

Introductory Report
From the opinion poll taken in Kiev in December 2004
by the Students and Staff of the
Eastern European Studies Department,
University of Warsaw

Presentation
January 31, 2005, 12:00 pm
The Senate Hall, Palac Kazimierzowski, University of Warsaw

STUDIUM EUROPY WSCHODNIEJ  UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKI
Pałac Potockich, Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, PL 00-927 Warszawa
Tel. 55 22 555; fax 55 22 222; e-mail: studium@uw.edu.pl; www.studium.uw.edu.pl

Introduction

The tampering with the fall of 2004 presidential elections triggered a wave of demonstrations in Kiev, as well as world interest in the situation in Ukraine. Poles were even more interested in these developments, and became deeply involved with helping Ukrainians, through numerous publications, discussions or demonstrations in several cities in Poland, and in the form of thousands of participants as observers during the successive rounds of elections.

The decision for the students of the Eastern European Studies Department of Warsaw University to travel and carry out “on the spot” research in Ukraine was a sudden one, but in terms of our interests, appropriate. I was motivated by the fact that we found ourselves in one of those rare situations when history is happening right in front of our eyes and when we can show it to our students, instead of only talking about it during lectures.

We cancelled the classes in the college in Warsaw in order drive to Kiev with a group of about 60 people¹. For the study we used the questionnaire developed earlier by our colleague, Professor Mark Sliwinski, for use in his research in Lithuania and Belarus.

We stayed in Kiev from the 8th to the 13th of December 2004. It was a moment when one could still see and feel the unique atmosphere of Independence Square, where demonstrations had been called off a day earlier due to the Ukrainian Supreme Court’s decision to acknowledge the falsification of elections and order a re-election. As a result, there were thousands of people from Kiev and tens of thousands from outside, but the atmosphere was already calmer and thus circumstances were better for scientific research.

Ultimately 313 surveys were analyzed. Because the study was carried out during this exceptional period, we were able to meet not only natives of Kiev, but as can be seen in the report, people from other regions of Ukraine. We understand that this research is limited and plan to carry out further studies in different regions of Ukraine. We will start with research from eastern Ukraine in May of this year. Only the completion of materials from the various regions will allow us to gain a full understanding and allow us to prepare a final report, most likely in the form of a book.

In the interim, we provide an “Introductory Report” from this first stay in Kiev during what was for the Ukrainians a turbulent and beautiful period during the fall of 2004.

Jan Malicki
January 31, 2005

¹ The Kiev research team was led by Jan Malicki and a group of advisors (Dawid Kolbaia, Mariusz Kowalski, Jan Malicki) as well as students from the University’s East European Studies Department who hailed from Poland and various East and Central European countries: Anastasiya Ilyina, Rostyslav Dzundza, Alina Koushyk, Mateusz Kubiak, Klara Milewska, Sviatlana Sendzer, Justyna Afek, Anna Awdiejewa, Gulomjon Azimow, Diana Brutyan, Aleksandra Gryźlak, Anar Ibrahimov, Naida Yunusowa, Abdurasul Niyazov, Evgenia Oleinikova, Justyna Prus, Marianna Sadownik, Grzegorz Strzeszewski, Aleksandra Zamaraeva, Dzmitry Hruzdou, Olena Litwinenko, Nazar Oliynyk, Joanna Pawłowska, Andriy Saldan, Marta Szpala, Sebastian Szajdak, Elżbieta Wiązowska, Maryna Bilozor-Tvardy, Anton Biespałow, Jekaterina Biespałowa, Ecelino Ionescu, Vitaly Yatskevich, Julia Oreł, Anna Stepień, Andrei Shelehau, Tsimur Valounik, Anatoliy Zymnin, Anna Gawęcka, Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Samir Sattarow, Emilia Sawicka, Krzysztof Wasilewski, Piotr Apostolidis, Mikołaj Falkowski, Aleksander Adamaitis, Nigora Akilova, Damian Ciarciński, Jurij Kurstak, Ihar Melnikau, Magdalena Mojduszk, Michał Pachocki, Anna Richter, and Marcin Tarułka.

Account of the research

Regional division

Regionalization of Ukraine for analytical purposes

The results from the last presidential elections in Ukraine (Figure 1 & 2) demonstrated a division of the country into three regions: western (great majority for Yushchenko), central (not a great majority for Yushchenko), and eastern (not a great but a fair majority for Yanukovich). This division is clearly tied to the historical and cultural circumstances.

The eastern, or more precisely the south-eastern region, was once a steppe where settlement began only during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Ukraine Slobodzka, and areas near the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov). Ukrainians settled here first and then next to them settled the Russians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, and Germans. Presently, the southern region is most ethnically diverse, as well as strongly Russianized. The central region is a territory settled by Ukrainians (Rusyns), dating back to the early Middle Ages. The west is also a region of long-lasting settlement. What distinguishes it is that before its incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1939 it was inhabited by a great number of Poles. This division was taken into account for the present analysis and was supplemented by a fourth region, Kiev. It was treated separately in light of its function as the capital, as well as the fact that it was a place of residence for a great number (over 1/3) of our respondents in this study.

Characteristics of the people surveyed.

The location for the study was Kiev. Surveyors chose respondents based on a previously determined key, with attention to gender, age, and place of residence (region), as well as political views. This was intended to ensure the best representative group of subjects.

The survey was administered to 313 residents of Ukraine.

Among those surveyed, respondents originated from all four regions (described above) of Ukraine (Table 1, Figure 3). Among the subjects of the study there were also 29 people born outside of the territory of present day Ukraine. Most of them came from Russia. Over 1/3 of the subjects were born in large cities (population greater than 500,000). Half of this number were people born in Kiev (Table 2).

Among those surveyed there were residents of all four regions (Table 1, Figure 4). Of the presently existing administrative districts, two were not represented: Sevastopol and the Zakarpachi territory.² One can notice that residents of Kiev are over-represented among those declaring place of residence, and comprise over one-third of survey participants (Table 2). This is without doubt a result of the prevailing tendency of migration in the last ten years; more

² A significant number of those surveyed provided area of residence: the city of Kiev-137, Kiev-22, Lviv-20, Ivano-Frankivsk-14, no residence provided-14, Dnipropetrovsk-11, Rivne-9, Zhytomyr-7, Khmelnytsky-6, Chernihiv-6, Sumy-6, Volhynia-6, Cherkasy 5, Donetsk 5, Crimea-5, Mykolayiv-5, Vinnytsya-5, Cherkasy-4, Chernivtsi-4, Odessa-4, Poltava-4, Zaporizhya-4, Kherson-3, Luhansk-3, Kirovohrad-2, Ternopil-2, Transcarpathia-0, Simferopol-0.

people have moved to Kiev than left. Another meaningful factor was that the study took place in Kiev. However, the number of residents from the remaining three regions were enough for a comparative analysis (Table 1). The political situation ensured that a significant number of people included in the study were from outside of Kiev.

The main wave of demonstrations had seemingly ended at the time, but there were still many people in the capital who drove from various regions of Ukraine, to demonstrate their political views. The respondents from outside of Kiev were found on Majdanie Niepodleglosci and in the surrounding areas, on Chreszczatyku or at the Main Station (Railroad). The fact that the study was undertaken during the Orange Revolution demonstrations in Kiev provided a unique opportunity to study the situation and guaranteed access to a diverse group of respondents. At the same time, the largest gatherings had actually ended, or been called off by Yushchenko as a result of the announcement of the decision regarding the falsified elections and a call for re-elections. As a result there was a decline in political emotions, which allowed for respondents with well-thought-out and diversified outlooks.

The material obtained by us reflects the differences in religion and ethnicity of the residents of Ukraine. The majority of respondents (around three-quarters) responded that they were Orthodox. However, they belonged to three separate parts of this faith (table 3). About 10% of the respondents responded that they were Catholics, with a majority being Greek Catholics. A majority of the people were Ukrainian; there was also significant numbers of Russians, as well as other ethnic groups (table 4).

There was a strong variation of responses with regard to language. Less than half of those studied (45.7%) primarily used Ukrainian at home, about one-third Russian, and almost one-fifth used both languages (Table 5). However, Russian has greater meaning in the everyday life of the respondents. Only 39.3% use only Ukrainian, even fewer use only Russian (31.0%) and both (28.5%). (Table 6). Despite the fact that Ukrainian maintains a small numerical advantage, Russian retains the character of a social language of contact.

A large number of the respondents reported having a higher level of education. Along with the students, they are over half of all surveyed (Table 7). One must allow for the fact, that people with higher education are more likely to take part in such studies. A large majority of the respondents considered themselves to be a part of the middle class, or intelligencia. This corresponds to the level of education of the participants (table 8).

The respondents also varied considerably in their political views (Table 9 and 10). In comparison to the general Ukrainian election results, those sympathetic to the present opposition are well represented. This is clearly evident in the city of Kiev, whose residents also made up a majority of the respondents to the survey. Comparing the support for the parties and politicians one can notice a stronger support for individuals (Yushchenko and Yanukovych) than for the parties with which they are affiliated. This is an undeniable effect of polarization linked to presidential elections and demonstrations in Kiev.

A more detailed analysis demonstrated that among the supporters of Yushchenko the majority were those with high school education, as well as a large group of students. Whereas

the supporters of Yanukovych were more polarized. This group included not only people with higher education but also a large number of those with only an elementary education (Table 11).

Ukrainians – an outside world

We will now move into a more detailed analysis of the survey. First, the survey focuses on the attitudes of Ukrainians towards other countries and nations.

There was a strong discrepancy among respondents in terms of their preference of the direction of political cooperation with other countries². There was a marked preference of the Eastern trend (Russia, Belarus, CIS) followed by cooperation with all countries. The least preferable was the Western trend (Table 13).

There were strong regional differences among these opinions (Table 12; Figure 5). Only among the respondents from the Western Ukraine was the western trend stronger than the eastern. This phenomenon can be explained by the historical relationships, as well as the geographic position of the region. The later factor had, without a doubt, greatly influenced cooperation only with the countries in the so-called “neighbor” category. As Russia and Belarus belonged to the “East” category, the “neighbor” category included the Western neighbors (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary) and the Southern neighbors (Moldavia, Rumania and in some sense Georgia). The Eastern trend of cooperation was generally chosen by the respondents from the Eastern part of Ukraine, supported by more than 40% of respondents. This can be explained by stronger pro-Russian affinity, as well as the geographic proximity. Among the respondents from the Eastern region, the majority supported cooperation with the East as well as the West (an obvious attempt to unite both trends). The notion of cooperating with the West alone received the least amount of support.

The overall opinion among the respondents from the central region and in Kiev was only slightly different from the opinion of respondents living in the Eastern region (leaning more towards the Western trend).

These results collide with the list of countries with which Ukraine should avoid contact. In the first place among these countries is Russia followed by the United States. There are very few statements against West European countries (Table 14). Perhaps this trend shows that the Ukrainians are still undecided and in the process of crystallizing their views and attitudes towards foreign cooperation.

This is borne out by the country- and nation-rankings in terms of economic and military cooperation as well as overall national affinities. Countries and nations were assigned points by the respondents on a scale from 1 (negative opinion) to 7 (positive opinion).

In the economic sphere there is a clear preference for Poland and the wealthier countries of Western Europe (Germany, France, Norway, Switzerland). Russia, in 10th place, holds a relatively low position. However, the United States holds an even lower position (representing

² This is the authors' attempt to interpret an open question to which there are diverse answers.

the anti-American sentiment). Middle-Eastern and Asian countries received the lowest marks of all (including Israel and the Southern part of former Soviet Union) (Table 15).

In terms military cooperation there is a clear improvement of attitudes towards Russia (6th place). The remaining countries retained approximately the same order as in the economic ranking (Table 16).

The rankings are a bit different in terms of national affinities. There is a visible improvement in the position of Slavic nations with the exception of Russia, which received the lowest scores across all three ranking categories (Table 17). At the same time this shows that it is not affinity, but rather pragmatic reasons (economy, security) that make Russia appealing.

The United States and the Americans are looked upon less favorably than Russia across all three rankings. This is perhaps a result of a stereotype – as “aggressors” – established by Soviet propaganda during the Cold War. At that time, the Ukrainians and the Americans were on the opposite sides of the barricade. The current foreign policy of the United States may actually strengthen this stereotype.

The rankings illustrate strong differences between supporters of Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Those in the first group without hesitation prefer Poland and Western countries. The United States also exceeds Russia here. The supporters of Yanukovych, in all three categories, place Russia as their first preference. Belarus also maintains a high ranking. Czechs are better assessed than are Poles and Poland. However, not even in this context does Poland fall below the tenth ranking. Participants clearly demonstrate sympathy for the Slavs and countries of the former USSR. Americans took last place twice (military, sympathy – Table 17 and 19).

In the case of national affinities, among the supporters of Yanukovych the third place ranking of Ukrainians is somewhat puzzling. Both Russians and Belorussians outranked them. This may be due to the Russians and those who were among the Russified who are numerous (Table 20). While showing great affinity toward all Slavic countries of the former USSR (just as the Ukrainian supporters of Yanukovych) they were less supportive of the Ukrainians.

Sympathy for nations is also differentiated by regions (Figure 6). The Ukrainians place first and in the West received higher scores than in the East. This is due to the number of Russian people and the strong level of support for Yanukovych in the East. The West is dominated by sympathy for Poland and the countries of Western Europe. It can be said, that only here the Western trend is clearly visible. The central region is dominated by affinity for the Slavic nations (Czechs, Poles, and Belorussians). Kiev appears close to Western Ukraine. Support for Russia is clearly increasing in Eastern Ukraine. Positive attitudes towards Slavic countries, including Poland, were evident.

Conclusions

The survey captured an image of society trying to find its place in the world, a new place among other countries and nations. The fall of the Soviet Union did not bring to an end but rather

initiated a process of formation of a modern Ukrainian society. Only inhabitants of Western (pro-Western, anti-Russian) and Eastern (pro-Russian, anti-American) parts of Ukraine have more crystallized, though radically different views. The United States does not have a good overall record among the Ukrainian society. The countries of Western Europe are in a more favorable position. The sympathy for Poland (especially in the Western part) and Slavic countries (especially in the Central and Eastern parts) is clearly evident. There is an uncertainty among the inhabitants of the Central regions. For them, Russia lost its attractiveness, whereas their attitudes towards the United States are still reserved.

The future direction of Ukraine will help determine how these views evolve. Poland with its least controversial position and due to its geographical proximity may play a significant role in the choice of that direction.

Table 1.
Region of origin and residence of the respondents

Region	Born	Percent (%)	Reside	Percent (%)
West	71	22.7	55	17.6
Central	74	23.6	63	20.1
East	70	22.4	44	14.1
Kiev	66	21.1	137	43.8
Other	32*	10.2	14	4.5
Total	313	100.0	313	100.0

Table 2.
Place of Birth and place of current residence of the respondents

Residence	Place of Birth		Place of Residence	
	Respondents	Percent (%)	Respondents	Percent (%)
City greater than 500,000	117	37.4	173	55.3
City greater than 50-500,000	80	25.6	53	16.9
City less than 50,000	58	18.5	33	10.5
Village	48	15.3	26	8.3
Not given	10	3.2	28	8.9

Table 3.
Religious make-up of respondents

Denomination	Respondents	Percent (%)
Orthodox (UAPC)	46	14.7
Orthodox (Kiev Patriarch)	78	24.9
Orthodox (Moscow Patriarch)	56	17.9
Orthodox (without distinction)	57	18.2
Greek Catholic	27	8.6
Roman Catholic	5	1.6
Other	17	5.4
Atheist	20	6.4
Lack of declaration	7	2.2
Total	313	100.0

Table 4.
Respondents' Nationality

Nationality	Respondents	Percent (%)
Ukrainian	261	83.4
Russian	28	8.9
Other	11	3.5
Ukrainian & Other	9	2.9
Lack of declaration	4	1.3
Total	313	100.0

Table 5.
Language spoken at home by respondents

Language	Respondents	Percent (%)
Ukrainian	143	45.7
Russian	109	34.8
Ukrainian & Russian	44	14.1
Ukrainian, Russian & Other	3	1.0
Russian & Ukrainian	11	3.5
Moldovan	1	0.3
Not given	2	0.6
Total	313	100.0

Table 6.
Language used daily by respondents

Language	Respondents	Percent (%)
Ukrainian	123	39.3
Ukrainian & Other	2	0.6
Ukrainian & Russian	70	22.4
Russian & Ukrainian	19	6.1
Russian	97	31.0
No given	2	0.6
Total	313	100.0

Table 7.
Education of the respondent

Education Level	Respondents	Percent (%)
Higher	135	43.1
Secondary technical	62	19.8
Secondary	41	13.1
College	34	10.9
Incomplete Secondary	21	6.7
Lack of response	11	3.5
Primary	7	2.2
Currently studying	2	0.6
Total	313	100.0

Table 8.
Social Class

Social Class	Respondents	Percent (%)
Middle Class	96	30.7
Intelligentsia	92	29.4
Workers (Blue Collar)	48	15.3
Lack of response	16	5.1
Lower Class	12	3.8
Student	10	3.2
Do not know	7	2.2
Upper Class	7	2.2
Agriculture	6	1.9
Retired	5	1.6
Worker (White Collar)	4	1.3
Entrepreneur	4	1.3
Office Worker	2	0.6
Other	4	1.3
Total	313	100.0

Table 9.
Support for Political Groups

Group	Respondents	Percent (%)
Our Ukraine	105	33.5
Our Ukraine & Other	19	6.1
Regions of Ukraine	21	6.7
Socialists	12	3.8
Blok of Julia Tymoshenko	12	3.8
Communists	11	3.5
Nationalists	10	3.2
Democrats	6	1.9
Ukrainian National Party	5	1.6
Pora (time, season)	4	1.3
Green Party	3	1.0
Other	15	4.8
Apolitical	44	14.1
No one	3	1.0
Lack of Response	43	13.7
Total	313	100

Table 10.
Support for specific politicians

Politician	Respondents	Percent (%)
Yushchenko	111	35.5
Yushchenko & other	54	17.3
Yanukovych	33	10.5
Yanukovych & other	7	2.2
Moroz	13	4.2
Moroz & other	3	1.0
Tymoshenko	9	2.9
Tymoshenko & other	6	1.9
Lytwyn	6	1.9
Lytwyn & other	4	1.3
Symonenko	3	1.0
Tyhypko	3	1.0
Other	8	2.6
Do not know	33	10.5
Lack of response	20	6.4
Total	313	100.0

Table 11.
Educational structure of Yushchenko and Yanukovych supports.

Educational Level	Supporters of Yushchenko	Supporters of Yanukovych
Primary & incomplete secondary	9.91	16.28
Secondary	45.05	27.91
Higher	30.63	46.51
Students	12.61	4.65
Lack of response	1.80	4.65
Total	100.00	100.00

Table 12.
With whom to keep tight political relations? Preferred direction of political collaboration (% answered). Trial of open interpretational question.

Direction	West	Central	East	Kiev	Ukraine
East	23.6	37.3	43.8	37.2	35.8
Neighbors	9.1	3.4	4.2	8.0	6.7
East & West	7.3	3.4	14.6	9.5	8.7
All	25.5	32.2	25.0	31.4	29.4
West	32.7	18.6	6.3	13.1	16.7
Other	1.8	0	4.2	0.0	1.0
Lack of response	0	5.1	2.1	0.7	1.7

Bold numbers indicate strongest support for certain directions

Table 13.
Differentiating the preferred direction of collaboration of Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters (%)

Direction	Yushchenko Supporters	Yanukovych Supporters
East	31.53	60.47
East & West	5.41	16.28
West	21.62	2.33
All	29.73	16.28
Neighbor	9.91	2.33
Other & lack of response	1.80	2.33
Total	100.00	100.00

Table 14.
Which countries should Ukraine keep at a distance?

Country	Respondents	Percentage
Russia	86	27.5
None	66	21.1
USA	60	19.2
Do not know	48	15.3
Muslim	27	8.6
Dangerous (such as terrorist, dictatorships, hostile)	10	3.2
Belarus	5	1.6
Others (such as Israel, China, Poland, Romania, EU)	11	3.5

Table 15.
Relations with chosen nations from the point of view of economic relations on the scale of 1 to 7 (1- extremely negative, 7- extremely positive). Average calculations based on the opinions of the respondents.

Ranking	Country	Average Score (scale 1-7pts.)
1	Poland	6.10
2	Germany	5.88
3	France	5.58
4	Czech Republic	5.58
5	Switzerland	5.54
6	Sweden	5.48
7	Norway	5.26
8	Great Britain	5.24
9	Slovakia	5.18
10	Russia	5.17
11	Finland	5.09
12	Lithuania	5.04
13	Latvia	4.98
14	USA	4.96
15	Hungary	4.94
16	Estonia	4.86
17	Portugal	4.85
18	Turkey	4.71
19	Belarus	4.60
20	China	4.49
21	Moldova	4.47

22	Kazakhstan	4.46
23	Romania	4.42
24	Israel	4.36
25	Georgia	4.35
26	Uzbekistan	3.21
27	Iraq	3.41
28	Iran	3.38

Table 16.

Relations with chosen nations from the point of view of military relations on the scale of 1 to 7 (1- extremely negative, 7- extremely positive). Average calculations based on the opinions of the respondents.

Ranking	Country	Average Score (scale 1-7pts.)
1	Poland	5.20
2	Germany	4.84
3	France	4.59
4	Czech Republic	4.58
5	Slovakia	4.40
6	Russia	4.37
7	Great Britain	4.35
8	Norway	4.21
9	Sweden	4.17
10	Lithuania	4.12
11	Latvia	4.10
12	USA	4.09
13	Switzerland	4.04
14	Portugal	4.01
15	Estonia	3.98
16	Finland	3.98
17	Hungary	3.94
18	Belarus	3.85
19	Romania	3.81
20	Georgia	3.78
21	Turkey	3.78
22	Moldova	3.73
23	China	3.61
24	Kazakhstan	3.51
25	Uzbekistan	3.27
26	Israel	3.20
27	Iraq	2.65
28	Iran	2.61

Table 17.

Diversity of sympathy from chosen nationalities on the scale of 1 to 7 (1- extremely negative, 7- extremely positive). Average calculations based on the opinions of the respondents.

Ranking	Nationality	Average Score (1-7pts.)
1	Ukrainian	6.51
2	Polish	5.96
3	Czech	5.77
4	French	5.7
5	German	5.64
6	Swedish	5.58
7	Switzerland	5.57
8	Belarusian	5.55
9	Norwegian	5.50
10	Slovak	5.47
11	Finish	5.43
12	British	5.36
13	Lithuanian	5.35
14	Georgian	5.27
15	Latvian	5.26
16	Estonian	5.20
17	Hungarian	5.19
18	Russian	5.18
19	Portuguese	5.09
20	Romania	4.72
21	Moldavian	4.71
22	Kazakhstan	4.68
23	American	4.65
24	Turkish	4.59
25	Chinese	4.59
26	Uzbek	4.53
27	Israeli	4.51
28	Iraqi	3.92
29	Iranian	3.92

Table 18.

Comparing the opinions of Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters pertaining to economic cooperation on a scale from 1 to 7 (1- extremely negative, 7- extremely positive).

Ranking	Yushchenko Supporters		Yanukovych Supporters	
	Country	Average Score (1-7 pts.)	Country	Average Score (1-7 pts.)
1	Poland	6.29	Russia*	6.51
2	Germany	5.86	Germany	5.84
3	Czech Republic	5.68	Belarus*	5.73
4	France	5.64	Czech Republic	5.61
5	Switzerland	5.63	Switzerland	5.56
6	USA	5.59	France	5.51
7	Sweden	5.58	Poland	5.45
8	Great Britain	5.36	Sweden	5.37
9	Norway	5.31	Slovakia*	5.34
10	Lithuania	5.19	Norway*	5.33
11	Slovakia	5.17	Kazakhstan*	5.30
12	Latvia	5.14	Finland*	5.12
13	Finland	5.09	Lithuania	5.00
14	Portugal	5.02	Latvia	4.97
15	Hungary	5.01	China*	4.94
16	Estonia	4.92	Israel*	4.88
17	Turkey	4.72	Hungary	4.88
18	Georgia	4.65	Great Britain	4.81
19	Russia	4.62	Moldavia*	4.65
20	Romania	4.60	Turkey*	4.64
21	Moldova	4.55	Portugal	4.63
22	China	4.35	Estonia	4.57
23	Israel	4.27	Romania	4.41
24	Belarus	4.27	Uzbekistan	4.36
25	Kazakhstan	4.27	USA	3.79
26	Uzbekistan	4.25	Iran *	3.74
27	Iraq	3.46	Iraq*	3.54
28	Iran	3.39	Georgia	3.21

*Countries who, among Yanukovych supporters, received more points than among Yushchenko supporters.

Table 19.

Comparing the opinions of Yushchenko and Yanukovich supporters pertaining to military cooperation on a scale from 1 to 7 (1- extremely negative, 7- extremely positive).

Ranking	Yushchenko Supporters		Yanukovich Supporters	
	Country	Average Score (1-7 pts.)	Country	Average Score (1-7 pts.)
1	Poland	5.49	Russia*	6.29
2	Germany	5.04	Belarus*	5.68
3	Great Britain	5.04	Kazakhstan*	4.72
4	France	4.98	Czech Republic	4.16
5	Czech Republic	4.87	Germany	4.03
6	USA	4.82	Slovakia	4.00
7	Slovakia	4.63	Romania	4.00
8	Norway	4.62	Poland	4.00
9	Sweden	4.51	China*	3.91
10	Lithuania	4.41	Moldavia*	3.88
11	Switzerland	4.38	Uzbekistan*	3.81
12	Latvia	4.38	France	3.74
13	Portugal	4.35	Hungary	3.58
14	Finland	4.25	Estonia	3.58
15	Estonia	4.19	Latvia	3.56
16	Hungary	4.17	Sweden	3.52
17	Romania	4.03	Switzerland	3.52
18	Turkey	4.03	Lithuania	3.47
19	Georgia	3.93	Norway	3.45
20	Russia	3.76	Portugal	3.40
21	Moldova	3.66	Finland	3.37
22	China	3.56	Great Britain	3.16
23	Uzbekistan	3.32	Israel	3.16
24	Israel	3.31	Iraq*	3.06
25	Belarus	3.24	Turkey	2.97
26	Kazakhstan	3.17	Georgia	2.85
27	Iraq	2.62	Iran*	2.80
28	Iran	2.55	USA	2.44

*Countries who, among Yanukovich's supporters, received larger number of points, than among Yushchenko supports.

Table 20.

Comparing the opinions of Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters pertaining to sympathy for other nations on a scale from 1 to 7 (1- extremely negative, 7- extremely positive).

Ranking	Yushchenko Supporters		Yanukovych Supporters	
	Nationality	Average Score (1-7 pts.)	Nationality	Average Score (1-7 pts.)
1	Ukrainian	6.65	Russian*	6.42
2	Polish	6.09	Belarusian *	6.32
3	German	5.88	Ukrainian	6.25
4	Czech	5.87	Czech	5.57
5	French	5.84	French	5.53
6	Swiss	5.84	Swiss	5.52
7	Swedish	5.79	Norwegian	5.51
8	Lithuanian	5.69	Swedish	5.45
9	Latvian	5.65	Slovakian	5.44
10	Norwegian	5.56	Polish	5.41
11	Finnish	5.55	German	5.31
12	British	5.52	Finnish	5.12
13	Portuguese	5.51	Kazakh *	4.97
14	Estonian	5.46	British	4.89
15	Slovakian	5.46	Hungarian	4.71
16	Georgian	5.41	Portuguese	4.66
17	Belarusian	5.41	Lithuanian	4.65
18	American	5.39	Moldavians	4.65
19	Hungarian	5.32	Romanian	4.65
20	Romanian	4.93	Chinese	4.63
21	Moldavians	4.88	Latvian	4.50
22	Russian	4.80	Uzbek	4.45
23	Chinese	4.71	Georgian	4.32
24	Kazakh	4.68	Turkish	4.26
25	Turkish	4.65	Israeli	4.25
26	Uzbek	4.56	Estonian	4.22
27	Israeli	4.38	Iranian*	4.06
28	Iraqi	4.02	Iraqi	3.94
29	Iranian	3.94	American	3.22

*Countries who, among Yanukovych's supporters, received larger number of points, than among Yushchenko supports.

Table 21.
Comparing the national structure of Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters.

Nationality	Yushchenko Supporters	Yanukovych Supporters
Ukrainian	91.0	79.1
Russian	3.6	18.6
Other	5.4	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0

Figure 1.
Support for Yushchenko during the first round of the presidential elections (October 31 2004)




Figure 2.
Support for Yushchenko during the third round of the presidential elections (December 26, 2004)




Figure 3.
Place of origin of the respondents in the major Ukrainian regions.




Figure 4.
Place of origin of the respondents in the major Ukrainian regions.




Figure 5. Preferred direction of political collaboration.





Figure 6.
Average regional differences in level of sympathy towards a nationality on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 -extremely negative, 7- extremely positive). In reference to the top five position holders.



**Compiled by Mariusz Kowalski
 (with the assistance of Konrad Czapiewski)**