of the first black national political coalition, what would become the African National Congress (ANC), formed in 1909.

The ANC's image of nationalism was of course directly contrary to the dominant white view. Instead of a nation of whites, solidified by exclusion of blacks, the ANC sought black rights, at first through peaceful petition by elites, and when that failed, with mass organization and protest. Eventually, the ANC adopted a particularly inclusive form of nationalism, defined as uniting all those who opposed the system of apartheid, including white liberals. The inclusiveness of the ANC's nonracial nationalism was its hallmark, purposefully designed to attract the largest number of followers to oppose the government. As long as apartheid remained, it provided the demarcation of the alternative image of a nation, defined as all those who opposed apartheid.

But this definition of inclusive nationhood was also contested among blacks, although the history of this dispute has been largely eclipsed of late by the predominance of the ANC. For instance, after the 1948 victory of the National Party, a section of the youth within the ANC became critical of the ANC's liberal inclusiveness. Arguing that the ANC's stance had failed to prevent the consolidation of white domination, this section broke away from the ANC in 1959 to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This group advocated a different form of nationhood, open only to those who claimed primary allegiance to Africa, and thereby effectively excluding whites, as well as the "mixed-race" coloureds and Indian descendants. The PAC advocated mass insurrection, and when protest did further explode in 1960, the PAC was banned and forced into exile, as was the ANC.

Constrained by state oppression and exile, the PAC and ANC continued their efforts at opposition, but in the vacuum of internal organization a new group and ideology emerged. Founded in 1969 by Steve Biko, the Black Consciousness (BC) movement sought to rebuild domestic assertiveness and resistance with yet another form of distinctive nationalism based on black separatism. Positive black identity was asserted by organizing political and service organizations that excluded whites, in direct ideological opposition to white nationalism. Unlike with the PAC, officially designated coloureds and Asians were included in BC as fellow victims of apartheid, thereby avoiding an essentialist demarcation of blacks as African descendants only. The power of this image built black assertiveness and exploded with the Soweto Uprising of 1976, sparked by violent state oppression against a peaceful student march.³

As a further complication, the late 1970s saw the blossoming of at least two other distinct forms of protonationalism. Concentrated in Natal, rural Zulus in particular were organized by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi into the Inkatha Freedom Party. This group enjoyed the status of state client, benefiting from the funding and arms provided to the KwaZulu homeland authority also headed by Buthelezi. But Inkatha resisted some aspects of apartheid, notably rejecting KwaZulu independence, although it distanced itself from the ANC. Despite claims of being nonethnic, Inkatha was generally understood as asserting an ethnically distinctive Zulu nationalism. And at the same time, the trade union movement among blacks was becoming a major social force, with more than a million members by the mid-1980s.⁴ Although less clearly nationalist in its framework and organization, the trade union movement (influenced in ways by the exiled Communist Party) projected an image of national rights leading to advancement of working-class interests.

This astonishing mix of actors all converged in pressing for the end of apartheid. The BC movement had helped rebuild do-
nestic protest, which was then inspired by continued ANC exile activism to resurface after the 1976–1977 crackdown. The result was the United Democratic Front (UDF), which adopted an ANC-inspired image of inclusive nationalism opposed to apartheid. This mass protest effort of the mid-to-late 1980s was reinforced by the activism of the trade unions, although coming into increased conflict with Inkatha and remnants of BC.

By the late 1980s, opposition had largely consolidated under the UDF and its allied unions, bringing South Africa to a state of near-civil war and economic collapse. By then, the National Party had become more open to pursuing reforms, encouraged by the consolidation of white power and privilege and discouraged about the prospects of retaining minority rule, social peace, and economic progress. The way was open to a compromise, further encouraged by the end of the Cold War. White fears of a Communist-aligned black takeover diminished even as international sanctions increased whites’ interests in finding an accommodation that would end the economic pressures.

The negotiations of the early 1990s largely pitted the ANC image of an inclusive nationalism against the prior rulers of the National party. Black separatists, Afrikaner nationalists, and Zulu nationalists were marginalized, the latter by ANC efforts to appease Inkatha with an alliance. The largest trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), effectively subordinated itself politically to the ANC, consistent with the long-held Communist Party view of the need for achieving majority rule before the more divisive issues of class power could be addressed. This accommodation by the organized black working class proved crucial to the negotiated transition, for it allowed the ANC to reach out to whites with promises of property protections for accumulated wealth and preservation of white civil service jobs. Whites thereby felt sufficiently confident of their prospects to support a negotiated settlement, which brought majority rule elections in 1994.

During the subsequent five years, at least for the most part, the contestation over South African nationhood finally came to rest upon the images propounded and reinforced by the ANC-led government. The world has been greatly inspired by South Africa’s relatively peaceful emergence from being the quintessentially racist state to a state committed to nonracial inclusion. All South Africans are promised equal citizenship rights by the new constitution, with minority rights of culture and language also asserted. Under the inspiring leadership of Nelson Mandela, blacks have been advanced by state-provided services, some redistribution of land, and limited forms of affirmative action in private employment. Whites have retained most of their previously acquired wealth and largely kept their civil service jobs. Business has been reassured by neoliberal economic policies and limits on state intrusion. South Africa would appear to have emerged as a successful compromise of minority interests and majority demands for redress within an inclusive nation.

For all that is to be celebrated about South Africa’s success at forging an inclusive nation thus far, tensions remaining under the surface continue to bubble up. In the political realm, there remain small groupings advocating Afrikaner, Zulu, or black separatism, although these have relatively little electoral support at the moment. The real tensions are more evident in related economic issues. Many blacks have enjoyed the new provision of water, housing, electricity, and improved schools and health care, although such redress has come more slowly than many expected. A relatively small black middle and upper class has profited greatly since the end of apartheid, but urban black unemployment
remains at approximately 40 percent, there has been little advancement particularly in the rural areas, and crime is rampant. Meanwhile, despite their continued enjoyment of relative privilege, many whites feel uncertain, some have migrated, and white-dominated business has made little new domestic investment and has shifted major holdings overseas.

The current economic situation impinges upon the new ANC-led government headed by Thabo Mbeki. Economic policy remains firmly neoliberal, seeking to appease domestic and international capital by limiting efforts at redress or redistribution in order to encourage growth. But amid record low prices for gold exports, world capital flows against the Third World, and lower labor cost competitors elsewhere, South Africa’s growth has been disappointing. The government postponed more redistribution to achieve growth but has largely ended up with less of either.

Pressure is brought against this stasis from competing quarters. Particularly the left camp within the ANC, aligned with the unions and Communist Party, would like to see more redistribution. Whites and business, to put it simply, press for less. The ANC’s inclusive nationalism and nonracialism inspire continued efforts to finesse these pressures and retain all camps within the “great tent” of a political party the inclusiveness of which was forged in the anti-apartheid struggle.

Efforts to maintain a compromise and retain coherence within such an inclusive ANC will come under increased pressure if economic dislocation continues. The inclusiveness that worked to bolster the ranks of the ANC in opposition to apartheid is less easily maintained in government, where actual and divisive policy choices must be made. Still, the ANC would of course prefer to hold on to its extensive constituency and retain majority power. This challenge presents the ANC, and President Mbeki in particular, with at least two temptations:

Given the salience of resentment against continued white privilege, the ANC may be tempted to solidify its support with an anti-white rhetoric. This approach might be seen as a way to maintain more-or-less unified black support, thereby avoiding a split of that constituency along the lines of a growing economic divide among blacks since the end of apartheid. There have already been at least three indications of this temptation. In late 1997, even the great statesman Mandela lashed out in a major speech against white selfishness, perhaps not coincidentally during the lead-up to the 1999 election, when blacks again overwhelmingly supported the ANC. Mandela and his successor, Mbeki, have also sought to consolidate an alliance with Buthelezi’s Inkatha by ignoring Buthelezi’s past use of violence and rewarding him with a post in the cabinet. The prospect has emerged of a Nguni peoples coalition, unifying the largest black ethnic groups, the Xhosa and Zulu, and including whites. More vaguely, Mbeki’s trademark advocacy of himself and his country as part of an “African renaissance” hints at a cultural exclusion of at least whites, despite claims that whites can be included as fellow Africans.

In whatever form, such appeasement to hard or soft images of black separatism may
be described as South Africa’s “Zimbabwe option,” consolidating black majority rule and white marginalization. Zimbabwe’s experience suggests that this approach may require increased authoritarian efforts, with antagonism of whites’ interests bringing economic costs, provoking popular unrest forcefully contained. Although South Africa’s history, larger white population, and higher level of development set it apart from Zimbabwe, white South African political parties have already stoked fears of the prospect of similarity.

The other temptation is the “Brazil option,” a coalition of middle- and upper-class blacks and whites that serve their interests while leaving unaddressed the needs of a marginalized poor population, particularly the rural blacks. This temptation is already evident in nascent form, with macro statistics demonstrating that limited redress thus far has indeed created a greater class disparity in South Africa since apartheid. Even the trade unions may be described as supporting this outcome, for their organized membership tends to benefit from a rising middle-class status, even as the unemployed and informal sector remain outside the union ranks. Neoliberal policies and international economic pressures reinforce this outcome, which at least in Brazil has brought economic advance for the top half of the population, with little advance and only limited protest and mobilization by the bottom half.

It is worth noting that South African elites may be tempted to pursue both of these seemingly contradictory temptations. They can use either explicitly antiwhite rhetoric or softer forms of Africanness to unify black support. And at the same time, they can pursue economic policies that reassure whites and better-off blacks but do not reach out to poorer blacks. Ironically, this combined approach would be consistent with the ANC tradition of trying to be strategically inclusive for pragmatic electoral benefit.

Still, the ANC ideology of inclusion runs against these less liberal strategic temptations. The ANC leadership rightfully prides itself on its nonracial and inclusive nationalism, which provides an inspiring alternative to the long history of more exclusive forms of nationalism in South Africa and elsewhere. This inclusion is the founding image of the new South Africa, which many would strongly resist abandoning. Nor do the actual experiences of continued deprivation and specified social exclusion in Zimbabwe or Brazil make the temptations of their approaches all that attractive, at least in the long run. Of course, the pressures pushing South Africa in either or both of these directions remain real, for it is difficult in this “new world order” to meet the needs of a poor Third World majority and the interests of a First World minority and its foreign allies. South Africa’s situation is emblematic of many countries that include both these competing constituencies, although of course every country faces its own unique pressures.

In the absence of sustained growth and foreign support for such growth, South Africa will be further subjected to the pressures that forced Zimbabwe and Brazil down their unfortunate paths of racial populism, authoritarianism, and inequality. When a balance of all social interests cannot be met, choices must be made that forge new coalitions and nationalism of selective inclusion and exclusion. Yet, thus far, the world shows little inclination to support South Africa’s efforts to avoid the alternatives of ethnic/racial or class exclusion (or both). Indeed, “the world” is now dominated by global economic market forces that do not have the collective agency to even make such a choice of support. Instead, private capital flows heighten domestic tension while overwhelming more limited global public policies.
South Africa thus remains poised at a crossroads of alternative images of its nationhood. The ideological highroad of inclusion is challenged by the pragmatic low road of social and economic choices that exclude some from the real benefits of citizenship. The contestation over these alternatives has not ended. South Africa’s future remains open, uncertain. And with it, the world will be making a choice, even if not consciously so. For South Africa has emerged as symbolic of the new world in which we live, inspiring many around the globe with its peaceful transition and efforts to redress past injustice while surviving in the global market. If South Africa fails to maintain this trajectory, it will be a signal that the great transformation of the post–Cold War era brings not an “end to history” but a new phase of contestation and possible conflict.

Notes