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Summary

The roundtable discussion “Leadership Succession in North Korea: Regional and Global Implications” took on the topic of the sudden death of Kim Jong-il and the succession of leadership by his son Kim Jong-un. The event was a panel-based discussion between experts in the field Charles Armstrong, Jeong-Ho Roh, Sue Mi Terry, and Joel Wit.  The discussion was moderated by Curtis Milhaupt.
Professor Charles Armstrong, Director of the Center for Korean Research, asserted that North Korea as a regime will not go away anytime soon and that Kim Jong-un will stay in power for the foreseeable future. He supported his assessment by mentioning that the hereditary system of rule in North Korea has enjoyed an unprecedented longevity. He also mentioned that in fact, the system operates through collective leadership in the party. For this reason, Kim Jong-un’s young age (He is not yet 30) and lack of experience are not necessarily challenges to the regime. Armstrong predicted a continuation of the transition with no real radical change.
Professor Jeong-Ho Roh, Director of Korean Center for Legal Studies, agreed with Professor Armstrong in the smooth transition but supported his argument with the DPRK’s constitution and New Year editorial. In the preamble of the New Constitution, North Korea states that Kim Il Sung will be the eternal leader and that his legacy will be carried out through his lineage, setting the stage for continuous succession. The New Year’s Editorial claims that the death of Kim Jong-il (not Kim Il Sung) was the most successful loss in 5000 years. Unfinished revolutionary work will have to be carried out by Kim Jong-un. The DPRK uses a different calendar to mark time based on this power lineage; 2012 is juche 101 rather than 2012. Roh noted that this editorial was the first acknowledgment of one bloodline: an important written piece of work legitimizing the leadership of Kim Jong-un.
Sue Mi Terry, former National Intelligence Fellow in the Council on Foreign Relations, provided a very different point of view from the previous two panelists. Terry argued that it is difficult and impractical to conclude that the transition will remain smooth for the foreseeable future. Terry pointed to the fact that Americans did not even know of Kim Jong-il’s death until North Korean media decided to inform the world. Furthermore, the facts around his death remain mysterious. Terry added that under Kim Jong-il’s reign there was corruption, bribery, and information penetration; more of the same would not be a surprise. Terry emphasized how the US needs to be prepared with contingency planning.
Joel Wit, who currently works at the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO), asserted that the United States should become more proactive with regards to North Korea. He mentioned that security policy could only be figured out by making contact with North Korea and negotiating what is possible in the future. Wit believes that we were on the right track before Kim Jong-il died. North Korea was about to suspend uranium production and resume six party talks. Wit stressed the importance of international meetings at the end of February. Another question he considers interesting is how the transition in North Korea will interact with other changes (political transitions in 2012 for South Korea, the US, and China).
Speculation is always difficult and in the case of North Korea this has especially been true. We have seen various predictions in the past in terms of the regime collapse of the DPRK, but as Armstrong pointed out, the regime has managed to survive until today. The system may seem vulnerable from the outside, but it is hard to argue that this leadership transition will immediately bring the collapse of the regime. It may be true that Kim Jong-un must confront leadership dilemmas like his father did. The question of whether to open up to the world or not will have a direct impact on the unification issues of the two Koreas.
The dilemma lies in the discrepancy between the position of North Korea and power shifts in the region. North Korea will not discard its nuclear weapons, for that is the only tool left for negotiation considering its dire economic conditions. On the other hand, North Korea’s maintenance of nuclear weapons will be dangerous for the stability of the region and other nations like the United States, China, and South Korea. As Wit asserted, reducing this discrepancy remains to be negotiated.
One last point to make is that one cannot assume that regime collapse will ensure stable unification in the peninsula on political as well as social grounds. As Terry mentioned, North Korean refugees are adjusting abominably in South Korea. Presuming that the regime collapse in the DPRK is an unconditionally positive phenomenon is a very naïve assessment to make. The differences in economy and ideology of the two Koreas are much bigger than those of the two Germanys had been. Sudden regime collapse is not in the interest of any international player.

By Sung Kim