When the finance committee of the Jewish Agency for Israel’s board of governors sat down to meet in June 2007, it planned to focus on dealing with a weak U.S. dollar. But then–Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had other plans. In a speech outlining a new mission for the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), and possibly for the State of Israel as well, Olmert admitted that his country’s founding ideology was no longer practically tenable:
The overwhelming majority of Jews worldwide live in physical and economic safety and security,” he declared. “Although... [immigration to Israel] is the biggest and most meaningful way a Jew can contribute to Israeli society, we have to recognize that the era of mass [immigration]...may have come to a close. With new realities, comes the need for a new paradigm.
Olmert’s blunt statement caused a great stir in the worldwide Jewish community. Effectively, Olmert acknowledged a reality that the Israeli government has ignored for some time—the vast majority of Diaspora Jews live in the comforts of America, and they have little or no or desire to emigrate to Israel.
Olmert proceeded to outline a new practical agenda for JAFI. JAFI would now work to promote Jewish and Hebrew education, Jewish culture, Zionism, and Jewish identity in the Diaspora. All of these practical suggestions lack the central element that has characterized Israeli policy toward Diaspora Jewry in the past—a focus on Jewish immigration. According to Olmert’s plan, JAFI, an organization explicitly established to encourage immigration prior to Israel’s creation, would now be stripped of its raison d’être.
Olmert’s rhetoric quickly became governmental policy. In September 2007, JAFI announced it would cede its responsibility for facilitating Jewish immigration in North America to Nefesh B’Nefesh (“Soul by Soul”), a private company created to streamline immigration to Israel from North America. JAFI’s ideological evolution is shocking and indicates an important turning point in the organization’s history. It may also suggest something even more profound: a disintegration of Israeli national identity. Recent indicators suggest that JAFI’s proposed change in mission may represent the sentiments of a majority of the Israeli people. If so, this dramatic shift reveals a gaping hole in a nationalist self–conception that, for the past 60 years, has viewed Israel as an inherently superior place to live one’s life as a Jew.
***
The notion of “negation of the Diaspora” is an element crucial to Zionist thought, dating back to the early foundations of the movement. Most often, Zionists argued that because of endemic anti–Semitism in the Diaspora, Jews could only rehabilitate themselves in their own national home. Zionists generally believed that a Jewish nation–state could give Jews a refuge from anti–Semitism and, through a physical connection to the land, rehabilitate the Jewish “condition.” Theodore Herzl said just as much when he remarked, “Anti–Semitism increases day by day and hour by hour among the nations; indeed, it is bound to increase, because the causes of its growth continue to exist and are ineradicable.”
While most Zionists believed their own state would lead to physical rehabilitation, thinkers like Ahad Ha’am saw a Jewish state as the antidote to a broken soul. He writes that “isolated groups of Jews... can be nothing more than a sort of formless raw material,” until a national home, serving as a “single permanent center” could reunite the “scattered atoms” of world Jewry into a “single entity” once more. For Ha’am, the Jews’ lack of a state was not only physically dangerous, but also spiritually debilitating. Building a Jewish national home could help Jews forge a stronger Jewish identity both in the Land of Israel and abroad.
Religious Zionism also played a role in the state’s creation. Founded by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, the religious Zionist movement believes that the Land of Israel is especially holy and that it is a religious duty to live there. Members of the movement agreed with Herzl and Ahad Ha’am on the idea that Diaspora Jews lived diminished lives, but their position was born from a conviction that Jews could only fulfill their religious commandments fully in the Land of Israel.
These three positions uneasily merged in the establishment of the State of Israel. Israelis—both secular and religious—viewed their state as rehabilitating the physical and spiritual decay of the Jewish people.
Since Israel’s creation, JAFI has striven to put this ideology into practice, working to promote worldwide Jewish immigration to Israel. The history of JAFI dates back to the early twentieth century, when the British Balfour Declaration, among other things, granted the Jewish community in Palestine its own governing body. JAFI was the Jewish community’s proto–government until 1948, when the Israeli government replaced JAFI as the official representative of the Israeli people. JAFI remained a powerful force, but it quickly shifted roles. In 1950, the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, defined JAFI’s role in the state apparatus, combining it with the World Zionist Organization (WZO). JAFI–WZO’s role was clear: to facilitate and absorb the “ingathering of the exile,” religiously couched language that meant immigration to Israel.
JAFI largely accomplished this goal, helping resettle hundreds of thousands of European Holocaust refugees and thousands more from the Arab world. JAFI continued these operations through the 1990s, first from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, then from Ethiopia in the 1980s and 90s, and then again from the former Soviet Union upon its collapse. Since 1948, JAFI has brought 3 million Jews to the State of Israel.
By the 1970s, though, JAFI’s core purpose of facilitating immigration began to evolve. The 1970 Agreement for the Reconstitution of the Jewish Agency for Israel slowly began to refocus JAFI’s mission on education and rather than immigration. The agreement decoupled JAFI from the WZO, thereby decreasing the influence of the combined institutions. Moreover, while the accord affirmed JAFI’s right to promote immigration in the Diaspora, it also stripped the organization of its responsibility to resettle immigrants in Israel.
This change, among others, led Daniel Elazar, a scholar of Jewish communal organizations in Israel and the United States, to articulate a slow evolution in JAFI’s mission. He noted that “the Agency has begun to take on greater responsibility for Jewish education in the Diaspora...[which is] symptomatic of what some Diaspora leaders have suggested as a basic shift in the Agency’s mission, from rebuilding the Jewish National Home in [the Land of Israel] to forging stronger links between Israel and the Diaspora.” Elazar recognized almost 40 years ago, when JAFI was still bringing in massive numbers of immigrants, that the organization’s original mission could not last forever. Though JAFI officials almost never acknowledged the organization’s gradual evolution, the trend towards improving Diaspora relations was inevitable.
It would be overly simplistic, then, to claim that Olmert’s policy speech spurred an overnight shift in JAFI’s mission. The process was gradual, and though Olmert’s words may have seemed shocking to the Jewish community at large, they merely reflected a development that began decades ago.
JAFI’s shift would be more remarkable if it corresponded to a similar shift in Israelis’ attitudes toward Diaspora Jewry. The evidence on the topic is mixed. One need look no further than Israeli author A.B. Yehoshua’s speech to the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in 2006 to see Herzl’s classical Zionism alive and well. Yehoshua, one of Israel’s most prominent authors, told the AJC that “If...in 100 years Israel will exist, and I will come to the Diaspora [and] there will not be...[any] Jews, I would say it’s normal. I will not cry for it. Why? Because it’s very natural that every one of you will be American and extend his [sic] identĩcation with the country in which he’s [sic] living.”
Despite Yehoshua’s statements, the majority of Israelis seem to agree with Olmert on the need for a new paradigm. In a poll conducted shortly after Yehoshua’s controversial comments, 59 percent of Israelis said they disagreed with him. Equally striking, nearly 50 percent of Israelis said they agreed with the proposed shift in JAFI’s mission, while less than 40 percent opposed it. That a near–majority agrees with such a policy shift—without a public debate and in the face of decades–long support for the status quo ideology—strongly suggests that JAFI’s proposed changes reflect a position held by an increasing number of Israelis.
Israeli intellectuals are speaking out on the issue as well. Alex Sinclair, a fellow at Reut, an Israeli think tank, recently argued that the “symbolic moment of demographic parity between Israel and the Diaspora (which occurred in 2006) should be a call for an ideological reevaluation of Zionism.” Sinclair questioned whether the Jewish wants to “[put] all of its Jewish eggs in one geographic basket,” and “dismantle Diaspora Jewry,” echoing logic often invoked by Israel’s friends and foes alike. From the street to the academic world, opposition to JAFI’s realignment has been surprisingly tempered.
Yet JAFI’s proposed realignment leaves Israelis with a deep ideological deficit. In Irreconcilable Differences: The Waning of the American Love Affair with Israel, Steven Rosenthal notes the fundamental implications of Israel’s reconsideration of Diaspora Jewry. He explains that while many Israelis are beginning to rethink their position on Diaspora Jewry, they often fail to recognize the major ideological shift this entails. Israel’s government, which has “always looked forward to the total ingathering of Jews,” he writes, is now “propping up a Jewish existence it has long considered inauthentic and even shameful.” Rosenthal declares this shift “nothing less than an ideological revolution” for Zionism.
The Israeli public’s support for this new policy is a subtle admission that it is facing an identity crisis: If Israelis no longer believe in Herzl’s and Ahad Ha’am’s visions, there may no longer be a shared ideology to bind the nation together.
It is unclear if a new set of beliefs will replace Israel’s warming attitude toward the Diaspora, or if the country will drift into a post–ideological framework. Different strains of post–Zionism, a broad group of ideological currents circulating among Israeli elites in recent years, would posit that JAFI’s paradigm shift is just a confirmation that Israelis no longer need ideology at all. Rosenthal notes that “post–Zionism represents the desire for normalcy—for a middle–class life untroubled by the vicissitudes of economic crises and by the constant demands of military necessity.” Post–Zionists contend that the state need not provide its citizens with a meaningful ideology—people must provide that in their own lives. This trend is still a relatively small one, but it does offer one indication of the Israeli public’s thinking on this issue.
Perhaps, though, we are witnessing the birth of a new ideology among Israelis, one in which Zionism is not abandoned but simply amended. Under this scenario, Israelis will continue to see their country as vitally important, but only in the sense that it plays a major role in supporting the Jewish people around the world. For Israelis, the Jewish people will replace the State in the hierarchy of importance, though Israel will remain one significant element in maintaining the strength of the world Jewish community.
 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert speaks at a press conference for the Jewish Agency. Olmert was the first Israeli leader to declare openly that Israel would no longer attempt to dismantle the Diaspora, and would instead attempt to foster connections between Israel and the Diaspora world. PI Phoro/Jack Guez/Pool |
JAFI’s realignment toward Jewish education makes a great deal of sense in this context. The State of Israel will promote Jewish values, culture, and modern Hebrew to world Jewry in order to strengthen Jewish identity. Sinclair discusses the practical implications of this reorientation for Israelis, suggesting that they must learn how to participate in Jewish life overseas. He suggests that as “Israelis seek... intellectual, political, technological, or business global leadership,” they will spend more time overseas and in need of a Jewish community. “A top priority for Zionism,” he states, “should be that the Israeli education system equips Jewish Israelis, particularly non–orthodox, with the tools to be part of Jewish communities overseas.”
Sinclair’s suggestion is a good practical starting point. Israeli educators should give their students the skills necessary to participate in Jewish activities wherever they may be around the world. However, what Sinclar and JAFI imply is that Israelis need these skills in order to “save the souls” of Diaspora Jewry.
For Israelis to develop a new ideology committed to Jewish peoplehood, they must acknowledge that they not only have much to teach, but they also have much to learn. American Jewry has much to offer Israelis about the importance of pluralism and tolerance in Jewish life. Liberal streams of Jewish religious observance barely exist in Israel, forcing Israelis to choose Orthodoxy, their own blend of traditionalism, Secularism, or nothing at all. Israelis can also learn from recent American Jewish attempts to increase Jewish identity, which—ironically—is in a sorry state in Israel as well. Jewish peoplehood requires a partnership between Israel, American Jewry, and Diaspora communities worldwide. Israel will develop a convincing new vision only when it can agree to full partnership.
But if Israelis do embrace this new ideology of Jewish peoplehood, will American Jews meet them halfway? After all, Israel can only support a partnership if there is a partner to be had. In this respect, the situation is more troubling. During a time when Israel may be inching toward American Jewry, American Jews seem to be pulling away. A book by Arnold Eisen and Steven Cohen hints at this trend in the title itself, The Jew Within. According to Eisen and Cohen, the majority of Jews find Jewish meaning in the private sphere—through friends and family, holidays, and, to some extent, ritual.
Indeed, contemporary American Jews, unlike those of previous generations, are less attached to Jewish institutions (including Jewish Federations), Israel, and the larger Jewish People. For example, the 2000 National Jewish Population Survey found that Jews ages 65 to 74 are three times more likely than Jews ages 35 to 49 to give to a Jewish federation. In a related finding, Cohen claims that the fall in American Jewish attachment to Israel is connected to high intermarriage rates. When people intermarry, their overall level of Jewish identification declines, taking affinity toward Israel with it. This weakening that Cohen references is most prevalent among young people.
Yet there is mounting evidence that disputes this interpretation, and suggests that American Jewish attachment to Israel and the Jewish People is strengthening. A major support for this argument is birthright israel, a free trip to Israel for American Jewish young adults. At current enrollment, one third of American Jews born since 1995 will go on birthright by the age of 27. Among the several hundred thousand young adults who have gone already, many express positive feelings toward Israel. Brandeis University’s Steinhardt Institute reported in its 2007 birthright survey that 62 percent of birthright israel participants said they were “very much connected” to Israel three months after the trip, compared to 21 percent of non–participants. Evidence has also shown that these positive attitudes endure several years later. A 2004 study found that even two years later, birthright israel participants are 20 percent more likely to report feelings of a connection to Israel.
In a recent report entitled “American Jewish Attachment to Israel: A Response to the Distancing Hypothesis,” Theodore Sasson, Charles Kedushin, and Leonard Saxe also suggest that apparent evidence supporting the “distancing” hypothesis is only a reflection of where young people are in their lives. While young people may feel somewhat distant from Israel now, the authors believe that when younger American Jews get married and have children, they will begin to feel closer to Israel and express levels of attachment closer to those feelings of their parents and grandparents.
While many American Jewish leaders have been engaged in displays of self–flagellation because of rising intermarriages rates and growing assimilation, they have completely missed a major potential reorientation of Israeli attitudes toward the Diaspora. An Israeli embrace of Jewish peoplehood could give American Jews a completely new method to connect with their Judaism. Not only could American Jews have the opportunity to learn from Israelis, American Jews could even play a new role by teaching Israelis about American Judaism. Israeli leaders have been pushing their public to accept this reorientation; American Jewish leaders need to do a better job with their own constituency.
A book published last September entitled Jewish Peoplehood: Change and Challenge is a good first step. The book outlines how different Jewish thinkers—mostly American—define and understand peoplehood. Now those American Jewish thinkers must translate rhetoric into policy. Just as Olmert used the prime ministry to help move Israel toward a greater acceptance of the Diaspora, American Jewish leaders must make a similarly concerted effort to convince American Jews that peoplehood serves as a compelling basis for Jewish identity in the 21st century. The stakes in this matter are high. For the first time since the Zionist revolution, American Jews have the chance to engage with Israel on a more equal playing field, without Israeli statements of superiority and condescension. American and Israeli Jews finally have a chance to come together in supporting a greater common goal: a vibrant and successful Jewish people. Israeli Jewry has sent American Jewry a message—it’s time we listen.
Above: A North American Jewish family disembarks from a special El Al flight bringing 235 new immigrants to the Jewish state August 13, 2008 at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport, sponsored by Nefesh B’Nefesh. The organization has largely replaced the Jewish Agency as the chief facilitator of immigration to Israel, but its success remains limited. © Getty Images
AVI HERRING, List ’10, is Managing Editor of The Current. He can be reached at sayk2107@columbia.edu.