Leaving Russia

A Conversation with Economist Sergei Guriev
Welcome to the second issue of the Harriman Magazine. We are pleased with the response from students, alumni, and friends of the Institute about our inaugural issue and are eager to share the next one with you.

At Harriman we cherish our traditions and legacy, but we are also proud of our commitment to inform public debate on the issues of the day. It is in this context that we are reviving the long tradition of the Harriman Lecture and welcoming Sergei Guriev to deliver a public address to the Harriman Institute on February 12, 2014. Previous speakers in the series have included Mikhail Gorbachev, Imre Kertesz, Helmut Schmidt, and Katherine Verdery.

As many of you know, Sergei has been one of Russia’s most prominent public intellectuals focusing on economic and political issues. Few in Russia can match the breadth of his activities in public life and academia over the last 15 years. A much sought after commentator on political and economic issues, Sergei also served as an adviser to President Dmitry Medvedev and counseled Alexei Navalny in his recent bid for the Moscow mayoralty. In addition to his role as a public figure, Sergei has excelled in academia. From his position as rector, he helped turn the New Economic School into a world-class center for teaching and research. Under pressure from the Investigative Committee of the Russian government for his role in the report from President Medvedev’s expert council that evaluated the legal basis for Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s second trial, Sergei left Moscow in May for Paris. We are excited to feature an interview with Sergei about the trajectory of his career, the political and economic situation in Russia, and his reasons for leaving in May 2013, as our cover story for this issue.

In concert with our ongoing “Sochi Olympics and Sport in Russia” events series, where we have been tackling the issue of LGBT rights in Russia, among other topics, we have an article about the Sochi Olympics in the context of the history of LGBT rights in Russia, by our alumnus Matthew Schaaf, currently a program officer in the Eurasia department at Freedom House.

But our coverage is not just limited to Russian politics. We are lucky to have an excerpt from the final chapter of Padma Desai’s recently published memoir, Breaking Out, about her adjustment to American life both as an individual and an academic after she emigrated from India. She is the Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of Comparative Economic Systems and director of the Center for Transition Economies.

We also highlight three of our alumni: Holly Decker (’13), who was the recipient of the newly instituted Director’s Prize for Dedication and Service to the Harriman Institute; Eli Keene (’11), who works for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Kazakhstan; and Mark Pomar (’76), president, CEO, and director of the U.S. Russia Foundation. And last but not least, we have a profile on Radmila Gorup, senior lecturer, Slavic Department, who retired in May 2013 and who will be dearly missed by the Harriman community.

We hope you enjoy our second issue and would love to hear your thoughts about the magazine and ideas for future stories.

Timothy Frye
Director, Harriman Institute
14

COVER STORY

Leaving Russia: A Conversation with Economist Sergei Guriev
By Masha Udensiva-Brenner

Last spring, the renowned Russian economist and public intellectual left Russia because he feared for his freedom; how did it come to this? Guriev discusses the rise of the New Economic School, his involvement on the Khodorkovsky panel, his relationship with Alexei Navalny, and the government investigation against him.

4

Mark Pomar and the U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law
By Ronald Meyer

Mark Pomar, Russian Institute alumnus ('76) and member of the Harriman National Advisory Council, reflects on how his years as president of IREX prepared him for taking on the challenges of becoming the founding president of USRF, a Moscow-based NGO.

7

Radmila Gorup: From Belgrade to Columbia University
By Masha Udensiva-Brenner

Recently retired senior lecturer of Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian/Montenegrin on the trajectory of her career and the challenges of teaching four languages in one classroom.
The Road to Almaty: Eli Keene ('11) and the Carnegie Program in Central Asia
By Ronald Meyer

Harriman Undergraduate Fellow ('11) on his work in Kazakhstan with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Central Asia-China Pipeline and Russia’s Energy Policy: An Interview with Holly Decker ('13)
By Masha Udensiva-Brenner

Why didn’t Russia try to disrupt the Central Asia-China Pipeline? Decker argues that Russia chose short term gains over long-term strategic interests by prioritizing the disruption of the Nabucco Pipeline, and allowing China to build a pipeline to Central Asia.

Advocating for Equality: A Brief History of LGBT Rights in Russia
By Matthew Schaaf

Why the Sochi Olympics are just a blip on the long, and possibly endless, road toward justice.

Breaking Out
By Padma Desai

A woman’s journey of transformation from a sheltered upbringing in India to success and academic eminence in the U.S.

Inside the Alfa Fellowship Program
By Alfa Fellowship Program Office
Red Square, Moscow. (Photo by Lydia Hamilton)
By any measure Mark Pomar (Russian Institute '76; Ph.D. Russian Literature and History, '78) has had a remarkable and varied career: scholar, nonprofit executive, broadcaster. Before taking up his current position in 2008 as CEO and president of the Moscow-based U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law (USRF), Pomar was president of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), now one of the largest U.S. nonprofit organizations that administers education and training programs worldwide, but in Soviet times it was the great facilitator for US scholars of Russia to be able to conduct research in the USSR. Pomar had studied in Leningrad in 1981 on an IREX grant. Prior to IREX, Pomar served as executive director of the Board for International Broadcasting and director of the Russian Service of the Voice of America, where he also performed the duties of an “on-air” announcer. A brief resume of Pomar’s academic career includes professor of Russian studies at the University of Vermont (1975–1982), research scholar at the Kennan Institute (1993–1994), author of a monograph on the Russian jurist Anatoly Koni (1996), and scholarly articles on Russian drama, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy.

When Pomar was named president of IREX in 2000, the organization was going through a difficult and painful process of adjusting to a different funding model. Rather than receiving small but regular grants from the U.S. government and a few foundations, IREX now had to compete for every program it
administered. As Pomar stated in our interview, “It needed to be entrepreneurial and to expand beyond the traditional area of the former Soviet bloc. To succeed in this new world, I needed to establish a highly professional development office, form and nurture a team of professional program managers, and ‘go global.’”

In the eight years that Pomar was president, IREX’s annual budget went from approximately $17 million to more than $50 million, and had offices in 30 plus countries. Clearly Pomar had hit on a winning strategy.

When he was tapped for the USRF presidency, Pomar was intrigued by the possibility of returning to a part of the world that he knew well. Moreover, as he admitted, “the challenge and excitement of being the ‘founding president’ was something I simply couldn’t pass up.” In addition to running IREX, he was also an adjunct professor at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, where he taught a graduate course on nonprofit management. Here was an opportunity to put practical and theoretical knowledge to work by building an organization from scratch.

Asked about the transition from IREX to USRF, Pomar answered that it was “actually quite easy.” He hired several outstanding program officers who had previously worked at IREX, and together they threw themselves into the difficult and rewarding task of creating the kind of organization that he had always envisioned. As he explained, “I was not hampered by any ‘skeletons in the closet’ and knew that the mission of USRF—to support the long-term economic development of Russia’s market economy—could succeed only if we worked in close partnership with the Russian government and leading Russian institutions. Russians had to take the lead and we would be happy to support them.” In the first four years of operations, USRF has provided more than $14 million in grants, while Russian institutions have contributed more than $6 million. Pomar is optimistic that over the next several years USRF and their Russian partners will move to full parity.

The vicissitudes of an NGO president are easy to illustrate. One year ago Pomar and USRF were savagely attacked in Komsomolskaya Pravda, a year later the same newspaper came out with the headline: “The U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law Is Proud of Its Collaboration with UNN [University of Nizhny Novgorod],” praising both Pomar and the USRF’s EURECA (Enhancing University Research and Entrepreneurial Capacity) Program.

The two halves of USRF’s title—economic advancement and rule of law—would seem to perfectly complement Mark’s expertise and scholarship. The Harriman Institute has been fortunate to host recipients of the Yegor Gaidar Annual Fellowship, sponsored by USRF and IREX, which is dedicated, as the certificate presented to the Harriman states, to the “strengthening of human capacity in creating a favorable environment for entrepreneurship, economic diversification, technological innovation, and globalization in Russia.”

Legal Clinic: Education Based on Practical Experience and Future Lawyers: Essential Skills to Success are just two of USRF’s programs designed to facilitate the rule of law in the private sector. Asked whether he has come full circle from his days of studying the Russian jurist Anatoly Koni, Pomar replied, “Yes. I now have an opportunity to see the Russian legal world up close. It is fraught with many of the same concerns and problems that faced Koni and his colleagues: Russia’s relationship with the West, the establishment of the rule of law, corruption, trust in the legal system, the use of juries, etc.” Pomar noted that many leading Russian jurists today look back to the late nineteenth century as a “golden age” of Russian legal thinking and that jurists such as Koni are finally finding their rightful place in Russian history.

Despite the gloom and doom of much Western reporting on Russia and what he called “a very superficial understanding of Russia in the United States,” Pomar is encouraged by the “sense of dynamism in the country as a whole,” citing the examples of “leading Russian universities committed to commercializing their research and establishing productive programs with U.S. and European counterparts.” He continued this train of thought with examples of NGOs that carry on their work despite government harassment and the new laws on “foreign agents,” the young Russians who are eager to be entrepreneurs, and the many Russian institutions that are open to learning best international practices.

Pomar summed up the mission of USRF amid the diminishing U.S. support for Russian projects as follows: “The goal of USRF is to support this positive dynamism and, in this way, strengthen the ties between Russia and the U.S. Unfortunately, there is less and less support in the U.S. for Russia-related programs. The recent closing of Title VIII—U.S. government support for Russian studies—is just the latest example.” Fortunately, as he put it, “USRF was set up with its own endowment and that will allow us to continue our work regardless of the ups and downs of international funding. It’s a challenge and responsibility we welcome.”

Mark Pomar is a member of the Harriman National Advisory Council and sits on the Council’s Finance Committee. We at Harriman are lucky to have such a staunch friend and advocate as Mark, with his expertise and experience as academic and executive.

I now have an opportunity to see the Russian legal world up close. It is fraught with many of the same concerns and problems that faced Koni and his colleagues.
“I still do not feel retired,” said Radmila Gorup, senior lecturer emerita, who taught in the Columbia University Slavic Department from 1980 until last spring. Though she is currently not teaching classes (but hopes to do so occasionally), she continues to participate in the University community, returning to campus every second Friday of the month to cochair a University Seminar and staying active in the Njegoš Endowment at the East Central European Center.

Gorup was born in Kragujevac, a town in central Serbia, but lived and studied in Belgrade until she immigrated to North America. Her departure had nothing to do with ideology. “I loved my country and had a hard time leaving it,” she said, noting that the Yugoslavia of that time differed from other East European countries; citizens were permitted to travel abroad and had access to Western cultures. She had been asked to join the Communist Party, but she made excuses for why she couldn’t join and faced no problems. “I always wanted to be independent. Here, too, I am not a member of either the Democratic or Republican Party.”

In 1963, she married Ivan Gorup, a Canadian of Slovene origin, and left with him for Montreal, where he worked, in 1964. After a few years, Ivan was transferred to New York City, and the couple moved again. Gorup started graduate school, receiving an M.A. in French literature and then a Ph.D. in linguistics from Columbia University. But finding a job in New York proved difficult. After teaching linguistics as an adjunct professor at New York University, she was offered a language lecturer position in the Columbia Slavic Department. For the first ten years (during which she spent some time as a lecturer at Berkeley), Gorup taught Serbo-Croatian. Then, in the early 1990s, Yugoslavia fell apart, and things became complicated: suddenly, she found herself teaching Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin. “It was a big challenge to go from one to four national or political languages in the same class,” she said.

Gorup explained that Serbo-Croatian was popularized in the 1950s and ’60s, “because of Yugoslavia’s independent politics and liberal economic policies.” This continued even into the late 1980s, when the country’s economic situation declined, and the political situation destabilized. Since the wars of the 1990s, however, and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the successor nations have become small, “disoriented and impoverished.” They are no longer in the position to become prominent international actors. Teaching the languages, which has always been difficult, has become even more so: “There was and is no will to produce material that would be appropriate for teaching abroad,” Gorup lamented. She has worked hard to produce her own materials, and maintains that an enthusiastic instructor can find a teaching approach regardless of the resources available. Overall, Gorup is pleased with her professional life. “I met hundreds of young, bright people and tried to be a representative of Yugoslav cultures as best I could,” she said. “I never regretted my decision to come to Columbia. Even though I did not have a tenure-track job, I felt fulfilled and loved my work.”

Throughout her career, Gorup has maintained both her language-teaching profession and an active presence in the field of theoretical linguistics. She has published books and scholarly articles on a number of subjects; her newest, *After Yugoslavia: The Cultural Spaces of a Vanished Land* (Stanford University Press), came out in June 2013.
The 15-foot tall Kalon Minaret from inside the Kalon Mosque, Bukhara, Uzbekistan.

THE ROAD TO ALMATY

BY RONALD MEYER
Ronald Meyer: You’ve been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for just over a year now, stationed in both Washington, D.C., and Almaty, Kazakhstan. What is the mission of the Carnegie Program in Central Asia, and what is your role in the program?

Eli Keene: The Carnegie Endowment opened a program in Central Asia in 2011 in partnership with al-Farabi Kazakh State University in Almaty. The program encompasses a fairly broad range of issues, including trade, migration, sustainable development, and regional security, to name a few. The overarching goal has been to generate more dialogue on Central Asia’s future, both within the region itself, and between Central Asia and the United States.

The program is small—there are three Washington-based staff working under the directorship of Dr. Martha Brill Olcott—so we all wear many hats. I’m our program coordinator, which essentially makes me the bridge between Almaty and Washington for all our programming. Sometimes this has just meant juggling logistics and navigating bureaucratic hurdles, but more frequently it has meant helping to design programming with a mind to what is going on in the region and what impact we are capable of making.

Currently, we’re setting up a unique Track II diplomacy effort called the “Network of Experts for Central and South Asia” (NECSA). The idea is to bring together scientists, social researchers, and NGO workers from all five Central Asia countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to develop and implement cross-border cooperation projects. The project is really exciting, and because I am our one contact point in the correct time zone, I’ve had the chance to play a big role in our outreach to new participants.

Meyer: I see that you’ve published two articles this year, one on the Eurasian Customs Union within the World Trade Organization and another on Tajikistan’s energy crisis. Could you say a few words about these pieces? What are you working on now?

Keene: The Eurasian Customs Union is something I’ve worked on a lot during my time in Central Asia. It’s a really polarizing topic, which makes it interesting, and it’s also a question that looms over every conversation about economic development in Kazakhstan. The article you’re referring to was an op-ed I produced for the EUROBAK (European Business Association of Kazakhstan) Global Monitor, a business magazine based in Kazakhstan. The piece was very much my attempt to balance the host of legitimate concerns over what the Customs Union means for Central Asia’s future with many people’s legitimate desire to see greater integration in the region.
The piece on Tajikistan was the first major article I produced for Carnegie. It delves into the controversy surrounding Tajikistan’s proposed construction of Rogun Dam and Uzbekistan’s objections to the project. It was also my first experience publicly wading into international controversy, which was an instructive experience in itself. The article got a great reception among the Washington crowd, followed by a massive wave of ridicule from commenters on RFE/RL’s Tajik service.

I’m currently working on a white paper for Kazakh policymakers that discusses technical regulation in the oil industry. The paper aims to analyze what Kazakhstan can gain by adopting international standards published by organizations like the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). I’m still in the beginning stages of the research, but it’s been interesting to work on the technical side of the issues concerning the country’s economic development. The paper should be published sometime in late December.

Meyer: You received a Harriman Institute Undergraduate Fellowship for travel to Moscow in January 2011 to conduct fieldwork in Moscow. What precisely brought you to Moscow that January and was this work in connection with your senior thesis?

Keene: I wrote my senior thesis on security policy in Ingushetia under republican president Yunus-bek Yevkurov. While I couldn’t get to Ingushetia itself at the time, the Harriman Undergraduate Fellowship gave me the chance to interview some of Russia’s most active human rights workers in the republic, including representatives of Grazhdanskoje deistvie and the Russian Justice Initiative. I also had the chance to interview several journalists, among them Ellen Barry, whose feature on Yevkurov inspired my thesis topic in the first place.

The fellowship allowed me to turn my thesis into a solid piece of research. My interviews put me in contact with people who had been working in Ingushetia for years and thoroughly understood the development of the conflict there. They also exposed me to important parts of the equation that I think I would have missed.

Meyer: With the exception of your field research in Moscow, you seem to have avoided the “center” on your various study stays in Russia: Kazan, Yaroslavl. Was that a conscious decision? What in your opinion are the benefits of looking at the center from the outside?

Keene: I think, as is true in most post-Soviet countries, the concentration of wealth and power in Russia’s capital can blind you to what is going on in the rest of the country. If I am in a small Russian city, I can always pick up a paper and read what is happening in Moscow. The reverse is not true. So I do think there are definite benefits to being outside the center.

That said, Russia is a big country, and different places give you different benefits. I went to Yaroslavl because I wanted a truly “Russian” experience. I got exactly what I was looking for, even if I quickly realized that living in die-hard Putin country in a place that was nearly 100 percent ethnic Russian was going to make for a difficult semester. Kazan was a totally different experience, and it was genuinely fascinating to see the split between Tatar nationalism and a general sense of loyalty to the Kremlin. It seemed to be a place that was completely capable of swinging in either direction.

Meyer: In your senior year you won the Columbia Slavic Department’s Pushkin Prize for your translation of Andrei Voznesensky’s “Parabolic Ballad.” What role does translation play in your work? Any plans to pursue another literary translation project?

Keene: Since I’m working between two countries, translation plays a pretty much daily role in my work. I regularly translate letters, grant proposals, and project descriptions for Carnegie, as well as academic articles for professors at al-Farabi University. At one point I was even roped into interpreting at a meeting between a Carnegie Endowment administrator and a senior official from Kazakhstan’s National Security Council. That was really a trial by fire for me, since I’d never met with anyone that high up in the government before and never had any experience with interpretation. All told, it could have gone much worse.

Translating the Voznesensky poem was a pretty terrifying thing for me. Russian poetry is such a beautiful thing, and as soon as I started the translation I was overcome by this nagging fear that I would end up mercilessly butchering every part of it. It was hugely rewarding when it got a positive response. Some day, I’ll build up the nerve to try another poem or two.

Meyer: You’re applying for law school now. What are your plans for the future and how does a law degree fit into them?

Keene: I would obviously like to continue working with the former Soviet Union. The big question I had when trying to decide what to do next was, what approach allows me to do the most practical work in the region? The fact that so much of the work I’ve done in Central Asia is tied to legal issues (particularly global governance and environmental regulation) really pushed me to go with the law school track.

But as for where exactly I’ll be five years down the line—I have no idea. I like to think that if I stay flexible and keep following my interests, life will eventually bring me back to the region.
Holly Decker, the recipient of the newly instituted annual Director’s Prize for Dedication and Service to the Harriman Institute, is a native of Fort Meyers, Florida. She became fascinated with Russia during the seventh grade, when her social studies teacher noticed her “fleeting interest” in the subject and encouraged it. Decker soon fell in love with Russian history, which sparked her desire to learn the language and study the politics. Her curiosity continued throughout high school, but it was not until the end of the third year of her undergraduate career at the University of Florida, where she majored in Russian and political science, belonged to the Russian Club, and spent a semester studying abroad in St. Petersburg, that she attended a lecture about the energy geopolitics of the Caspian region and discovered her true passion—the geopolitics of oil and gas in the post-Soviet space. “That’s what compelled me to pursue a degree at the Harriman Institute,” she explained.

Decker anticipated that studying at Columbia University would “open doors,” yet she was surprised by just how much faculty attention she received. “Maybe because I went to a larger university as an undergraduate, I expected professors to be a bit more hands off, but they were extremely invested in the success of their students and really pushed for it,” she said.

She is particularly grateful to Professor Jenik Radon, her thesis adviser, who allowed her to present her research on a panel at the Seventh Annual Colloquium of the Eurasian Pipelines—Road to Peace, Development and Interdependencies? “Suddenly, I got to sit up there as the expert. This absolutely baffled me,” she recalls. “It also gave me a good opportunity to get feedback from experts in the field.” She considers the experience the highlight of her graduate career.

After graduation, Decker embarked on an internship at the Center for the National Interest and then got a job at the American Petroleum Institute, where she is coordinating a series of proficiency exams for petroleum inspectors. Recently, she published a piece on Russian energy strategy in the face of the “shale revolution” in *The National Interest* online. Her dream is to eventually work in diplomacy with a focus on Eurasian energy.

Decker and I spoke by phone about her thesis on Russia and the Central Asia-China Pipeline.

**Masha Udensiva-Brenner:** Can you tell us about Russia’s role in the Eurasian gas market before and after the Central Asia-China Pipeline?

**Holly Decker:** When the Soviet Union collapsed, all gas pipelines from Central Asia ran north to Russia. This was functional under the Soviet Union because the central government was able to redistribute the gas as needed. But suddenly, the USSR was divided into independent countries, yet Russia was still the main recipient of the gas, and for a time, oil. This became a problem.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), a 1,099-mile-long crude oil pipeline from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, started pumping oil in May 2005 and broke Russia’s oil pipeline monopoly. But gas remained a major issue, and unlike petroleum, which can be transported relatively easily by train or boat, gas is primarily transported via pipeline. Given the location of Central Asia, it would be very difficult to get gas across the Caspian and into the pipeline system that goes out from Azerbaijan. As a result, Russia, which was transporting natural gas from Central Asia through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system, remained the primary transit state for Caspian natural gas. This was a very powerful position, because transit states can designate the amount of gas transported from producers to consumers and the cost. They also have the power to disrupt gas flow and raise transit fees for political and economic gains.

Russia had tight control and tried to disrupt pipelines that looked like they could threaten its monopoly, without which Central Asian and Caspian countries could become competitors...
for consumer markets. This was the case with the Trans-Caspian Pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, proposed in 1996. Russia attacked the legality of that pipeline on the basis that ownership of the Caspian seafloor was unresolved. It also questioned the project’s environmental impact, a highly suspect concern given Russia’s abysmal track record with environmental protection and natural resource transportation. The pipeline was shelved in 2001 but then reconsidered in 2006; it continues to be under consideration.

The biggest project, of course, was the Nabucco Pipeline—if built, it would have been the largest and longest pipeline to carry gas from Azerbaijan to Europe, bypassing Russia—which was proposed as an effort to diminish Europe’s energy dependence on Russian natural gas, and was in the works for a decade until it was finally shelved in 2011.

Udensiva-Brenner: Also due to Russia’s efforts?

Decker: The Nabucco Pipeline was plagued by questions of supply availability. Iraq was too unstable to be a supplier, and there are sanctions against Iran. Azerbaijan agreed to provide the gas; however, it doesn’t have enough natural gas to supply the entire pipeline. The development of the project would have needed to be closely linked with the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline—the only cost-effective and reliable way to move gas across the Caspian Sea. As I mentioned, this pipeline has yet to be created.

Supply was the surface reason, but it was underscored by Russia’s tactics to disrupt Nabucco construction. In 2007, Gazprom proposed the South-Stream Pipeline [routed to transport gas from Russia to Europe via the Black Sea, with construction initiated in December 2012 and operation projected to begin in 2015], which would compete with Nabucco for supplies, import markets, and financing. Russia also contracted natural gas suppliers away from Nabucco, offering to buy up Azerbaijan’s excess natural gas. The offer was initially refused, but then accepted in 2009, after a blip in Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey.

In addition, Russia used internal contacts with states that had previously supported the Nabucco Pipeline, such as Romania, to gain support for South-Stream. It publicly questioned Nabucco’s supply availability, and, eventually, weakened the project’s viability, ultimately leading to its cancellation in 2012.

Udensiva-Brenner: And how does the Central Asia-China Pipeline fit in to all this?

Decker: While Russia was making efforts to disrupt the Nabucco Pipeline, China, whose demand for natural gas increased over the last decade, was completing agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to build the Central Asia-China Pipeline, which runs from Turkmenistan to China. But, Russia’s reaction to this pipeline was markedly different from its reaction to the Nabucco and the Trans-Caspian pipelines. Russia could have done things if not to prevent the Central Asia-China Pipeline, to get access to the Chinese market before the pipeline was built. The Chinese market is there, it has the demand, and Russia could have cashed in. But instead Russia largely ignored the Central Asia-China Pipeline. At the time, the European market was the market willing to pay large amounts; it was the guaranteed market.1 Russia allowed China to build the Central Asia-China Pipeline because it helped Russia maintain its European market by decreasing the feasibility of the Nabucco Pipeline. It just so happened that the two pipelines coincided, and Nabucco was a bigger threat, and Russia desperately needed the European market in the short term.

By choosing Europe, Russia effectively closed itself to the potentialities of the Asian market—which required more effort on its part, such as large-scale investment in East Siberian and

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1 Holly Decker: Currently, there is talk of EU customers renegotiating contracts with Gazprom. There are pressures for Gazprom to sell its gas at spot prices, and the company was already forced to refund European customers $2.7 billion in 2012. EU members are still paying high prices, but this is likely to change.
Far Eastern fields and pipelines to China—and weakened its own position on the Eurasian markets; Central Asian producers are now able to use their gas exports to China to leverage prices against Russia in pricing disputes.

Also, unfortunately for Russia, the Central Asia-China Pipeline was completed at nearly the same time as the explosion on the Central Asia Center Pipeline in 2009, which disrupted gas flow between Russia and Turkmenistan...so, suddenly, China became the primary market, and Russia was suffering not only economically—it also lost large amounts of political influence.

Udensiva-Brenner: Would you say this is one of the reasons for Russia’s dire economic state?

Decker: Russia’s dire economic state resulted from a lot more than just the pipeline. But the pipeline does contribute in part, because Russia no longer has access to very cheap gas, and now it has to look elsewhere. While Russia does have large amounts of gas in East Siberia and the Far East, it doesn’t have the infrastructure to extract and transport it, and it hasn’t put in the investment needed to start a new production facility or to open up a new field; even if Russia were to start accessing a lot of these resources today, it probably won’t have access to the revenue for another five to seven years.

Udensiva-Brenner: And how is Russia reacting to all this?

Decker: I would love to be a fly on the wall to find out what’s actually being said about the Central Asia-China Pipeline now, because in the media it’s been downplayed.

Udensiva-Brenner: Downplayed in what way? Are you referring to the Russian media?

Decker: The Russian media, but to be fair, in the U.S. media as well. The Central Asia-China Pipeline is rarely mentioned, and certainly not mentioned as a threat. When it does come up, it is often put in the context of how it has disrupted the Nabucco Pipeline. You know, searching for this, finding out about the Central Asia-China Pipeline, was more of an accident for me. I was reading something where the Central Asia-China Pipeline was mentioned, and the next sentence I expected was, “and this is how Russia tried to disrupt it,” and it just never came.

Udensiva-Brenner: Is that what inspired your thesis?

Decker: Yes; I wanted to know why. Not much has been done on that specific pipeline. A lot of my thesis consisted of cobbling together a sentence from one author or another who had an insight, but might have only had a paragraph or two on the Central Asia-China pipeline. This is not the pipeline that everyone thinks about; it’s the pipeline that’s ignored.

Udensiva-Brenner: Why do you think that is?

Decker: Russia’s position is waning. And China’s position is growing. So, you have to wonder if Central Asia, Turkmenistan in particular, has lost one overlord only to gain another.2

Udensiva-Brenner: You’ve done such a great job with your thesis and made a lot of lasting connections at the Harriman; do you have any advice to incoming and current students? How can they take better advantage of the program?

Decker: Get to know your professors and work closely with them. I didn’t have to take any classes during my final semester; I was mostly done with my credits, but I took three oil and gas classes on top of my thesis. Columbia is a once in a lifetime opportunity, and you have access to some of the best professors in the world. Take the classes that interest you.

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2 Holly Decker: Turkmenistan is going to be the state most affected by the shift in energy power dynamics. Kazakhstan has had Western involvement for years, primarily in terms of petroleum. There was less Western interest in Turkmenistan. Before Central Asia-China, Turkmenistan had two options, send gas to Iran or send it to Russia. The CAC pipeline exploded under suspect circumstances, the relations between Russia and Turkmenistan haven’t really recovered, and Russia is only importing a very small amount of gas from Turkmenistan. China now gets the majority of Turkmen gas. Kazakhstan has other options. Uzbekistan wasn’t really a player. But Turkmenistan, I believe, will feel the brunt.
In late April 2013, members of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation arrived unannounced at the office of the economist Sergei Guriev, then rector of the New Economic School (NES), with a search warrant, and seized the previous five years of his e-mail—45 gigabytes worth of correspondence. For two months, Guriev had cooperated with the Committee as it repeatedly contacted and interrogated him as a “witness” in the original case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the imprisoned chair and CEO of the now-defunct Yukos Oil Company (in a surprising turn of events, Khodorkovsky was pardoned and released by President Vladimir Putin on December 20, 2013, three-and-a-half months after my interview with Guriev). The day his e-mail was confiscated, he understood that he was not just a “witness” but, rather, a suspect.

Guriev, a prominent public intellectual who had advised the Medvedev administration, became involved with the Khodorkovsky affair in early 2011, after President Medvedev’s Human Rights Council asked him to prepare an evaluation about the validity of the second round of government charges against the oil tycoon and his partner Platon Lebedev. This request, Guriev says, was driven by public opinion. “Everybody was outraged because the second case was obviously fab-
Masha Udensiva-Brenner: Let’s rewind a couple of years. How did you end up on the Khodorkovsky panel in 2011, and did you perceive any risks at the time?

Sergei Guriev: From what we now know, they had asked quite a few people to participate, and many said no. In my case, it was very simple; I got an e-mail from Tamara Morschakova [former deputy chair of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation] and Mikhail Fedotov [chair of the Council for Human Rights] inviting me to prepare an evaluation. And so I did. I didn’t know who else was on the panel, I didn’t know anything about the implications, but I was asked to prepare my opinion. I read hundreds and hundreds of pages of documents; they are still on the web, so everybody can do the same. Then I wrote an evaluation. At some point Tamara Morschakova gave me further questions, and I answered those as well. And that was it. Then, in December 2011, there was a press conference presenting nine such evaluations; I was one of these nine experts. Out of nine people three were foreigners and six were Russians.

In 2011, I had known there was a risk, but I also knew that it’s very hard to say no when the president asks you to speak about something within your professional domain. It’s very hard to say no because I am a professional, I am an economist who is working in the field of corporate finance, vertical integration, and the Khodorkovsky case, the second case, was within the realm of my expertise.

Udensiva-Brenner: At the time, what did you speculate the risks might be?

Guriev: I didn’t have any idea. Just before President Medvedev came into office, it was very clear that speaking in favor of Khodorkovsky was unwelcome. But, I thought that since the Presidential Council on Human Rights was interested in my opinion, the situation was probably changing. It doesn’t really matter that much; academics should always say what they want, what they think is right, and this is, I believe, the most important part of our profession—intellectual integrity. This is what we teach our students, I’m sure this is what students at Columbia are taught, and I think we need to practice what we preach.

Udensiva-Brenner: Can you describe your relationship with Mr. Medvedev?

Guriev: I don’t know Mr. Medvedev closely. I talked to his advisers, I’ve been a member of several advisory bodies that advised him,
I’ve been to meetings with Mr. Medvedev, but we don’t have a personal relationship—I only advised him through various advisory councils. And we have never met outside official meetings. 

Udensiva-Brenner: How did you become a government adviser? Describe the trajectory of your career.

Guriev: Well, it’s a very straightforward career. When I was growing up in the Soviet Union, the best and most exciting careers intellectually were in mathematics and physics, and I joined the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, which was the top institution in these fields at that time. I was a straight A student. I actually graduated a year ahead of time with straight As and then joined the Academy of Science. At that point the Soviet Union had disappeared. I finished in 1993, and it turned out the demand for mathematics and physics was very low and it was tough to have a competitive career in the natural sciences. At the same time, the economic transformation was so interesting and intellectually exciting. Looking around, young people were asking questions: how can we help Russia to meet the challenges of transformation? I became very excited about economics. I spent a year at MIT [later, Mr. Guriev also spent a year as a visiting professor at Princeton], I understood what economics was, and started to write academic papers. Then I came back to Russia and discovered that if you want to become an international style academic, you have to contribute to building modern universities. It was very hard to be just a professor of economics in Russia and not contribute to building the New Economic School, and, at some point, I became its rector.

Udensiva-Brenner: Why was it so difficult to be just an economics professor?

Guriev: Outside the New Economic School, universities were not modern, internationally competitive organizations. There was no American style economics department, so if you wanted to be an international style academic, you had to build your own department, and that’s what we did.

After I became rector, but probably even since I became vice rector in 2002, I realized that in order to build a university you also need to become a fundraiser, and to become a fundraiser you have to be a public intellectual; to fundraise effectively, you have to have good relations with the government, and that would work only through advising the government. One thing led to another. I was actively involved in the policy debate to raise the visibility of the school; I became involved in the media. One should also keep in mind that the Russian economics profession is actually very small, so every person spending some time in the economics debate can go a long way and become very, very well known. This is different from the United States or Europe, where there are many very good economists.

Udensiva-Brenner: How were you able to make NES an independent and transparent institution?

Guriev: The Russian legal system is such that you can do the right thing, and there are no barriers. As long as you want to admit students based on transparent exams without corruption, you can do that; it’s not illegal. As long as you want to hire faculty in the international market on an open and competitive basis, no one can stop you; you just need to want to do it. At first our friends in state universities laughed at us, and then they started to follow our lead because they saw that the New Economic School’s reputation was growing. It was very simple.

Udensiva-Brenner: And you also established an endowment for the school, which was something that was pretty much a foreign concept in Russia at the time.

Guriev: There are many new things that we did for Russia. There is a board to which the rector is accountable, we established an endowment, and we admitted students based on international exams; we eliminated all oral exams—a widespread Russian practice—nothing was rocket science. When you look around the world, many countries are following the same trajectory in
reforming higher education. If you want to build a good soccer team, you bring in a coach from a country that excels in soccer, and you learn from this coach. We looked at the best schools in the world and observed what they were doing.

Udensiva-Brenner: What were some of your models?

Guriev: U.S. research universities are everybody’s models. You go to China, they are very different, but still they try to build schools in the way that Harvard and Columbia are doing things. You go to continental Europe—it’s the same thing. You go to Korea or Israel or India—everybody has their own specific barriers, specific mentalities, specific patterns, but all believe in openness, competition, and integrity. Without that you cannot build a good university.

Udensiva-Brenner: Why have so few other schools in Russia been able to do this?

Guriev: They don’t want to. It’s all about whether or not you want to do the right thing.

Udensiva-Brenner: Why don’t they want to?

Guriev: Reforms are always hard. And a university’s reputation has a lot of inertia, so if you’re a top Soviet school and you do nothing, the glow of this reputation will stay with you for twenty years. In that sense, for anybody who is thinking only about the next ten or twenty years, previous reputation is enough. But if you want to leave a legacy, then of course you need to work hard and do what’s best.

Udensiva-Brenner: What do you think will happen to NES now that you and Mr. Sonin have left?

Guriev: Well, NES is not just about two people. I think NES has a great reputation; it has hired a lot of great people this year. I do think it will suffer, but it’s not just about two people. There is now a search for a new rector; I quit the board and the rector search committee for reasons I will not comment on. But from what I know, there are some very strong candidates, and some of those candidates are actually much better suited for leading NES than I was; I think NES will have a great future. It would make me very happy if NES ends up going further than I could take it.

Udensiva-Brenner: Another institution that thrived during your involvement with it is Sberbank. You wrote in the New York Times that it went from “a sleepy Soviet institution to a modern, competitive international institution.” Can you tell us a bit about the success of that organization?

Guriev: Sberbank is another example of the fact that if you want to do the right thing, you can do it. Of course Sberbank has the advantage of being virtually a monopoly in Russia, but, actually, that only creates the incentive to do nothing. Yet when Mr. [Herman] Gref became CEO, he thought that Sberbank should be competitive, and he introduced a lot of reforms. He had to replace a lot of people, including people at the top; he invested a lot in training people. Again, many things are different in Russia from other countries, but the basic principles, which are meritocracy, competition, openness, and, in the case of Sberbank, attention to customers—a new concept in Russian retail services—can already take you a long, long way. And Sberbank still has a lot to do, but everybody who walks into the Sberbank office today knows that it’s a very different institution from what it was five years ago.

Udensiva-Brenner: You’ve been warning the Russian government to adopt more open and transparent economic policies for years—to stimulate investment, to diversify the economy. But now Russia appears to be on the brink of recession. What’s going on?
Guriev: In our book, *Russia after the Global Economic Crisis*, which came out in 2010—Professor Frye wrote a chapter for it—Aleh Tsyvinski and I described the “70–80 Scenario,” where we predicted that if oil reaches $70 or $80 per barrel, Russia will probably become Brezhnevist (like in the 1970s or ’80s). There will likely be no reforms, and the economy will stagnate despite high oil prices; of course, at that time, $70 to $80 looked high.

Today oil prices are at $100, and in that sense we made a mistake, but even still, Russia is back to the 1970s and ’80s patterns of stagnation, and this is exactly what we warned about. When we wrote that chapter in 2009, we couldn’t even dream of $100. Today the government isn’t fighting corruption; it is increasing rather than decreasing the intervention of government companies in the economy.

Just to remind you—in 2013, there was a nationalization rather than privatization of TNK-BP by Rosneft. This is larger than the entire three-year plan for privatization. We’re talking about $40 billion paid in cash for shares in a private company. And there are some other nationalization deals, so it is no wonder that investors are leaving Russia and that there is capital outflow despite high oil prices and low sovereign debt; money is leaving Russia and going to Europe.

And the other thing is the price of Russian stocks. Russian stocks are twice as cheap as, say, Brazilian or Indian stocks; this is something that suggests investors are voting with their feet. They no longer believe in the government’s promises.

Udensiva-Brenner: In attempts to introduce some much-needed reforms, you participated in the Open Government Initiative. Can you tell us about that?

Guriev: It was a very important initiative for me. After Mr. Putin decided he would be elected in 2012, Mr. Medvedev had several months remaining of his presidency, and he decided to launch it. We gathered a group of experts, associations, think tanks, and government officials and discussed various initiatives. Now, I think many of them have been pushed back and shelved, I should say, for example, that I am very sorry to hear that the Amnesty for Entrepreneurs, which was established to make sure that tens of thousands of people were freed, is now about dozens of people being freed. I am also sorry to hear about the delays with other initiatives. But I think one area where we really succeeded was making sure that the government was clear about its priorities, and that it quantified them and made them public. And today, it’s very easy to check what the government promised. If you look at the decrees—the eleven decrees that Mr. Putin signed on May 7, 2012, when he came into office after the inauguration—you will see that they contain a lot of quantitative indicators: what has to be done in economic policy; social policy; education policy; demographic policy; foreign policy; and now we can compare the performance of the government and its promises. And through this mechanism, we can, at least in public debate, hold the government accountable. And Mr. Putin takes these decrees and promises very seriously, and occasionally he criticizes his government for not delivering.

Udensiva-Brenner: For instance?

Guriev: There was a meeting in May 2013, a year after Mr. Putin came into office and signed these decrees, when he asked his government to prepare a report on how they were doing, and Mr. Surkov said: “We’re doing okay; we performed 70 percent of what we promised.” Mr. Surkov was fired. But we are talking about many, many things that are not being implemented. For me, the most important things are of course the deregulation of the business climate—Russia promised to become number twenty in business climate rankings by 2018, number fifty by 2015, and so far it is not doing very well on this indicator. Also, Mr. Putin promised to privatize everything except defense, natural resources, and natural monopolies before 2016; this promise is already being reneged on, and the government is now preparing a different privatization plan. But in any event, I think this is going to be an important benchmark against which the public can judge the government.

Udensiva-Brenner: You’ve done a lot to help the government. How were you able to walk the fine line between being its critic and adviser for so long?

Guriev: Apparently, I haven’t really been able to walk this fine line. But I’m not sorry about anything; at each particular moment I tried to do what I thought was right, but eventually, as it turned out, it wasn’t safe. I couldn’t combine doing the right thing and being safe, and so I had to leave. But in general, this is how it works—you try to do what you think is right, and then whatever happens, happens. I think the fact that I did that for many years means that if I had to do it again, I would probably do it the same way. For me, the most important things are of course the deregulation of the business climate.
meant the government was okay hearing some criticism, until last
year; but last year things changed.

Udensiva-Brenner: What is it about Mr. Khodorkovsky in
particular that’s such a sore spot for the Putin administration?

Guriev: I think you should ask Mr. Putin. One can speculate
that Khodorkovsky was a threat for the government because he
had a lot of money and was thinking about interfering in politics.
They decided to send a strong signal, not just to Khodorkovsky,
but to everybody else in the business community: If you have
a large business, don’t interfere in politics, or you will follow
Khodorkovsky’s path. It’s not only Khodorkovsky who suffered,
but his partners, people who decided not to testify against him,
his colleagues. This “scorched earth” tactic is meant to send a very
strong signal; basically, every business leader who reads this signal
knows that it’s not only he/she who can follow Khodorkovsky,
but also his colleagues, and his company, and his employees may
become a target.

Khodorkovsky’s story doesn’t only test the courage of business
leaders but also puts them in the position of thinking about
hostages. In this sense, putting Svetlana Bakhmina, Vladimir
Pereverzin, or Vasily Aleksanyan in jail is a very important part
of the Khodorkovsky affair. It’s not only about Khodorkovsky’s
personal courage, but also about making sure that Khodorkovsky
feels even worse, and that the people who think about
Khodorkovsky’s fate also think about the hostages.

We see the same logic in the Navalny-Ofitserov affair; Pyotr
Ofitserov, who’s done nothing wrong, got a jail term because the
government wants to tell Navalny, “Look, this person is suffering
because of you.” They are also sending a message to everybody
who works with Navalny. “Since you’re supporting Navalny, and
Navalny is against the government, you will suffer even if you
haven’t done anything wrong.”

Udensiva-Brenner: You’ve donated to Mr. Navalny’s foundation,
and you’re involved in planning the economic program for his
campaign. Can you tell us about that?

Guriev: In May 2012, Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Ashurkov, the
head of his foundation, reached out to me and said, “How about
you publicly donating a small amount of money?” And I respond-
ed, “I’m not a rich person, I can only donate a small amount, but I
am not afraid to do it publicly.” My wife joined me in this decision.
Sixteen people did that, there was a public announcement, and
I don’t think there was anything wrong with it. At that point, I
wasn’t yet part of Navalny’s team.

Around this time, I also wrote a special op-ed piece arguing
that whenever a person like Navalny is fundraising, it is very good
that it’s done publicly, that nobody is afraid, and if Prokhorov or
Medvedev or Yavlinsky come to me and ask, I will also be happy
to give them the little money I have. But at that point, Prokhorov
didn’t need my money, Medvedev didn’t want to run, and Yavlinsky
was not allowed to run; the only person who asked me for money
was Navalny.

After I left Russia and resigned from the leadership of the New
Economic School, Navalny came back to me and asked if my
wife and I would join his team and help to prepare his program.
This was a person who was facing a real prison term and still
fighting, working, engaging people, and not shutting up; such a
brave person deserved all the support he could get. Again, I could
not say no. So, we participated in writing the program, which
was presented on July 1, we kept providing him with advice, and
various input on other things presented as part of the program.
The first steps were the six bills he would introduce to the Moscow
parliament. I’m not sorry about it; I’m very happy and feel
fortunate to be a part of this team.

Udensiva-Brenner: You recently wrote an article for Project
Syndicate that discusses the importance of this mayoral election for
Russia, regardless of whether or not Mr. Navalny wins; it’s the first
competitive mayoral election in Moscow. Can you elaborate?

Guriev: There are many groundbreaking elements to this
campaign. It is indeed a more competitive election than Moscow
has ever had. I think in an honest election, Mr. Navalny has all the
chances. I would like to remind you that United Russia did not
It requires a lot of hard work, it requires good ideas, charisma, but this is what political leadership is.

get the majority of the vote in Moscow City in 2011. Mr. Putin did not get the majority of Moscow City’s votes in the presidential election—in that sense, there are reasons to believe that maybe there could be a runoff and a victory for an opposition candidate in Moscow City.

The campaign is not honest. It’s much more competitive, much more open than other campaigns, but it’s not honest; we expect a lot of fraud, but that is a different story.

Another thing, which is completely groundbreaking, completely unprecedented, is that this is a door-to-door grassroots campaign, and we’ve never seen that in Russia. Navalny brought together thousands of volunteers; he raised several million dollars—again quite transparently. And this is very important. It changes the political style completely and already now, we see that people are asking opposition candidates, “Why aren’t you doing a Navalny-style campaign in your particular city or region?” And some opposition leaders are actually doing it. It requires a lot of hard work, it requires good ideas, charisma, but this is what political leadership is.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** Why do you think the authorities are allowing this level of competition? Why did they release Navalny in the first place?

**Guriev:** This is something I can only speculate about. I think some advisers to President Putin think that a competitive election is problematic; they would like to remove Navalny from the race. Others probably want to add legitimacy to Sobyanin’s election; they still believe that he can win with a landslide. They want him to be more legitimate. Why do they do that I don’t know; Sobyanin will immediately become a competitor to Putin. If Sobyanin wins this election with a large margin, it would mean that he is more legitimate than Putin, at least in Moscow, where Putin didn’t get the majority of the vote.

Another theory is that authorities are afraid of people taking to the streets. Remember what happened on July 18, 2013, after Navalny got a prison term? There were thousands of people in the streets, and this was not a sanctioned rally. Before that, unsanctioned rallies would gather only a couple hundred people; now we are talking about thousands of people. Perhaps the authorities know that if they stifle competition, they will not have enough prison cells for the protesters. But this is something I can only speculate about.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** Recently, given what’s happened to you, and the anti-LGBT laws, and the NGO crackdown, the Russian government has come across as increasingly repressive. Some speculate that these measures have been taken in an attempt to distract Russians from things that really matter, like the economy. What’s your take?

**Guriev:** I think the antigay laws and anti-orphan laws are so cruel, and stupid, and counterproductive; it’s very hard to find the rationale. But maybe indeed—and I can only speculate—some people think it would work out for the majority of Russians if they find an enemy, then argue that all the economic troubles are because the enemy doesn’t allow Russia to prosper. This is why anti-Americanism is so high in Russia, the laws about foreign agents are very important, the anti-orphans law, what’s called the Dima Yakovlev Law, is very important, and then of course, homophobia is also very convenient.

This is a dangerous path, a dead end. You cannot really rely on homophobia or xenophobia, or persecution of other minorities: young Russians are growing up, as they become richer they learn more and more, especially through the Internet, about the world around them, and homophobia cannot lead Putin to success with the majority. I think this is a short-term tactic that may work, but in the long term this is a dangerous and painful path, and I would advise strictly against these laws if I were in Russia, but this is not something I can do anymore.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** Yet you mentioned in an interview you gave for GQ Russia recently, that Russia’s reputation is much worse than its reality. What did you mean?

**Guriev:** I meant that while the Russian reality is very bad—the homophobic laws are real, the anti-NGO laws are real; many things that Russians have gotten used to are actually real—the reporting on Russia is even more negative. Journalism works this way; it’s easier to report bad news from Russia than good news. Its reputation is indeed worse than the reality, but the reality is pretty grim. All these things you mentioned are true. If you had asked me two years ago whether I could imagine the Dima Yakovlev Law or the antigay laws, or the freedom of speech restrictions on the Internet, I would not have really been able to imagine that; now it’s a reality.

**Masha Udensiva-Brenner:** What are some of the things you think might be embellished by the Western press?

**Guriev:** No, no, no, the Western press always reports the truth; it’s just that the Western press doesn’t report good news.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** What’s some good news that it has overlooked?
**Guriev:** Wow, well, that’s not easy to come up with. But, I think that the fact Navalny is free is good news. There is a lot of good news surrounding the IT business, private equity business, venture capital business. There are many, many entrepreneurs in Russia who succeed despite all odds. There are many success stories that get underreported in the West.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** Many blame Mr. Putin for Russia’s problems and believe that his removal would likely improve things, while others argue that his removal wouldn’t really change much because the problems lie in the institutions and in the mentality of the people and the way society is structured. What do you think?

**Guriev:** All of this is true. The current government has done a lot to destroy institutions and instill the feelings of cynicism and mistrust in the society, which makes it very hard to recreate modern civil society, modern political organizations; this is exactly where Mr. Navalny is doing so well. By making people excited about his campaign, bringing in volunteers, getting people who never met him to donate money over the Internet—this is a great, great development, which will contribute exactly to addressing these skeptics’ concerns. But generally, of course Russia needs better institutions, and I fully agree with Mr. Navalny, who says that it is much more important to build an effective and independent judiciary system than to build nanotechnologies or roads or tanks—without fighting corruption you cannot really build anything. The current government has done a lot to destroy the court system; without fixing it it’s going to be really hard to see a developing Russia. But I remain an optimist; I think both of us will see a prosperous and democratic Russia.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** What would it take for you to return to Russia?

**Guriev:** I would have to feel that there is no risk of losing my freedom. So far, because the Khodorkovsky case is still open, and I’m still a witness, while there are no charges against me and I’ve done nothing wrong, I know for sure that this is not a safe place to be. I’m very happy that I’m in a different country from the investigators and judges who harassed me.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** Where do you see your career headed?

**Guriev:** We’ll see. I’ll look for a job here. I now have a visiting position at Sciences Po in Paris; it’s a great institution; I’ll see where I get a permanent job. But, so far I see myself as an academic. I’m happy to help Alexei Navalny in his campaign, but generally I am most likely to end up as an academic, which I think is a great profession; finally, I can concentrate on my research.

**Udensiva-Brenner:** You’ve been interviewed a lot lately; is there anything that you’ve wanted to say that no one’s asked you yet?

**Guriev:** I’ve been asked everything. My interview for Snob magazine was published online today, and everybody’s calling me because when I was interviewed, I was almost crying at some point, and this is all over the interview, and so I’ve probably talked to interviewers too much, and people are making fun of me that I’m being interviewed too much. I think it’s okay.

Some people see me as a victim. Indeed, I did have to sacrifice a lot. I am also very unhappy that I could not deliver on my obligations and promises to my colleagues at the New Economic School, to partners of the New Economic School, to faculty of the New Economic School, and students, but I cannot really see myself as a victim when I think about people who are now imprisoned in Russia. Especially Bolotnoe Delo [the Bolotnaya Square Affair] prisoners, normal people like myself, who are in prison based on completely made-up accusations, and of course about Mr. Navalny and Mr. Ofitserov, who face terms based on a completely fictitious case, so in that sense I just cannot complain.

Since the time of our interview, Guriev continues to live in Paris and teach at Sciences Po. Navalny lost the Moscow mayoral race on September 8, 2013, coming in second with 27.24 percent of the vote—much higher than his opponents expected. The prison sentences for Navalny and his codefendant, Ofitserov, were suspended by a court in Kirov on October 16, 2013. The conviction will not be removed from their records, and, as a result, Navalny, who had planned to run in the 2018 presidential election, will be barred from doing so.
What is propaganda of homosexuality? This is a question discussed in both international media and kitchens across Russia since the Russian Duma began considering a ban on homosexual “propaganda” in 2012. The “crazy printer,” as the Duma, which has been churning out one repressive law after another, is mockingly called by its critics, finalized the ban on “propaganda” in June 2013 on the heels of an increase in homophobic attacks, hateful statements by a wide spectrum of Russian leaders, and a 100-year ban on public gay pride events in Moscow. Diplomats and foreign officials voiced concern and activists organized solidarity actions in foreign capitals, but it wasn’t until the question of how
At the same time, homosexuality also came to be considered by many as anti-Russian, either because it was condemned by Russian Orthodox officialdom or because they believed it undermined Russian norms of machismo or patriarchy.

The propaganda ban will affect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) athletes and fans during the Olympics that the marginalization and hate that has recently plagued LGBT people in Russia finally percolated into mainstream discourse. If you haven't been following LGBT rights in Russia, this moment would seem to have appeared completely out of the blue, but it was in fact a long time in the making.

For the last 20 years, there never was much attention to the LGBT population in Russia despite Russian activists’ attempts to develop community, address the invisibility of people with so-called “nontraditional sexual orientations” in Russian society, and tackle widespread discrimination and violence. While article 121.1 of the criminal code, which criminalized sex between men in Soviet Russia, was annulled in 1993, Russia’s chaotic and “free” 1990s was no heyday for LGBT rights. Homosexuality as an alien Western infection or mental illness continued to be the defining narrative as Russian identity was being reconstructed and redefined by renewed religious fervor and nostalgia for the Russian empire. At the same time, homosexuality also came to be considered by many as anti-Russian, either because it was condemned by Russian Orthodox officialdom or because they believed it undermined Russian norms of machismo or patriarchy.

Until 1993, being a gay man in Russia could result in significant time in penal colonies or the Gulag. Even in 1993 around 75 men remained in prison for muzhelozhstvo (men lying with men), though that was a far cry from the 500 to 1,000 men who were annually imprisoned between 1960 and 1990. Getting people out of prison and reconciling with this repressive past was one of the first tasks that Russian LGBT advocates took on following the decriminalization of homosexuality, according to the renowned Soviet and Russian sociologist Igor Kon. Activists campaigned for the freedom of imprisoned gay men and confronted attitudes such as that of one prison director who, Kon reports, reacted to the changes by saying, “I don’t give a damn that article [121.1] was annulled, they’re locked up and they’ll stay locked up.”

Numerous educational and LGBT rights groups, including Tema (Theme) and Krylya (Wings), sprang up in the early 1990s around the time when gay sex was decriminalized and pressure from the outside on the Russian government to reform was immense. In his volume *Sexual Culture in Russia*, Kon characterized the period as the “entrance into the battle by representatives of the sexual minorities themselves, mainstreaming of the problem of human rights, and transformation of the problem from medical to political.”

Foreign activists also entered the fray. The International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) was launched in 1991 when 90 American
LGBT activists traveled to the Soviet Union to advocate for reforms and the rights of gays and lesbians. In 1994, Russian activists and IGLHRC published the first report on the rights of LGBT people in Russia.

While violence against LGBT people was a regular occurrence in the late 1990s and early 2000s, an overall lack of visibility at once protected LGBT people from outward hostility and kept them on the margins of society. As bars with unmarked doors hidden in courtyards began opening in some cities, discretion ruled the day, and many gays and lesbians were content to stay in the closet—flying below the radar was the safest option.

With the exception of Russia’s joining the Council of Europe in 1996 and adopting its jurisprudence and norms, few major LGBT rights developments—positive or negative—occurred in Russia until 2006, when the first law banning homosexuality propaganda was passed in the region of Ryazan. Similar laws subsequently went through in the Arkhangelsk region in 2011, and in St. Petersburg in 2012. While the law in Arkhangelsk was adopted without much uproar, media coverage and discussion of the St. Petersburg law was much greater, in part because it was championed by a flamboyantly homophobic and mean-spirited member of the regional Duma and because of St. Petersburg’s status as Russia’s unofficial “cultural capital.” If such a law could pass in St. Petersburg, then it could happen anywhere. It soon did, passing in six other regions in 2011.

A new generation of advocates for the rights of LGBT people also began agitating for respect for rights in 2006, many seeking to tackle homophobia and discrimination in the courts, through engagement with the government, and broad efforts to educate the public. A group of activists organized gay pride events in Moscow in 2006, seeking official permission to hold a street event. Though they were denied, they marched anyway and the police stood by as marchers were violently attacked by anti-gay Russian nationalist groups; some reports suggest that the police even encouraged a clash by funneling the groups together. Attempts to hold a gay pride demonstration in 2007 were met with similar results, including the arrest of the peaceful protesters rather than the violent agitators. The European Court of Human Rights ruled these bans discriminatory and in violation of key free assembly rights, noting in its 2010 decision that the authorities had “effectively endorsed” threats of violence and disorder such as the calls to stone homosexuals to death by a Nizhniy Novgorod mufti. In response, Moscow’s Mayor Luzhkov produced his own flourishes, calling gay pride events

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“satanic” and prominent activists “faggots” and orchestrating a ban on gay pride demonstrations in Moscow for 100 years. The 100-year ban was stamped with a Moscow court’s approval in June 2012.

In St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, and elsewhere, activists sought to change society’s approach to homosexuality and to tear down discriminatory laws and policies. However, the groups met strong resistance from authorities and were generally unable to register as official organizations, meaning they couldn’t conduct official business, open bank accounts, or receive official donations. Rainbow House in Tyumen, for instance, was repeatedly prevented from being registered because its goal of defending the rights of LGBT people would allegedly undermine spiritual public values. Evoking similarities to Russia’s anti-extremism and antiterrorism statutes—one of the authorities’ best bludgeons against independent activists—the government said that Rainbow House would undermine “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” Coming Out in St. Petersburg was the first LGBT rights group to receive official government registration as such, but that was only in 2009; many groups continue to operate without official registration out of fears of inviting hostile scrutiny.

Marginalization and secrecy make it difficult to collect much accurate data on rights violations and public attitudes toward LGBT people and homosexuality. Nonetheless, online polls of some groups demonstrate the extent of the violence and threats against LGBT people in Russia; according to the results of a 2012 poll of 897 people from the LGBT community conducted by the Russian LGBT Network, 15.3 percent of respondents were physically assaulted during a ten-month period in 2011–2012, and nearly 3 percent had been attacked more than once. While the tenor of public discourse and media coverage make it clear that public approval of homosexuality is low and anecdotal evidence suggests that negative opinions are on the rise, there are no widely respected Russian polling agencies that can document the dynamics of public opinion about homosexuality and homophobia in Russia over time or even at one time.

An impressive and diverse number of the new groups have risen to the continuously mounting challenges, including violence against the community. The Russian LGBT Network based in St. Petersburg is striving to create a nationwide network of organizations and advocates who can tackle challenges to LGBT rights on the ground from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad. Through the Week against Homophobia, which has taken place annually since 2006, the Russian LGBT Network and partner groups use artistic and educational events to raise awareness among the LGBT community and society about homophobia and how to tackle it. Several other strong regional organizations work at the local level to build community, defend LGBT people in local courts and through political bodies, and fight discrimination. Coming Out organizes legal assistance for LGBT activists, supports LGBT parents and families in St. Petersburg, and organizes cultural events such as Queer Fest, an annual weeklong festival that has engaged the LGBT community and public in a celebration of queer pride and culture through photo exhibitions, discussions, films, and other events since 2009. This is only a small sampling of the diverse array of pro-LGBT activities under way against the backdrop of legal sanctions.

As creative and enterprising LGBT activists have grown in sophistication and visibility, they have been increasingly caught up in the government’s broader...
assault on human rights groups and civil society organizations. The crackdown, which in reality began in fits and started almost ten years ago, is picking up steam and threatens the very existence of a broad swath of Russian civil society. A series of aggressive investigations and audits of nonprofit organizations by prosecutors across Russia—the monitoring project ClosedSociety.org documents at least 314 inspections so far—has led to fines, warnings, and prosecution of dozens of NGOs accused of being “foreign agents,” with some of Russia’s most prominent LGBT organizations among them. We have also seen a redefinition of treason under Russian law to include sharing information that harms Russia’s security with international bodies like the UN, a new Internet blacklist, bans on funding of advocacy and campaigning in Russia by U.S.-based individuals and organizations, and new restrictions on public assemblies—all part and parcel of the recent crackdown and aimed at intimidating, co-opting, or exhausting into submission many of Russia’s independent civil society groups.

Then there is the federal-level “propaganda” law, which bans “propaganda [among minors] of nontraditional sexual relations” aimed at cultivating nontraditional sexual attitudes, the desirability of nontraditional sexual relations, the “incorrect” impression that traditional and nontraditional sexual relations are equal, and an interest in nontraditional sexual relations. It is still unclear what falls under this definition, justly raising fears that the homophobic law will be used arbitrarily to quash what should be ordinary activities—such as publicly asserting equality between straight and gay people or giving any hint in public that you are gay or lesbian—with fines of up to $31,000.

At the time of the law’s passing, Russia’s human rights ombudsman expressed concern that “harsh and unwise implementation [of the antipropaganda law] could lead to human costs and tragedies.” That is exactly what it did. As it turns out, the authorities have actually brandished the national-level and regional “propaganda” laws in only a few cases, but the impact on society and on LGBT rights activists is palpable. Members of Russia’s LGBT community now fear that their work in public health, the arts, and social life will run afoul of the propaganda law. And as of late, it is not uncommon to see an “18+” requirement on event announcements in an apparent effort to avoid persecution under the law. A recent demonstration along the Arbat, a touristy street in downtown Moscow, during which activists chanted “Hitler also began with the gays . . . No to fascism in Russia,” ended in the activists being arrested and roughed up by the police as passersby refused to intervene when they found out that the action was in defense of LGBT rights.

The comparison with fascism is becoming less of an overstatement. Outrageous new homophobic proposals continue to come out of the “crazy printer” Duma. A proposal to allow the government to strip LGBT people of their parental rights is, though technically withdrawn from consideration, likely to reappear in 2014. The Duma also passed a ban on future adoptions by LGBT Russians and by people from countries where gay marriages are legal. Politicians, TV hosts, and other public personalities are joining in on the hate. The host of a show on Russia-1, Dmitry Kisilev, recently said that “fining gays for propaganda of homosexuality among teenagers isn’t enough”; they should be forbidden from “donating blood, sperm, and their hearts ... should be buried or burned” if they die in an accident. That will probably be the next proposal from the Duma.

For LGBT people and advocates for LGBT rights in Russia, the path forward is arduous, and it may very well get worse before it gets better. The Olympics are an excellent opportunity to shine light on the LGBT situation, but after the athletes and the media leave, Russian activists will remain, along with the mountain of challenges they face. As Igor Yasin, an LGBT rights activist from Moscow, said in a recent interview, the homophobic law “has triggered a public witch hunt,” but it has also inexorably activated advocates for LGBT rights in Russia. “[People] have suddenly started leaving their closets in a way that they never did before—a wave of ‘coming-outs’ is sweeping the country,” as “activists have emerged in just about every city” and “are making a real difference to people’s lives.”

A difference is clearly needed.

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For LGBT people and advocates for LGBT rights in Russia, the path forward is arduous, and it may very well get worse before it gets better. The Olympics are an excellent opportunity to shine light on the LGBT situation, but after the athletes and the media leave, Russian activists will remain, along with the mountain of challenges they face.
INTRODUCTION
Padma Desai, the Gladys and Roland Harriman Professor of Comparative Economic Systems, is the author of a dozen books on economic topics, including Conversations on Russia: Reform from Yeltsin to Putin, which was named the Financial Times Pick of the Year in 2007, and From Financial Crisis to Global Recovery (2012). Desai’s new book shows us a completely different side of this remarkable teacher, scholar, and writer. Breaking Out: An Indian Woman’s American Journey, is the brave and moving memoir of a woman’s journey of transformation: from a sheltered upbringing in India to success and academic eminence in America. Dedicated to Kaki, her uncle’s widow, both a spectral presence in her childhood on account of her widowhood and an unfailing source of warmth, Desai’s book tackles difficult questions: the place of women in society (both in the U.S. and India), her mother’s depression, which she inherited, and seduction by a fellow student whom she was then compelled to marry. But the memoir also celebrates the courtship and marriage to fellow economist Jagdish Bhagwati, motherhood, her professional career, and gradual assimilation into life in the United States.

In the words of Homi K. Bhabha (Anne F. Rothenberg Professor of the Humanities, Harvard), “Breaking Out is a brave and eloquent account of the complex conditions and compromises that connect our professional lives to our personal commitments. Padma Desai has given us a tale of several cities, many worlds, and a testament to lasting love and companionship.” Publishers Weekly selected Breaking Out as one of the “Big Indie Books of 2013.”

The excerpt below, from the final chapter of Breaking Out, is printed with the kind permission of MIT Press. It is with gratitude that I thank Colleen Lanick, publicity manager for MIT Press, for her assistance with the photographs. I also want to thank Brett Simison (BrettSimison.com) for generously providing his photographs of Padma Desai at Middlebury College. Due to limitations of space, it was not possible to print the chapter in its entirety—breaks in the text are marked by […]. —Ronald Meyer

By Padma Desai

In a letter to the young aspiring Russian writer Aleksei Suvorin dated January 7, 1889, Anton Chekhov, then twenty-nine years old, talks about how a writer from a humble background must acquire a sense of personal freedom. In a translation by Rosamund Bartlett, Chekhov exhorts Suvorin to write about a young man, the son of a serf, a former shop boy resembling Chekhov himself. Suvorin must “then go on to tell the story of how this young man drop by drop wrings the slave out of himself until, one fine morning, he awakes to feel that flowing in his veins is no longer the blood of a slave (rabskaia krov’), but that of a complete human being.”
I like to think that my American assimilation represents such a struggle, in which I have managed to become “a complete human being” by wringing out the slave from myself as I searched for personal happiness and professional fulfillment. In 1968, I came to America for good, desiring to marry Jagdish, raise a family, and follow a career. Starting as immigrants, Jagdish and I settled in Lexington, Massachusetts, where we owned a house, planted trees, raised our daughter, made lifelong friends, and celebrated American holidays, among them the Fourth of July and Thanksgiving. The process of immigration, settlement, domestication, and finally acculturation has helped me discover my truest self and acquire a sense of personal freedom.

How did I manage to take charge of my life in America? Which aspects of the land I ultimately called my own contributed to my progression? I came to realize slowly and fitfully how Americans tend to combine individual initiative and self-reliance with voluntary participation in community betterment, amid a vibrant diversity. Perhaps this is a biased view. Outsiders may find it unreal. But this has been my personal experience. In describing my American journey in these pages, I have revived old memories and shed unhappy experiences. Occasionally I have commented on how Indian practices—for example, that of child-rearing—differ from those in America. But I have kept away from the larger issues of whether American norms are superior or whether Indian arrangements have improved over time. These formidable themes belong in a separate book. My story here simply focuses on how I found fulfillment in my new surroundings, which turned out to be alternately demanding and nourishing.

That happened to me, an outsider, in America where I realized “drop by drop” that anyone can become a distinct person. Once I asked a South African Supreme Court judge to name a noteworthy American trait. “Personhood,” he said, without the slightest hesitation. Personhood, I discovered, implies self-reliance, accountability, and hard work, which again are American markers. Of course, becoming a person does not make everyone equal, but living in America affords everyone an opportunity to take a shot at the American dream. One may of course end up as a garbage collector, but all honest work in America has a badge of dignity, although you know that becoming a garbage collector will not give you social status. But there is a second chance for those who learn to operate in a rule-based, competitive environment.

[...]
When I finally came to Harvard in 1955, I carried with me distracting memories of a marital relationship that stalked me in the classrooms and the quiet of Littauer Library.

In India, I had learned to accommodate myself to the person I was with, to hold my feelings to myself, and to lead a life in opposition to itself. I was brought up to act appropriately, depending on the context. There was a difference between what I felt and what I showed to others. I realized that the Indian behavioral norms relating to women are complicated, subtle, and ultimately sexist. In America, I learned to step outside my skin and express my deepest thoughts. Acculturation has meant that I must learn to share some of my pain and stop feeling like an immigrant who has settled in a foreign land. I could not have written this book if I were living in India. As for my professional life, it has been marked by continuous striving in American academia with a bit of luck along the way.

When I finally came to Harvard in 1955, I carried with me distracting memories of a marital relationship that stalked me in the classrooms and the quiet of Littauer Library. Despite that, I performed well and got solid grades. But, along with my academic accomplishment, my exotic persona gave me exceptional recognition. I was admired in a way I had not experienced before. I felt special. Occasionally my mind wandered to the events leading to my marriage, and my adolescent days “fostered alike by beauty and by fear.”2 Unknown to others, I was ceasing to be a stranger to myself and was indulging in introspection. Why did I lose control over my emotions in Bombay? How could I not see through my ex-husband’s manipulative design? Was I wholly responsible for the way I acted? Should I continue feeling guilty and live with a sense of shame? Why should I carry a permanently sad expression on my face? I realized then how distant India was, how time-consuming and costly the means of communication and travel, and how protected and secure I felt in a place that gave me the courage to seek my salvation. I was away. I was alone. I was wronged. And I must act grown-up. I finally chose to break out and to end the marriage. Had I remained in India, I would not have experienced the necessary self-worth or taken the initiative. […]

Living in America, I recall my childhood experiences, and struggle to understand my parents through the light of an American lens and overcome my conflicted relationship with them. These are not moments of instant revelation. I do not rub my eyes and scratch my ears and find solace. What had happened? Who were they really? Would I ask these questions if I had remained in India? I must get rid of the emotional confusion. I must clear the misunderstanding and end the warfare. From my American perspective, they were old-fashioned and I was their daughter with a soaring dream. How could the relationship not be agonizing? How could it be perfect?

In particular, I remember Father’s reaction to my dazzling performance in the statewide matriculation examination in which I missed the first rank (among 48,000 candidates) by two marks: “You are wearing a crown of thorns,” he had said. Even if I were not in a state of ecstasy, I would not have interpreted his pronouncement as a deliberate put-down. I had grown up believing that he cared for me and worried about me in his own way. […]

I had to settle in America and sort out this mismatched father-daughter equation from a distance. American daughters too, I noticed, occasionally battle patriarchal authority. At the end of a pell-mell journey of professional setbacks and personal traumas, I feel sufficiently fulfilled to get over the slow, painful realization of having to swim against parental lack of support for my ambition. Father had a Cambridge degree, but his cultural norms with regard to his daughters were formed years before in the village where he
I have treasured my conversion as an intensely spiritual experience, more so as I became aware of the polarizing controversies between the secular atheists and the biblical zealots during the Bush presidency. I wondered how the brown-skinned pastor who sought to liberate me in a genuine gesture of love would react to the contentious debates between the proponents of creationism and the advocates of evolutionism.

had grown up. It made no sense to assign to him a role that he was incapable of fulfilling. Nor was I inclined to judge him by taking the high ground and arguing, “Let bygones be bygones.” At the end of the day, I believe that what he gave me far exceeded what he denied me.

[...] My American viewing also tends to be nuanced and objective, and informed by the transition experiences of American children into adulthood that I hear and read about. I have turned to such coming-of-age experiences to assess my relationship with Mother. Had I remained in India, I would not have put her under a microscope. Was she abusive? I do not think so. Rather, she was sick and lacked proper treatment for controlling her manic-depressive symptoms that Father handled by combining undue indulgence toward her with frequent doses of phenobarbital that the doctor prescribed as a palliative. Psychiatric care was unknown then and is rare even today in India. When I told my New York psychiatrist that Mother lived a totally episode-free life after Father's death, he was silent. Perhaps he did not want to tell me that Father pampered her, although, as we were growing up, we all thought he did. Did I grow up in a dysfunctional family arising from her illness? This is a very American question. But I do not think so. The three adults in the family, Father, Mother and Kaki, were highly industrious and, despite the frequent rumblings, the house ran like clockwork.

In my American days, I cannot help but remember Kaki as a vivid, immediate presence. She was the gentle, loving nurturer who passed on to me, patiently and imperceptibly, an acceptance of life’s unpredictability and punishments. Unlike her, I do not believe in karma, but from her I learned to carry out my daily routine in a positive, purposeful spirit. In my most hopeless moments, I have not wanted to give up on life as a meaningless cipher and sink into a Samuel Beckett-like existential void: life is a bitch and then you die. Kaki’s example saved me from the nihilism of postmodern “wastelanders” who believe that to be disenchanted is to be enlightened. She gave me the precious gift of forming close ties, of deepening them confidently, and of repairing them generously. I learned to manage personal relations by adopting her gentle negotiating manner for she never offered me this-or-that, take-it-or-leave-it American-style choices in my childhood. All this, and I gave her nothing in return. I have accepted Father’s lack of indulgence toward me, and Mother’s mood swings, but I find it difficult to come to terms with Kaki’s subhuman position in the family. Had I continued living in India, I would have accepted that...
as the natural order of the day. From an American perspective, it appears cruel beyond words, beyond forgiveness.

The canvas of my American life has become clearer and softer as I have sorted out my relationship with Father, Mother, and Kaki, the three far-flung characters of my childhood. With the confusion and the guilt behind me, I experience relief with what I have learned. Father imposed many rules but they help me steer my daily routine, whatever the context. I have inherited Mother’s mood swings but also her fierce ambition and her indomitable stamina. Kaki provided me with the equanimity and an almost natural acceptance of life’s uncertainties. In America I have managed to move on from the very center of my inheritance.

Of all the early experiences, the dissolution of my first marriage turned out to be the most wrenching. I converted to Christianity when my ex-husband signaled via his lawyer that he would be ready to file for judicial separation by invoking the ground that I had changed my religion. The law allowed the dissolution of a sacramental marriage on that basis. Having learned of my conversion, he informed Father via his lawyer that he had changed his mind. “The light at the end of the tunnel turns out to be a tiger’s eye.”3 How could we have been so trusting?

My Delhi years could best be described by the American expression I learned later, “the double whammy”—of a challenge-proof academic environment and an unsolvable personal problem.3

I recall a conversation with her in her mid-teens that was marked by a stark American content and startling forthrightness. It threw me completely off guard. It was close to midnight and she was perched on top of the clothes dryer in the kitchen. “Mama, what would you do if I were to become a lesbian?” This came as a bolt from the blue. I stalled and struggled for a few seconds and said, “Why? Are you thinking of becoming one?” As if seeking to protect me, she said, “Not right now. Maybe in a few years.” Instead of sizing up the situation, I blurted out a response that I regret to this day: “Then I will jump out of the window.” That was the end of the conversation then but, years later, I remember her saying: “How could you say that to me? I was so scared that I was going to lose you!” By that time, I had come to view lesbian relationships so practical? Did they love him unreservedly? Did they trust his judgment? Did they think I was ultimately a suitable choice? Living in America, where marriages tend to dissolve frequently, I have come to value my fifty-year relationship with him as precious, although a bit old-fashioned and perhaps exceptional from an American perspective.

My daughter, on the other hand, is an American explorer with abundant traces of a rule-bound routine. Her life is informed by principles rather than by shrewd considerations of self-preservation and advancement. Now in her mid-thirties, she has me alternately concerned and elated by the strength of her convictions and the steadfastness of her heart. In turn determined and mellow, open and reserved, she has managed to craft an American-style mother-daughter relationship with me. She reveals details about her life in measured doses but also shares her worries with me with rare openness and a concern for my well-being.

Seeking to end the marriage while teaching at the Delhi School of Economics, I felt I was earning my living in an academic environment that lacked the stimulus of the creative challenges and the spirited camaraderie that I had experienced at Harvard. My Delhi years could best be described by the American expression I learned later, “the double whammy”—of a challenge-proof academic environment and an unsolvable personal problem. I should have been in a different place. But there was a saving grace. I felt I had lost the external battles, but the pursuit of Russian grammar and north Indian vocal music subdued my anguish and gave me internal composure. They almost became substitutes for the unfulfilled longings, my relationship with Jagdish having failed to acquire romantic power or intimacy or the daily interaction of a married couple. At the end of a Russian language lesson or a training session with my music teacher, I felt relieved of the burden of the deprivations and uncertainties of my life, and energized to handle my teaching obligations.

I often think about the Delhi phase of my relationship with Jagdish and wonder about his steadfast commitment to me during nine years of my unresolved marital situation. It provided me with not only an emotional anchor but also respectability and a protective shield. His unwavering attention lifted my status. I also knew that his prestigious family, dedicated to remarkable professionalism and public service, was traditional and deeply religious. His parents not only did not object to his decision to cast in his lot with me but also made me feel welcome. Were they practical? Did they love him unreservedly? Did they trust his judgment? Did they think I was ultimately a suitable choice? Seeking to end the marriage while teaching at the Delhi School of Economics, I felt I was earning my living in an academic environment that lacked the stimulus of the creative challenges and the spirited camaraderie that I had experienced at Harvard.

My Delhi years could best be described by the American expression I learned later, “the double whammy”—of a challenge-proof academic environment and an unsolvable personal problem.
would tend to be less argumentative and more accommodating of my opinions. From that perspective, my bond with her would be different if we were living in India. But I do not regret it. We both guard our independence but we also express our emotions in intimate moments. How can I deny her the sense of herself that I have managed to develop for myself?

That said, my relationship with her and her father as well has required steady understanding and continuous balancing. They are undoubtedly the anchors of my American existence. My daughter has provided the nourishment without which I would feel emotionally bankrupt, and my husband, the glow of companionship without which I would remain lonely. Nevertheless these have been testing relationships that remind me of Ivan Turgenev’s lyrical rendering in Fathers and Sons of a woman’s predicament as a wife and a mother. In this story about generational tensions in mid-nineteenth-century Russia, the mother Arina Vlas’evna reacts to the abrupt disappearance of her son Bazarov (after only three days) from the crushing provinciality of the family home. Pressing her gray head to her husband’s, she says, “What’s to be done, Vasya? A son’s a piece cut off. He’s like a falcon: he comes and goes whenever he likes; while you and I are like mushrooms growing in the hollow of a log: we sit side by side and never budge. Except that I’ll always be here for you, as you will for me.” My daughter’s brief appearances and sudden departures have left a similar impression on my permanent union with Jagdish.

 [...]
serious scholar, albeit not a flashy one, who searched for truth. I felt flattered and fulfilled because my scholarly status was recognized in three pithy attributes. It seemed I had combined the fulfillment of my deepest ambition with an upright academic record.

I did begin my Russian discovery motivated by my love for Russian language and literature, but I have avoided converting it into a sentimental journey. I believe that Russia will move into liberal political and economic arrangements of its own choice at its own speed because it is today a vastly different country from the time I visited it as long ago as the summer of 1964 and lived in the Indian consulate in Odessa. In the Czarist days, Odessa was known as the “Pearl of Russia” and as “Little Paris.” During my stay under Soviet rule, it appeared morose and preoccupied as if it were in permanent mourning. The French and Italian cafés of its cultural heyday, which I imagined Pushkin and Tolstoy had visited during their stay, had disappeared. When Mark Twain passed through Odessa in 1869, he wrote: “We saw only America! There was not one thing to remind us that we were in Russia.”

I, on the other hand, realized that I was in the Soviet Union. I remember the perennial lines in front of the stores combined with exquisite orderliness. Beyond orderliness, I noticed pervasive fear. Indo-Soviet relations were at their friendliest during my visit, and yet people were afraid to communicate with me. The overpowering signs and signals of the drab, fearful, regimented Orwellian reality were everywhere, prompting me to recall a wry witticism: religion comforts the masses by assuring them that there is life after death, whereas communism does so by assuring them that there is death after life.

More than four decades later, millions of Russians, urban, educated, and feeling European, had begun earning their living as citizens rather than as employees of a communist state. The steady economic growth of 6.5 to 7 percent in the seven years starting in 2000 offered Russians greater occupational mobility, higher earnings, and improved standards of living reflected in more housing, cars and telephones, and travel. The lives of most ordinary Russians on the eve of the financial crisis that hit Russia in September 2008 were far better than ever before. Russians, it would seem, had entered into an implicit contract with their authoritarian president Vladimir Putin and agreed to surrender critical freedoms to him in exchange for a better life. On the other hand, from an American policymaking perspective, Putin had damaged the prospects for Russia’s democratic evolution.

Nevertheless, I have steadfastly argued that isolating Russia politically and economically is counterproductive. A stance that relies less on confrontation and more on bargaining, initiated by the Obama administration in Washington, DC, on contentious bilateral issues (such as placing US missile defense units in Eastern Europe), and greater Western economic participation in the Russian economy will push forward Russia’s evolution toward a liberal law-based system.

Looking back, it was an uphill battle for me to advance this position among mainstream American opinion makers and analysts, especially during President Putin’s authoritarian governance, which has been marked by occasional muscle flexing. Typecast as a Russia specialist, I also failed to get adequately acknowledged by fellow economists for my technical contributions that pioneered the application of rigorous analytical tools to problems of the Russian economy. At the same time, I had to bridge the gap between my hyper-attenuated academic aspirations and the persistent awareness of my foreignness in the eyes of Russian and American beholders. Wouldn’t it have been easier if I had continued working on India? I had to put behind my Indian professional interest and also acquire an American identity before I could aspire to be recognized as an American scholar of Russia in the United States and Russia. […]

It’s not often that a fully funded opportunity to spend nearly a year abroad studying a foreign language, attending high-level seminars and going on regional trips, and then working in that country at a prominent organization presents itself. Even rarer is to find such an opportunity in Russia. As the "R" in BRIC, Russia is an essential player on the world’s political stage and an increasingly important economic force, especially when considering its wealth of natural resources like oil and gas. Russia is of strategic interest to the United States; having specialists with first-hand knowledge of how the country functions, and what its cultural norms and business practices are, is critically important to maintaining productive working relations between the countries. Luckily, there is such an opportunity—the Alfa Fellowship Program, funded by Alfa-Bank and administered in the United States and the UK by Cultural Vistas.

The fellowship provides the opportunity for 15 American and British citizens per year to take part in this 11-month-long program, the main emphasis of which is the seven-month-long work placement at prominent organizations in Russia, including major corporations, media outlets, think tanks, and foundations. Fellows generally come from the fields of business, economics, journalism, law, and public policy. They begin their fellowship in the spring with private Russian tutoring in the U.S. or U.K., followed by a language course in Moscow starting in mid-June. Throughout the summer, Alfa Fellows attend a seminar program with key public and private sector officials to discuss current issues facing Russia. Fellows then commence their work assignments. The fellowship includes a generous monthly stipend, language training, program-related travel costs, housing, and insurance.

The Alfa Fellowship Program is a competitive program. Eligible candidates from the U.S. and U.K. apply for one of fifteen available slots and undergo a rigorous selection process. We are pleased to note that in the ten years the Alfa Fellowship Program has been in existence, six Harriman Institute graduates were awarded Alfa fellowships and now join the nearly 100 individuals who have experienced Russia through this initiative. The six Harriman graduates are Ilona Tservil, Michael Kreidler, Michael Hendley, Mark Mozur, Virginia Wilkinson, and Hilary Hemmings, who is currently an Alfa Fellow. Each has a unique story about how they came to be interested in Russia and what they did during their fellowship. Their work assignments and experiences are as varied as their backgrounds. For example, Hilary is currently working at Focus Humanitarian Assistance’s Russian Representative Office in Moscow, providing labor migrants from Tajikistan and their families with medical consultations, vocational training, and financial assistance to help them navigate the challenging work environment in Moscow. Michael Kreidler was an Alfa Fellow during 2008–2009 and came to the program after completing his graduate work at SIPA, prior to which he had been a Peace Corps volunteer in Ukraine. As a Fellow, Michael worked for a Russian lobbying firm, European Public Policy Advisors, and following the fellowship, became a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State. Please read on about the experiences of some of our fellows from the Harriman Institute.
Hilary Hemmings, SIPA and Harriman Certificate 2013, Current Alfa Fellow

I knew I wanted to apply for the Alfa Fellowship after meeting up with 2012–2013 Alfa Fellow and Harriman Institute alumna Ginger (Virginia) Wilkinson in Moscow last summer and discussing the program. I was in Moscow at that time, volunteering at FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance, Russian Representative Office, an affiliate of the Aga Khan Foundation, which helps Tajik migrant workers receive access to affordable medical care. As a Human Rights concentrator at SIPA with a focus on the rights of Central Asian migrants in Russia, my work at FOCUS touched upon all of my professional and academic interests. However, FOCUS being a small NGO with a limited budget, there was little chance I could be hired there. The Alfa Fellowship, which provides housing, a monthly stipend, and the opportunity to work wherever you choose in Moscow, was the perfect opportunity for me to return to the Tajik migrant community that I cared so much about.

Initially, I was really doubtful that a program sponsored by a well-known Russian bank and supported by the Russian government would take on the “liability” of accepting someone working in the field of human rights and with migrants, both hot topic issues in Russia right now. I think the fact that the program choose me really shows its unbiased, sincere commitment to the professional development of its fellows, regardless of their field. While I have only been in Moscow for three months, I am already seeing the benefits of being in the program. It’s an incredibly interesting and precarious time to be a human rights professional in Russia, particularly regarding migration issues. The Alfa Fellowship is allowing me to work with a small, grassroots organization that acutely feels every change in Russian migration legislation, every law enforcement crackdown on migrants, and every surge in nationalist sentiment. I know this work experience in Moscow will serve as an invaluable basis for my future human rights career, and I’m really grateful that I heard about the program through the Harriman Institute.


With its army of expressionless birches and its highly favorable winter weather, who wouldn’t want to spend a year in Moscow? If you’re at the Harriman Institute and you have a love-hate relationship with Russia (love: vodka and Nabokov; hate: grechka and Grishkovets), then I highly encourage you to apply for the Alfa Fellowship, a one-year professional exchange that gives you the chance to take language classes, explore Russia, and gain work experience in Moscow. What’s not to love?

I spent my year in Moscow as an Alfa, working in the oil and gas business as a consultant to major Russian energy companies. Clients such as Gazprom Export, TNK-BP (RIP), and NOVATEK were thrilled at the opportunity to work with a Harriman Institute grad with exceptional Microsoft Office skills.

The lessons learned in Moscow, both personal and professional, have stuck with me to this day.

Professional: I still work in oil and gas and have applied my experience to a number of projects throughout Eurasia, including places such as Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq. I can honestly say that the Alfa program was an integral step in my post-Harriman career path.

Personal: Long johns are essential in Moscow, and the Russian virtue of hospitality extends even to amateurs like myself.


With its combination of language training, professional development, and exposure to a range of business, political, and academic figures, the Alfa Fellowship offers a unique opportunity for any Harriman Institute student interested in gaining real on-the-ground experience in Russia. As someone who had relatively limited experience traveling in Russia, the fact that the Fellowship dealt with all visa issues and living arrangements was invaluable. Additionally, having a few months to settle in while taking language courses allowed us to adjust to the pace of life in Moscow—a huge plus! Moscow is a relatively small city in terms of foreign-oriented professional life, so having access to the Alfa alumni network was very useful for reaching out to people to get a more nuanced understanding of current developments. Of course, being a Harriman Institute alumnus was also very helpful in this respect.

For my job placement, I worked in the equity research department for an investment bank. The work itself was interesting, and being placed in a Russian-speaking office was quite useful in strengthening my Russian. I currently research economic growth and financial stability issues related to emerging markets at the New York Fed; my experience on the Fellowship was absolutely critical to gaining the insights that allow me to understand Russia-specific as well as broader regional issues. In my opinion, the Fellowship is an ideal next step for graduate students who want to further develop their understanding of a chronically misunderstood part of the world while gaining valuable professional experience.
Dana Geraghty (MARS, 2013) served as the program coordinator for the Russia Project at the Open Society Foundations (OSF) from April 2013 to August 2013. In September 2013, she became the program coordinator for the Caucasus and Central Asia Program. In this role, she directly supports the regional director for the Caucasus and Central Asia, who oversees the work of OSF’s national foundations in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia.

Rinna Kullaa (Postdoc 2008–2010) is assistant professor of modern European history and international relations at the Department of History and Ethnology of the University of Jyvaskyla. Rinna is an area expert on Southeastern Europe. Her monograph *The Non-Aligned Movement and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Finland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Challenge* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012) represents two comparative case studies of Soviet foreign policy after the Second World War. She is the organizer of international workshops on the topic of third way foreign policies and superpower politics in the Cold War. In the past year she has given invited papers and presentations at the U.S. Department of State; University of Paris; Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po; the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies, School of History; the Slavic Institute of the Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Moscow; and the Department of Political Science at the University of Zagreb. She currently works in five research languages. She is interested in questions of EU accession and the current construction of EU foreign policy. Her work is often used by policymakers at the EU and national levels.

Jonathan L. Larson (Postdoc 2008–2009) helps Grinnell College manage its international programs as assistant director of off-campus study. Since his stint at the Harriman Institute, he has also been serving as visiting assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Iowa, where he also holds an appointment in the Graduate College. Jonathan’s first book, *Critical Thinking in Slovakia after Socialism*, was published by the University of Rochester Press in April 2013. You can follow his scholarly work at http://grinnell.academia.edu/JonathanLarson.

Emma Lieber (Postdoc 2011–2012) is beginning a two-year tenure as an ACLS New Faculty Fellow in the Department of Germanic, Slavic, and East European Languages and Literatures at Rutgers University, where she will teach courses on Nabokov, Dostoevsky, and Dickens. She is working on the completion of her book manuscript, “Investigations into the Unpoliced Novel: The Russian Novel in Comparison,” in which she examines pairs of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russian and English novels, concentrating particularly on ideas of discipline and novelistic policing and their attendant concerns—notions of novelistic form and of narrative, psychic, judicial, and domestic closure; the representation of bodies and the material world; and questions of sexual difference and the marketplace—in order to give shape to the “distinctiveness” of the Russian novel and the unusual permissiveness of Russian realism.

Kirsten Lodge (Harriman Certificate 2002; Postdoc 2006–2007) is assistant professor of comparative and world literature and coordinator of the Humanities Program at Midwestern State University,
situated north of Dallas. She has been teaching both undergraduate and graduate courses, including European Romanticism, A Cultural History of Animals (Animals in Art and Literature), Medieval Cultures, The 19th Century to the Present (humanities), World Literature from Antiquity to the Renaissance, World Literature from the Enlightenment to the Present, The End of the World: Apocalyptic Film and Literature, and Introduction to Literary Theory. Kirsten’s translation of A Gothic Soul (1900) by the Czech decadent Jiri Karasek ze Lvovic is forthcoming this year from Twisted Spoon Press, and she is currently working on a new translation of Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground, with background materials, for Broadview Press. Kirsten reports that she is especially proud of her article “Decadence and Barbarism in the Czech Lands at the Turn of the Century,” in Renato Poggioli: An Intellectual Biography (2012), as it illustrates the best of her research on Czech decadence. Lodge comes up for tenure next year—and we wish her the very best!


**Marci Shore (Postdoc 2001–2002)** is assistant professor of history at Yale University. She is the translator of Michal Glowinski’s The Black Seasons and the author of Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation’s Life and Death in Marxism, 1918–1968 (Yale University Press, 2006); and The Taste of Ashes: The Afterlife of Totalitarianism in Eastern Europe (Crown, 2013). Currently, she is at work on a book project titled “Phenomenological Encounters: Scenes from Central Europe,” an examination of the history of phenomenology and existentialism in East Central Europe. Her recent articles and essays include “Out of the Desert: A Heidegger for Poland” (Times Literary Supplement); “The Banality of Merkel” (Foreign Affairs); “The Jewish Hero History Forgot” (New York Times); “Rachelka’s Tablecloth: Poles and Jews, Intimacy and Fragility ‘on the Periphery of the Holocaust’” (Tr@nsit Online); “Bezdomni ludzi w potrznakanym świecie” (Gazeta Wyborcza); “On Cosmopolitanism and the Avant-Garde, and a Lost Innocence of Mitteleuropa” (Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical Possibility); and “Can We See Ideas? On Evocation, Experience, and Empathy” (Modern European Intellectual History).

**Eugene A. Sokoloff (SIPA/Harriman Fellow, 2009)** is clerking for the Honorable Robert D. Sack of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After completing his M.I.A., he went on to earn a J.D. at Yale. He was previously a litigation associate at the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, where he plans to return after his clerkship.

**Ludmilla A. Trigos (Harriman Institute Certificate 1992; Postdoc 2000–2001)** received her Ph.D. in Russian literature
Ludmilla A. Trigos

from Columbia University. She specializes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian literature and cultural history. Her book *The Decembrist Myth in Russian Literature* was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2009 and made the long list for the 2012 Historia Nova Prize, sponsored by the Prokhorov Foundation, for the best book on Russian intellectual history. She served as co-editor of *Under the Sky of My Africa: Alexander Pushkin and Blackness* (Northwestern University Press, 2006) with Catharine Nepomnyashchy and Nicole Svobodny. Ludmilla has also contributed articles to notable volumes and journals, including *Just Assassins: The Culture of Terrorism in Russia*, edited by Anthony Anemone (Northwestern University Press, 2010); *Times of Trouble: Violence in Russian Literature and Culture*, edited by Marcus Levitt and Tatyana Novikov (University of Wisconsin Press, 2007); and the *Slavic and East European Journal*. Ludmilla has taught Russian language, literature, film, and humanities at Columbia University, New York University, Drew University, and Barnard College. Her current research focuses on Russian biography and will result in a volume of articles, co-edited with Carol Ueland, about the book series *Lives of Remarkable People* (*Zhizn’ zamechatel’nykh liudei*).

Laura Trimajova (MARS, 2013)

works in the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, as a parliamentary assistant to Eduard Kukan, member of the European Parliament. Mr. Kukan, a former two-term Slovak minister of foreign affairs and UN Secretary-General’s special envoy to the Balkans, is a highly acclaimed EU diplomat working on the Western Balkans. While Laura’s work focuses mainly on EU policies and the EU Enlargement portfolio, with a focus on Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo, she also follows and advises on the EU-Ukraine dialogue.

Ernest A. Zitser (Ph.D. History, 2000; Postdoc 2000–2001) is the librarian for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at Perkins/Bostock Library and adjunct assistant professor in the Department of Slavic and Eurasian Studies at Duke University. He is an active member of a number of professional organizations, including the East Coast Consortium of Slavic Library Collections; the Association for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies; and the Eighteenth-Century Russian Studies Association. He has been a fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, the John Hope Franklin Humanities Institute, and at the National Humanities Center. Dr. Zitser is the author of *The Transfigured Kingdom: Sacred Parody and Charismatic Authority at the Court of Peter the Great* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004; Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2008), and has published in both historical and library journals on a wide variety of topics, including Slavic information literacy, American and Soviet photopropaganda, and Russian nationalism in post-Soviet cinema. He is the cofounder and managing editor of ВИВЛІОθИКА: E-Journal of Eighteenth-Century Russian Studies (vivliothesis.library.duke.edu).

Elizabeth Zolotukhina (MARS, 2013)

worked as a research associate at the Institute of Modern Russia from May 2013 until August 2013, helping to foster economic and democratic development in Russia. In September 2013, she started at the International Harm Reduction Development program, part of the Public Health Program, at the Open Society Foundations.

We also want to congratulate Laura J. Nettelfield (Ph.D., Political Science, 2006; Postdoc 2010–2011) on the upcoming publication of her second book, *Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), co-authored with Sarah E. Wagner; it is the result of a project she worked on during her postdoctoral fellowship at the Harriman Institute.
The Harriman Institute is deeply saddened by the loss of two esteemed alumni. We extend our deepest sympathy to the loved ones of the recently deceased.

Henry G. Barnes Jr. (’68) was an esteemed diplomat best known for his service in Chile during General Augusto Pinochet’s regime, where he ignored diplomatic protocol by joining opposition leaders in the protest against the extension of Pinochet’s rule. During his distinguished tenure in the State Department, he held the posts of ambassador to India and Romania, where he was the first U.S. diplomat to address the nation. Barnes passed away on August 9, 2012, at the age of 86. He is survived by his wife, the former Elizabeth Ann Sibley; his son, Douglas; his daughter Sibley Barnes; and one grandson.

Peter Juviler (’54) was the 2011 Harriman Alumnus of the Year and a long-time Harriman faculty member. He joined the Barnard Political Science Department in 1964 and became a steadfast advocate for the study of human rights at Barnard College and Columbia University. Juviler cofounded and directed the College’s Human Rights major, codirected the Center for the Study of Human Rights, and cochaired the University Seminar on Human Rights at Columbia. His human rights legacy at the Harriman Institute lives on in the Harriman Institute’s 2011 Core Project: Human Rights in the Post-Communist World: Strategies and Outcomes, and the annual course: Human Rights in Post-Communist Eurasia.

In addition to promoting human rights on campus, Juviler was an unyielding promoter of greater freedoms in the former Soviet Union and was the first U.S. scholar to lecture on human rights at the USSR Academy of Sciences and Moscow University Faculty of Law, in 1983. He continued his work in the region during the post-Cold War era, engaging with a number of post-Cold War states about their human rights processes.

Juviler passed away on May 20, 2013, at the age of 87. He is survived by his wife Anne Stephenson, by his sons Gregory and Geoffry, his brother Michael, his step-daughters Christiana and Stephanie, his grandchildren Peter, Jamie, Henry, Sophia, and Katie, and his step-granddaughter Elizabeth.

In Memoriam

Giving to Harriman

The Harriman Institute relies on the generosity of individuals like you who share a belief in our core mission to promote the study of Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe in this ever more globalized era, and to train specialists who bring in-depth regional knowledge and understanding to a wide variety of career and life paths.

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We thank our generous contributors for their continued support of the Harriman Institute’s mission.
In late April 2013, members of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation arrived unannounced at the office of the economist Sergei Guriev, then rector of the New Economic School (NES), with a search warrant, and seized the previous five years of his e-mail—45 gigabytes worth of correspondence. For two months, Guriev had cooperated with the Committee as it repeatedly contacted and interrogated him as a “witness” in the original case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the imprisoned chair and CEO of the now-defunct Yukos Oil Company (in a surprising turn of events, Khodorkovsky was pardoned and released by President Vladimir Putin on December 20, 2013, three-and-a-half months after my interview with Guriev). The day his e-mail was confiscated, he understood that he was not just a “witness” but, rather, a suspect.

Guriev, a prominent public intellectual who had advised the Medvedev administration, became involved with the Khodorkovsky affair in early 2011, after President Medvedev’s Human Rights Council asked him to prepare an evaluation about the validity of the second round of government charges against the oil tycoon and his partner Platon Lebedev. This request, Guriev says, was driven by public opinion. “Everybody was outraged because the second case was obviously fabricated.” Guriev participated as one of nine independent experts who did not know each other’s identities. They presented their findings during a press conference in December, where each expert concluded that the evidence used to charge Khodorkovsky was insubstantial. The court and the prosecutors in the case dismissed the evaluations, says Guriev, and nothing changed for Khodorkovsky. Though this was traditionally a sensitive topic for the Russian government, the experts faced no consequences, and the matter was forgotten.

However, once Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in May 2012, the spokesman of the Investigative Committee announced plans to assess the experts’ “independence and objectivity.” Starting that fall, the panel members were investigated one by one. In April, Guriev realized the severity of the situation. He bought a one-way ticket to Paris, where his wife and children were already living, and left Moscow for good. In late May, he resigned from his public positions.

Though he was an open critic of the Russian government, Guriev was also its eager adviser—a man who used his influential status to better his country. He had managed to do what seemed impossible in Russia: during the nine years he was rector, NES became a private, competitive, independent, and internationally renowned institution with its own endowment during a time when such institutions did not exist.1

I spoke with Guriev over Skype on September 4, 2013, four days before the mayoral election in Moscow.