I thought it belonged to the State... I didn't want to ruin the painting - I only wished to scratch it a few times." "But why did you choose the Nightwatch?" "Because it seemed to me to be the most expensive possession of the State... When I'm annoyed I'm capable of anything." 41

The range of motives is considerably expanded by the case of the slashing of Velasquez's Rokeby Venus in March, 1914. 42 This time the attack was clearly premeditated, and it was followed by a press statement issued by the assailant herself, a young suffragette named Mary Richardson, who had already gained some notoriety for her actions on behalf of the female cause. 43

I have tried to destroy the picture of the most beautiful woman in mythological history as a protest against the Government for destroying Mrs. Pankhurst, who is the most beautiful character in modern history. Justice is an element of beauty as much as colour and outline on canvas... If there is an outcry against my deed, let everyone remember that such an outcry is an hypocrisy so long as they allow the destruction of Mrs. Pankhurst and other beautiful living women, and that until the public ceases to countenance human destruction, the stones cast against me for the destruction of this picture are each an evidence against them of artistic as well as moral and political humbug and hypocrisy. 44

In other words, as Miss Richardson was to put it in an interview some forty years later, "I wanted to show that the most beautiful woman on canvas was nothing compared with the death of one woman in prison. I wanted to draw attention to the plight of Mrs. Pankhurst, our leader, who was then in an underground cell green with mould in Holloway Prison. We believed she was dying..."; and she concluded, "I always remember that Mrs. Pankhurst was removed from her cell almost immediately." 45

But on the occasion of this interview, she adduced another reason, which may well not have been paramount at the time, but is nevertheless of equal if wholly different significance: "I didn't like the way men visitors to the gallery gaped at it all day long." 46 Two further kinds of motivation thus appear: firstly, the use - or rather, the abuse - of images to draw attention to a political cause; and secondly, the more common objection to a painting or sculpture which somehow offends propriety or morality. Of the latter sort there are, of course, many examples from the past; 47 and who is to know how much of a role such basic feelings as those which take offence at that which is regarded as impropriety of one
kind or another lie at the root even of modern acts of iconoclasm. An unusual — and apparently sophisticated — example occurred in the case of the late seventeenth-century statue of Juno attributed to Rombout Verhulst standing in the gardens of the Rijksmuseum. The mirror she holds as her attribute was broken off by a man who thought that such an image was too vain and worldly to have a place in a national museum open to the public — shades of Erasmus as well as the severest Reformation critics. She is a beautiful half-clothed woman — bad enough, however prudent — so she should certainly not hold a mirror in which to gaze at her own voluptuousness.

Let us return to the ways in which a political statement is made via a damaged picture. In 1981, a young man ripped a gaping hole in Bryan Organ’s portrait of the Princess of Wales shortly after it was put on display in the National Gallery; and the court proceedings subsequently taken against him provide a surprisingly clear insight into the possible reasons for the choice of a painting as a potential vehicle, once assaulted, for calling attention to a political issue. The fact that the picture was of a royal personage (and a particularly popular one at that), and that it had aroused unusual public interest (possibly because of its almost unprecedented informality for this genre) is of obvious relevance — particularly in the light of the specific political problem at stake. At his trial, then, the young man is reported to have declared: “I am in sympathy with Northern Ireland . . . I have done it for Ireland.” He explained in court that he had wanted to do something that would be well known; the portrait was easy to get at; it represented someone who was very popular in Britain; and so in this manner he decided to bring to the attention of London what he felt about the social — rather than the political — deprivation of Belfast; or thus his counsel is supposed to have pleaded (but it has the ring of plausibility and a certain empathy). It was, he observed, an easy and non-violent thing to do. And this merits brief reflection, since it so simply encapsulates a basic element of ambiguity in the perception of figured imagery, one which is present in us all.

When we see an image of the king — to put it in the classical imperial terms — we will be inclined to respond to it as if the king himself were present, because of the more or less easy elision — of which every theologian has always been aware — of image and prototype. But of course we can always stand back, take hold of ourselves, aesthetically differentiate, and argue with ourselves against that elision. We see a picture, a framed object, a cold and bloodless statue; so we rally at least part of our minds against the conflation, which we know to be inevitable, of signifier and signified. The young man knew perfectly well that by attacking the image of Princess Diana dishonour would somehow accrue to her as well, that public response to this act would have at least as much to do with the
fact that it was she who was represented as with the damage to an expensive object in a
public place. But he also knew that he would not really be damaging her person. Hence, the violent act could somehow and quite self-evidently be relegated to a second
order harm, but one which could gain a much lower level of publicity if the act had not
involved an image, and certainly not an image of royalty.

In 1978 a man attacked Poussin’s Adoration of the Golden Calf in the National Gallery
in London, concentrating his efforts in the representation of the Golden Calf itself. No
statement about his motivation is recorded, other than his declaration, upon being impris-
oned for two years, that “it pleased me to do it” (almost the exact words of the man who
threw acid at twenty-three paintings across North Germany one year earlier). The psy-
chiatrist who examined him declared him to be a schizophrenic and appropriate institu-
tionalization was recommended. But perhaps a clue to the act is to be found in the subject
of the painting itself. Both Gallery officials and the press expressed more than usual puz-
zlement as to the motives for the attack. The Public Relations Officer of the National
Gallery declared, “we cannot think of any reasons why this particular work should be
attacked. It is in fact a very beautiful painting,”65 while the Liverpool Daily Post opined that “it is not offensive. It just depicts the Israelites dancing round the Golden Calf.”66 It was beautiful, it was not offensive; why then, the naive thought-train runs, should anyone attack it? But folk memory is long: could it not be that it was precisely this subject which lay, to some degree at least, behind the singling out of this work, rather than any other, for the attack? There could have been any number of other reasons, but the story of the Golden Calf is of course one of the loci classic of idolatrous image worship, and has been adduced as such, as one of the indices of the sudden moral descent of the Israelites in the Wilderness, ever since men and women began worrying about the validity and use of figured imagery.67 How much awareness of this, one wonders, would the assailant of the Poussin have revealed if one had a chance to probe more deeply into his motives?

Clearly one could not, in the space of a short paper, thus investigate the motives for every act of iconoclasm in the West in the last twenty-five years.68 But the phenomenon has been much more widespread than most people might acknowledge, and taken together they constitute rather an alarming list. Here, in addition to the ones already mentioned, are some of the works that have been assaulted since 1956: in that year the Mona Lisa; in 1958 Raphael’s Sposalizio; in 1962 Leonardo’s Burlington House Cartoon (which had a bottle of ink thrown at it); in 1972 Michelangelo’s Pietà; in 1974 Rubens’ Adoration of the Magi in Cambridge, where, with a motive similar to the attack on the painting of Princess Diana, the letters IRA were scrawled across it;69 in 1977 the appalling series of acid attacks on twenty-three paintings in Germany, beginning with Klee’s Goldfish in Hamburg, through Rubens’ Archduke Albert in Düsseldorf, the Martin Luther and other Cranachs in Hanover, and ending with four paintings by and around Rembrandt in Kassel;70 and the knifing of van Gogh’s Berceuse in the Stedelijk Museum.71 The list is a frightening one.72 Before our general conclusions, let us look at some of the chief characteristics of public reaction to these collisions between deranged and overwrought sensibilities on the one hand and works of art on the other.

The assailant is, of course, regarded as beyond the pale, wildly outside the bounds of socially acceptable behaviour, mad. The transition from wholly indignant rejection to the more or less sympathetic acknowledgement of madness may be seen in two different sets of reports on the Nightwatch attacks of 1911 and 1975. Het Leven of 17 January 1911 referred to the “impulsive hand of a degenerate,” who seriously mutilated the work with an evil intention.73 De Echo actually managed to track him down some time later, and could barely restrain its indignation at the apparent nonchalance with which he regarded his deed. He is reported to have been quite indifferent about the “baseness of so unmotivated
Willem Drost, Christ appearing to the Magdalene, Gemäldegalerie. As damaged in 1977.
an act." "People like the one sketched here," the paper concluded, "are a danger to society. Complete lack of conscience is evident from his words. Even in the Indian army [he had hoped to go to the Dutch Indies] someone like this would have caused trouble. One therefore need not regret that he was not accepted for service in the tropics." 74 In the case of the 1975 attack, however, even the police said of the assailant that "we do not think he realizes what he has done;" 75 everyone concurred that he was plainly mad, and indignation was swiftly transformed into a kind of sympathy. But the basic element remains the same in both instances: that the only possible reaction to the assault on so great a work of art, indeed the only way to comprehend it, is to see the assailant in terms which set him utterly beyond both the social and psychological pale.

What else do we find in almost every report of attacks on major objects? In the first place there is the emphasis on the financial value of the work concerned: how much it was bought for, how much it was currently worth, by how much its value had decreased as a result of the deed. 76 But this concern with the relationship between money and art is common enough nowadays; it is perhaps a little more surprising to see it featuring so prominently in 1911 (with the first attack on the Nightwatch) 77 and in 1913 (with the Rokeby Venus). 78 There is always a great deal of discussion about security, usually with the conclusion that not much can be done about it; and again that the less talk about security in general the better. 79 But there is another more disturbing side of this coin, and that is the quite extraordinary attention paid to the minutest details of each attack — from the kind of weapon used, to the precise damage to the canvas, and to the exact foci of the assault. Every newspaper attempts to give a photo of the damaged work, at least in part because of their awareness of the drawing power of something that is plainly sensational. In 1911, Het Leven captioned its photograph of the damaged Nightwatch with the most specific details of the likely movements of the assailant's hand; 80 and proudly announced in its columns that it had been able to be present in the Rijksmuseum within moments of the attack "so that we can offer our readers several excellent photos of this act of vandalism." 81 But further details of the sometimes almost hysterical reports of this kind may be passed over here. It is not hard to imagine what periodicals like the Readers Digest would make of the attack on the Nightwatch, 82 but in the case of the Poussin Golden Calf even the normally dry and sober Press Reports of the National Gallery went so far as to detail the size and number of the slashed strips, how they fell to the floor, and so on. 83 It is also worth noting a further aspect of such reports, and that is the interest in restoration, in the awesome difficulties of repairing the work, of the almost magical success of making it appear as if the attack had never happened. 84 Thus, it is not surprising to find that during the restoration
of the *Nightwatch* in 1975–1976, most of which the Director of the Rijksmuseum had allowed to be carried out in public, behind glass, many more than the usual number of visitors are reported to have flocked to see it.\(^8\) One can hardly wonder at the success of at least one element in the motivation of so many iconoclasts: that of the desire to gain attention and publicity,\(^9\) even if it is only to amaze at the skill of the restorers.

At this stage it might not be out of place to consider at least some of the general implications of the variety of material presented here, even if other more specific conclusions seem obvious and emerge as self-evident from so bald a presentation of these emotive facts. A general analysis of such apparently disparate phenomena would be much more difficult, but the following partly random observations are offered as a tentative basis for future discussion.

One class of iconoclasm emerges clearly from the present exposition, and that is the attention-seeking act—which usually appears to be more or less successful in its aim. The other is much more difficult to define, but it evidently has to do with the hold a particular image or part of an image has on the individual imagination; and the iconoclastic act represents an attempt to break that hold, to deprive the image of its power. A third motivation characterizes iconoclastic movements, such as that of the sixteenth century, where it is felt, often on the broadest social level, that by damaging the symbols of a power—the Spanish regime or the Catholic church—one somehow diminishes that power itself. The problem with these broader movements, however, is that it is often difficult to establish the extent to which they somehow legitimize or give licence to the kinds of "primitive feelings of hate and destructiveness" that are more closely aligned with our first two classes of iconoclasm, with the psychologically more fundamental levels of motivation.\(^10\) While there is plenty of evidence for the calculated orchestration of iconoclasm in the sixteenth century,\(^11\) we often find instances of the more basic and individualized levels of response, of the unleashing of what might loosely be termed "primitive" feelings and behaviour, of the kind of wild abdication of self-control that we described in some of the isolated acts of the present century. Any number of investigations in both Northern and Southern Netherlands in the late 1560s will testify to this; and so one finds men like Huych de Smit in Heevliet, whom the bailiff described as promiscuously smashing everything around him with a hammer.\(^12\) On such occasions a wild delight seems to take over in breaking those images and objects which we normally protect and cherish, a delight in a relishing of the sudden loosening of normal social and psychological restraints.\(^13\)

Here we may briefly turn to a group of objects from earlier periods that bring together two crucial aspects of our problem, and that will lead us on to our conclusion. Everyone is
familiar with attacks on images in which the eyes of the figures represented are the chief targets – as a little-known example, take Matteo di Giovanni's *Massacre of the Innocents* in Capodimonte, where the soldiers had their eyes scratched out. Similar motives presumably informed the scoring out of eyes of the executioner in Mantegna's *Martyrdom of Saint James* in the Ovetari Chapel in the Eremitani in Padua. While most acts of iconoclasm seem wild and unprompted, there are often occasions when this is not so. It seems easy, on the face of it, to maintain that there is no "method" in the attacks. When de Bruyn Kops published his excellent account of the restoration of the polyptych of the *Seven Works of Mercy* by the Master of Alkmaar in the Rijksmuseum, one of the few works where the marks of sixteenth-century iconoclasm (whether of 1566 or 1572 is not certain) are capable of being plotted, he described the savage slashes and observed: "What is noteworthy is that this did not all happen in a wild way, but evidently in a purposeful manner," not in a random way but selectively. But of course this is not surprising at all. One can think of several reasons why the main foci of attack should have been the figures performing the acts of charity; and it was above all the eyes which were scratched out and obliterated. What better way to deprive an image of its life than by assaulting those organs which give us most sense of its liveliness?

If one considers the remarkable portrait of Jacob Cornelisz and his wife in Toledo, Ohio, one can grasp even more instinctively why someone might have been impelled to poke out the sitters' eyes, as once appears to have been the case. Here is a work in which the figures appear with an astonishingly unusual sense of real presence. The degree of illusionism in this respect is, of course, one of the real achievements of the artist, but it is not difficult to see why the attacker may have been disturbed by that sense of presence that seems to reinforce even more strongly than usual the feeling that the signifier has become the signified itself, that a mere image has become living and personal reality. The peculiar effectiveness of this form of mutilation may be brought home by the kind of damage inflicted on Rubens' portrait of the Archduke Albert in Düsseldorf. We feel especial horror at the mutilation of face and eyes (rather, say, than if the hands had been damaged), and we are thus provided with deep psychological testimony to the labile inclination to respond as if the body were actually present.

Allusion has already been made, in semiotic terms, to the tendency to conflate image and prototype, as all image theory, from its very beginnings, has either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged. We worship, venerate, give thanks to, make promises to not the image itself but the Virgin or Saint in the image. At the same time, we know that it is but an image, man-made, of a substance that is not flesh. When critical pressures are brought to

Right: Dirck Jacobsz., *Portrait of the Artist Jacob Cornelisz and His Wife*, detail. Toledo, Ohio, Museum of Art.
bear on this tension, men and women break images, as if to make it clear that the image is none other than just that; it is not living, no supernatural embodiment of something that is alive. We fear the image which appears to be alive, because it cannot be so; and so people may evince their fear, or demonstrate mastery over the consequences of elision, by breaking or mutilating the image; they disrupt the apparent unity of sign and signified by making plain the ordinary materiality of the sign. On the other hand, that identity may not be impugned at all, indeed it may be acknowledged and asserted, as when people think they damage the king when they damage his representation. And of course when inhibition goes, in frenetic states (whether autogenous or as a result of the reversal of normal social pressures) images may be assaulted simply because of the associations they carry. But by and large, iconoclasm represents the most heightened form of making plain one's superiority over the powers of both image and prototype, of our liberation from their unearthly thrall. This can only happen if conditions are such as to give people strength to infringe the powerfully intuitive assumptions of identity and its consequences, if they act as part of a similarly disposed group, if the critical stance has been made plain; or they may be deranged and internally generate the will to make explicit the desire present in all of us, to rupture the identity of image and prototype.

This, in nuce, is one possible way of accounting for iconoclasm, but it is by no means complete. When we are moved by an image (in whatever way), when we find ourselves concurring — whether as a result of cultural conditioning or not — with its canonical status, our natural response is one of protectiveness. The image moves us, benefits us, protects us; it enhances our emotions, sparks our intelligence, arouses meaningful evocation; and so we must shelter it, protect it, conserve it. These things and the fact that a work may be acknowledged as a masterpiece, as the greatest product of a nation, as extraordinarily valuable (even in the monetary sense alone), even the fact that it is housed in a grand or public institution, reinforces the inclination to make of the work an object which we preserve against ravage. And so the image becomes a fetish; not a pleasure to be partaken of and then cast aside, forgotten, but something which we must cocoon. This doting projection of our protective desires onto figured material objects undoubtedly has still deeper psychological roots which we cannot here even begin to plumb; but it is worth emphasizing the obvious importance of preserving all those representations of the world by which we grasp nature itself. If we sighted people let go of representation we have nothing from which to make sense of all that is outside ourselves, not even words. And so we cling, dote, cherish, preserve, at all costs. The iconoclast does so too, but then he or she overturns these impulses into their very opposite ("I had to destroy that
which others cherish,” said the North German acid thrower); and it is in this that the neurosis lies. That too, apart from the shock at any form of destruction, is why the action of iconoclasts arouses indignation and a state of troubledness that seems to run a good deal deeper than many other forms of dramatically neurotic and psychotic behaviour, perhaps only — but then not certainly — excepting those destructive acts which affect the body itself.

These are only two possible analyses, and they are both sketchy and incomplete; but they should at least make clear the inadequacy of explanations of the power of images in terms of magic. That is a term that is used increasingly in connection with the effect that images have on men and women, and one that should be banished. The most recent book on the problem of images in the sixteenth century, for example, equates “idolatry” with a faith in the magical quality of objects. But where does the notion of magic get us an as explanatory category? It explains nothing, it merely labels. It fails wholly to account for the complex and interlocking relationship between people and images, for the interplay between making and seeing, appearance and perception, intention and response, between the putative autonomy of the object and the context of seeing. Most often it locates the primary source of power in the image itself, rather than arising from the dialectic of its relation with the beholder. This is perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the study of iconoclasm; and if it in any way helps us in our understanding not just of pictures and sculptures themselves, but also of what it is that makes us cherish them, then the aim of this paper will have been fulfilled.

Notes

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4. George, *Catalogue of Political and PersonalSatires*, 639 (with earlier sources), as well as the works cited in note 2 above.

5. Ibid., 847.


7. According, at any rate, to the *Neue Kronen Zeitung* (11 October 1975): "'Der Täter und seine Motive sind für uns völlig uninteressant', erklärt uns Direktor Hyermans [sic], Öffentlichkeitsexperte der Rijksmuseum, ‘denn man darf an die Beweisgründe eines mental Gestörten nicht normale Maßstäbe anlegen.’ Whether or not precisely reported, the sentiments thus expressed have the ring of plausibility; and they are ones which are widely shared. Compare, to take only one out of many such reactions, the immediate response of the Rijksmuseum curator who declared, the day after the attack: "Jederen die de Nachtwatch aanvalt moet gestoord zijn" [Anyone who attacks the *Nightwatch* must be deranged], *De Volkskrant* 15 September 1975; and see further discussion on pp.19, 22-23, with notes.

8. The psychoanalytic conception of suggestibility, as Dr. Ernest Kahn has reminded me, is of obvious applicability here; its usual relevance is to the case of hystericis, but it may well operate with respect to the varieties of violence involved in iconoclasm and the inclination towards it.

9. At least until fairly recently. The situation with respect to the study of iconoclasm and iconoclastic movements and acts is not as acute as it was a decade or so ago. Almost alone in the 1960s, Julius Held made a brilliant and extraordinarily wide-ranging assessment of both past and contemporary attacks on works of art, although he included one category of mutilation not discussed here: that of the doctoring, excision or curtailment of works of art to make them look more aesthetically pleasing – usually for financial motives; or the discarding of all but the most “beautiful” parts. J.S. Held, “Alteration and Mutilation of works of Art,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 62 (1963): 1-28. Since commencing my own work in 1968 on my doctoral dissertation, Freedberg, *Iconoclasm and Painting in the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1566–1609* (Oxford: unpublished dissertation, 1973), an increasing number both of general and of case studies has appeared. These include, notably the collection of essays edited by M. Warnke, *Bildersturm: die Zerstörung des Kunstwerks* (Munich, 1973), as well as H. Bredekamp, *Kunst als Medium soziale Konflikte: Bilderkämpfe von der Spätantike bis zur Hussitenrevolution* (Frankfurt, 1975); J. Phillips, *The Reformation of Images: Destruction of Art in England, 1535–1660* (Berkeley, 1973); J. Scheerder on the Netherlands in the sixteenth century in *De beeldenstorm* (Bussum, 1973); C. Christensen, *Art and the Reformation in Germany* (Athens, Ohio, 1979). Interest in recent and contemporary iconoclasm continues to grow apace, as evidenced by particular case studies such as K. Staeck and D. Adelmann, *Der Bonner Bildensturm, oder was die CDU von Demokratie hält* (Göttingen, 1976) and D. Gamboni, Un iconoclasme moderne: théorie et pratiques contemporaines du vandalisme artistique* (Zurich: Institut
Suisse pour L’Etude de L’Art, 1983), which also contains an extremely useful survey of recent works on vandalism of works of art.

In the 1970s and 1980s art historians have also shown greater awareness of the significance of great iconoclastic movements of the Reformation (perhaps most brilliantly in M. Baxandall, The Limewood Sculptors of Renaissance Germany [London, 1980], especially 69-83), of the French Revolution (for an out-of-the-way study see K. Scheinfuss, Von Brutus zu Marat: Kunst im Nationalkongress 1789-1795 [Dresden, 1973]), and of the Russian Revolution (see the stimulating discussion of the removal of monuments of the Tsarist regime in H. Gassner, "Zwei Arten ein Denkmal zu gebrauchen," Kritische Berichte II [1983]: 34-41, as well as H. J. Dregenberg, Die Sowjetische Politik auf dem Gebiet der bildenden Kunst von 1917-1934 [West Berlin, 1972]). None of these areas have been neglected by political, social and theological historians. For further references, see D. Freedberg, "The Structure of Byzantine and European Iconoclasm," Iconoclasm, eds. A. Bryer and J. Herin (Birmingham, 1977).

Indeed, the collection of essays edited by Bryer and Herrin bears ample witness to the fact that of all iconoclastic movements, that of the eight and ninth centuries in Byzantium has received by far the most attention, and the list of Abbreviated Works on pp. X-XI includes the most outstanding of the many excellent and thorough works in this specific area (but again they are not primarily by historians of art). That the interest outlined above continues in full spate is evidenced by a number of still more recent works — not all as adequate as one might have hoped — especially in the theological field. See, to cite only a few examples, F. de Maffei, Icona, pittore e arte al Concilio Niceno II (Rome, 1974) and V. Fuzzo, La giustificazione delle immagini religiose dalla tarda antichità al cristianesimo (Naples, 1977) for the Byzantine period; G. Scavizzi, Arte e architettura sacra, cronache e documenti sulla controversia tra riformati e cattolici (1500-1550) (Reggio Calabria and Rome, 1981) for the late medieval period as well as for the sixteenth century; and the useful general Reformation survey of M. Stirm, Die Bilderfrage in der Reformation, Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte 45 (Gutersloh, 1977). All of the above references are merely intended to indicate the spate of interest in the subject during the late fifteen years, not to make any qualitative or ranking judgments about the works concerned, while the present essay seems to be one of the few to concern itself with the individual rather than those arising from social movements or the movements as a whole. I have deliberately omitted the equally important areas of non-Western iconoclasm and non-Western outbreaks of hostility, antipathy and violence to images. These areas have also received considerable — but still insufficient — attention, especially with respect to Islam. Here, too, general and comprehensive analyses are, by and large, still wanting.

For a useful survey of the problem by a criminologist, see F. Geerdts, "Kunstvandalismus: kriminologische und kriminalistische Gedanken über ein bisher vernachlässigt Phänomen im Bereich von Kunst und Kriminalität," Archiv für Kriminologie 163 (1979): 129-44. The article deals summarily with several of the issues raised in the course of the present essay. Geerdts footnotes are especially useful for references to further approaches to the subject from the forensic and criminological point of view.

For some German and Swiss examples, see, inter alia, Christensen, Art and the Reformation in Germany and C. Garside, Zwingli and the Arts (New Haven, 1966). The interested investigator will, furthermore, find any number of further instances in local sources and chronicles, and these may be combed as appropriate. One of the most spectacular of such sources comes from England, with the frighteningly vast listing of destruction for Suffolk and Cambridge alone, in the Journal of William Dowsing, in which Dowsing methodically records his achievements in these counties (he acted on commission from the Earl of Manchester following the Long Parliament’s 1643 Ordinance concerning images). For a summary of his activities, with further examples and a good range of bibliographic references, see Phillips, The Reformation of Images, 184-87. Dowsing’s Journal was published in 1786 (W. Dowsing, The Journal of William Dowsing, of Stratford, parliamentary visitor, appointed under a warrant from the Earl of Manchester for demolishing the superstitious pictures and ornaments of churches etc. within the County of Suffolk in the years 1643–1644 [London: J. Nichols, 1786]). See for example, p. 2: “At Haver Jan. the 6th 1643. We broke down about a hundred superstitious pictures, and seven Fryars hugging a Nunn; and the Picture of God and Christ; and diverse others very superstitious . . . and we beat down a great stoneing Cross on the Top of the Church.” For Dowsing’s Cambidgeshire deprivations, see J.G. Cheshire, “William Dowsing’s Destructions in Cambridgeshire,” Transactions of the Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire Archaeological Society 8 (1914): 78ff.

11. The question of the relative status of social and political motivation has been much discussed, above all for the Netherlands. See the excellent summary in M. Dierickx, “Beeldenstorm in de Nederlanden in 1566,” Steen 19 (1966): 1040–49, as well as the more recent discussion in Scheerder, De beeldenstorm. The debate about levels of motivation has been particularly acute in the case of iconoclasm in Flanders and Antwerp, where the evidence is abundant and where discussion has been stimulated by the views of Marxist historians, as in E. Kuttner, Het honderdjar 1566 (Amsterdam, 1949; 2d ed. 1964) and T. Wittman, Les Gueux dans les “bonnes villes” de Flandres (1577–1584) (Budapest, 1969). The earlier views of motivation are usefully summarized in R. van Rosbroek, Het wonderjaar te Antwerpen (1566–1567) (Antwerp and Louvain, 1930). For a brief general survey of questions of motivation, see my section on this aspect of iconoclasm in Freedberg “The Structure of Byzantine and European Iconoclasm,” 167–68; but see also the further reference at the end of note 15 below.

12. For material consequences, see in the first instance note 10 above. Once again, the research in this area varies from locale to locale; but a good example from a less studied area is provided by D. McRoberts,

13. See A.L.E. Verheyden, Le conseil des troubles: liste des condamnés (1567–1573) (Brussels, 1961), as well as the vast number of documents recording the investigations of the Raad van Berloeten in the Archives Générales du Royaume (Algemeen Rijksarchief), Brussels, which have been widely and extensively published in the various works on Netherlandish iconoclasm recorded in the preceding notes.

14. For examples culled from C. van Mander, Het schilder-boeck (Haarlem, 1604), see Freedberg, Iconoclasm and Painting, especially 124-35.


16. For an attempt see Freedberg, "The Structure of Byzantine and European Iconoclasm."

17. The situation is usefully summarized by G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (Harmondsworth, 1979), 74-81, with the important observations and distinctions on p. 78 that "the fury was carried out, at least in the southern provinces, in a remarkably orderly way. In contrast to the casting 'down' of the Catholic churches in Scotland and France, the destruction in the South Netherlands was the work of a very small band of determined men…. The iconoclasm in the northern provinces was accompanied by more tumultuous scenes and involved more popular participation." Ibid., note 7 gives specific details (with more sources) of organization. For Holland, see the excellent article by A.C. Duke and D.H.A. Kolff, "The Time of Troubles in the County of Holland, 1566–1567," Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 82 (1969): 316-37. For the element of organization in Breda, see A.J.M. Beenakker, Breda in de eerste storm van de Opstand: van ketterij tot heeldenstorm, 1545–1569 (Tilburg, 1971); and in V. van Hoenck, S.J., Corpus iconoclasticum: documenten over den heeldenstorm van 1566 in de Boorgondische monarchie, vol. 2, Nijmegen (Tilburg, n.d.), 183-85. See, furthermore, Scheerder, De heeldenstorm, especially 98-100 for a very succinct summary of the question of the degree to which the various iconoclastic bands were organized or not. Almost everywhere, however, there is evidence of at least some organization,
even though in some places the crowds joined in the fury once begun; or remained passive while the image-breaking went on.


19. On Breda itself, see Beenakker, Breda in de eerste storm van de Opstand, 68-73. The Antwerp iconoclasm took place on 20 August. The next morning – Wednesday, 21 August – reports of that event were already circulating in Breda, and on Thursday the storm broke loose there too. The same dates apply, for example, to Middelburg, Vlissingen, and – very slightly later (though still beginning on 22 August) – Hertogenbosch.

20. See note 11 above.

21. Perhaps the most important town to have been spared was Haarlem. That this was so appears largely to have been a result of the efforts of Dirck Volckertsz. Coornhert, who, despite his reservations about images and his hostility to the Spanish regime – and despite allegations to the contrary – managed to restrain the more destructive and wilful elements within Haarlem populace. See J. Kleijntjens and B. Becker, Corpus iconoclasticum: documenten over den beeldenstorm van 1566 in de Bourgondische monarchie 1, Haarlem (Tilburg, n.d.), 1-110. In Haarlem, Brederode’s agitation was mitigated not only by Coornhert but also by the timely provision of a separate church for the Protestants in which to worship – a measure which failed (or was refused) elsewhere. Gouda and Dordrecht were spared as well; so were the main towns of Gelderland, Arnhem, Nijmegen and Zutphen. At Hoorn the iconoclasts appear to have been thwarted in the nick of time – they were successfully driven off by mud-and-dung-throwing Catholics (Duke and Kolff, “The Time of Troubles,” 323, also listing other places in Holland which escaped the worst of the storm).

22. For the purification of churches in and around Groningen see J. Kleijntjens, “Beeldenstorm in Groningen en in ‘de Ommelanden’,” Archief voor de Geschiedenis van het Aartsbisdom Utrecht 67 (1948): 171-216. For the purification and whitewashing of a Leeuwarden church (Oldehove) see J.J. Woltjer, Friesland in hervormingstijd (Leiden, 1962), 152 and Woltjer, “De beeldenstorm in Leeuwarden,” Spiegel Historiael 4 (1969): 170-75. For Limburg see J. van Volten, “Stukken betreffende de hervormingsberoerten te Utrecht in 1566 en 1567,” Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht 14 (1858). For Culemborg, see O.J. de Jong, De Reformatie in Culemborg (Assen, 1957); for Middelburg, J. van Volten, “Onderzoek van’s Konings wege ingesteld omtrent de Middelburgsche beroerten van 1566-1567,” Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht 18 (1873). Indeed, in some places – Utrecht most notably – the richest churches were spared, since the iconoclasts’ desire seems simply to have been to have their own church in which to hold their own services (see A. van Hulzen, Utrecht in 1566 en 1567 [Groningen, 1932], as well as van Volten 1858, J. Kleijntjens and J.W.C. van Campen, “Bescheiden betreffende den beeldenstorm van 1566 in de stad Utrecht,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht 53 (1932): 63-245).

23. See Freedberg, Iconoclasm and Painting, 105-35, for many instances. There often – but by no means
always – appears to have been some awareness of the importance of saving the most famous or most skilled works of art. The most renowned work to have been saved was probably the altarpiece of the Mystic Lamb in Ghent; the way in which it was preserved is recorded in van Vaernewijk’s manuscript in the University Library in Ghent, but more easily available in the French translation by H. van Duyse, *Mémoires d’un patricien gantois sur les troubles religieux en Flandre* (Ghent, 1905–1906), I, 129-32, where many further instances of destruction, saving and repair are recorded as well.

Many characteristic examples of the saving of works are recorded by van Mander, *Het schider-boeck* (see the case of Cornelis Engebrechtsz. Marienpoel altarpiece on folio 210 verso, for instance); but the most extensive published material is that provided in the brilliant examination of Turnhout by E. van Autenboer, “Uit de geschiedenis van Turnhout in de zestiende eeuw: voorbereiding, uitbarsting en gevolgen van de beeldenstorm,” *Taxandria* 40-41 (1968–1969): 1-276.

24. The classic Netherlandish rebuttal of this point of view — though here attributed to Luther — is the pamphlet ascribed to Marnix van Sint Aldegonde entitled *Van de Beelden afgebroken in de Nederlandsen in Augustus 1566*, reprinted in ed. J.J. van Toorenberghen *Philips van Marnix godsdienstige en kerkelijke geschreven*, (The Hague, 1871), I, 1-34.

For efforts at legitimization — rather than toleration of promiscuous individual destruction — in Nürnberg and Zürich, see Christensen, *Art and the Reformation in Germany*, 71, and Garside, *Zwingli and the Arts*, 120, 158-59, respectively.

Duke and Kolff, “The Time of Troubles,” 322, provide instructive details of the application of the principle to immediate social and political necessity: “in The Hague, for example, the churches were stripped deliberately and methodically. Still more extraordinary this was done with a semblance of legality. Two prominent members of the Reformed communities in The Hague and Delft informed the President of the Court of Holland that they had a warrant to purge the churches. Without probing more deeply, Mr. Cornelis Suys told them to proceed about their work without causing a commotion, and the twelve men so employed were paid out of the President’s pocket.”

In any number of places the removal of images was thus carried out under direct supervision of the town authorities (or local nobleman), either because of avowed Protestant principle, or more frequently — in order to forestall indiscriminate destruction and violence. Such was the case in Leeuwarden, where images were removed by command of “regent and authorities” (Woltjer, 1969), in The Hague, where, as we have seen, the magistrates actually paid for the images to be removed as soon as they heard of the events in Antwerp (in order to avoid any unseemly tumult which might excite the mob; cf. Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, 80), and above all in Antwerp in 1581 (on which still see F. Prims, “De Beeldenstormerij van 1581,” *Antwerpiensia* 1939 [Antwerp, 1940], 183-89).

25. Any number of ministers were involved either in the organization of iconoclasm or in the image-breaking itself. At the very least they stood to gain a church in which to preach. Kleijntjens, “Beeldenstorm
in Groningen en 'de Ommelanden,' gives several instances, including the following: at Loppersum two lapsed priests destroyed images which had not yet been taken to safety (174); at Bedum the pastor himself took them down — although he did not destroy them (176); while in other places — Saxum, for example — the pastor, presumably under suspicion, declared that he was not himself responsible for breaking images (175). Kleijnjens also records that at Loppersum, the schoolmaster helped the two lapsed priests destroy the images in the church there (174); the Rector of the school in Groningen together with his students helped pull down and smash images (Ibid., cf. 212). It is worth recalling that in Antwerp in 1568 no less than twenty-two schoolmasters lost their jobs “because they had taught their charges Protestant psalms and catechisms and had encouraged them to defy authority” (Parker, 289, note 10, citing J.G.C.A. Briels, “Zuidnederlandse eenderwijskrachten in Noord-Nederland, 1570-1630,” Archief voor de Geschiedenis van de Katholieke Kerk in Nederland 14 (1972): 92).


27. Cf. notes 54 and 71 below. For the last category see — out of many possible examples — the entirely characteristic sentiment expressed by the headline in the Berliner Zeitung of 22 April 1982 over an article reporting the attack on Barnett Newman’s Who’s Afraid of Red Yellow and Blue IV (the irony of the title in this context can hardly be overlooked): “Das hättte jeder Lehrling malen Können.”


29. Such reports usually reveal a mixture of panic and enthralled excitement; furthermore, they recount the iconoclastic act in such precise and minute detail that a well-nigh fetishistic fascination with the object itself is laid bare (cf. my comments above on pp. 22-23) — in addition to the more obviously sensationalist aspects of derangement and destruction.


31. See De Telegraaf, 16 September 1972 (two days after the attack): “Ik ben de Messias” etc. Cf. Neue Kronen Zeitung, 11 October 1975: “Gott selbst, Jesus Christus, hat mir den Auftrag gegeben...”

32. De Echo, 17 January 1911.

33. Munich, Alte Pinakothek, nr. 320; oil on panel, 288 x 225 cm. Attacked on February 26, 1959. See the report in Kunstchronik 12 (1959): part 4, p. 89, as well as the account of its restoration in Maltehnk-Trestauro 65 (1959): 65-70.

The assailant was one Walter Menzl, who a year before had published a booklet entitled Die Welt von
Morgen: Aufgang einer glücklicheren Zeit (Überlingen-Bodensee, 1958), and who was later to describe himself as "eine Philosophischer Schriftsteller" trying to bring about a new world in which war would no longer be known. This declaration followed the confiscation of several of his books and pamphlets (written under the pseudonym of Paul Brecher) by the authorities in Konstanz. These included such titles as Der Schlüssel zum Eros, Faust und Greichen, Erotik der Elite, and Jenseits vieler Grenzen (reviewed as "Die Geschichte eines Abenteurers und Casanovas," Pforzheimer Zeitung, 21 October 1966.

34. For these threats, see, for example, the articles in the Neue Rhein Zeitung (5 January 1970) and the Saarbrücker Zeitung (7 January 1970). That his messianic impulses continued is evidenced by his advertisements for help in the Munich Abendzeitung (24 January 1970), and a variety of other more public acts during that month (including the interruption of an SPD conference on 15 January 1970). All this followed a number of letters and "final appeals" to a variety of newspapers in November and December 1969.

35. See De Telegraaf and Trouw (16 September 1975) for brief reports on the early history of Wilhelm de Rijck, a 38-year-old former teacher from Bloemendaal.

36. Subsequent reports in German newspapers all maintained that at his hearing he insisted in words translated as "Es wurde mir von Herrn befohlen. Ich musste es tun!" or "Gott selbst, Jesus Christus hat mir den Auftrag gegeben," Neue Kronen Zeitung, 11 October 1975. But cf. the report in De Telegraaf, 16 September 1975: "Ik ben de Messias. Ik wilde een spectaculaire daad verrichten, zodat ik op de tv mijn boodschap aan de wereld zou kunnen uitdragen."


38. For the classic case of publicity-seeking – Herostratos' destruction of the Temple of Diana at Ephesus – see note 89 below. But such motivation has ever since been a common one. With regard both to the desire for publicity and the claim of possession by superior powers, the case of Leutard and the Bees, recorded by Raoul (proc Radvphus) Glaber, is instructive in several respects. One day around the end of 1000 the peasant Leutard was working in a field round Châlons. He fell asleep, "and it seemed to him that a great swarm of bees entered his body through his privates . . ., they seemed to speak to him bidding him to do things impossible to men . . ., He sent away his wife as though he effected the separation by command of the gospel; then going forth, he entered the church as if to pray, seized and broke to bits the cross and image of the Saviour. Those who watched this trembled with fear, thinking him to be mad, as he was; and since rustics are prone to fall into error, he persuaded them that these things were done by miraculous revelation from God . . ., In a short time, his fame, as if it were that of a sane and religious person, drew him no small part of the commonpeople. The wise bishop Gebuin then investigated Leutard realizing that he had been completely overcome and deprived of the adulation of the people, threw himself to his death in a well," cited in W.L. Wakefield and A.P. Evans, Heretics of the Middle Ages (New York and London, 1969), 72-83. The story is as paradigmatic as one could wish, in its ascription of madness to the assailant of the image, in the terror his deed arouses (even now it is not difficult to understand the horror of the destruction of an image of Christ, at
the consequent breaking of its power and aura), in the fame or notoriety he subsequently achieves, and finally the awareness of failure of the aim, here culminating in suicide.


40. I am grateful to Dr. P. J. J. van Thiel of the Department of Paintings in the Rijksmuseum for providing this gloss on first hand reports of the assailant’s words at the time he was apprehended.

41. *De Echo*, 17 January 1911.

42. London, National Gallery, nr. 2057. Attacked on 10 March 1914.

43. *The Times* (11 March 1914) referred to her as “the prominent woman Suffragist” – a rather more tactful description than her subsequent one of “Slasher Mary.” Her attack on the *Rokeby Venus* took place during one of the periods in which she was released from Holloway Prison in order to recover from hunger strike; it followed an extraordinary career as a protester on behalf of the feminist cause. As her obituary in the *Sheffield Telegraph* (8 November 1961) recalled, she held the suffragette movement’s medal record – 10 bars for forcible feedings in prison, hunger strikes and arrests. She appears to have been arrested, released and rearrested a remarkable number of times under the so-called “Cat and Mouse Act” – in a few weeks between 8 July and 12 October 1913, she was detained for at least ten separate incidents of more or less petty violence (the “Cat and Mouse Act” was used to send prisoners out of Holloway when their lives were threatened by prolonged hunger strike).

44. *The Times*, 11 March 1914, 9. Implicit in this statement is the notion – amongst others – that if one is to make a political protest of one kind or another then it were better to assault a “dead” picture than a living being.


46. Ibid.

47. Held, “Alteration and Mutilation of Works of Art,” 8-12, gives some of the best known examples from the past, including the well-nigh classic case of Paul IV’s instructions to Daniele da Volterra to cover up the offending nudities of Michelangelo’s *Last Judgment* (on which see also C. de Tolnay, *Michelangelo: The Final Period* [New Jersey: Princeton, 1960], 98 and E. Camesasca et al., *The Sistine Chapel* [New York, n.d.], I, 248-50), and of Louis of Orleans’s mutilation of Correggio’s *Leda and the Swan* (Berlin, Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz, nr. 218) on the grounds that it was too sensual (cf. Mrs. Jameson’s comments, cited by Held, “Alteration and Multilation,” 8, that “the memory of Correggio would surely have been fauter had he never painted them”). Ibid., 6, rightly notes that the other side of the coin – that of the mutilation of sexual parts – may well be motivated by the “subconscious compulsion to possess” the figure represented (usually the female figure). Many other examples in J. Clapp, *Art Censorship*. For the sixteenth century, see D. Freedberg, “Johannes Molanus on Provocative Paintings,” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 13 (1971): 128-38, which also contains many instances of earlier objections to indecent imagery. But see also Freedberg, “The Hidden God: Image and Interdiction in the Netherlands in the Sixteenth

48. Abundant examples of iconoclastic attacks on works regarded by the assailant as somehow improper or indecent are collected in Clapp, *Art Censorship*.


50. I am grateful to Dr. J.W. Niemeyer and Dr. W. Kloek for telling me of this otherwise unrecorded instance of the relationship between an ostensible desire for decency and decorum on the one hand, and iconoclasm on the other. For the sentiment, cf. the classic reproach by Clement of Alexandria to the Greeks that "you are not ashamed in the eyes of all to look at representations of all forms of licentiousness which are portrayed in public places" in eds. A. Robert and T. Donaldson, *The Ante-Nicene Fathers* vol. 2, *Fathers of the Second Century: Exhortation to the Heathen IV* (reprinted, New York, 1969), 189.

For sixteenth-century objections to the indecency of classical statues – often in public places – see Freedberg, "Johannes Molanus," especially 24-241, with its references both to Bilio da Fabriano and Erasmus. Erasmus' reminder of a passage from Aristotle is typical: Aristotle thought that "indecent paintings and statues make for such corruption of morals that he wishes the magistrates to take precautions by means of public legislation that there be no image in the state suggestive of obscenity...." The relevant passage comes from the *Politics*, 7.17; the passage from Erasmus comes from the *Christianni matrimoni institutio*, in ed. J. Leclerc, *Desiderii Erasmi opera omnia* (Leiden, 1703–1706), V, col. 606E. But cf. Erasmus's further observation that "Aristotle seriously errs by making an exception of the gods who are traditionally allowed indecency...." (Ibid., col. 719 C-E). More in Freedberg, "Johannes Molanus," 234-35.


53. Ibid.

54. With this attitude one may perhaps associate the recurrent objections to images on the grounds of their cost and financial value. From St. Bernard on, and through Martin Luther, we are familiar with the feeling that the huge sums spent on paintings, sculptures and other ornaments had better been spent on the poor, on other more socially worthwhile causes. St. Bernard's views are succinctly expressed in the well-known letter to William of St. Thierry, in *P.L.*, vol. 182, cols. 915-17. For Martin Luther, see *D. Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Weimar, 1883), I, 236, 556, 598; X, 32 part 3; and in several places, most of which are cited in Christensen, *Art and the Reformation in Germany*, 43-44. Still more references in Freedberg, "The Hidden God," 149-50, note 56.

55. *The Times*, 17 September 1981.

56. The *locus classicus* is Athanasius of Alexandria's illustration of the Unity of Father and Son by "the example of the Emperor's image which displays his form and likeness. The Emperor is the likeness of his
image. The likeness of the Emperor is indelibly impressed upon the image, so that anyone looking at the image sees the Emperor, and again anyone looking at the Emperor recognizes that the image is his likeness. He who worships the image worships the Emperor in it. The image is his form and likeness."


58. Counsel for the defence said at that trial that it was an attack on a portrait of someone who was extremely popular in Britain, and there had been a sense of outrage," The Times, 17 September 1981. For the question of the financial value of an image, see note 55 above.

59. Cf. the comment of the sailor cook who attacked the Nightwatch in 1911, De Echo, 17 January.

60. This in itself may account for the many attacks on images of royalty, even when they are not symbols of a repressive order (as they were in the case of attacks on images of rulers such as those of Alba in Antwerp in 1567, of the nobility during the Peasants’ Revolt in Germany, of the Tsars during the Russian Revolution, and so on and so endlessly forth). Hence attacks on statues and paintings of sovereigns like Queen Juliana of the Netherlands. It is perhaps worth recalling here that in 1970 another painting of royalty in the national Portrait Gallery in London – that of the Queen by Annigoni – was assailed. When the painting had been on display for only three days, a woman shouting abuse hurled a Bible at it (recalled in the report in The Times [31 August 1981] on the attack on the painting of Princess Diana).

61. London, National Gallery, nr. 5597; 154 x 214 cm; attacked on 3 April 1978, by a recent Italian immigrant who was unemployed and had a history of mental illness. Cf. The Times, 4 April 1978 and The Guardian, 20 June 1978.


63. Cf. the headline "Die Zerstörung der Gemälde hat mich befriedigt," in the Munich Abendzeitung, 10 October 1977. For further details of these attacks, see note 71 below.

64. The Evening Standard, 19 June 1978: "Three psychiatrists who interviewed him since his arrest agreed he was schizophrenic. Dr. Jack Shaby, medical officer at Brixton Prison, said that Borzi slashed the
painting when he was suffering from delusions and hallucinations. "He was living in a world of fantasy", he said." The Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1978: "Sentencing Borzi, Judge Friend recommended that he should be taken to a prison specializing in psychiatric treatment until deportation papers were served."

67. The biblical source is Exodus 32: after Moses delayed his descent from Mount Sinai, the Israelites exhorted Aaron, "Up, make us gods..." (32: 1); they gave up their golden ornaments, from which he fashioned a molten calf and built an altar before it; "and they rose up early on the morrow and offered burnt offerings...and the people sat down to eat and to drink and rose up to play..." (32: 6); and God was angry; so was Moses; the tablets were broken, the calf finally destroyed. Already in 1 Corinthians 10:47, this even served as the basis for the admonition: "Neither be ye idolaters, as were some of them, as it is written. The people sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play." A crucial sixteenth-century representation of the subject, is, of course, Lucas van Leyden's Dance round the Golden Calf (Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, nr. A3841), painted at just the time (ca. 1525) when the relation between image worship (especially Catholic image worship) and idolatry was being spelled out in no uncertain terms. For more implicit irony of a painting representing this particular subject, see L. Silver, "The Sin of Moses: Comments on the Early Reformation in a Late Painting by Lucas van Leyden," Art Bulletin 52 (1973): 406; but see especially P. Parshall, "Some Visual Paradoxes in Northern Renaissance Art," Wascana Review 9 (1974): 99-101.
68. Clapp, Art Censorship, gives a listing up to 1972 that is by no means complete but is probably fuller than elsewhere available. Most of Clapp's citations, however, have to do with works destroyed or mutilated as a result of objections to their putative immorality, their expensiveness or because of the increasingly frequent allegation that modern work was not "art" at all. For the period after 1972, see, inter alia, Gamboni, Un iconoclasme moderne, 114-17.
69. Compare the case of the chisel attack on Raphael's Sposalizio in the Brera in Milan in 1958, where the assailant left a sign reading "Long live the Italian Revolution" (cited by Held, "Alteration and Mutilation of Art," 4). It has become a common journalistic practice to survey instances like this whenever a well-known work in a major museum is attacked. Thus, for a useful overview of most of these examples, see the report in The Guardian (4 April 1978) on the day after the attack on Poussin's Golden Calf discussed above. For these and further examples from 1956 on, see Held; Geerds "Kunstvandalismus," 132-33; Gamboni, Un iconoclasme moderne, 19-21 and 114-17; and D. Kinnane, "Kunstvandalismus," Artis 28 (1976): 25-27.
70. All the attacks were by one Jans-Joachim Bohllmann, and were widely reported in the German newspapers. Bohllmann's acid-throwing activities began with Klee's Goldfish in the Hamburg Kunsthalle on 29 March 1977, and continued through the Kassel attacks on 7 October 1977. He remained unapprehended until his confession on 8 October 1977. His trial took place in Hamburg from 16 January 1979 to 1 February 1979. There it emerged that his wife had died after a fall while he had already had a long history of severe
mental illness, he felt he had been "cheated and disappointed by life," wished to become famous, etc. The last straw was his wife's death. At his trial he expressed regret at his actions, and declared that he would not do such things again (press cuttings provided by the Deutsche Presseagentur; ref. bsd 251 311705 January 1979, 263 vm).

71. The painting was knifed by a painter, on the grounds of his resentment at the termination of a city subsidy to painters; while, for apparently similar reasons, another painter attacked van Gogh's Self Portrait in Grey Hat in the Van Gogh Museum just a short while later (Gamboni, Un iconoclasme moderne, 115, with references).

Not dissimilar resentments may occur in the case of artists who are moved to destroy that which they see as not worthy of being regarded as "art" at all. Thus on 15 March 1953, an expatriate Hungarian artist destroyed Reg Butler's prizewinning model for his sculpture of The Unknown Political Prisoner, temporarily on display in the Tate Gallery - it had won a substantial prize and seemed too simple, too abstract and too easy (cf. for example, The Daily Sketch, 16 March 1953, and The New York Times, 16 March 1953).

72. To it could be added the whole range of works judged by the assailant to be unnecessarily or unfairly expensive, or to fail to conform to personal notions of what constitutes a work of art. For examples, see the preceding note as well as notes 27 and 54 above.

73. Het Leven, 17 January 1911.

74. De Echo, 17 January 1911.


76. Much journalistic mileage is self-evidently to be gained simply by citing the supposed monetary value of the assaulted work. The value given is often entirely notional and sometimes exaggerated; but the inflated prices paid in auction rooms provide - for journalists and others - the only possible comparative bases for making the kinds of estimates that cause people to gasp. One would have thought the phenomenon to be especially common in the post-war years, when the spiral of prices has gone ever higher; but see note 81 below for an early instance of this obsession. The need - a little abated these days - to assess the exact financial extent of the damage is also exemplified by reports on the attack on the Rokeby Venus cited in note 81; but even in 1978 after the attack on Poussin's Dance round the Golden Calf in the National Gallery in London, the Daily Telegraph (20 June 1978) reported that the court heard that the value of the painting "was now halved" (in its report on the trial of the assailant).

77. Indeed, Het Leven (17 January 1911) even commented on the cost of the gallery that had especially been built for the Nightwatch. The caption of its photographs of the hall referred to "De Rembrandtzaal die indertijd voor de som van 70.000 gulden speciaal voor de Nachtwacht werd gebouwd...."

78. In the course of its report on the attack, The Times (11 March 1914) insisted twice on the purchase price of the picture (£45,000), but also added two further characteristic elements. First it produced an estimate of the amount by which the value of the picture had decreased as a result of the attack (£10-£15,000);
and then, revealingly, it made the following statement: "It was universally recognized by good judges as one of the masterpieces of the great Spanish artist," and the width of the circle to which it appealed was shown by the subscription list, which contains names of lovers of art of every class, from the very rich to persons of extremely modest means. The list was headed by "An Englishman" who gave £ 10,000, then followed Lord Mickleham with £ 8,000, Messrs Agnew (who had been the vendors of the picture) with £ 5,250, the late Dr Ludwig Mond with £ 2,000, and many others who gave £ 500, £ 250, £ 100, £ 50, and so on, till we come to "A Young Student" who contributed 25.

79. Cf. The Daily Telegraph (12 April 1978) in its report headed "Stricter Gallery Security," after the attack on Poussin's Dance round the Golden Calf: "Security arrangements are being reviewed by the National Gallery following the slashing last week .... In keeping with its policy, gallery officials declined to elaborate on the security review .... One said: 'Security ceases to be security if we talk about it.' " In an article headed "Tralies voor de Nachtwacht?" following the 1975 slashing of the Nightwatch, the Algemeen Dagblad (September 1975) reflected: "Blijft de vraag: zijn dit soort daden te voorkomen? ... Dit 'openbaar kunstbezet' zal altijd een zeker risico met zich meebrengen." On the other hand, Geerds, "Kunstvandalismus," 140-44, emphasized the value of security arrangements - a variety of which he reviewed and analyzed - even if only as a means of discovering and detecting (if not actually deterring) the assailants of works of art; but even he felt obliged to express reservations (142).

80. Cf. The Times account (11 March 1914), of the movements of Mary Richardson's hand, in a report whose second sentence ran as follows: "She mutilated the picture with a small chopper with a long narrow blade, similar to the instruments used by butchers .... " A similar obsession with the instrument used to attack a painting was shown by a large number of reports on the attack on the Nightwatch in 1975; the press seemed to be particularly concerned - diverted, amused? - by the fact that the assailant had used a knife stolen from a restaurant where he had dined earlier in the day, cf. De Telegraaf, 15 September 1975.

81. Het Leven, 17 January 1911: 75.

82. Reader's Digest, 3 April 1977: "Lacerated by a madman's knife, the masterpiece has come gloriously back to life under the restorer's touch," ran the subheading of the article by Francis Leary, "How They Saved Rembrandt's Nightwatch." Its second paragraph began thus: "Nightwatch! Rembrandt's masterpiece ... one of the most famous in the world! Hijmans was stunned. He hurried to the Nightwatch Gallery and stared in horror at the immense painting. Long strips of canvas hung limply from several deep gashes. There were 13 knife cuts. The two central figures had slashes two feet long which one triangular piece of canvas 12 by 2 1/2 inches was completely severed ...."

83. National Gallery, Press Notice, 6 April 1978: "Five pieces of canvas were cut and ripped from the stretcher, leaving very little of the 5 : 7 foot picture in the frame." There is, of course, some justification for providing the press with precise details of the damage to a major work of art, but notes 81-82 above make it very clear how prurient interest in such details may turn out to be. Indeed, even in apparently straightfor-
ward reviews of iconoclastic activity, this kind of interest belies an element of real Schadenfreude. When Janet Watts surveyed the "chain of outrages" which preceded the attack on the Poussin, her article was headed "Knives, Acid, Ink: The Weapons of Art Vandals"; and after assessing the financial extent of the damage caused by the North German acid-thrower in 1977, returned to the case of Michelangelo's Pietà: in 1972 Laszlo hid a hammer under his mac, climbed over an altar rail in St Peters, and started to smash the face of Michelangelo's Pietà, knocking off the nose, damaging the left eyelid, chipping the veil. Then he knocked off some of the fingers of the left hand and finally severed the left arm. "The Guardian, 4 April 1978. Cf. Geerds, "Kunstvandalismus," section 2 ("Praktiken der Tatsauführung"), divided into 1. "Mechanische Praktiken" and 2. "Physikalischchemische Praktiken," with several specific instances, 134-36.

84. As in the charming account of the four girls from Worcester who saw the attack on Poussin's Dance round the Golden Calf, and were rewarded by being taken to see the final stages of its restoration. "It should be quite an experience because we thought it would be impossible to repair the painting after the attack", said Jacqueline Laurence, aged 17.... They were accompanied by the art teachers who took them on the original visit. "There was so much small detail on the painting that the restorers were dubious whether they could ever repair it", said Mr. Jellyman, "Although it will never be the same again, they must have worked miracles," Worcester Evening News, 1 December 1978. Popular awe of the renewing capabilities of restorers is exemplified, mildly, by headlines like "The dedication of the invisible menders who will restore the Golden Calf to its rightful place" (Daily Mail, 12 April 1978, over a photo of the Chief Restorer of the National Gallery standing beside the damaged picture).


86. The classic case, is, of course, that of Hesiod (Eratostratos). Varélius Maximus, 8.14.5, Aulus Gellius, 2.6.18, Aelian, 6.40, Strabo, 14.1.22 (64), Cicero, De natura deorum, 2.69 and De divinatione, 1.47 and several other writers all record how he burned down the Temple of Diana at Ephesus, specifically in order to ensure that posterity would not forget his name. Although the Common Council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention that name, it was handed down by Theopompos.

But see too Geerds' final remark after emphasizing the importance of devoting attention to the whole subject and of taking reasonably firm security measures, "Kunstvandalismus," 144.

87. Cf. the judicious comment in Duke and Kolff, "The Time of Troubles," 322, that "[T]he term
beeldenstorm usually conjures up a scene of indiscriminate destruction with wreckers and looters running amok in the churches. In fact, such outbreaks were comparatively rare in the northern part of the Netherlands, but because the image-breaking in Antwerp had taken this form, with Europe looking on, the exception was taken for the rule. In Holland, the disturbances in Amsterdam, Delft, Leiden and Den Briel conform most closely to this pattern . . . .

88. Cf. note 17 above.


90. Even though – as we have seen (cf. note 17 above) – iconoclasm is often planned, organized and supervised, this loosening of social and psychological restraint is precisely what many of the commentators insist upon bringing to the fore. Thus, not surprisingly, van Mander in Het schilder-boeck, frequently refers to the “rasende,” “onverstandighe,” “uytsinnighe,” “ontsinnighe,” “woest” and “blind” behaviour of the iconoclasts (eg. fols. 210v, 213v, 224v, 236v, 244, 244v, 254 and 254v), while J.L. Motley, The Rise of the Dutch Republic (London, 1904), 473-475, brilliantly using many of the elements of the sixteenth-century descriptions he knew, provides a kind of omnium gatherum of contemporary attitudes: “The statues, images, pictures and ornaments, as they lay upon the ground, were broken with sledge-hammers, hewn with axes, trampled, torn and beaten into shreds . . . . Nothing escaped their omnivorous rage . . . . The noblest and richest temple of the Netherlands was a wreck . . . .” A contemporary account of the Antwerp iconoclasm gives a list of the most notable works destroyed in the Cathedral, and concludes: “want haer verwoesthey en namp ghene respect nergens aen.” G.V. van Loon and F.G. Ullens, Antwerpse chronyke sedert den jare 1500 tot het jaar 1574 (Leiden, 1743), 88.

The evidence for the “abdication of self-control” (aside from the kind of isolated individual act analyzed in this essay) is abundant in the Southern Netherlands, but less so in the North. Nevertheless in many places – as in the case of Heenvliet cited in note 89 above – the matter does seem to have got out of hand, and led to more or less promiscuous image-breaking; while despite the many efforts in Groningen and “de Ommelanden” to control the stripping of the churches and to save works of art, there remains plenty of evident to suggest that many individuals got carried away by their enthusiastic destructiveness (Kleijntjens, “Beeldenstorm in Groningen en in ‘de Ommelanden’,” 171-216).

91. Naples, Museo Nazionale di Capodimonte, Pinacoteca, nr. 38; oil on panel, 237 x 238 cm.

92. Padua, Eremitani, Ovetari Chapel; destroyed in 1944; left wall, lower row, right. For a good reproduction of this detail, see G. Fiocco and T. Pignatti, The Frescoes of Mantegna in the Eremitani Church, Padua (Oxford, 1978), pl. xv. For other instances of damage to the faces of “figures representing villainous or detestable characters,” see Held “Alteration and Mutilation of Works of Art,” 7.

93. Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, nr. A 2815; each panel 101 x 54/55.5 cm.
94. De Bruyn Kops, “De Zeven Werken van Barmhartigheid,” 214: “Merkwaardig is dat alles niet in het wilde weg gebeurde, maar kennelijk nogal doelgericht”; cf. the English summary on p. 250: “Nor had all this been done at random, the intention clearly being to concentrate on the figures, faces, eyes, or even attributes of the persons performing the works of mercy.”

95. Attributed to Dirck Jacobsz., Toledo Museum of Art, nr. 60.7; panel, 62 x 49.3 cm.

96. As appears from the photographs of the painting in its stripped state, which were made by William Suhr in 1959, immediately before he undertook restoration and repairs. The photos show severe X-shaped cuts on the eyes and mouths. I am grateful to Dr. J.P. Filedt Kok for drawing my attention to this aspect of the painting’s history. With this example of the mutilation of the eyes in a portrait that seems extraordinarily and powerfully present, one may align that of the vastly more compelling and arresting self-portrait by Dürer of 1500 in Munich, Alte Pinakothek, nr. 537, which has also been subject to various attempts at scoring out the eyes.


98. Perhaps the most revealing of the loci classicī is the story from the Life of St. John the Faster, Patriarch of Constantinople (d. 595), by his disciple Photinus, who tells of the way in which an image of the Virgin cured a severe case of demoniacal possession. The story ends with the absolutely telling statement that cure was wrought by the image which was “ho topos, ho topos de mallon tēs parthenou, mētros” (J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, col. 85C) – “a last minute withdrawal from the abyss of sheer animism,” as the most distinguished modern commentator on these matters puts it (Kitzinger, “The Cult of Image before Iconoclasm,” 147). Cf. also R. Trewler for several striking Florentine instances of the location of the Virgin or Saint in the particular image, of the operativeness of the image as Virgin or Saint, not of the image as image of Virgin or Saint, in “Florentine Religious Experience: The Sacred Image,” Studies in the Renaissance 19 (1972): 10-40. Freedberg “The Hidden God,” 139-40, has a further analysis of this phenomenon.

99. This, of course, lies at the root of all iconoclastic acts and movements where representations of rulers or those in one form of authority or another are destroyed. But even in such cases – often and erroneously termed “symbolic” – this is only part of the story. In the Revolt of the Netherlands, in the English, French and Russian Revolutions – take only the best-known examples – images of the deposed authority (or the authority that has to be deposed) are assailed with great vigour; but the explanation in terms of an attack on the authority itself is, as we have seen, only a superficial one. This essay has attempted to raise the deeper issue of why it is felt that by damaging images one somehow damages the authority they either denote or connote.

For striking instances of the way in which damage to an image may be felt or seen to affect the powers of
the authority itself, see the excellent study of iconoclasm in Münster in 1534–1535 by Warnke, "Durchbrochene Geschichte? Die Bilderstürme der Wiedertäufer in Münster 1534–1535," in Warnke, 84-90 and 91-98, where it is told how appropriate punishment was visited upon the images themselves, as if they were real bodies, by mutilating organs and limbs – in the manner of current judicial procedures.

100. "Ich musste zerschlagen, was andere verehrten," said Hans Joachim Bohlmann when finally taken into custody. Words exactly like these, or to this effect, were reported by several German Newspapers of 10 October 1977 (e.g. in the comprehensive report in Die Welt, 10 October 1977). But see the comment by Geerds, "Kunstvandalismus," 139, note 25, on this same assailant. See also notes 32, 36.

101. Admittedly G. Scavizzi, 3, does attempt to shift responsibility for the equation ("L’Idolatria, o per parlare in termini comuni, la fede nelle qualità magiche dell’oggetto..."; my italics), but no real alternative of "idolatry" is offered in the general statement of the programme of his book.

102. Although there is much in Marcel Maus' general theory of magic that appears to me to be untenable or in need of revision, the following of his caveats seem to be appropriate in the present context: "These values (i.e. magical ones) do not depend on the intrinsic qualities of a thing or person, but on the status or rank attributed to them by public opinion or its prejudices. They are social facts, not experimental facts.... Magical 'judgments' are not analytical judgments.... We have no wish to deny that magic (not an ontological entity in Maussian terms) does not demand analysis or testing. We are only saying that it is poorly analytical, poorly experimental and almost entirely a priori...." in A General Theory of Magic, trans. R. Brain (London, 1972), 120, 122, and 125, etc. It is regrettable that claims about magical "properties" do not usually begin with the rigorous theoretical framework offered by Mauss, especially his insistence on the a priori nature of magical judgments and on the fact that they are by no means individual – or inherent in the objects themselves – but are rather social and collective in origin. This aspect of his theory should lie at the foundations of any analysis of individuals – like the iconoclasts discussed here – who infringe socially acceptable norms while at the same time acting upon collective assumptions about that which they threaten to destroy.