KASHMIR
Crisis in Kashmir: The Latest Phase
by Sumantra Bose
UPDATE
ANALYSIS
1996 Lok Sabha Elections
What do the Top-Level Corruption Charges Reveal?
by Dr. Raj Mishra
GEOPOLITICS Iran and the Weakening of U.S. Power
by V. Siddharth
LATUR Lessons from Latur
by V. Siddharth
PART III
WOMEN
The Indian Women's Movement: Some Methodological Issues
by Dr. Shailaja D. Sharma
APPEAL: Ten Years After November 1984
Text of Appeal Circulated by the AIPSG in November 1994
BOOK REVIEW
Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema
by Vijay S. Jodha
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KASHMIR IN CRISIS: THE LATEST PHASE
Sumantra Bose
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Marouf Ahmed Hub was a 22 year-old shopkeeper in Kishtwar, a
town deep in the mountainous reaches of the Jammu region's
volatile Doda district. When he was detained by the Border
Security Force in March 1995, his uncle, the Imam of the
local mosque, rushed to intercede with the BSF authorities
and obtained an assurance that the young man would be
released the same evening. What was eventually released was
his beheaded corpse, disfigured by electric shock torture
and with a rope tied around his genitals. Recalling the
incident, the and the massive demonstration for "azaadi"
that followed in Kishtwar, the Imam told me: "The Indian
government claims we are citizens of this country. But it
treats us worse than enslaved subjects."
Marouf Hub's fate is an eloquent symbol of life (for lack of
a better word) in the violence-torn regions of Jammu &
Kashmir. The protracted war of attrition that has been
raging in J&K since 1990 is unmistakably approaching a
turning point. The Indian state, with its enormous police
and military resources, is now perhaps showing greater
stamina and staying power in this struggle than the
ideologically divided and organisationally fragmented
Kashmiri armed movement. Militant activity is clearly
declining, at least for the time being, in many areas of the
State, both urban and rural. Moreover, the faltering "armed
struggle" is increasingly dominated by outsiders, especially
Pakistanis and Afghans. And as the kidnapping and murder
episode near Pahalgam involving foreign tourists reveals,
these outsiders have scant regard for Kashmiri public
opinion (which is overwhelmingly opposed to such acts) and
little relation to the social base they claim to represent.
But the cost of temporarily curbing and containing armed
militancy may have been the permanent loss of whatever
residual faith Kashmiris may have retained in the Indian
Union, even after 1990. By converting the Kashmir Valley,
plus Doda district, into a vast prison for its people, where
no rule of law exists and the most basic humanitarian and
democratic norms are systematically violated by the
"security" forces, the authorities in New Delhi have
successfully and completely discredited India's claim, in
Kashmiri eyes, of being a democratic and secular state. The
acute danger is that the Government, increasingly heady with
the apparent "dividends" of its policy of indiscriminate
terror and ruthless repression, may confuse a military edge
over armed insurgents as a "solution" to its "Kashmir
problem" (the Prime Minister's assertion that Kashmir will
not even be an issue by the time of the next general
elections is a disturbing portent of this myopic mentality).
That could be a catastrophic error of judgment.
I very recently traveled throughout Jammu & Kashmir in an
effort to comprehend the complexities of making progress
towards a durable, democratic resolution of the "Kashmir
question", and to assess the popular mood and existing
realities on the ground. In the process, I visited (in
addition to my base, Srinagar), practically every major town
in the Valley, including Baramulla, Sopore, Kupwara and
Handwara in northern Kashmir and Anantnag, Bijbehara and
Pampore in the south. I also visited many remote rural
areas in Baramulla, Kupwara, Anantnag and Pulwama districts.
In addition, I extensively toured the Jammu region,
especially Jammu city, Pandit migrant camps in Jammu
district, and the towns and rural interiors of Doda
district. I had in-depth conversations with almost all
leading political figures (of various persuasions) in J&K,
with prominent members of the academic and professional
intelligentsia, and with numerous political activist and
hundreds of ordinary people at the grassroots level.
Despite the confusion and demoralisation in the "azaadi"
movement, a degree of popular disenchantment with
internecine killings and criminalisation among some militant
groups, and a widespread yearning for peace, the people are
still very resolute and determined on one score: that Indian
rule over them is illegitimate and unacceptable. The mass
euphoria that ignited the uprising in 1989-90 is no longer
evident in that particular form, but popular defiance has
congealed into a seething, smouldering rage and resentment
against the Indian military administration and its forces.
In spite of the best efforts of both the Indian and
Pakistani authorities, mass opinion in the Valley (and among
the Kashmiri Muslim majority in Doda) is by and large
unambiguous on one point: that only independent statehood
would constitute true emancipation. There are a few
exceptions to this general rule. For example, in Sopore, a
long-standing Jama'at-i-Islami stronghold, I found public
opinion evenly split between independence and Pakistan, and
there also seemed to be a sizeable pro-Pakistan minority in
Anantnag town. But elsewhere, popular allegiance to the
ideal of independence ranges from decisive to overwhelming.
As a senior Jama'at activist and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
ideologue I met in Kupwar district admitted ruefully: "I am
committed to Pakistan. But the awaam (people) don't agree.
I think 80 percent support the notion of independence."
Indeed, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) leader
Mohammad Yasin Malik's assertion that "it is still JKLF, as
the most consistent and principled advocate of independence,
that represents the wishes of the people," is not far off
the mark.
But any mention of New Delhi's plans to hold "elections"
evokes near-universal derision and contempt. This response
is not a manifestation of irrational intransigence or surly
rejectionism, but understandable when viewed in the context
of the actual situation on the ground. Kashmir's social
fabric has been terribly scarred over the past six years by
violence, above all, by the massive and systematic violence,
directed against the population in general, sponsored by the
Indian state, and perpetrated by its agents. And ever more
anguish, suffering and indignity continues to be inflicted
daily on the people. As anyone who has visited Kashmir and
interacted freely with the citizenry knows, the towns and
villages are filled with maimed, traumatized, and bereaved
people. The central squares and marketplaces of almost
every urban centre - Srinagar, Sopore, Bijbehara, Handwara,
Doda - bear the ugly scars of large-scale arson (usually
accompanied by massacres) committed by the security forces.
In this context, imposing an "election" at gunpoint would
amount to rubbing a lot of salt into very raw wounds, the
final insult to compound many injuries.
Such an exercise, whatever else, cannot be dignified as a
reintroduction of democratic processes. As one Kashmiri
told me, "the root cause of all problems here has been
government of the centre, by the centre, for the centre."
But Kashmiris will no longer passively tolerate the
imposition from New Delhi of unrepresentative, unaccountable
and corrupt puppet cliques. Even the small potentially
"pro-India" constituency in the Valley, which is fed up with
violence and uncertainty, regards Pakistan with distrust and
the independence demand as a romantic slogan, and is
increasingly nostalgic about the pre-insurgency days, is
unequivocal on this point: the imposition of Farooq Abdullah
or Ghulam Rasool Kar would be an intolerable affront. As
for the government's plans to resolve the Kashmir problem
through infrastructure development and employment-generation
schemes, Abdul Ghani Lone, 60, a senior Hurriyat leader,
aptly expresses the popular sentiment - "Are they going to
tell a man whose virgin daughter has been raped that they
will put a road through his village, on condition he agrees
to be loyal to India?" Indeed, it is clear that such a
crude, economistic approach to an essentially political
problem is simply a diversionary, tactical device to avoid
the real, substantive issues.
Moreover, while armed militancy can be curbed or contained,
it is folly to imagine that it can be eliminated permanently
and completely. Specifically, Hizbul Mujahideen, the most
formidable insurgent force, is, while certainly on the
defensive, still far from being a spent force. Indeed, a
senior HM ideologue confirmed to me that "they [HM] have
received instructions from across [the border] to lie
relatively low for the time being, and re-emerge with a
vengeance as soon as elections are announced." Thus, any
attempt to hold an election may well spark a desperate re-
escalation of militant violence, with the attendant risk of
large-scale reprisals on the civilian population by the
security forces. If this happens, the government's dreams
of "normalisation" could rapidly evaporate.
There are more compelling dangers to forcing elections.
Elections will most likely elicit a total boycott in the
Valley, and partial, but significant boycotts in Doda, in
Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu division (where there
is a subtle but definite undercurrent of sympathy among the
dominant Rajput and Gujjar Muslims for the Kashmiri cause),
and in Shia-majority Kargil district in Ladakh. If this
happens, the election, which will in effect be reduced to a
referendum on patriotic allegiance to the Indian Union,
could well lead to unprecedented communal polarisation, with
only some of the Hindu population groups in the Jammu region
and Buddhists in Ladakh's Leh district turning out to vote
in substantial numbers (even this will partly depend on what
attitude the BJP chooses to adopt - it currently says it is
opposed to polls "at this stage, till terrorism is
completely crushed".)
Communal polarisation will be aggravated if Pandit migrants
in Jammu and Delhi are allowed to cast ballots, and if some
Kashmir Valley seats are decided principally on the basis of
those ballots (some vociferous Pandit "spokesmen" have been
demanding that 6 of the 46 Valley seats be "allotted" to
them). Such a pointless deepening of the sectarian divide
between the different communities of Jammu & Kashmir can
only be to the detriment of prospects of any serious and
lasting (i.e. mutually agreed) solution to the Kashmir
crisis. As Yasin Malik correctly put it while still in
prison, "the ultimate solution shall have to be one
acceptable to all citizens [of J&K] regardless of their
region or religion."
Janata Dal leader Abdul Qayoom, 60, is a lonely "pro-India"
politician who has stayed on in Srinagar since the troubles
began (albeit in the city's heavily-guarded "security
zone"). He is convinced that "elections will be totally
counter-productive, and bring on absolute disaster."
Instead, he argues passionately for "taking the people of
Kashmir into confidence," and for "applying a healing touch
to this bleeding society." Asked what such phrases might
connote in more concrete, tangible terms, he responds that
"a completely open, unconditional dialogue" with all popular
forces of Jammu & Kashmir, and particularly of the Valley,
will be indispensable to creating an atmosphere conducive to
making progress towards peace.
There indisputably are significant variations in the
aspirations and concerns of the inhabitants of the three
distinct regions - Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh - that
compromise the State. But these differences cannot serve as
an alibi for doing nothing about the crisis in Jammu &
Kashmir. Even less can they be a justification for
reactionary, communalist approaches to that crisis.
Arguably, the only outcome worse than the present status -
quo would be some kind of partition or fragmentation of the
State along (largely false) communal lines, and all major
Kashmiri political forces, including JKLF and HM, are
opposed to this. Such a course carries the grave risks of
spawning disgruntled minorities (of one kind of another),and
of possibly leading to permanent population transfers, in
both the Jammu region and the Valley.
In particular, the "Hindu-majority" label conventionally
accorded to the Jammu region is, while true in a limited
sense, also seriously simplistic and potentially misleading.
Apart from the fact that three of Jammu's six districts have
Muslim majorities, it is far more accurate to describe Jammu
as a patchwork or mosaic of an array of religious (Hindu,
Muslim, Sikh), ethnic (Kashmiri, Rajput, Gujjar, Dogra,
Punjabi, etc.) and linguistic (Kashmiri, Dogri, Hindi,
Pahari, Punjabi and several other languages and dialect)
groups.
This social reality of multiple forms of identity and cross-
cutting cleavages is too often deliberately ignored by those
elements, in both India and Pakistan and on both sides of
the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir, who view the Kashmir
conflict in reductive and bigoted communal terms. The fact
is that religious affiliation is but one axis of social
diversity (and of political conflict) in J&K - albeit an
important one. But there have historically been other,
overlapping axes of contestation and conflict - region,
ethnicity, caste and political ideology, for example. Thus,
when Hindutva spokesmen claim to be upholding the "interests
of Jammu," they conveniently forget not only that no such
monolithic Jammu exists, but that sectarian Hindutva parties
have never, in successive assembly and parliamentary
elections, won more than a quarter of the popular vote in
the Jammu region (primarily that of a section of urbanised
caste-Hindus).
Nor is the spirit of amicable coexistence between
individuals and groups professing different religious faiths
entirely dead in Jammu & Kashmir. In several towns and
villages of the Valley, I met Pandit families living in
safety, dignity and complete harmony with their Muslim
neighbours. Doda district (60 percent Muslim, 40 percent
Hindu) has an enviable history of communal amity and
cooperation, and its residents are trying their best to keep
this tradition alive despite grave pressures and
provocations.
There is thus no alternative to democratic debate and
discussion between representatives of various social groups
and political tendencies in the different regions of the
State, if progress is to be made towards a durable political
solution. This is precisely what Kashmiri leaders like
Shabbir Shah and Yasin Malik, as well as several courageous
members of the Jammu intelligentsia, have been energetically
advocating. Such an inter-regional, inter-community
dialogue would have to be a crucial component of any broader
or bigger dialogue (involving India, Pakistan and
representatives of Jammu & Kashmir from both sides of the
Line of Control) on the Kashmir issue.
Altaf Ahmad Khan, alias Azam Inquillabi, is a child of
Partition and of the Kashmir "dispute." Born in 1947, he
possibly holds the record for the maximum number of
clandestine border crossings between Indian and Pakistani-
controlled Kashmir - over thirty since 1969. This veteran
rebel is also one of the masterminds behind the insurrection
that erupted in 1989-90. But this firebrand radical, while
remaining committed to his political ideal of an independent
Jammu & Kashmir, is now absolutely convince that dialogue
and negotiations are the only route to making meaningful
progress towards a lasting solution. "We must make a
beginning somewhere, as soon as we can," he says with a
grave sense of urgency, "if nothing else through non-
official contact and discussions, between enlightened
intellectual and professional leaders of India, Pakistan and
the different regional and religious groups of Jammu &
Kashmir. If this conflict is allowed to fester
indefinitely," he warns, "there is a real danger that the
politically conscious and articulate voices of Kashmir will
one by one gradually be liquidated or marginalised. The gun
has largely served its purpose; now politics must take
over."
It is a pity that those whose rule India does not, as yet,
appear to have the courage and confidence to recognise the
same reality. This obstinacy (based on a purported but
unverified "consensus" in this country that "Kashmir is an
integral part of India") is all the more irrational because
the ultimate guarantee of the Indian state's "security" and
"integrity," the 600,000-odd heavily armed military and
police forces, are, for the present and foreseeable future,
at least, very much in place throughout Jammu & Kashmir,
including its borders with neighbouring countries. New
Delhi's injunction that the "problem" must be settled
"within the framework of the Indian Constitution" is not
just irrelevant (the Constitution, like very other man-made
document, is hardly a repository of sacrosanct and
inviolable Truth), but also a deliberate tactical device
that effectively precludes substantive dialogue.
Individuals and organisations that are genuinely
representative of a popular movement, and that have at least
some ideological principle and consistency, cannot be
expected to summarily renounce their political platforms for
the sake of "talks" of uncertain nature and outcome with
powerful adversaries. Leaders such as Shabbir Shah and
Yasin Malik, among others cannot come crawling to the
negotiating table and be co-opted into signing some
"package" on terms dictated by their opponent. Sinn Fein's
Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, both former Irish
Republican Army (IRA) guerrilla commanders, have not
abandoned their commitment to the idea of a reunited
Ireland. That has not prevented an indefinite cease-fire in
Northern Ireland nor a measure of tentative progress towards
a lasting solution. Even the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO), which has had its back to the wall in
the struggle against Israel by the 1990's, still formally
retains the clause in its founding charter that commits it
to the destruction of the Jewish state. That and the
continuing turbulence in the West Bank and Gaza have not
prevented Yasser Arafat and the Israeli authorities from
maintaining a continuing, if halting dialogue.
The same applies to those important, popularly-based forces
in Jammu & Kashmir who would be willing to have a dialogue
without crippling preconditions of any kind on any side, but
who have so far been repressed, rebuffed and denied
recognition as bona fide political actors representing deep-
rooted collective aspirations. Yet there are clear
indications that some of these forces increasingly realise
the potential efficacy of serious, substantive dialogue
(caveat: not some charade masquerading as dialogue) for
their people, and the fact that they themselves have
compelling pragmatic incentives to enter into such a
process.
Responsible political leaders and activists in Kashmir,
whatever their public positions and ideological commitments
(which they cannot be expected to summarily forsake), know
perfectly well that the gun alone cannot liberate their
people. Indeed, they realise that they themselves, and the
political future of their people, are increasingly being
held hostage by the environment of violence, intimidation
and fear. But as long as large-scale victimisation of
civilians by the security forces continues, armed resistance
will also continue and the conditions propitious for
dialogue cannot come about.
But in the immediate future, the authorities in Delhi would
be well-advised not to exploit a military advantage over
"militants" to trample wantonly on Kashmiri sentiments and
aspirations yet again. Instant fixes or cosmetic surgery
cannot alleviate, leave alone resolve, the historically
rooted, complicated and multi-dimensional conflict in and
over Jammu & Kashmir. A peace of the graveyard will only
condemn Jammu & Kashmir to a bleak, uncertain and unstable
future. It will also freeze India-Pakistan relations in
their present condition of polarised animosity, to the
detriment of prospects of peace, democracy and development
in the entire subcontinent. It is unlikely that any
"solution" (whatever that may constitute) to the Kashmir
question can be stable and final without the participation
and acquiescence of the rulers of Pakistan.
"Kashmir," wrote Kalhan, the 12th-century historian and
chronicler in his Sanskrit epic Rajatarangini, "can be
conquered by the power of spiritual merit, but never by the
force of soldiers." Certainly, for too long have a few
million hapless inhabitants of Jammu & Kashmir suffered as a
result of being the focal point for the manifestation of the
deep mutual hostility between India and Pakistan. And for
too long have the billion-plus people of the subcontinent
had their security and development prospects held ransom by
the Kashmir conflict. The time is overdue to make a move
towards breaking this dangerous and destructive stalemate.
The moral and pragmatic case for a just and lasting peace in
Kashmir and South Asia is a compelling one.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
U - P - D - A - T - E
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JUSTICE FOR BHOPAL VICTIMS
Activists campaigning around the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster
case described their continuing struggle in seeking justice
and compensation for the gas victims at a Columbia
University forum sponsored by the IPSG.
The activists - Rehana Begum from the Bhopal Gas Peedith
Mahila Udyog Sanghatan (BGPMUS) and N.D. Jayaprakash from
the Delhi Science Forum - talked about the conditions of the
people of Bhopal ten years after the gas leak, their
struggles to secure just compensation from the Indian
government and the state of litigation against Union
Carbide. Also present was Ward Morehouse, of the U.S -
Bhopal Action Committee. Two other activists from Bhopal
were unable to attend the meeting as the Indian government
did not grant them the requisite travel documents in time.
These were T.R. Chouhan - a former plant operator at the
Union Carbide factory in Bhopal who was sacked after he
blamed management for the disaster, and Abdul Jaffar, a
founding member and leader of the BGPMUS.
In their presentations, and in the panel discussion that
followed, the speakers described the 1989 deal between the
Indian government and Union Carbide as a complete sell-out.
They pointed out that as per that settlement, the final
compensation awarded to those who lost their relatives in
the disaster was Rs. 90,000, and that too, only to those who
able to produce a death certificate. Since death
certificates are not available in the majority of cases,
even this paltry compensation is denied them. As for those
who have suffered injury and continuing medical disorders,
the award is Rs. 24,000 of which Rs. 7,500 is being deducted
because of the interim relief some of the afflicted persons
received. The remainder, which is meant to cover all the
needs of the victims, including medical care, etc., has been
since given out in installments of Rs 200 a month.
Speaking in Hindi, Ms. Rehana Begum, who had personally lost
several close relatives in the gas tragedy, spoke strongly
of the plight of the victims. She also described the
ongoing frustrations that the BGPMUS faces in its attempts
to bring Union Carbide officials to book, primarily due to
the strong unwillingness of the Indian authorities to press
for action in this case.
A statement was also released by the IPSG, entitled "Bhopal:
What Rights do People Have?". Excerpts from the statement
are quoted below.
"The Bhopal tragedy and its aftermath raises two crucial
issues for all concerned people. The first is that of the
right of the victims to proper rehabilitation. The second is
that of culpability for the disaster. To the credit of the
people of Bhopal and the tireless work of the activists who
have taken up their cause, the issue of culpability has been
kept alive, despite attempts to the contrary. It is widely
understood that the government has not been keen to
prosecute the company because of the adverse impact such a
case would have on foreign investment as well as the
interests of Indian monopolies who operate their industries
with the same callousness and lack of concern that Carbide
did.
The issue of rehabilitation of the victims is independent of
the issue of culpability. Surely the Indian government
remains obliged to fully rehabilitate the victims of such a
tragedy, regardless of whether it is successful in making
Carbide pay or not. Yet, except for brief periods before
elections, successive governments have distanced itself from
this issue, and have effectively reduced its own role to
that of a lawyer whose responsibility is limited merely to
arguing for a settlement."
SOUTH ASIAN PREPCOM DELEGATES TO BEIJING
At a meeting organised by the IPSG at Columbia University on
April 4, 1995, several South Asian women NGO delegates to
the U.N. PrepCom meetings for the Beijing Conference on
Women spoke about how the concerns of women from developing
countries are getting marginalised.
The women who addressed the meeting included Vidya Das, an
activist with Agragami in Orissa, Nafisa Barot of Utthan in
Gujarat, Pamela Phillipose, Features Editor of the Indian
Express, Asha Ramesh from the Indian Coordinating Committee
for the Beijing Conference, Shagufta Alizai from Shirkat
Gah, a women's group in Karachi, Niloufer Ahmed from
Bangladesh, and several others.
Pamela Phillipose pointed out that women are constantly
having to fight against the rollback which is taking place
on the question of rights, both nationally and
internationally.
With respect to the Beijing Conference's draft "Platform of
Action", she said that clauses affirming the rights of women
which have already been adopted at the Rio Conference on the
environment or the Vienna Summit on Human Rights are once
again being questioned by many governments.
Vidya Das and Nafisa Barot stressed that many women in India
and the developing world are being adversely affected by
economic liberalisation and structural adjustment but that
the governments don't even want to place this question on
the agenda. Resources belonging to the tribal and indigenous
peoples in various countries are being handed over to
multinational companies, and women are the first to suffer
the consequences.
Some of the speakers noted that many western governments and
NGO's were exerting pressure on women groups to confine
themselves to exclusively "women's issues" and not be
concerned about the larger question in society like economic
justice and political power. "But the consequences of
structural adjustment is a women's issue," asserted Vidya
Das.
Shagufta Alizai spoke about the situation in Pakistan and
noted that having a woman as Prime Minister has not
fundamentally altered the lot of women.
JUSTICE H.SURESH ON THE BOMBAY RIOTS
Justice Hosbet Suresh, retired judge of the Bombay High
Court, addressed a meeting on Saturday, April 14 1995 at
Columbia University, organised by the Indian Progressive
Study Group, and spoke on "Bombay After the Elections".
Justice Suresh, who has been active in Human Rights work
since his retirement from the bench, reached national
prominence recently over the independent report on the
Bombay riots of January 1993 that he co-authored with
Justice Dawood. The findings, which were published in
August 1993, identified the Shiv Sena as having primarily
organised and carried out the riots. The report also
charged that the Shiv Sena could not possibly have carried
out the attacks if not for the active complicity of the
police and local administration.
In the meeting, Justice Suresh noted that despite clear
evidence that the riots were instigated and carried out by
the Shiv Sena, the government had taken no steps to
prosecute them. Bombay, he remarked, was a city with strong
progressive traditions, where people had historically stood
firm against communalism. However, he added, following the
Babri Masjid demolition, the Shiv Sena and BJP wanted to
ensure that the city would be ghettoised and that a
permanent rift should exist between Hindus and Muslims. It
was to this end, that both these parties organised the
communal riots, with the acquiescence of the Congress (I),
local administration and police, he said.
In discussing the recent elections, where the Congress (I)
lost heavily to a BJP-Shiv Sena coalition, he noted
ironically that the Shiv Sena had initially been formed by
S.K. Patil, the Congress Chief Minister in Maharashtra. The
Sena, he said, was created in order to break the strength of
Bombay's trade-union movement, through a militant anti-
outsider chauvinist program. It was, he said, directed
particularly at the South Indian leadership of many trade
unions. Justice Suresh observed that over the past thirty
years, the Shiv Sena became known not so much for
communalism as for anti-South Indian and anti-outsider
politics, financed largely through extortion and other
criminal activity.
Tracing the history of the Shiv Sena's involvement in
communal politics, he described how it had, together with
the BJP, adopted the Babri Masjid issue only after 1986, and
that too, only when the Rajiv Gandhi government
provocatively reopened the controversy. It was at this time
that the Shiv Sena also gained control of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation for the first time and used its newly
found influence and power to open "shakhas" throughout
Maharashtra.
Suresh noted that while the Shiv Sena and BJP have recently
formed a government in Maharashtra, they only received 28%
of the popular vote. He attributed their success largely to
the fragmented opposition, the lack of any substantial or
credible "third force" that could capture people's
imagination., and to the ongoing decay and collapse of
ruling Congress (I).
The Congress (I), for its part, lost heavily because they
were decisively rejected by Muslim voters who felt aggrieved
over the Congress (I)'s implicit support of the Shiv Sena
through the riots, and over the indiscriminate arrests of
large numbers of Muslims in Bombay under TADA, in relation
to the 1993 bomb blasts. Furthermore, Suresh added, Sharad
Pawar's image as a corrupt leader added to the popular
rejection of the Congress (I).
On the Bombay bomb blasts of March 1993, Suresh commented
that there exist many theories as to its perpetrators. The
police, he said, immediately blamed a foreign hand.
Regardless of this, the fallout, Suresh said, has been the
largely arbitrary arrest and torture of hundreds of Muslims
under the infamous TADA law. TADA, or the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, is a preventive
detention law that has achieved notoriety throughout India
for the sweeping powers it gives to the police, and for its
highly arbitrary use in practice, throughout India. Suresh
estimated that over 68,000 people had been arrested under
TADA, and that less than 1% of those arrested had ever been
convicted..
In discussing the situation following the recent Shiv Sena-
BJP victory in Maharashtra, the prospects appear bleak in
the near future. Suresh noted that Bal Thakre, the Shiv
Sena leader had mentioned that although he is himself not in
the government, that he would retain power through "remote
control". Thakre has already made two demands. The first
is for the removal of "Bangladeshis", and the second is to
bar any outsider from entering Bombay. Suresh noted that
the Bangladeshi issue was a farce, and that at most, there
were some 2000 - 3000 Bangladeshis in Bombay, mostly of
Bihari origin.
He said that what was underway was a very vicious campaign,
and that people who have lived in Bombay for years are
suddenly being asked to prove their citizenship under threat
of deportation.
In addition to the inquiry and report on the Bombay riots
published by Justices Suresh and Dawood in August 1993,
there exists an official, government appointed commission of
inquiry, headed by Justice Srikrishna, a sitting judge of
the Bombay High Court. Justice Suresh noted that while his
inquiry was completed by May 1993, the Srikrishna Commission
is still collecting evidence, almost two and a half years
after the riots. Justice Suresh noted that in spite of its
shortcomings and delays, the Srikrishna Commission is
expected to arrive at the same conclusions as his report.
However, he expressed cynicism in this regard, since the
Shiv Sena itself now forms the government, casting doubt on
whether the Commission would continue to exist at all.
POSTSCRIPT: The meeting described above was held in April
1995, shortly after the state elections. On January 23
1996, almost exactly three years after the end of the riots,
the Manohar Joshi ministry officially terminated the
Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry, claiming that it has
already taken too long, that "calm" has returned to the city
and that in any event, it be unwise to reopen "old wounds"
all over again. - Ed.
VICTOR BANERJEE ON UTTARAKHAND
Mr. Victor Banerjee, the noted Indian screen actor and star
of several films, including "A Passage to India", addressed
a meeting organised by the IPSG on April 5, 1995, where he
presented a paper titled "Uttarakhand - A People Denied."
As a long-term resident of Mussoorie, Mr. Banerjee painted a
haunting portrait of a region whose problems, until
recently, have remained far from the public gaze. The
Uttarakhand region comprises most of the north western parts
of Uttar Pradesh, encompassing an area of some 55,000 square
kms with a population of over 66 million. A large part of
its territory is mountainous but the ruggedness of terrain
was not the main reason why the people of Uttarakhand were
suffering, Mr. Banerjee said. He marshaled a large amount of
statistics pertaining to the availability of health and
education for the region's population, showing how vastly
inadequate it is. In addition, the region's economy is
completely undeveloped, with the result that most adult
males migrate away from the region to work - mainly as
domestics - in large metropolitan centers like Delhi and
elsewhere. Despite the fact that the region produced an
enormous amount of hydroelectric power, the availability of
electricity in Uttarakhand was woeful.
Mr. Banerjee said that the Indian constitution adopted in
1950 had created a state which acted like a "trustee",
ruling over the peoples of India as a master rules over his
slaves. As a result of this and other iniquities, groups of
all kinds have begun demanding recognition and protection of
their own rights, languages, etc.
While the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru
had promised the establishment of a special Hill state in
Uttarakhand, and other prominent national leaders had done
the same, none of these promises have been fulfilled. The
demand for Uttarakhand state was a non-partisan one, he
said, and politicians from a wide variety of parties have
endorsed the demand. The Communist Party of India leader,
Prof. P.C. Joshi, supported the demand as early as 1952, he
noted.
Mr. Banerjee then turned to the politics of reservations,
which, he argued, has played an enormous role in giving an
impetus to the present struggle of the Uttarakhandis. He
said that reservations for Dalits and lower castes had
nothing to do with their social or economic upliftment but
was mainly a way for politicians to create vote banks for
themselves. "The carrot of social emancipation always
remains tantalizingly out of reach for the poorest and most
oppressed" he said, while an impression is created that
something is being done to help them. In 1994, the U.P.
government raised the percentage of jobs reserved for lower
castes from 27 percent to 50 percent. This was despite the
fact that the existing quota had not been filled, and was
clearly a political move aimed at increasing the support of
the government in the plains regions of U.P., Mr. Banerjee
contended. The Chief Minister's plan was to fill the vacant
jobs in Uttarakhand with people from the plains. As a
result of the governments new policy to extend reservations,
students in the Uttarakhand region went on an indefinite
strike, fearing that it would be even more difficult for
them to find jobs upon graduation.
Because of the police brutality unleashed upon them, the
parents of the students also got drawn into the movement,
and soon the protests crystallized into the demand for a
separate state of Uttarakhand. Mr. Banerjee then gave
specific examples of the kind of brutality unleashed by the
police. On September 1, 1994, a dozen demonstrators were
killed at Khatima, and the next day, in Mussourie, another
five people were killed and scores more injured in firing by
the U.P. Provincial Armed Constabulary. Then, on October 2,
1994, more than 10,000 peaceful demonstrators who were
heading for New Delhi to take part in a protest, were
illegally detained by the police in Muzzafarnagar and
attacked. Twenty women were raped and hundreds more
molested. It was this outrage, more than anything else,
which served to catapult the Uttarakhand region onto the
national stage. But despite the gravity of the police's
actions, Mr. Banerjee noted, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao
remained silent and refused to take any action.
Mr. Banerjee also drew attention to the prominent role
played by women in the struggle for Uttarakhand (as well as
against social problems like alcoholism), and said that
police actions like that which took place at Muzzafarnagar,
seemed intended to humiliate and intimidate them.
In the discussion which followed, Mr. Banerjee said that if
the government stops treating people who are demanding their
rights as "secessionists" and "terrorists" and refrains from
using force, the problems in Punjab, Kashmir and elsewhere
would not have taken a bloody turn.
In response to another question, he said that all parties,
including the BJP, which had once supported the creation of
Uttarakhand, have betrayed the people of the region.
PANEL DISCUSSION ON BEIJING CONFERENCE
On September 30, 1995 the IPSG held a panel discussion
consisting of delegates from several organizations who had
attended the Fourth World Conference on Women, and the
parallel NGO Forum.
Mallika Dutt of the Center for Women's Global Leadership
gave an overview of the three previous World Conferences on
Women in 1975, 1980 and 1985, in Mexico City, Copenhagen and
Nairobi respectively. She went on to explain the role that
different women's groups have played at the four UN
conferences held since the end of the Cold War, at Rio in
1992 (Environment), Vienna in 1993 (Human Rights), Cairo in
1994 (Population), and Copenhagen in 1995 (Social Summit).
"The Platform for Action, adopted in Beijing, was a
summation of many of the provisions won through years of
lobbying by diverse women's groups", said Dutt, recounting
her own experiences at these conferences. She noted that
over the years, a global women's movement has evolved, which
has articulated an agenda that is not limited to "women's
only" issues anymore, but lobbies for all issues affecting
society at large.
Anita Nair, of the Women's Empowerment and Development
Organization (WEDO) explained the process by which the final
draft of the Platform for Action was adopted. In her
comments, she said that the Platform is not "a perfect
document", but marks an advance in the struggle for women's
rights. However, she remarked that issues such as the
globalization of the economy, foreign debt, and structural
adjustments were not addressed properly. Nair gave a vivid
and first-hand description of the specific negotiations done
in the final days of the Conference in Beijing and explained
how different women's organizations worked through the
Linkage Caucus, and lobbied to get specific language
included in the Platform for Action.
Inji Islam, also of WEDO, detailed her own experience at the
negotiations, on sections dealing with the environment and
monetary commitments, where she noted that there was a wide
gulf between the North and the South. She said that women
from around the world came to Beijing with many novel ideas,
and "pushed the debate beyond the limits" set by the
Platform for action, even though not everyone was involved
in the debate on its language. Her organization ran
workshops to bring together people concerned about
militarism, globalization, health and environmental issues.
Sandhya Mishra of the AIPSG spoke of the successful AIPSG
workshop titled "Human Rights and Indian Women" at the NGO
Forum in Beijing and explained the five themes which were
discussed at the workshop. She appealed to people to look
critically at the record of "lobbying" as a means of ending
the marginalization of women. "Lobbying is what people have
been doing for decades, is it not time to discuss how to
renovate and modernize institutions and underlying theories
that keep people marginalized, in spite of lobbying?" asked
Ms. Mishra. She also called for a serious examination of
the slogan Women's Rights are Human Rights - "those
governments who recite this slogan most enthusiastically are
the very ones who are spearheading the cutbacks on social
spending that affect women," said Mishra. In her opinion,
the Beijing Platform for Action is not a plan for the
realization of human rights or women's rights. Instead, it
is intended only to "create opportunities" by strengthening
"civil society" or rights based on private property
relations worldwide. She remarked that there is imperative
to oppose the pressure of the West that everyone has to
adopt the values, methods, and definitions based upon the
"free market economy and pluralism".
Following the presentation, a lively discussion took place,
touching on several different themes. One issue that arose
was on the particularly harsh effects that the cutbacks in
education, health and other social services, as well as the
Structural Adjustment policies have on women globally. In
this context, there was discussion on the inadequacy of the
UN mechanism whereby the provisions contained in the Beijing
Platform for action and other UN declarations are not
legally enforceable even when a majority of governments have
approved them. Another issue that arose was the meaning of
the term "civil society" - in reference to its usage by,
among others, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, who
claimed the Platform for Action to be a "victory for civil
society." Several of the panelists also spoke about their
personal experiences in China during their stay.