The Golunov Affair: Fighting Corruption in Russia
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The June arrest of investigative journalist Ivan Golunov, the powerful civic movement in his support, and his subsequent release marked the start of an eventful summer in Russia. In mid-July, Russians took to the streets again, over the disqualification of opposition candidates from the Moscow City Duma election. In this context, we dedicate the bulk of this issue to contemporary Russia.

Russian journalist Nadezhda Azhgikhina, a longtime friend of the Institute, and executive director of PEN Moscow, dissects and contextualizes the Golunov Affair in an insightful essay about the current state of Russian investigative journalism and its broader history.

The Golunov Affair serves as a stark reminder of the threats faced by investigative journalists working in Russia. Fifteen years ago, Forbes Russia editor Paul Klebnikov was assassinated leaving his office in central Moscow—the first and only U.S. journalist murdered in Russia. For nearly a decade, the Harriman Institute has partnered with Klebnikov’s widow, Musa, to honor his memory by bringing a Russian journalist to the Institute every year for a three-week residency. In this issue, you can learn more about the Paul Klebnikov Russian Civil Society Fellowship, and what it’s like to do investigative reporting in Russia, in a profile of Maria Zholobova, our 2019 PKF Fellow.

In recent years, Russia has seen an uptick in anticorruption protests. David Szakonyi, an alumnus of Columbia’s Department of Political Science, examines the fight against corruption through the lens of the Kremlin’s ongoing anticorruption campaign.

In February we lost our colleague Seweryn Bialer, a leading scholar of the former Soviet Union and member of Columbia’s Department of Political Science for over 30 years. This issue honors his memory and contributions to the field of international relations with an article about Bialer’s experiences in postwar Poland and his 1956 defection to the United States, and two unpublished draft documents from his personal papers.

Also in the issue is an article about nonconformist artist Eduard Gorokhovsky by curator and art historian Natalia Kolodzei; and a piece by Colleen Wood, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, about a group of ethnic Kyrgyz from Afghanistan returning to their ethnic homeland, and what their experience says about the broader study of ethnic return migration.

We hope you enjoy the issue! As always, we value your comments, ideas, and suggestions.

All the best,

Alexander Cooley
Director, Harriman Institute
COVER STORY

The Golunov Affair: The Reawakening of Civil Society or a New Episode in the Security Forces’ Intemecine Conflict?
By Nadezhda Azhgikhina

Nadezhda Azhgikhina, executive director of Moscow PEN and former vice-president of the European Federation of Journalists, recounts the story of Russian investigative journalist Ivan Golunov, arrested on trumped-up charges of drug dealing, which set off massive protests in Russia and other cities.

For many, the familiar method of framing a person as a drug dealer brought to mind the Azadovsky Affair of the 1980s. But unlike Azadovsky, who was sentenced to two years of hard labor, Golunov, to everyone’s amazement, was cleared of all charges and released within a week.

Combating Corruption in Russia
By David Szakonyi

Is the Kremlin’s anticorruption campaign effective, or is it being used as a way to purge rivals and consolidate power?

Investigating Russia’s Elite:
Maria Zholobova in Profile
By Masha Udensiva-Brenner

Zholobova has reported on everything from Russia’s infrastructural problems to its criminal networks, President Vladimir Putin’s inner circles, and the hidden assets of public officials. Last spring, she spent three weeks in residence at the Harriman Institute.
Returning “Home”: Why Social Scientists Should Pay More Attention to Ethnic Return Migration
By Colleen Wood

Ethnic return migration has been studied from a geopolitical perspective but never from the perspective of returnees and the governments who invited them back. Wood’s research changes this.

War’s Reality in the Life and Work of Seweryn Bialer
By Joan Afferica and Ronald Meyer

A brief survey of Seweryn Bialer’s life and work introduces two excerpts from his unfinished manuscript: “Russia at War: The Nazi-Soviet Conflict.”

From Siberia to Moscow and Beyond: The Artistic Quest of Eduard Gorokhovsky
By Natalia Kolodzei

An introduction to the life and work of Soviet noncomformist artist Eduard Gorokhovsky—one of the first to juxtapose archival photographs with a text, a geometric figure, or a silhouette to create a new work that would explore public and private space, personal and cultural memory, thus eliciting myriad interpretations.

Alumni & Postdoc Notes

Giving to Harriman
RETURNING "HOME"

WHY SOCIAL SCIENTISTS SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO ETHNIC RETURN MIGRATION

BY COLLEEN WOOD

In October 2017, a sturdy striped UAZ bus with six families on board reached Naryn City, a modest regional capital in central Kyrgyzstan, after several days of travel from northeastern Afghanistan. The bus’s engine buzzed as its passengers—six families, 33 people in total—descended to meet the Kyrgyz officials who waited to welcome the guests with candy and music. The families, stepping foot in Kyrgyzstan for the first time, had left their community of several thousand ethnic Kyrgyz high in Afghanistan’s Pamir mountains, a century-old community that’s dwindling due to harsh living conditions and extreme isolation.

Kyrgyzstan’s government had invited these families to return to their ancestral homeland for education and medical care, but the terms of support and the length of stay remained unclear. In July 2018, after a long winter cooped up in Naryn, about half of the group packed their bags and began the long journey back to Afghanistan. Journalists who met with the departing Pamiris at a rest stop, four hours in to a three-day journey, recounted the group’s frustration with the lack of employment opportunities and the impossibility of keeping up on rent after housing subsidies ran dry. “Cold, sad, boring,” one headline announced, trying to piece together the flop of this particular resettlement effort. Government officials dug in their heels, asserting that they had only extended the invitation for humanitarian support and educational opportunities, backtracking from previous promises to provide full support.

The Pamiri Kyrgyz who stayed, determined to make Naryn home, had nurtured hopes of receiving kairylman (returnee) status, as part of a larger national initiative established in 2006 to fast-track the citizenship process for ethnic Kyrgyz expatriates. In May 2019, a news story broke about Pamiri men who worked in the Naryn City bazaar collecting cardboard boxes for a few dollars a day. They needed the money to feed their families, but also to pay for the five-hour trip to Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, in order to complete the paperwork.
needed for kairyłman status. At a roundtable in Bishkek later that month, several parliamentarians criticized the ministry responsible for these returnees, saying that the big show of bringing these families from Afghanistan was nothing more than a PR stunt. High-level bureaucrats struggled to clarify their language to circumvent the tangle of local and international politics of this initiative. At the same roundtable, a representative from Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that citizenship for Afghani Kyrgyz was impossible because it would lead to Afghanistan’s government refusing to allow ethnic Kyrgyz to even visit their ancestral homeland, although he did not explain why that might be.

The two-year saga of this group’s return to an estranged homeland provides a lens for studying the challenges associated with the broader phenomenon of government-sponsored ethnic return migration, an understudied migratory pattern in which the descendants of migrants who permanently settled abroad “return” to their ancestral homeland at the urging of the ancestral state. In Kyrgyzstan’s case, mismatched expectations about the purpose and duration of the Pamiri Kyrgyz community’s resettlement, as well as the terms of economic support, demonstrate how insufficient bureaucratic capacity and limited resources can constrain a government from reaping the intended political and cultural benefits of engaging its diaspora.

Approximately 60,000 people have migrated to Kyrgyzstan through its kairyłman program, but Kyrgyzstan is not the only country to facilitate ethnic return migration by sweetening the pot with fast-tracked citizenship acquisition, land allotments, and welfare support. Examples of countries engaging their diasporas in this way can be found around the world: Israel supports the right of Jews to make aliyah and get Israeli citizenship; Germany sponsored the return of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union; South Korea welcomes people with Korean ancestry, largely from China and the United States, to work and receive social benefits. In the post-Soviet region, Kazakhstan has actively encouraged its diaspora members to return to their ancestral homeland since declaring its independence in 1991, when ethnic Kazakhs made up less than half of the country’s population. Since then, more than one million ethnic Kazakhs, a quarter of the total diaspora, have resettled in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s government revamped its Oralman (Returnee) program in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s own compatriots movement—a repatriation scheme targeting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, formally institutionalized in 2006—has facilitated the resettlement of about 800,000 people.

At least 15 other countries have policies aimed at attracting ethnic return migration, but an exhaustive list does not exist because the topic is still so new to social scientists. Preliminary research has been framed primarily from a bird’s-eye, geopolitical perspective, rather than from the perspective of the returnees and the governments who invited them back.
Existing theories focus on the reasons why states might encourage ethnic return migration. Some states, such as Kazakhstan, use return migration in order to overcome demographic challenges—encouraging migrants to move to sluggish industrial areas or sparsely populated border territories, for instance. Ethnic return migration can have economic advantages as well; South Korea has promoted the return of ethnic Koreans from the United States as a way to capture human capital. Finally, countries can frame repatriation programs in such a way as to promote a particular political and cultural identity.

Ethnic return migration is one way to achieve a congruence of nation and territory

Ethnic return migration is one way to achieve a congruence of nation and territory, sending a message to neighboring states that a government sees itself as responsible for its co-ethnics. This can explain why Hungary’s government jumped at the chance to resettle ethnic Hungarians from Venezuela in early 2019, and promotes minority language rights in other Central European countries, while simultaneously pursuing draconian deportations of non-Hungarian migrants.

When applying these theories to the Kyrgyz case, the decision to sponsor the resettlement of these 33 people—and the kairylman program, more broadly—seems to follow the identity-based logic rather than the materially driven one. While Kyrgyzstan receives millions of dollars in development support from Western countries, sending humanitarian support to co-ethnics in Afghanistan could have been seen as a way to build legitimacy at home; resettling members from an impoverished community in a war-torn country could signal generosity and relative wealth to Kyrgyzstan’s domestic population. But, because the government did not have the capacity to support the Pamiris and integrate them into Kyrgyz society, it is likely that the two-year saga of the Pamiri Kyrgyz did not achieve its intended effects.

The existing theories help us understand why the Kyrgyz state may have encouraged the Pamiris to come, but there is no scholarship about what happens on the ground. My research attempts to disentangle the relevant local actors and interests driving the kairylman program and to understand the experiences of the returnees. Lack of funding, inaccurate statistics, or miscommunication between the national and regional governments might all have caused hiccups in welfare distribution and driven confusion, for example; but we won’t be able to understand divergent outcomes in ethnic return migration programs as long as social scientists try to explain this phenomenon through a detached geopolitical perspective.

We also don’t know much about the decision-making process and
The popularity of ethnic return programs illustrates the allure of myths about homeland. Experiences of those who pack up and move to their ancestral homeland, and even less about the reactions of those who have lived for decades in places where returnees settle. Albert Hirschman’s famous book *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* has been picked up by political scientists like David Laitin to explain migration patterns, but more research is necessary to understand the dynamics of ethnic return migration programs in particular. It is unclear which factors are relevant for navigating insider-outside boundaries between those who have ethnic and linguistic features in common but do not share a civic identity, for instance.

The “return” of six Kyrgyz families from Afghanistan constitutes just a small fraction of the 60,000 who have migrated through the *kairylman* program, numbers that pale in comparison with neighboring countries’ initiatives to resettle their diasporas. The popularity of ethnic return programs—both from the perspective of ethnic return migrants and governments with policy aims—illustrates the allure of myths about homeland that stretch back in time and across borders. The story of the Pamiri Kyrgyz also demonstrates just how fragile these myths are, as they crumbled under the logistical demands of large-scale migration.

Colleen Wood is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. In 2019, she received a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship to study Central Asian return migration and diasporic identities.
CORRUPTION IS QUICKLY BECOMING ONE OF THE MOST SALIENT POLITICAL ISSUES IN RUSSIA. SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY THE LEVADA CENTER IN EARLY 2019 REVEAL THAT RUSSIANS NOW RANK CORRUPTION THIRD ON A LIST OF THEIR MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS, COMING IN AFTER POVERTY AND THE HIGH COST OF LIVING. THIS LEVEL IS AT ITS HIGHEST SINCE 2005 AND TWICE THAT RECORDED IN 2016. ACCORDING TO TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL’S 2018 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, RUSSIA RANKS 138TH OUT OF 180 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE—THE LOWEST AMONG THE 20 LARGEST ECONOMIES. CLEARLY CORRUPTION IS NOT NEW IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY; THE COUNTRY’S HISTORY IS LITTERED WITH EXAMPLES OF CAPRICIOUS OFFICIALS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THEIR POSITIONS.

BUT OVER THE LAST DECADE, FRUSTRATION WITH GRIFT, PAY-TO-PLAY ACCESS, AND MISMANAGEMENT OF BUDGETARY FUNDS THREATENS TO UPSET THE SEEMINGLY STABLE PUTIN REGIME. BEYOND THE POLLING DATA, RECENT EVENTS SUGGEST RUSSIANS ARE MORE LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION AND EXPRESS THEIR DISCONTENT OVER CORRUPTION THAN OVER OTHER HOT POINTS, SUCH AS ELECTORAL FRAUD. FOR EXAMPLE, FOLLOWING A SENSATIONAL VIDEO IN MARCH 2017 DOCUMENTING ALLEGED ENRICHMENT BY PRIME MINISTER DMITRY MEDVEDEV, THOUSANDS OF RUSSIANS TOOK TO THE STREETS DEMANDING PUNITIVE ACTIONS BE TAKEN. IN 2019, DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST WASTE DISPOSAL IN MOSCOW OBLAST, AND CHURCH CONSTRUCTION IN YEKATERINBURG, HAVE BEEN TINGED WITH COMPLAINTS THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE PUTTING BUSINESS INTERESTS ABOVE THOSE OF AVERAGE CITIZENS. THE PUBLIC OUTCRY OVER THE FABRICATION DRUG CHARGES AGAINST IVAN GOLUNOV, A PROMINENT ANTICORRUPTION JOURNALIST, EMERGED FROM THE SAME SENSE THAT POWERFUL ECONOMIC INTERESTS COULD CO-OPT THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ORDER TO PROTECT ELITE ASSETS. THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT CORRUPTION IS A ROOT CAUSE BEHIND OTHER SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN RUSSIA, PARTICULARLY INEQUALITY AND POVERTY, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS OPENLY DEMANDING STRONGER CRACKDOWNS ON CORRUPT BEHAVIOR.
The Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny detained on Tverskaya Street in Moscow. Photo by Evgeny Feldman via Wikimedia Commons.
Although the Russian government has denied many of the most high-profile accusations, it has acknowledged the breadth of the problem, and in particular, its potential to trigger mass unrest and calls for significant political change. Indeed, if the Putin administration refuses to take action to clean up the government, it could find its way out the door. Ironically, it was former president Dmitry Medvedev who kicked off the state’s most concerted effort to clean up corruption in 2008. Since then, a series of promising laws have easily passed the State Duma with the aim of reducing opportunities for officials to profit from public service and for companies to raid government coffers. These initiatives came about not because of international pressure but presumably due to a realization that the blatant abuse of public office for personal gain was becoming a liability for the regime.

The scope of the government’s activity has been broad. Reforms to the public procurement system, though still incomplete and flawed, have brought a measure of transparency and competition to a notorious avenue for self-enrichment. For example, citizens and activists can now easily see the prices their schools pay for cafeteria food and the expenditures their local governments make on road construction. The activist Alexey Navalny earned his anticorruption chops, in part, by exposing flagrant contractual abuses, overcharging, and nonimplementation.

This trend toward open data has also led millions of budgetary rubles to be invested in so-called “e-government,” whereby citizens and firms can gain electronic access to key government services and never have to interact in person with a bureaucrat. Many in the Russian government believe that an increased reliance on impartial technological solutions can help reduce the ability of bureaucrats to extract bribes. But alongside transparency has also come the whip. Led by newly empowered prosecutors and the notorious Investigative Committee, several unsuspecting, high-ranking officials have been caught up on charges of outrageous theft.

These steps raise provocative questions about what the government is trying to achieve through its anticorruption campaign. Is the Russian state sincerely interested in combating graft? Are these reforms actually reducing corruption? Or are skeptics correct in seeing these new laws as tools for the government to purge rivals and further consolidate power?
PUBLICIZING OFFICIALS’ PERSONAL FINANCES

One of the government’s signature anticorruption reforms is the 2008 requirement for federal officials to submit annual income and asset disclosures. The forms contain information on all income earned over the previous year as well as the real estate and transportation assets for officials and their immediate families. Over the last decade, the disclosures requirement has been extended to all regional and municipal governments across Russia and now applies to more than one million public servants. Perhaps surprisingly, these data are published online on individual agency websites; the team at Transparency International–Russia has taken the lead in collecting and systematizing the information through its Declarator project (Declarator.org).

An interesting consequence of this reform is that the obligation to publicly disclose income and assets is already changing the types of individuals who want to work for the Russian government. My research shows that after the government applied the disclosures law to local elected councils, many incumbent officials declined to run for reelection. These individuals would rather leave government altogether than reveal their personal finances to the general public. The same was true for politicians suspected of tax evasion. Properly enforced transparency rules reduced the attractiveness of government service for those who had something to hide or were only interested in public service as a way to make money.

Who did politicians fear in disclosing their income and assets? Not voters or the media, but law enforcement officials. Given the priority the central government has placed on reducing public perceptions of corruption, motivated prosecutors can now build successful careers out of exposing and punishing bad behavior. The disclosures law has been a key weapon in their arsenal: discrepancies in an official’s form can trigger swift expulsion and even criminal investigations. In Omsk Oblast alone, over 300 municipal deputies (or 7 percent of the total) have lost their positions as a result of running afoul of the new transparency rules. Local law enforcement and tax agencies have invested considerable resources in enforcing compliance and applying the rules to all these lower-level officials, regardless of their affiliation with the Putin regime.

Above: Russian investigative journalist Ivan Golunov on June 14, 2019, after the Moscow City Court quashed proceedings on the appeal against house arrest. Photo by Global Look Press.

Opposite page: Navalny on the street after a zelenka attack in Moscow. Photo by Evgeny Feldman via Wikimedia Commons.
The disclosures law example reveals something fundamental about how the Russian state is currently working to combat corruption. At the lowest levels of government, stringent monitoring and punishment are changing incentives to abuse power, potentially for the better. Overtly exploiting government positions for personal gain now carries a greater risk of jail time. In fact, ongoing research suggests that over 10 percent of mayors and governors wind up under arrest after leaving office on suspicion of having engaged in corruption. Moscow is trying to change the conversation about graft by making public examples of elected officials being held accountable.

But as officials climb the power ladder, the luster of the anticorruption campaign quickly begins to fade. The trials of many prominent ministers, agency heads, and businessmen on corruption charges carry strong hints of political infighting and intrigue. Rather than justice being properly handed down, anticorruption investigations in Moscow are being used to settle scores and target rivals. Moreover, demonstrating loyalty and activating connections can save federal officials from jail time. Just three years after an early morning raid on his apartment on charges of embezzlement, former defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov landed a plum gig as an industrial director for the defense sector behemoth Rostec. Apparently his longtime service had earned him enough powerful friends to protect him.

This inaction at the federal level helps explain why public opinion about the pervasiveness of corruption has not budged amid the rollout of the anticorruption campaign. Powerful leaders avoiding prosecution fuels perceptions that a different set of rules applies at the very top. Properly documented, damning evidence of corruption is not enough to spell the end of careers embedded in dense political networks. The average Russian has enough information to see this disconnect and may get on board with more radical reforms to remove the culture of impunity among the ruling elite.
David Szakonyi is assistant professor of political science at George Washington University and an Academy Scholar at Harvard University. His research looks at business-government relations and corruption in Russia and the United States. He is an alumnus of Columbia University’s Department of Political Science.

Above: Police detain a participant in an anticorruption rally in Moscow’s Pushkin Square on March 26, 2017. Photo by Victor Vitolskiy.
ON a hot, sunny morning in late April, Maria Zholobova, a Moscow-based investigative journalist on her first trip to the United States, walks into the cavernous halls of the New York County District Attorney’s Office in lower Manhattan. Waiting to go through the metal detector, she looks up at the cylindrical lamps suspended from a golden sun decorating the white, vaulted ceilings, takes a breath, and says “классно” (awesome).

Upstairs in the waiting room at the Human Trafficking Response Unit (HTRU), which prosecutes sex and labor trafficking crimes and provides support for victims, Zholobova marvels at the pleasant atmosphere—the children’s play area, the calming tree painting mounted above the soft beige chairs. She’s there to meet with the HTRU chief—a friendly blond woman named Carolina Holderness—for an information session about the unit; it’s part of a series of meetings and classes set up for her by the Harriman Institute during her residency as the 2019 Paul Klebnikov Russian Civil Society Fellow. The fellowship honors the memory of investigative journalist Paul Klebnikov by bringing promising Russian journalists to New York for three weeks and introduces them to various experts and media professionals.

Founded by Klebnikov’s widow, Musa, shortly after his death, the fellowship continues Klebnikov’s efforts to support the creation of a free and independent Russian press and to help Russian journalists expand their professional networks in the U.S., learn Western journalistic techniques, and publish in Western publications. Musa Klebnikov hopes it will produce “a whole cadre of Russian journalists who think more of themselves because they have been abroad.”

Holderness walks Zholobova down the wide hallway to her spacious, sunny office and explains that the center’s pleasant atmosphere is intentional, designed to avoid the cold, bureaucratic feel of government offices so as not to “retraumatize” trafficking victims. Zholobova is impressed. Such details would never occur to the Russian government, which routinely prosecutes trafficking victims rather than helping them.
Working as an investigative journalist in Russia is dangerous. In 2019, Russia ranked 149 out of 180 on the annual Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 39 journalists have been murdered there since 1992. Forbes journalist Paul Klebnikov was the first and only U.S. journalist murdered in Russia. Klebnikov had spent much of his career investigating the connections between Russia’s business elite and the criminal underworld. He received frequent death threats, briefly employed a bodyguard, and spent years fighting a libel lawsuit brought against Forbes by the Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky. In 2003, he moved to Moscow as the founding editor of Forbes Russia; in July 2004, he was gunned down on the street outside his office. To this day, his murder remains unsolved.

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On the way out of Holderness’s office, Zholobova’s phone buzzes. Suddenly, she’s pacing the hot, crowded sidewalk outside the DA’s building, coordinating logistics with a Russian drone operator she’s hired to photograph a high-security estate hidden in a compound outside Moscow. An estate that, she has good reason to believe, belongs to President Putin.

Zholobova spends much of her time in front of her laptop, scouring open databases for property ownership records. She uses them to uncover the hidden assets of Russian officials—expensive properties paid for with undisclosed funds and erased from public view. When Holderness learns that Zholobova’s story about an alleged St. Petersburg mobster with ties to Putin has landed the young journalist in the middle of a criminal slander investigation, she looks concerned. Zholobova shrugs and laughs it off. “Don’t worry,” she says. “Nothing happened—just a case in Russia.” She managed to link the estate to the president through previous owners and the offshore company’s director. “Of course, we’ll never be able to prove the offshore is his,” she says. “It’s in the world’s most protected jurisdiction.”

The property, valued at over 2 billion rubles ($31.5 million), has been erased from Google Maps. Zholobova, who had to use pilot flight maps just to locate the estate’s coordinates, visited the site with a colleague a few weeks prior. Getting off on the “wrong” side of Rublyovskoye shosse (a highway connecting Moscow elites to fancy country homes),
Mild-mannered and makeup-free, Zholobova seems nothing like the intimidating, stiletto-donning persona who used to expose Russian media fabrications on TV Rain, where she hosted a weekly segment called *Fake News*.

“We had a speech coach who told me to act like a bitch,” she says with a laugh. In the nearly two years she worked for Rain (late 2016 to late 2018), Zholobova spent the bulk of her time on an investigative documentary series about the criminal networks in St. Petersburg and their connections to President Putin. It was her first time in TV journalism, and she never got fully comfortable with it—she prefers writing. “TV doesn’t leave room for nuance,” she explains.

Zholobova has loved writing since childhood, shunning other subjects in school as she excelled in the humanities and composition. Growing up in Kirov, a small city about 600 miles west of Moscow, Zholobova says she had a “very ordinary” childhood. Though her mother, a sanitation inspector, and her father, an electro-mechanical technician, have always “blindly believed” traditional Russian media, they never tried to hold back her career as an independent journalist. When they watched her on *Fake News*, all they said was, “be softer; why are you offending people so much?”

That afternoon, in a profile writing class at Columbia Journalism School, Zholobova watches the professor—a petite woman with glasses and short, gray hair—write student sentences on the whiteboard and cross out unnecessary words in green marker.

Zholobova attended journalism school at the Institute for Journalism and Literary Arts in Moscow, but she did not learn how to write. Nor did she learn any investigative techniques. The education, she says, revolved around literature and trends in the field rather than practical skills. She is amazed to attend classes—“Art of the Profile,” “Deadline Writing,” “Investigative Projects”—that teach things she and other Russian journalism school grads have had to learn in the field.

After graduation, Zholobova worked for a book publisher, then won a contest that landed her an internship at *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the most popular newspaper in Russia. The work was boring—“it’s yellow journalism that publishes unverified facts,” says Zholobova—but it got her enough experience to move to a better place. By 24, Zholobova was happily working at the respected Russian business daily *Kommersant*, learning the ins and outs of business reporting. But the experience ended abruptly in 2013.

In late September of that year, Zholobova’s editor sent her to a lecture by Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov. According to Zholobova, the official let down his guard and made a controversial, on-the-record comment about Putin. Though Peskov quickly realized...
“We had a speech coach who told me to act like a bitch,” she says with a laugh.

His mistake and tried to retract the comment, Zholobova, understanding her journalistic rights, published the story anyway. It went viral, and Peskov, livid, claimed the remark had been off the record and demanded a retraction. Kommersant deleted the story and fired Zholobova that very day. Ironically, the incident only strengthened her career—it established her credibility in Moscow’s independent journalistic circles. It was her first experience with how Kremlin pressure can affect even seemingly independent outlets.

In Russia, it’s nearly impossible for mainstream media outlets—largely funded by Russian oligarchs susceptible to Kremlin pressure—to maintain journalistic independence. Several editors, such as Zholobova’s boss, Proekt founder Roman Badanin, have been able to stay independent by launching their own media projects and registering them abroad. But, though foreign registration provides some inoculation, it does not alleviate threats to journalists’ personal safety. Last June, Zholobova’s friend and former colleague Ivan Golunov, a reporter for the Riga-registered news website Meduza, was arrested on trumped-up drug charges and badly beaten by the police. If not for the enormous display of public support demanding his release, Golunov could have faced a long prison sentence.

The case was unusual—it is the first time in recent Russian history that authorities have succumbed to civic pressure and publicly admitted to a mistake. Some see it as a cause for optimism, but Zholobova and Badanin doubt that anything will change in the relationship between journalists and the state. The two journalists have faced their own obstacles: in 2017 they published a TV Rain documentary about the prominent businessman and alleged St. Petersburg gangster Ilya Traber and his connections to President Putin. The notoriously secretive Traber accused TV Rain of slander. The criminal investigation dragged on for nearly two years. The statute of limitations expired in August, and, hopefully, the case is permanently behind them.

On her last day in New York, Zholobova pulls on a cigarette and looks at the cars rushing up and down Amsterdam Avenue. Her flight leaves in five hours, but she doesn’t want to go. “I feel so free in New York,” she says. “You can act however you want and no one cares.” In Moscow, she says, she feels confined. “People think you’re an idiot just for smiling in public.”

Maria Zholobova trekked across a field of horse manure to reach a tall, impenetrable fence on the banks of Moscow River guarding a property that Zholobova believes belongs to President Putin. Photo courtesy of Proekt.
The arrest and imprisonment of Ivan Golunov, correspondent for the Riga-based online Russian news service Meduza, dominated the Russian news for more than two weeks and received worldwide attention. Internet references to Golunov outnumbered those to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and Putin’s meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping.

Without a doubt, the swiftly developing events surrounding the Golunov Affair represent a new stage in the development of the situation in Russia’s media space and the domestic political situation as a whole.
Protester with tape covering her mouth takes part in the March for Free Internet in central Moscow on July 23, 2017 (MLADEN ANTONOV/AFP/Getty Images).
Chronology

On the afternoon of June 6, 36-year-old journalist Ivan Golunov was on his way to a business meeting in downtown Moscow. He had recently published investigative reports on the “funeral mafia” in Moscow and its ties to high-ranking officials in the police and FSB (Federal Security Service) and was continuing his work on this subject. Suddenly he was stopped by the police, frisked, and hauled off to the precinct. The police made a statement that they had discovered a bag with narcotics in Golunov’s backpack. He was beaten by police in custody, denied access to counsel, and not fed. They did not run tests on his hands and nails for traces of narcotics. There was no word about him until the following day.

Meduza, quickly followed by Novaya Gazeta and Moscow Echo, released statements that a journalist who not only did not use narcotics but who would not even drink a glass of wine was being prosecuted for his reporting. The Ministry for Internal Affairs, for its part, published an announcement of the arrest as well as photographs taken in Golunov’s apartment, where the police supposedly found drug paraphernalia. State-owned television channel Russia 24 further embroidered the story, adding that the journalist had been drunk. The photographs soon proved to be fakes taken at another location; no traces of narcotics were found on Golunov’s hands and fingernails once he was tested.

On June 7 and 8, lone pickets began to appear near the buildings of the Moscow police and the court where the hearing was held, demanding Golunov’s release. Outside 38 Petrovka Street, General Headquarters of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, a line of more than 400 people formed, waiting for their turn to hold a placard as a lone picket. In cities throughout Russia—from Kaliningrad to the Far East—people went out onto the streets, demanding Golunov’s release and a stop to police abuse of power. Tens of thousands of people signed online petitions, and hashtags in his defense accompanied user photos on Facebook and other social networks. Three of the leading business newspapers—Kommersant, Vedomosti, and RBK—published identical headlines: “I/We Are Ivan Golunov” (Я/Мы—Иван Голунов), which could not but remind one of Obshchaya Gazeta’s attempt at solidarity during the 1991 putsch. Issues of the newspapers sold for 35,000 rubles (approximately $500) on the internet!

Golunov told the court that police had planted the narcotics, more than likely at the behest of the “funeral
mafia,” from whom he had been receiving threats for some time. Late at night on the evening of June 8, Golunov was put under house arrest, which his supporters took as a victory since they had expected a sentence of anything up to 20 years.

During the next two days Golunov went from drug user to national hero. Stars of stage and screen, sports figures, and popular entertainers came to his support. If that were not enough, official media outlets and inveterate propagandists, not known for their affection for independent journalists, also lent support. Valentina Matviyenko, chairperson of the Federation Council, condemned the police’s unprofessionalism. The prosecutor general initiated an investigation; the chief of the Moscow Police requested that the president punish the culprits. . . . On June 11, the case was closed for lack of evidence, and Golunov was released from custody. Putin dismissed two police generals. The joy of this unexpected triumph of justice filled the air waves and the internet. Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova greeted the ruling with emotion, while the editor-in-chief of RT, Margarita Simonyan, wrote on social media that she was proud of her country.

Meanwhile, word came that the authorities had released Oyub Titiev, the well-known Chechen human rights activist and a faithful Muslim. Titiev had been convicted of selling narcotics; human rights activists believed he had been framed.

On June 12, Russia Day, a protest rally took place that had not been sanctioned by the authorities, but which had been planned before Golunov’s release from custody. The protesters changed their slogan to fit the new situation: now they demanded that the people behind Golunov’s arrest be punished and the law on selling narcotics, which activists believe has been used against thousands of innocent people, be amended. The authorities came out against the rally, and information spread on the internet that cancelling the rally was one of the conditions for the journalist’s release. On June 12, police detained more than 500 people—almost one out of every three protesters—but they were not held for long. The brief moment of solidarity was shattered.

The rally “Law and Justice for All,” initiated by Pavel Gusev, editor in chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets, and approved by the authorities, was held on June 16. Estimates put the attendance at slightly more than 1,000 people. Some of Golunov’s supporters called it a “rally for the
propagandists,” designed to deflect attention from the real infringements on civil rights, and they urged people to ignore the event.

An independent union of journalists and media workers, together with the Libertarian Party, organized yet another rally, “against police abuse of power.” Approximately 4,000 took to the streets. They were addressed by colleagues of Abdulmumin Gadzhiev, the Dagestani journalist for the independent newspaper Chernovik, recently arrested for supporting terrorism; participants of the weeks-long protest against the construction of a garbage landfill site in Shiyes, in the Arkhangelsk region; and the parents of a group of young people accused of creating an extremist group, and many others. Protests in solidarity against police abuse and freedom of speech took place in another 12 cities nationwide and were widely reported on social networks.

Meanwhile, three Dagestani newspapers followed Moscow’s example and came out with the headline: “I/We Are Abdulmumin Gadzhiev.” Another high-profile case ended with the prisoner’s release. Journalist Igor Rudnikov, publisher of the Kaliningrad
newspaper Novye Kolisa, accused of extorting bribes, was released after spending more than a year and a half in a pretrial detention center (June 17).

Putin was asked about the Golunov Affair during the course of his televised Direct Line and at a press conference. In Osaka he was again questioned about Golunov, and he harshly condemned the actions of the law enforcement officers, calling them an abuse of power. Every day Russian media published reports about the resignations of high-ranking police officials.

The End of the KGB’s Omnipotence?
The Golunov Affair could not but call to mind another case known throughout the country during perestroika. Namely, the case of literary scholar Konstantin Azadovsky, which Yuri Shchekochikhin covered for Novaya Gazeta. Shchekochikhin, who was murdered in 2003, exposed the KGB’s methods against the dissidents of the late Soviet era. At the time, the Azadovsky Affair ended with what seemed to be society’s victory over the omnipotence of the intelligence services. Provocateurs had planted drugs on Azadovsky and his wife, and, after being sentenced to hard labor in the Kolyma region, the couple was not only rehabilitated, but also received compensation as victims of political repression. Support for Azadovsky and more generally human dignity over the absolute authority of the KGB came from respected members of the intelligentsia in Russia and abroad (for example, Dmitri Likhachev, Anatoly Rybakov, Veniamin Kaverin, Joseph Brodsky, Sergei Dovlatov), as well as from the American PEN Center, readers of Literaturnaya Gazeta, and the newly founded Memorial Society—in other words, from people who wished to see real changes in the country.

Pyotr Druzhinin devotes the third volume of his monumental study Ideologiia i filologiia (Ideology and Philology, published by NLO, 2012–16) to the Azadovsky Affair. The first two volumes cover the evisceration of the Leningrad philological school, to which folklorist Mark Azadovsky, Konstantin’s father, belonged along with Viktor Zhirmunsky and Boris Eikhenbaum. By means of documents and eyewitness accounts Druzhinin uncovers the true picture not only of what was taking place in the country, but also how the conduct of these actors reflected the era and its concepts of courage and betrayal. In his recent appearance on Radio Liberty (June 19, 2019) the St. Petersburg mathematician Anatoly Vershik, drawing parallels between the Azadovsky and Golunov cases, asked: Will it be possible to find and name all those responsible for the Golunov provocation?

Vershik believes that there are grounds for hope and recalls how in 2017 Alexander Arkhangelsky, the editor of Free People of the Dissident Movement, brought up the Azadovsky Affair during a meeting of the Presidential Committee on Culture and Literature. Putin responded that he knew nothing about it and promised “to take a closer look.” Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, gave the identical response when asked by representatives of Novaya Gazeta about Andrei Sukhotin’s recent publication that portrayed the Golunov Affair as an episode in clan warfare among the FSB and police higher-ups. The speaker for the Kremlin answered that he did not have any information about that. Soon afterward heads of police officials began to roll, and the mansion of an FSB general portrayed in Golunov’s investigation in short order changed owners in the state registry.

Citing insider sources, the online media group Proekt reported that Kremlin and Moscow officials were trying to use the Golunov Affair in their own interests. At first the authorities took the police allegations on faith, but after the unexpectedly large protests they signaled to the judicial authorities to proceed with compassion, simultaneously giving the go-ahead to federal television channels to spearhead support for the journalist. According to Proekt, the Kremlin at the same time decided to teach the overreaching law enforcement forces a lesson. According to one of Proekt’s sources, the Kremlin was literally enraged by the clumsiness of the police. At the same time, Proekt believes that the Golunov Affair will not induce the authorities to implement any fundamental changes in the legal system. As evidence Proekt cites Putin’s announcement on Direct Line that the law regarding the sales of narcotics is not subject to review (a law that is responsible for the incarceration of tens of thousands of people, many cases of which are spurious, according to human rights organizations), along with the refusal to hold a referendum on the garbage landfill in Shiyes, about which residents have been protesting now for many weeks. Not to
mention the new indictment of terrorism filed against Dagestani journalist Gadzhiev on June 14.

One can point, however, to other takeaways. The demand for public oversight of the police and special services has resounded in protests throughout the country. The Golunov Affair, which has roused the nation and prompted authorities to take unprecedented measures “to redress shortcomings,” signals a new stage in society’s pursuit of well-being and self-determination. Many of the people who took to the streets in cities throughout Russia had not read Golunov’s investigations, but they understood all too well: this could happen to any one of us. The police had adopted the old KGB game of planting drugs. The journalist in theory could be replaced by practically anyone. The journalist’s release not only did not soothe the public, but instead prompted people to engage in more ambitious actions; for the first time in many years the public understood that something might result from taking a stand.

Dmitri Muratov, head of Novaya Gazeta’s editorial board, who together with Moscow Echo’s editor in chief Alexei Venediktov took part in the negotiations with Moscow authorities regarding Golunov’s release, believes that the events of recent weeks have opened up new possibilities for dialogue, without which there is no future.

One Country, Two Schools of Journalism

Ivan Golunov has become the new face of independent Russian journalism for the world. Against all odds, the Council of Europe received a positive reaction from the Kremlin, despite the fact that the European Federation of Journalists over the years has released dozens of statements regarding violations of freedom of speech in Russia that went unanswered. This is likely tied to the Russian delegation’s concurrent readmittance to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Freeing Golunov was an auspicious occasion to demonstrate consensus in approaches, particularly on such a sensitive issue.

Russia’s readmittance to PACE has given rise to highly fraught debates among human rights advocates both in Europe and in Russia. The authors of the appeal to European politicians not to deprive Russian citizens of the right to turn to the European Court of Human Rights—signed by, among others, well-known attorney Karina Moskalenko, MBKh Media journalist Zoya Svetova, and Yuri Dzhibladze, president of the Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights—have been severely criticized by radical human rights advocates who believe that any contact with the “bloody regime” is unacceptable. It is interesting to note that the military “hawks” are just as unhappy with the decision as the Stalinists, since they oppose any participation in European institutions that “imposes alien practices.”

Galina Arapova, a media lawyer and director of the Mass Media Defense Center, is of the opinion that a sustained opening up of the scope for human rights, coupled with wide-ranging dialogue, can gradually change the social climate and the state of human rights in Russia. The center has already won several cases in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which Arapova believes to be the most important mechanism for democratization and a practical instrument for applying pressure on the authorities. In Russia, 95 percent of the ECHR’s decisions have been carried out and citizens have received millions of euros in compensation for everything from being detained during a protest rally to illegal convictions and being subjected to abuse and torture. It cannot be ruled out that Golunov will also appeal to the ECHR if Russian authorities do not bring to justice those involved in his case.

Golunov has become the new face of independent Russian journalism.
“Russia’s Strident Stifling of Free Speech, 2012–18,” issued by PEN International together with the Free Word Association (Moscow) and the Moscow and St. Petersburg PEN Centers, portrays the shrinking sphere of freedom—which writer Lyudmila Ulitskaya calls in her preface a “horrifying picture of the relationship between the state and civil society, the state and the individual, the state and the artist.” Each successive act of legislation circumscribing the activities of independent mass media, the internet, and journalists—for example, the laws on extremism, offending believers, internet controls, fake news, and disrespecting government—makes a journalist’s work more and more difficult. New initiatives are constantly being floated, for example, to punish publications whose work leads to sanctions against Russia—in other words, criticism of any kind is becoming impossible. All these acts of legislation are passed without debate and without regard to expert opinion. In fact, experts, the Council for Human Rights, and even some ministries have actively protested some of these laws. The fact that legal enforcement is selective and that punishment meted out to critical voices is often unreasonable is another problem. A genuine scourge is the extrajudicial blocking of websites, which is at the behest of the prosecutor general.

As Galina Arapova has testified, in recent years another problem that has arisen is charging undesirable journalists with criminal acts—whether it be accusations of dealing drugs (Chechen journalist Zhelaudi Geriev, who spent four years in prison on what his colleagues believe to be trumped-up charges); extortion (Igor Rudnikov in Kaliningrad; and before him Sergei Reznik in Rostov province); legislation on extremism (Svetlana Prokopieva in Pskov); or supporting terrorism (Gadzhiev in Makhachkala). Another very important factor in limiting freedom of speech is an
economic one. The Russian advertising market, which is dependent on the government, cannot cover even half the expenses entailed by mass media, which consequently must seek funds from business and government, thereby falling into inevitable dependence. The recent scandal when Kommersant’s entire political department quit over the firing of two journalists for publishing a piece alleging the replacement of Federation Council chairperson Valentina Matviyenko is but one of many examples of censorship by the owner. Self-censorship, avoiding sensitive issues and investigations, and criticism of the authorities in general have become ubiquitous. Fear of losing one’s job, as well as fear for personal safety and the safety of those close to you, is another factor in self-censorship.

The majority of the crimes against journalists in Russia have not been investigated as they should, despite the article in the criminal code that provides for up to six years’ imprisonment for interfering with or harming a journalist while she is carrying out a professional assignment. Everyone knows, however, that these perpetrators often act with impunity. The martyrology compiled by human rights advocates comprises more than 350 names of those who have been murdered or died under mysterious circumstances or who have simply disappeared since 1991. The overwhelming majority of these crimes have not been solved, even in those cases where the immediate perpetrators of the murder have been convicted—as in the Politkovskaya case their employer remains at large. In the majority of cases, according to human rights advocates, corrupt police and security forces, politicians, and people in positions of authority are responsible. But the reasons for impunity are attributable not only to the absence of political will but also to unqualified investigators.

The absence of professional solidarity as well as the absence of solidarity shared by journalists and society is another factor. If during the years of perestroika citizens had more faith in the press than in all the branches of government and social institutions put together, then today this lack of trust in the mass media is a genuine problem. In the current situation—and this is true not only of Russia—the consumer is generally clueless about how to separate fake news from the truth and therefore stops believing everyone outside her small circle of trusted people, generally found on social media.

In Western Europe professional organizations with influence and experience are trying to mitigate the pressure from business and politicians on the tradition of independence, and on journalism as “a public good,” and to this end they are developing programs to promote media literacy and build support for public mass media. Nothing comparable exists in Russia. The professional community is splintered and confused. Over the course of 25 years the Russian Trade Union of Journalists and Media Workers had tried to create an independent, national organization.

Police officers detain opposition activist Konstantin Kotov during a rally in support of Ivan Golunov (June 12, 2019). On September 5, 2019, Kotov was sentenced to four years for “multiple breaches” of protest laws. In the photograph he is wearing a T-shirt supporting political prisoner Oleg Sentsov, who was released to Ukraine as part of a prisoner exchange on September 7.
outside of politics, based on democratic values. But all that came to an end when the new union administration came on board in 2017 and fundamentally changed the union’s direction and priorities and became a recipient of government funding, thus becoming an appendage of the state by supporting and even proposing limitations on freedom of expression. The union advocates for all the world to hear that the main problems for Russian journalists do not lie inside Russia but are to be found abroad, where they are attacked by Russophobes and hostile governments. Many journalists who work outside the capitals do not share the positions of the new union administration but are loath to object, turning for support to the Mass Media Defense Center and the Union of Journalists and Workers in Mass Media, which came into being on the wave of defending journalists’ rights. This new union prepared its own report on the conditions of freedom of expression, which together with the report by PEN International and the two Russian PEN centers will be discussed this fall by the Council on Human Rights. But the true significance of this discussion will only come about when the Russian audience will perceive attacks on journalists and the violation of their rights to be a violation of its own rights and the Russian people come to the defense of journalists on its own behalf. The Golunov Affair shows that in principle this is possible.

As Dmitri Muratov, chairman of the editorial board of Novaya Gazeta, told me at the memorial evening for slain journalist and politician Yuri Shchekochikhin (June 2, 2019):

For the first time since the publication of Obshchaya Gazeta during the August 1991 putsch, journalists have exhibited a real sense of solidarity. In the ’90s the people and journalists were against the authorities. And then the journalists turned out to be alone; the people had fallen in love with the authorities. And the authorities began to punish journalists, and many editorial boards began to serve the authorities. Today something has changed. And it’s not just the fact that journalists and mass media editors of all stripes united in their demand for Golunov’s release. A new technology has come into being: the very same text now is published by all manner of mass media, and more and more new people are becoming engaged; consequently, the audience for these materials grows larger than the one for the propaganda channels. That’s another outcome.

Muratov believes that the people will once again understand that they have a personal stake in freedom of expression, as they did during the perestroika years. Many young people believe this as well. It is not accidental that students are once again posting to social media that they believe in the profession—in its higher calling to be a boon to mankind. They understand that their individual voice can also make a contribution to this cause.

There were always two schools of journalism in Russia. The first Russian newspaper, the St. Petersburg News, which came about by decree of Peter the Great in 1703, was published in German and addressed primarily to European monarchs; later it was published in Russian for the autocrat’s governors in faraway places, reporting on the tsar’s orders and actions. Censorship and iron-fisted totalitarian control came into being with this publication. But soon afterward, under the auspices of Moscow University and its faculty, another type of journalism came into being, inspired by the ideas of the Great French Revolution, progress, and respect for one’s fellow man. Journalism has flourished in Russia for more than three centuries. The intense debate and adversarial relationship between the two directions in journalism has been going on for nearly as long: the first is conservative, totalitarian, propagandistic, while the second is independent and based on respect for mankind and its rights and on a respect for freedom and democracy. This battle continues today. And the outcome depends on what choice journalists and readers make.

Nadezhda Azhgikhina, former vice-president of the European Federation of Journalists (2013–19), is a journalist and executive director of PEN-Moscow.
A war’s reality in the life and work of Seweryn Bialer

An article about Seweryn Bialer (1926–2019) could well reiterate his contributions to the Harriman Institute, to Columbia University, to students, to the many beneficiaries in the United States and abroad who benefited from his knowledge about events and processes in the period of the Cold War. They would recognize the broad range of subjects he taught in the Department of Political Science and the School of General Studies. They might know something of his administrative
experience with the Research Institute on International Change or the Harriman Institute as well as of his membership on the Board of Supervisors of the School of International and Public Affairs and the executive committees of the Political Science and Sociology departments. They may have heard he was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and the Carnegie Foundation on International Studies, among other organizations. They may have witnessed the whirl of departures for Washington, London, Moscow, Havana, or Beijing. The curriculum vitae is long.

This article, however, will focus on some experiences and stimuli in his less-known younger life that nurtured an unflagging pursuit of knowledge and on the never-fading memories that underlay his preoccupation with the history of a period in which he and his family suffered dislocation, hunger, pain, and the expectation of imminent death. It will attempt to show something of the determination, willpower, and luck that enabled him to survive and, with years of hard work, to gain a professional reputation of merit in this university and in this country.

This article introduces the context for two unpublished draft documents from Bialer’s legacy of personal papers that follow. The first document affords a glimpse of a grievous past with his recollections of the war’s end in 1945 and some thoughts on his early commitment to communism. The second document presents his approach to the war’s origins. The first was intended to serve as the preface, the second as the introduction, to his unfinished, last major work on the Second World War in the East.

Perhaps Bialer’s first public appearance in the United States, following his abandonment of Poland in January 1956, may be dated June 1956, when he testified for three days before a closed U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing that was investigating the “Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States.” Without knowledge of English he was accompanied by a distinguished interpreter, Professor Jan Karski of Georgetown University, known as the courageous Polish courier who had brought directly to President Roosevelt a firsthand account of atrocities against Jews in concentration camps. Bialer, asked to relate his positions in Poland at the time of his defection, listed membership in the Central Committee Party aktiv, the roughly 200 senior Party officials employed by the Central Committee. In that capacity he was responsible for anti-Western propaganda, he was privy to confidential memoranda, orders, and letters addressed to the Central Committee and in contact with peers in the Soviet Union and other countries in the

Ludu, the official Party newspaper; and research scholar for the School of Economic Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences. An author of several political science textbooks, he had written as well a doctoral dissertation on the U.S. Marshall Plan for the program in political economy at the Institute for the Education of Scientific Cadres of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. Charged with the organization of anti-Western propaganda, he was privy to confidential memoranda, orders, and letters addressed to the Central Committee and in contact with peers in the Soviet Union and other countries in the

HARRIMAN | 33

The whirl of departures for Washington, London, Moscow, Havana, or Beijing.

Eastern bloc. In sum he had access to the nerve centers of the Polish Communist Party. He proved to be an unexpected and unmatched source.

The senators who questioned the 29-year-old expert would have no knowledge of the route traveled by the 18-year-old who made his way in 1945 from his last work camp at Friedland, on the border with Czechoslovakia, through devastated Poland to Warsaw. Confined at the age of 13 with his family to the Łódź Ghetto, it was there he began what became a lifelong study of Marxist theory. There he joined the Anti-Fascist Youth Movement, a Communist-sponsored study group, and risked taking part in the ghetto underground, which earned him one among several medals awarded to him in the postwar period by the Polish government. As the Łódź Ghetto was being emptied in 1944 in the face of the Soviet advance, Bialer was transported by train to Auschwitz-Birkenau and in 1945 through Gross-Rosen to Friedland.

Upon reaching Warsaw in the summer of 1945, the idealistic young man, uneducated and unskilled, believed that it was his duty as a Communist to seek factory work. The forewoman informed him at the outset that the Germans had made one mistake in Poland: they did not kill all the Jews—an opinion, she continued, that was shared by everyone working in this factory. Soon he turned to the Party for direction. At the time his only choice for a high school education was a militia training base where, owing to his ability, he attained the rank of captain and at the age of 19 became head of the political department of this Citizens’ Militia Training Center. From there he moved into Party organizations, rising quickly, despite his age. The Party leadership gave priority to an urgent need to create an intelligentsia capable of governing the country, given the earlier brutal destruction of Polish intellectuals by both Nazi and Soviet rulers.

Bialer’s first publication in the United States was entitled “I Chose Truth: A Former Leading Polish Communist’s Story” (News from Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956). This document was read in English translation into the record of the Senate proceedings, broadcast in Polish for Radio Free Europe, and dropped in thousands of copies from balloons flown over his homeland. The essay detailed his rise in the Communist Party and his “political, moral, and ideological” reasons for rejecting the Party. After many years of working in the Communist system at the highest levels, he had concluded that it was an “antidemocratic system which could not exist without poverty, waste, and falsehood.” Stalin’s death in 1953 did not end dictatorship but merely changed the players who engaged in the same “Stalinist and Beria-like methods.” He grounded his assertion in documents and conversations that shed light on the actions of Beria, Tito, Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev. He argued that the Party leadership feared the progress of the Thaw: “I had access to many documents and I know the way comrades from the Politburo tried to smother and suppress the so-called ‘Thaw.’” Bialer’s defection had taken place a month before Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” (February 25, 1956). Might he otherwise have remained in Poland with the promise of a distinguished future?
Toward the end of his Senate testimony Bialer was asked to recommend what policy the United States should follow with regard to Poland. “I believe,” he replied, “that the most important thing is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people that they first sympathize with them, and, secondly, that the Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.”

Bialer would be summoned to Capitol Hill numerous times from the 1950s through the 1990s to address U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviet political economy, and the Soviet role in Asia.

Bialer remained in Washington with a new identity, working as a research analyst of Soviet and East European affairs for various government agencies. It was Seweryn Bialer, however, who moved in 1963 to New York and entered the doctoral program in political science at Columbia University, where he remained until his retirement in 1996 as the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations. His doctoral dissertation, “Soviet Political Elites: Concept, Sample, Case Study” (1966), was a painstaking study on early computer punch cards of members elected to the Soviet Central Committee from 1939 to 1965. This work contributed in a major way to elaborating the concept of nomenklatura, a significant notion in later study of the Soviet leadership.

Rather than publishing his dissertation, however, Bialer chose to concentrate on the stream of Soviet World War II military memoirs that benefited from Khrushchev’s Thaw. Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (Souvenir Press, 1969) was hailed in the New York Times as “an unprecedented glimpse of Stalin through the eyes of his associates” (April 27, 1969).

Bialer’s next book, Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (1980), secured his position as a leading expert in Soviet studies. His achievement was recognized three years later when he was awarded the MacArthur Fellowship, the first ever granted to a political scientist and the only one awarded to a Sovietologist.

In his final book, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline (Knopf, 1986), Bialer laid bare the fundamental paradox of Soviet rule: that the long-term survival of the Soviet Union depended upon the processes of democratization and glasnost, which were required for economic modernization, but which also imperiled the entire authority basis of the Soviet system itself. Writing for the New York Times Book Review, Peter Reddaway singled out for particular praise the “masterly chapter” that details the rise and suppression of Poland’s Solidarity movement as a “critical turning-point in the history of the Soviet empire” (July 27, 1986).

But rather than repeat material easily found in the tributes to Seweryn Bialer written after his death and the obituary published in the New York Times on February 21, 2019, not to mention entries in Wikipedia and other online sources, we turn the reader’s attention to the two draft manuscripts that follow. They introduce the subject on which he was thinking consciously and unconsciously all his adult life, namely, a study of the Second World War in the East. In his curriculum vitae it has the working title “Russia at War: The Nazi-Soviet Conflict.”

And we close this introduction to Seweryn Bialer’s manuscripts with the knowledge that when illness denied the book’s completion, he asked to be read aloud in Russian a book he knew almost by heart: Konstantin Simonov’s novel Zhiviye i mertvye (The Living and the Dead), the moving chronicle of the first months on Russia’s Western border. He thus returned to the fate of the Red Army soldier with whom he had “suffered the defeats and rejoiced at the victories” in Poland 70 years earlier.

Joan Afferica is L. Clarke Seelye Professor Emeritus of History, Smith College, and the late professor’s wife.
Draft Preface and Introduction to “Russia at War: The Nazi-Soviet Conflict”

BY SEWERYN BIALER

PREFACE

I saw my last armed German soldier, and my first armed Red Army soldier, on May 9, 1945—the day that the war with Germany officially ended with the Nazi capitulation. I was perched behind a tree on a rocky hill about 100 feet above a road that crossed the German border and the Sudetenland and close to which, about less than a mile, the concentration camp Friedland was placed, where I had been incarcerated the last months of the war. Both I and a large group of the camp inmates were able to escape after the death of Hitler was announced in the first days of May. By that time most of the SS soldiers who regularly guarded the prisoners escaped to the West and were supplanted by mostly drunk Ukrainian SS or even Volkssturm. The barbed wires surrounding the camp were not electrified anymore and it was possible to escape the camp with limited risk at night in places where the lights were missing. On May 9, the last SS troops were moving south and by afternoon the Red Army storm troops arrived. I could see from the hill the red banner that was raised over my camp. I ran from the hill, still in my striped camp “uniform,” my head adorned with a “promenade of lice,” my feet in wooden clogs, and I do not know how I jumped onto the gun-carriage of a horse-drawn artillery piece where a young Russian soldier held the reins. To his visible astonishment I started to sing the Russian patriotic song “Yesli zavtra voina” (If There’s War Tomorrow), which as I will explain later was unintentionally very ironic.

The war started in earnest for me on September 7, 1939, when the German troops marched into Łódź (which they renamed Litzmannstadt), the second largest city in Poland, where I lived with my family. I was then 12 years old and was facing almost six years of Nazi rule, first in the Łódź Ghetto and then in Auschwitz and other concentration camps. I grew up fast, started to work in a factory that produced electrical motors, and in 1941 became a member of the Anti-Fascist Youth Movement, which was in fact a Communist organization, the only organization in our large factory that was engaged in thinking and activities that went beyond the effort “only” to survive.

After the disasters of 1939–41, when all of Europe was ruled or aligned with Hitler, the only hope that kept me and most of my family and friends spiritually alive and prevented our descent into “walking dead,” as far as such fate was dependent on nonphysical factors, was the expectation that the Soviet Union would break its ties with Germany and in a powerful attack defeat its armed forces and liberate us from the certain death that awaited us from the Nazis. For the entire Ghetto the German attack on the Soviet Union of June 22, 1941, came as a virtual festival of joyous expectations. The incredible German

Łódź Ghetto, February 9, 1942.
victorious march toward Moscow in 1941, and, even more so, the Red Army defeats in the summer of 1942, left most of my family and acquaintances with only remnants of the initial hope and with deep resignation to meet the fate that the Nazis were preparing for us.

Yet not many among the small circle of my comrades in the Communist organization abandoned hope and withdrew from any activity under the shock of what for us was the unexplainable, because of our beliefs, near collapse of the Soviet colossus. We mentally and emotionally fought with the Red Army every step of its struggle with the Germans, suffering its defeats and elated by its victories. It should therefore come as no surprise that I wanted to write a book about the Nazi-Soviet conflict for a very long time, probably all my adult life. I hope by doing so to explain for myself why our elation of June 22, 1941, was so bitterly disappointed, and why nevertheless the cruel but just end-verdict on the Nazi state and its German supporters was achieved primarily by the sacrifice and determination of the Red Army.

My early allegiance to the Communist faith [in the Łódź Ghetto] was primarily intellectual: it explained to a nonreligious boy why the world turns and provided satisfying, authoritative answers to the many questions that he faced. It permitted a Jew who was deeply frightened by the German overlords to feel superior in most basic ways over the same Germans. It provided a sense of a closed community and sure support in conditions of extreme suffering and danger. It built an emotional and rational basis for the feeling that almost never abandoned me, not of personal survival, but of the unavoidable defeat of the evil of Nazism. And finally it provided a virtualization of the force of the ideology by the presence of the Soviet Union, its powerful army, and its wise leader.

The confrontation in 1945 of the idea and the reality of the Red Army and the “New Soviet Man” was a harsh blow that could, however, be rationalized by the always rational ideology; by my very survival that was brought almost miraculously not a moment too soon; by the lack of even basic education and culture; by the lack of information from those who knew the “real” reality and were afraid to communicate it to a Communist; and by the monopoly of “heavy” readings confined by the Communist regime to the “Holy Script.”

After the war I received my education in social sciences, apart from the Party School, at Warsaw University and the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences. I was also educated in Soviet military science. Yet slowly my commitment was being undermined intellectually by confrontation with published untruths pronounced by the Party leaders, particularly in 1952. The single most important incident occurred, however, in July 1953, three months after the death of Stalin and three days after the arrest in Moscow of Beria, the chief of the Soviet secret police. [It was then that Aleksandr Zawadski, later President of Poland, recounted to me the truth about his wartime experience in the Soviet Union.]

By 1955, my last year in Poland, my career in the Party was on a sure path to a “favorable future.” I was First Secretary of the Party organization in the Higher Party School, a Lecturer for the Central Committee of the Party, and a Reader in Political Economy at the Par-
my wife *Stalin and His Generals* (Pegasus, 1969), the first collection in English of excerpts from Soviet war memoirs that was based on the stream of new memoirs appearing in the Soviet Union after the 20th Party Congress and Khrushchev’s “secret” speech.

April 2010

**INTRODUCTION**

At the beginning of the 20th century many historians predicted an era of mankind’s rapid and benevolent progress owing to the advance of education and science and the expansion and intensification of technological development. Mass education would “inevitably” carry with it an increased rationality of mankind’s behavior. The explosion of technological prowess would not only make the planet more habitable and peoples’ material aspirations easier to satisfy, but also it would make wars impossible between nations entering the industrial age because of their predictable destructiveness.

At the beginning of the present century there are very few historians who in retrospect fail to portray the 20th century as particularly vile, violent, and destructive in mankind’s history. In most cases the formative process leading to the tragedies of the past century is seen in the First World War, which undermined any preceding positive expectations for the future. Volker Berghahn and others are convincing in their position that the chasm between the decades that separated the two world wars is, to a large extent, artificial and grounded in the Eurocentric bias of historians. Nevertheless, the First World War, because of its unimaginable level of human losses and its material and spiritual destruction, marked a watershed in the experience of European countries, which controlled the bulk of global military and economic power.

It is easy, however, to forget that the stakes in this war were rather limited, despite the total character of mobilization and the terrible losses. The Allied victory did not endanger Germany’s existence as a major sovereign power, nor would a German victory have brought an end to France and Great Britain as great powers. In fact, as a result of the First World War, no power achieved a high level of hegemony over the European continent. Moreover, as a result of the collapse of the weak Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires (which would in all probability have dissolved even without the war), the distribution of nation-state power became rather more fragmented than it was before the war. The only power that really profited from the war, the United States, shortly after its end withdrew from the Continent, consistent with its cultural and political traditions and preferences.

From the point of view of the outcome at stake, the Second World War...
was from its beginning very different. Nazi Germany’s victory over Great Britain, as was the case with Poland and France, would have led to the dissolution of a sovereign nation-state and an end to a way of life. Moreover, with Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, there emerged for a short period of time a true potential for a nontraditional, vicious dictatorial system to establish its rule over the entire European continent. The Nazi victory in war with the Soviet Union or a rapid and complete Soviet victory over Germany, would almost certainly have created a situation in which such rule would have been established.

The Nazi-Soviet war was not simply another phase of the war Hitler started in September 1939 with the attack on Poland and finished with the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece 20 months later. In this early war the entire European continent was either conquered or allied to Germany or neutral. As Sir Michael Howard suggests, the attack on Russia on June 22, 1941, started a new, separate war, with different aims and different rules—a vicious slaughterhouse with no analog in modern history. “Germany,” he proposes, “had to win the interrupted First World War before it was able to embark so disastrously on the Second.” Howard is seconded by Niall Ferguson, who wonders whether in fact there was “really such a thing as the Second World War.” The crucial segment of this war, as David Reynolds suggests, was exactly the period on which I intend to concentrate my analysis. “International events in 1940 and 1941 undoubtedly shook the foundations of contemporary thinking,” writes Reynolds. “In many ways this period was the ‘fulcrum’ of the 20th century, the turning point in the endgame of the old Europe-centered order.” Stressing the eventual American domination of the 20th century, one has still to remember that the crucial dynamic for this era was provided by the unavoidable clash of the two totalitarian empires—those of Hitler and Stalin. These two regimes could enter into contractual relations while trying to out-guess their opponent. They could, as they did, clash in a total war, but they could not ignore each other. Their preoccupation with one another was so close because they had much more in common than with any other regime to which they were allied or opposed. For Stalin, the real opponent of Communist movements in capitalist countries was not the fascist but the Social Democrat who competed for loyalty of the working classes. For Hitler, on his way to power, the real opponent was not the Communist who necessarily served as the specter that frightened the establishment into appointing him chancellor of Germany. Rather it was the Center parties that could provide an alternative, as well as the social extremists and adventurers in his own ranks which could intimidate the establishment. When Hitler and Stalin faced each other, they knew that for the first time they were facing their ultimate challenge, their mirror image, an image that they both admired and hated with a passion unequalled in any of their other encounters.

Yet one can abstract from ideological counter-positions or constraints and look at the period 1938 to 1941 from the point of view of the logic of great power ambitions and fears. It seems that the results would not have been different; the German and Soviet regimes would clash regardless. While Nazi and Communist ideology contributed to the virulence of their clash, it was not the decisive ingredient as their cooperation in 1939–1940 has shown. (One could risk the proposition that “ideology” played a greater role in the actions of the allegedly most “pragmatic” country—the United States.)
Germany and Russia shared their greatest fear: a common front of other countries against either of them. Their second greatest fear was also similar: for the Soviet Union—a German attack on the Soviet Union following the German defeat of Great Britain and its full control of Europe; for Germany—a Soviet attack while Germany was fighting an England receiving increasing lend-lease help from the United States.

At some point Germany had to attack the Soviet Union. It dared not risk having a powerful and growing presence in its rear while it was engaging more intensely in the struggle with Britain. (This is true in addition to the other authentic rationale for the war—the search for “Lebensraum,” which would end Germany’s chronic shortages of resources for the war.) At some point the Soviet Union had to attack Germany. It dared not see England defeated and Germany establishing and exploiting complete domination over Europe. (The Soviets were concerned not only with the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East, but also with the increasing odds of a Japanese attack.)

For Germany the crucial point would arrive when England refused to capitulate or to sign an agreement with Hitler and when Soviet military power had grown to become potentially dangerous. For the Soviet Union the crucial point would arrive when Germany made an all-out effort to defeat England or was able to reach a peaceful solution to their conflict. The middle of the year 1941 was the most obvious critical period for both countries to reach a decision. While the Soviets could still wait for a while, the realities of climate in a war against Russia made a German decision more urgent.

As it happened, Germany suffered a total loss in the war, and the Soviet Union’s victory was far from rapid and was achieved with the decisive participation of the United States, which, moreover, contrary to tradition, did not withdraw from the European continent at the war’s end. Moreover, taking into consideration the extraordinary expenditure of blood and material resources required to gain the military victory, the actual Soviet gain, both territorially and materially, was far from what the Soviets had hoped when the Second World War started with their substantial help. In this sense, both dictatorial regimes lost in their clash with one another. The Nazi defeat was immediate, complete, and evident. The Soviet victory in the short run made it a superpower, but it also undermined the foundation of its economic ambition to become modern in fields other than military.

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Biographical Note
Eduard Gorokhovsky was born in 1929 in the city of Vinnytsia in southwestern Ukraine. In 1954 he graduated with distinction from the Odessa Institute of Civil Engineering (now Odessa State Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture), majoring in architecture and studying under A. Postel, T. Frayerman, G. Gotgelf, and A. Kopylov; his postgraduate work assignment took him to Novosibirsk, where he had his first solo exhibition in 1967. Gorokhovsky moved to Moscow in 1974, where he lived until moving to Offenbach, Germany, in 1991.


Gorokhovsky’s paintings and works on paper are in major museums around the world, including the State Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow; the State Russian Museum, St. Petersburg; the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts, Moscow; Moscow Museum of Contemporary Art, Moscow; the Norton and Nancy Dodge Collection of Nonconformist Art from the Soviet Union in the Jane Voorhees Zimmerli Art Museum, New Brunswick; Kolodzei Art Foundation, New Jersey; State Museum of Arts, Dresden, Germany; Jewish Museum, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; the Ludwig Forum of International Art, Aachen, Germany; the Costakis Collection, Athens, Greece; and Albertina Museum, Vienna, Austria.
Eduard Gorokhovsky developed his signature style in the early 1970s. He was one of the first Soviet nonconformist artists to use old photographic portraits, into which he juxtaposed and inserted a text, a silhouette, another photograph, or geometric figure, thus creating works in which serial images explore personal and cultural memory, public and private space, inspiring multiplicities of interpretation. The photographs provide a framework that keeps the artwork in balance, while the intruding objects add a certain intrigue or mystery to the whole. Many of Gorokhovsky’s works convey a sense of history or the process of change, often alluding to the disappearance of individuality in a totalitarian society; the destruction of the family unit brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution; a succession of devastating wars; and the forced relocations dictated by Stalinist collectivization.

Gorokhovsky was interested in art from an early age, attending evening classes at the Odessa Art School. His parents, however, encouraged him to pursue a career as an architect. But after completing two years of a postgraduate assignment in architecture, Gorokhovsky resolved to pursue a career as an artist and remained in Novosibirsk for 20 years, where he became friends with the artist Nikolai Gritsyuk (1922–1976). As Gorokhovsky recalled:

Back in the 1950s I was living and working in Novosibirsk after graduation. There, in Siberia, I met people who introduced me to the sort of art that was not even mentioned in the institute, with its strict ideological control. I owe my discovery of Impressionism, Expressionism, Cubism, the Russian Avant-Garde, above all, to the remarkable artist Nikolai Gritsyuk. I consider him my first real teacher; he opened my eyes to many things in art. . . . The 20 years I lived in Siberia were good preparation for a real understanding of the essence and purpose of art.
Beginning in 1957, Gorokhovsky earned his living as a book illustrator, which he continued after his move to Moscow. By 1990 Gorokhovsky had illustrated more than 120 books; many of his book illustrations received numerous accolades and awards and were showcased in national and international exhibitions. A number of Muscovite nonconformist artists—including Ilya Kabakov, Erik Bulatov, Oleg Vassiliev, and Victor Pivovarov—illustrated books, which allowed them to experiment with formal issues and work in their own art.

Gorokhovsky joined the Union of Artists in 1968. In the early 1970s, he met Victor Pivovarov, Erik Bulatov, Oleg Vassiliev, Vladimir Yankilevsky, and Ilya Kabakov. In 1974, Gorokhovsky moved to Moscow and later was able to acquire a cooperative apartment in the Union of Artists’ building near Rechnoi Vokzal where a number of artists and creative search, fostering the conversation on contemporary and nonconformist art from the Soviet Union and the place of printmaking and art on paper. Some of the works from the Harriman show (including Novosibirsk, Meat [1965], The Stone Pillars of Krasnoyarsk [1971]) were exhibited for the first time in the United States. In the Worker (1968), the black eye, somber colors, shades of black, blue and gray, sharp outlines, cigarette, and cap—all contribute to the exhausted and worrisome look of the sitter in opposition to the glorifying image of the Soviet worker in socialist realist style. The Athlete (1976), on other hand, evokes the work of Russian avant-garde photographers El Lissitzky and Aleksandr Rodchenko. Gorokhovsky places positive and negative images of the athlete in the minimalist interior of a black square with the outlined white door. The visual interplay between image and geometrical forms was of particular importance in Gorokhovsky’s early works, as well as in his interest in the continuity of the ideas of the Russian avant-garde.
his friends, including Ivan Chuikov, Victor Pivovarov, and Ilya Kabakov, also resided. Even though nonconformist artists did not share a single aesthetic or unifying theme, they were in constant conversation about art. This sense of the multifaceted spirit of the artistic community is also alluded to in Group A Group B (1982), juxtaposing the nostalgic iconography of studio photography from random family archives in Group A with Group B featuring a number of nonconformist artists in Kabakov’s studio: Eduard Gorokhovsky, Francisco Infante, Erik Bulatov, Oleg Vassiliev, Victor Pivovarov, Eduard Shteinberg, Ivan Chuikov, Boris Zhutovsky, Vladimir Yankilevsky, and Ilya Kabakov (See inside back cover). Throughout his artistic career Gorokhovsky often used photographs of his close friends, colleagues, and their social interactions—for example, gatherings of friends and family or birthday celebrations. For Gorokhovsky, old archival photographs provide the opportunity to “relive” the lives of three generations of an officer’s family and offer for future generations a glimpse into the life of the nonconformist art circles.

In 1974–75, during Norton Dodge’s trips to Moscow, my mother, Tatiana Kolodzei, was able to introduce the famous collector of Soviet art to a number of nonconformist Muscovite artists, including Gorokhovsky. The series of traveling exhibitions organized by Dodge in the United States, and the 1977 publication of New Art from the Soviet Union: The Known and the Unknown by Alison Hilton and Norton Dodge, inspired many of the nonconformists to continue their own search for new forms of expression. At the time there were very limited opportunities for nonconformist artists to showcase or publish their work.

Two more publications on Gorokhovsky appeared in the magazine A–YA (Unofficial Russian art review [Paris, New York, Moscow]), published by Igor Shelkovsky in Paris: one by

Some of the works from the Harriman show were exhibited for the first time in the United States.
Galina Manevich in issue 2 (1980) and the other by Ilya Kabakov: “Eduard Gorokhovsky: Reproduction of Reproduction” in issue 6 (1984). The Soviet authorities had known about the existence of nonconformist art before the publications, but they did not act. After the publications, the Soviet government immediately reacted with the only method they knew—namely, repression. Many of the nonconformist artists were members of the Union of Artists of the USSR, so the KGB repeatedly called them in for questioning and they were told to publicly renounce and condemn A-YA. As none of the artists betrayed the magazine, many of them lost their jobs as book illustrators. With the advent of perestroika, however, some of the nonconformist artists began to travel freely and exhibit internationally.

In the mid-1980s, Gorokhovsky began to rethink Russian history, and political subjects began to appear in some of his prints and paintings, including images of Lenin and Stalin, alongside anonymous characters. Like many artists in his circle, Gorokhovsky felt impelled to express his relation to authority. In an untitled composi-
tion from 1984. Gorokhovsky combines an excerpt from a current Soviet newspaper that features articles on “two-faced policy” and the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan with an absolutely unrelated photograph from the archives of a woman in a frivolous pose. In many of Gorokhovsky’s works, like fragments of a puzzle, the images are not placed next to one another as equals; instead, they overlap in layers, canceling one another out. This layering of images creates for the viewer a sensation of chaos, as the angle changes and photographic images become clear, giving rise to complicated and complex associations. Gorokhovsky’s political works include Enemies of the People (1986–88) and Russian Officers (1988). Gorokhovsky dethrones Lenin by creating a portrait of Stalin from 2,488 small stamped miniatures of Lenin’s head in 2,488 Portraits of Lenin (1988). The photograph of Tatiana Kolodzei and Eduard Gorokhovsky, taken during the installation of Gorokhovsky’s solo exhibition at the Central House of Artists in 1994, shows the pair standing in front of Gorokhovsky’s portrait of Brezhnev, constructed from miniature Stalin heads. In 2006, Gorokhovsky’s Festive Mosaic (1988) (Stalin and Brezhnev portraits) was sold at Sotheby’s Russian Sale in London for $331,514—his auction record.

Gorokhovsky used a combination of media in his artistic quest. The photographic image is transformed by the artist through the prism of drawing, photo-collage, etching, lithograph, and screen-print to a combination of all of the above to address conceptual, optical, or narrative tasks for each individual work or series. In his early works, the figures and faces are sometimes outlined; others are shaded, dotted, scribbled, crosshatched; and yet others emphasize certain details in random 19th-century family studio portraits. Gorokhovsky’s juxtapositions, intruding and clashing, transform photo images and abstract geometrical forms: square, oval, circle. In his serial images, Gorokhovsky favored screen-print media for photographic manipulations. Photo screen-printing techniques offer an artist the opportunity to repeatedly reproduce the images; most of Gorokhovsky’s prints, however, were created in very small or unique editions. In a single series, Gorokhovsky can appropriate the elegant and nostalgic old photograph of a lady (Oval, 1982) and—by optical games, intrusion, and alterations (negative, positive, fading, compression, duplication)—transform it into a pencil drawing, or a tire, or an airplane, or any other form or object. The photograph has the status of a historical document, regardless of its esthetic virtues, and relies on the thematic interpretation of its content, whereas the geometrical forms or objects are open to a pure visual game of the imagination. Gorokhovsky constructs his works on the intensity of coexistence of opposite extremes, and his work remains open to a multiplicity of interpretations. Gorokhovsky does not impose his own reading on his works; instead, he plays on the ambivalence of meaning filled with ideological and cultural layers, encouraging discussion.

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**FEATURED**

Eduard Gorokhovsky and Tatiana Kolodzei, Moscow, 1994.

Natalia Kolodzei is the executive director of the Kolodzei Art Foundation and an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Arts. Along with Tatiana Kolodzei, she owns the Kolodzei Collection of Russian and Eastern European Art, which contains over 7,000 pieces, including paintings, drawings, sculptures, photographs, digital art, and videos by over 300 artists from the 20th and 21st centuries. Active as a curator and art historian, Kolodzei has curated over 80 shows in the United States, Europe, and Russia at such institutions as the State Tretyakov Gallery (Moscow), State Russian Museum (St. Petersburg), and the Chelsea Art Museum (New York City). In addition, she has contributed to several books and catalogues, including works on Olga Bulgakova, Oleg Vassiliev, Alexander Sitnikov, and Russian women artists from the Kolodzei Art Foundation. The Kolodzei Art Foundation, Inc., a US-based 501(c)(3) not-for-profit public foundation started in 1991, in museums and cultural centers in the United States, Russia, and other countries, often utilizing the considerable resources of the Kolodzei Collection of Russian and Eastern European Art, and publishes books on Russian art. For additional information, visit http://www.KolodzeiArt.org.
Alumni & Postdoc Notes

I am a practicing attorney in San Francisco, where I represent public entities in civil litigation. Prior to my career in law, I was a federal civil servant in the Pentagon, where I worked on implementation of the New START Treaty, the NATO-Russia Council, strategic stability, and furthering arms control. In 2013, I was seconded to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad for a special assignment to work on girls’ education development.

Outside of work, I have participated in several enriching fellowships for young leaders from the German Marshall Fund, the Aspen Security Forum, Slovakia’s Global Security Conference (GLOBSEC), and the Eurasia Foundation. Prior to SIPA, I served as a Russian linguist in the U.S. Air Force. In the past few years, I have advocated for refugees and asylees through the program Veterans for American Ideals with Human Rights First. The knowledge I gained about electoral systems and the process of democratization in Eurasia at SIPA is now applicable to the U.S. as the country struggles with numerous aspects of our representative government. The backslide from liberal democracy around the world is of great concern to me. I plan to use my regional, foreign policy, and legal skills in service to the U.S. again in the future. I greatly look forward to the recalibration of relations between Washington and Moscow under a future U.S. president.

—Kelsey L. Campbell (M.I.A., SIPA, 2011)

I am a publishing professional and alumni club leader who specialized in Russian studies and national security policy at SIPA. As a senior acquisitions editor, I acquired, signed, and published several prescient books about Russia, including *Dismantling the West: Russia’s Atlantic Agenda* (Potomac Books, 2009), by Janusz Bugajski; *The Consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia: An Inside View of the Demise of Democracy* (Praeger Security International, 2007), by Joel Ostrow et al., with a foreword by Garry Kasparov; and *The Next Great Clash: China and Russia vs. the United States* (Praeger Security International, 2007), by Michael Levin, 12 years before the release of journalist Jim Sciutto’s *The Shadow War: Inside Russia’s and China’s Secret Operations to Defeat America* (Harper, 2019).

Prior to becoming an acquisitions editor, I edited and wrote profiles for *Current Biography*, a reference periodical. One memorable article centered on the authoritarian tendencies in Russia shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as seen through the lens of the career of nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who has since been called the “Russian Trump.”

For the past six years, I have been privileged to serve as Treasurer of the Columbia University Club of Chicago, for which I also help to plan events, recruit author and alumni speakers, and manage social media marketing.

An avid runner since 2007, I’ve completed 15 marathons and more than 40 half-marathons in 26 states, among a total of nearly 200 races from 5K to 50K. My proudest running moment came in 2013, when I qualified for the Boston Marathon. In 2018 I was certified as an RRCA Running Coach.

—Hilary Claggett (M.I.A., SIPA, 1986)
In March of 1989 I visited East Berlin for the first and last time. I was a junior studying abroad, and my sister was a college graduate enjoying the Bohemian lifestyle of Cold War Berlin. The Wall came down the fall of my senior year, and after a brief “semester” working full-time while studying Hungarian at my parents’ kitchen table, I was on a one-way ticket to celebrate the ’91 New Year in Budapest, where I found an apartment on Bartók Béla út and a job teaching English. I returned to the heart of Europe as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Poland (1992–94), and then went on to Madagascar, a recent U.S. ally due to the fall of the Soviet Union, (1994–96). I began graduate school at Columbia in 1997 and received the Certificate in the Harriman Institute on East Central Europe in 2005.

I am now a professor of history at Bronx Community College CUNY, where I have recently completed my second book, *The Fly Room*. In July and August 2019, I will be giving a series of lectures and leading seminars on Russian geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky at Fiocruz in Rio de Janeiro, as well as giving a talk on Lysenkoism at the University of São Paulo, as a Fulbright Specialist on the evolutionary synthesis of genetics and natural selection.

—William deJong-Lambert (Ph.D., Teacher’s College; Harriman Certificate, 2005)

I am an associate professor of history and international affairs at the George Washington University, where I teach courses on the Soviet Union, the Cold War, Germany, and the uses and misuses of history in international affairs. I entered Columbia in 1986 and felt incredibly lucky to be there for the next three years and to be at the Harriman Institute during the exciting Gorbachev years. For my dissertation and then first book, I spent much of the 1990s shuttling back and forth between Moscow and Berlin doing research on what led to the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Again, I was lucky to be using archives in Moscow during the “golden era” of the early ’90s. In 2003, Princeton University Press published my book (*Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961*), which won the Marshall Shulman Book Prize in 2004. In the midst of writing the book, I had the exciting opportunity to serve as a director for European and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council (2000–2001); and afterward, I served as the director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs (2005–2009).

I am very happy that in time for the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall this autumn, Cambridge University Press will publish my second book, *After the Berlin Wall: Memory and the Making of the New Germany, 1989 to the Present*. The history, meaning, and legacy of the Wall remain controversial even after 30 years. My book examines key individuals who have played a role in keeping the memory of the Berlin Wall (and its victims) alive in Germany and analyzes the narratives about the history of the Wall that political leaders have adopted since 1989. It also discusses global memory of the Wall and the impact of this memory on German commemorations of the Wall.

—Hope M. Harrison (Harriman Certificate and M.Phil., Political Science, 1991; Ph.D., Political Science, 1993)
My new novel, *The Condor’s Shadow*, is being considered by two major publishers, Penguin Random House and St. Martin's Press. The novel I published in 2015, *Problems of Translation*, was described by Gary Shteyngart as “an insanely amusing adventure that has a deep love of language at its belly-shaking core.”

*Condor* strikes a different tone: Thirty-four-year-old Clayton Poole has wandered from state to state, changing identities for nearly two decades. Finally, about to start life as a small-town Montana journalist, he is confronted by his darkly checkered past: the love of his life he'd felt forced to surrender and the violent act that first expelled him onto the road and changed his life forever. A work of literary fiction set in California, Montana, and the Pacific Northwest, it is told in a layered fashion, moving back and forth through time, yet following Clayton from the early 1950s to the present as he struggles to escape, then rectify, and finally reconcile the forces that have shadowed his life.

—**Jim Story** (Ph.D., GSAS; RI Certificate, 1971)

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