I. INTRODUCTION

On December 5, 1997 most daily newspapers in Slovakia reported on a statement made by the deputy of the European Parliament (EP), A. Oostlander. Among other things, Mr. Oostlander made the following comment regarding Slovakia's dismal accession status to the European Union (EU): "You either have to change your opinion, or change the government."⁽¹⁾The Office of the Slovak Premier responded promptly. According to Vladimir Meciar the statement constituted an unprecedented interference in the internal affairs of Slovakia, and the behavior of Mr. Oostlander is unprofessional, irresponsible and unfit of a member of the EP. Moreover, the call for the dismissal of a democratically elected government of a sovereign state is against all accepted international norms, and the entire affair is another example of bias and double standard applied against Slovakia. In addition, the Vice Premier, M. A. Huska was quick to point out that Slovakia is treated as a second class state for it refused to become the vassal of rich and powerful Western countries whose only desire is to deplete Slovakia's natural resources and wealth. A promise of vigilance and continuous protection of Slovak national interest concluded Mr. Huska's emotional statement.⁽²⁾

Since politicians as well as scholars frequently complain about ambiguities, inconsistencies and double standards in EU policies toward new applicants,⁽³⁾ the exchange of opinions summarized above should raise several questions. First, are the methods used by the EU to evaluate the accession status of new applicants problematic? If so, how can the evaluation process be improved? Second, to what extent, if at all, would a change in government diminish Slovakia's democratic deficit? After all, Vladimir Meciar and his Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) are the legitimate winner of two, free and fair elections. The suggestion for his removal from office made by a member of the EP can hardly be acceptable by international standards. Moreover, the suggested correlation between government change and more democracy in Slovakia is unfounded and speculative.⁽⁴⁾ Third, would rapid and fundamental changes in the criticized areas of Slovak domestic politics be meaningful? Are such changes socially and politically sustainable?⁽⁵⁾ It seems likely that under the present conditions concessions to the Hungarian minority would increase popular support of the Slovak National Party (SNS). In addition, the opposition parties are still too fragmented to provide a viable alternative for Meciar's coalition.⁽⁶⁾ Finally, Mr. Huska's comments suggest that the statement made by Mr. Oostlander had an adverse effect and may have strengthened popular support for the Meciar government. In short, it seems reasonable to point out that there might be fundamental flaws 1) in the EU's approach to evaluation, and 2) in its accession strategy toward the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

The main objective of this essay is to propose different and more viable alternatives in both areas. Since a complete and comprehensive analysis of the EU's approach to evaluation would go beyond the scope of this paper, I will focus on the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more specifically on their approximation policies--and the evaluation of these--aimed at citizenship. A systematic comparison of the two countries is useful, because they share a common history of 40 years of communism, shared the same state from 1918-1993, and their chances for membership, at least until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, were essentially equal. Today, however, the Czech Republic is IN, while Slovakia seems to be definitely OUT of the first round of accession talks.⁽⁷⁾ A systematic comparison of the post-1993 developments in the two countries, therefore, might reveal whether changes in their accession status result from ineffectual evaluation, misguided accession strategies at the EU level, or whether they appropriately reflect changes in domestic political and economic trends.

It also seems profitable to focus on the area of citizenship. First, there is an explicit theoretical link between the concepts of citizenship, nationhood and democracy. The link between citizenship and nationhood is relevant, because it reflects the degree to which a state might be willing (and able) to trade sovereignty for the sake of integration.⁽⁸⁾ The link between citizenship and democracy, on the other hand, reveals the degree of democratic deficit in a state's observation of human and minority rights, in the nature of consultations between the state agents and citizens, and in the extent to which citizens are protected from arbitrary action.⁽⁹⁾ Second, a systematic analysis of citizenship politics on the domestic level provides vital information for an accurate evaluation of accession candidates at the EU level, and for the consequent development of feasible accession strategies toward candidates. Both evaluation and accession strategies are important, because the former provides useful hints regarding the popular attitudes toward foreigners in societies that were for several decades "protected" from their influence, while the latter diminishes the likelihood of policies that could have undesired outcomes. Finally, while Article 8 of the Treaty of European Union⁽¹⁰⁾ revived the academic debate on changing the understanding of citizenship in contemporary Western democracies, a surprisingly insignificant part of this debate focuses on post-communist countries.⁽¹¹⁾ This is a disturbing trend, mainly because Western paradigms do not always fit and often produce unintended and undesired consequences when applied in the countries of CEE.

Following a review of most influential arguments in contemporary literature on citizenship, I define the relevant concepts, and outline a theoretical framework in which relations between nationhood, citizenship, democracy and integration could be analyzed. Then, with a specific focus on citizenship, I compare evaluations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia made in "Agenda 2000," point out inconsistencies, and suggest alternatives for evaluation and accession strategies. I will argue that inconsistencies and bias in evaluation are in part the results of methodological inadequacies, namely 1) the absence of comprehensive definitions and analytical frameworks, and 2) the consequent ignorance (at the EU level) toward the specific domestic political and societal constraints. In part, however, bias can be traced directly to the lack of desire of EU leaders to sit down and negotiate with political figures of dubious reputation like Vladimir Meciar.⁽¹²⁾ I conclude that the EU strategies of Eastward enlargement hinge on a paradox that demands the most substantive changes from countries that are institutionally the least stable. Such changes are politically not sustainable, and therefore a gradualist and incremental strategy of change is likely to be more feasible.

II. CITIZENSHIP, NATIONHOOD, DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

One segment of the scholarly literature on citizenship makes an attempt to disentangle the complex set of relationships between the EU member--and non-member--states, their citizens and the Union.⁽¹³⁾ These arguments fit into one of the following three categories where conceptions of citizenship are understood: 1) as rights and obligations that establish an individual's membership of a nation-state; 2) as a membership in any space outside of the nation-state where individual and collective rights can be legitimated; or 3) as rights and obligations that place the individual somewhere between the alternatives 1 and 2.

The second segment of scholarship tries to explain the relationship between citizenship and democracy. Two distinct approaches can be identified in this literature. According to the first, the extension of equal political, civil, and social rights to citizens leads gradually to the destruction of the old status-based hierarchies, and to democracy.⁽¹⁴⁾ The second approach disputes the progressive, linear, and evolutionary character of citizenship rights. It argues that the democratic component of citizenship is 1) the result of an ongoing bargaining process that started between the ruling elites of 18th and 19th century European states (more specifically France) and their subjects, and 2) the consequence of a successful emulation of the Western model by the subsequently established nation-states.⁽¹⁵⁾ Below, I shall review these arguments and then propose a composite framework for a relational definition of citizenship that incorporates nationhood and democracy. Finally, I develop a model that helps to evaluate the degree of democracy in selected cases.

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD

Scholars who understand citizenship as a membership of a nation state, view efforts leading toward European integration with skepticism.⁽¹⁶⁾ According to Raymond Aron, European citizenship is logically impossible because it would have to involve the transfer of political and legal powers from the national level. For such a transfer to take place, a sustained popular demand for a European Federation would have to be present.⁽¹⁷⁾ Rogers Brubaker argues that citizenship is likely to remain a bastion of national sovereignty because its definitions continue to reflect a deeply rooted understanding of nationhood.⁽¹⁸⁾ Both arguments are, with some qualifications, supported by Charles Tilly, who claims that citizenship is one of the underlying organizational features of modern nation-states. It is therefore unlikely to shed its close relationship to nationhood because the construction of new organizational relations entails substantial transaction costs for their implementation, maintenance and learning.⁽¹⁹⁾

The second category of scholars dismisses the idea of citizenship as merely a membership of a nation-state. Yasemin Soysal and David Jacobson point to the changing conventional characterization of citizenship, as a form of belonging to a nation-state, arguing that international migration, supra-national associations and the nearly universal acceptance of basic human rights constitute an alternative space for legitimation of individual and collective rights outside the membership of a nation-state. The citizenship of the Union--a formal extension of rights to free movement of goods, services, capital and people--from their point of view cannot be considered a major obstacle to European integration.⁽²⁰⁾

The third strand of explanations tends to agree that the contemporary conception of citizenship in Europe inched away from the conventional, national understanding in the Union's direction. Yet, by no means are views expressed by the authors who fall into this category as optimistic as those of Soysal and Jacobson. Some cautious observers even point to rising fortunes of European nationalist parties at the ballot box and suggest that a significant portion of individuals want neither to give up their right to the national membership, nor to share their well deserved benefits with foreigners.⁽²¹⁾ Hence, integrative pressures from the EU, some argue, actually contributed to the racialization of citizenship policies, and they threaten even the well established inclusive and non-ethnic principles of national citizenship laws.⁽²²⁾ This view is corroborated by empirical evidence that points to a correlation between cycles of economic decline in the member states, with instances of rising resentment toward foreigners, and a declining support for European integration.⁽²³⁾

In addition, Baldwin-Edwards, Baubock and Meehan argue that the Citizenship of the Union has had little impact on the legalization of migrant and guest workers of non-member states; and it continues to limit the movement of unemployed and young people.⁽²⁴⁾ Furthermore, they argue that it is slow to provide the anticipated stimulus for the much desired harmonization of voting and naturalization laws in the respective member states.⁽²⁵⁾ Therefore, the Citizenship of the Union in its present form is merely a procedural window-dressing, rather than a substantive and enforceable law.⁽²⁶⁾At the same time, according to Meehan, the emerging new kind of citizenship is neither national, nor cosmopolitan, but multiple in a sense that "identities, rights and obligations associated with citizenship are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and trans-national voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions."⁽²⁷⁾ The growing acceptance of this new kind of citizenship is reflected in the relaxation of naturalization laws in traditionally strict countries like Germany,⁽²⁸⁾ and in a growing acceptance of dual citizenship by Western European countries.⁽²⁹⁾

CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Investigating the emergence of civic, political and social rights in England, T.H. Marshall traced the formative period of civil rights in the 18th century, namely the protection of an individual's freedom and property from the state which led to the political rights of the 19th century. These enabled citizens to participate in the political process through elections. Finally, the social rights of a welfare state provided entitlements to social security. According to Marshall, "[C]itizenship is a status bestowed by those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed."⁽³⁰⁾ Thus citizenship, in Marshall's view is linked to democracy in a sense that equality in the application of rights and duties helped destroy the strict, status-based class hierarchy of mediaeval England, and provided the impetus to challenge the inequalities of 20th century capitalism.

Marshall's theory is criticized on several grounds. First, it is argued that the evolution of citizenship rights in England has taken place in relative isolation from external influences and in a culturally homogeneous society. This model, therefore, should be used with reservation when applied to the continental European states that were exposed directly to external threats, or to states that incorporated culturally and otherwise diverse peoples. Second, the teleological model according to which citizenship rights progressed from political, through civic, to social, assumes the culmination of this process in a full welfare state. Today, however, the entitlements provided by welfare states are under constant pressure from increasing global competition. One can only speculate to what extent social rights will survive in their present form. Third, citizenship rights in the former communist states of CEE (and elsewhere) seem to take a reverse evolutionary course that started with social rights inherent in the socialist economic systems, progressed through civil rights via the increasing challenge to authoritarian regimes from dissidents in the 1970s and 80s, and culminated in the acquisition of political rights after the 1989 revolutions.⁽³¹⁾ Finally, the relatively new states--for instance states that became independent in the aftermath of the Soviet empire⁽³²⁾--have neither the time, nor the necessity to go through a similar evolutionary process. They can simply emulate the Western model, and make adjustments that best fit their present demographic, cultural, social and economic conditions.

An alternative to Marshall's explanation was proposed by Charles Tilly. According to Tilly, the origins of modern citizenship could be traced to the 1792 French Constitution that granted voting rights to wage-earning males who took the oath to defend the nation and Constitution. In Tilly's interpretation, it was the expanding military activity of the revolutionary state that increased the need for conscription and revenue, and forced state agents to strike bargains with the reluctant subjects. Thus, citizenship, as defined by Tilly is a "tie entailing mutual rights and obligations between categorically defined persons and the state." It was established through a bargaining process between the state and its subjects. The increasing demands of the state and the subsequent inclusion of continuously widening segments of population in the bargaining process made democracy possible where it had not previously existed. This does not mean that all new states follow the same paradigm, or that bargaining resulted in the establishment of a welfare state. On one hand, the availability of the Western model makes emulation not only possible but relatively easy. Yet, as far as the contemporary status of citizenship rights is concerned, they seem to hinge on the extent to which globalization undermines the capacity of states to fulfill their commitments.⁽³³⁾ The increasing momentum of European integration, for instance, might weaken the bond between the nation-state and the citizens, if it can offer a viable and credible alternative for an expansion of individual and collective rights vis-a-vis the benefits provided by nation-states.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS: TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In an effort to compromise between conventional and post-modern conceptions of citizenship, Baldwin-Edwards, Baubock, Heater and Meehan rely on the following definition: "Citizenship is a bundle of rights and obligations--both formal and informal--which link an individual with society."⁽³⁴⁾ Although the substitution of a "society" for the "nation-state" in this definition creates opportunities for unconventional conceptualizations of the "link" between citizenship and individuals, the definition fails to explain how and by whom the rights and obligations in question are guaranteed. The rights anchored in the Citizenship of the Union, for example, are conferred on every person holding the nationality of a member state, and are guaranteed by the agents of participating states rather than through EU enforcement mechanisms.⁽³⁵⁾

More importantly, such a conceptualization of citizenship does not help to establish a relationship between citizenship, nationhood and democracy, mainly because it 1) does not incorporate the common components of these concepts, and 2) it takes merely a substantive, or procedural approach rather than a relational one.⁽³⁶⁾ Building on the work of Charles Tilly, I propose to begin with the following concepts:⁽³⁷⁾

State: an organization that controls the means of coercion within a defined territory and exercises a priority in some respects over all other organizations within the same territory.⁽³⁸⁾

Polity: the set of relations among the agents of the state and all major political actors within the delimited territory.

Rights: enforceable claims, the reciprocal of obligations.

Citizenship: consists of rights and mutual obligations binding the state agents and a category of persons defined by their legal attachment to the state.

Along these lines:

I) Nationhood and citizenship are linked to an extent that a state establishes a category of persons (based on criteria of descent, culture, birth, language, race, naturalization rules, and their combination) who by virtue of membership in this category acquire distinctive rights and obligations vis-a-vis the state.⁽³⁹⁾ Citizenship then is considered broad by the degree to which it extends membership to persons living within the state's bounded territory, and is considered equal to the extent to which the distinctive rights and mutual obligations apply to these persons.

II) Depending upon the criteria used to establish ties between the state and the people living within its territory (culture, language, race, ethnicity, birth, naturalization, etc...), citizenship might vary along two dimensions from a) exclusive to inclusive, and b) primordial to learned.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Then the primordial and exclusive variety of citizenship could be egalitarian, yet by no means broad, the primordial and inclusive could be broad but by no means egalitarian, learned and exclusive citizenship could be considered as moderately broad and egalitarian, while the learned inclusive variety is likely to be the broadest and most egalitarian of the four ideal types (see Figure I).⁽⁴¹⁾ Naturally, conceptions of citizenship in most states are going to fall somewhere along the boundaries of the ideal types proposed in Figure I below, which should be used only as an analytical device.

FIGURE I.

EXCLUSIVE

INCLUSIVE

PRIMORDIAL

Folk or Ethnic Model: expression of an ethnically homogeneous society where citizenship is acquired by descent (Israel) I.

Imperial Model: facilitates integration of different people under the domination of one national group (the Ottoman or British Empire) II.

LEARNED

Republican Model: Citizenship is acquired by birthplace, and naturalization by cultural assimilation (France) III.

Multicultural Model:

Citizenship by birth, and naturalization through adherence to norms and rules (US) IV.

III) Any polity should be considered democratic to a degree that it establishes: (1) broad and equal citizenship

(2) binding and transparent consultation of citizens with respect to governmental personnel and policies

(3) protection of citizens from arbitrary action of state agents

IV) Finally, we might want to think of states as falling somewhere along four continua on a scale form 0 to 1, where:

a) citizenship can be narrow (0) to broad (1)

b) unequal (0) to equal (1)

c) consultation with citizens: no (0) to extensive (1)

d) protection from arbitrary action: no (0) to extensive (1)

A state then is a complete democracy when rated (1111), while a state rated (0000) is a complete tyranny. A state with (1100) is a populist dictatorship, and so on. For a better orientation, contemporary Western democracies are likely to be rated somewhere in the neighborhood of (.80, .90, .75, .85).⁽⁴²⁾

III. CITIZENSHIP IN THE WEST AND THE EAST

As I have mentioned above, there are fundamental differences between contemporary Western and CEE states, of which scholars and practitioners should be aware when setting the standards and criteria for accession to the EU. First, Western states (here the member states of the EU) vis-a-vis the CEE countries are relatively old, have stable institutions--(in the sense that the rules of the game are well defined, anchored in constitutions, and are generally respected). ⁽⁴³⁾ Their conceptions of citizenship have evolved gradually in response to existing historical constraints, and they reflect a deeply rooted understanding of nationhood.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Second, the capacity of these states is usually high in a sense that they are able to 1) design and implement strategies that structure inter and intra-state relations,⁽⁴⁵⁾ 2) extract revenue, and 3) maintain low levels of violent crime.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Consequently, Western states appear well positioned to make changes in citizenship laws that are gradual on one hand, and politically and socially sustainable on the other. Finally, the politics of citizenship in the EU states are to a large extent governed by the generally accepted trend toward convergence (or harmonization). Therefore, one might encounter political opposition toward further relaxation of citizenship laws in the UK and France, where these laws are relatively inclusive and are extended, with some qualifications, to legal immigrants who demonstrate an anticipated degree of cultural adaptation.⁽⁴⁷⁾ On the other hand in Germany, where until recently citizenship was relatively exclusive and derived from the principle of descent (primordial), political opposition toward a relaxation of these laws appears less salient.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Unlike their Western neighbors, the states of CEE are relatively new and have only rarely attained sustainable levels of institutional stability. Additionally, their conceptions of citizenship were, or in many instances, are being emulated and made--with varying degrees of success--to fit the contemporary demographic, political, cultural, social and international settings. Citizenship in CEE states is therefore seldom rooted in a fully developed understanding of nationhood. Slovakia, for instance is currently engaged in the process of state and nation-building, and hence its politics of citizenship often lack coherence and the individual policies contradict one another⁽⁴⁹⁾ Moreover, the capacity of CEE states is usually low in a sense that they are rarely able to 1) design and implement strategies that structure inter and intra-state relations,⁽⁵⁰⁾ 2) extract revenue, and 3) maintain low levels of violent crime.⁽⁵¹⁾

In short, the comparison of CEE states with the West reveals a paradox. The old, well established and institutionally stable Western European states are expected to make only gradual and incremental changes in their citizenship policies, while the new, often nationalizing, poorly established, and institutionally unstable states of CEE are required to make changes that are rapid and fundamental. Such strategies could be counterproductive, mainly because they are likely to hamper--rather than advance--institutional stabilization. Even if formally accepted by CEE countries, these strategies are unlikely to facilitate conditions for meaningful and politically sustainable changes. Therefore, if the aim of EU accession strategies is to develop stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human and minority rights, West European standards should only serve as a point of orientation rather than applied across the board as unconditionally attainable criteria.

IV. CITIZENSHIP IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

The evaluation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia Agenda 2000, makes a clear distinction in their accession status. The Czech Republic, according to the report, has stable and properly functioning political institutions, free and fair elections, an opposition that plays an active role in the operation of institutions, and therefore "presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities."⁽⁵²⁾ At the same time, the report admits that the judiciary does not operate properly, and that the Czech citizenship law discriminates against the Roma.⁽⁵³⁾

The evaluation report on Slovakia identifies a number of problematic areas, that failed to fulfill the political criteria for EU accession. In the commission's view, the institutional framework defined in the Slovak Constitution corresponds to that of a parliamentary democracy, yet the degree of institutional stability is unsatisfactory.⁽⁵⁴⁾ In addition, the report expresses concerns about the independence of the judiciary, the government's use of the secret service, and the treatment of the Hungarian and Roma minorities. According to Agenda 2000, the elections held in Slovakia were free and fair, and there is no mention of citizenship law.

I will argue below that the reports are correct as far as the degree of institutional stability in the two countries is concerned. However, the report on the Czech Republic could have been more critical regarding the treatment of the Roma. In this case, changes in the Czech Citizenship Law are necessary and would be politically sustainable in the sense that they are unlikely to cause institutional instability. In case of Slovakia, changes made in the areas of citizenship and protection of minorities already reached a politically sustainable limit, and more profound changes could increase rather than decrease institutional instability. Continued changes in this area could have an adverse effect on the process of democratization.

A comparison of the Czech Republic and Slovakia reveals several differences that are relevant for the understanding of nationhood, the nature of citizenship and institutional stability in the two countries. First, the Czech state is relatively old and institutionally stable in a sense that the rules of the game are well defined and respected by most political actors. While the Slovak state is in a transitional phase, and the main political and societal actors are in a power struggle over institutional arrangement. Second, following arguments made by Brubaker and Tilly, nationhood in the Czech Republic has developed in response to state-seeking nationalism, while in Slovakia this development has a state-led character.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Finally, in accordance with state-seeking nationalism, the Czechs have developed a deeply rooted ethnic understanding of nationhood and a moderately ethno-centric conception of citizenship, while in Slovakia both the evolution of nationhood and citizenship are still in progress. Therefore, the understanding of nationhood and the conception of citizenship in Slovakia are going to be shaped through the bargaining process between domestic political actors and external third parties (the EU). Whether the Slovak conception of citizenship will acquire an exclusionary/ethnic, or inclusionary/civic character will depend upon the outcome of this bargaining process in which the EU is likely to play an important role.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Czech state is relatively old and the definition of Czech nationhood is well established. Historically, the tradition of Czech statehood goes back to the Czech Kingdom (Zeme Koruny Ceske). Its institutional foundations can be traced to inter-war Czechoslovakia and to the Czechoslovak Federation.⁽⁵⁶⁾ he rules of the game between the major political actors--the executive, legislative, judiciary and societal--are well defined, anchored in the Czech Constitution, and respected by the involved parties. In comparison the state capacity concerning the collection of revenue and control of crime and corruption is low.⁽⁵⁷⁾

The contemporary understanding of Czech nationhood evolved slowly in response to the continuous presence of its strong, and more often than not, assertive neighbor--Germany. Like most CEE nations which sought some degree of autonomy in the European empires of 19th century, the Czech national revival had a state-seeking character. Czech nationhood is folk-centered, defined vis-a-vis the Germans who are seen as the "arch villains of Czech history." The primary source that set the direction for the evolution of Czech nationhood (aside from the physical presence of Germans) was F. Palacky's interpretation of Czech history. Palacky portrayed the Husites as one of the ancestral national liberators of the Czechs from German oppression. He argued that the treachery of German nobility at the infamous Battle of Bila Hora is to be blamed for the Period of Darkness (Temno) in the Czech Lands.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Anti German sentiment gained momentum and endurance via the popular literary works of writers like Alois Jirasek,⁽⁵⁹⁾ and was exacerbated during the Great War, reaching its peak during the Protectorate, and the subsequent expulsion of the Sudeten Germans in 1945.⁽⁶⁰⁾

While the understanding of Czech nationhood was ethno-centric, the citizenship and language laws of the new multi-ethnic state were relatively inclusive.⁽⁶¹⁾ This transformation of the ethno-centric conception of citizenship was, to some extent, shaped by the desire of Czech politicians to maintain the liberal democratic image of the republic established by T.G. Masaryk. According to Czech thinker, F. Peroutka, during the discussion of the Language Law in 1921, the deputies argued that it would be smarter to exceed the minimal requirements for protection of minorities stipulated by the Treaty of St. Germain. Such a strategy would protect the Czech liberal-democratic image in the event complaints were launched by the well organized German and Hungarian minorities.⁽⁶²⁾

However, several episodes from contemporary Czech history support the argument that the ethno-centric understanding of nationhood endures. First, there was no comprehensive strategy of assimilation or inclusion directed toward the German and Hungarian minorities living in the interwar republic. On the contrary, ethnic claims in regions with high a concentration of Germans were routinely suppressed by force. The Great Depression of the early 1930s further escalated repression.⁽⁶³⁾ Second, the assumption of collective guilt, and the consequent expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the Czech lands in 1945 is well documented. Close to 3 million ethnic Germans were expelled, some 600,000 died in the process. Those Germans and Hungarians who remained in Czechoslovakia had no citizenship rights until 1952. More recently, domestic and international human rights organizations and NGOs note the ongoing discrimination of the Roma minority, racially motivated attacks on Asians and Africans living in the Czech Republic, and the subsequent pattern of government inaction against these trends, as well as the continuous maintenance of a discriminatory and exclusionary citizenship law.

Although problems with the Roma are by no means unique to the Czech Republic, it is disturbing that racially motivated attacks are on the rise. Human rights organizations attribute this trend to the lenient treatment of perpetrators. According to the International Helsinki Federation (IHF) 1997 Annual Report on the Czech Republic, there were 62 attacks on the Roma in 194, 90 in 1995, 157 in 1996, and as of November 1997 the number climbed to 233.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Between 1990 and 1996, 17 Roma were killed in such attacks, and several hundreds more were injured. Yet, of the more than 200 persons accused of these acts, less then 100 were convicted.⁽⁶⁵⁾ A recent killing of a Sudanese student in Prague attracted attention to the problem of racial intolerance in Czech Republic. In response, a number of politicians, including President Havel, took part in a public demonstration against racism and xenophobia.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Another episode of ethnic exclusionarism was inspired by a program aired on the Czech TV Nova. The program which depicted Gypsy immigrants living a relatively prosperous life in Canada, instigated a massive exodus of Roma from the Czech Republic. Some Czech politicians suggested that the documentary was the best thing the TV station had done thus far, and the program should be aired more often. The Mayor of Ostrava, Jana Lickova, even made a public offer that the city will pay $600 toward the air ticket of every Roma who decides to leave the country.⁽⁶⁷⁾

In response to an increasing criticism from the UNHCR, OSCE and the EU, the Czech authorities began to deal with the problem in 1995. In 1996, the Parliament passed a resolution denouncing racism and xenophobia in the Czech Republic, and created 120 new positions for specialists to fight against racism and extremism.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Yet, there were no significant improvements in the work of the judiciary; Cases of racially motivated acts were often characterized as "personal fights," and the sentences passed were light, sending a message that such crimes were not considered serious.⁽⁶⁹⁾ For instance, a restaurant owner in Rokycany was accused of banning Roma from the premises. He was charged with discrimination, but the case was dropped for lack of evidence. "In general," according to Mrs. Laubeova, the director of Nadace Nova Skola, "there is bias in the treatment of Roma in every sphere of life in the Czech Republic, from the top government officials all the way down to the owner of the village pub."⁽⁷⁰⁾

The 1993 Citizenship Law supports the ethno-centric and exclusionary nature of Czech citizenship, and is often criticized by international organizations including the UNHCR, OSCE and the Council of Europe.⁽⁷¹⁾ The law which came into effect on January 1, 1993, excluded all Slovaks who had their permanent residence in the Czech Republic from Czech citizenship. The law resulted in a number of stateless people, and is being used to discriminate against the Roma minority.⁽⁷²⁾ Article 18 of the law gives Slovak citizens the opportunity to apply for Czech citizenship under the conditions that the applicant reside in the Czech Republic for at least two years, has a certificate of exemption from Slovak citizenship, and has no criminal record within the last five years. Thus, people who were exempt from Slovak citizenship and failed to meet the requirements for Czech citizenship became stateless. Moreover, even individuals who were arrested, but not persecuted, were automatically disqualified from Czech citizenship.⁽⁷³⁾ On April 1996, the law was amended so the Ministry of Interior could waive the five-year clean record requirement in selected cases. Yet, according to the Tolerance Foundation, Roma were often given no information or misleading guidance regarding citizenship issues. Out of the 255 Roma surveyed who were not granted Czech citizenship, 80% were long-term residents, 50% had a clean criminal record, and only 19 had been convicted of serious crimes and 26 of petty offenses.⁽⁷⁴⁾

In short, the endurance of ethno-centric and exclusionary understanding of Czech nationhood stems from the violent episodes of Czech-German relations in the interwar and post-WWII periods, and by the ongoing discrimination of the sole remaining minority, the Roma which does not fit into the Czech conception of citizenship.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Consequently, Roma applications for citizenship are refused, their rate of unemployment remains at 60-70% (compared to 3-4% overall), they are applauded and offered money if they decide to leave the country, the courts do not take seriously cases of racially motivated attacks against them, and they continue to be the favorite targets of Czech skinheads. However, at the same time, there were always liberally minded, moral and ethical figures in Czech politics, such as Masaryk, Benes, and Havel, who were able to influence and moderate the exclusionary conception of Czech citizenship. This could be President Havel's challenge for 1998, the year when accession talks with the EU will have to be taken seriously.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Given the liberal democratic tradition of Czech statehood, the relative institutional stability and the general desire of Czechs to join the West, moderation of citizenship policies is the most viable option at this time.

SLOVAKIA

Compared to the Czech Republic, Slovakia is a new and institutionally unstable state with an ethnically heterogeneous population, engaged in state and nation-building.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Activities aimed at the construction of Slovak nationhood are state-led.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Yet, the process of nation-building--the ongoing struggle between the various conceptions of Slovak nationhood presented by a range of individuals and organizations is more complex than it used to be in the days of F. Palacky. Not surprisingly, the conception of Slovak nationhood is ambiguous, and the understanding of citizenship is superficial at best. Even though some academics point as far back as the Kingdom of Great Moravia, or the 1939 Slovak State for the origins of Slovakia, the Slovak state is still being built from the ruins of the former federation. It is relatively weak in its capacity to extract revenue, prevent crime, and structure internal relations.⁽⁷⁹⁾ Both state and nation building activities create favorable conditions for institutional instability, reflected in a lack of coherence, abrupt changes, and controversial decisions in domestic and foreign politics.

Since efforts to construct and authenticate a credible conception of Slovak nationhood are multiple and represent a range of interests, they are often contested. Therefore, both the conception of nationhood, and the understanding of Slovak citizenship are full of ambiguities. In Spring of 1996, for instance, Milan Durica, a history professor at the University of Bologna, published a controversial book financed by PHARE. Durica's book, Dejiny slovenska a slovakov (The History of Slovakia and the Slovak People), which was intended to serve as a supplementary high school history textbook, depicted the 1939 Slovak Republic as liberal, and the treatment of Jews during the war as lenient. After criticisms from the Slovak Academy of Sciences, teachers associations, Jewish organizations and the EU, Premier Meciar was forced to make a public announcement regarding the removal of the work from schools.⁽⁸⁰⁾In another case, the SNS proposed bills to allocate money for a traveling exhibition of "Slovakia's Written Heritage," or shift responsibility of history, language and literature curricula from the Ministry of Education to Matica Slovenska. ⁽⁸¹⁾ Both initiatives were rejected under pressure from the media and teachers associations. Inflammatory speeches of SNS politicians about the role of Hungary in Slovak history were publicly analyzed and refuted.⁽⁸²⁾ In short, the construction and authentication of an ethno-centric and exclusionarist conception of nationhood in Slovakia appears unlikely in the near future.⁽⁸³⁾

The ambiguous and contradicting trends in Slovak politics are exacerbated by institutional instability. The rules of the game that structure the interaction between major political actors are outlined in the constitution, but have not yet taken hold in Slovak political life and are often ignored. The Meciar government's program after the 1994 elections declared that "party diversity is an attribute of democracy which the party (HZDS) supports," yet the same program pointed out that "diversity will not be allowed to lead to a permanent political crisis whether in open or hidden form."⁽⁸⁴⁾ The latter conception of political diversity appears prevalent in contemporary Slovak politics. It is reflected in the ongoing and open confrontation between the Premier and the President, in the exclusion of opposition parties from parliamentary committees (including the controlling organ of the secret service (OKO)), and the impeachment of unruly members of the governing coalition of parliament.⁽⁸⁵⁾ However, in 1995 and 1996 the Constitutional Court, ruled on eleven cases submitted either by the members of the opposition or by the President (one was initiated by the governing coalition)-- nine of which were ruled unconstitutional. In 1997, the Constitutional Court ruled the actions of the Minister of Interior, Gustav Krajci, during the May 1997 Referendum, and the impeachment of a former HZDS MP Gaulieder, were unconstitutional.⁽⁸⁶⁾ However, the legal case against Minister Krajci was dismissed by a Bratislava district procurator, T. Sumichrast, and the parliament refused to reinstate the mandate of MP Gaulieder. All this took place after a government memorandum accompanying the application of the Slovak Republic to the EU proclaimed: "Developments in the Slovak Republic show that democratic institutions are firmly anchored and that despite various political changes, the constitutional system is stabilized."⁽⁸⁷⁾

Ambiguous trends in the construction of Slovak nationhood coupled with institutional instability, also are noticeable in the domestic and foreign policies of the Slovak government. For example, the 1993 Constitution, was written in the "name of the Slovak nation," provoking an instant outcry from the Hungarian and other minorities, who did not consider themselves Slovak nationals.⁽⁸⁸⁾ At the same time, the 1993 Citizenship Law has an inclusionary and civic character. The law permits any person who was a citizen of the Czechoslovak Federation by 31 December, 1992, to claim citizenship of the Slovak Republic. In addition, the law permits dual citizenship.⁽⁸⁹⁾ In another instance, the governmental coalition passed a discriminative Language Law--parts of which were ruled unconstitutional. At the same time, Slovakia became a signatory of the Citizenship of the Union agreement which overrides the Slovak Citizenship Law, and has no language clause.⁽⁹⁰⁾

In addition, efforts to establish favorable conditions for broad and equal citizenship are likely to face obstacles in new, multi-ethnic, and institutionally unstable states like Slovakia for several reasons. First, the state capacity to structure internal relations is low, which opens opportunities for entrepreneurial mediated political claim-making. Second, in such states political entrepreneurs are likely to make claims on behalf of their respective ethnic constituencies.⁽⁹¹⁾ Third, such claims often bear on the other ethnic group's interests and could lead to inter-ethnic discord. This suggests that some order is better than no order at all (perhaps even under the Meciar government).⁽⁹²⁾ Finally, since neither the understanding of nationhood, nor the conception of citizenship have not yet attained clear contours in Slovakia, the EU strategies could play an important role in shaping Slovakia's national definition. Therefore, if the EU wants to maintain its influence over Slovakia in the future, it 1) should not try to isolate it, and let it become democratic on its own, 2) should not issue statements and policies that can be used as political capital by anti-integration nationalists,⁽⁹³⁾ and 3) should set attainable and sustainable criteria that take into account the limits of change in each applicant's case.

V. CONCLUSION: CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA.

Using the criteria for evaluating the level of democracy proposed above, I will evaluate Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and suggest policies that make more sense than the existing EU strategies of Eastward enlargement.

The Czech Republic:

Citizenship: Narrow to broad................0.5

Citizenship: Unequal to equal................0.3

Consultation with citizens......................0.8

Protection from arbitrary action............0.7

Slovakia:

Citizenship: Narrow to broad................0.8

Citizenship: Unequal to equal................0.6

Consultation with citizens......................0.7

Protection from arbitrary action............0.3

Assuming that the Slovak minority made a conscious choice to stay in the Czech Republic after the 1993 break-up, has already been to a large degree culturally assimilated, and makes no contentious claims that would bear on the Czech's interests, the Roma remains the only significant and problematic minority group in the Czech Republic. If one agrees with Ralf Dahrendorf's claim that "the true test of the strength of citizenship rights is heterogeneity,"⁽⁹⁴⁾ with the Germans gone, the Roma minority is the true test of Czech citizenship. Thus far they barely manage to get a passing grade.

Moreover, the high marks for binding consultation with the citizens and for their protection from arbitrary action suggest a relatively high degree of institutional stability in the Czech Republic. Therefore a change toward more inclusive and egalitarian citizenship policies is likely to be politically and socially sustainable.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Thus, there is no reason for the Czech government to further postpone the signing and ratification of more than thirty UN and EU documents concerning human rights.⁽⁹⁶⁾ Neither should Canada or Britain hesitate about the reinstatement of visa requirements for Czech citizens in the case of another exodus of Roma. Finally, it seems more feasible for the EU to push for a more inclusive and equal conception of citizenship in the Czech Republic. Once it becomes a full member state and foreigners, such as Algerians from France, begin to look for work and settle in large numbers in the Czech Republic, it might be too late to try to moderate the Czech ethno-centric understanding of nationhood.

In Slovakia, the citizenship laws are clearly broad, yet there are problems concerning equality. Since the proportion of minorities in Slovakia is more than two times greater than in the Czech Republic, and we agree with Dahrendorf's statement regarding the test of citizenship, the Slovaks have to get higher marks in this area for their effort. In the area of binding consultation with citizens, the two elections were ruled free and fair, and one should not blame Meciar for the opposition's lackluster performance. It is true, however, that privatization in Slovakia lacks transparency, and in many instances state property is used to reward individuals for party loyalty. On the other hand, few complaints have come from citizens regarding these matters. Finally, cases like the abduction of the President's son, the impeachment of Frantisek Gaulieder from Parliament, the deliberate sabotage of the May 1997 referendum, the dismissal of Minister Krajci's case by an insignificant district procurator suggest that the protection of citizens from arbitrary action in Slovakia is inadequate.

It seems reasonable to ask what should be done regarding Slovakia's alleged democratic deficit, since, in this comparison, Slovakia, rather than the Czech Republic, is the true test of alternatives to the EU strategy of Eastward enlargement. I propose using Tilly's argument that citizenship is related to democracy in a sense that it engenders an ongoing bargaining process between state agents and societal actors. At the center of this process are issues concerning the extent, depth, and mutual respect for the agreed upon set of rights and obligations.⁽⁹⁷⁾ If this is indeed true, assuming that a simple government change is going to fix Slovakia's democratic deficit, amounts wishful thinking. The democratic deficit in Slovakia cannot be improved overnight with, for example, elections that bring a new government. Rather, changes can occur incrementally, leading to a de-concentration of political power, increased uncertainties in the interaction of major political and societal actors, and the consequent acceptance of the rules of the game as the best possible option for all parties.⁽⁹⁸⁾

Today, when the existing political opposition to Meciar is fragmented, the country suffers from an acute shortage of new political personalities, and the electoral preferences are virtually unchanged since 1992 (give or take a couple of percentage points), one possible solution might be the politicization of young people. This, as of yet inactive group of voters, has a vital stake in the future, does not care a great deal about the past, and wants to enjoy the good life right now. Moreover, young and intelligent political actors have at least two assets, they are flexible and reasonable. Neither can be said about most of the old guard. Finally, a political party that has the core of its constituency in the 18-30 age group could attract some of the older constituency with its vitality and a clean record in terms of former communist affiliations, corruption, failures, and undesirable political loyalties.

In addition, Slovakia has a deficit of politically attractive personalities. There are several reasons for this. First, some people are intimidated. Second, others have chosen a career in the private sector. Third, the civil society, where political elites grow and are recruited from, is still relatively weak in Slovakia. These problems, I believe, could be solved with the creation of an upper house--the Senate--for the National Council. The powers vested in the Senate would be less than those of the lower house, yet it would provide the space and environment in which political personalities could grow and mature. Senators would be elected locally in the 81 administrative districts through a majoritarian system. Such elections would enable (1) the best to win, because districts are small enough for the respective constituencies to identify and nominate individuals according to their merits, and (2) the senators would come from all parts of the country thus weakening the existing affinities toward urban centers. All this would not only create viable alternatives to the current political elite, but would contribute to the de-concentration of political power and the reduction of democratic deficit.⁽⁹⁹⁾

Taking into account these points, EU officials should recognize that a change of government is not likely to change the system. On the contrary, only an electorate that is actively engaged in the bargaining process with state agents can accomplish such a systemic change. Second, international isolation of Slovakia is not a viable option at this point, because external third parties such as the EU could play a decisive role in shaping Slovakia's institutional transformation.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Third, harsh words, like those of Mr. Oostlander, may have adverse effects, such as strengthening popular support for the extreme right, nationalist faction of the ruling coalition.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Fourth, Slovakia's democratic deficit does not hinge simply on the lack of protection from the state's arbitrary actions, but rather from the lack of public awareness in this area. Therefore, a viable EU strategy should provide time and should help to facilitate the internal shake-up of the Slovak electorate that would lead to the activation of the bargaining process described by Tilly. Buying time for the reduction of Slovakia's democratic deficit can be accomplished by formally including Slovakia into the enlargement process and by periodically evaluating progress in problem areas. In order to help facilitate an internal shake-up in Slovakia, EU strategies should exert pressure on the new industrial elites. Therefore, the EU should be more selective in areas such as 1) steel export quotas, (Slovak steel comes from a plant owned by Meciar's men; 2) monitoring PHARE, (to prevent the use of EU money in projects that promote ethno-centrism); and 3) extend the time horizon for distribution of the stabilization package and tie the installments to gradual and incremental changes made in the development and activation of civil society.⁽¹⁰²⁾

In short, if the aim of EU accession strategies is to develop stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human and minority rights, West European standards should only serve as a point of orientation and should not be applied across the board as unconditionally attainable criteria. Should this be considered a reasonable proposition, then a little more has to be demanded from the Czech Republic in terms of accession criteria, and somewhat less from Slovakia.

1.See for instance, SME, Pravda, Narodna Obroda, Slovenska Republika, or Novy Cas, from December 5, 1997.

2.See SME, December 6, 1997, "Slova Oostlandera su pre HZDS vyjadreniamy choreho, tutorskeho politikarenia."

3. See Jan Zielonka, "Politics without Strategies: The EU Policies toward Central and Eastern Europe," paper presented at the EUI seminar in Florence, October 1997. The Slovak government often complains about double standards regarding the state of democracy and their treatment of minorities in the country. The vice premier, Mrs. Tothova, for instance argued that the Hungarian minority of Slovakia is by no means treated worse than the Russians of Estonia, yet Estonia is among the five Central and Eastern European countries that are likely to take part in the first round of accession talks to the EU. Turkey does not seem to fit the EU paradigm because of the political criteria of democracy, or in other instances its membership application is refused on cultural grounds. How to account for the acceptability of Cyprus along EU criteria remains a mystery. Also see Zdenek Lukas and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia," in Werner Weidenfeld ed., Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the EU, (Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 1996), pp. 201-224. The authors claim, among other things, that the simple replacement of the current political elite in Slovakia would greatly improve the political performance of the Slovak Republic. They fail to explain, however, the facts and theories that lead them to this belief.

4. The HZDS won elections in 1992 and 1994. Vladimir Meciar became Prime Minister three times (he was voted out of office twice). See Grigorij Meseznikov, "Vnutropoliticky vyvoj a politicka scena," in Martin Butora ed., Slovensko 1996: Suhrnna sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1997, (Bratislava: Institut Pre Verejne Otazky, 1997), pp. 16-39.

5. J.M. Wiersma, the spokesperson of the European Parliament who visited Slovakia in October of 1997, gave Slovakia 6-7 weeks to fulfill the criteria required for the country's inclusion in the accession talks. See SME, "Slovensko ma 6-7 tyzdnov na to, aby splnilo kriteria na zacatie rozhovorov o vstupe do EU. Octoper 15, 1997, p. 1. The components of the democratic deficit that turned Slovakia into a single CEE country that failed to fulfil the political criteria are: 1) lack of respect for the constitution; 2) disrespect for the rights of the opposition; 3) inappropriate use of the secret police by the government; and 4) mistreatment of minorities. See "Slovakia," Agenda 2000, Doc/97/8, Strasbourg/Brussels, 15th July 1997. Also see Doc/97/20, Section

6. Mr. Kukan, the chairman of the Democratic Union (DU), pointed out that the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) still lacks a coherent electoral strategy, and the leaders of the respective parties are unable to agree on whether or not the election campaign should be designed and coordinated by professional image-makers. Personal interview with Mr. Kukan, December 3, 1997, Bratislava.

7. See for instance, Delia Meth-Cohn, "The New Wall," Business Central Europe, September 1997, pp. 19-22. Slovakia is the only applicant who failed to fulfill political criteria for accession. This conclusion surprises many who are familiar with the political conditions in Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus.

8.See Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1992).

9. For the classical study of citizenship and democratization see T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973). Also see Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," in Charles Tilly ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 224-236.

10.See Article 8 EC(The Treaty of the European Union) signed in Maastricht on February 7 , 1992 and ratified on November 1, 1993. For an extensive summary see Paul Close, Citizenship, Europe and Change, (London: Macmillan Press LTD., 1995), pp 241-53.

11. A few of the rare exemptions are, for instance, Zdenek Kavan, "Democracy and Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," in Einhorn, Kaldor and Kavan eds., Citizenship and Democratic Control... pp 24-39; Piotr Korcelli, "Current Issues Related to Migration and Citizenship. The Case of Poland," in Baubock ed., From Aliens to Citizens, Chapter 8.

12.The international image of Romania, for instance, improved dramatically after Ion Iliescu was voted out of office in 1996. Whether or not changes in the democratic deficit of Romania are equally dramatic, is, however, disputable.

13. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Citizenship of the Union: Rhetoric or Reality, Inclusion or Exclusion?" in Kososnen, Pekka and Madsen eds., Convergence or Divergence? Welfare States Facing European Integration, (Brussels: Commission of the EC, 1995); Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Third Country Nationals and Welfare Systems in the EU," Jean Monnet Working Papers, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, (September, 1997); Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1992), Conclusion; David Ceasarani and May Fulbrook eds., Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, (London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 1996); Barbara Einhorn, Mary Kaldor and Zdenek Kavan eds., Citizenship and Democratic Control in Contemporary Europe, (Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar, 1996); Christian Joppke ed., Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Bart van Steenbergen ed., The Condition of Citizenship, (London, UK, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications, 1994), Chapters 2 and 3; Charles Tilly ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), pp. 384-398.

14.See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge, 1950).

15.See Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," in Tilly ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

16. Rogers Brubaker, "Introduction," in Rogers Brubaker ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 1989), p. 3. ""

17. Raymond Aron, "Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?" Social Research, 41/4 (1974: pp 638-56).

18. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood... p 3.

19. Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," in Charles Tilly ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 1-17. Tilly points out that it took more than 100 years for feminists to break the gender barrier built on the prevailing male female household relations at the time, and reflected in tying citizenship to military service and presumed economic independence. " "

20.Yasemin Soysal, "Changing Citizenship in Europe," in Ceasarani and Fulbrook eds., Citizenship, Nationality... pp. 17-29. This view is supported by David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

21. Several British politicians expressed a desire to maintain the sovereign right to regulate immigration. See Guardian, 14 March 1995, and 24 March 1995. Jean-Marie Le Pen and Philippe Villiers both run on anti-immigrant platform in the French presidential elections. Jorg Haider's Freiheit Partai Ostereichs won over 22% in the Austrian General Elections. See Richard Mitten, "Jorg Haider, The Anti-immigrant Petition and Immigration Policy in Austria," Patterns of Prejudice 28 (2), 1994, pp. 27-47; Cas Muddle, "One Against All, All Against One! A Portrait of the Vlaams Blok," Patterns of Prejudice 29 (1), 1995, pp. 5-28.

22. See David Cesarani, "The Changing Character of Citizenship and Nationality in Britain," Tony Kushner, "The Spice of Life? Ethnic Difference, Politics and Culture in Modern Britain," and Patrick Weil, "Nationalities and Citizenships: The Lessons of the French Experience for Germany and Europe," in Cesarani and Fulbrook eds., Chapters 4, 5 and 8. Also see A. Geddes, "Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities and the EU's Democratic Deficit," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 197-217. Geddes argues that EU policies are one sided because they emphasize control of immigrants and asylum seekers on one hand, and do little in terms of immigrant rights or combating racism and xenophobia on the other.

23.Stefania Panebianco, "European Citizenship and European Identity: from the Treaty of Maastricht to Public Opinion Attitudes," Jean Monet Working Paper in Comparative and International Politics, (University of Catania: December 1996). Also see the Internet:

24. Baldwin-Edwards, "Citizenship of the Union...," p. 6. Baubock, "Changing the Boundaries...," in Baubock ed., pp 209-10. Meehan, pp. 13-14.

25. Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Citizenship of the Union..., p. 6-7. Also see Baldwin-Edwards, "The Emerging European Immigration Regime: Some Reflections on Implications for Southern Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 1998, pp. 495-519. Baldwin-Edwards argues that the resolutions of JHA governing migration are particularly incoherent for allowing substantial national variations.

26.Marco Martinello, "Citizenship of the European Union: A Critical View," in Rainer Baubock ed., From Aliens to Citizens, (Aldershot, Brookfield, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney: Avebury, 1994), Chapter 2. Baldwin-Edwards, "The Emerging...," pp. 502.

27. Elizabeth Meehan, pp. 1-4.

28. In France, for instance, a draft law was proposed that would grant asylum not only to refugees who fear oppression from a state, but also to those whose life is treathened by non-state groups (Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria). Moreover, under the proposed law, citizenship is to be granted to children born on French territory to non-French parents. See Robert Graham, "Delicate Balancing Acts," Financial Times, November 17, 1997, p. II.

29. See Dilek Cinar, "From Aliens to Citizens. A Comparative Analysis of Rules of Transition," in R. Baubock ed., From Aliens to Citizens, Chapter 3. Also see Baubock, "Changing the Boundaries of Citizenship," in Baubock ed., From Aliens..., p. 205.

30.Marshall, p 18.

31. These developments fit the countries of CEE, yet in China, one can speculate, civil rights might follow after the expansion of political rights. In either case, Marshall's model does not seem to fit the evolution of citizenship in communist and post-communist states.

32.The dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia created 21 new states.

33. Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," in Tilly ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 224-36.

34. For Derek Heater, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education, (London and New York: Longman, 1990), citizenship could be asociated with any territorial unit from a small town to the entire universe. For the purposes of my argument it is sufficient to limit this association as either being directed toward the nation-state, or toward the EU. For T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), on the other hand, citizenship was attached not so much to territory, as to a variety of rights some posessed while others did not. In Marshall's view, citizenship in the West evolved from political, through civil, to social rights. Also see Baldwin-Edwards and Baubock who rely on the same definition.

35. Seven rights are listed in the Citizenship of the Union. These are the right 1) to free movement, 2) of residence, 3) to vote and stand in local elections, 4) to vote and stand in EP elections, 5) to consular assistance in countries where one's member state is not represented, 6) to petition the EP, 7) to appeal to the Ombundsman. Yet, there is clearly no viable enforcement mechanism in place at the EU level that would be able to compete by the state.

36. A substantive definition of democracy, for instance, describes outcomes such as equality or liberty. Its procedural definition, best captured by Dahl, looks at processes like free and fair elections, participation, contestation, etc...

37.Charles Tilly, "The State of Nationalism," Critical Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 299-306. Also see Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elswhere," in Charles Tilly ed. Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 224-236.

38.With some modifications this is the definition originally developed by Max Weber and then reformulated by a number of contemporary social scientists. See, for instance, S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p 5; M. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of The State," Archives Europeenes de Sociologie. XXV (1984): pp. 187-188; G. Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 19-24; T. Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p 26; C. Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 24, 70; Max Weber, Economy and Society, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p 64)

39.Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship...," pp. 231-32."

40.See Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Citizenship of the Union: Rethoric or Reality, Inclusion or Exclusion?" In Kosonen, Pekka and Madsen eds., Convergence or Divergence? Welfare State Facing the European Integration, (Brussels: Commission of the EC, 1997). Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach and Reitz, Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varients of Experience in a Canadian City, (Toronto: 1990). Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1992). Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," in Tilly ed., Citizenship..., pp. 9-10. Aristide Zolberg, "Labor, Migration and International Economic Regimes: Bretton Woods and After," in Kirtz, Lim and Zlotnik eds., International Migration Systems: A Global Approach, (New York, 1992).

41. Similar arguments were made by Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship, Nationhood..., and Leah Greenfeld, Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Brubaker came up with the civic and ethnic ideal types of nationhood, while Greenfeld added another variable to distinguish between individualistic and collectivist varieties.

42.See Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship...," pp 233-34.

43. From the literature on new institutional economics that understands institutions in this sense, see Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 3-5. Aso see, Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p 4.

44. Brubaker, p 3.

45. For state capacity see Barkey and Parikh, "Comparative Perspectives on State," in Annual Review of Sociology, 1991, 17, pp. 510-528. State capacity, according to Barkey and Parikh, is the ability of state agents to implement strategies in pursuit of social, political and economic goals.

46.There are several indicators commonly used to measure state capacity. I argue that the state's capacity is high to the extent its agents are able to collect revenue from their citizens and protect them from violent crime. See John M. Hobson, The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International and Political Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

47.Several British politicians expessed a desire to maintain sovereign right to regulate immigration. See The Guardian, 14 March 1995, and 24 March 1995. Jean-Marie Le Pen and Philippe Villiers buth run on an anti-immigrant platform in the French presidential elections. Also see Tony Kushner, "The Spice of Life? Ethnic Diference, Politics and Culture in Modern Britain," and Patrick Weil, "Nationality and Citizenship: The Lessons of the French Experience for Germany and Europe," in Cesarani and Fubrook eds., Chapter 4, 5.

48. The German Aliens Act of 1990, for instance, has for the first time recognized the right of young foreigners who returned to their parent's country to re-immigrate into Germany. This perogative was traditionally reserved for citizens only. See Gezetz zur Neuregulirung des Auslenderrechts, Par. 16.

49.See Rogers Brubaker, "The Triadic Nexus: External Homelands, National Minorities and National States in CEE," Daedalus, 1995. As far as the nationalization efforts of Slovakia are concerned, they are too numerous to list. The most recent examples include diversion of large funds from Pro Slovakia, a government sponsored foundation on promotion of the Slovak culture for projects such as a traveling exhibition of allegedly Slovak ancient manuscripts that are enshined in a wooden reconstruction of a church building from the times of the Great Moravian Kingdom, and the production of numerous publications that attempt to reconstruct some 1.000 years of Slovak past (some written by historians, but most by story-tellers). Additionally, there was an effort by Matica Slovenska to take over the job of curriculum development for lower middle schools from the Ministry of Education, etc...

50. This is particularly true of new multi-ethnic states such as Slovakia, where internal ethnic relations often spill over into the international realm and vice versa. Moreover, due to the fragility of political configuration in the Slovak party system, attempts to manipulate ethnic relations could destabilize the domestic political scene.

51. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have dismal records in revenue extraction and crime prevention. According to the Czech Ministry of Finances, Czech firms and entrepreneurs owe to the state 63 billion CK from the year 1996. As far as crime prevention is concerned, only 45% of all criminal cases committed in Slovakia in 1996 was solved and successfully prosecuted. See Pravda, 15 October, 1997.

52. Institutions, in Agenda 2000 are understood as political actors (individuals or organizations) rather than the rules of the game based on sanctions and rewards. See Agenda 2000, DOC 97/17, pp. 15-16.

53. The report does not mention other forms of discrimination against the Roma.

54. In this passage it appears that the commission is using the term "institutions" in both senses. On one hand, the reference to an "institutional framework," seems to imply the "rules of the game." On the other hand, passages in the text suggesting "integration" of institutions into political life, seem to suggest that the authors have in mind actors, rather than rules. This, I believe, creates inconsistencies and ambiguities in the report. See Agenda 2000, DOC 97/20,A/1.3.

55. Brubaker distinguished between French and German understandings of nationhood. In France, the state-led efforts resulted in an inclusionary and universalistic understanding of nationhood that in turn shaped the nature of French citizenship, while in Germany the state-seeking effort contributed to the evolution of a folk-centered, ethnic, and differentionalist conception of citizenship. See Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood..., pp. 1-3. Tilly generalizes the same argument concluding that while state-seeking nationalism is more likely to result in an ethnic understanding of citizenship as oposed to the state led variety, it is by no means rare to encounter the ethnic version of citizenship in the latter case. See Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of ...," pp. 231-33.

56. Here I mean not only the organizational structures, but also the objects and skilled administrative personnel employed in the state administration. In 1993, Slovakia had to designate, renovate and build, the buildings in which the state agencies could perform their functions. The best known example is the residence of the President, that was moved on several ocassions from the Bratislava Castle, to the Old Town Hall, and finally to the Grasalkowitch Palace. Moreover, some 100,000 Slovaks, many of whom worked in the Czechoslovak state administrative apparatus and at the ministries, decided to stay in the Czech Republic after the 1993 break-up. Thus, the Slovak state sufferes from a shortage of skilled administrators and all state levels.

57.The Czech Finance Minister, Ivan Pilip, reported that in 1996 the state failed to collect 63 billion ($20 million) CK in taxes. According to Hobson, the collection of revenue in CEE states is between 50-60%, in Russia only about 25-30%, while in the EU countries it is 80-90%. See "Danove Uniky v CR," Pravda, 1 October, 1997, p 13. Also see John Hobson, The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International and Political Change, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 8-13. Crime rates, at relatively low levels under the communist regime, went up some 300% betwen 1990 and 1992. Although in decline, the relative crime rate in the Czech Republic is still high. Finally, even the Klaus government was forced to resign in December 1997, in the aftermath of a corruption scandal concerning the Civic Democratic Party (ODS).

58. Placky's influence on the contemporary popular understanding of Czech history is disputed by social scientists. Yet, the accuracy of Palacky's historiography is often challenged. For instance, Josef Pekar argued that the Hussites were first and foremost fighting to reform Catholicism, and that the nobility who fought at Bila Hora was actually mostly German and, more importantly, Catholic. See Josef Pekar, O Smyslu Ceskych Dejin, (Of the Meaning of Czech History), (Rotterdam: Accord Publishing, 1977).

59. The works of Alojs Jirasek, inspired by Palacky's interepretation of Czech history, continue to be assigned readings in Czech (formerly also in Czechoslovak) elementary and middle schools. These works also provided popular themes for dramatization and movies. See Jiri Rak, Byvali Cechove: Ceske Historicke Myty a Stereotypy (They Used to be Czechs: Czech historic Myths and Stereotypes), (Praha: Nakladatelstvi H&H, 1994).

60. The idea of expulsion is attributed mostly to President Eduard Benes, who lobbyd the Central Powers for support during his exile in London. In academic circle such a solution of "the German question" (Nemecka Otazka) was not new. Prof. L. Stehule, for instance, argued in favor of expulsion of the "German element" from all Czech regions where Czechization would not be feasible as early as 1919. Prof. Stehule based his claim on the argument that the Germans, because of their role in the Great War, should be deemed international villians and outlaws, and therefore do not deserve any rights in Czechoslovakia. I have to add that Prof. Stehule's claims did not reflect mainstream thinking at the time. Nevertheless, the works of T.G. Masaryk, the 1922 Constitution, the Czechoslovak Doctrine and the institutional foundations of the interwar republic were motivated to a considerable degree by the desire to maintain the state vis-a-vis the vividly present German threat. See Tomas G. Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973); Ferdinand, Peroutka, Budovani Statu, III, (Praha: Lidove Noviny, 1991), pp. 1285-1290; Jaroslava Peskova et. all, Dejini Zemi Koruny Ceske, II, (Praha: Paseka, 1992), pp. 168-170; L. Stehule, Ceskoslovensky Stat v Mezinarodnim Pravu a Styku, (Praha: Nakladatel Jan Laichter, 1919).

61. According to Peskova, the ethnic compostion of the intewar republic was: Czech 51%; German 23.4%; Slovak 14.5%; Magyar 6.2%; Ruthenian, Ukrainian and Russian 3.8%, and Polish and Jewish 1.1%. See Peskova, Dejiny Zemi..., p 168.

62. Peroutka, p 991.

63. German attempts to maintain some sort of cultural autonomy in predominantly German regions were supressed by force. See Peroutka, pp. 1283-1290. Moreover, the interwar governments consciously neglected the eceonomic plight of the predominantly German Sudenten Lands and when President Benes tried to negotiate an austerity package with them in 1937, it was too late. Also see Peskova, Dejiny Zemii..., pp. 186-191

64. See Annual Report, 1997: Human Right Developments in 1996, (Vienna: REMA-Print, 1997), pp. 83-94.

65. Pravda, November 11, 1997, "Tisice ludi demonstrovalo v Prahe proti rasizmu."

66. Pravda, November 11, 1997, "Smrt vyburcovala verejnost." The article reported that 10,000 to 15,000 protesters attended the event. In contrast, the day before 80,000 demonstrators were reported to have attended an event organized by the trade unions.

67. Jane Perlez, "Boxed in Bias: Czech Gypsies Look to Canada, New York Times, October 31, 1997, p. 3.

68. The 1997 IHF Report, p 90.

69. "Czech Republic: Roma in the Czech Republic -- Foreigners in Their Own Land," Newsletter, vol. 8, No. 11, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki.

70. Nadace Nova Skola is a Prague based human rights NGO that Has worked with the Roma since 1992. Personal interview with Mrs. Laubeova, Prague, July 18, 1997.

71. For example, see The Czech and Slovak Citizenship laws and the Problem of Statelessness, UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Europe, Division of International Protection, February, 1996. Also see, Report of the Experts of the Council of Europe on the Citizenship Laws of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and Their Implementation and Replies of the Governments of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Council of Europe, 2 April, 1996.

72. For example, Nadace Nova Skola reported that immigration officials routinely dismissed citizenship applications of Roma even if they were long term residents and had no criminal record. According to Bauback, on June 30, 1994, 70,000 Roma became stateless because they had not applied in time for Czech citizenship. See Rainer Baubock, From Aliens..., p. 229.

73. See the UNHCR report cited above.

74. From Exclusion to Expulsion: The Czech Republic's New Foreigners, Part Judicial Expulsion, the Article 8 Project of the Tolerance Foundation, Prague, November 1996.

75. It is true that there are Slovak, Moravian, Silesian and even some German minorities living in the Czech Republic, but they are not considered "troublemakers." According to the 1991 census 5.2% of the population are minorities, with Slovaks constituting 4%, and the remaining 1.2% Roma. According to another source, the Slovak minority is approximately 4% and the Roma constitute 3% of the total population. See Agenda 2000, DOC/97/17, B, 1.2.

76. Havel spoke out on several occasions against the inaction of Czech leaders concerning the ongoing violence against the Roma.

77. Statistics regarding Slovakia's ethnic composition are often contested. According to the 1991 census, Slovaks constitute 85.69%, Hungarians 10.76%, Roma 1.44%, Czechs 1.00%, while the Moravians, Rusins, Unkrainians, Germans, Poles and others make up the remaining 1.11%. Other estimates put Hungarians at 12% and Roma at 7% of the population. See the Materials of the Slovak Statistical Office, Bratislava, 1993.

78. In the case of Slovakia, one has to agree with Gellner who argues that it is the modern state that created the nation and not the other way around. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

79. On crime in Slovakia see Ivan Pivarci and Ernest Klotton, "Statistiky Kriminalnej Cinnosti na Slovensku", Pravda, 15 October, 1997. Statistics show that only 29% of 97,684 criminal acts committed in 1996, were solved. Sixty-nine percent of crime was identified as property crime (burglaries) and 11% as violent crime. Moreover, some publicists have suggested that there seems to be a close connection between state agencies (namely the secret service-SIS) and organized crime in Slovakia. See Ladislav Pittner, "Predstavitelia podsvetia sa dostavaju do povedomia prislusnikov Policajneho zboru ako spojency moci," SME, 20 October, 1997, pp. 4-5.

80. See "Duricova prirucka dejin nebude v skolach," SME, 2 July, 1997. Dusan Caplovic, "Politika a nase dejiny," Pravda, 13 June, 1997, p 7. Dusan Kovac, "Dnes by tato kniha nebola financovana," Forum, 12 June, 1997, p 2.<

81. The exhibition Napisane Zostave: Najstarsie Klenoty Slovenskeho Pisomnictva (The Written Word Endures: The Oldest Treasures of Slovakia's Written Heritage), (Bratislava: Slovenska Informacna Agentura, 1997), shows ancient texts written in German, Latin, Russain, and Greek from the 8th through the 15th century.

82 During the visit of J.M.LePen in Slovakia, J. Slota, the chairman of SNS made a speech in which he depicted the Huns, allegedly the ancestors of contemporary Hungarians, as the "misfortune of Europe." He argued that they pillaged, burned and killed during their conquest, and since the Slovaks survived the ordeal then, they will not be pushed arround by the descendants of such barbarians today. Even LePen publicaly distanced him self from Slota's opinions the following day .

83. Naturally, there are inumerous examples like these, and my intention here is to present only an illustration of a two-way process in which various attempts to interpret and autenthicate historical events are successfully challenged.

84. Grigorij Meseznikov, "Domestic Political Developments and the Political Scene in the Slovak Republic," in Martin Butora and Peter Huncik eds., Global Report on Slovakia: Comprehensive Analyses fron 1995, and Trends for 1996, (Bratislava: Sandor Marai Foundation, 1997), pp. 11-31.

85.Ibid., pp. 15-19. Also see Meseznikov, "Vnutropoliticky vyvoj a politicka scena," in Martin Butora ed., Slovensko v Pohybe: Slovensko 1996, (Bratislava: Institut pre Verejne Otazky, 1997), pp. 15-36.

86. Ibid., pp. 23-24. Also see "Tema: Gustav Krajci," SME, 13 July, 1997, p 5. Jan Drgonec, "Ako Uplatnuju priamu demokraciu vo svete," Pravda, 13 June, 1997, p 14.

87. Cited in Meseznikov, "Domestic Political...," p 14.

88. See Ustava Slovenskej Republiky, (Bratislava: Danubia Print, 1993). For the reaction see, Peter Huncik, Slovensko pre Slovakov, (Bratislava: Nadacia Sandora Marayho, 1993).

89. See "Zakon Narodnej Rady Slovenskej Republiky o Statnom Obcianstve," Part 1/3/sec.1.

90. Pravda, "Ochrana Obcana," 11 November 1997, p. 3.

91. On the relationship between the state's internal capacity and group formation see John M. Hobson, The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International and Political Change, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Joel Migdal, "The State in Society: An Approach to Struggle for Domination," in Migdal, Kohly and Shue eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Also see Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation," in Wiener and Huntington eds., Understanding Political Development, (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 1987).

92. For a seminal study of this topic see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp 1-12.

93. Jan Slota of the SNS is against EU integration because, he argues, the single aim of the Western countries is to rob Slovakia of its wealth.

94. Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Changing Quality of Citizenship," in Bart van Steenberger ed., The Conditions of Citizenship, (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 1994), p 17.

95. The marks in the last two areas are lower because of the undemocratic Press Law, inadequate legal framework for the economic transition, the arrogance of the PM, and the lack of transparency in the privatization process.

96. See Miroslav Kusy, "Stav ludskych prav," in Martin Butora ed., Slovensko, 1996, p 51.

97. Charles Tilly, "The Evolution of Citizenship..., In Charles Tilly ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). New institutional economists tend to conceptionalize democracy in a similar manner. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Przeworsky argues that in democracy one encounters a devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules, and that democracy is consolidated when this set of rules becomes the only game in town.

98. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, Introduction.

99. This idea was inspired by Prof. Peter Sykora during one of our many informal discourses about the political conditions in Bratislava.

100. Some scholars argue that only the total economic isolation of Slovakia from the EU states could create sufficient pressure on the contemporary ruling coalition. On the other hand, one could say that isolation of Slovakia could lead to even greater institutional instability and eventually to a reversal towards an authoritarian regime. See Ivo Samson, "Proclamations, Declarations and Realpolitik in Current Slovak Integration Policy," Perspectives, 6-7/1996, pp. 51-59.

101. This occurs because statements like this indirectly support criticisms made by the anti-integrationist SNS, namely that the powerful Western countries want to enrich themselves at Slovakia's expense.

102. This is important if one agrees that the stimulus for change has to come from below. Even though the EU report on Slovakia states that the degree of development in the third sector (NGOs) is corresponds to Western style democracies, the high number of NGOs is not indicative of broad-based popular involvement in these organizations. Moreover, the government created its own third sector which runs parallel to the actual civic associations. This sector puts constraints constraints on finances as well as on the availability of social space outside the state which is vital for the development of a healthy civil society. See Tibor Papp, "A Progress Report on the Development of NGOs in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia," Columbia University Working Paper, (New York: Columbia University, Dept. of Political Science, 1997).