Central to the achievement of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) was the
economic rationale of maintaining the "prosperity and stability"
(fanrong anding) of the territory. This declared common objective, while
not exclusively confined to the economic sphere, reinforced earlier
assurances that investors could set their hearts at ease; it also proved
to be the primary catalyst in the successful completion of the
Sino-British accord. Not only does the term "prosperity and
stability" appear in the Joint Declaration, but the Basic Law
Drafting Committee (Drafting Committee) for the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) has since dignified the phrase by
enshrining it in the Preamble of the Collection of Draft Provisions of the
Basic Law (Collection) and placing it alongside the statement of the
national goal of reunification.
Maintenance of Hong Kong's "prosperity and
stability" has thus become a basic objective of the political agenda,
a jiben fangzhen zhengce (fundamental policy direction). It is unnecessary
here to go into the supposed dialectical function of a fangzhen (also
called a "duality norm"). A caveat, nevertheless, should be
sounded at the outset: within the economic and political realities of the
contemporary world of the Joint Declaration lies a largely unnoticed
reservoir of ideology which could burst abruptly upon the landscape to
change our perception of things. For example, the meaning of such key
words and concepts used in the Joint Declaration as "autonomy,"
"upholding national unity," "sovereignty,"
"freedom according to law," "accountability,"
"election" and so forth might be subject to ideological
reinterpretation. To varying degrees, these terms have been the subject of
controversy or the focus of concern in Hong Kong.
The wording of the Preamble to the Collection
illustrates this ideological sub-context; immediately after inclusion of
the term "prosperity and stability" follows a pregnant reference
to "the history of Hong Kong and its realities," thereby
signifying that the necessary "specific conditions" are present
to justify the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR under article 31 of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as an instance of the
application of the Chinese Communist ideological line of "seeking
truth from facts" (shishi qiushi). In the Marxist world view this
principle appears in economic garb, proclaiming that truth is to be sought
primarily from economic facts. One such fact is Hong Kong's continuing
role as an economic dynamo of the PRC's Four Modernizations.
It is outside the scope of this short commentary to
explore the whole range of inter-relationships between politics and
economics which will form the political economy of the Hong Kong SAR. Yet
the economic profile of the Hong Kong SAR, which will take shape from
within the crucible of "one country, two systems" (yiguo
liangzhi), cannot be viewed in isolation from this new hybrid political
structure. The economics of the Basic Law is bound to be shaped by its
politics, although Lu Ping, Secretary General of the Hong Kong and Macao
Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC, has put the matter another
way: "The economy," he said, "is the base, politics is the
superstructure." Be that as it may, it is essential to examine the
economic fundamentals sought to be protected by reference to the political
profile of the future Basic Law and to evaluate both the economic and
political structures by reference to, among other things, their
credibility.
Nothing illustrates this better than the promise of
"a high degree of autonomy" (gaodu zizhi). The concept is
essentially political, but it has an economic impact so profound that
without the promised autonomy, the ability of the Hong Kong SAR to become
more than just another Chinese coastal city would be completely destroyed.
More accurately, unless visibly credible steps are taken to realize the
promise of autonomy, the declared objective of "prosperity and
stability" will become unattainable.
The Joint Declaration itself was largely an exercise in
building credibility. The PRC could have simply made a unilateral
declaration of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong. Such a unilateral
declaration, however, would not have had the credibility of a negotiated
settlement and the external restraint constituted by a legally binding
treaty. Even a legally binding treaty, however, may be lacking in
credibility. Hence, the need to develop norms of credibility by which the
promised future may be evaluated.
In its broadest sense, a credibility norm is simply any
standard by which the credibility of a system or enterprise may be judged.
The promise of autonomy (gaodu zizhi), the principle of continuity (zhidu
bubian) and the precept of maintaining prosperity and stability (fanrong
anding) are three primary norms by which the draft provisions of the Basic
Law and the concept of "one country, two systems" may be
evaluated.
There is another prescriptive, rather than descriptive,
sense in which the term credibility norm is used herein. Because the
primary norms may themselves be deficient in credibility either initially
or by reason of subsequent developments, it becomes imperative to solve
the credibility problem if an enterprise is to be a success. In its
prescriptive sense, therefore, a credibility norm is a rule of action
which seeks to augment that which is perceived to be deficient in
credibility. It is thus a principle of selection which seeks out among
available options that which provides the most credible solution to a
given problem. Therefore, the development of a credibility norm involves,
first, a judgment as to what deficiency in credibility exists and, second,
a decision as to what must be done to cure the deficiency.
An illustration on the level of selection of options is
supplied by the controversy over how the chief executive for the Hong Kong
SAR should be chosen. The elaboration by the PRC Government of its basic
policies regarding Hong Kong contained in Annex I of the Joint Declaration
stipulates that the chief executive for the SAR is to be appointed by the
Central Government on the basis of either "consultations" or
"elections" held locally. A consultative model, therefore, would
be in perfect accord with the letter of the Joint Declaration, but, in
this writer's view, lacks credibility when considered in conjunction with
the promised high degree of autonomy.
Demonstration of real credibility will require something
more than minimum compliance with the Joint Declaration. Nothing less than
a full and generous implementation of the Joint Declaration will succeed
in maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity. The principle of full and generous
implementation is a credibility norm which works on the premise that
credibility is best tested in areas where a choice of options exists.
Thus, if the PRC Government shows a propensity to exercise greater control
of the Hong Kong SAR whenever the option presents itself, or if it
re-interprets terms in the Joint Declaration so as to secure such control,
questions will naturally arise as to what credence should be placed in the
promised autonomy. If, on the other hand, it measures up to the
credibility norm of full and generous implementation, favoring options
which give as high a measure of self-rule as is consistent with the terms
of the Joint Declaration, the credibility of the entire enterprise will be
immeasurably enhanced. The principle of full and generous implementation
also leads to recognition of the opportunity to translate, where
appropriate, various rules of self-restraint into credible constitutional
guarantees or directive principles, a point discussed below.
This analysis focuses on the economy and autonomy
provisions of the Collection, not only because of the inter-relationship
between these areas, but principally because such an approach will enable
the credibility of the new political order to be tested at both its
strongest and its weakest points. The realm of economics is one where the
impact of a credibility problem is often measured in dollars and cents, as
Hong Kong's 1983 financial crisis amply demonstrated. |