

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Reminiscences of

Patricia L. Rosenfield

Columbia Center for Oral History

Columbia University

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## PREFACE

The following oral history is the result of a recorded interview with Patricia L. Rosenfield conducted by Ronald J. Grele on February 22, 2012, March 9, 2012 and September 24, 2012.

This interview is part of the Carnegie Corporation of New York Oral History Project.

The reader is asked to bear in mind that s/he is reading a verbatim transcript of the spoken word, rather than written prose.

3PM

Session #1

Interviewee: Patricia L. Rosenfield

Location: New York, NY

Interviewer: Ronald J. Grele

Date: February 22, 2012

Q: I wanted to take you back to 1998, when you had your earlier interview. And you had just gone through the transition, which you described rather interestingly. You said that it was particularly jarring, imposing, it was needlessly fraught with tension, et cetera. And I want to take you back to that moment in time and how that resolved itself.

In that interview you had just had a conversation with Dr. [Vartan] Gregorian. And he had talked to you about the scatteration of your program [Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries] and talked about being an armchair chair. And that's where we left off with that. You wanted to get it on the record as to what your program was doing that wasn't scatteration. And we never got around to being an armchair chair, but that was the point at which we left you.

Now, how did that resolve itself in terms of future conversations with Dr. Gregorian, through the McKinsey [& Company] report, through that period? Your thoughts on what that was all about.

Rosenfield: I'd have to start by saying recently Dr. Gregorian has been as generous and kind and wonderful to me as any employer has ever been, and even more so. This is not coloring my remembrance of that period. The resolution has been a huge amount of respect and affection, I think, on both sides. But that was a particularly fraught period for a number of reasons, and I wasn't, by far, the only one who felt that way.

But in terms of the critique of the program, it shows how different perspectives—someone who knew nothing about Africa and knew nothing about development—would view something, whereas under the previous tenure of [David A.] Hamburg and [Barbara D.] Finberg, it was considered the most strategic of all the programs. And the board was always very positive, very enthusiastic. I would get more money, I'd get more kudos. Even though we weren't talked about. The Education and Avoiding Nuclear War programs were still getting more attention. Every meeting, every review was over-the-top positive.

So I said: scatteration? Yes, we have a lot going on but it's all around the theme of access to knowledge and the mission of the organization. So I have a great deal of affinity for Frederick [P.] Keppel, whose chapter I've just finished revising in my book, because he was accused of the same thing. And he had the same response—I mean, I didn't know this in '98 and '97—that there's a big picture, and we're looking at how we fill in those missing elements of that picture to come up with a whole. And we had lots of strategy sessions.

So I couldn't accept that criticism: an armchair chair. I did not do as much traveling to Africa, having spent the previous ten years excessively traveling in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, because I had two staff members who wanted to travel all the time and I was always looking at budget. So I handled the U.S. stuff, they handled Africa, and we would share the European visits. So I went occasionally, but not so much. And so I just thought, this is someone who doesn't really—I couldn't accept that comment.

At the same time, he had something that I totally agreed with in that he wanted to have an African chair of the program. I couldn't agree more. I found the best African possible for him. And at the same time, scatteration for him meant you're not doing institutions, you're doing projects. We had a different perspective. And I have, as I've done the history, seen in a historical trajectory how it probably didn't fit in. It was much more a Ford Foundation program than a Carnegie Corporation [of New York] program. But that was Hamburg. It was very comfortable for Hamburg to have this program. Not only comfortable, but there was wild enthusiasm.

Gregorian narrowed it to funding universities and libraries. All the development stuff disappeared because he was focusing on institutions, which is what he was comfortable with. He knew universities and he knew libraries. And I said if that's what the president wants to do, that's within his prerogative. Now that I look at the history of Carnegie, it sort of zigs and zags between that approach, but universities were always there. Libraries less so in Africa but they were certainly there at the beginning.

So the evolution in my mind right away was: let's find the best person. Because I'm very loyal to the Africa part of the program because it's always fragile. Do we do away with it? There are some board members—and I probably said somewhere in that oral history—it was Warren [M.] Christopher, the [63<sup>rd</sup> United States] Secretary of State. Thank God he was appointed Secretary of State because he was going to do away with the Africa program. Not geopolitically important [spoken sarcastically].

So I said we'll find the best university person. And we did. As it turned out, Narciso Matos, who became the chair—and I don't know if you're going to be interviewing him—but he was the best choice. A senior university administrator. Our grantee as the head of the Association of African Universities. And he did a great job. And we got him here.

Q: What was the understanding of what would happen to you then?

Rosenfield: Well, I think basically—to be frank, Gregorian would have loved it if I had left. I know he would have. And I wasn't going to. I had a child who was growing up, I was in the middle of getting a divorce, I was not about to leave. And my grandmother had just died, my mother was very sick. I said, I don't need a new job and I love being at Carnegie Corporation. I feel that it's someplace where I—and it used to be you stay for five years, you're here for life. No one left unless they got a better position, and most people didn't leave.

And so he appointed a very nice man as vice-president, Neil [R.] Grabois. And they were going to do the [Carnegie] Scholars program. Now, I knew how to run a scholars program because when I was at WHO [World Health Organization], I had been very instrumental in our Ph.D. grants program.

Q: He hired Neil Grabois. But that as a result of the reorganization from the McKinsey report.

Rosenfield: No. Before McKinsey.

Q: It wasn't?

Rosenfield: No, he was—

Q: Organizationally, they had urged him—

Rosenfield: No, nobody paid attention to the McKinsey—

Q: Let's talk about that for a while.

Rosenfield: The McKinsey report had no impact, no impact. Except on the trustee part. The McKinsey report—these were novices. Thank goodness it was pro bono, and we got what we paid for. Pardon me, this is my perspective. It's never been mentioned.

It did change the trustees. It limited staff contact with the trustees. It changed the role of the trustees, not vis-à-vis their traditional role in policy setting. But it did change the relationship of staff to trustees. I think that's the main thing.

They were useless. Carter [F.] Bales, all those guys. I mean—just to explain how useless they were—and I don't mind who reads this part. Anybody can read this part. After they finished this report, Carter Bales calls me and he says, "Oh, I've just joined this NGO [nongovernmental organization] board." They didn't even know what NGO meant when they started. "I need some

help as to how to be a good board member on this not-for-profit board.” I said, are you kidding me? Are you kidding me, Carter Bales? And I see him from time to time.

What did they want us to do? They did not understand the nature of private grantmaking foundations in contrast to operating foundations. What they said—and everybody was aghast: you need to get in the trenches and do the work with the grantees. Carnegie, Ford, you don’t do that. If you think they’re [the grantees] good enough to get a grant, you may want to make site visits to make sure they’re doing it, you may want to evaluate them. But you’ve given them the money. The conflict of interest inherent in that statement! So it had no impact.

And I don’t know. On the hiring part, I have no idea. But he needed a vice president. He had one vice president, Ed [Edward M.] Sermier, but he was handling administration. He needed a program vice president.

Q: I’ve read it through, and what struck me was that it was kind of management consultant language for what foundations had historically been doing anyway.

Rosenfield: They were just giving back what we said to them anyways.

Q: Had they interviewed you for that?

Rosenfield: Oh, many times.



Q: Many times. What was the team like?

Rosenfield: Young. I mean, Carter Bales was the senior person at McKinsey. I believe he'd either helped Vartan at the [New York Public] Library and Brown [University], or just the Library. Pro bono. All pro bono. He's a distinguished person. He was very—

Q: I once interviewed—

Rosenfield: I mean, he's full of himself. He's a very nice man. I mean, I've seen him recently when he was doing something in [Co-operative Republic of] Guyana on the rain forest, and Norway. He's active. But he had these two or three—I know there was a man and a woman. There might have been another person, I don't remember. They knew nothing about philanthropy at all. They knew nothing about nonprofits. They really basically were cookie-cutter management consultants. And it completely changed my opinion of McKinsey. I mean, I never had a very positive opinion. We all were very—we said, well, if the new president wants to do this, we'll go along with it. Because everybody here is very good and loyal in that sense.

Q: When you say, we, you mean?

Rosenfield: I mean the staff.

Q: And Neil Grabois?

Rosenfield: I don't remember. It's an interesting question. I don't think so because Vartan had wanted to hire somebody in education to do the liberal arts part. And Vivien Stewart had been reading me the applications—who was acting vice president, and I may have gone into that story, but that's a story that has to be told. Has to be told. And has to be accurate because it really shaped everything in a negative way.

Anyway, Vivien was reading these resumes for the liberal arts position. And she said, oh, here's someone who was president of Colgate [University]. Maybe you should look at him for something else. And Vartan knew that Vivien was going to be on her way out. And I think traditionally we've always had a vice president—not always—but we've had a senior person running program, and Barbara Finberg had left. So Neil was hired in that. So I think that probably was—he came in '97, '98. I think he came in, '99, was it? Maybe it was '98, '99. But I never in my mind could connect it with the McKinsey report. It's possible. I'm not sure. I knew he needed to have a vice president, he knew he needed to have it, and he knew we needed to get rid of Vivien.

Q: Well, at the beginning of the report there's an organizational chart. And it shows the vice president—

Rosenfield: Maybe that's what we had. Maybe he was already here.

Q: Where he was slotted in. What were your first impressions of him? This was, in effect, the person who would be between you and the president.

Rosenfield: He seemed nice enough. I mean, and there was one big glitch that affected me badly in terms of secretarial support. But in terms of the program, he didn't know anything. At all. At all. But he was a very nice person. He knew nothing about philanthropy. He knew how to raise money. So we had two fundraisers at the top. No one who knew anything about philanthropy, except to get money from them. And some preconceived notions. But he was very nice. Very, very intelligent person. A mathematician, so very logical. But also very—I'd say Neil has, like Vartan, wide ranging interests, and very charming. They both have the charm. The fundraising presidents of universities need to have it in order to raise the money. Vartan is much more intellectual. Neil is much more, I would say, academic, in a sense.

Q: In one of his reports, which is kind of a biography, he admits to not knowing how the Corporation, or how a foundation, operated day by day.

Rosenfield: Not a clue. And how would they? No one knows. Can't know. It's my big thing that's coming up when I finish this book. You need people who know philanthropy if you want it to be effective. I mean, he lost a lot of time worrying about that. Worrying about David Hamburg, and these transitions—and that's a whole other thing I'll write about sometime—they're always fraught. And Hamburg didn't make it any easier, and I loved David Hamburg. And I grew to love Vartan Gregorian. It's just in the nature of the process. Not always has to happen that way, didn't always happen that way in the Corporation's history. But more recently it did.

And then he had the pressure from Vivien Stewart, who was constantly gathering negative things about Vartan thinking she would change the board and get them to fire him.

Q: Oh, really?

Rosenfield: Yes. This is why some people who really loved Vivien and David wanted nothing to do with them. Maggie [Margaret] Mahoney. I mean, Barbara Finberg was the victim in this process. I am sure anybody who knew Barbara was one hundred percent convinced if Barbara had stayed, Vartan Gregorian would have had smooth sailing right at the beginning. Because she was a tremendous institutional genius. She knew how to get things running. And not because she was, “Oh, we’ve always done it this way, we have to continue doing it.” She would’ve talked with Vartan, she would have seen what he wanted to do, and she would have made it happen in a gracious and effective way.

I’d say he lost three or four years because of not having someone working day in, day out with him who understood philanthropy, who understood how to deal with all these program people, what they actually did on a daily basis, on what grantmaking was at its core. But, I mean, he learned.

But for me, just coming back to what happened for me, I said, well, I can run the Scholars program. I know how to do this. This is easy compared to running this grants program. And it turns out they had gotten the letters out over the summer of ’99. The answers—he’d written to all

of his buddies, two hundred university presidents and provosts. The responses were in a box like this under somebody's desk.

And I said, you know, credibility of the Corporation—the Scholars program is a great idea. We'll revive our support for individuals, which we've not had since 1968 because of the tax thing. I can do that. So I convinced the two of them I should do it. And they gave me complete leeway to run the program. And they gave me Heather [S.] McKay as an assistant, you know, program—

[Interruption]

Q: Where did the idea for the Scholars program come?

Rosenfield: Vartan. Now, Vartan—

Q: He had that before he came.

Rosenfield: Really crucial thing for you to read to understand about his frustration and his genius—there are three documents. One is “1999 New Directions [for Carnegie Corporation of New York: A Report to the Board by Vartan Gregorian]”. The first is his publication—I don't know. It was the annual report essay, the first one from '98. '97, '98. “New Directions” has it laid out in there.

And then there's another series that came out in the summer of '98, which is, as far as I'm concerned, the most brilliant restructuring of a foundation that I have ever seen. Should be implemented. And when I found this, I found this in some files—where he was going to make it one Carnegie. And he was going to do away with all the divisions, and he was going to have every program person work on domestic and international, and be a truly global foundation. It would have been revolutionary at the time. He would have had some difficulties.

I read that as a June strategy paper from him, draft. By that fall it was gone. I don't know what happened. I've tried to push him on it. I said, here's the document—what happened? What happened? And he said, we'll talk about it some time. But it was brilliant. When I saw that this summer—

Q: I saw that, where he was going to have this restructuring.

Rosenfield: But this is not recently. This was '97, '98, when he was going to—'98, '99.

Anyway, so that was too bad, because that was the right thing. And someone dissuaded him from doing it.

Q: Did he ever talk to you about where he had gotten the idea for the Scholars program?

Rosenfield: Oh, I think it's his individual interest. No, I never asked him. I mean, it would be interesting to ask him where he got that idea from. I think it's really individual scholarship. He's very—he's a big believer in individual scholars.

The one thing he had also wanted, which I'm really sorry he was constrained—restrained from implementing—was having a group of—it would have made him feel so much more comfortable about the ideas and the work. He was going to get wise advisers to work with him. It became academic advisers, and I used them. They became my reviewers for the Scholars program, and very wonderful people. And he had chosen very well. And the Education Program used them. I inherited some of the Education Program ones. And the others were—[International] Peace and Security used them.

I mean, it was a great idea to bring in some new ideas and new blood. And he didn't fire anybody. I mean, if I had wanted to leave, he would have been thrilled. He was not about to fire anybody because that was, of course, the reputation that all presidents since Frank [Franklin A.] Thomas had been laboring under. We don't want to be Frank Thomas, poor guy.

Q: One of the things about the reports is his rather constant mention of continuity. He seemed to have been worried about continuity and wanted to assure whoever the reader was that there was a certain continuity about this.

Rosenfield: Because Hamburg—I mean, I see [Alan J.] Pifer as completely changing the—he completely changed Carnegie Corporation over his tenure. Then Hamburg comes in and

drastically changes it, putting in programs where there were no programs. Program chairs, all the structure, restructure—redid the ideas. Still some continuity.

Gregorian knew all that history. I mean, that he was aware of. And he wanted to keep continuity. He did not want to be seen to be overturning Hamburg's programs. He kept tremendous continuity in the Peace and Security area.

It was only Africa. And that's because Africa is the one place where everybody feels that they can—which is really a pity, because we had a huge program change—and it started with Pifer's later years. Had we kept up the early Pifer years, we would have a much more vibrant program in Africa. Actually, one Gregorian would have been—I never would have joined. But Gregorian would've loved it because it was all universities and teaching. Not library, but the university and teaching and the education process.

Q: He mentioned the earlier Carnegie program. And there's a thing in there where in order to restart the program, you had to consult the IRS [Internal Revenue Service]?

Rosenfield: For the Scholars program? Yes. Because you can't—because of individual scholars. It's complicated because the 1969 tax law [U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1968]—

Q: Because all kinds of foundations had individual scholar programs. No?



Rosenfield: No. Guggenheim. The Harry Frank Guggenheim, and the John Simon Guggenheim, you have to get special permission to do it. And it has to be related to a program strategy or mission or something. Because in the 1969 tax law, I mean the whole hearings in '68 emerged because—and Alan Pifer is really eloquent about this, and nasty about McGeorge [Bundy] because of his funding his friends. So that led to doing away—everybody had to drop their scholars programs. And they became, in the context, because they went through institutions, or they were very announced like the Population and Development Program that Rockefeller [Foundation] and Pop [Population] Council had. And Ford had an announced program. You have to really make a big deal, and you always have to get IRS approval for an individual program. Because you're making grants directly to the individual, not to an institution. And that set us apart. I loved that. That was really great. It was a very different—

Q: But Carnegie stopped the Scholars program in '68.

Rosenfield: We had it through the Travel Grants Program, and then we had grants-in-aid that we did, funded to individuals, all gone. You had to. You had—I mean, it wasn't even possible to do. The IRS rules hadn't been worked out.

Basically, Vartan redid it. And we had always been funding. I mean, there's Andrew Carnegie saying: “[F]ind the effective man and give him what he needs.” And that was a theme. We always were funding creative people. [John W.] Gardner makes a big deal about it. Gardner does, but Keppel makes a big deal of it. Everybody. And so Vartan did do that, and it was thrilling. Ten years of really a fabulous program.

I know it's going to be the legacy.

Q: Through our conversation so far, this has come up tangentially in many ways, comparing Hamburg and Gregorian. What are your thoughts on that?

Rosenfield: Very different. I mean, night and day. Hamburg is a medical doctor and a psychiatrist. And Gregorian is a historian. So right away, although a psychiatrist gets into patient histories—they have some common traits, actually, which maybe people who become foundation presidents all share.

But basically, Hamburg came in totally passionate about a few ideas that he wanted, that he only would accept and it's clear in the record—the leadership of the foundation. And he was on the board, so he knew what he was getting into—if they would go ahead with direct work in Russia and the nuclear weapons stuff. Now, he thought this was radical. Everybody on the board thought it was radical.

What they didn't know was in the 1950s we were doing atomic energy. We had the Russian Research Center. But we did more than that. So I step back and look at it as a historian, and it really wasn't that radical. And I've actually talked with Hamburg about this. Nobody knew. I mean, maybe Barbara Finberg knew, but nobody was going to say to him: it's not that radical, but it's great that you're doing it.

But in any case, he was passionate about those ideas. He wanted to restructure. He wanted to make this more like a university environment with chairs and programs like that. But he was an extremely kind and humane person, and bending over backwards for individuals. At the same time, he was totally motivated by important people. He and Vartan both. Different kind. Political types. Very geared towards making a difference in the policy realm.

I would say Gregorian is much more—and now I get to Gregorian—much more geared to making a difference in the idea realm. Has only gradually gotten into the policy part. But really shaped around—and in terms of the mission of the Corporation, Hamburg is much more on the “do we make a difference?” That charge to the board by [Andrew] Carnegie? “Do what’s right for the time.” And Gregorian is: advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding.

So we have a very extraordinarily active dissemination program, which we had in part under Hamburg, but an unbelievably gold standard dissemination program that Vartan introduced. Hamburg was disseminating to Congress and to presidents. I mean, he would meet with the President. But really meet with secretaries of state. He knew them all. And U.N. [United Nations] people. We were very much at the high policy level.

Q: Yes, that was his [unclear] wasn’t it?

Rosenfield: It was his. And very comfortable. Gregorian doesn’t need that. He likes important scholars, and so important people matter. They’re both into Nobel Prize winners. But on

literature—you know, different ones. And Gregorian is really much more into the scholar, whereas Hamburg was more into the policy research.

But very different leadership style. He was very willing to delegate. Gregorian is not comfortable with delegation.

Q: I was going to ask about the relations between him and the staff.

Rosenfield: Hamburg was a little distant in the sense that he had Barbara Finberg. He didn't need to be day to day involved. But I loved meetings with him as chair because we would always—and I knew him beforehand. I mean, basically, I knew him as both sharing a deep interest in social science and health work. So it was a different relationship. But he had a good relationship with all of the leadership, the program leadership. And it was a very positive kind of—it was very well run because of Barbara Finberg and the committee that she had with Jean [Jeanmarie C.] Grisi and Dorothy [W.] Knapp and Dee [Idalia] Holder. The four ladies ran it like—I mean, there were always issues. There were some personnel issues. There was some—it was more of a kind of white glove kind of place. But it was a very well run, thoughtful place.

Under Gregorian it's a little more—idiosyncratic I think is the word—based on his interests. And very geared towards—I mean, I would say the vice presidents he's hired or promoted are—there are too many of them. He's got too many layers. And I don't know whether he's comfortable, but he's still very hands on. So it's a very—Hamburg was not hands on. He only critically commented on one grant that I ever made. And only in some cases—I mean, he had a lot of what

we called “Hamburg specials” [grants] that you had to do. We have Gregorian specials, too.

Presidents all do this. But he would be insistent on them. Gregorian is more understanding that maybe some of them don’t fit, and he would—but Gregorian is—mercurial is the word.

Mercurial is the word in terms of staff relations, human relations.

Q: How does that play out organizationally?

Rosenfield: It makes it unpredictable. We have a lot of continuity because everybody works hard at it, in the big picture continuity. The day to day, it’s a little more challenging. But he is, to his credit, the one thing that he’s done—and this has created the upsetness—and I used to talk with him about this. He always was asking questions. Because I could see it, and I felt the Scholars program was always a little bit out of it and separate, and we worked directly with him and Neil and I didn’t really have to report to any program person. Which was great until it changed.

He said in, I think it was either the “New Directions”—yes, it was the “New Directions”—that he liked to ask questions. And he made a list of all the kinds of questions. Because he’s, at heart, a professor—I can see why his students would love him. As I’ve talked with him about the ideas in the book, he raises very challenging comments. And I feel I’m the only person here who has been able, one of the few people, anyway, to talk to him. On a scholarly level he’s fabulous. He must’ve been a great university president. He’s got these ideas. He makes connections.

It’s not the administrative stuff. That’s not his strength. And he wants it to be his strength because he knows that’s—but his strength is the ideas that he has. And he doesn’t always have

the confidence of his ideas to put them into play. And what he said in his “New Directions” was the questions that he asked and the ideas that put forth—the journalism, the Islam—it took him years to get some of them into place. And he should have just said, as he did without any hesitation with the Africa program, I want you to do universities and libraries. Everything else goes by the wayside.

He should have done that with other things. He might have been—it was honest. He was very honest with the Africa program, I think. I thought it was dishonest to the import of the program, but it was what he wanted.

But the questions, they were very fair. Why are you doing this? How does this relate to your mission, or to your objectives, your goals? How are you making connections across these? And a whole series, laid out, and he would proceed to ask them. And people would get very upset because they weren't used to being questioned this way. We were never—and all of a sudden, somebody was asking questions. And so he laid it out.

And I would say to people, he said—there's no lack of transparency here. It's right here. Read what he's written. And we had to have a retreat in June of 2002, when people were so upset. But he was being who he said he was. He was very—

Q: People were upset about the unpredictability?

Rosenfield: Well, no, he'd ask all these questions: "Who is he to ask these questions? And why is he always asking me the same question? Why doesn't he know the strategy?" Well, yes, but he wants to make sure you're relating it. And so I feel that he needed a vice president.

And Neil, sweet as he was, could not defend—it wasn't his role to defend him—but couldn't explicate this in a way that would make it reasonable for staff. He was ineffectual. Very, very smart, nice person, but very ineffectual. He just didn't want to counter Gregorian. We had this wonderful Council on Evaluation, which I was the rapporteur for with Neil as his special adviser. That's the other thing—I became Neil's special advisor. So I worked daily with him and moved over here and was part of his team.

We never implemented any—

Q: That's for evaluating the whole of the Corporation.

Rosenfield: We had a great team. We'd have program people. Very honest. It was the only place in the Corporation where people felt really comfortable saying what they thought. And that's to Neil's credit. And we never did anything with it. Eight years of doing nothing with it. Brilliant stuff. It just sat. It was for him—and I felt, as his special adviser, I couldn't say: this is how you implement it. We wrote memos about it, but he had to take—he didn't want to do it. Now we have an evaluation, which is not so different from what he put forward, but it was a lot of rigmarole and much more expensive to get there.

Q: How did he relate to the trustees compared to Hamburg?

Rosenfield: Oh, the trustees loved both of them. Loved both of them. Which, if I were a president, I'd be a little nervous. Hamburg era—this is “Carnegie University”—David Hamburg is the most wonderful thing since sliced bread. We've learned so much, we love it, we adore it. Very, very close working relationships with staff. And Hamburg put trustees on all sorts of commissions, made them co-chairs, really got them intimately involved in the work of the Corporation. Which, now that I look at things, I think actually was a very smart thing to do.

But some of them began to think—I think, and this is what led to the changes from McKinsey—some of them may have thought: “Are we being co-opted? Can we be honest? Here I am co-chairing this thing on education, but supposing I don't really like what they're doing, am I now in a position to critique what I'm co-chairing?” Uncomfortable.

So even towards the end, although it was love, love, love, love-fest with Hamburg, I think they gave Gregorian the go-ahead to do things differently. Now, they also—but what they're saying now is, “We love you. Gregorian is so brilliant, Gregorian is so marvelous.”

I would be very nervous. Not nervous, I would just be concerned. That kind of language, when trustees start going over the top, you never know. I mean, they're not involved in the same way. Gregorian talks to them all the time. He has a different board. We have fewer scholars on it. We have university presidents, but we won't—Hamburg brought in some very deep scholars, building on the activists that Pifer had brought in.



Q: Right. I noticed that change. There's a lot of university presidents up there now.

Rosenfield: And some of them are wonderful—Amy Gutmann and Dick [Richard H.] Brodhead, probably contenders for the next presidency. Putting that in there now, see if I'm right. They're very, very deeply intelligent people, and would be perfect Carnegie presidents, actually.

Q: You mentioned Vivien Stewart going to the board. That's always a problem for the president of a foundation, with staff running to the trustees.

Rosenfield: Something snapped with Hamburg. This is my reading of this. And probably this will mean I close this forever. Not forever and ever, but until everybody's not here anymore. But it's actually what happened. And I'm sure others would confirm it.

Hamburg had not done anything about succession. He announced that he was going to—we had this retreat in 2005. And it's an early announcement that he's leaving. Nobody expected him to do it, but he was turning 70. It's interesting—Pifer decided to do this when he was turning 60. Keep edging it up, Gregorian's going to do it when he turns 80. So it's very, very interesting. I mean, I'm pretty sure he will.

And Hamburg opens it up. We had a great, fabulous retreat. The board loves the programs. Everything was extraordinarily positive. And they start the search process. I am not sure when Frank Thomas put Susan [V.] Berresford in as president, who was his right hand person. I think

that had been either right before or during this process. Must have been before. No, it was maybe during, because '90—No. It was—

Q: Somewhere around there, yes.

Rosenfield: Little earlier. But anyway, Hamburg didn't think about doing that. It was earlier because he could have done that with Vivien. Vivien was his fair-haired child, was his protégé. And it would've been a smooth process. Vivien would have probably been a very good president, in a different fashion.

Anyway, come 1996, where they're appointing—I mean, the committee is working. He announces at the board meeting not only his date of retirement, but he announces that Barbara Finberg—not to her knowledge, she was not informed—was going to retire with him. Never her intention. Her intention was to stay through the transition. And he was appointing Vivien Stewart acting vice president. Sealed Vivien's fate. Hadn't consulted with anybody as far as I know. Probably, maybe the board chair.

Barbara. Everybody immediately became protective about Barbara because she had a recurrence of cancer. And also was the right person to handle the transition. Vivien didn't have that kind of gravitas. And then they appoint, at the end of that year, Gregorian, who was not the person they had been talking about. Bob [Robert E.] Rubin, Donna [E.] Shalala, all dear buddies, dear buddies.

Q: Did you read Gretchen Morgensen [and Joshua Rosner's book on the real estate crisis, *Reckless Endangerment*]?

Rosenfield: Oh, I like her stuff.

Q: In there she's talking about James [A.] Johnson and Fannie Mae. And she claims that James Johnson was pushing Robert Rubin to become president, and that's one of the reasons why it took a long time—because there was a real struggle on the board.

Rosenfield: No, no. We all loved Robert Rubin. We all loved him. He was a fabulous board member. Had he been the Carnegie president—this is missed history—he might have been pushing Africa. He was big on South Africa. He and his wife were doing fabulous stuff on urban redevelopment. He was a very dedicated board member. He came to board meetings. He was instrumental on the finance committee. Everybody on staff would have been thrilled if it had been—and he was very nice. One of the ones on the Board who would make a point to know your name, to talk with you. Just because he was Bob Rubin, he didn't—there were no airs with him. And his wife, Jill, I think is her name, very nice also. Very friendly.

So he was a perfect—we all thought he would be the perfect president. This is really important for the record, for people to know: staff were thrilled at the idea.

Q: Well, the way it was presented in the book is like it came out of nowhere.

Rosenfield: No. Absolutely not. He was on the board for years, eight years. And the only thing holding it up was he had to decide: did he want to stay in government or not? And if he wasn't going to be reappointed, he would have been Carnegie president. With everybody's thrill at approval. No, it's just unbelievable.

Q: You might want to look at the little section in the book.

Rosenfield: I will. How can they—and Johnson was an excellent board member. I have to say, he was very difficult. He asked really tough questions. You had no idea the nonsense he was up to. I mean, he paid particular interest in the Africa program. He and Vincent [A.] Mai would ask very tough and great questions. I loved it. I loved it because it gave me a chance to speak at the board meetings.

But Donna Shalala was the other one. And she might have been less—there was less enthusiasm for her. Bob Rubin was really everybody's candidate of choice, and we were very disappointed when he went. And Gregorian had been looked at by the committee and not interviewed. And he had been pushed. The rumor is that he was pushed by Jim—I'm putting all this gossip in.

Q: Who?

Rosenfield: This is gossip, gossip. Had been pushed by Jim [James D.] Wolfensohn, who was his best friend and who felt, why are you taking so long? Don't get Bob Rubin, get this guy. He can be the best. And so they appointed him.

Vivien went ballistic. Because I think she thought, and Hamburg might have—no, when Bob Rubin couldn't take it, he decided to become Secretary of Treasury again—I think she thought, and Hamburg thought, that he could appoint her president. And the board wasn't going to have anything to do with it. Because he didn't groom her. He didn't present her in that way. And it was such an afterthought.

I mean, poor Hamburg, because he was a great president, he was a really great president. But he was not fair to Barbara Finberg. Pushed her out without even talking. She looked as surprised as anybody at the board meeting. It was terrible. And then he puts Vivien in an untenable position.

And then Vivien starts to collect all this nasty stuff about Vartan and tries to share it with the board—this was dumb, on everybody's part—thinking she could get the board to change their mind before he actually came in July of '97. And then she tried to undermine—

Q: That stuff tends to happen.

Rosenfield: And she tried to undermine—I mean, I have notes from that. And I'm thinking, of course, when I went back to write the chapter, I was looking at it and I said, I don't want to relive this period. It was not great.

And I feel for Vartan, and that's why I forgive him a lot in terms of me, personally, at the earliest stages. I mean, he was fine. More or less fine. I'll go into the running of the Scholars program,

which could have been much more effective if I had been allowed to run it as a real program. We'll talk about that. But he had a lot of dirty pool. You know, it wasn't fair. And I always feel this way.

He'll never say this, he will never say this—but I think he's had to overcome what is unfair. And it wasn't necessary. It just was not necessary. And it was laid in motion, set in motion by the previous president.

Q: In your last interview you said that at that point in time that he would now have the possibility of selecting five new trustees. That there had been that number of resignations, et cetera, that was going to open.

Rosenfield: Retirement, no resignations.

Q: First of all, it raises the question, in Carnegie, do the presidents select the trustees?

Rosenfield: There's a nominal trustee committee. All the way through, the president has been very much in charge. Even Keppel, when the trustees—there was no staff— and the board members were very powerful. I mean, it was a joint effort then. But gradually presidents would find them. It's a Committee on Trustees, I think it's called, or Nominations. And they make the final decision. But basically, if the president wants somebody, they come in.

Q: Those first trustees that he brought on—and I think I’m correct: James [B.] Hunt [Jr.], Geoffrey [T.] Boisi, Ruth [J.] Simmons, and Bruce [M.] Alberts.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: Those are the four I have.

Rosenfield: I mean, I don’t remember the dates. I have—

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: They were reasonable. I mean, they covered different—Geoffrey Boisi was going through problems with Chase [Manhattan Bank]—the merger stuff. But he was a good finance person. Ruth Simmons was president of Smith [College] at the time, and a very distinguished scholar.

We needed people of color. Ruth [J.] Hamilton had died. She was a wonderful board member, an African-American from Michigan, a brilliant lady. James Hunt was a big educator and former governor. So they were in keeping with the kinds of people that we would have.

Q: Many years ago I interviewed Tom [Thomas H.] Kean—

Rosenfield: Oh, I loved Tom Kean.

Q: While he was an Assemblyman in New Jersey.

Rosenfield: Oh, really? Oh my goodness.

Q: Oh, yes. It was really early on.

Rosenfield: Yes, he was just getting started.

Q: I'll tell you some time about that. But I'm going to interview him again. I would assume that he and Gregorian get along very well.

Rosenfield: I don't think there's anybody in this world that Tom Kean doesn't really get along with. Because he's got a very balanced—first of all, he's extremely confident. He knows who he is. And he gave a very good talk. One of the meetings that Hamburg had on education where Bill Clinton had talked. It was a very big—we had a lot of big, big, big meetings under him.

Oh, there's another—I do have to mention this because it's a style thing. It's also very, very important between Hamburg and Gregorian. Tom Kean talked about when he was growing up and how he stuttered. And how there was a teacher who got him out of it, and how it changed him. And it was such—I mean, to have the governor of New Jersey talk about—at the time, it must have been in the mid-'90s—talk about this in such a humane way. And he just, it was a



wonderful, warm—and I've talked with him. I don't know him that well, but I really admire him. And he just is a wise and judicious person. And he's been a low-key board chair.

I mean, Helene [L.] Kaplan is a superstar of all board chairs. I mean, she should be training board chairs.

Q: Now, she came on with Hamburg?

Rosenfield: No. She came on with Pifer. She was on the search committee that chose Hamburg, but she was there are several years before. She was on the board. She was the longest—I think she, outside of the early years where board members had no terms, I think since the mid-'60s she's the longest serving board member. And who keeps coming back.

Anybody would want her on their board. She's also wise, judicious, organized. Tom doesn't ask questions so much. He does to some extent, but she will read everything—and I'm sure he reads everything. And he's been board chair twice. Hamburg loved him, and Gregorian. So you can see two people can both respect, adore, and use him in constructive ways.

I just have to mention for the record here the style changes. Hamburg—

Q: Oh, I was going to ask you about style.

Rosenfield: Very different style. And appropriate for the era. So there was the '80s and '90s, the exuberance. We would have the most fabulous board dinners. Under the whale at the American [Museum of Natural History]—Hamburg was on the board of the Museum of Natural History.

Hamburg also “made” a lot of people. He would find jobs, even when he fired someone, he would find a really good job for them. And then they might not like him, but at least they'd be appreciative. But he was on this American Museum of Natural History board where he brought Helene on the board. He really helped Helene once they started working together at Carnegie—they'd even reach out even further than she was.

I mean, there were no expenses spared. The annual Christmas party was in the Rainbow Room at the Pegasus Suite. But this was the '80s and '90s, and we spent a lot of money on this stuff. Everybody had limousines. It was just over the top. Staff members—the program senior staff would be there, spouses. He'd invite lots of people from the outside. We always had flowers downstairs.

Gregorian comes in. What is the first thing he does? This is not a way to win friends, but he comes in as a university president. There's Don [Donald] Kennedy at Stanford [University]—flowers in the house? Gets excoriated by the IRS and gets fired. So the flowers disappear. And, why are the flowers gone? It's a nice thing to have—well, they were expensive. It was a very stringent financial movement. And, of course, then the '90s get worse and worse. Then in 2000 there was the dot com thing.

None of these board parties—we had a few—now we have them here. I mean, it was just not as glamorous at all. But it's fun. So his style is much more financially rigorous—not rigorous, stringent.

Q: He, in that biographical piece, he talks how he brought with him a feeling of scarcity, as a university president. And that he was kind of overwhelmed with an entirely different kind of stuff. But you still have tea.

Rosenfield: Tea was introduced by Frederick Keppel. Let me set the record straight. It was not introduced by Andrew Carnegie. It was a Frederick Keppel innovation. He said, for fifteen minutes in the afternoon, we all go down—this was the staff, there were mainly his assistants and some ladies—and we're going to find out how everybody's families are doing. It was really just to talk about family. Everybody went. And then they went back to their offices. Even if they had visitors they would go to tea. And that's the tradition. Frederick Keppel, who's my hero of this foundation. The hero of the Foundation, besides Andrew Carnegie.

So it's a very different style in terms of values. And Hamburg, were he president now in this era, he probably would be the same way. Because you really can't, with all the IRS investigations and Sarbanes-Oxley and all that. That hadn't happened. It was a very different set of values that were being promoted. Not that anybody ever abused anything, but it was a more [unclear].

Q: I want to ask you some questions about program. But before we get into it, Gregorian at one point points out that the reputation of Carnegie far exceeds its resources.

Rosenfield: That's always been the case. Keppel says that this is because—and there's a great quote that I hope will stay in my Keppel chapter—because we think very carefully, we stick to mission. Very important. We're one of the few foundations where the mission—I mean, everybody has a mission. Ours is downstairs on the wall when you walk in: the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding. It's not a service organization. It is an ideas organization. It's building institutions to promote those ideas. It's disseminating them in various means.

It gives you great guidance as to what to do and how to do it, and where are your comparative advantages. We know where our comparative advantage is. Now, we may have a few grants that go outside of that. And we do have the charge from Andrew Carnegie that says: I have confidence in my trustees, should they choose. They will be wise and good men, and they will know if—they'll change the themes, but they're not changing the mission.

And you see with Ford and Rockefeller right now, where their mission is down the tubes. They just—the benefit of mankind, [unclear] Rockefeller's. It's also broad enough, but it's always—

Q: What do you mean, down the tubes?

Rosenfield: It doesn't seem relevant. They're not serving mission, in a sense. It's other ideas. It's very much of the moment. Well, Carnegie is of the moment, but through our comparative

advantage. We don't chase pipe dreams, in a sense. We may have great ideas, and take high risks.

Hamburg also was a big risk taker. Hamburg was a very big risk taker. Gregorian is not a risk taker. We did a lot of very risky things. Hamburg met with [Mikhail S.] Gorbachev when it was very risky—it was okay, he made sure he informed everybody. But he told the board—and I found this material, and it's never been talked about, and I hope it stays in that chapter, it will stay in that chapter—Hamburg informed the board that this is a big risk that we're doing, and it could blow up in our face. But we have to do it. Because if we don't do it with this particular group, we miss a real opportunity.

And he reported to everybody, and it turned out to be highly positive. I mean, he knew what he was doing. And the other characteristic that Hamburg had, which very few people had—and Gregorian does not have this side, and I know no one else who is like this—he will think of avoiding nuclear war, and he'll know where it has to be at the end point, and he knows the steps needed to get there.

So that's why the programs were very strategic, even my Africa program. Because we knew where we wanted to be. And we would talk about it. We didn't call it strategy. We said this is how we get there. These are the benchmarks that we'll look at. We didn't have evaluation. It was—we knew it. There was a lot of very savvy programmatic thinking, and Barbara Finberg was instrumental in this. Instrumental in knowing this.

But that's why she and Hamburg worked so well together. Because he knew the path to take to get there. He knew we may need to deviate a little bit. Barbara knew how to handle those deviations and also had to keep us on track. Gregorian's not been blessed with that. I mean, Hamburg was blessed with Barbara Finberg.

Q: When you say he knew the end, is it fair to say that Gregorian has a much more ambivalent idea of what the end will be? That the end is be more open and fluid?

Rosenfield: Right. Now, in this complex system that we're in today, it's always been—you don't know. I mean, I do a lot of work on complexity theory. You don't know where the end is. It's how you deal with the emergent properties. And so I'm not sure that anybody knows how to deal with them. But you get the framing questions right. So it's a very different era.

Hamburg came in at the Cold War, at the end. We didn't know it was the tail-end of the Cold War. It wasn't the end of the Cold War until into his tenure. And there was Apartheid. There were some big, hot button issues. Gregorian didn't have those hot button—I mean, September 11 [September 11, 2001 attacks] hadn't happened—it did happen, but it was a few years into his tenure.

I don't know how—I mean, I really shouldn't even speculate, and I haven't thought about it. How would have Hamburg handled September 11? This is the ambivalence of Gregorian. How do you respond to that? It took us a couple of years to figure out how to respond. I think we did the right things. I had called—Helene Kaplan and I talked about it, and she had suggested that

maybe—she had suggested to me, and I suggested—well, maybe Channel Thirteen, because there were towers—so we ended up doing that.

But there are some things that—and then he did the libraries and the schools. Probably not the most significant thing to do. But it was down there, and it was a way of showing support for Lower Manhattan.

Q: I was going to ask this later, but it sounds like a good place to put it in. It struck me during the reading that very early on, there were two events that seemed to be crucial in thinking. And one was September 11, and the other was the [U.S. Presidential] election of 2000, which is kind of always mentioned in the [Strengthening U.S.] Democracy Program as the shock to the system.

Rosenfield: Gregorian wasn't comfortable with the Democracy Program. It's interesting. That's really shifted too. And he wasn't originally comfortable with the immigrants. Geri [Geraldine P.] Mannion has done a fabulous job of bringing him around. A traditional theme—from day one of Carnegie Corporation, Andrew Carnegie, of course, very interested. So this is a long-term, one hundred year interest. But not the way it was going. And campaign finance reform, which was a big issue—of course, continues to be a big issue.

And the Democracy Program. He made Geri chair. I mean, that's something. He gave it, made it. Strengthen American, U.S. democracy. It was a big—that's interesting. George Bush.

I was chair of the Scholars program then, and Africa—actually, some of us in the field think that Africa always does better under a Republican president, which is interesting, because there's less trying to tell Africans what to do. Republicans are more laissez-faire about it, which is the way to—I have to say, what Vartan instituted for the Africa program, in terms of the university—which came out of discussions that we had, although I give him credit, because he did it—was having university vice chancellors give us their program university strategic plans and fund within their parameters, as opposed to our parameters. Very important change, which we could talk about some other time. So I think that was a big difference.

Q: As I said, we can talk about this later—

Rosenfield: But I would say September 11 was more—well, only the election of 2000 was important because it dealt with the aftermath of September 11 in a way that made it—that we had to deal with.

Q: I sense—it's kind of interesting because I'm going to be interviewing Geri. And my research has concentrated on you and on Geri. So that may be why I see those two points.

Rosenfield: Well, Geri is always very political in that. And Geri is the most out there of all the staff members, crossing boundaries as much as she can get away with. So she's always pushing the boundaries. I pushed it in Africa, she's pushing it in the U.S. And I like Geri a lot. I respect her enormously. Very effective, but not always very strategic. And she isn't strategic. Actually,



strategy is not part of her thing. She really sees the issues and what to do about them, but she doesn't necessarily—strategy isn't—her strong point.

Q: The first restructuring seems to be for programs—Education, HRDC [Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries], Democracy, Special Projects, and International Peace and Security. Was that just a reformulation? Or—

Rosenfield: It was exactly that.

Q: Or did that actually mean new directions?

Rosenfield: No.

Q: Ah, that's what I figured.

Rosenfield: Africa was the only one that had new directions. Everything else was exactly the same. Education began to change slowly, but Peace and Security was a Hamburg program. Strengthening U.S. Democracy was just taking what had been Special Projects and putting it in—Special Projects became a little bit different, but more special Special Projects.

Q: It was old wine in new bottles.

Rosenfield: Yes, it was old wine in new bottles. And I think he'd agree. I mean, I don't think he'd want—I mean, that was this concept of continuity. And basically, we had not had a Democracy program. It had been—I mean, he built up something that was appropriate actually.

And what he did begin to do in—I mean, here's the mercurial—but why not be honest about it at the beginning? He kept the early childhood focus in Education, hired a good person for that, and then said, after the person had worked on a program paper: I don't want to do it. I want to look at adolescence, or something like come up with a new strategy. This is Vartan.

So the person hired, Andrés Henríquez, has done a great job in taking what he was originally brought into and developing a whole new program thrust. And then, of course, Gregorian, because of his Annenberg [Institute for Social Reform at Brown University] interest, was much more interested in public education. We didn't do that. That was not what we were doing. We were really looking at how do you make the human spirit able to be educated more effectively, starting with babies. And he focused on high schools. We were not focusing on high schools.

Q: Now, you remained as Chair of the program. And you were also a Special Adviser.

Rosenfield: I became Chair in 1999 of the Scholars program.

Q: Which means to me that this period of uncertainty, this period of stress and *sturm und drang*, et cetera, you came out okay at the end.

Rosenfield: I came out very okay at the end. I love the Scholars Program. And I enjoy working—

Q: So there must have been some way in which you and Dr. Gregorian became kind of copacetic at some level.

Rosenfield: I would say copacetic is going too far at that period. I think he didn't want to fire me. I was very out there in the foundation community. The Africa program, by everybody else, was considered a smashing success. Not a smashing—I mean, a big, effective program. I had close ties to the other foundations. And to be frank, I have some relatives who were very instrumental in helping him get money to fund the library. And he knew. He didn't want to face that backlash.

And I think he also respected my scholarship. I mean, what he kept saying to me was: why aren't you teaching?

Of course, he and Ed [Edward Sermier] reinforced a negative feeling about foundations, philanthropy: that it wasn't a valid—it was a do-gooding. Ed Sermier was particularly bitter about spending all this money on grants. He didn't want to spend any money on grants. And Gregorian, because of his scarcity, was also afraid, always, of spending money. Very different.

So that, really—at the core, Hamburg would spend, spend, spend. Gregorian would try to conserve, conserve, conserve. And always, Hamburg might enlarge budgets. Gregorian would take them down. I mean, he's changed now. But at the early days, he was very nervous about spending this money. Never affected Hamburg. Ever. Had a good idea? Let's put money behind

it. Don't need to work out all the details. Gregorian, all the details need to be worked out to make sure we're not to waste a penny. Hamburg, it didn't motivate him. He was going for the action.

And Ed Sermier reinforced that tendency of Gregorian's. Barbara Finberg would have absolutely helped guide Gregorian in how you protect, and what decision-making in philanthropy you build up [unclear]. It was an awkward period. He didn't want to spend money in the beginning because he wasn't sure the ideas were the right ones. And he wanted to be sure. And we couldn't figure out what would make it sure, and so there was that give and take.

Personally, the Scholars program was the same budget year in, year out. And I could just—programmatically, I knew to make the Scholars program totally effective, and we had a great advisory committee. I instituted a fairly complicated process. But it meant we selected the very best people. I'm sure. I mean, toward the end [not meaning toward the end of each selection process, it would be], because of the critiques that we would bring in and the process that we followed, the last candidates—let's say, the last thirty or forty—when we would pare it down to that with the external committee—or maybe less: thirty, twenty, sometimes less. There would be a little fine difference.

But it was basically a great, I feel—and I'd love someone to evaluate it, and I do want to write about it at some point even though we have the two books—that there was a configuration, a conglomeration of the right people—fabulous people—on the advisory committee who took it very seriously. And I said, well, this Scholars program—I have to say, one reason why I think I was able to embed it in the work of the Corporation: I had gone around—Heather [S. MacKay]

and I had gone around before we actually worked out the procedures—and talked to the Open Society Institute that had had an individual program, [Andrew W.] Mellon Foundation, American Council on Learned Societies, SSRC [Social Science Research Council], and a few others. Population Council.

And the Open Society Foundations Institute was doing away with its individual program. And I went to talk to the lady who was running it [Gail Goodman, and she said, the program people “hate me.” They think I’m taking money away from them, that I’m a competitor of theirs.

She never talked to them. She never involved them. So Heather and I said, a-ha! We’re going to have the first stage review be the program staff. And now, because the original theme of the Scholars program was to extend the boundaries of the grants program, we don’t want them to think we’re competing and developing our little mini grants program. Somebody from Peace and Security, somebody from Education, somebody from Democracy, and Africa should be on it. Preferably the chairs or whoever they appoint.

And they took it really seriously. They would read three hundred proposals. And a couple of them would write detailed comments on all of them. And they would come to a review committee, the first round. We get these prospectuses. They were short, but still. They would make comments. We would take a full day, sometimes two days to go over those. They could select the finalists.

Gregorian kept himself separate because he was going to be the final approval. He gave final approval. So he understood this process perfectly. And then we had the external committee. When the new proposals came in, all these—so we had the only truly cross-program activity.

And we had so much fun at those meetings. I mean, we'd always have a dinner.

Q: Well, that seems to be one of the distinctions with this program: that you were funding people who were working in the areas of your program.

Rosenfield: Right. That's the only way you can get it through, actually, by IRS.

Q: Not setting up that this is a program under which it applies, so it wasn't separate. It was integrated into. I was going to ask how you integrated that into the day to day working. Just tell me.

Rosenfield: Well, because we were doing these—but they were always extending the boundaries. So basically, in the Africa program, we had a really big challenge in finding Africans here because we couldn't fund people in the region. We had to fund people based in U.S. institutions who had green cards. And so we always had a challenge.

And Narciso Matos, the Chair, was very helpful. And we met with the African Studies Association—the former presidents of the African studies. But in the meantime, funding in that area—we have funded the top development economists in the country. I am sure we will have

Nobel Prize winners from that. Because we gave them the money to do their books that have made it. Dani Rodrik, James [A.] Robinson, James [K.] Galbraith. Brilliant stuff.

And then we did education. But then, to make it a truly cross-program—because my whole background is interdisciplinary—people commented on the other fields that they didn't know anything about. And they always said, well, I don't really know, but this, when I read this proposal, this isn't clear to me. And so in the first stages, we had—and also the external advisory committee were also interdisciplinary—the first five years was a very vibrant kind of discussion.

And Neil was a great chair of that program. I asked Neil, I thought, well—

Q: Look, let's go through the stages as they begin. The first stage is the nominations. You would get nominations from—

Rosenfield: It was a nominations program. So this was Gregorian's idea: that the people who would know their best scholars were the university presidents. Because he knew his best scholars at Brown. Turns out not everybody was as interested in scholarship as university president Vartan Gregorian. And I give him huge credit for his concept of scholarship.

Q: I read that. I thought, whoa, wait a minute, now.

Rosenfield: So we wrote—we eventually had six hundred nominators, about. We had university presidents, we had provosts, we had heads of departments in the different areas, we had heads of

think tanks, we had journalists, we had publishers and editors. And we'd get every year about twenty-five percent. Not always the same twenty-five percent veteran. And I would have interns every summer who would—we'd try to analyze who's responding, who's not. There was a core group that would respond every year, but basically once someone made a nomination—

Q: You would reach out to them and send them a letter: do contact us somehow, we have this program, this is what it is.

Rosenfield: Right. And it got into their routines. So I would get calls. When we were bringing the program to a close, I would get dozens, hundreds of calls from the development office people saying, isn't it time for you to be sending me a letter? We haven't received your letter yet. What is the theme of the Scholars program going to be this year? Because it was built—Carnegie Scholars program, in June we should get that letter and we'll get the nomination process.

What I didn't realize is a lot of universities set up their own mini screening process. They only wanted to bring their senior people in. So one of the things we had to do was say, and make it very clear, underline it in the letters, we want senior, established scholars, but we're also looking for new people? The emerging scholars. We are even more interested in emerging scholars, and we want more women. And we had to really—and whenever any person would call me who was working with the provost or the president, I would say, young. Female. They don't have to be female. I mean, we have a very fair process. But we had to really work with them. But I got to know a number of them. We worked with these presidents.



Q: That makes also something—some people have programs—I think the SSRC and ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] have programs for emerging, young scholars. And then others have, like the [John D. and Catherine T.] MacArthur [Foundation], the rewards—but this is a mix.

Rosenfield: This is a mix. And it was really fascinating. For me, I got to hear, to be up to speed on all the scholarship. And for our external advisory committee, Stephen Graubard, John Steinbruner, Edie [N.] Goldenberg, and Jill [K.] Conway, the first committee. I mean, they were fantastic. They would review them. And they were also—they wanted to have some senior people, because there were some ideas that were very complex and they saw that they were very well presented. But they also, they were all looking for emerging scholars. And we found some really great people.

But they would take it very seriously, with detailed comments.

Q: How would you find the outside reviewers?

Rosenfield: These were our outside reviewers. And we didn't send them to outside review. We had the internal review, and then these four guys or girls—two guys and two girls—would be the final review stage. Because we didn't want to complicate it any more. If we had a question, if there was something where I knew that nobody anywhere knew anything about it, I would find someone who did.

Actually, I take that back. The first couple of years, because Vartan had established these academic advisory committees for each of the programs, I used them as other reviewers. And we would get tons of reviews. And unlike the final committee, my external advisory committee, these guys were all partisan. So I've seen, like in the Peace and Security, we got a lot of Russian-related ones. One of the Russian experts on the Peace and Security advisory committee, and another, they were at loggerheads. They always disagreed. You'd get if this one said yes, the other one would say no. This one said yes, the other one would say no. It was helpful, but basically toward after about the third year, I think we said, it's not really shedding a lot of light. We're getting a lot of paper. We have to send out a lot of stuff. Let's streamline this process.

Now, when we moved to Islam, though—and I have to say, we turned on a dime. I want this for the record. Vartan had always wanted to do something in this area.

Q: Let's come back.

Rosenfield: We need a special conversation.

Q: Yes, let's get back to a couple of other things. Having served on NEH [National Endowment for the Humanities] boards, there's always this tension between the outside reviewers and what the staff really wants.

Rosenfield: Oh, for sure—so Geri Mannion will tell you—

Q: What the staff really wants.

Rosenfield: Geri Mannion will tell you, because Geri Mannion wanted the activists. I had to keep saying, Geri, this is not a program for activists. This is a program for scholars. And she would come up with all the ones that I knew would never be funded because they were just sort of different. And she had nothing but scorn for the process. She was very dedicated. She read things. She participated. And she said, I don't why I'm participating. Everyone I like, they [the External Advisory Committee] don't like. I said, but it's for this and this reason, and you have to understand that. And she was very good-spirited about it.

Q: Always a tension.

Rosenfield: Always a tension. Very much so.

Neil introduced, which was something called repêchage. So we would go around, we'd make the final list, and everybody had a chance to bring back in a candidate at the end of the day. And that's how we were able to do it.

And then with Vartan —I have to say, there were one or two instances where really, really ridiculous people were selected for the wrong reason. Heather and I would say to Vartan, you know, he's not going to do the work. There's something else going on here. And Vartan, at length, he rarely, very, very rarely turned anybody down. Except on occasion he would listen very carefully to Heather and me, and Neil, on this process.

Q: One of the assumptions, of course, is individual scholarship matters.

Rosenfield: So believe me—what difference does this make?

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: So in and of itself, the ideas should be out there. Carnegie, through its grants and aids program, over time—which I did not know, at the time—we had Robert [A.] Caro, we had funded [Walt Whitman] Rostow. Some books really make a difference. And we kept looking for what is that book that's going to make a difference. And some—Michael Mandelbaum—some of the scholars that we did fund have made—Jamie [James] Galbraith—I mean, they're out there all the time.

How do you make it matter? My premise was you set up a network of the scholars because there's cross fertilization across the scholars. I hear it from the review discussion.

Neil thought this was a waste of money, and he convinced—one of them, either Vartan thought it was a waste of money, or Neil. I had two meetings before we went to Islam, of the scholars. First of all, because the way we made it matter was to say: you're not just scholars.

I'm sorry, this is a little disjointed.

Our person who became vice president of Public Affairs, Susan [R.] King, was fantastic. And I give her huge credit, even though we argued a lot, on the announcements about the scholars in the *New York Times*. People didn't do that before. She really instituted that idea. And she called them scholars of vision, scholars of promise. Social change begins with scholarship. And so that emerged, in my mind, saying these are public scholars.

We're not funding public intellectuals. We're not funding the Edward [W.] Sells—anybody who can talk about anything. Or the Isaiah Berlins. We're funding the deep scholarship on a particular issue, but we want them out there. This became extremely important with the Islam part. But we would say to them, in all of your newspaper articles, and scholarly articles too, we want you to acknowledge the Carnegie Corporation.

So I began looking into what does a public scholar mean? I met with a committee at Columbia [University] that was independent scholars that Dick Magat whose last name I'm not remembering—that puts together—it's a very interesting committee. And I went to talk to them about what is a public scholar? How do you interpret a public scholar? I read a lot of the books on public scholars from even Lionel Trilling. I mean, people write about public school versus public intellectuals. I also talked with Ira Katznelson, who wrote about public scholars.

And toward that aim I wanted us to create a network of our scholars and have them meet together every year. Because MacArthur did that, and it was very valuable. But I thought, they're small enough in number, we build a cohort, we have them communicate with each other, we talk basically around the concept of sharing ideas, helping to build a deeper scholarship, or a broader

scholarship on the issues. Because some of them are interrelated. Some of them, people might spark off ideas and collaboration.

And from the few meetings we had that I was able to get through—I wanted one every year—that did happen occasionally. They found, you're working on that? In education? Oh, I didn't—even in the same field. And we'd always talk about what it means to be a public scholar.

They had to explain: how were you going to get the ideas out there? Because we didn't have the wherewithal to organize that communication process. But my premise was that for public communication—and we had some training program that Susan organized on how you write op-eds, and television performances—I thought having the program staff involved meant that many of them—so tied up with policy makers—they would take the scholarship or the scholars and share it. And some of them did. I mean, that did happen in some cases.

Q: And looking through the literature, what I saw was three or four different ways in which this was measured. Not metrics, but measured. Policy—who went to Washington, who didn't go to Washington, which ideas were accepted in the political process, et cetera.

The second was within the disciplines. What ideas resonated with what the discussion in the discipline had been. In the community of scholars. There were a couple of ways in which it's talked about in your literature.

Rosenfield: So here's the way I assessed it. Every year I'd have these interns come work. Because we didn't have time to do it. And they would do a survey of all the scholars. And they'd say, what difference has this made for you? So that's the first level, was what difference did it make for the scholar? Promotions, awards. And we have that. I mean, I would analyze it for you, by year, except the last two years, which, with all the changes in the book and everything and not having an assistant—

Q: I wish I had it last week. I can't tell you the time I spent [laughs]. Go ahead.

Rosenfield: Oh, yes. The scholar, the institution, the field, and then the world. And they would talk about it. So I have reams of information. And I would like to put that together at some point. And we did try to pull it together. And we have it now. We would have difficulty reaching some of them.

When I finish this book, my next thing, no matter what I'm doing, I'm going to write to all the scholars and say: look, we're going to try to pull all this together. Think back—what difference did it make, now that you've had some time to reflect on it? Can you just give me a paragraph on these questions?

They would call them and interview them. So I have a lot of information. And then I would put it in the promotions. People got a lot of tenure and promotions. I mean, certainly it helped the individuals. And in some cases, the universities got much more aware of public scholars. And instead of detracting from tenure, it would add to tenure, which is always a big constraint.

Q: It would be impossible to go through all of them, but what I did was to sit down and try to trace out some of them, where they came from, what happened to them. But in his initial report, Dr. Gregorian talked about scholarship reiterating and reconstructing the various strands of knowledge. That we're faced with a situation in which we have an enormous amount of information—how do we turn that into knowledge, is how he said it. And I looked at the titles and I thought, well, this looks like the same monographic literature. But then when I looked at what the books were actually about, in this first stage, they were directed to far more generalizable kinds of problems. It was interesting.

Rosenfield: Richard [M.] Langhorne's thing on globalization is a masterful treatise on it. Really, I mean, it's a definitive book. Michael Mandelbaum, but also [Richard] Rick Shweder, when he finally finished his. I mean, it's enormous.

Now, some of them have not—a few still haven't finished. I mean, I'm very sympathetic, just based on what I'm going through with my book. But we had great hopes for Don [Donald L.] Horowitz, for instance. Brilliant, brilliant legal scholar, constitutional scholar. He's still working on it. He says it's over a thousand pages. I mean, this was a few years ago.

Michael J. Sandel—took him forever. He's just finished. So I have a very, very open and understanding—and I had to fight, I have to tell you, which is not on the letter. I had to fight with Sermier, the administrative people, and our grants management people. You're taking so long—



we just need them to give us back the money. I said, they can't give you back the money. It's costing them—most of it is salary or research assistants.

And they will come up with a book. You can't produce—they're not expected to come up with a book. They are expected to come up with a report on where they are at the end of two years. They're not going to come up with a book. And I'm delighted to say, in my arrogant way here, I'm proven right. Michael Sandel's book on money and morals is going to be a dynamite book. Some of the ones that have come out—and he was the first or second round. So it's been years waiting for his book.

Q: Always a problem with something like this.

Rosenfield: And Gregorian is always exaggerating how long it's taking me to do this book—it'll take four years! I said, no, I started working once we brought the Scholars program to a close, full time, fall of 2009. But you took away my assistant. So all by myself.

Q: In for a penny, in for a pound.

Rosenfield: Yes. So I had to struggle with the administration. Not Vartan. I mean the managers here, the administrators, the bean counters. Because they didn't understand—had no concept of scholarship.

Q: Who set the price?

Rosenfield: Vartan did. And he wouldn't change it. Heather and I would do these analyses—cost of living. There wasn't much inflation. But it was, I mean, up to two years, and up to \$100,000. Never changed. That was it. That was Vartan.

Q: But you know I come from the university, which is the scene of scarcity. It looked pretty good to me.

Rosenfield: Well, that's what he thought. And I would say, you know, that we don't really need to do any more. And we were very flexible on benefits, what we covered. In fact, I just completely said, I'm not doing any of it—one of the things I think McKinsey may have lead us to, and I'm not sure, it could have been Sarbanes-Oxley—these egregious proposal forms and budget forms. I would never want to apply to Carnegie Corporation for a grant. They are ridiculous. We're probably the worst in the field. We're making changes.

Not knowing what the process is, not understanding. Vartan was not involved. As far as I know, he devolved that. So I said, the Scholars program, here's some questions we want them to answer in whatever way they want to answer them. The budget is basically salary, research, travel. And it's very simple. We would never get away with that today with the administration here.

Q: Does that salary replace their academic salaries? Or they can collect the academic salaries at the same time?

Rosenfield: A lot of them didn't put it for salary, actually, because they needed the money for travel, for books, for research assistants. So they were very serious. And the way I argued with Ed and the others, they were getting it as individuals. Most of these people hadn't the faintest idea how to organize this. And we gave no accounting advice. And, of course, they had to pay taxes on it. So I said, get your salary if you can. Don't add it to salary. That's all I can advise you—I don't know anything about taxes. Make it expenses, and make sure you have it documented.

Q: You also said that you wanted to get cutting edge research.

Rosenfield: And we do.

Q: You're happy with that?

Rosenfield: I'd say, for the most part, we got people like Amy Stuart Wells, who would say, I've always wanted to do this work on the charter schools. On the early stages of education. No one has looked into this. This is how—and she's finally finished, but it's taken a while because she's done other things.

Caroline M. Hoxby said there's such a controversy—here is a very conservative economist looking at charter schools. She says, no one is willing to look at what price really means in education, and I need to do this. And she's a brilliant economist. So that would appeal.

One thing that I think—Stephen Graubard was extremely important in that as the editor of *Daedalus* for forty years, he knew what was out there and wasn't out there. Jill Conway—we had, fortunately, the reviewers in the first phase. Edie Goldenberg, very distinguished in the political and social sciences. So they were aware of the different fields. And they would say, oh my God, this is the fiftieth proposal I've seen this week on this subject.

Because what appealed to staff—we weren't as up on this. And we would tell people, don't say you're the only one doing this—tell us how you situate yourself in the field. And that took a lot of—I mean I would talk with everybody. And that was what I felt my role was. I would talk with all the applicants. Anybody who called me. I didn't go out and reach them.

And I would also talk with those deferred or turned down—we had this process of deferring people. If they were turned down this time, we were open to having them come back in. And sometimes I would have the best conversations with the people who were turned down. And I would go over it—I had permission from the reviewers to tell them why. Not who, but what. What the issues were, and they were the ones who took it seriously would come back in with absolutely spectacular proposals and would get funded hands down the next time.

So that was a learning process. And I learned a lot in terms of how to interact with very sensitive scholars who were being turned down. It was real easy with the ones who were approved.

Q: You also said that Carnegie would help in disseminating.

Rosenfield: Yes, and we did. For instance—

Q: How did you do that?

Rosenfield: [Ian] Shapiro's book, *Death by a Thousand Cuts*, we sent that out to every business editor in the country. We had a launch here. We've had a few launches here. We would disseminate them. We did a press release when they finished. We did a press release on the Scholars program. We would issue a press release when they started for all their institutions.

And then we had the list in the *Times*. And we started out with the *Times* and the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, and *The Washington Post*. We stopped *The Washington Post* because it got very expensive. And some of them didn't need help. But we would help them with that.

Not as active as I would have liked. I would have liked to have done more. Islam, we were a little bit more active. But the first phase, we were not as—we did some launches here and getting the word out. If someone asked, we would help.

Q: I also tried to look through and see what the overall ideological slant might have been. It was difficult to do because you'd have to look at the whole thing. But I saw one or two of your authors, at least, had a background of writing for the *New Left Review*. But I didn't see—

Rosenfield: Caroline Hoxby is out there, highly conservative economist. Raj [Rajan] Menon, highly conservative.

Mainly they would have gotten it because one of the things that did make a difference—and this is the public scholar dimension—those people who had some journalism in their background wrote better. They weren't journalists, but they wrote better proposals. Very good training for this—kind of what we were looking for, actually. And, I mean, I haven't done that analysis, but that would be an interesting analysis, actually, to do. A strong English or a strong journalism background. Michael Mandelbaum.

But I would say we didn't get many submissions that were going to be that conservative. Because it wasn't that much of an issue. In 2000, this conservative stuff—I mean, there was George [W.] Bush—but it didn't. What would have been the issue like in Strengthening Democracy, looking at—I think it wasn't as crystallized then. It wasn't as polarized. Today it would be very much more sensitive with this open-ended program.

I'm trying to think who might have been turned down. I mean, one person who was turned down, highly radical: Carol [M.] Swain. She writes about white studies, whiteness studies. And I love her stuff. Now, it was not a great proposal, but it was in a very important field. And looking at Aryan studies and whiteness studies. And because it wasn't a good proposal, they weren't willing to take a risk on her. And some of the ones that we turned down, I kept in touch, or I kept track of them.

And when her book came out, to very positive reviews, I wrote her a note, and she wrote me the nicest note back. But I said, this is one I wish had been a Carnegie—it would have been our

book. And we didn't do it. That was too far out for them. But it wasn't well-argued, either, because she put a lot of emotion into it. And that tended not to sound scholarly—so if it was a much more scholarly—and in a sense, yes, they wanted outreach, but they really wanted to see carefully argued scholars. And so whatever the ideology, if someone could've—like Caroline Hoxby did with her economics, very well-reasoned, I mean, she was right to the top. There was discussion. This one has to be funded. It's controversial.

We wanted controversy. I mean, actually, we sought controversy in that sense if it was good scholarship. Sean [F.] Reardon was also looking at a very different perspective on Hispanic learning, very radical. He's out, he's quoted all over the place, saying this is what's happening in the schools. Not what you think is happening in the schools. And what bilingualism really is and isn't. And very important.

Q: In one sense, cutting-edge means that.

Rosenfield: Yes. And we were looking for who's raising the critical questions. So right or left or in between. That's why it was really a neat—five years—I mean, it was a great five years. And I think very—but it was very much, I mean, it's one of those areas where group decisions made a difference. And a number of groups. So it wasn't just—

I think the thing that helped in getting this broader swath of people is that we had these multiple layers. First of all, the universities put in review. That might have been the most conservative of all in terms of making sure this was only excellence that got to us. But then we had staff review,

and then external review, and then Vartan review. There were a lot of layers of review. It would have been hard—

Q: In all those layers, how much autonomy did you have?

Rosenfield: Autonomy. I didn't assume any autonomy. I said I'm the staff person here. I mean, my autonomy came—I would just speak to anybody—I mean, I wouldn't decide. Anybody who called, I would speak to, even if I didn't really like their proposal, or whatever, and didn't think they had it. So I said my role is to support everybody.

So I wanted to be the one person who was going to promote everybody, unless I thought it was truly bad. And then to make sure—I said, my role is making sure quality was first and foremost. Heather MacKay was also instrumental. She was a great partner in this. Although she worked for Gregorian, also, and he would always demand—

Q: What's her background?

Rosenfield: She was a Russian major at Columbia, but a very smart person. One of the smartest—and very thoughtful. And she's now getting a Ph.D. combining epidemiology and molecular bio—very analytical. Obsessively analytical. But the two of us were put together.

Q: When you say she also worked for—



Rosenfield: She was part-time with me. So I ran this program with one assistant. Never—until the end—never a really good assistant. I have to say, I made—we made—bad choices about assistants. I mean the secretarial support. And as program assistant, Heather, fifty percent of the time and fifty percent for Vartan Gregorian, president. So you knew I didn't quite get the fifty percent.

So that's why I loved my committee—they did a lot of work. And the group. But it was a lot of photocopying, a lot of nitty gritty stuff. And they all pitched in.

I felt my role was to identify—quality was first and foremost. Innovative thinking, critical, cutting-edge thinking. So I would read and read and read a lot. And I would look at articles. And I would see whether they fit in. And I would look very carefully—

One of the things I learned—the final review committee, the external review, pored through the CVs [curriculum vitae]. Oh, my gosh, and if they saw a discontinuity or an unanswered question in the CV, they would ask what was happening between this period and that. So—that was the first—to look at them, and read them first. I would call up the scholars and the applicants, and say: there's this little gap in your CV—can you tell me what happened? Because I know this is going to be a question, and I don't want the wrong question to be the reason why you're not funded. It has to be on the basis of the quality of your work.

But I would have done the same—I was very labor intensive at the decision process with granting when I was running the previous program. I saw no reason not to be the same with this.

But it was really quality first and foremost. And that's where my autonomy came in. Not autonomy, but my role was, if I said, this is really terrible, and I know you all think it's great, it shouldn't be funded but this is really fabulous for these and these reasons, and you don't: Here's why the program staff, you gentlemen and ladies—I know I can't influence the process because we have to be very protective of the boundaries—you are the final just purveyors of the decision, but here's why you should really rethink this. And Neil gave me a lot of leeway to do that.

Q: In your earlier interview, you talked about when you were a young scholar. And the fellowships. How much of your own experience was poured into this program?

Rosenfield: It's possible. I mean, I had the most wonderful experience with Rockefeller [Foundation]. Twenty-five thousand dollars for writing a proposal with no form whatsoever. I just had to put in the budget. I put in, I figure it was maybe ten pages. I was funded. Virgil [C.] Scott and Ralph [W.] Richardson. And I was crossing boundaries at the Rockefeller Foundation. I got into deep trouble with the program I was working with, and they protected me. And it was wonderful as wonderful could be.

But the one thing they didn't do—and I think this is why I was obsessive in trying to be in touch—no one ever contacted me afterwards. They didn't know. They didn't ask if I had done a book from it. I mean, I have a book that came out, a monograph that came out. I'm not even sure I sent it to them. No one ever asked for it. They just—this is work we want to see done. And actually, someone who was a program officer at the time is still at the Rockefeller Foundation,

all these years later. I should ask him. I mean, and I actually should give a copy to them now that the archives are in. But I was never asked if I could contribute to the program.

But the early stages of the decision process were fantastic. And they brought us together at least once during the process. The way I saw it was, from my WHO [World Health Organization] experience, where we really did fund a lot of scholars—researchers, not scholars as much—and I could see the importance of being extremely understanding of the application process.

And then I chaired the Clark Foundation's Tropical Disease Research Committee. A different set of experiences as chair of that committee for that foundation. The importance of flexibility and understanding where someone's coming from when you're working with individuals.

Q: You talked about trying to bring these scholars together. Did that ever happen?

Rosenfield: Twice, and I had to fight for it every time. And to me, that's what you do. One of my strengths is knowing how to build networks. And I did this with—and I know why Vartan absolutely did not believe in networks, but now he does. But he didn't then.

I have to mention to you at some point my observations on the current Africa Program. The next time.

It was very rich and wonderful. Maybe we only did it once in the first five years. I'm so sorry. I should know this.

Q: You would fund them to come to New York?

Rosenfield: Yes, we did. So that was extra money. Vartan didn't really want to spend any more money on the scholars because he didn't see, he didn't understand. He didn't—I mean, for someone whose program—this is his legacy. And I've said to him many times—I just won't let him go on this—I've said, this is what you're going to be known for. When these people start getting Nobel Prizes and Pulitzers. I don't know if we've gotten any—we've gotten lots of awards. It's because you had the Scholars program. And in history, this may be one thing that really lasts from what you did. Because I see, as I go through now—and I even feel more strongly about it—when I see the people Carnegie funded. Henry Kissinger at an early stage. And I can see the Corporation actually took risks on individuals. That was our hallmark, basically. Barbara [M.] Ward, the most brilliant, one of the most brilliant development economists.

So I tease him on this. I mean, there are other legacies, but we're not building enduring institutions now. We are building enduring, quality scholarship. And that's what's going to last. I mean, sure, fifty years from now, when some of the people look back at the books, they're going to say, oh, my God, that came out of Carnegie?

Q: Let's talk about the whys and hows of the transformation of the program.

Rosenfield: Oh. You mean into Islam. The why is very clear. Vartan wanted to do Islam from day one. Before—it's in his '97 and '98 document. He tried. Geri brought some people together across the spectrum of American Islam. It was a disaster. People were fighting with each other—Pakistanis, American subcontinent Indians—others. She might give you this, and I have to give you an insight from that meeting why it didn't go anywhere.

We had an African American Muslim, a wonderful lady who was also an Imam, sitting next to a Pakistani American Muslim, who started to talk about civil rights and our rights. And the African American said, you can't use the term—you can't use civil rights. You're not authorized to use that term. You can't appropriate that. That's my people's term, not your people's term.

We're not going to get there too soon on Islam as an issue. We tried lots of things. So he tried a few publications. Not publications—a couple of other grants. We did a few things. I mean, actually, as I went through the files, more than I thought we did.

One day, so after five years—

Q: Yes. You go through reports, there is a steady stream—

Rosenfield: But it didn't ever coalesce into a program. Because he didn't ask. Because he was thinking—this is the disconnect between Vartan as president and Vartan as idea person, and program staff. The right idea, had we done it when he said it, it would've been brilliant. Not

Scholar, the Islam Program. Nobody here was going to organize a program unless the president authorizes it.

Vartan thought: staff takes the initiative, gives me program, we'll go ahead with it. He didn't communicate. He sort of communicated that, but that isn't how it operates. No staff member—as aggressive and initiative-taking as they are—is ever going to say: here's the program we need to do and to present it to the president without being asked to develop a new program. Now, Vartan was saying: I want a program. But when you say that to the general crowd of program staff, who's going to not do what they're supposed to be doing and do something where they don't even know what's going on?

So it was a disconnect. He didn't say, Geri, develop the program. Or, Pat, develop the program. In contrast, when Hamburg wanted to do the International Conflict Program in 1988—and that's in my oral history—he came to me. And he said, I want to develop this program. It's important in Africa—will you help me develop the program? So I wrote the first papers, small memos, on conflict and did the work with the Carter Center that launched the conflict part of his Avoiding Nuclear War program. And he just came to me. And, of course, I would do it, and he knew I knew what to do.

Vartan, he didn't know that that's what you do in a foundation. The president has to have the idea. Or, say, have a little group of people around him. It has to come in a give and take. And then you actually assign someone the responsibility of doing it.

So finally, what he did one day, again, with me—I think the relationship with me is that he feels very comfortable treating me a little differently. He might not admit it. Differently because we've been through this up and down relationship over time. And so he took Heather and me and he said, five years is enough. I want you to focus on Islam. We said, Islam?

I think we had presented it—he had challenged us, one program paper and strategy paper that we prepared. We said, well, we realize five years is long, but we could continue and do this and this and this. We could do this, and maybe we take up Islam. And he said, Islam—do it.

Overnight—I'm really proud of Heather and me for doing this—we talked to a few people. We had a meeting. There was one other foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, that was interested. Together we organized a little meeting with a few other foundations that were beginning to be interested. Then we had a meeting with the heads of Near East Studies programs and Islamic Studies programs in the city: City University of New York, Queens College, Rutgers [University], a few places. What are the issues? What do we talk about?

And then we talked to Vartan. He gave us a list of issues that he thought was important, and those issues were comprehensive. And we said, okay, we're writing to our nominators. We'll bring in a few new nominators. But basically, because our nominators are all above supra scholars, in the sense that they're university presidents or provosts, those people ought to know in their universities. So we explained why we were changing, what we were looking for. We came up with language that Vartan was comfortable with. Within four months we had a

program—we got the letters. Maybe four to six months. We finished the round, the last round on the broader program, and we started doing Islam.

Q: Were there particular scholars who were more crucial to you? From, say, Rutgers or Queens [College] or some other—

Rosenfield: I would say—that’s an interesting question. Vartan was the most important person, in terms of—Vartan was the most important. And I had done my Ph.D. work in Iran, so I was always interested in these subjects, and I kept up with some of this. But not in the same way. Although, I have to say—

Q: Well, he would have some personal interest in it because of his own life and work.

Rosenfield: Right. And the Islam book he had come up with at the Brookings Institution.

But I was going to say that Neil, Heather and I were thinking, we’re ready to send these letters out—maybe we’re not going to get any nominations. We didn’t know what was out there. We didn’t do a scan. And, in fact, when we did the scan, there wasn’t a whole lot coming out under this rubric. People were still hesitant. This was 2005 when we sent this out—2004, 2005. Actually, 2004. So it was still pretty raw.

And there was Afghanistan and Iraq. We did not want to get all war. We wanted to frame it in terms of Islam and Muslim societies and communities, not Islam only as a religion. And not



war—we got some of those. But basically, we got some fabulous proposals coming in. That then lead to a kind of ripple effect where we'd get some, and then the word would get out.

And this we made a very conscious public scholars program. They had to give us—we were firm on this—they had to say how are they going to talk to the public and policymakers about this field. To my colleagues' credit here, at the time we started the program, there was no one on staff who was an Islamic scholar. No one on staff who was a Muslim at that time. They all gamely said they would—I said, you don't have to do this, but I'd really appreciate it. Barbara Gombach, who is no longer here, was fantastic because she had actually done some work in India. So she had a little bit of knowledge. And Steve [Stephen J.] Del Rosso [Jr.] and Deana [Arsenian] were helpful—Steve Del Rosso in particular, from his foreign policy. And Geri a little bit on the outreach part here. But basically, no one knew anything in detail. [Added later: But they did know good from bad proposals.] And we kept the same—for the first time we knew we needed to add a couple of specialists to the review committee, making it very difficult. Because it could have been ideology writ large.

The first round we kept the same committee. It was very difficult for them because they were very honest scholars. And they said, we really don't know the field. This is a good proposal, but is this enough in the field? So we had some external reviewers coming up who could help us. And from that, basically, we chose a new committee. And they were fantastic.

Q: You did have a conference on June 29, 2001?

Rosenfield: That was Geri's conference. Yes. But that's gone. Oh, you mean Scholars conference? Oh, if it's a Scholars conference—

Q: Carnegie Conference on Muslims in the United States.

Rosenfield: That was Geri. That was the one where—

Q: That was the one you were talking about. Okay.

Rosenfield: Where they said that you're not authorized to say [unclear].

Q: Okay, okay. Yes.

Rosenfield: That was the only one. And we had some other grants. I mean, I tried to list them in the book. And I know what—I mean, I have them in chapter eight.

I would say Rashid Khalidi was very helpful. There were a few people that I would have long conversations with. Shibley Telhami was a grantee already who was doing some stuff in peace, and he was very helpful. And he became the sort of senior person on the review. He took Stephen Graubard's place, really, as the senior reviewer. And he was a wonderful, wonderful—I mean, I was devoted to him—on the external advisory committee.

We had some other not great people. I mean, we did get polemic discussions on that committee, and Shibley was very instrumental in keeping us on the straight and narrow, in a sense. Let's look at quality, not politics or ideology. We were basically trying to look at who were the people who could communicate deep scholarship to a broader public, and who were new scholars who had brilliant things to say.

And we found Elizabeth [F. Thompson]—I mean, some people who, their books have been extremely well-received—well, we had some like Noah [R.] Feldman, who became even more of a public scholar, and did a very good piece on Constitutionalism.

What we didn't do enough is bring people together—now this is the era where I said to Neil and Vartan, we need to bring these people together—A smaller meeting was held on conflict and Islam. Because they will reinforce each others' scholarship. And I could only do that once on Islam. Or did we do it twice? We had some meetings, but what we did for dissemination with the Women's Foreign Policy Group, the Center for Conflict Resolution at the NYU [New York University] Law School, we had some outreach meetings where they would bring scholars. And they were very good meetings, sometimes some very good publicity from that.

But basically, this time we worked with every scholar. Susan King had a fantastic public affairs people op-ed. And we created two superstars—Jen'nan Read and Brian [T.] Edwards as a result of—whose editorials are out there all the time now. Have they finished their books? No. Because they've gotten caught up in the public scholarship part.

But their ideas—Brian is looking at American studies in Tehran, Cairo, Rabat and Beirut. *How Are They Talking About Us?* That book is very important. His book is out. And Jen'nan is looking at American Muslims. What are they saying? Looking at the data, trying to track. And her book will be very important when it comes out. She's got a ten year history of data.

Q: Now, in a field like this, chances are that they know one another already.

Rosenfield: They didn't.

Q: They didn't?

Rosenfield: It's unbelievable. And that's the first meeting we had. They didn't know each other. Because no one—either you're part of the Middle East Studies Association—highly polemic group. Or there might be Islam and religion in America—you're very religion-oriented. They don't talk to each other. So that's what I said: we need to spend \$50,000 or \$25,000 a year bringing them together. "Why? They're doing their thing, we don't want to take their time away from their scholarship." I said, nonsense!

So that's the big frustration for me, was not being able to do the kind of coalescing of ideas. Because I know there's a process. Because I know this from my own work. You have the individuals, you build the networks, then you have networks coalesce and you really get strong ideas out there. And that's how you bring about—I hate to use the word—paradigm shifts. It's when you get the coalescing of the distinctive perspectives that have some complementarity. You

find those little points where they intersect, those adjacent possibilities, and you get them out there. And that's how you bring about change.

Q: You know, I kind of had area studies in my mind, not disciplinary boundaries.

Rosenfield: Area studies is what I'm looking at right now. It was really—well, they were—interdisciplinary.

Q: Where you hit economics, religion, separate categories.

Rosenfield: But it was really the ideas coming together and coalescing. And it wasn't really building. Hillary [S. Wiesner], who took over—and we can talk about what happened. And I love Hillary, and she's great—she's a wonderful person. And she knows the field very well. I think it was actually a help, though, to have someone—Heather and myself starting it at least—who were agnostic, as it were.

We wanted to see—again, taking over the first five years—the best scholarship. We did not have a point of view of Constitutionalism versus non-Constitutionalism. This perspective on jihad or that perspective on jihad. This understanding of terrorism or that understanding. We really were open to all the ideas. And I think that's the best in program work. You don't necessarily want the expert. You want the expert on the committee. It's also a big change. Vartan has brought in experts. And I'd say it's narrowed the program a huge amount, across the board. I mean, across the board.

And that's why Geri is so effective, because she is not an expert. She's the first to say she's not. But she really has become expert in certain areas, just as I did on Islam. I mean, I feel very comfortable in certain areas of Muslim societies and communities. But you end up with an openness, and you get—your training as a program decision maker is: what's the best work? Is this the best argument? Who makes the best argument and presents the best supporting data?

Q: You know, just looking at the grants, my sense is that the program, after the shift, became a little more monographic than it had been.

Rosenfield: Yes, definitely. The field, humanities, is more monographic. It is very clear—

Q: Just glancing. I'm guessing at all this.

Rosenfield: In some cases, because we had many more legal scholars, major legal articles have come out.

Laura [K.] Donohue, she did come up with a book. This is a brilliant one, who I hope—she's gotten mixed up in a whole lot of other issues. Her work is on the concept of counter-terrorism in this country and what it does to damage American democracy is extremely important. She said: in order to do what I'm doing, I have to go to law school. So she took time off to go back to law school. Now she does have a book.

But the legal articles from the lawyers are extensive—trying to think who else. They're not books. So we have fewer books. We were more into books in the first part of the program. Maybe one or two people wrote really major, major, significant monographs or articles. But the rest of them, out of—

Q: Would that be because of the topics? Because of the field? Because of the nature of the publishing world?

Rosenfield: Could be. Could be all of the above. I mean, some of them are very geared towards books. But I'd say, also, we have many more lawyers in this competition. And I'd say they're not geared toward books. They're not really. They're geared towards the major law review articles—or the big articles. Now, we still have a lot that are not finished.

Q: But I would imagine that, you know, as a kind of monograph, Sharia law in 18th century Egypt doesn't have much of a selling audience.

Rosenfield: And that. We wouldn't have funded. We wouldn't have funded that. It had to have something more. If it was a history—and we have several that we funded on history, and one of them by [Ussama] Makdisi is very controversial, sort of the history taking it up through modern times. That, we would do. There had to be something religious [that is related to Islam]—it wasn't just, this was not an area studies program. This was definitely much more cutting-edge, making a difference for today.

Q: What makes it controversial?

Rosenfield: Oh, the concept of jihad, the way they've talked about it. Overturning accepted wisdom. We were looking for who was going to overturn accepted wisdom on Islam as a religion, accepted wisdom on Islam as the force of nature. The concept of the Muslim Brotherhood. Carrie [R.] Wickham. Muslim Brotherhood is not all—long before all the stuff now, she knew all the Muslim Brotherhood. She wrote marvelously about it. She was the top scholar. And she's written about that.

We were looking for those current things. So the monographs were not scholarly. We actually turned down some brilliant scholars. Someone who was really wonderful when looking at the nature of rhetoric in Arabic, and how it's used. But it was just so scholarly. And they said, this is a very, very important study, but not for us.

Because there was no one else when we started—no one else was funding like this. No one. Not NEH [National Endowment for the Humanities]. No other foundation. Not even ACLS [American Council of Learned Societies] had any. So I made it a major responsibility to try to promote the ideas with foundations. We had a little working group on—what did we call it? I guess Muslim Societies or something. Bringing in other foundations. It didn't really take hold.

I mean, there's still sort of—Rockefeller Brothers Fund made a major commitment. Mellon has a little bit. ACLS. Open Society Institute. The ones who were did enlarged what we were doing.



And they're the best, as far as I'm concerned. But they weren't—nobody funded individuals. But I said, it doesn't matter, because then they can graduate to a grant. They can fund the grants.

Q: Dick [Richard W.] Bulliet is my next door neighbor. So I looked very carefully at the work that he was doing on modernism. I've never asked him about his own work.

Rosenfield: You should.

Q: How would you judge the successes of that program?

Rosenfield: Well, Hillary can answer that question. She said, while it was active, all the Middle East Studies associations, the Islamic scholars—all of a sudden the term came in use. Do you have a Carnegie? And I thought, oh, my God, we've really made it. And it became the gold standard. And the people who had them were considered the gold standard scholars. So I'd say—

Q: Within the discipline.

Rosenfield: Within the fields. Islamic studies, Near Eastern studies, Middle Eastern studies. It was the gold standard.

And they were very upset when they ended the program. And Vartan felt five years was enough. I was thinking maybe—because toward the end, we were getting a lot of the same proposals. But we were getting younger, newer people. We had rebuilt a field— basically, I think we can claim

to have, because we did a lot of publicity. Susan was very helpful. We had a lot of publicity about this. I think we helped build—and especially within the universities we would do a lot of outreach with the press releases, making sure everybody knew, and giving our scholars a lot of leeway to take time to do this. We would always write a letter back to the president informing them and have Vartan sign it. I would say that we helped rebuild the field.

Now, should we have moved from this into a program—the logic, if it had been looked at programmatically, what we would have done is five years, we've seeded it with all these individuals we would have then looked around the country to see where are the strongest Islamic studies programs, or, as a result, where are scholars who are building. And we had actually talked about this. And there was a group in Canada that was a cluster of Carnegie Scholars who had moved to, I think, University of British Columbia. Another in the West Coast. We had a very strong group at [University of California] Berkeley and Reed [College]. And we were looking to maybe set up a West Coast cluster, and to look at a different kind of graduate program.

And we had a strong East Coast cluster. Different institutions—not Harvard [University] and Yale [University], but other places. Princeton [University] was very strong. In the early '50s, we rebuilt the Near East studies program at Princeton, which is interesting. But a few—and so the only meeting we did that around was with the Duke Islamic Studies Center, Bruce Lawrence. He brought—we had a fabulous meeting with scholars around the university at Duke who were being funded by Carnegie Scholars, basically, and a couple of other people. University of North Carolina, Emory [University], and then Georgetown [University]. Can we get a little regional

network going, and a little exchange? And Bruce got us some money from some place to do it, and Vartan supported it. So that was one.

And I thought, well, we could then look at how do we reinvigorate the field? Bring in controversy. Bring in new ideas. Get them to be public scholars. And had we had another five years, that's what we would have done. It was very clear what the trajectory could've been.

Now, Hillary took a slightly different track, toward Title VI [of the Higher Education Act], which was also important, and through SSRC—Title VI and the language training program. But through SSRC focused on the public scholar part and funded a whole lot. So in a way, she did do that. I would've kept the deep scholarship, but she didn't have the resources to do both. So it was not only around Carnegie Scholars but around important institutions. And SSRC organized the committee. Carnegie didn't do it internally. It went external. And we funded that for a few years.

And then the next thing would have been to continue that. That probably needed ten years. And that they've done that for five years, I guess. And now that's ended.

Q: In your discussions of ending the Scholars Program, was there a concern with what happens the field now that we get out?

Rosenfield: Oh, yes. And what happens to the scholars.

Q: Oh, these things you'd been talking about were part of that?

Rosenfield: Yes. And Hillary had been hired. And basically Hillary was the reason why we ended Islam, also, is not that we'd done five years, but Vartan had met Hillary, was enchanted, and she really knew Islam. So he wanted to, in the interest of expertise—and he's a big believer in expertise, as I said—he brought her in to take the Islam program from us. I mean not take, in that sense, but devolve it over to her and have her develop it into something.

So then the idea came: what would be the next round for the Scholars Program? And the summer of 2009 I must have written twenty memos taking new ideas out there. But the problem is: in Vartan's mind, nothing could compare. I mean, he saw everybody, the feedback from everybody was this was a fabulously successful program. Finding new people, building a field, getting important books out.

And I think they were faster than the first round. Because a number of people we funded were closer to completion but just had no support. So they were ready to go. That was interesting. I mean, I hadn't thought of that part of it at the time. Nobody thought that was going to be the case where the books came out right away, and here from the earlier phase we'd been waiting five years for their books. I thought, oh, maybe something is happening in where they are in their book, and we're getting a later book stage. So this is just a take-it-to-the-last-mile part.

So I thought the knowledge idea—taking off from what Vartan was interested in. This was the anniversary of C. P. Snow [Charles Percy Snow], and I thought there was some really interesting stuff with bringing together a fiftieth anniversary of C. P. Snow's "[The] Two Cultures." Two

Worlds. And we should have done something. And he said no, there's already so much going on. I said, but not the deep scholarship. What does it really mean, you know, Vartan? And my interdisciplinary stuff. Migration. He was interested in migration, and then it turns out MacArthur had a major program. And it would have been duplicative. So we basically—that's what led to the book. Rather than fire me. He said, okay, what's next? And we had our centennial coming up, so I said, well, let's do this book.

Q: What was the feedback from trustees on the program? From time to time you must have gotten something back.

Rosenfield: Whenever I talked about it, they were very positive. But it was only a few of them. I mean, Tom Kean was one. It would be interesting what he thinks of it. You should ask—I'd love for you to ask him about the Carnegie Scholars program. The university presidents, because of course, they were very positive. Amy Gutmann had been a nominator. They all were nominators, but Amy Gutmann had actually called me to ask for an extended deadline when she was provost at Princeton so they could get their nominations in.

I think the others, it wasn't on their radar screen. But I don't know what they think of any of the programs. I mean, the trustees are much more disassociated than they—I mean, they come together four times a year. Some of them are involved. It's not as though they're all so active. I mean, I only got positive feedback.

And I think they loved it when they would see people write op-eds. And the challenge is we couldn't get people to put in the name—some people did, but not a lot of them—so and so is a Carnegie Scholar. And they all claim that the editors would cut it out, but then we had Janet [L.] Robinson, who was the publisher of the *New York Times*, and she said, I don't think so—we don't do that—they have to put it in.

Q: Yes. They just forgot about it.

Rosenfield: Well, they wanted their university. I mean, they do have a space limitation, so I guess that's the first thing to go.

Q: So what happened to you?

Rosenfield: Well, you know, I was very—

Q: What years are we talking about? 2009? 2010?

Rosenfield: Yes. So Neil had been fired, basically.

Q: Oh, I was wondering, why did he leave?

Rosenfield: He didn't want to leave. But Vartan wanted to restructure. He had always wanted to restructure. And finally—I'm afraid it's a little—I keep getting mixed up in this 2007, 2000—

Neil must have left by March 2007. So the year before we had a retreat of some sort with the trustees [Dec 2006]. And Vartan, he'd always wanted to do away with chairs and programs. So he always wanted to do this. He never—Neil bought into the program people. And he was a very loyal vice president for programs. He was keeping the structure the same. So the chairs, we had a Chairs Committee. We had this Council on Evaluation. He wasn't going to change—I mean, he would fight for the chairs. And I agreed—I mean, I was a chair, what was I going to say? And why would anybody not want to have chairs? I think Vartan saw it as an artificial thing, in that—which he didn't—

Q: What did he see as the alternative?

Rosenfield: Well, what does he see is one organization—flat—had he gone back to what he had written in the summer of 1998, and sort of devolved all the leaderships, taken away all leadership—everybody become program officer, which some foundations work that way. Or call everybody program director, whatever the title. Or program staff. And have everybody working on program, rather than around position and program. But no. That would have been in 2007. So that wouldn't have been the time to do it. Instead, he said: I'm concerned because everybody's in silos. Which was definitely more and more the case. I'm going to break this apart and put it back together again. So how did he put it back together again? He had an International Program and a National Program.

Well, let me say, this 'twain does not meet. And he appointed vice presidents from within. And I mean, he brought back in Michele Cahill as vice president. She was going to be director, a chair,

and then it became vice president. She would only do it as vice president to leave the New York City Department of Education.

And then he had to do the same in International. And he made a choice between two people there, and he chose the person of whose—this is definitely going to be sealed—of whose child he is the godfather, Deana Arsenian. So you know, she's very good. But she was very narrow. She knew Russian. Steve Del Rosso knew the world. And it made all the difference.

And so they're separate, the two programs—they try to work together. They are just extremely competitive and they don't work together. And within them—so that's why Geri is no longer Democracy Program. It's Immigrant Civic Integration Through Education. Her best grants she's managed to get through because she's got this great sense of humor and tenacity to get it through.

But what happened is Africa has become a little more marginalized in International Program. So that's been a very tough, tough situation over there. At the same time, they had this fabulously successful Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. So a lot of things got blurred and not sorted out. And I think Vartan was really counting on the vice presidents to do it.

So Michele has banged heads together. And she has a coherent program, for better or for worse, I don't know it. It's very coherent. Deana being truly a good program person, she knows grantmaking. She is a grant maker. In other words, she's trying really hard to build connections. And I've read through volumes, reams and reams of notes and files on the International Program



for my book—you see this torturous—trying to bring them together. You read the program papers, and they're just painful. They just don't find the points of intersection. Nobody wants to harm anyone, which is a wonderful trait, but it means that it's the area that I think he's probably most concerned about.

Q: Now, in 1971 I worked on the oral history of the Ford Foundation.

Rosenfield: Oh, that's really interesting. Oh, my goodness. We have another—this is lunch. This is lunch.

Q: But at that point in time, there was a real distinction between the two programs.

Rosenfield: Oh, absolutely.

Q: And it was a constant kind of problem. One would think that, knowing the history of a foundation, that that would be a kind of division that you'd really kind of back into very slowly.

Rosenfield: Right. Very bad.

Susan Berresford, when she reorganized the Ford Foundation—here's Frank Thomas: you choose your protégé and then she does away with everything that you've done. It's really interesting. I don't know what—they're still very friendly, I guess. Anyway, she tried to make it what I think is absolutely what Vartan had been proposing—a global foundation. Domestic,

international, all together in one place. The only thing is she did away with the NY-based area reps—and then gave a lot of power to the regional offices. What happened is that you lost spinal contact in New York. When I ran the Africa program, I knew who to call if I had something that I thought they'd be interested in, and then they would tell me who to call in the field. The implications of restructuring probably are never fully thought through. But in this case, I think Vartan is pleased with it. It's led to a reordering.

And, of course, the Scholars program gets put in National Program, which is ridiculous. We should have been in the International Program. We would have been in a very different situation, actually. Because Deana loved the Scholars program. Michele thought it was a waste of time. Michele is not interested in scholarship—she's interested in action. She really thought it was a waste of time. And I mean, I had been working for Neil, for people who really understood what we were trying to do. And it was very hard being in the National Program.

Q: Well, when you have that kind of diffusion, then everything has to be slaughtered, one way or the other.

Rosenfield: And I refused. I mean, I kept up my independence. And to Michele's credit, she said, fine, I don't care about it. You do what you've been doing. So I like Michele, but it wasn't the right home for it.

And he put the Islam Initiative under International Peace and Security, even though it was all taking place in domestic institutions and would have really benefited from being part of the

National Program, which had this focus on education. It was sort of looking at different criteria for setting us in the different places.

Q: So you moved on to write a book.

Rosenfield: Well, we had a choice. And Vartan and I had a very good discussion. I'm sure this was another decision point where he would've loved it if I'd said I wanted to leave. But in the meantime, I didn't want to leave. I wanted to do something on the centennial. Because I've been here a large part of my life at Carnegie. And I said, there's some things we have to do.

We had done no planning on the centennial whatsoever. I had written two memos already on it, starting in 2003, as a result of something Gerald Holton had said. And I thought, okay—and I hope I'm not coming across as arrogant as I feel I'm sounding—but I just thought, I care about Carnegie Corporation. We have a particular role in philanthropy, and we are the first, in a sense, of the major grantmaking foundations. I mean, yes, Russell Sage [Foundation], others were here before [but first of general purpose grant-making, non-organizational foundation.]

But what are we going to do? What kind of statement are going to make for the centennial? Now, it's only a marker, but what are we going to do? Then he said, what would you like to do? And I said, I'd like to write a book on the International Program, because no one has really pulled it together. We have a couple of books. Ellen [Condliffe] Lagemann, in her domestic history, makes it very clear she doesn't know anything about the international—she goes: I'm not going

to talk about it. And I said, we've done so much that I know about. And a lot that I don't know about.

So, naively, we thought, okay, this is a good idea. I wrote a prospectus. I had no idea what was really, really done. I mean, no one had any idea. Australia, New Zealand—no one knew anything about it. I mean, we knew, but not really. The institutions we funded in Australia and New Zealand are enduring. The one in Australia, the Australian Council on Educational Research, is the major global institution on testing. It does all the math and science testing, the—whatever they're called—the major test, PISA [Programme for International Student Assessment]. They do all the evaluation of it. They do all the design. They do everything. It's like we funded them. For years [1930s-1950s], we funded them. Nobody knew.

So this has been a revelatory process. And exciting, in that sense. I've given great talks—I mean, I don't know if they're great. I mean, staff have been really excited about it because it's been a lively part of the centennial. But that's basically, I said, it's two years—let's do it.

Q: This is certainly—there's an enormous amount of work that's been done on foundations.

Rosenfield: Oh, tons. Tons, tons. I have a whole shelf.

Q: But there aren't very many histories of particular foundations.

Rosenfield: [Raymond] Fosdick did it of Rockefeller from his very particular point of view. Ford does not have one.

Q: No, no.

Rosenfield: Ford is very close—[Francis] Frank [X.] Sutton has done the most. And he's done some wonderful writing, but not pulled it all together. And in fact, he has in one statement: this is probably the most impossible task to do. And believe me, I found out why. And even Carnegie, relatively not as—

Q: Is he still around?

Rosenfield: Oh, he's wonderful, 94. I have lunch with him every month. I talk to him all the time. I just saw him last Friday for lunch. He's fantastic. He's brilliant.

Q: Ten years or so—probably more than that—he invited me out for lunch because I had worked on the oral histories. And he was not interviewed for that project.

Rosenfield: Oh. Oh. Oh, my God.

Q: We can talk about that sometime. But he was pumping me about what was—because they wouldn't give him access to the files at that point in time. They might have later. But I was

wondering if he's still around. It's funny that he's still around. But there isn't that much on particular foundations.

Rosenfield: Yes. And that's why there's a lot of interest in this book, and why I, then, have this particular fuss with the editor. In that I want to make sure there's a sufficient detail. I don't want to write a glossy puff piece. This is not a puff piece.

And Vartan gave me complete freedom—I mean, he is wonderful in this regard. Absolutely. I have a very different relationship with him now. And he loves the scholarship. He said, I'm very jealous—you don't know how privileged you are. I said, I know how privileged I am to be on staff and still do this. And finally, I think, in a way my own fault, I got so involved in it. I mean, where is it? Thirteen hundred pages of stuff.

Q: Let it be noted that she's now waving her hands at piles and piles and piles of paper.

Rosenfield: But there it is, thirteen hundred pages right there.

Q: Oh!

But I took so long to do it that he finally said, look, it's been three years. We've got to cut—and when I handed in—actually, when I handed in the manuscript in August, I said, okay, this is it. He said, this is it—you're going. I mean, I know you need to finish it. You can be a consultant. I'm not supposed to reveal this, but I'm the second. We'll pay for you to finish it, but I don't

want you on staff—I mean, basically you need to leave here. You need to do scholarship, you need to do something else, and it's for your own good that you need to leave. And very, not paternalistic, but paternal, and he was absolutely right. I don't fit in with what he wants to do now. It's very clear. I know he would love to be writing books. And it's a real privilege.

I hear a lot of critical comments about the Corporation, which I think are not justified. Some of them are justified. But I have to say, whenever anybody starts—and there are a couple of former staff members who want to go down this critical route—I said, look, I cannot complain. First of all, the Scholars program was a precious, precious thing. It got me back into writing—I wrote two books, I wrote a paper—I edited two books. I've gotten back into my own field, it got me back into my own field of scholarship, transdisciplinary. And it's enabled me to do this book. And it really gave me a lot of grounding to do this. And Vartan has let me do this. So he has transformed my life in a way that's been very privileged. I am very fortunate. I know I'm very fortunate.

Because a lot of other people are dealing with his own frustration—and he is, I have to say, he's not wrong in why he's frustrated. He now sees the need for a certain kind of risk-taking. And he took on the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa—which we can talk about, because I want to set the record straight on that at some point—he did this fabulous thing. Fabulous. Yet it's been followed up in very interesting ways. But Africa program people are sort of rudderless because this reorganization hasn't given them the position that they need. And the rest of the staff don't know how to deal. They've got little bits and pieces.

So people are doing their thing. Some of it is very successful. I'm not saying it isn't successful.

Education: there they are in the [Barack H.] Obama White House. A little risky, but that's where they are. I have to finish the book. I mean, I know for me I have to finish. For the foundation I need to finish it because I think it'll be good for the foundation for me to get this book out there.

I'm trying to give a sense—and when you were talking about what the history, in terms of shaping ideas and the individual writing it—I see the power of Carnegie Corporation, “the soft power” is the trite phrase. But it has a lot to contribute, and especially for a new president. So I've talked with Tom Kean, and— I'm sorry he's stepping down as a chair—said, I want to be there in the search process because I need to tell you what works at Carnegie as president, and who will work best.

So I will do that, and quite aggressively. Because I've been here—I was here twenty-four years. So that's a large part of my life. And a quarter of the foundation's history, almost. So I want the next hundred years to be as effective as the first.

Q: Next time I want to talk about the book and about the Corporation, about foundations. But for now, to end it, do you see yourself as staying in the foundation world?

Rosenfield: So my conclusions: yes and no.

Q: Once the book is put to bed and everything, what happens then to Pat Rosenfield?



Rosenfield: Oh, well, that's an interesting thing. So let's see how predictive I can be. I'm not at all sure. I've never, never followed a trajectory. And it's always been—

Q: Yes [unclear].

Rosenfield: It's very interesting. And it's—oh, can I just say one thing about the book right now for this? I had a feeling that it is possible to be too connected. When I was reading—in 1951, there I know too much—so I'm at the Rockefeller Archives to try to fill in the Rockefeller gap, and this is the myth history part, which we'll talk about. I mean, it's unbelievable what people say and don't say in these things. Even internally, the myths that get promulgated.

I'm seeing people I had as mentors—because I started out so young—writing the letters as active. And I can picture them. And I think—Gilbert [F.] White, Cornelius Kruse, Benjamin Paul, oh, my God—I know these people. I shouldn't be reading this in 2011, on 1951. And there, lo and behold, a major grant of Carnegie's from—not expensive, but in terms of earth-shattering grant that we funded in the 1930s—it's coming up being evaluated by Rockefeller Foundation, and Nova Scotia fishing villages, the Antigonish movement, which was a powerful community. I'm thinking, how can I be objective about this? I know this too much. And so this is a history which has a lot of personal dimensions to it because of all the connections that I have. So I'm trying really hard to keep it as objective as possible, knowing the field. But it's very hard.

Q: You know, if objectivity takes away the passion, there's no sense in doing it.

Rosenfield: This editor's taking away the passion. I spent six weeks on the Keppel chapter getting the passion back in. I hope. Race. Race, what an interesting question. And I'm passionate about this question of race and whether Carnegie Corporation is racist or not.

Anyway, but one of the things I did at the end in the conclusions was thinking, all right, I start with Andrew Carnegie—let me end with Andrew Carnegie. Knowing that Andrew Carnegie was not an inventor—he was an innovator. So he would take someone else's invention, like the Bessemer process, and make it better. He would take scientific philanthropy, which was George [F.] Peabody's basic idea, and make it better.

So if he came back today—and I have this section which I know they're going to make me take out—what would Andrew Carnegie do if he came back? And he'd be really excited—because he's a great communicator—on the internet. How do you use this? On human relations, he was a great connector of people and ideas. So how do you build relations? And he believed deeply in values—values of peace, value of democracy, value of access and opportunity.

So what are the values? And I was thinking, he wasn't such a great believer in institutions, even though he set up all these institutions. It was just a convenience. Maybe we've gotten so top-heavy and administrative overhead in the foundation world—even the little baby ones, like the small, family ones that come up—that setting up an institution—[William] Bill [H.] Gates and Warren [E.] Buffett, using Andrew Carnegie's "the man who thus dies rich dies disgraced" as the premise for going around the world promoting philanthropy and foundations. And there's a big movement for global philanthropy, to look at the legal dimensions and all that.

I don't think so. I think he would say: these institutions take up too much money. There's too much of a disconnect between the ideas and the people who need to be funded. We need to look at it differently. Now, he would be definitely into exchanges and things like that, so some mechanisms do that. Vartan's very excited about this. And he's giving some support to do this after this when I finish what I have to finish.

On global philanthropy—what do we really mean by global philanthropy? But it's very clearly one world. Not around disease—all the stuff that has been there forever. Climate change. I mean, there's always been some issue with some major catastrophe, whether it's resource scarcity or not resource scarcity. Climate change or not climate change.

Those are kind of at that level, but what's really happening at the ground in terms of values and connecting the world around shared values? And through philanthropy? Because philanthropy can take the risk to build those connections, and build more of a connection. And I'm not sure network is the right idea.

So I have been talking about that, and I need a global base. So I've been talking with some institutions. And I can stay here—but it may not happen—U.N. [United Nations] University may set up a global public policy program, and that is a truly global institution with outreach. Not well known here, but—and I want to develop a global philanthropy program. Rockefeller Brothers Fund is very interested in that.

And since Vartan will cover my salary for the next year, which can't be told to anybody. This is private.

Q: Pardon?

Rosenfield: Can't be told to anybody, because he doesn't usually do this. He's very—I gave a little piece to him on my future work, and he said, this is exactly what I want to see from you. This is what you should be doing. So I want to try to do it. May not get anywhere, but I think it's really worth getting the values out. And I've decided that the place to work is not the established foundations because why are they going to change? They're not going to change. It's with young people.

So I have come in contact with these networks of twenty-to-thirty somethings called the Sandbox Network. You can't join if you're over thirty. You have to be selected. And so I'm finding a very receptive audience when I talk to people thirty and under. And there are some very nice networks that have developed. And I'd always wanted Geri to develop a youth network idea connecting—here, have these different networks of youth groups. Really interested in social change—not social entrepreneurs—not as individuals, but as groups. All doing comparable stuff. And I would say a program bringing them together could change the world. This is one of the most important new activities—and so Carnegie is not there. A new president might be there because they—

Q: Well, I've had you going now for two hours. And it's wonderful, after twenty-four years you're so excited.

Rosenfield: Well, I see the possibility for social change.

Q: Something about the experience has been very, very good. So that's where we'll begin next time.

Rosenfield: Okay, thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much.

[END OF SESSION]

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3PM

Session #2

Interviewee: Patricia Rosenfield

Location: New York, NY

Interviewer: Ronald Grele

Date: March 9, 2012

Rosenfield: Let me talk about finding glasses for Dr. Ruth.

Q: This is an interview for the Columbia University Center for Oral History, Carnegie Corporation Oral History Project, with Patricia L. Rosenfield. Today's date is March 9, 2012. The interview is being conducted in New York City. The interviewer is Ronald Grele. Would you say just a few words so we'll test the volume?

Rosenfield: Delighted to have you in my office.

Q: And we are where?

Rosenfield: 437 Madison Avenue, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth floor.

Q: Terrific. Thank you very much.

Rosenfield: Actually, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh floor.

Q: Where I'd like to start today is to back up and ask you some questions about the earlier interview. Things—as I listened to it, new questions came up. Let's start with the McKinsey report again. Because you said it really didn't have much of an effect, et cetera.

When I interviewed Dr. Gregorian years ago, he talked about the effects of what he thought was coming. And he was particularly focused on the administrative changes. And we talked about the appointment of the vice presidents. And we talked about Neil Grabois but we didn't talk about the other side. The reorganization of the administrative side, with Ed Sermier and the changes in the secretary. Were you at all aware of that or involved in that? How did that all play out?

Rosenfield: I was more than aware of it as program chair because it affected all of us but not involved in any of the decision process. So to be clear, Carnegie's always had vice presidents. Well no, I take that back. Since former foundation president Charles [R.] Dollard, we've had vice presidents. So this is not something new. I would posit that probably no one was aware of it because that history wasn't clear and you have to go through all the files to see we had a strange assortment of titles.

So while McKinsey may have said this was the necessary thing to do, it wasn't an unusual thing to do. What was unusual is the number of vice presidents. And where people had previously been either director for administration or corporate secretary, all of a sudden, the responsibilities were amalgamated and there was a title of vice president and a kind of chief administrative officer on one side. And then vice president for all programs.

Now, in the past, we had a vice president and an executive vice president. So it was different but not that different. What was different is that there was no executive vice president. So there was the president and two vice presidents. And then they created, when they hired Susan King—because she felt, well, you have two men, you've gotta have a woman—a vice president for public affairs. That title has changed a few times but it was originally, I believe, public affairs. And then when we hired the chief financial investment person, she also became a vice president. So all of a sudden, we went from a tradition of one to four. This made everybody think we were becoming a little top heavy, to be frank.

From a person who had been running a university, where you have many vice presidents and like a Corporation, many, many, many vice presidents, it probably seemed like the right thing to do. It didn't seem necessary to staff but it really didn't affect us in that we probably expected administrative costs. But what it did was to create more of a sense of bureaucracy, which we had never had before.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: It was always a lot of paper, always a lot of approvals—but never a sense that there's a bureaucracy. And hierarchy began to set in. Now, especially with putting someone in administration and in program who had—neither of them had any experience in foundations and there is Vartan with no experience in foundations—I think McKinsey set him up for some rough rides.



And in effect, none of the vice presidents had had any experience. They'd been on the other side of grants—seeking or dealing on a different level with foundations. But they had never ever made a grant. And that's really important because even in the past when we had, for instance, Florence Anderson, also make grants. She did a lot of our arts grants.

Sara [L.] Engelhardt did some other grantmaking. Dorothy Knapp was very much involved in the Russia program. So we always had, in the administrative part, grant makers.

Q: Looking through the annual reports, I sense over time there was a continued articulation of that side, with the growing sophistication of the investment portfolio and the growing administrative changes seemed to be coming from two different directions: one from the outside—the increasing complexity of the foundation world vis-à-vis the federal government in particular—but also other things.

And then internally as well. Kind of like the iron law of bureaucracy, that it just grows and grows and grows internally. The Peter Principle, almost.

Rosenfield: So, absolutely right. And actually, I made some notes about what I thought I hadn't discussed. And I also said that internally, I really didn't talk about some key appointments and some key changes and what the results were. I would say [D.] Ellen Shuman is the unsung hero of this era. There's probably mixed feelings about her because she was very strong minded, she could be whimsical, I guess.

Now, I have had a lot of respect for the people who were running the finances in the past. Jean Grisi was a superior treasurer and they had great investment ideas. But the external environment had changed so greatly. The dot com problem and certainly 2008 but also this enormous opportunity to make a huge amount of money.

And Ellen, from her work at Yale [University] and being trained by the best with the guy [David Swenson] at Yale, she brought her skills and her deep understanding to our investments. And we were very, very lucky. We built a huge portfolio. Vartan—we were all the beneficiary of that.

Q: Yes, the growth is astounding.

Rosenfield: Ellen Shuman is directly responsible for that. And I hope you'll be interviewing her because I do think when a scholar looks back at this period, she is going to emerge as one of the superstars twenty years from now.

As I look back at certain financial things—the superstar idea in the 1920s was being in bonds, for instance, when there was a crash—we were not hurt by the crash—we got hurt later but we were not hurt by the crash of '29.

Shuman changed our asset balance and she introduced a really good concept of asset classes that we had not had before. We've always had superb finance investment people on the board but she was able to kind of gather them into a strong group. And we really came out pretty unscathed by 2008. We had some dips.

And we're all the beneficiaries. Vartan especially. But he deserves the credit for hiring her because she was very young— and for creating that position. And maybe that was a McKinsey idea but I'm sure he was comfortable with it because of the university and they always had someone like that at the university and he was familiar with that.

The vice president for public affairs, Susan King, also deserves a huge amount of credit, although you'll hear she was a little bit more of a mixed bag. But I would say, as I've said before, we have outstanding publications and an outstanding sense of what the institution is because of her work. And so she's another superstar. Both women built excellent teams.

In contrast and this is not a feminist agenda here, I would say the two male vice presidents were less successful. Neil is a very, very nice person. I was his special advisor and I wanted to talk about that at some point later. We can talk about that detail. And I worked very closely with him for the eight years he was here, from day one practically. Not day one but close to day one, until the day he left. He was the wrong person. There's just no question. Very nice, very supportive, not the person who—

Q: Wrong? Too academic? Or not academic enough?

Rosenfield: No. He's a very, very intelligent person. Very interested in ideas. On that point of view, he would have been a good board member, would have been a superb board member.

In reluctance to act. And reluctance to confront Gregorian. Very hard to argue with Gregorian but he loves it. And you can argue with him if you have marshaled your evidence and you're persuasive and you don't mind not winning. You know, you can present all the facts and eventually you keep presenting them. He could change his mind.

Neil was a coward. I shouldn't—please. I don't mean a coward in a general life sense. He didn't want to take on Vartan. He had awe. He worshipped him [Gregorian]. He respected him enormously. And that wasn't to his advantage. So in that way, he didn't support the program.

And the other thing, even when there were clear problems—well, I could go into this now. I read every single proposal that was submitted as his special adviser. I wrote comments. He used my comments in all the meetings. And I would say, oh my goodness, not another one dealing with this issue, let's say in education. Not another one on value added. Haven't we done enough of this? What have we learned from it? Not another one for my Africa pals? This aspect of university. We have ten of them already. Do we need another one? Why is this one different? Ask this question. He didn't ask this question. And then some of them would come in. One set had totally negative reviews from everybody, external reviews. And I said, why are you putting this forward? Why aren't you asking the program? Well, the program has worked so hard on it. So he immediately took the program's side.

Vartan looks at these reviews and says, why are we funding this? And Neil couldn't defend the program. But he couldn't say to Vartan, yes, I've read them through and you're absolutely right, we should bring this up. So he was—maybe not a coward. He was just weak—weak was the

word—and we needed a strong person. We needed a Barbara Finberg, as I said before in the last interview. We didn't need to have a Barbara Finberg who had thirty-five years of foundation experience. We just needed someone who would act on the basis of right action, intelligence. And he knew better. I know he knew better.

And the other example, I think I went into it late last night on the Council on Evaluation—we're doing it now—but six years of this meeting with everybody very excited about it and nothing ever happened. Nothing.

I'm going to make sure this material is in the archives. Because we had one excellent report after one excellent report. And we had staff members writing papers. And it was, here are the guidelines to how we can look at cluster evaluations. Here are guidelines for how we look at formative evaluations, summative evaluations. The only thing that changed is we did develop a new format for program strategy papers. And that was to serve as the basis for evaluation.

And I thought and maybe I should've been stronger but I tried. He was the vice president, I was a special advisor running another program. I said, let's try to do these cluster evaluations. Here. Andrés and Cindy have given us a really good—Andrés Henríquez and Cindy [Cynthia] Gibson—really good outline for how we could—with detail as to how we could implement some cluster evaluations. Let's just try some. They're willing to do it. We don't even need to bring in a consultant, they're willing to take this—

Q: What do you mean by cluster evaluations?

Rosenfield: We're funding a whole lot of projects in, let's say, adolescent literacy. Let's just look at what's common, what's working, what's not working. Let's look at them as a cluster, not individual grants.

Q: Uh-huh. Yes.

Rosenfield: Makes sense, huh?

Q: Sounds like step one. [Laughs]

Rosenfield: Yes. Well but we hadn't done it because there hadn't really been—in a formal sense. The foundation was always looking at the results of what it was doing. So it wasn't as though we never did evaluation. And in fact, there's a whole set of wonderful memos in the late 1960s, early 1970s under Alan Pifer, on evaluation, where he generated a lot of really thoughtful response from staff.

Anyway, Neil couldn't take it to the next step. Because he'd been a university president, he'd been a dean, he'd been a provost. He had all the actors under him. He had boards. He didn't need to do the action. So I would say, if one looked at his vice presidency, you wouldn't see much for it.

Ed, on the other hand, was a failure. And I mean, he's a nice man, too. But he thought foundations were effeminate, weak—not in a gender sense—but just weak institutions that were living off of the fat of the land. And why all this money? They're stuffed money bags.

Q: Where did he come from?

Rosenfield: Oh, he was a scrappy street fighter type person. At least he wanted to give that image. He had been the CFO [Chief Financial Officer] at the [New York] Philharmonic, so it's not as though he came from some poor starving orchestra in the middle of Ouagadougou, he didn't. Capital of Burkina Faso. And he had then been a special education person at the city.

But he adored Gregorian. When Gregorian went to the Public Library, he had always wanted to work for Vartan Gregorian. And so he also had—unlike Neil, who saw Gregorian as this great man and afraid to question him. Ed worshipped him as a great man. I mean, one was sort of feared, the other was worship. And would talk about him in hushed tones. It was embarrassing.

And also with anything Vartan said—whether it was the right thing or not—Ed would do, until he became very disaffected. Because in fact, he did learn and he saw maybe things weren't the right thing to do. But he'd already developed this kind of modus operandi of not questioning, so he had sort of dug a hole for himself.

The other thing is, he used filthy language. And I have to say, I don't want to sound boastful but after one meeting—and we had the most nutty—and I'm sure it came from a McKinsey—nutty

kind of personal evaluation stuff that he was proposing. And there was a very upsetting staff meeting on this where he was running it and he used terrible language.

So I said okay, I'm going to play the Barbara Finberg role and I'm going to go in and tell him we don't really talk like that around here. And maybe some of what you're saying is good, maybe some of it isn't. But if we have more civil discourse and we don't need to use swear words. I mean, damn would have been okay. He just went—I mean, it was twelve-year-old talk. Very scatological and all this stuff. And why? We don't need it. This is a foundation for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge and understanding. At least have a little bit—anyway, just civil discourse and not put down people with—it never occurred to him that people might get offended by that. Never.

The good thing about both these gentlemen, you could go in and tell them, this isn't how you do this. Or this is how you might want to think about doing this. And they listened. And Ed acted on it. I don't think Neil—Neil was missing some capacity to act on knowledge. He loved knowledge. Did the crossword puzzles at his desk with his Executive Assistant [Evie Nieders] answers shouting back and forth. It did not do him so much good in public relations.

But Ed, he was into bureaucracy in a major way. That's what he knew, bureaucracy.

Q: It changed the nature of the office of the secretary, did it not?



Rosenfield: Absolutely, absolutely. And he didn't want to bother. He couldn't care—and what he did was to do away with blue sheets [notes or interviews], to do away with all the stuff that I see has destroyed the history of the foundation. Or eliminated the history of the foundation.

Susan, fortunately, through the publications program, has a whole series of publication that convey history in the making. And I'm writing this and putting this somewhere in my book because I couldn't have done the Gregorian chapter, in contrast to all the other chapters, with the material available if it hadn't been for Susan King's publications. Her office. The [*Carnegie Results*], the *Challenge Papers*, the *Carnegie Reporter*.

Because the annual report is now in-line—she didn't want to do it. The corporate secretary's office used to be the ones who read it with a fine-toothed comb. The typos—it may be pretentious to care about that but there's so many—you don't know whether it's accurate or not. That may change. Ellen is much more of a stickler for detail. But Ed, just why should we bother.

Q: This is a little off the topic but obviously for this project I've been going through the annual reports rather deeply and I find them very difficult to deal with.

Rosenfield: Impossible. The structure—

Q: They're not organized well.

Rosenfield: I've read every single annual report. You have, too. I mean from a hundred years. Well, 1921. Not quite hundred years, obviously. The *Annual Report* began to get very bad under Hamburg. Even Pifer. Before that, they were structured around program themes and you could get a consistency. And so if you were looking for everything in public affairs, you could follow it through. At least under a particular presidential era.

There'd be a thoughtful essay on program and then there'd be a thoughtful essay on some idea that the president was working on. Always. Alan Pifer began to write more on the ideas that were compelling him. And then the secretary's report would have some more on the program. That ended and you don't have that now.

And it's really missing. It's missing in the Hamburg era and it's missing in the Gregorian era. And I would advise a new president that that's something, just for posterity. Also for understanding what's continuing and what's changing and why. We don't have that thoughtful analysis.

Q: You mentioned also a little later in the interview, you said something about the egregious forms that one has to fill out.

Rosenfield: Ed introduced them.

Q: Is that part of that whole—

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: Whole kind of bureaucracy?

Rosenfield: The budget form, the narrative form. I mean, I was able to get around that from the Scholars Program, arguing that these were individuals and they didn't have the capacity to do that. Actually, we started with a formless form [laughs] before that all was introduced. But Ed introduced forms and it has gotten—I just was talking with some colleagues and heard how absolutely incomprehensible the forms are now.

And the budget form is beyond belief difficult. And I'm not so sure these are useful things. There's a group called Center for Grantee Effectiveness [Center for Effective Philanthropy] or something. And they've done these surveys. We've had them do our surveys. That's what comes up, that our forms are really the worst of anybody.

Q: Oh, really?

Rosenfield: Though it's just unnecessary.

Q: Now, the forms you're talking about. Are they forms that you as a staff member fill out or the grantees fill out?

Rosenfield: The grantees fill them out.

Q: The grantees.

Rosenfield: But there's another set of forms that we—our personnel—we've gone so far overboard on the personal evaluation, you would have thought we had seven thousand people here instead of seventy. Not that anybody's ever going to look at this but a new president coming in, if they're the right kind of person, will clear all that up. It's just ridiculous. I mean, we do ranking of—it's absolutely a way to disempower people.

And what we had before it—and maybe I'm saying this because I was on the personnel committee for ten years—before, we wanted to empower staff to think about how they're performing, talk with their supervisor and have a much more collegial understanding of their progress. Because this is a small place. We are a philanthropy, for heaven sakes.

And people who aren't performing, it becomes clear. You don't need to put a ranking of zero or one or whatever. And we fire people. But one of the biggest losses and Gregorian just couldn't work with her, was Dee Holder. Dee Holder was one of the true heroes of the Hamburg era as human resource person.

She and Barbara Finberg and the team that worked together, she was an integral part of the leadership team, administrative team. And generous, kind, understanding. Maybe not firm enough when getting rid of people that maybe—it took a little bit longer. It took a little longer to

hire people. But she had a sense of what the foundation stood for and how to make this a very humane place.

But it's really much more rigorous about evaluation. Rigorous has come into it. And rigorous without substance isn't really—and without a theoretical base is kind of useless. It's just form.

Q: What comes to my mind almost immediately is the question of morale. And from the outside, yes, it seems that, with foundations generally and Carnegie as well, that usually the morale is fairly high and it's an amiable place to work.

Rosenfield: We're in a highly privileged position. I mean, Ed wasn't wrong that we are privileged. But we're privileged not because we're fat—oh yes. He used to think we were fat cats living off the lay of the land. It was ridiculous. And he actually did a lot to damage to morale. He did not do Gregorian any favor whatsoever on the morale front.

But there's not enough understanding. I think what happens, that maybe staff orientation needs to emphasize this. People don't understand unless they've been here a while and in the field a while that we are in a very privileged position to have this risk capital. To be able to see where the opportunities are to make a difference, with the right people. Not us and not everybody, is comfortable doing this. Some people want to be out there doing it—taking the risks.

But there's some people who want to be able to facilitate, catalyze others to do it. And have that sense of how to put people together, how to put ideas and people together. How to listen, how to—from that point of view, you can't be in any better field if you're interested and motivated.

On the other hand, you can fall into traps. And I would say amiable, yes but arrogance happens. And I'd say there's a high degree of arrogance in the foundation field as a whole. I'm not so sure so much at Carnegie. But it just grows. It seeps in. Other foundations get accused of that. It's because you have money to spend and you have a power relation. So it becomes very problematic.

So while it might seem amiable, for grant seekers it can be very offensive.

Q: In an interview at the Forbes Foundation, I was told by a grant officer there that working for a foundation is like writing a sex manual without having sex. And the arrogance is, you think you can do it better. [Laughter] Always had that in my mind.

Rosenfield: That's very funny. That is cute.

Q: You also mentioned that there was a change in the relationship between the trustees and the staff.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: I was wondering if you could give me an example of that.

Rosenfield: Yes. The Hamburg era was probably the extreme in close relationship between trustee and staff, which I think was productive but trustees may have felt not.

Q: And then tell me. You met more often with them—

Rosenfield: No, well, yes—

Q: Or you met informally or—

Rosenfield: So, every board meeting the staff could ask questions at the board meeting. Not all the time but you could. I mean, it had to be the right question. We were asked directly questions we were supposed to present on the programs. And there was a lunch. And you were assigned seats and they rotated, so that the trustees had a chance to ask you informally there in the staff dining room. They would set up tables and there'd be two or three staff members and two or three trustees.

Now, these were program staff. I mean, it was a little hierarchical, very hierarchical. Trustees could call you. You could call trustees if there was something serious you needed to let the president's office or the secretary's office know. For instance, the trustees who are interested in Africa—Vincent Mai—I would regularly brief him over lunch. We would have lunch, I would say, over the course of his tenure, we probably met three or four times a year for lunch. He was

very interested in the program. He came from South Africa. I would pull together material for him. I don't even think I told any—I mean, I might have mentioned to Dorothy Knapp or Hamburg or Barbara—I think probably Barbara Finberg because I talked to her all the time.

But it was strongly encouraged. Trustees were chairing commissions, co-chairing commissions with staff, with Hamburg. They were on commissions, they would be on study groups. They were intimately involved in the work of the program. Now, did that co-opt them so they couldn't say no? I don't know. They may have felt that they, by the end, they may have endorsed the McKinsey thing to say we want more distance from the staff.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: So what Vartan's preference would have been is to have no staff at board meetings, except maybe his vice presidents. That he couldn't accomplish because that would've been such a major break. And now we have board meetings that have very interesting discussions with grantees. We've come back to that model.

I forgot a very important thing that Vartan introduced and I'll come back to in a minute. But there's no interaction after that. Unless, possibly, if a board member asks Vartan and Vartan will ask a staff member, give me a memo on something. But probably people don't communicate directly with the staff.



And I have to tell you, he scolds me for talking with trustees at board meetings. He said, you don't do yourself any good. And I'm thinking, I don't care, I'm not doing myself any harm either. I have a question to ask them, they have a question to ask me, they're interested in the Scholars Program or they're interested in the work I'm doing. Some of these trustees, I know from other lives. So I'm a bad staff member in that. So he calls me on it. He called me on it all the time.

Anyway but what he did introduce, which was a very good idea—and here's where Neil also failed: he thought—and this may have been a McKinsey recommendation, I don't remember—that there should be program committees so that the Africa program would meet with—there'd be a program committee of the Board. Ford has this, I mean, a lot of foundations have this. One focusing on Africa. One on peace and security. One on education. One on democracy. And that at each board meeting, each committee would meet with the program staff.

Now that's a lot of meeting. And there may have been a different way of organizing it.

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: The discussions could be very rich or they could be very bad. And we had a few very, very bad ones. And staff got very defensive. They weren't properly briefed by Neil. There were very few dry runs on these things or thinking about what issues. It was one of these program committee meetings that led Vartan to absolutely throw up his hands and have to reorganize. He wanted to reorganize the place but that's what prompted the reorganization.

People might not want to remember this but Fiona [B.] Druckenmiller asked a staff member who had made a presentation—Connie [Constancia] Warren, on our Schools for a New Society—and she asked a very appropriate question for a board member: “Supposing I meet a friend at a street or at a cocktail party and they, say, ask me: ‘So what does Carnegie Corporation do and what difference are they making? Would you mind—I’d just like to understand it better.’” This poor staff member. I went to college with her, I know her very well. She said: “It’s extremely complicated. I don’t know if I could explain it to you.” [Laughter] Something to that effect. I wrote down the notes. And the data—we don’t have all the data in and we can’t really say, then she went, on the one hand, on the other. And no one saved her. Her program chair, Dan [Daniel] Fallon, let her twist in the wind. Neil didn’t come in. It wasn’t really up to Vartan.

The program people should have come in to say, well, in fact we can say it’s ninth grade graduation rates or progress rates that make a difference. We think that’s what we’re testing for. And you can tell your friend, ninth grade. Just say, we think it’s ninth grade. We’re testing it and when I know for sure, I’ll—they just didn’t have any presence of mind. And she was not asking this to hurt the program—it wasn’t a get-you question.

Q: Do you want to say who this is?

Rosenfield: Oh, you mean Fiona Druckenmiller was the trustee. And she’s very involved in education.

Q: No, I mean the—

Rosenfield: Oh. Connie Warren was the—yes. She won't be interviewed by you, I'm sure. It was ridiculous. And the worst part is, okay, a staff member can be defensive. Someone, her superiors—and we did have superiors, we had the program chair and we had the vice president for program—no one stepped in to save the day. And if I were Vartan, I would have fired them [her superiors] right then and there.

He didn't. He wanted to—I mean, I'm sure he wanted—I don't know if he wanted to fire, all three of them. You don't treat any human being this way but you certainly don't treat a trustee, who is asking this in good faith. And dissemination of knowledge and understanding is the second part of our mission. You want the public to understand what we're doing. Here's someone saying, I want to communicate to the public. But for the world, I can't figure out what you're doing.

As a result of that, we were reorganized. Neil left. I mean, really, eventually—it wasn't immediate but it was over the next—it might have been, actually, over the next year—the changes. Dan was out. Connie was out. Neil was out. And I would say appropriately so. That was a silly thing. And that was the end of the program committees actually, too.

Q: You know, looking at the board, the Carnegie board in those years is a very prestigious board. And I looked at the Ford Foundation board, the Rockefeller Foundation—they don't strike me as as prestigious as the Carnegie board.

Rosenfield: I think having David Hamburg and Vartan Gregorian, two very distinguished intellectual leaders in their own fields and in Vartan's case, certainly accomplished institutional leader and from New York City—Vartan, and his work for the public library, being a truly beloved person—he asks anybody to join the board, they will.

And he got to meet *crème de la crème* of not only New York society, intellectual society. He himself is an intellectual. He could bring anybody he wanted from the business community, onto the board.

I would say they don't have the same caliber of presidents on the—I mean, Judith Rodin is a—I shouldn't be saying this—yes, a University of Pennsylvania president, but she doesn't have the same standing in the world of ideas or the world of business or even the academic community. And they're not very interesting boards. They were. Rockefeller used to—I mean, I look at the Rockefeller board. Really distinguished, wonderfully distinguished and forward. Susan Berresford brought on people, who was a wonderful person, which she's very community. She brought on a different level of board member.

Who is it getting to be a problem? They have problems with their presidents right now, in the sense that they're adrift. The boards can't deal with it even though they know it. It's been a very, very slow growth process and a steep learning curve for both those presidents and those boards.

I think we have a very sophisticated board. It's a pity that they're not more involved because, in fact—I mean, they're all very, very busy but they've always been very busy. I'd say it would benefit the staff because the boards have other networks to draw on, the boards have other ideas. And a closer working relationship that doesn't cross a line—I don't think the Hamburg years crossed a line. But some board members might have felt that way. Helene would be an interesting person to ask when you interview her.

Q: Talk to her about it if it fits in.

Rosenfield: Yes. Vartan's able to—I mean, anybody he asks to join the Carnegie board will join the Carnegie board.

Q: You also talked about the Gregorian plan in '98, where he was working up a new strategy. Is there any record of that?

Rosenfield: I have it.

Q: Oh, you have it. So eventually that will be available for—okay. I just wanted—

Rosenfield: It's the way to organize a foundation. If I ever run a foundation, I'm going to organize it that way. I'm keeping a copy for me.

Q: Yes, sure. Just the way that it was discussed last time, it seemed to have disappeared.

Rosenfield: Something happened and he and I—he said we would talk about it some point. He’s closer to it now. But what was really exciting about that plan and what should be—any scholar looking at this in the future, this is really—so he said, we’re one foundation. We’re going to have everybody doing something global and something local and domestic. But we’re going to take some common themes and we’re going to work around those themes.

We do have some themes that are absolutely able to be shared globally. With a sense of global that it’s relevant to almost any country in the world, every country in the world. And we’re going to have our special focuses of the U.S., our special focus where we can work directly in commonwealth countries and then our countries of interest in the Americans, Russia, China, whatever.

It makes us a truly global foundation, even though we don’t have the same level of resources as someplace like [Bill & Melinda] Gates [Foundation] or Ford, we can go to the cutting edge with the resources we have. And then, if you have staff members who actually know national and international issues, so they become global. It’s career, it’s strong grantmaking, distinctive grantmaking.

Susan Berresford tried to implement that at Ford but there they had really entrenched regions and entrenched domestic. And it was harder to pull it off, it was for a while. It was a good idea, it just was hard. It’s not easy because staff members—it makes it much harder for staff members. They have to learn something beyond—they can’t just be specialists.

Q: Back to the first interview. But it follows logically from what you're talking about, that more and more today, philanthropy is kind of global. If you think of migration, if you think of AIDS, health, all kinds of things, that philanthropy has become global. And encouraging philanthropy abroad, Carnegie is involved in all of that.

Rosenfield: Migration, to some extent. I mean, it's actually what I'm going to work on when I finish the book. And Vartan's very keen about it and is actually going to support me to some extent. Global philanthropy right now is Americans promoting philanthropy. That's not global. That's American. And it's always looking for the negative, the problem. The disease stuff, the terrorism, how do we deal with it.

I think what's missing and this is what really permeated philanthropy in the '20s and '30s, what became global philanthropy, certainly for Rockefeller and Carnegie—Carnegie in particular—was a wonderful scholar named Akira Iriye. I love him. He's my new passion. He and Frederick Keppel because Frederick Keppel would have been a disciple of his. Iriye has written about cultural internationalism. We the Foundation really promotes shared values around the world, looking at shared issues, shared opportunities, shared with and around—and this is the way to promote peace.

We might add prosperity but really, it's peace that we're looking for. So that we don't have—and certainly in the inter-war period between World War I and World War II, the concern about peace was paramount. And you do it as peers around the world. and so you build peer

relationships. And what we said was, we can't make decisions about what to do in Australia or New Zealand or South Africa or the British colonies unless we have people involved who understand what's going on there—local people.

And so we worked as peer partners with local people. This was very revolutionary at the time. Rockefeller wasn't even doing it. We're not doing that now. I mean, we do it, yes, to some extent. Vartan introduced it, as I said last time, for the Africa program with the African vice chancellors. They gave us what they wanted to do within the realm of higher education. It was fantastic. It was the right thing to do.

Global philanthropy should be working with peer institutions around shared interests, shared values. And that will get a truly global philanthropy going, where it's driven by local concerns but there's global sharing of ideas, opportunities, experiences. And for American foundations who want to work overseas, that's the way to do it.

And then there's this other layer of what's truly global and it is the circulation of ideas, it's the circulation of people and then it's also the circulation of problems. Air pollution, global warming, where you absolutely can't solve it—one person, one institution, one country, one individual can't solve it alone. You need to have a collective.

And that's a theme for philanthropy. Philanthropy can take the risks and do it. And then you have to get others involved, Corporations because it's not just the same client who's going to be the only one. I start thinking about this when I did the last chapter. I was thinking, okay, what



would Andrew Carnegie do when he came back, if he came back? And he was an innovator. He wasn't an inventor. He would've said, okay, here are all these things I started, I helped to start. We've got to fix them. We've got to go do something. We've got to have a better Bessemer steel process, in a sense, a better Pullman Sleeping Car. We should do something about this. And he would come up with something probably using the Internet because he was very technology oriented.

But also getting people together. And it's built around relationships. And we don't do a very good job—foundations don't do a very good job—of building relationships. They may give them money but they don't build the kind of networks that make for true relationships. And philanthropy has done it in the past but they aren't doing it now.

Q: It just struck me, listening to you talk, that a very important part of the Muslim world is giving and philanthropy.

Rosenfield: Absolutely.

Q: It is a way in which one bridges a very real cultural gap.

Rosenfield: No question.

Q: Are foundations doing anything along those lines?

Rosenfield: Egypt, the Saudis, Qatar, Oman, Abu Dhabi, India, China, other places. Turkey probably has some. I don't know, I haven't looked at those lately. Africa, there's some real African grant makers. I'm involved with a foundation [T.Y. Danjuma Foundation] in Nigeria, a real grantmaking foundation with huge wealth behind it, good wealth.

President Gregorian, he is, personally. The foundation isn't. None of the foundations. I'm involved now in a little group that's on global community philanthropy. Some foundations are getting together. There are no local foundations in the sense of real grantmaking foundations involved in this yet from another country. And he's very involved with—he's on the board of one of the Qatar foundations. The main one.

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: It'd be interesting to ask him that question when you—

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: Or Mary [Marshall Clark] should ask him that question.

Q: How is philanthropy organized in the Muslim world? I don't know.

Rosenfield: Well, it's a basic tenet.

Q: Yes. It's very important.

Rosenfield: There's the tithing, there's the community giving, like—

Q: One of the pillars.

Rosenfield: Yes, one of the five pillars. And they've always had it. There's actually a superb scholar of Muslim philanthropy, I think her first name is Suzanne Singer [Amy Singer], who's based in Tel Aviv. She's the daughter of Maxine [F.] Singer who ran the Carnegie Institution in Washington. And she's one of the most brilliant—Suzanne might not be her first name. Anyway, Singer is her last name.

And she does a lot of work on this. And Ford Foundation, actually under Susan Berresford, had a phenomenal program on fostering local philanthropy. And we did, under Hamburg. We had a little program looking at what we called alternatives to development assistance, where we wanted to say: "Okay, there's local money. How do we tap it for local problem solving and reduce dependence on the aid agencies?" We weren't thinking of a foundation so much.

And the moment is now. I think both of those initiatives, we did ours in the '90s, Ford did theirs a little later. The time is now to do it. And this group, the Aga Khan Foundation [AKF], the [Charles Stewart] Mott Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and ELMA Philanthropies, that they're trying to get off the ground, is maybe the right thing to do but it's going to take some effort.

Q: Somewhat along the same line, you mentioned the last time about David Hamburg reaching out to Gorbachev. That seems to be a kind of precursor for the foundation world becoming increasingly interested in Eastern Europe and Russia with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But that's early on. Carnegie seems to be the precursor. Was there a sense that this was leading to something larger?

Rosenfield: I have to, just for the record, say that it was not a precursor. I'm now reading all these files and I'm finding out that in fact, really, starting in World War II, Rockefeller Foundation was very concerned about Soviet studies, Russian studies and was funding something at Columbia. We immediately said, that's just training, we should do education. And we should research.

We funded a major Russian research center. So there was a tremendous amount of interest in Russia—Soviet studies, by both foundations. And possibly Ford was—I'm trying to remember now, I'm not as up to date on the Fords—so starting in the late '40s early '50s and continuing.

Q: Well, they had a program with George [F.] Kennan for a while.

Rosenfield: Yes, they did. George Kennan was actually a—I just was reading that in Frank Sutton's papers, that Paul [G.] Hoffman wanted him to be their main program officer. Yes, indeed, they had an office—and they did have an office in Moscow later. I think what changed

was the Cold War, the fall of the—but before that, Hamburg came on. And as I said before, no one here was familiar with that history.

But Rockefeller actually had major interests, major program work. And I think Ford and Rockefeller together in international security issues in the '70s. And we built on that with Hamburg in the '80s. But he wanted to do it at the highest levels. The others were maybe more at the institutional level and trying to reach policymakers. But of course it was much more sensitive. You're not going to reach out to [Leonid I.] Brezhnev, for instance.

But Gorbachev was also amenable to it and interested. Hamburg, as a medical doctor heading the institute of medicine, had done these kinds of what we call now Track II diplomacy. Bringing doctors together, for instance, Israeli doctors and Egyptian doctors. And he had a very interesting thing going. So he introduced a Track II perspective.

And Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Rockefeller Foundation were also working in theory. But he was the one who made it a really big issue. For example, with Alec [Alexander] George and with McGeorge Bundy, Hamburg advised the MacArthur Foundation to help MacArthur shape its international security program. And then MacArthur and Carnegie did things a lot in tandem as real partners. In fact, the team of George Bundy recommended the Carnegie program to MacArthur. And MacArthur and the board accepted it. It was like a variation. And basically, as I traced it—I don't know what's going to stay in whatever's published in my book—it's very clear. And Gregorian, I think with a lot of respect for what Hamburg was doing, kept that going. We're still doing it.

And it still needs to be done, in terms of seeding the field of Russian studies, seeding relations with Russia as a major power.

Q: Again, in the last session and you today talked off and on about evaluations, et cetera. But we didn't block it out. How did evaluation change over the Gregorian period. From what to what?

Rosenfield: From minor at the beginning, irregular, not done very much. There wasn't any reason to do it. Nobody was asking for them. Too extensive. And now—and I'm not quite up on it, I have to say other people, Michele Cahill's made it a passion—are gung-ho. And we've become highly—in fact, I wrote this down as something, I'd say—it's become mania in the foundation world.

Probably Sarbanes-Oxley, a sense of accountability, transparency, all those buzzwords, have led to overkill on evaluation. So we're now outcomes-driven—Paul Brest, who as president of [The William and Flora] Hewitt Foundation, was saying, expected outcomes—we've lost the understanding of the long-term nature, to some extent. We've come to excessively focus on short-term impact, short-term being three to five years. Nobody's thinking about ten years. And what we're doing, in many cases, won't have impact maybe until the next generation. So evaluation has become a major enterprise for the field.

Now, Gregorian, to his credit, he knew that we needed to do it. He has it in his early writings. But he sees the weaknesses of it. And, I mean, with his way of evaluating. I'm much more comfortable—ask really tough questions. You don't necessarily need the structure.

What are we going to do with the evaluations? Are we going to bring the program to a close? Well, maybe. But if you're a really good program officer, you know long before an evaluation that something's not flying and you should close it or you should work with it to make it successful—from site visits. We've always had site visits. It's the sort of basic characteristics of being a good program officer, which means close communication with your grantees.

It used to be letters. Lots and lots of letters and telegrams that I see in the files and site visits. Now, it's emails and site visits and telephone. You pay attention and you don't just look at what's in front of you. You look at what's not in front of you. And so you learn how to ask really, really good questions. And you can do them in gracious ways. But you can also find good external people who can do reviews of programs.

It's nothing new but we've given a lot of architecture to it. Now we've not gone and hired an outside person to do it because that's a lot of money and then an evaluation can end up driving program. And I think there's a sense we don't want that. But we spend a lot of time and effort trying to figure out—taking, here we had eight years of this Council on Evaluation—which resulted in paper, nothing else.

I mean, things were going on at the same time but they were not a result of that work. And now, we have a major effort on the part of both the national and international programs. So it's major, constant and whether it will last or not, whether it will make any difference, I have no idea.

Q: In a conversation I had with Geri, she mentioned metrics. The problems with evaluation through metrics.

Rosenfield: We're on the same wave. I mean, Geri comes from philanthropy as it should be practiced. She knows. Metrics, you force things into a number.

Now one of my most favorite mathematicians, someone named Abel Wolman in Oregon, is saying—who is a really, really brilliant mathematician—is saying there's no such thing in math as measurement. You can't measure—metrics don't exist—it's a construct. It's not a reality, it's an abstract construct.

So we've put a lot of emphasis on metrics. There can be benchmarks. But to have so much faith in metrics when the error is so great—and “case control,” “before or after”—it's just, we are dealing with a complex system. And what you really want to have is a good framework, a good understanding of the field, of the context of what you're doing, where what you're doing fits in, who else is doing this.

It's a lot of knowledge, a lot of work and a lot of making good bets, actually. And understanding what's important—and you want your grantees to understand what difference they're making. I



do think Gregorian had an idea which is worth testing and that is having—I mean, I’m of two minds of this, I’m not sure—but having fewer, larger grants. That’s a Ford Foundation strategy, versus the smaller, more distributed grants.

And depending on what field you’re working in, it may—for instance, with our partnership for African higher education—the way we wanted to do it, to strengthen universities, it made sense to have a few universities, give them sufficient resources to work on their strategic plan, support their strategic plans and make sure that they have in place the understanding of what’s working and what’s not working.

I think you need some—I come from a mathematical modeling background, so I’m not opposed to quantitative, I’m not opposed to numbers—but I think you have to know what the numbers mean and you have to know what the error is. And we can be a little gung-ho. And the foundation is definitely hugely gung-ho.

Q: Last time you mentioned that the Carnegie objective is the diffusion of knowledge, except for Geri’s program. I wonder if you can spin that out for me a little bit.

Rosenfield: Oh, no, no, no. Not except for Geri’s program. I have to correct that. I don’t mean that. The mission statement is the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding. Geri is for action. But diffusion, absolutely. She is very diffusion, meaning outreach and everything. She’s less on the scholarship and knowledge part. Although she’s more so now because she’s part of the Education Program. It was very much doing. Let’s make for social

change. So I mean, she's had a lot of experience at Ford and Rockefeller, so she's sort of an amalgam of the Rockefeller science in the service of mankind and Ford, the doing for mankind.

And here she's much less interested in the theory behind things or the research behind things, than the doing. And finding the right institution. So she's very interested in dissemination. She's for the advancement of action. So she's more of an action person. What she finds kind of a waste of time is, first of all, this evaluation stuff. She really was very reluctantly involved with the Council on Evaluation earlier. Really reluctant. Saying this is a waste of time, basically.

And the whole sense of strategic planning. But she's not wrong because you can waste a lot of time on strategic planning and not get anywhere—and never use them. So they don't actually—they're just paper on paper. So that's what she's resistant to. It's just that she has very little time of day for scholarship.

Q: The last time you mentioned, in September 11, something about Channel Thirteen and Helene Kaplan.

Rosenfield: It was her idea.

Q: I'm not familiar with what that is.

Rosenfield: Well, it's because the tower went down. Channel Thirteen lost its—or was it WNET [Wireless Networks and Emerging Technologies]—lost its tower. And she said, can't we help

them? Because we had this interest in supporting New York City after 9/11. And so I was talking to her. And then I told Susan. And that's what we did. That's one of the things we did. It was really, let's do something practical—let's not just do something. So we did libraries in lower Manhattan, for better or for worse. And then we did this. And then Gregorian, of course, was on the World Trade Center Memorial Foundation.

Q: I was looking for something programmatic. [Laughter]

Rosenfield: We've always been there for Channel Thirteen, for heaven sakes. No, no. Nothing programmatic. No, no, it's technical. Technical. Let's get them to rebuild so we can still see it. They don't have to borrow some facility.

Q: Get that cleared up.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: Then you also said that “education changed slowly.” How did that change? How did that change occur?

Rosenfield: So, education under Hamburg was very much focused on prevention of damage to children—early childhood education. We did major stuff. We began to get into middle school a little bit. We did nothing with the high school. Of course, we had done a lot with the high school when we funded the Conant Report—ancient—years ago, in the '50s.

Conant was a big, big—collaborated with the Corporation. He received lots of money from the foundation. And Gregorian had been involved with the Annenberg Foundation and their work on strengthening the schools and districts and things. I don't know enough about that. But he was very much involved in their public school research. So he came interested in trying to do something different in education.

And he kept the early childhood. We hired someone in that field. He hired this gentleman, Dan Fallon, who was a very distinguished educator, very opinionated. And he focused on teaching. Gregorian was also very keen to do something about teaching. I mean, Carnegie has been involved in teaching from day one. Carnegie himself was very involved.

So it wasn't a new thing but it was to look at how do we—Gregorian was frustrated with schools of education—how do we improve schools of education in order to have better teacher training so our teachers are better and give the students better teaching? And how do we understand what's better teaching? That led to two initiatives that were very, very big. And this was the idea: very big initiative and very few grantees but a lot of money: \$40 million each, total, \$20 million each.

Teachers for a New Era, which was working the schools of education to improve them and Schools for a New Society which was looking at school districts.

Q: A \$25 million gift to—

Rosenfield: No, no. The budgets were ungifted —not gifts. But they were big grants—the schools were getting big grants—and we were starting to make very large grants. But thanks to Ellen Shuman, we had the asset base to do that. So we were making much larger grants than we made in the Hamburg era.

Q: The 2001 annual report says that some donor gave \$25 million to Carnegie for the program Schools for a New Society. It didn't say who brought that money.

Rosenfield: I don't think we got extra money for it. Maybe it says that. It was to collaborate with us—Gates Foundation—I think, in getting started.

Q: Ah, okay.

Rosenfield: No, it was not that they gave it—maybe they gave it—did they give it to us to do? Or maybe we helped them program it.

Q: A-ha.

Rosenfield: We were a passive—

Q: So that was the cooperation with Gates?

Rosenfield: I have to look at it and see exactly what it says.

Q: I'll have to look at it, yes.

Rosenfield: Michele Cahill's the person—well, she wasn't here at the time, so I don't know—she was a program officer. She was brought in to run Schools for a New Society.

Q: We can find that out.

Rosenfield: But what happened is that those programs took on lives of their own and very un-self-critical. And here's where program officers can fall into a trap. And this is where McKinsey was dead wrong. Where they said, you know, to get in the trenches and do the work with them. Well, in both cases, staff members were intimately involved. It became like operating—and we're still in education—like an operating foundation.

And I will say this now and close this for another decade. I think it's a big mistake because we do not have the objectivity as to whether we're doing the right thing or not and we're stuck. We're all gung-ho that we're doing great stuff. I don't know. We don't have—the external evaluations don't seem to make—I don't know right this minute. But certainly for those programs, we got an extraordinarily negative external evaluation of teachers for a new era by the RAND Corporation. It made no impact whatsoever.

How could they? They don't understand it. It's too complicated. It's just like the answer to the board member. It's too complicated for them to understand. Well, I don't think so. One may not like RAND but this was a report struggling to try to say good things and they had a really hard time. Because we bought into the programs, lock, stock and barrel—instead of going the distance—on both of those programs.

And Gregorian saw it. I could see it in the proposals that I was reading. Neil saw it. Neil didn't say anything critical, though—and this is where Neil, as a really smart, really, really smart man and really good with numbers—he's a mathematician. He could have said to Gregorian, we have to pull the plug. Would have protected everybody. Or we have to really regroup. Let's have a very hard hitting external review of what we're doing. Let's do it first internally to see if we need to.

But Neil was also in awe of Dan Fallon who was a very, very, very tall, very persuasive, full of himself person. Pardon me for the record here. Not friendly, not collegial towards anybody else except some of his program people. And was absolutely a true believer in what he was doing. And one of the things that you need to be a good program officer, you need to have a healthy dose of skepticism. You need to always be asking the question. That's why Gregorian was so great.

Q: What was he so positive about?

Rosenfield: That value added—the teacher assessment model. We know the right thing. We've got the right teams. We've got the right people and it's going really well. And it wasn't going really well. They weren't lasting. They hadn't built for sustainability in these things. So that they were investing a lot of money in University of Virginia for the teaching program. And then Schools for a New Society, they never got it together.

And there was Andrés starting with the early childhood and then adolescence literacy. The big fallacy, the reason why that program didn't succeed was, I think, in large part because they had Teachers for a New Era working on teaching improvements in a set of institutions here, in one part of the country. And around the country in some different areas, we had Schools for a New Society in seven districts around the country.

Not the same—not the same as Teachers for a New Era. And then we had adolescent literacy, looking at all the issues with adolescence, in yet another set of institutions. All we needed were two or three places where you put it altogether and we could say what happens if you're improving teacher education at the training level.

We're improving the school districts. And we've got a program for adolescent literacy for disadvantaged kids or immigrant kids. Let's put it all together in some place where it might be manageable. So not New York City. Maybe the program in Boston. Maybe the program in Providence. Maybe the program in Nashville. Let's just do everything in one place and see if we can really build dense critical mass of investment.



Is this what it's going to take? Because that would be the model for the country. They wouldn't even dream of it. We kept raising it and Vartan—I think if Neil had pushed it, Vartan would have embraced it. It was the right thing to do and we didn't do it. So that program failed. They all failed. I mean, failed in the sense that—I'm sure there's learning that's—I mean, I hate to say the things I failed—there was learning taking place but there's nothing sustainable from it. There's not going to be any lasting difference.

And the thing is, that's actually been a hallmark of all the work we've done with the schools. And here we are now pushing—so we've gotten into this math and science stuff in a big way. And Carnegie has pushed math and science education since Vannevar Bush was on our board in the '40s. This has been our thing.

But there's no acknowledgement of what did we learn, what did we not learn, what should we never do again. Or has the context changed sufficiently? So I can see a scholar looking—20 years from now, there should be someone who just looks at the trajectory of Carnegie Corporation's funding of work in math and science education. Teachers', disadvantaged children, how we changed the—let's get them more innovative. Let's use technology to be more innovative. That we talked about the same issues in the 1950s.

What's the political support? What's the teacher union support? And just see, where did we go wrong? Where did we go right?

Q: The collaboration with Gates. How close is that and how equitable is that?

Rosenfield: I'm completely on the outside of that. So I only have hearsay. I think that's something—

Q: We can ask other people.

Rosenfield: I think they work harder on that. I mean, my collaboration has been more in the developing country area with Ford and Rockefeller and MacArthur. And on the scholars' side, it was more with Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Q: Let's talk about this. Because the last time you said that you were out there in the foundation community. And I have—how? Lead you right into it?

Rosenfield: No, Geri and I are the two big pushers of partnerships. I mean, Geri Mannion and I are the two—Geri's out there on the domestic side and I was definitely out there on the international side. Because I felt, we don't have enough money to do it on our own. And if I'm really believing what I'm doing, I want to have partners. I'm a big believer in partnership. I don't need to do it alone.

And Gregorian's very supportive of that. Hamburg was very supportive of it. It's been a hallmark of Carnegie in some eras, not in all eras. So I had built these partnerships. And not just alone. I mean, it was the right configuration of people on Africa and development work in the '80s and '90s. And we all worked together a huge amount.

And for the Scholars Program and especially with this combination of national and international scholars, we really talked quite a lot. There were a number of programs. And so that's how I was out there. And I was on the International Committee in the Council on Foundations. I think Geri and I are maybe two of the few people who have been on the program side, who have been actively involved in the Council on Foundations. I was on the planning committee for a couple of the large annual meetings so that I got to know people on the international side.

Our Scholars Program was a little bit different because there's less of an organized community around fellowships and scholarships—the way we were doing it, they were really fellowship programs. But I still kept in touch and would go a lot of networking meetings because I felt I needed to know what others were doing. And it could shape my program and I could learn from it. And I care about the field [development in Africa]. Still.

But we never could really collaborate in the same way with the Scholars Program because funding individuals is quite different from funding institutions. The opportunity for partnership—although, I was always able, when people wanted to know experts or people who were really thoughtful in certain areas, I could give them names. The scholars didn't mind.

Q: How was it to work with Ford and MacArthur and Rockefeller?

Rosenfield: It was a different period. And actually, I'm writing something for the chairman of the board of the Rockefeller Foundation. I was talking to, last night, David Rockefeller on this.

And I promised him I'd get him something today. It was really lovely because our presidents got along. It was a welcome sense of collaboration. And the presidents—they don't have to get along.

But it was also—there was a high degree of respect, a high degree of trust. And we shared—we knew where each other's comparative advantages were, where they lay. We had differing missions but they were in alignment. We also shared the same goals that we wanted to build capable institutions or individuals in the programs that we were funding, so that we wouldn't have dependence on external resources forever.

So it was a lot of shared—and especially around the issues related to Africa at that time, with MacArthur, Ford—and it was the right people. For instance, I knew the Ford person, Victor Rabinowitch. For years and years, he had tried to hire me. I don't mean to make this sound so arrogant. But the Ford people had tried to hire me. So I knew them for—both those institutions I had known for years.

And then the Rockefeller people, I had worked with them on my program at WHO. So it was just—we all know each other—we all respected each other and we could argue with each other. We could disagree.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: And still be close collaboration. And we had a sense of huge respect for the people we were working for in the countries. We could also discuss with them and we could also be comfortable enough to say, that's not the right thing to do. This is what we think.

And Thomas Odhiambo, one of the great leaders of African science whom we all backed. And he would say, I want to do it anyway. So okay, well, we trust you. And we'll fund this African Academy of Sciences. And it's still going strong, remarkably today. Well, however strong it might be—it's still going today.

And the other partner which I love working with, I've loved working with them from day one at WHO, is the International Development Research Center [IDRC] in Canada. They're also a fabulous partner. And we brought them into several of the networks that we created with the foundations. They're great partners. But it was—I wouldn't say easier but there was no competition.

I mean, it wasn't as though we were saying, oh, Rockefeller and Ken [Kenneth] Prewitt, were saying, we're better than you and we're going to do this our way or no way.

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: There was a lot of give and take.

Q: Ford and Carnegie were particularly collaborative in South Africa.

Rosenfield: Wonderfully so. Actually, even more than I realized. Because I've been talking with [William] Bill [D.] Carmichael, the Ford person who actually was the collaborator. Alan Pifer was absolutely consumed with—this is under his era—with social justice. And in South Africa—I'm not going to go into better or for worse and whether—but he really focused with David Hood on the core issue of the public interest bar, as a way of reducing the egregiousness of apartheid.

Because, one thing in South Africa rule of law had impact. Amazingly. And with Eli [N.] Evans, Pifer and Eli Evans had done this in the American South.

Q: Right. That's right.

Rosenfield: So there's a trajectory. There's a lot of connectivity and that's what I'm trying to bring out in my book. And it's really, really neat to see this. Pifer embodied that connectivity. And so we started in the late '70s to revive our program in South Africa around these issues. Not thinking that apartheid was ever going to end.

Hamburg continued it. He was reluctant because there was this issue. Should we be in a state of apartheid like this. We had pulled out in the '60s. Pulled out in a sense that we reduced our direct grantmaking, still funded travel grants out of there. And we had our Carnegie inquiry, so we lay the groundwork for and the support for the public interest bar.

And when I came into the program here, we continued that. Because it was really thriving and important. But we were able to bring in gender issues, Witwaterstrand and [University of the] Western Cape. And Vartan has continued that in the support for universities and libraries. It's a different program but we're still there. South Africa has always been a major part of the Africa program. I assume it will remain. It's been there since 1928. I think it will probably stay.

Q: That was the most interesting part of the earlier project that we did—

Rosenfield: Oh, yes.

Q: —the interviews that were done in South Africa. They were wonderful.

Rosenfield: I just have to say there's an error that must be corrected. I'm trying to correct it in my book. Francis Wilson says that "The Poor White Study" that we did in 1828-1932—it was the blueprint for apartheid. It was not the blueprint for apartheid.

Q: Oh.

Rosenfield: And whoever is reading this has to read my book to find out why. There's a huge amount of scholarship on why it wasn't.

Q: Oh.

Rosenfield: You have to be very careful on what—I mean, not you. One has to be—

Q: Good to get that on the record.

Rosenfield: Because Mary Marshall [Clark] has it on the website. And it's not. Because apartheid didn't even come in place till later.

Q: Till '47, yes.

Rosenfield: And apartheid was really a long trajectory of discrimination around segregation that was bought into by the white liberals in South Africa as well as the racist Afrikaans. What we did was to give it a little more ammunition. But we did not—the blueprint was not a result of the study—there was no blueprint for apartheid. And it's really important to say that. And Francis was just really good on the one-liners. But there's just huge South African scholarship on this.

Q: Yes. So the way I read that was that it led to the recognition of Afrikaans as a people, as a—

Rosenfield: They had that really strong before him. I didn't mean to interrupt you. And in fact the findings of the commission were rejected by the strongest Afrikaans. Afrikaans were very strong as a people. Believe me. They were—the Boer war. It was the understanding of poverty and Afrikaans poverty.



But there were a lot of people who said black poverty is worse. The South Africans—I go into this. In not as much length as I want to but the full volume, the thirteen hundred-page thing. It's a plug here!

Q: Along the way you also said something about that you have relatives who were funding sources.

Rosenfield: Yes. I mean, I come from a family where philanthropy was always part of the picture.

Q: Who in the families were funding sources?

Rosenfield: Well, not for Carnegie Corporation but Sandra, the Rose family and my cousin Sandra [Priest Rose], she was on Vartan's library board.

Q: Oh.

Rosenfield: And the public library. She and her husband. She's my cousin but her husband Fred [Frederick P. Rose]—but my own direct family, my two great grandfathers were major philanthropists in their own right. One in New York City and one in Providence, Rhode Island.

Q: But we don't have that in the earlier interview.

Rosenfield: It never came up.

Q: Oh. That's an interesting piece of biography.

Rosenfield: Philanthropy has always been there. William Fischman and then Samuel Priest.

Q: It sort of puts you in a certain kind of continuity that—

Rosenfield: I mean, I may not have thought about it. I think what made it clear to me was I was actually in some strategic planning meeting of the Council on Foundations on the International Committee. And they had one of these facilitators who made everybody go around the room saying why are you in philanthropy? And I had to think about why am I in philanthropy? So I just thought it kind of was a trajectory based on—and so that made me—in my forties, sort of think about why was I in philanthropy, anyway?

Q: Was there a dialogue within your family about giving?

Rosenfield: Oh, yes. Always.

Q: Always. Isn't that interesting? Are you going to talk about that in the book at all?

Rosenfield: This isn't really personal, except as a practitioner. And I don't know. Maybe the author's note?

Q: In the introduction or something?

Rosenfield: Maybe the introduction. Eleanor [Lerman] is wonderful here but—every word is weighed.

Q: Yes, yes, yes.

Rosenfield: The publisher will only take four hundred manuscript pages. And I'm saying five hundred manuscript pages. I want to talk about Carnegie, not me. Maybe in the author's note. Maybe I'll put it someplace. I might do a memoir. Actually, Jill Conway, who was one of our wonderful reviewers for the Scholars Program—and I'd love to talk about the Scholars Program too, sometime soon, here—said to me, I had to do a memoir about being in philanthropy.

But there are a lot of women in philanthropy. Philanthropy is a field that attracts women, not necessarily at the presidential level but at program officer level.

Q: When you were talking about the Muslim Scholarship Program. You said that Dr. Gregorian had a list of issues.

Rosenfield: Yes, we—

Q: What were those issues?

Rosenfield: That's actually an important point because the material that's been sent to archives does not have all the—I have to, as soon as this manuscript is with the publisher—I'm going to be putting the scholars files over there in that corner. We were trying to say, how can we, we want to change. We want to really change the program, turn around really quickly and get the letter out to the nominators.

But we don't want to have just open, just say that we're interested and—we want to formulate it in a way that makes it clear this isn't just looking at religion and is not just looking at Muslims. It is Muslims but how do we fit together these ideas? And how do we build it as a public Scholars Program?

And so we put together a list of issues. We had three or four and then Gregorian filled it out. We have a whole list of—I guess there are about ten or fifteen topics about Islam and democracy. I mean, they're very general. Because we didn't want to tell anybody. But it does, of course, influence what you get in.

Q: Sure.

Rosenfield: But we've got Islam and democracy and constitutionalism—women in Islam, Muslim societies and how they're constructed vis-à-vis others. Muslims in America, historically and current issues. The role of the mosque, Sharia law, Jihad. I mean, he just write them down, off the top of his head.

I mean he was compelled—it's so clear in his new direction—he was saying from day one. I mean there are some issues and I think to his credit he didn't push them. But on the other hand, like David Hamburg, who did push his ideas, had he pushed we might have been able, as I said, on the Islam issue for sure, to have done something earlier.

And he tried but it didn't—he really was able to use this—it was interesting. It was the right moment in 2004, 2005 to do this. Because September 11 had sunk in, we had this ongoing war that wasn't getting anywhere. We didn't want to focus on the war—we had enough other people from the previous five years of the Scholars Program looking at issues of the war.

We didn't really want to focus on Iraq or Afghanistan. We were interested in it because that's not related to Muslim society or Islam. It's really power issues. So we were looking at it and we wanted to shape a different lens on it.

Q: Did you have any of the problems that Ford had in terms of claims that there are funding terrorists? Susan Berresford and [Anthony] Romano came out with this statement about how they were funding. Were there any proofs like that on you?

Rosenfield: Vartan was trying to advise her not to be so—I mean, she overreacted. And he said—it'll be interesting at some point to ask him—I don't know if it's uppermost in his mind to asking that question—we didn't have that problem. Because once they instituted the screen that you had to do, the Homeland Security, we just did that on everybody we were funding.

And we never had a problem. It was hard because the names are very common and familiar but we didn't have a problem.

Q: They [Ford] were dealing with organizations.

Rosenfield: They did. They were out in front. And there's much because they are so large and they had people in the field. I think it was related to the meeting around race. I can't remember the name of the title of the meeting that was in South Africa, it was on race and something else—

Q: Oh, the Durban thing [2001 World Conference Against Racism , also known as Durban I].

Rosenfield: The Durban thing. And that caused a big problem. And that triggered—I mean, so they're already running.

Q: The declaration of Zionism—

Rosenfield: Right. And then it's possible that some of the grants they were making in Palestine and Israel were but the program officer, Aaron Back, who made those, he was Jewish. He was funding Israeli grants. He was funding what liberal Israelis wanted to have funded.

And you could have—instead of being defensive—the foundations do this, you could have made it a teachable moment about what foundations can and can't do. We have much less power than everybody thinks they have.

Q: I want to get into that. That's a new topic for us. But you also said that in the Scholars Program, the experts narrowed the program. But that's a tension in all.

Rosenfield: Absolutely. And Geri is one of the ones who resented that most, I would say. Because her people were not scholars often, I mean, the ones she liked. They were more doers. And this was a program—although we had a mix, although it was narrow. What we really tried to steer clear of—and we had one problem, I have to say—at some later point in the Islam part, when we were focusing on Islam, the external review committee feeling they could do the work better than the scholars.

We had one person toward the end who was like that. And that was unfortunate. We had to get into making her feel less threatened by the work we were funding. Because it became an issue: are they actually going to do the work? And so some of the big expansive ones were hard to get through. I think, what I haven't done and maybe one of these days I'll just go back and see who—I really do want to see who is actually—most of them have finished their obligations but not all of them. And a couple of the ones and it's interesting. Because the ones I know who haven't finished yet, even from the early days of the program, were not necessarily the junior ones. The junior ones, of course, have the incentive to finish, so they get their books out and they

get tenure. It was the older ones who had maybe bitten off more than they could chew, because it's a group decision process.

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: Heather and I would make our list of what we wanted beforehand and we got most of them but not all of them. There are occasions where there were some people, not very many each meeting but there would be two or three finalists who absolutely, there was no question about it. And that would be very exciting, where they had a fabulous proposal, a really cutting-edge idea. And we didn't even discuss those, which was probably too bad because that would have been good.

Q: You mentioned the program and the SSRC. But we didn't get into the relationship and what it is like now.

Rosenfield: It's funny because I just yesterday—

Q: How was the decision made?

Rosenfield: I just want to say at the Rockefeller Archive Center yesterday, I just went through all the SSRC files—they have the SSRC files. And I just went through the finding aid on all the SSRC things. And I was just thinking, oh my god. There is a whole other history to be written about foundation collaboration. I mean I know—



Q: Oh, boy, yes.

Rosenfield: Don [Donald] Fisher's done some of it but it's really incredible. And I was totally unaware of that when I joined the program in '87. Even though I'd been involved with SSRC, I just was totally unaware of it.

SSRC was out of the picture for me as far as I was concerned when I was running the developing countries program because we were really focused on funding Africans in African settings on African issues, around what we saw and they said were important. If they had wanted to work with the SSRC, we definitely would have. We may have given them support for that.

Nobody, no African grantee ever asked to work with the SSRC. We did work with something called CODESRIA, which was kind of the African equivalent, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, a little bit. We didn't even work with them too much. Because we weren't into that kind of—we supported some other networks. And in the social sciences and health area, we funded a lot of social sciences. There were new networks being created.

So basically, I don't think we made any grants to SSRC—I'm not even sure on the domestic side—in the '90s. I can't say that. But then when Gregorian—and Gregorian—we didn't really start supporting them again until—no. I worked with them personally. I chaired committees for

them and I have books from that and everything. But this, on very different issues from what we were doing.

Q: I'm talking about the Scholarship Program now.

Rosenfield: Oh, the scholarship. Oh, I see.

Q: How it ended up there.

Rosenfield: So the scholarship, that's a little different because we actually—the Africa program is now doing a lot of work with SSRC. When Heather and I were starting the program and we wanted to see, how do we build the data. Because we were very much interested in—because I knew from the Rockefeller issues with their post-doctoral programs, that they hadn't kept a up-to-do comprehensive database.

I mean, they had it. I know they have it. I've seen it in the archives. But they hadn't done anything to have a knowledge base from this. And Joe [Joseph R.] Bookmyer there was trying to do that. And I knew OSI [Open Society Institute, Soros Foundation] had. So Heather and I had talked about this. So we said: "Let's go talk to some people about, what are the right databases? How do you do this?"

So SSRC and the American Council of Learned Societies [ACLS], Steve [Steven C.] Wheatley, they were very, very helpful to us on how to build the right database, what to do. So that's where

they were. We had no one from SSRC on our committee. But what happened is when Hillary Wiesner came in to start the Islam Initiative and we had this body of scholars, she wanted to build on the public scholarship part.

So with SSRC, it kind of flowed into her program with supporting SSRC to look at public scholarship through Title VI institutions, which are training around Arabic and Islam issues in universities around the country. And many of our scholars participated in that. But not all—there was more.

When we were thinking of trying to build better knowledge networks around the Islamic scholars, I did talk to someone named Joshua DeWind at SSRC, who was very much interested in how do you disseminate scholarship? How do you get journalists to pay attention? We were going to do something with them. But then I was told I couldn't take any more discretionary money. We did three grants and couldn't do any more. So I couldn't work with him.

And that's really, as far as I'm concerned, a big sadness with the Scholars Program, that we couldn't—and I talked about that a lot last time—that we couldn't have done more to sort of not only build the networks but build relationships with journalists and get the word out better. Susan King helped to a large extent there.

Q: Does Carnegie fund the SSRC scholarship programs?

Rosenfield: No.

Q: No.

Rosenfield: We did. We did a lot earlier. But now we're funding a network of—they're not scholarships per se but we are working with ACLS on scholarships in the humanities in Africa. SSRC, we're funding a network on conflict in Africa. A big network. And then there's another one on conflicts. So the Peace and Security people and the Africa people are working together on this.

Q: Though this is—

Rosenfield: Brand new, though. Brand new.

Q: I couldn't catch it on the recording. You mentioned that the choices for the vice president for international were Deana and somebody else. And I couldn't get the name.

Rosenfield: Oh, the other choice who could have been?

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: Oh. Steve Del Rosso.

Q: Okay. okay. It just—

Rosenfield: No, that's okay.

Q: I couldn't get it out in the—just couldn't get it.

Rosenfield: It's all right, I might have swallowed it at the end of the sentence. I do that.

Q: I couldn't get it. Oh. Just one last thing. You said the Africa program was marginalized.

Rosenfield: When this merged.

Q: Yes. I'd say it's a little less so now but I'm not fully aware of what's going on. Because they strongly—Deana and Steve and Carl Robichaud and Pat [Patricia Moore] Nicholas are strongly focused on peace and security, nuclear security, foreign policy to some extent, those networks, those issues, those institutions that they've been working with.

They didn't know anything about the Africa program. Because we had always been separate. The previous chair, David [C.] Speedie and Geri Mannion and I had worked together on U.N. studies and other things like that. Still, on the Africa stuff, everybody was very separate, siloed.

On the Russia stuff, when we had the Russian higher education and the African higher education, the issues are completely different. And they were organized in completely different ways. So there just wasn't any alignment there. And to put those programs—there's no alignment. And

universities and libraries didn't feature in the same way as in the Peace and Security program. So to put the two together without really saying how are you two going to make this a coherent program? Michele did a fantastic job in doing that, with some costs and losing some initiatives. But basically the education program—the national program—is in alignment around a few key issues. Slowly, maybe, the international program is coming that way.

The marginalization of the Africa program is that, now that they don't have the major university partnership, what are they going to do? And I still think they're thinking about that. They are following up on some issues that the vice chancellors have identified—particularly next generation post-graduate training. But that's a very big issue. And we can only be a drop in the bucket on that.

So I do think the conflict network is a good one and that's really bringing the Peace and Security and the Africa program together in ways that need to be looked at but could be very promising. The humanities funding is a big need. But are we doing it? Just fellowships, focusing on two or three universities, we could build—I hate the term but—centers of excellence or least excellent institutional arrangements in that area.

But it's the energy, oomph. I mean, they had major, major contribution around the women's scholarship initiative that they had as part of the universities and the broadband. Very important. Very path breaking work. What's next after that? How are we going to do that? I don't know. I think the question is how committed are we to maintaining.

I don't think we would ever not have something in Africa, since it's a legacy of the institution and a hallmark of the institution, actually. But to what extent, I don't know. It's something that should be tracked.

Q: Right. Now, I've finished my list. Let's go to your list. [Laughing]

Rosenfield: Well, I was thinking—I mean, we've talked about some of this. We've actually talked about maybe a lot of this. The issue of individual support is always something that foundations grapple with. And I think it becomes one of the things that we did, which was different with having the Scholars Program run internally instead of externally, is that, to be able to shape it and have it run by staff.

It is a high administrative cost, relatively speaking to the other programs, because we didn't expand the program. We could have done other things and the administrative costs would've been lower relative to the budget because we would be doing more grantmaking, as I tried to explain to Ed when he would say such high overhead. And I said but if we could just do more in grantmaking, even if we only have two staff members.

And we did pay too much for the external advisers. Vartan had early on set the fee—all of them were going to get \$25,000 a year as retainer fees. This was across the board for all the programs that we're supposed to be working with, these external advisers. They were supposed to be able to be called on from time to time. They worked in major ways for us. But with \$25,000 in a "retainer" fee, we gradually reduced that.

But I think it's [individual grants are] important because it keeps foundations engaged with the cutting edge minds in the country. So to do it in some way internally. And because we had the program people reading them, it was a kind of knowledge gaining. But it's a choice. And I'm not sure really whether it's the issue—the main issue is that support for individuals is extremely important to build fields.

But what we're doing with ACLS and what we used to do with SSRC and what we've done with other institutions may actually be certainly more efficient. But as long as the program staff member is very much involved in reading the material and keeping up to date with what's going on, then the foundation will benefit internally as well. But the idea and what we didn't really do—we didn't get to that next level.

When the program was to extend the boundaries of the other programs, if we had had more resources to hold more meetings, we might have been able to bring the programs and the scholars together. And they may have actually helped shape those programs. The Islam Initiative because Hillary—we involved her in an active way as soon as she joined, she actually—I mean it worked perfectly there. When there was a very specific theme and that's where it was smart to focus around a theme, Hillary was able to take it over and build it into a program. So as far as I'm concerned, that shows that you can do it. Especially, if you give it five years to assess whether it's a program or not. It was perfect. It's appropriate.



But it is heavy duty. It does involve a lot of staff time and you have to really be committed to it. And I think it ran—I didn't run out of steam but I think the institution kind of ran out of steam doing it.

Q: You know, I've served on boards for the SSRC and the ACLS.

Rosenfield: Oh, yes.

Q: The grants thing. And those are just general. So you get incredibly disparate kind of things. And you end up after two days and you wonder, what is the nexus there? What is it really all about? Where you have a focus, at least you have some central core of something that you're looking at.

Rosenfield: It makes a big difference. So I would say, as a recommendation—now, as it turns out, in the first five years, the program we ended up having—because in the economic development part of the program we had a hard time reaching Africans. But we ended up having the top development economists in the country.

Dani Rodrik, James Robinson, James Galbraith, Danny [Daniel N.] Posner, Carol [J.] Lancaster and three or four other even younger ones. And I was trying to work with someone named Janet Maughan at the Rockefeller Foundation, who was very interested in our scholars. And then we had another grantee, Francisco Sagasti, raising fundamental issues about development.

And I said, let's rethink development. We've got the minds here. She [Janet Maughan] couldn't get support from Rockefeller. She was working with someone named Keith Bezanson, also very senior, very important in the field. And Francisco, I was working with Francisco. We had these eight scholars, all keen and we just couldn't get them together.

It wasn't even a question of resources. Well, it was here, I wasn't able to get any extra money. And she didn't have the backing to do it. It wasn't so much the issue related, but the principle of: we don't want to give any more money to the Scholars Program. A Vartan and Neil decision. That's too bad. That's a real opportunity missed.

At the right moment in 2003 and 2004, when I realized, oh my gosh, we have first of all, potential Nobel Prize winners—three—on that list. And we have a field that's in desperate need of rethinking. And we have the people who could do it. And we knew others, so we could have made it, not necessarily a theme for the Scholars Program but let's pull it together, get a major publication out and help re-think the field.

So we could have put a monograph because that was a thematic in contrast to the other areas. I would say, peace and security, we had some interesting things on terror. We could have done smaller thematic work but you're absolutely right. It wasn't scholarship for the sake of scholarship. It wasn't as though we were looking at a methods thing.

For instance, in the '60s, we looked at what do cross-cultural case comparisons mean anyway? So we had a methodological focus. Here there weren't any methods to be dealt with. It was really

what are the themes emerging? And what was interesting in terms of the process from the first five years, these were themes that emerged from a nomination process that was pretty open.

I mean, we were writing to presidents and provosts. So it wasn't as though we were directing the themes, except around our four programs, which were pretty big and capacious. So we were seeing where scholarship was going. And then the Islam was, of course, very exciting and did make all the sense to focus.

I think it's up to me, I think—because nobody else will do it—to really make sure all the papers are pulled together and to try to do a little assessment. We do have two books which—and this is where Susan King was really good and she is another unsung hero in a sense. That she said, there's not going to be any other way of doing it. Let's pull together in terms of two publications. And she pushed for it and we got it done. I think that was a good sense of collaboration between public affairs and a grants program that was very positive.

I would say where I feel less satisfaction was the role of special adviser, only because I wasn't sure how to make it active. I mean, I did a huge amount of work. That was really fifty percent. It wasn't quite fifty percent. The Scholars Program took up—twenty-five percent of my time was spent writing. I organized and wrote up all the minutes for the Council and reports from the Council on Evaluation.

I did all the reports of the chairs meeting. I did all the reports of the program team meetings. I would do action items for the vice president. But even his assistant couldn't get him to act. So that was a very frustrating period, I have to say personally. And Geri points this out a lot.

Even though I wrote all this stuff for him, he never wanted to acknowledge that, I was kind of his report writer and speechwriter type of thing. And I didn't care. I had my satisfaction in the Scholars Program. It was collegial but not—I don't know how to put it. It was a collegial relationship but it didn't lead anywhere.

There had never been a special advisory for it, so I'm not quite sure—well, there had. Elena [O.] Nightingale. But I wasn't developing any grants programs around that because I had the Scholars Program. And Neil chaired the program and he was at the Scholars Program meetings but basically I—

Q: You more or less hinted at this but could it be the clash of an academic culture and a philanthropic culture? That he was just accustomed to a university in the way a university operates.

Rosenfield: Right, so maybe academic not in the sense of ideas but institutional.

Q: Yes, institutionally. It's not a very cooperative place institutionally—

Rosenfield: No, that's true.

Q: The academy.

Rosenfield: Right. And what's interesting is when Elena Nightingale was David Hamburg's special adviser, she was given certain grants programs to develop around some aspects of early childhood and other things and mental health issues. So that she did, as special adviser, develop grants programs for Hamburg.

I developed his conflict programs when he came in, which then went to someone else because it wasn't where I was at. We did some of it in Africa but basically it was for the international people. The international peace and security people eventually took it over. So it wasn't the same. And you're right. I think Neil wasn't used to that.

He wasn't into writing grants and he had never had—I mean, I don't think he ever had written a grant proposal—interesting thought. Never occurred to me. Maybe he had never written a grant proposal. He was in math. He didn't need it. And he was provost. And then he was president, so everybody else was writing the grants proposals. And then he's been a trustee at Swarthmore [College]. So he never was in that.

Q: Culturally different, yes.

Rosenfield: And maybe Vartan has never written a grant because he didn't need it either.

Q: Oh, I bet he has though.

Rosenfield: And there are dissertations—I don't think so.

Q: For the public library?

Rosenfield: He didn't write proposals but he had to—he raised the money. He had other—he didn't have to actually sit down and write a proposal.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: Some of us here had been grant seekers and that's also a great—I mean, literally, a grant seeker. The person who had to sit down and write the proposal, conceptualize it, work with the program staff. That also changes your relationship. So anyway, that's something that's an interest. I don't think it's a position that really fits, unless there's a real set of terms of reference, which we never thought about. I mean, we developed some terms of reference but it didn't seem to ever be referred to. We talked about the internal changes.

There's one other element and this is something to ask in the education program. Note, September 11 was extremely important, dot com—I mean the financial issues were important but also No Child Left Behind was very important in shaping education.

They always felt it was a big success. I'm not sure. I mean, not this crowd but the—

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: And that did shape a certain agenda for the program. We talked about evaluation—so the other thing that's a big issue is organizational learning. And that's what I was passionate about, have been passionate about—why I wanted to do the book, actually. Because I said, we're not learning, we don't know.

Q: Oh. Spin that out for me.

Rosenfield: Because I think there is some interest in learning from our history. Ellen [J.] Bloom is interested. That's why we're doing the oral history. She's very keen about it and she's become keener and keener as she has been here longer. It takes time. And what I see is a real gap in practitioners learning from what they're doing and how they're doing it.

Then it's where Susan King's focus on the results and the *Challenge Papers* and reporting and getting staff members to write is so important. Vartan always wants staff members to write. Some do, some don't. Not everybody wants to write. But you do need to learn what you're doing and build on it. And maybe the evaluation focus will do that.

But certainly there isn't a way of institution wide, getting everybody together to say what—and I'm thinking of institution—and we tried under Neil and it just didn't work. Here we had the

funding of universities, the teacher education were a good example of where we failed and might have built a really strong, exciting, internally collaborative program.

And this is where Vartan would have been thrilled had we done it. Even if he didn't say do it. He would have been thrilled with the results. There we had Dan Fallon with Teachers for a New Era. And I'm going to the people. Deana doing the Russia Higher Education Program. Narciso Matos and Andrea Johnson and Courtenay Sprague doing the Africa partnership.

So we set up something called the Council on Higher Education, Neil and I did this. We had maybe three meetings. And all they did was say the same thing at three meetings. What are you doing now? What are the issues arising? It was each of the three of them Narciso, Deana and Dan, gave a little speech on here's what our mission is, here are the grants we're funding. And no analysis. Either not wanting to share or not thinking about it because other—

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: And we couldn't find what the points of intersection—I'm sure there were points of intersection. And we could have announced a global program on strengthening higher education because now it's the issue. We were doing this in 2003, 2004, 2005, before it became a global issue. We would have had something.

Not that we needed to take credit for anything but we would have had a lot of learning if we could have done some internal learning about what's working, what's not working. Each of them



had people evaluating and evaluators working with their teams. And so that's—there's no learning about comparisons. I mean, now we're doing some reports.

But you need to have the learning built into the process, so as it goes along, you also are learning. You're pulling out and then—especially when you have a kind of complementary effort right inside, right internally, right down the hall—there's no opportunity to talk. The focus on teachers could have emerged from the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. Here in the United States, we have a big focus on teaching here.

It's a big issue, big, big issue in Africa. It's what we were known for in the '50s and '60s, especially the '60s with the African Teacher Education Initiatives, with the Teachers College [Columbia University] in Ghana and Uganda, Nigeria and Kenya. And then it turned out to be continent wide.

And I would say collaboration doesn't just happen. It's not a natural phenomenon. Neil had to promote it. And that's where it's really too bad. It didn't have to come from Vartan, he would have endorsed it. It needed the program, so that's maybe a more specific failure on the part of the vice president for program.

We tried but it just couldn't—and he could have just said, I want you to do this and I want the paper next week. I know you're really busy but take some time. Or get a staff member. If you need a consultant, bring in a consultant to do it. And so what I see is that we don't really

understand, despite all the public relations efforts, what philanthropy does, what they learn, how they grow, how it changes.

And so this is a field-wide phenomenon. It means that philanthropy is still a black box. And there is Gates Foundation, announcing failure all the time. So it looks like it's a big waste of money and why don't we tax it?

Q: What does Carnegie do to transmit its history to its own staff members?

Rosenfield: Well, Susan tried. The website has some stuff. We have "highlights." I've given two talks which—Susan and I, what we thought would be more fun is to have Susan interview me. So we had two interviews, they're on tape. I think they're on—I'm not sure they're taped. But anyway, they may not have been taped. But they were very well attended staff luncheons. Food might have been the attraction, not the history. But whatever it takes, whatever it takes.

[Laughter]

This is a non-Carnegie thing, can I say? I used to work for someplace called Resources for the Future in the mid-'70s in Washington.

Q: We've all had that classroom.

Rosenfield: Wait a minute, wait a minute. And we were so upset because we thought we were doing the most brilliant environmental economics work. And there was this new institute called Worldwatch [Institute] and they knew how to get the journalists because they had shrimp salad at their lunches and we just had ham and cheese sandwiches, so—

Anyway, at Carnegie staff “history” lunches, we had tremendous turnout—they were very interested. And I have given talks to the different programs, especially the international programs—were very interested. I’ve sat down and talked with them. That’s it. That’s it.

Q: That’s something.

Rosenfield: It’s something. Ellen and I have talked about my being involved in orientation of new staff members. The people who don’t have a sense of the history, the board. And even though we have a great board and I don’t know—I have to finish the book before I have any credibility to say this to Vartan but I really think they need to know the role of the board.

I’m looking very much at the role of the board over them. I think the role of the board is a very, very big issue. Across philanthropy, what do boards do? Why do we have boards? What value are they?

Q: Are you finished with your list?

Rosenfield: That’s it. Mm-hmm.

Q: I want to start on a kind of new tack. And I've kind of labeled it philanthropy of the state.

Rosenfield: Oh. Ooh. That's an interesting—good.

Q: But I just tried to think through it. And one of the things that was oddly enough not mentioned in the earlier interviews was the Filer Commission.

Rosenfield: Oh, nobody knows about these commissions. Nobody knows about them. Geri and I, we know about it because—

Q: It's an enormous production that has little tide or power to it. That's what strikes me.

Rosenfield: I don't know how Carnegie really—well, Alan Pifer was our philanthropy president. And what happened under David Hamburg—

Q: Deeply concerned.

Rosenfield: Hamburg was consumed with ideas and not the field of philanthropy. Gregorian was also—he's become more interested in the field of philanthropy but he also, early on, didn't—he could ask why are we part of the Council on Foundation? All of them. And why do we pay dues? I guess we have to. Geri would make the case, I would—

And this is not to just say that Geri and I are these paragons of virtue and everything. But because we've been in philanthropy for so long, either directly or indirectly, we see it as a field. We feel proud being in the field.

I just have to say, in terms of philanthropy, the state of philanthropy and philanthropy in the state, there's this other sense of, in the program staff, why are you wasting your time? We're here to make grants and we're here to spend the money on these issues. They don't see it as—I would say a big change at Carnegie now, with the specialists that we have and there are a whole bunch of specialists—they don't really care about the Institution. It's not that they don't care about it but they don't have a feeling of Carnegie Corporation.

Even our centennial, there were moments. And certainly people like Jeanne D'Onofrio are trying really hard and Ellen Bloom, to say, this is Carnegie Corporation. We should care about Carnegie and going to the exhibit and everything.

But there's not a sense—they could be doing this at Ford. They wouldn't mind doing it at Ford, Rockefeller, wherever they get the money to do what they want to do. So they want to push ideas. Which is fair but if you're in a foundation that has such a history, there should be some kind of sense of, if not pride, at least understanding what do we accomplish and how do we fit into the trajectory of philanthropy.

Filer Commission? I mean, even the Walsh Committee, the Cox Committee, the Reece Committee, the tax stuff. There's no sense of whether they made any difference or not and they

made—certainly, since '68, they've made major—I mean, I'd say Sarbanes-Oxley had some impact on things. And then the Terrorist List. So there have been some aspects but—

Q: Just looking at some of the discussion—

Rosenfield: I haven't mentioned the Filer Commission enough in my chapter, in the Pifer chapter. Thank you very much.

Q: The Filer Commission, they started as a reaction to the Tax [Reform] Act of '69 with a certain fear that they had to answer government regulation.

Rosenfield: Absolutely.

Q: But they ended up by arguing that no money should be given to philanthropy. There's a certain change that occurred there. Other than changes in the tax law, I'd be hard pressed to see, within the foundation world, how those eighty-five reports were—

Rosenfield: Too many, maybe. Too many, maybe.

Q: Too many.

Rosenfield: It might have been just too hard to figure out.

Q: Did you as a staff person read any of them?

Rosenfield: No.

Q: No.

Rosenfield: I mean but I came later. And it wasn't what I was doing.

Q: But they weren't around.

Rosenfield: Nobody. I mean, I have—

Q: It wasn't suggested.

[Interruption]

Q: You ready?

Rosenfield: Yes I'm ready. I'm enjoying this. Appreciate this.

Q: Do you want to say a few words and we will see if everything's working properly?

Rosenfield: Okay. I'm enjoying this immensely and thank you for the good questions.

Q: Okay.

Rosenfield: Alright.

Q: Now, one of the things that did come from the Filer Commission was the creation of the Independent Sector. Did you have any contact with any of that at all? Was there any—

Rosenfield: No, I didn't. But Barbara Finberg was chair of that. We had—Carnegie did. Yes. Absolutely. Very supportive.

Q: Carnegie did.

Rosenfield: Mm-hmm. Carnegie Corporation did, yes. I was very focused for the first ten years here, maybe the first thirteen years here, on the international program. And I was also very much opposed, I have to say, philosophically, for working with American NGOs who were working overseas. I saw them as destructive.

So, you know, I'm on the board [of Future Generations], chair of the board of one of them now. Just for the program, for what we were doing, we wanted to—and I have to say, the foundations were right there. I mean, Ford—and that was another reason I think why collaboration was so constructive in the '90s. Because we all had the same framework for action.



So Independent Sector, though, in terms of this country and what they were promoting had done some really great things. This is not to say—

Q: Are you doing anything in your book about Carnegie and the independent sector?

Rosenfield: Not at all. Doesn't feature. And it doesn't feature historically. Under Hamburg we didn't do anything with them. Because I'm focusing on the international work. And we did not—now I would say, under Pifer, toward the end, there was some work. And actually even in the '90s, with some of our health work, we worked with some U.S. institutions but generally not the international NGOs backed in the United States. Population, the women's stuff too a little bit—

Q: Well, these are questions for philanthropy in general. One of the things that comes out of the Independent Sector, of course, is enlarging the conception of philanthropy, bring in churches and—

Rosenfield: I couldn't agree more. Couldn't agree more. And this community philanthropy idea that I'm going to be working on with—I mean, I hope I will—with Mott and others is very much, the institution isn't the thing. The institution's a lot of overhead, maybe. A lot of administrative costs. What is philanthropy at its core? It's coming back to a more de-institution—not de-institute but other models of philanthropy that, especially at the community level, that may actually be more empowering of communities, as opposed to possibly disempowering, the way some of the institutional philanthropy can be. You need both, I think and the mix is a good idea.

But one of the things that the Independent Sector came up with—because I also did a little bit of writing on ethics of philanthropy, particularly international philanthropy and I have one published article. My colleagues and I here talked about it—Heather and Courtenay—as ‘obedience to the unenforceable.’

And that is the basic core principle in philanthropy, that the ethical principle is not as Rawlsian or Kantian or Utilitarian, it’s really, what is the right thing to do? And you can’t enforce it. There’s nobody who’s monitoring the foundation—oh, I guess there’s some IRS regulations, those are the easy ones—it’s what is the ethically right thing to do and how to do it.

And I feel very strongly in terms of work in other countries, there is a framework for right action and there is a framework for doing it the wrong way. And a lot of foundations do it the wrong way. But the work on ethics was very important and more is needed.

Q: At the center, there are two other kinds of trends. One is with the [Ronald R.] Reagan administration and the beginning of the cutbacks, that more and more foundations were called upon to take what had been government functions, take over government functions.

And so we end up with the ‘thousand points of light’ or whatever it is, where we’re expected—the philanthropist is expected to do it and the taxpayer not.

Rosenfield: And I think that calls into question about the social compact with society. I think it’s a big mistake. It’s a misuse of philanthropic money. It has nothing to do with political,

democratic, conservative, liberal, radical, whatever. Why else have a state? There are services the state is supposed to provide.

Philanthropy was never to be about charity—the old time charity, though charity exists. But charity is not what you want in terms of keeping the services going. I mean, it isn't philanthropy. It could be charity. But philanthropy, as has evolved over the a hundred years anyway and really since George Peabody in the 1850s, is very different. It's protected money for a particular reason.

It's not to take the role of the government. It is definitely not. And that's just so clear. And we don't have enough money. There isn't enough. Even the Gates Foundation—even though somebody said its annual budget is the size of the economy of Sweden or something like that. It doesn't matter. It's not the size of the economy of the United States. It's a drop in the bucket. And it's a wrong drop to be putting in that bucket because it's money to be used for ideas—different—what government can't fund. And I think that's the partnership. And government can take it over. And that's what we always hoped, at least Carnegie was certainly hoping that's the relationship with government—not on the regulatory side but on the dissemination and scale-up side.

If this works, let government be the one to put it to scale. We don't have enough resources to go to scale. If it's the right thing to do and we can find the right receptor sites, as Hamburg called them—in government, local, state and federal—let them take it to scale. That's what they can do best. And so it's a misalignment of purpose. And it's wrong, it's absolutely wrong.

And even now, with 2008, to think that philanthropy is going to take over governments [unclear] service, organizations and agencies isn't right. It's not to say at the very local level that you couldn't draw on community resources and public and business resources—private, I mean the real private, the for profit.

Q: Well, that's been around a long time, from the courtroom foundation on.

Rosenfield: Right. That's what a community foundation does. That's where they come into the picture. Exactly. And they can do that. They can mobilize around certain issues. But they can't sustain it. Government sustains it. Why else? Otherwise, let's just go back to a primitive—or the anarchic state, state of being, state of nature.

It's really mistaken. On the other hand, when [Former U.S. President Ronald W.] Reagan talked about giving more power to communities, whether he meant it or not, that was—I mean, I certainly believe that communities have more ability to control their agenda within an overall system and in partnership—not in contra distinction to the state but working in partnership with the state. So they feel more of a sense of confidence in their future—more internal security.

Q: It's a question I want to raise with Geri because, with Reagan on, it was more kind of block grants instead of taxation. So the benefits went to the middle class. Transfer, sending your kids to the private schools.

Rosenfield: The poverty agenda. Now, it's really interesting. Reading Andrew Carnegie on poverty is a little disconcerting because he feels that poverty is a really good thing, meaning because it builds competitiveness and ambition. It's healthy. You're not beholden to anyone. And he felt that his mission was to give people access to get out of poverty but that it wasn't a bad.

And of course he was talking about his own life experience. He was in a particularly egregious situation when he came here. I mean very, very poor. He was very, very poor for a long time before he left Scotland. But what's happened with poverty now is not the kind of poverty—I mean, yes, it's always there but it is pernicious. And when you have such excessive wealth, it becomes destructive of society, so that there is a need for rebalancing.

And it just seems from an equity point of view, that equity has to come into the picture. So poverty—it's not poverty per se, it's really fairness. And that seems to have gone out the window because greed has become a concern—And what is the role of philanthropy there? I'm not quite sure. Because you have everybody wanting to be seen as philanthropists.

And it's the downside of our Carnegie Medal [of Philanthropy]. I think the Carnegie medals that we've been doing—we haven't talked about that at all. I mention it in the book. It is the only time that, outside of serving on our board, that the Carnegie institutions have gotten together. And that's a good. That's a plus. Because we don't do enough together.

And we could be a force for good, over the science and the international, the education and all sorts of different dimensions that they're doing. And I think Vartan's made a major contribution to the Carnegie family. And I'm sure Andrew Carnegie would be thrilled at that.

But the Carnegie medal and celebrating some of these individual philanthropists, you can be squeamish about it in a sense. And Bill Moyers, he was the MC [master of ceremonies] and he gave his perspective. He also was a little—and I don't remember his exact words but when he did it, it was maybe the one four years ago. When Bill Moyers—raised the question about what does all this individual motivation mean—why are you guys—he didn't say it like this, of course—getting into philanthropy? Because what's in it for you? And he sort of looked at the selfish dimension of philanthropy. A lot of what they're doing is actually charity. I mean, although they're trying to be more careful in whom they selected as the winners of the medal. Are we just celebrating money? I mean, there's some interesting questions to be asked.

On the other hand, how else to keep the Carnegie family together, the Carnegie family of institutions—because they're really Andrew Carnegie's legacy. He had one child who had several children and there are Carnegie descendants. And they are part and parcel of the medal. And we've also brought them in for the—they were tangentially involved in the past. Louise [Whitfield Carnegie] and Margaret [Carnegie Miller] were on the board. But it's a question. And maybe the role of intermediaries is something that's important in terms of the service role.

Q: Just going back again to the Filer Commission. One of the points that they made, again and again, was that philanthropy was a public trust. It wasn't individual giving, it was a public trust.

But there are a lot of foundations working today which really are just a mask for an individual donor.

Rosenfield: I couldn't agree more. Now Alan Pifer has—and I have to go back to it, I can't quote it exactly—talks about we are not public good, public trust institutions. But he didn't mean it in quite that way. We are definitely—I am a firm believer in why Andrew Carnegie set up foundations, what he wrote in “The Gospel of Wealth.” The money that I earn is not my money, it comes from the people. And it needs to go back to the people because it is a public trust. We are holding it in trust for them and we shouldn't hold it. We should give it back and we should give back in our lifetimes because we should help direct where it goes, which is a little bit of what's in it for me. But basically, this is the money that wealthy people earn—it doesn't belong to them. And I think this is a basic tenet.

Now I'm interested in this and I tackle it in a tiny way in the book but it's something that's a real conundrum. And it's also led me to this new thinking about—not new—but this thinking about global philanthropy—new for me.

We're a public good, public trust institution. We are chartered by the State of New York. We exist in context of the tax legislation of the United States. So therefore, the public that we talk about and the public where our money was earned was the American public. But now we have this international programming. And we're working in Uganda, let's say, or Ghana or South Africa or Russia or China, wherever else these foundations are working. What's the role of their public in making—because once we go overseas, are we still a public trust, public good

institution? We might be public good but are we public trust? How do we engage in the public trust discussions there? And that led me to think maybe we can't. Because it's not our public and it becomes presumptuous of us. I haven't really developed this idea further. This is what I want to work on when I get this book done. Because it calls into question, it raises—it makes more prominent the issue we need to work in partnership with those institutions that understand the public trust and that work in the public good in their own societies.

And then what I'd love to see is a dense network of public trust, public good institutions working together, understanding their own publics. And it may be different but at least you're in communication. And you build a kind of denser body of public around the world crossing international lines to become truly a global public. And that's the global commons, the global public. But it becomes driven by understanding what the public trust means in a Ugandan setting versus a New York State American setting. Or, you know, a Kampala. Or a—

Q: Tomorrow's the 10th, isn't it?

Rosenfield: And that's what I'm working on, that's what I really want to work on. And there are some people interested. But it's a little complicated because it says maybe American foundations who work overseas—and here we have this tremendous promotion of philanthropy. And I have to be careful. I don't want to say international is bad but it has to be done a different way.

There's the Gates Foundation promoting vaccines. Well, vaccines may not actually be the highest priority because—and a vaccine for AIDS in Botswana didn't work, \$100 million. Was it



down the drain? Maybe not because some people got funded, but there was a big opportunity cost. So the opportunity cost of working elsewhere and creating dissension in those societies and then not being productive for social good.

So that's a really big issue. The public trust is. But we don't talk about it enough. And certainly Alan Pifer, that may have been the last on Filer—it was the last time that issue was debated. Now, you have people like Pablo Eisenberg today writing about this. Geri and I read him. Maybe a few other people read him.

He hasn't promoted a public debate on this. Does the Council on Foundations talk about this? I don't know. Yes, you have it. Is that the [*Nation Review*]?—ooh, I didn't get it. Ooh, it's published. I might want to photocopy it before you leave if you don't mind.

Q: Questions to ask.

Rosenfield: That's okay.

Q: That's where we are going to end up.

Rosenfield: Oh, good.

Q: Moving back a little bit to the question of the individual donor and the foundation.

Rosenfield: Oh yes, yes. Okay.

Q: We did an oral history of the Atlantic Philanthropies. And the tension there that no one really wanted to talk about was the donor running around just giving money away. There were actually foundations and then the board okaying it.

Rosenfield: Did you interview Elizabeth McCormack for this? Because—

Q: Yes, Mary Marshall did that.

Rosenfield: Oh, you should be just—she would be direct.

Q: This latest one is the Cornell [University] school that they're putting up on—the \$300 million from Cornell came from Charles [F.] Feeney.

Rosenfield: Oh, yes.

Q: That's how they secured it. It came from Feeney. That is not necessarily—I don't know the ins and outs of it but I think he did that and then went to the foundation to get okayed with it.

Rosenfield: So this is how to do—this is how to end philanthropy as we know—

Q: They talk about Charlie's money. It isn't his money.

Rosenfield: Thank you, Ron. It's not Bill Gates's money. And he runs around as if—it's not his money. Once you set up a foundation, it's the public's money. Actually that's what Pifer was sort of taking—not taking issue with but saying this is not an issue to be discussed—it should be so obvious.

It isn't because you have all this wealth and you have these entrepreneurs or these people who had great ideas who think: "This is my great idea, I give my money, I earned it." Don't set up a foundation. And really interesting—I'm just blanking on his name. The wealthy—the wealthiest—the guy from Mexico.

Q: Oh, Slim.

Rosenfield: Yes. Carlos Slim [Helu]. He has some foundations but basically, he doesn't want to do that. I mean, not that Mexican law is the same. But he wants to spend what he wants to spend. That is perfectly acceptable. If Charles Feeney wants to spend \$300 million on having Cornell to develop this thing on Governor's Island, fine. But not when—once it's in the foundation, you have a process.

And it is entirely possible that Congress could call into question our foundations going counter to their process. Now, if Sarbanes-Oxley had any teeth to it these days, the Attorney General's office would be bringing a case against the Atlantic Philanthropies.

Q: Yes, I see it as a profit. But my doctor told me they don't see it that way at all.

Rosenfield: Really? Really?

Q: One of the funniest parts of the Ford Foundation project was the testimony about when Robert [M.] Hutchins and Paul Hoffman—

Rosenfield: Yes, yes. I just read about this.

Q: Told Henry Ford [II] it wasn't his money.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: He was quite shocked. [Laughter] From day one, they just said: "It's not your money, Henry."

Rosenfield: It isn't. And of course, lawyers aren't going to say that because they want to get the fees to help them do it. And some of these people are very strong-minded. They wouldn't have been so successful financially. I mean, it's interesting that Warren Buffett chose not to set up a foundation, possibly thinking he couldn't do a good job.

He made the wrong decision, I think, in terms of what he did with his money. But at least he was honest about his own capacities. And that's where—

Q: He was going to be one—well, where it really is telling is the growth of the conservative foundations.

Rosenfield: Yes. I mean, Geri's our expert on that but it is really—yes. I mean they have—it does call in—and of course, that won't be questioned. But it is a big issue because it's a misuse of the field and it's an abuse of the field. And it's—

Q: They don't seem to get the scrutiny that the more mainstream foundations get.

Rosenfield: But there are some different tax categories—it depends how they're set up. And if they're set up as operating foundations, they have a little bit more leeway. And I don't actually—and I guess Atlantic is an offshore foundation so in a way—

Q: It's offshore—yes. It's—

Rosenfield: But they do get the—

Q: It's Bermuda. It's under Bermuda law.

Rosenfield: And then, probably, the first thing to do is clear up the offshore. The second thing is clear up the operating foundation scrutiny. And then you might not have this abuse. Because it is protected money and it means that there's no accountability for that. And what we really get raked over the coals, like by Pablo, is what is the accountability of these big foundations like

Carnegie, MacArthur and Ford and Rockefeller? Well, what about Atlantic? And what about some of the Bradley Foundation or the [John M.] Olin [Foundation].

Q: Olin, yes.

Rosenfield: Smith Richardson [Foundation]. I mean, some of them are better than others but—

Q: We also did a project on Pew [Charitable Trusts], which is an interesting history in that it was founded for very conservative purposes but has just totally turned around.

Rosenfield: Well, Tom [Thomas W.] Langfitt—and I actually worked very closely with Pew because we had a fantastic, fantastic collaboration with them on the international health policy program in the '90s. And I got to know Rebecca [W. Rimel] very well, Becky. And Nadya Shmavonian—Tom Langfitt was still alive and very active and president.

Fantastic people. Really great partners. Patti [Patricia Patrizi], I mean, we had—it was a very successful program. They were fantastic to work with. And we did a major evaluation. Patti—it was the first time I ever thought that we needed to do evaluations—my WHO program had evaluations all the time but this was the first foundation one that we did together and I learned a lot from her.

But Rebecca Rimel was one of the most savvy foundation presidents around. I'm very impressed with her. She is just a super—and modest. I mean, overly modest, actually. She should be out there speaking more. But they're very liberal in what—I mean, I'm sure the Pews aren't—

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: I don't know this—I knew one Pew from Haverford [College]. That's the family there.

Q: They're now funding 501(c)(4) groups.

Rosenfield: Good for them. They can do that.

Q: No, I'm confused. Atlantic is.

Rosenfield: Oh, Atlantic. Atlantic is?

Q: Yes, 501(c)(4) group. Yes, they're funding a lot of liberal stuff.

Rosenfield: I mean, you've got to be consistent. You know? If we don't want the conservative foundations to do it, they shouldn't be doing it either. But maybe they have, if they've followed—I guess the thing is to know the regulations really well and to see where you can push the boundaries a little bit.

I don't know—the political atmosphere is such that right now I don't think anybody's going to hold foundations accountable too much. There are too many other issues afoot. But if the economy doesn't improve, certainly if the Republicans come in, I'm sure there will be hearings. I mean, Chuck [Charles E.] Grassley wanted to for the longest time and he was dissuaded. But I don't know.

Q: Yesterday or the day before, editorial in the *New York Times* wrote about the IRS getting on these 501(c)(4) organizations organized by the super PACs (Political Action Committee). A lot of that money is—

Rosenfield: Oh well, that's true. That's true. So it's totally abused. And it's maybe, there's just too much money, so—tax people, get a better government. What does Pablo say here?

Q: These foundations.

Rosenfield: Yes because I have to be on a panel of Olivier's [Zunz] in three weeks.

Q: Oh really?

Rosenfield: Yes. So I guess I really need to make a copy of that.



Q: The rapid creation of mega-foundations is what he's talking about. They are not publicly accountable. They set priorities without any public discussion and operate outside of the political process. They can, in effect, determine national and international policy priorities. As such, they are forced outside the control of representative government.

Rosenfield: So the Marxist perspective that we have this great power is wishful thinking. Would, in some cases that we had this great power. But on the first points in terms of setting—we'll come back to that in a—I probably said that last time too. Setting priorities without public consultation—I agree.

I mean, the question is, so Rockefeller Foundation tried this crowdsourcing thing. But they got inundated and then they didn't respond and they created a huge public relations disaster for themselves. Because you can't go out and get public engagement in what you're doing unless you're prepared to engage with the public and be responsive. It's got to be a two-way street. You can't just get all that material coming in, you've got to give it back out. So we're not set up to do that. It might be a role for some of the foundation groups, like the Council on Foundations, to reach out. They're not reaching out to—I mean, they may have some public outreach but they are not holding meetings.

For instance, we funded the Council on Foreign Relations in the '30s to start their national committees and to have debates around foreign policy issues around the country to increase American understanding of foreign affairs, world affairs. And we ended up—I forget—at the maximum, there were like 42—oh, every state had one practically and lots of cities.

Maybe the community foundations could take this on as an agenda to say what are the priorities. But it depends what your mission is. It depends—so there are a lot of complicating factors. Boards could play a major role in outreach on this. I mean I'd say there's sort of a taxonomy of outreach that one could do to get in, to understand priorities.

Choose public members of the board so you have some more public participation on the board, somehow. This is my issue, I mean, one way of resolving, if you don't want to go through the—I mean, I think there's a more effective way of resolving it when you work overseas. But at least have more international representatives.

And that's how Ford and Rockefeller and now us to some extent and MacArthur have that public input. But be very conscious about it and talk about it more.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: I also think with a website—I don't know how many people come to foundation websites—the websites become very important and that's where transparency should come in. And some of them are very difficult to use. And they might need public scrutiny of the website because—that's how you're accountable these days.

And if there could be watchdog groups and maybe foundations should fund the one—and we do. We fund GuideStar. We helped start GuideStar. This was very important. The National

Committee for Responsive Philanthropy and in the corporate social responsibility sphere, there's some groups maybe to give them teeth. I mean, GuideStar is very important.

So you can—it's passive, in a sense—you have to make the effort as the public but you can find out what's going on. Then you have to be as courageous as Pablo and write about it or do something about it. And not through an ideological lens. Because the people who tend to write about it, some Marxists have been very critical. There's a whole gang of them from over the last fifty years, sixty years, who have done this. They put such an ideological straitjacket around themselves that they—the healthy points that they're making get lost within the morass of—

Q: Well, this seems to be implying that there has to be more government regulation.

Rosenfield: Well, I don't know—

Q: It says they're undemocratic. How do you make foundations more democratic?

Rosenfield: And what does that mean? What does that really mean?

Q: Would that mean opening them more to the process of politics?

Rosenfield: Right. Do you want to have them distorted by a political process?

Q: A conundrum.

Rosenfield: I don't want to have people elected to foundations. Now, you could set up public foundations. The huge—like The California Wellness Foundation. I fully believe that the public trust should determine what's going on. And somebody needs to hold foundations accountable.

So one of the things that you could do, not to make it more—oh, I'll come back to the legislative process, regulatory process in a minute. The foundations could and through the Council on Foundations and some committee on watchdogs. Let's promote watchdog institutions. The Foundation Center could take it on. They have all the data. They could be doing something.

But in terms of the regulatory process because everybody's chartered in a particular state, it's not so much the IRS which—because they're already so burdened and there are big issues for them. It's not that, that much money—well, some money but it's not going to be the big money that's going to help with the deficit, for instance.

I think it's actually a state issue and this may be where you want the states—maybe the states' attorneys general should get together and say, what are we doing? Somebody might want to do a study of what are the regulatory processes. And maybe they need to do some spot checking. Carnegie did this on audits for our grantees.

This was in the '90s. There was a concern that maybe we needed to do just spot audits, so we just would randomly choose groups to audit. And they weren't done independently of our corporate secretary's office. They did consult program staff, saying: "Will we cause any damage if we go

audit this institution in Africa? And why not? They're all pretty good." So maybe attorneys general should just, from time to time, spot audit a foundation to see are they doing what they say they're doing.

Q: Sometime in the '80s or the '90s Robert Abrams here in New York did do that. He'd do some investigation—

Rosenfield: And that may have led to our doing spot audits, actually. [Laughing] I'm sure this didn't come out fully grown as Hamburg said.

Q: Yes, I forgot, I quite forgot about that in that point in time.

Rosenfield: It could have been. Could have been. It's entirely possible. But I think it needs a more nuanced discussion. And I think it's a healthy discussion to have because if a foundation is hiding something, that should be brought out. The light should be shined on them. The big mega—and I don't know what he means by mega-foundations because I would say—

Q: He means Gates and—

Rosenfield: Well, Gates requires some—Gates has—so what is a board? I mean, you have to ask big questions. If you have only family members on your board plus your big donor, this is not a board. You need independent minds on the board. The donors are intimately involved in decision

making and like Charles Feeney, they direct it. And people are scared to death of the donors over there. It's unfortunate. They have some talented people but—

Q: I don't know the internal workings of the Gates Foundation at all, whether or not they think it's—

Rosenfield: They have thousands of staff members, most of whom are contractors.

Q: Whether they think it's Bill's money or they think it's—

Rosenfield: I'm pretty sure he thinks it's Bill's money. It's certainly the case that the staff kowtowed to that perspective.

Q: It's really the trustees' responsibility to exercise fiduciary control.

Rosenfield: Trustees are the stewards of the institution. They are the fiduciary—they are responsible in a fiduciary manner. I mean, I'm on the board of the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and there the trustees are leading questioning the role of the president, the role of the board, the role of—and asking really fundamental questions instituted by two very dedicated family members.

One in particular who's asking deep probing questions. And I'm thrilled. This is the first time I've seen from within this kind of self-questioning that the board is raising. Very pleased with

what the staff is doing. It's not a question of any concern but wanting to make sure that we are on top of what we're doing. And pushing for much more public visibility of what we're [the foundation is doing, too.

Q: The first time around you mentioned Carter Bales calling you, what is this all about?

Rosenfield: Oh, yes. I mean—

Q: But realistically, is there a training program for future trustees?

Rosenfield: Now that's a good question.

Q: When you're asked to be on the board, you're then supposed to go someplace to be trained?

[Laughing]

Rosenfield: Now each—I assume and we have one here—that each foundation has an orientation as to what they do. I assume that. There are certainly philanthropy training programs around the country, I think forty at latest count, someone told me. Those are for program staff—and would a trustee go to a training program? I doubt it.

I think people who are at that level think they know what they're doing, which is nice. So it behooves each foundation to do it. But this sense of stewardship and fiduciary responsibility,

which means you really have to read the board books and you have to ask questions and asking questions is your main responsibility as the president and staff.

And that's where Carnegie is not unique in not having staff members interact closely with the board. The board is protected. And that's under the guise of conflict of interest. And I do think—I'm very interested in pushing the boundaries on discussions of conflict of interest. What does it mean? And should boards be so ignorant of what's going on?

Q: The last point he makes here in *The Nation* article is that with few exceptions, foundations are governed by boards composed of the wealthiest and most highly paid professionals in our society. Totally unrepresentative of what democratic institutions should look like.

Rosenfield: Well, I think that's a point. I think that's—I mean, I haven't done a study of boards. I don't—I mean, Alan Pifer—again, coming back to Alan—took what was a white male board, except for Mrs. Miller and made it a highly diverse board with many, many interesting people. Some wealthy but a lot of very, very interesting rainbow mix and gender mix.

Did that make for a stronger foundation? More publicly conscious? Maybe. I'm not sure. I mean, it would be really interesting to have an honest assessment. And I'm not doing it because on the international side he made major, major changes which I think were not all positive. Had nothing to do—well, maybe had something to do with the board. But it was really his personal inclinations. I don't know.



And Hamburg kept on a lot of scholars—met a lot of scholars in that time. But some wealthy people, a smaller mix. I would say, a modest mix. This time we have a mix of university presidents. Independent scholars—I mean, people who represent scholarship, maybe less so as scholars. A lot of wealth.

The other boards—I'm not sure that the Ford and Rockefeller boards are just wealth. I think they have a mix.

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: And I don't know if it makes any difference because boards are less instrumental and they work with the presidents. Their role is—I would say they're not as much involved in as they once were—they set the policies but the priorities are very much the president proposes, the board approves and the staff disposes in a sense.

So I don't know what role they would play. Maybe the questions would be asked differently but I don't know.

Q: Yes, if we started by role, what is the role of a trustee?

Rosenfield: I want to write about this, yes.

Q: One is increasingly directing investments.

Rosenfield: Absolutely. When the asset base gets so large.

Q: So who do you need on your board in order to protect your investments? Obviously, I have to have someone who knows something about investments. Another role is political. They run interference with Washington—with this one, with that one. With Gorbachev—

Rosenfield: Although we had no board members involved in that. It was only David [Hamburg] who did that. They had to agree to the risk—I'm sorry to interrupt you on that—But David, he told the board beforehand. I found the memo saying: "I want you to know I'm going to do this highly risky thing and it may backfire, may blow up in our face. But we've got to do it." And they approved it. So they had to approve it. They didn't raise any qualms—we had no one on the board who was still politically connected.

Q: Except that if he had failed, there were people on the board—

Rosenfield: Who could have? Right. Absolutely. So, right. They could have helped mitigate the problem. Right.

Q: Warren Christopher was on the board at the time. Anyway—

Rosenfield: I don't know who was—

Q: There were people in the foreign policy, close to the foreign policy—

Rosenfield: Right.

Q: —establishment who could have helped.

Rosenfield: John [C. Whitehead] might have been, maybe was on the board, yes.

Q: So asking the question in a different way—

Rosenfield: That's true.

Q: Results in a different set of answers.

Rosenfield: Yes, that's true.

Q: The way he's asking the question is that the role is to represent a broader community or to bring issues before the board of a broader community.

Rosenfield: And that's healthy. I mean, that's a rule. And when we have presentations by grantees and program staff, to ask tough questions. And I must say, on our board, we have a few board members who ask very tough questions. Amy Gutmann is someone who asks very good tough questions. The university presidents. Susan [J. Hockfield]—they ask very tough questions.

Ana Palacio from Spain asks from a European perspective, so she brings a different perspective. But from a public perspective. I mean, Kurt [L.] Schmoke—just a name since they may be interviewed—does sometimes. In the past we would have people like Shirley [M.] Malcolm who would ask really tough gender, public, disadvantaged, black, minority questions.

Maybe we could have in a sense of the public perspective, the public issues, someone who's really engaged with—I mean we're not doing anything related—for instance, we don't have a teacher union representative on the board. Should we have a teacher union representative? Well, only if they really are into philanthropy. We don't want someone who's just going to be there and feel like a token or used—they don't want to compromise themselves either, so they—but it would be someone, maybe that sector of society. I'm not sure. We might have someone who had that in their past. I don't know.

Q: The whole issue is a little more complicated than—

Rosenfield: But I think in principle it's an issue that boards should discuss and the president should discuss. And ideally, the staff should be engaged in that discussion, too. What are they saying? I mean, I don't know right now whether staff has any input. At the vice president level, maybe they do. They might. I hope, I mean, they might. Corporate sector, surely but—

I would say that when Alan Pifer was diversifying the board, the staff was fully engaged in those discussions with him. Fully. I mean, he was a very participatory kind of president. One of the

more participatory ones. [Devereux C.] Josephs and Dollard were also very participatory. Gardner was not that participatory. And Hamburg and Gregorian are not that participatory.

Q: One last question: is there any kind of scuttlebutt about who the next president might be? No.

Rosenfield: Just for the record, I want to be able to talk to the search committee, seeing 100 years of transitions and what works and what doesn't work. I just want them to know that there is a very important set of considerations to think about when choosing a next president. And mainly, it's got to be somebody who doesn't have to go through what Vartan went through in figuring out what philanthropic institutions are all about. And what Judith Rodin has gone through, what Luis [A.] Ubinas has gone through and what Robert Galluci at MacArthur has gone through.

It wastes so much time. And it's not that you have to accept the priorities because one of the things that someone has to understand about the history of Carnegie Corporation and the trustees in particular, that we are in a very special situation. And that we can be true to our mission and make major changes.

Because Andrew Carnegie not only gave the mission of advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding but he also give the charge, saying, I have confidence in my trustees. They will be good and wise men. And they may want to change what we're doing, within the framework of the mission.

So we're not tied to peace and security in Russia. We're not tied to education in the schools. Just because we've done it doesn't mean we have to keep doing it. It's the basic premise that we're going to advance knowledge and disseminate it that guides what we do. But we could go into anything we wanted, in that sense. Anything.

And that's where Pablo's not wrong. We need a president and trustees who are really out there in the world of ideas and see where the gaps are in ideas. I mean, we are the idea foundation. And I think that's what I would promote with them, that we need someone—and that's what Vartan does—but who not only grapples with ideas but is going to promote that within the foundation and maybe be highly risk taking.

I'd say there's a lack of risk taking in the foundation world generally. Maybe because of things that Pablo was writing about. Worried about regulation, worried about political dimensions. We need a risk taker. Intellectual risk taker.

Q: Well, there certainly has been an undermining of the consensus that used to reign about philanthropy—

Rosenfield: Absolutely.

Q: And about foundations.

That's really important, Ron. Yes. And that could be because there are all these individuals who are doing it for a variety of reasons, setting up foundations that aren't foundations in the traditional—the one-hundred year sense of it.

Q: It's also a generalized attack on institutions that's been going on for the last thirty years.

Rosenfield: Yes, the last thirty years. And this is also where Pablo's not wrong. I mean we try, with—Susan King certainly made a major effort and with Vartan's support, working with journalists, getting different publications out, clearly not reaching people. I don't know who's reading what. Our press releases are not picked up.

Gates gets picked up because of the money involved but it's not necessarily positive when it's picked up. It fuels a kind of Pablo Eisenberg fire. I think it is a big issue. And I think that this is a century where philanthropy could play a major role but it—another, a second century of philanthropy is really what I'm thinking about now.

I think it would be really great to have a healthy public debate on it. That could be what foundations could fund around, some kind of open-ended debate which maybe will lead nowhere but at least let's get the issues out in the open. I think that's maybe what he's talking about, that we stay very closed. We don't think the public can engage in it. I mean, I'm not sure that that's the thinking but it could be.

So it's well worth—and particularly if we look at a global world—where we are. Doesn't matter what anybody says. The states matter but they're going to matter in a very different way as we go forward in this century. And what's really exciting about the changes in the United States by 2050, even before, when we're a minority-majority country and we look like the rest of the world, the boundaries are going to be quite—they're going to be different.

There may be boundaries around educational opportunity. They're going to become class boundaries. So class is becoming the most important set of boundary drivers, than geography. Much more important than geography. And so how are we going to tackle that? And it would be really great for these foundations—all of them, not just Carnegie—two things that would be great.

One idea, promoters who understand the mission of their institutions go back to their missions. But then, this sense of consensus, that they're collegial. That they don't have to do the same thing. It's not that there's going to be collusion but we need to reduce the competition among foundation presidents as to who's going to get their picture on the *New York Times* or their institution in the *New York Times*.

Gates has fueled a lot of competition, by the way. Because they're out there all the time. They want to get the publicity. I guess maybe donor-driven institutions do that. But if we could build a sense of collegiality around risk taking and what foundations really stand for. Not the barriers, not to be collusive in that sense.



But it would be a very different world for philanthropy—and then build the collegiality with other foundations, like-minded, similar institutions around the world. That could be a world where the public has a role in it and where the wealth is actually working for the public trust and social good.

Q: We meet at an interesting time.

Rosenfield: Yes, it's a good time to do this oral history.

Q: Thank you very much.

Rosenfield: Thank you, Ron.

[END OF SESSION]

3PM

Session #3 (video)

Interviewee: Patricia L. Rosenfield

Location: New York, NY

Interviewer: Ronald J. Grele

Date: September 24, 2012

Q: This is an interview for the Columbia University Center for Oral History and Carnegie Corporation Oral History Project with Patricia Rosenfield. Today's date is September 24, 2012. The interview is being conducted in New York City in the boardroom of the Carnegie Corporation. The interviewer is Ronald J. Grele. Pat, we're talking to you at an interesting moment in your own career, the moment when you're completing your study of the Carnegie Corporation. I wonder if we can begin by talking about how you think about the Corporation and the field of philanthropy in the sense of, of what value is it to foundation officials to know their own institutional history?

Rosenfield: Thank you, Ron. It's a pleasure to be here and it's a great question to start with. Essentially, that's the premise of the book. When our centennial happened in 2011, President Gregorian thought it was important to have a history that would fill the gap in our own self-knowledge of the institution, namely the international grantmaking that had been made in the United States and overseas, and to cover the whole span of a hundred years. The reason for doing it is to understand better how we made grants, why we made certain grants, why we got into certain fields actually to start with, why we got into certain fields, and what did we learn from all of this, a hundred years of history. Was there anything worth learning that we could actually use today, even recognizing that context changes? And it's remarkable to me what we have been able to unearth in this process, thanks in large measure to the archives in oral history at Columbia

University, but also looking at other publications to examine the relationships with other foundations. And it will, I am certain, deepen the international grantmaking at Carnegie Corporation going forward in our second century of international philanthropy. I could give some specifics. For instance—

Q: Please do.

Rosenfield: We—actually, I should also add I saw in our domestic grantmaking, our U.S.-based grantmaking, where we had been consistently addressing, dropping, addressing again, dropping, readdressing certain fields and there's absolutely no continuity of shared knowledge across those fields. In the U.S. context, teaching math and science in the schools—we have done that since the 1940s, and there's very little recognition of and understanding of what worked and what didn't work and how context might actually influence that but how it might be context-neutral, actually.

In the international arena we learned lessons early on about how to work overseas and gradually they seeped into the grantmaking. For instance, our first foray into Canada to develop a federation for higher education in the Maritime Provinces was really designed by two consultants—one of whom from Bowdoin College, the other from Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching—after doing lots and lots of interviews. That's the right thing to do: find out, talk to lots of people. But they didn't hear what they were saying. And as a result they came up with a three million dollar program—this was in 1921—that couldn't work, didn't work. They wanted to develop this federation. Those provinces didn't want to develop a

federation because they want to keep those colleges where they were and not aggregate them all in Dalhousie University in Halifax [Nova Scotia]. Losing that opportunity—and having put aside three million dollars, so losing the use of that money, which was controversial of some of the board members—taught the next president of Carnegie Corporation, Frederick Keppel, that you can't just go into someplace else, go into another country, actually go into any community, and say, "We know what's good for you." [Laughs] "Let us tell you." You might have some ideas as to what might work based on other experiences but, in fact, you need to hear what the local voices are saying, local people are saying. And that really influenced his grantmaking.

On and off over the next years in our international grantmaking after Keppel, the next decades, that was more or less the case, but not quite as consciously. We didn't really set up committees locally the way Keppel did, partially because of the administrative costs, partially because we wanted to have a broader reach than just the committees themselves, the local committees. It came home actually because a colleague and I, in doing a study of how we might get into higher education, which President Gregorian wanted to do for his contribution to the work in Africa, we started reading about this. We had no idea, though, and having run the developing countries program for ten years before that, I had no idea about what had not worked in that setting. And while I think we were listening to local voices, listening to people's advice, and trying to gather as much information as possible as to what could work and what couldn't work in the context of the 1990s, we didn't really shape it around existing plans.

I can go into more detail on certain specifics in terms of our work under that era. What we did and what the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa did—which was so innovative except

that it was a lesson learned from nearly a hundred years before that—was to say, “We’re not just going to fund you because we think higher education is a good idea, you universities. Vice chancellors, give us your plans. Tell us what strategic plans have been approved by your faculties and your faculty senates. And we’ll fund what you want us to fund out of those plans, so we know that they’re going to be internalized in your own decision-making and eventually, if they work, in your budgeting and be implemented and sustained.”

That’s just one example. But there are other fields that we simply didn’t have a grasp of the history. It hasn’t been as carefully documented as that Maritime Province experience. And that’s what I hope this book will reveal, at least for Carnegie Corporation, that going forward, especially in the fraught area of peace and security—which is clearly going to be such an important one for the twenty-first century—we have a lot to learn from the past and to build on what we’ve been doing today.

Q: As I listen to you talk, I sense that you and I are both involved in the same process. We’re building a record of the past, we through our oral histories, you through your writing. Now the second part of that—and I draw on my own experience of working with another foundation, in which that foundation went into the question of aging four different times without anybody from a current program ever looking at the documents from the past. So we built up this documentary record. How do we get the people who are involved in program today to actually go back and look at that? What kind of internal education do we need to make that history, in a way, transmissible?

Rosenfield: That's a really tough question to answer. Because the lives of program officers are very, very busy. They're constantly making new projects, they're constantly doing site visits, they're constantly evaluating what's working at the moment and what's not working. And they are looking ahead. So the idea of looking back and there might be something to learn—oh, even when I've done this book. Some people have said, "Oh, this is really exciting. I want to talk with you about it," when I've given lectures and talks to the staff, very excited about it. Some of it has stuck. Some of it, people just said, "Well, that's really nice but I don't see the relevance of it." In fact, I think it's a challenge for a knowledge management person at an institution, whoever might have that role, whether it's the president himself or herself or the corporate secretary—usually at Carnegie Corporation the corporate secretary has been the repository of a lot of the institutional knowledge—or a program vice president, someone like that. They have to make it their priority that—at least give some acknowledgment of what we did and why we're not doing it that way or what we might be picking up from the past that could actually help us with our grantmaking. Or what institution—we've had a long history of working with this institution. Maybe we could revive that.

A very good example, actually, is with Carnegie Corporation's creating and funding for ten years the Australian Council for Educational Research. This is actually a very interestingly controversial issue, which I can talk about the controversy. But from the Corporation's point of view, why it is so interesting is that we established that because the Australian education establishment wanted to do something. Several of them had been trained at Teachers College—Columbia plays a major role in our educational activities overseas: I could also talk about our collaboration with Columbia in that regard at some point. And when we established that, it

gradually built itself up to be not only the major educational research institution for Australia. It became a global institution, and today it is the institution that works with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, and what they call the PISA, the Programme for International Student Assessment, around the world. And they do all the standard-setting.

If we had known—and, believe me, nobody knew that we had worked with them, and I didn't know, I assure you, until I just started looking at the records. It's listed. There's this little book we have on Commonwealth grantmaking. It's right there. But I read about it. I saw what we had done. It really took a lot of effort and a lot of resources over the ten years from 1930 to 1940 when we funded it heavily and then worked with it a little bit after World War II. That could have been a partner for us as we look at the testing agenda here in the United States. Maybe they've learned something. They are the repository for these tests. They helped design them, they helped analyze them and they are the global leader. And I think they would have been so thrilled to reestablish a connection now, not as a grantee but as a peer partner, in looking at the whole question of assessment—testing and assessment in higher education, in the school system, in the twenty-first century. So had we known that—it both deepens and extends the significance of grantmaking if you know what you've been doing. From my own other work—and the work in Africa, particularly, on women's reproductive rights—I have always wanted to write a paper called “The Costs and Benefits of Redesigning the Wheel.” There are some real costs because you want to have ownership. You want to feel that this is my subject, this is my project, this is my work. But there are so many benefits. And I think now that I have [laughs] real evidence to be able to write that paper, I might do it.

Q: You mentioned the sense of ownership. I was going to ask, why do you think that on both ends, from the world of philanthropy and from the grantees themselves, why do people forget? Why do—there is, yes, the sense of ownership. But also it struck—the ideology of foundations is one of continuity. Yet, when you examine the programs, they seem to have forgotten.

Rosenfield: I think it's not like science. Science remembers. Science builds on itself. The experimental design has to take into account what went before.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: And that is why science is so strong. It's always asking the questions. What did we do before? What's that little route that we didn't take? We didn't light the Bunsen burner this way, we [laughs] should have lighted it a different way. So scientific philanthropy—which is actually kind of a misnomer in the sense that it's an examination of the roots of social problems and social conditions—it's sort of trying to give it more depth and more heft. I think if we were thinking about what is the scientific process then we would learn how much we could value and benefit from understanding where we've been in the past. But it is—just to go back to it, I think it's the memory process, the documentation. I know it's really challenging to do this kind of documentation that I've been doing.

But what, again, Frederick Keppel instituted—and this was really for public awareness, not only for our learning but also for the public to understand foundations better—he issued something that the corporate secretary, Robert [M.] Lester, actually undertook called the Audits of



Experience. And he would take each main grantmaking program—and this started in '30 or '31 and went through '41, '42—and write about it. And he didn't analyze it so much, but he listed all the grants. He said, "Why do we do this? What were some of the problems? What happened when he knew that information?" And the Maritime Provinces, the example I gave earlier, has its own booklet and that's where it all is. No one had looked at it. But then they absolutely looked at it—the board looked at it—and it got wide distribution in that period. And he did that for our arts and music grants, he did that for our adult education—a major program, a field that we helped shape and define, really, both in the United States and globally, through a commitment to lifelong learning—and thirty other topics. If only we had kept that going. Instead, what we did was to develop something also very good for public dissemination, something called the *Carnegie Quarterly*. And now we have the *Carnegie Reporter*, which blended a lot of topics together. And so you didn't get that focusing, that laser focus on a theme that then says, here's what we did. I would like to mention, though, that one of the advantages of having a historian as president—and maybe we need more historians as presidents—

[Laughter]

Rosenfield: —where's Dr. Gregorian? I'm giving him a plug here—as presidents of foundations is that he has revived this value of history. And what he did that has not really been done in this way in any other era except for these Audits of Experience was to encourage our public affairs people to put out something called *Carnegie Results*, *Carnegie Challenge Papers* and also the *Carnegie Reporter* and *Carnegie Reviews*. These are for this era, pulling together the grantmaking, and going back at least to the previous era and sometimes even further. We've

done one on [Karl] Gunnar Myrdal and *An American Dilemma [The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy]* and the question of race in America. We've done the South Africa grantmaking, the public interest bar and the inquiries that we did. They're not deep but they give just enough information. So my suggestion going forward is that any new program officer in their field be given a collection of the appropriate *Reviews* and *Results* and *Challenge Papers* and say, "Here, read these, and when you write your strategy paper, I'd like to see how you're using them in your planning for the future." And I think positive incentives have to be in place. This has really been the challenge: knowledge management, becoming a learning organization. It's not just forgetting. It's just learning from what you've done and being able to internalize it enough to build on it that, I think, it could go forward. But you need the documentation. And it doesn't need to be [laughs] a thirteen hundred-page volume. It could be concise, crisp, and list everything—that's what these reports do. They list everything that we did in a particular field. So it's really easy to find out what happened. There's practically no time involved. You just skim through it and say, "Oh, yes, I need to know that."

Q: When you talk about these reports, who is the audience for that? I know from time to time, it strikes me from the history, that the program people, the presidents of the Corporation, have had different audiences in mind. Who do you think the audience for this history might be?

Rosenfield: First I have to say one of the most important findings from my study is the importance of mission. And the mission of Carnegie Corporation is the advancement and diffusion—diffusion—of knowledge and understanding. So for Carnegie Corporation of New York in particular, that public outreach, diffusing, disseminating our work is of vital importance.

So the public becomes—and not just that layer that might want to know about philanthropy, but in different fields. Whether it's K–12 reform, science and technology in the schools, peace and conflict studies, the U.N., the role of the U.N., these are important issues that the American public in general might be interested in, could perhaps be interested in. So public dissemination becomes a very important part of the process—just making the grants is not enough. And we expect our grantees to do it. My Scholars program was a public scholars program—and I'd love to talk about that in a minute—but it was because we feel an obligation to communicate the results of what we've done, but make sure it is knowledge-based. The knowledge has to be there to make it worthwhile.

Of course, the other audience is often other philanthropists, especially new people with this, now, movement of wealthy people creating more foundations. Although I have to say this has been going on for a very long time, since Andrew Carnegie wrote the “The Gospel of Wealth” and he and John [D.] Rockefeller and Mrs. Russell Sage [M. Olivia S. Sage] and the Milbanks set up the first major foundations in the early part of the twentieth century. It's people thinking about philanthropy. Do I want to get into that? Do I want to do this? What is my mission statement going to be? Pointing out what's important in certain fields. Because perhaps the other area of learning that doesn't take place is when you have people with really good intentions—they want to spend their money, they think of investing their money wisely in a philanthropic way—they go into a field that's very crowded and where, even if you have hundreds of millions of dollars you're not going to make a difference, because it's really quite crowded. So how do I identify the gaps, the niches that need to be filled?

The other audience is, of course, policymakers, in general and especially certain fields. And some of these reports are written in such a way that they're crisp enough that a policymaker—another person who's very busy—doesn't have to invest a lot of time in reading them but can get the gist of why this is important and what's been learned and perhaps incorporate that some way in their decision-making. And maybe the other audience—but this should be obvious—the Carnegie family of institutions, the Carnegie family of grantees, the Carnegie board and former board members, trustees and the former board of trustees, and the Carnegie staff in general should be interested in this.

Q: Do you find a similar kind of drive to understand history in other foundations, other areas of philanthropy?

Rosenfield: Regrettably not. And I think it's because people are so busy they don't always see the value. Rockefeller Foundation, for its centennial, though, has done some wonderful things. They have been working with a place called the Rockefeller Archive Center to develop a website that has in-depth—still crisp, but in-depth presentations on their history and the major accomplishments and activities of the foundation over its hundred years. Their centennial is next year. They've been very serious about their history and commissioning a team to do this work in-depth—they're doing videos, they're doing other things as well as written material. They've had a whole series of meetings about it, trying to build on their history and use it more, at least in their talking about the current grants. Interestingly, the Ford Foundation, which is a mere youth at fifty years in terms of its international activities—older, founded in 1936 for its Michigan work, slightly more than fifty years for its international activities—it is going back to some of its

historically important programs and funding them, very conscious of the fact that they had done this before but they're shaping it for the new era. So I think that's very exciting.

I haven't seen—there are bits and pieces from other foundations. It takes a major investment. And I do know from a dear colleague, Frank Sutton, who has been writing the history of the Ford Foundation over many, many decades—that is a massive institution to be writing about, it has a massive amount of material—it takes teams to do it. And Rockefeller, in fact, by calling together a team, funding it quite considerably, has recognized that, Rockefeller also being quite large. Carnegie has had a major history by Ellen Lagemann on our domestic grantmaking and we did have a book on our international grantmaking by E. Jefferson Murphy, on the Commonwealth grantmaking. What I'm doing is pulling together our based-domestically international grantmaking and the overseas grantmaking and trying to pull that together. And so those are the three. I don't think we needed teams, but the other foundations, which are trying to do the whole picture and do everything at once, it makes sense. It's an investment. But they're going to be much stronger. We're all going to be. The three foundations will be much stronger by this explicit understanding of where they've been.

Q: I'm really impressed. The amount of material written about foundations is actually quite large. Centers have been in operation now for twenty years producing all kinds of studies—

Rosenfield: Huge.

Q: —and all kinds of evaluations, et cetera. But the ideology within the foundational world seems to be go, go, go with the modern.

Rosenfield: And the money. I think there's a gap. And this is what I'm going to be doing over the next year, based on this history—and working with the Rockefeller Archive Center, so just really well-placed because they now have the Rockefeller archives and the Ford archives and the Russell Sage archives and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund archives, so we've got a wealth of material there. And then Columbia with the Carnegie archives. We're trying to build a constituency, cross-constituency, I guess, across the practitioners in philanthropy and the historians and scholars of philanthropy to say: history matters for practitioners and practice matters for scholars. Because one of the things that does not come through in the scholarship on philanthropy—and this is where that ideology, I'll come to foundation ideology in a minute—is so—actually it's almost painful for me to read. Because they're really well-intended—even the Marxist analysis of the foundations, and there are a lot of them out there, they're very prolific—they think they know the motives. They don't do enough—and it's very hard to get under the surface in archives. You have to really dig, you have to read and read files that seem very dusty and very boring and all of a sudden you find the jewel that's just sparkling right in the middle of thousands of papers. They don't understand the practice. They think, “Oh, this is for power. Or this is to spend money. Or this is to influence in an untoward way.” And if you just read the memos and you read all the little scribbles in the margins you see, no, we're just trying to figure out, how can this money make a difference? How can we do something that actually will help this particular situation and not harm? And so I think there could be real benefit in bringing these two big, big fields of work endeavor together.

The ideology of foundations. I think what's happened to philanthropy today—and there are some very important articles, on blogs, primarily, unfortunately not as widespread as they should be, but Pablo Eisenberg in particular has been a really helpful critic of philanthropy. Money has become front and center and not the ideas. And this is a very strong statement, I know. But it was that the ideas mattered. It was always recognized. And now—I see this coming back in something I've just read today by someone named Tom Watson from Forbes. When Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation in 1911 and 1913, respectively, were established, their funds made a difference. Together they were probably more than the education budget of the United States and, I have seen a statistic, more than the assets of the major research universities. They did something—they could transform just by making a grant. Very quickly that changed. Even during the Depression that changed. And certainly following World War II, with the enormous prosperity and with the coming of Ford Foundation, and with the National Science Foundation, with the federal government getting so much more active in fields that were the purview of philanthropy before, especially in education and research.

Foundations should be the risk capital. That's what they have been called. We use that phrase a lot. And we should not put money front and center. But right now, money seems to be—you know, “How much money are they giving? Who's giving more money? How much money goes into this?” And I think we should be saying, “Whose ideas are really making a difference?” And the ideology, the idea should be right out there. And I think that's where there's actually a justification and a rationale for wanting to know the history of the ideas. Ideas matter. And I think foundations are really well-placed institutions to promote new ideas, ideas that still should

get more traction. Maybe what seem to be crackpot ideas become [laughs] accepted approaches ten years later, so to be really open to the ideas.

Q: Right. You mentioned a couple times an interesting kind of process where at one point in time—Carnegie, Rockefeller, Russell Sage, et cetera—there were only a few granting institutions like that. Now there are thousands.

Rosenfield: Seventy-five thousand.

Q: Seventy-five thousand.

Rosenfield: I just read that this morning.

Q: How does the Carnegie mission change vis-à-vis that kind of transformation of the world in which it operates?

Rosenfield: We are particularly blessed by having a founder, Andrew Carnegie, who gave us a mission that was so prescient that it doesn't change. The advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding—that is still the crucial mission. Doesn't matter how many foundations are out there. This is still, at our core, what keeps us grounded in understanding what our strength is. Certainly every president has understood that. President Gregorian, with his deep respect for intellectuals, intelligentsia, and public scholars, knows that at his core. But it's our strength. If we start becoming a service—we can't replace service agencies, federal money that



dries up. We don't have that comparative advantage, we don't have that kind of reach, we don't have those kinds of resources. We can target the knowledge community, the research universities. We can make sure that this isn't just research—in our sense; some places do very important basic research. Our research is really more applied: How can this be used? How can these grantees help change, understand the root causes that they're working on, whether it's education, peace, democracy—those are big issues, but the components of it that they're working on.

So I think that keeps us grounded. But what Andrew Carnegie also did, which gave us enormous flexibility, is to say, “I don't want you stuck in any one idea”—he didn't say it like that. But he said, “I know that the conditions on this earth change,” which is what he said. “And therefore I know that my trustees are also going to be wise and responsible men. And they will know what is the best thing to do. So I do not hold them to any particular line of activity. I hold them to using their best judgment. That's what I'm counting on. All my trustees now”—and he funded the foundation in perpetuity—“and in perpetuity, I count on them to know what they're doing.”

And therefore, while we've stayed very consistently in certain big fields, what we do in it changes. What is our appropriate niche? Can we be out in front? Can we be ahead of the wave? Can it be foreign ideas way ahead of a wave? Can we be just a little bit ahead of a wave? Can we push the wave forward? So that, I think, no matter how many other foundations—and when I joined Carnegie was, I think, number fourteen in terms of assets totally. Now we're number twenty-four, not that bad but still not as good as—I mean, if we care about that. We still have a major role to play in keeping good ideas supported, finding the good people. Andrew Carnegie's

basic premise was finding a good man—or woman—give them what they need to do what they need to do. And that drives us forward. And we can do that however everything else around us changes.

Q: Yes. When you talk about Carnegie being number four, number twenty-four, et cetera, in a larger sense the Carnegie endowment was always—especially in the age of Ford and [Robert Wood] Johnson [Foundation] and now with Gates, et cetera—the Carnegie endowment was never that large. But one of the things that it strikes me they did do was to work in coordination with other foundations. Is that a long-term trend in Carnegie?

Rosenfield: Yes. We may be doing it very extensively now but it has always been the case. I should say Carnegie Corporation was number one when we were established. We actually had more resources—

[Laughter]

Q: Right, when you were number one. [laughs]

Rosenfield: No, for many, many years, even before Rockefeller was established because Carnegie put all of his money behind the foundation right away, just about all of his money. We started in 1920, actually, to work with the Rockefeller Foundation. We made a joint grant, the conditional joint grant to Dalhousie University to fund its faculty of medicine. And we made it conditional on the government of Nova Scotia putting in more than each foundation was going to

put in—five hundred thousand dollar—and they wanted the government to put in at least six hundred thousand dollars, build the building and make it work. And so that was our first partnership, in that sense. And that was very much discussed together. There's a lot of cross-discussion all the time with program officers and program leaders. Actual real partnerships took off, I would say—they existed. There weren't that many, in the '20s and '30s, although a lot of consultation. And I have to give a really neat example of consultation again between Carnegie and Rockefeller. Frederick Keppel knew he wanted to go work in Australia and New Zealand, but it was very far away. And he knew that Rockefeller Foundation had been doing a little bit of public health work there and they were sending a team. And he said, would you mind just telling us whether you think there's any opportunity for us to do any grantmaking, any good people, what the landscape looks like for us? And they did. And the report that the Rockefeller Foundation team to Australia and New Zealand came up with helped shape our next forty years of grantmaking in that region. And it was very interesting and very productive.

But in terms of formal partnerships, we certainly, both when we started working much more extensively in Africa, worked in partnership with the other foundations, Ford and Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Rockefeller Foundation. I would say South Africa—I've talked with Franklin [A.] Thomas, the former president of the Ford Foundation, and he thinks the period right before the end of apartheid, when nobody knew it was going to be right before the end of apartheid, in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, around the public interest bar, was one of the most wonderful examples of foundation collaboration. We were building on our experience very explicitly, building on our experience in the American South to work with South African universities. This was the age of apartheid, and laws, anti-apartheid laws. Blacks were in a very

difficult situation. We started building a public interest litigation firm. We started building training for a wide range of lawyers, black lawyers, with Ford, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Carnegie Corporation jointly working on this, each with their same grantees providing support. And Rockefeller Foundation, which wasn't sure where it would place itself there, organized a commission that everybody participated in on South Africa. So that was a really nice long long-term collaboration. We certainly, in the '90s, collaborated closely with all the foundations. I'm able to give many examples of collaboration in Africa on more global issues and the health and social sciences with Rockefeller, Ford, also the Canadian International Development Research Center. And under Gregorian, partnership has been a hallmark.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: And of course I keep talking about the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. This is one of the few instances where there has been an actual formal signed memorandum of understanding that all the foundation presidents sign—they have to agree to and sign before they join. And this has been very, very successful over a ten-year partnership, defined first by five years then renewed and more foundations came in, seven foundations, nine countries, umpteen universities—eleven or so university partners but many, many more. We're really reaching out to several hundred universities and colleges around the country, millions of students. But it was a formal partnership. We established a partnership committee so that each foundation who participated sent at least two members of staff to participate in that committee. And there were some partnership initiatives, one of the most exciting being what they call the Bandwidth Consortium, which was to allow African universities to purchase bandwidth at a greatly reduced

cost. It's been revolutionary for them. So I'd say it has to happen. But it also is important to happen and what I want to see going forward—if I could just add to this question—is a different kind of partnership. And this is, I have to say, my radical—it's not in the book, though, I have to say.

[Laughter]

Q: Well, point that out for us.

Rosenfield: There is a movement under way called global community philanthropy, which is to build local philanthropic entities and activities and communities. And I think that's extremely important. I'd like it to go one step further, though. I would like American foundations to remain as internationally active as they are but, taking off from the understanding that the African partnership actually had of listening to what people are already doing and reinforcing that with resources and ideas and building connectivity across that, to work with the now increasing number of foundations around the world in the countries where we can work as peer partners and fund what they think is important. Listening—because we are a public institution—this gets at my concern of a public trust institution.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: We listen to the American public—listen in the sense that we see what the problems are in America. We're intimately associated with understanding that and trying to work towards

reforming that or improving that and really increasing the knowledge base. Even if you have offices in those countries, you can't possibly have the depth of understanding. And you're not chartered in those countries. You're not a public trust institution in those countries. What does it mean to be a public trust institution if we go into Nigeria, or even South Africa, where we've been so active for many decades? So there are now foundations and some of them work on our agenda—it's not that we necessarily change our agenda. But if we want to keep with what we're doing that we think is important, it's our comparative advantage, we should find like-minded partners. And instead of making the grants directly or deciding who we want to fund and maybe distorting the landscape of institutions and creating new institutions or competition where it won't be healthy—sometimes it is but sometimes it isn't, especially when resources are so limited—contributing to sustainability of those initiatives by working with local foundations. I think it's the way that global philanthropy should actually move forward.

Q: Interesting.

Rosenfield: I'm going to be trying to make that happen in a little way.

Q: In talking about the partnerships, we've talked about Dr. Gregorian and especially the movement now toward much more cooperation. In what other ways has the Gregorian era brought the foundation back to its basic themes?

Rosenfield: Before I answer basic themes, I want to tell something that he did that brought us back to our founding, actually. And that is, on the original board of Carnegie Corporation were

the heads of Carnegie's five major philanthropies that he established. He did many more, but the five major ones that he [Carnegie] had established before Carnegie Corporation were the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the Carnegie Heroes Fund [Commission], the Carnegie Institution of Washington and the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh. Over the years, gradually for a variety of reasons, that changed. They had been given life memberships on the board; they became term memberships as that ended. And then when somebody rotated as president of that institution, they rotated off. And basically by the end of World War II there was perhaps one person left on the board, Vannevar Bush, who at that time had been the head of the Carnegie Institution in Washington. That was it. We worked with the Carnegie Endowment [for International Peace] because our fields were so similar. We worked with the Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching for many years—because they had such financial problems, we paid for their staff. Basically their vice president was our vice president, our president was their president, and their offices were with us for a long time. But there wasn't this general sense of the Carnegie family of institutions.

What Vartan Gregorian did was, in 2000, by establishing the Carnegie medal as an activity, an award of the Carnegie family of institutions, he has all of a sudden extended the reach of Carnegie Corporation to these twenty-two institutions around the world. And it is very exciting. And it's brought us back to our roots in a very real way, but it's moved us forward in other ways, and I think that's a partnership that I hope any new—whenever a new president comes on—would keep. They may not want to keep the award, the Medal of Philanthropy. It's an important thing to do. But they should certainly keep the family together. Because all of a sudden you have

all these areas for discussing what to do, figuring out where the world is going. And as we get so global and everything has backwards and forwards linkages, there we are with ready-made connections.

Now in terms of themes, what he's done—and I can say this with a lot of evidence, actually. Because I came in to be a part of the Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries program in 1987. And we had not a clue about the history. Nobody told me about Jefferson Murphy's book. I went ahead and did what—from my own international experiences, which had been my career—I thought was important with Dr. Lucas, who was the first chair of the program, Adetokunbo O. Lucas. We did what we thought was important. It was completely ungrounded from Carnegie Corporation history. It was very important, very successful. Things were lasting.

When Gregorian became president, he said, "Where are the universities?" Well, we were working in universities but they were the vehicles. They weren't the aim of our grantmaking. "Where are the libraries?" Well, we were working on information systems but we weren't working on libraries. Yes, by the by, we had university libraries who wanted to introduce CD-ROM or change the information structure in their university; we weren't looking at libraries and especially public libraries. And for the Africa program, Gregorian brought it back to its roots in this very powerful way, both through the partnership and by saying higher education matters. These universities as institutions matter. You can fund all the projects you want. But if you don't have strong institutions, the projects don't have a medium in which to function effectively.



And so, certainly for the Africa program, in a very exciting way—and the public libraries, which were really backwater sectors of society, have become front and center in the information revolution in Africa. And now university libraries are part of that to some extent too. And so I think, in that case, it's been very important. He has certainly given extraordinary attention to the diffusion, dissemination part of our mission, which every president has, but he has put huge resources behind it. And he established the [Future of] Journalism [Education] initiative, which had been a part of—John Gardner had worked on that. Actually even Keppel, through working on radio and new forms of communication technology, was interested. Gardner and Pifer were interested in journalism—Gardner funded some Nieman Fellows—especially with regard to Africa. Gregorian revived the concept of journalism as an important vehicle for communicating with Americans and improving the training of journalists. So those are important themes. And of course he's kept with education, and the K-12 has been a consistent theme all the way through its history, especially the past fifty years, sixty years. He also, though—just one last thing—the work on immigration and democracy, which was definitely a major theme, especially the democracy part, developed under Alan Pifer and David Hamburg—he's kept that going in very important ways. But this was also a major issue for Andrew Carnegie and the early Carnegie Corporation.

Q: Yes. I wonder if we can get back to that for a moment with Andrew Carnegie and the amelioration of major social problems as a kind of continuity over a long span of the history.

Rosenfield: Well, Andrew Carnegie, of course, deeply believed in that because he didn't think just giving money away for the sake of giving money away for charity was getting anywhere.

And this was not his idea. Benjamin Franklin probably thought of it. But it was really codified by George Peabody in the 1850s and '60s. I think that's probably when the term scientific philanthropy was getting underway. And Carnegie said, why spend money when it just goes to—he didn't use this term—Band-Aid solutions? We really want to get to the root cause. And that was imbued by all the trustees and, I think, just became really part of the ethic of Carnegie Corporation and philanthropy. I think most philanthropy, certainly Ford and Rockefeller and MacArthur and the others, are very much that way—Russell Sage, Milbank [Memorial Fund]. You can just give to charity. You can write a check for charity if you want to. But this is a way to bring the best minds to bear on complex problems and come up with a wide range of solutions.

And this is really what we've done in terms of, I'd say, some of the major initiatives that relate to field building. I'd say this is where you see the commitment to getting at the root cause of something take hold. One of the prime areas of field building was in area studies. There, the root cause was, how do you increase American understanding of the world? [Laughs] This was a cause everybody's been concerned about for such a long time. And it actually started, following World War I, at Carnegie Corporation. When we have all these people coming in—first of all, how do we Americanize immigrants—but how do we ensure that Americans are going to know, in this changing world, how it's changing, what's going on the world? And under Keppel, again—he was really our first major president. We had several before, of course, after Carnegie, but—and he was president for nineteen years. He started working with the Council on Foreign Relations and said, “This is great, all the meetings you're funding in New York and Washington. But what about the rest of the country? Aren't there people out there who should know about foreign affairs?” And so Carnegie Corporation started funding their national committees, all over

the country. And they grew and grew and we funded them for many, many years. We then, during World War II, with Rockefeller Foundation, funded something that there has been very, very little publicity or writing about. And it's an area where greater study is due and definitely needed, something called the Ethnogeographic Board, which was—[laughs] it was to pull together—

Q: It's a surprise to me.

Rosenfield: Yes. No one knows about it. The American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the Smithsonian [Institution] and the National Research Council all pooled their ideas and some money, each of them, and came to Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations and said, just give us fifteen thousand dollars. That will complete what we need. And we want to pull together all the expertise in the country on the foreign areas where our troops might be going and put together manuals about what they're going to find: the cultures, the tribes, the fauna and flora, what the governance is like, what's going on there. And they put out all this material. Nobody knows [about this program]. Rockefeller had been funding Latin American studies, Slavic studies and Asian studies a little bit. We had gotten in a little bit on some of that. We'd been doing international security studies. But this was the first time to pull together knowledge, create publications. And it led to—absolutely, to me—there's a straight line leading to both Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundation getting involved in area studies immediately following World War II.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: We started with the Russian Research Center—a huge grant, but figuring we had to know the Russian mind, not just Russia. Rockefeller funded Columbia for the study of Russian language and Russian history. We got into the Russian mind and culture somewhat at Harvard. All these had many controversies and things associated with them. But we funded about thirty universities, all over the country, eventually, to build this field of area studies. And it was every area in the world. Arizona on Southeast Asian studies. Kansas, they're involved in Costa Rica. [Laughs] And this is either one-on-one links and working with students and faculty and having field exchanges, going to Monterrey, Mexico—we had a Latin American cluster. We had a Japan one. We had a China one. We had Arctic studies. African studies was the most difficult for us to get off the ground. We funded the first African studies with Melville [J.] Herskovits at Northwestern [University] and a couple of other programs, not as many as some of the—Latin American studies was actually where we were making a big effort in the 1950s. It wasn't just history, culture, field—a lot of exchanges with the countries in question. It was language training. And actually it started out in the '30s as language training. But that was at the core. And we said, "So we're building this field in order to make sure that we have this understanding." And not just the expert who's going to go into the State Department or the Defense Department; the American citizen should understand the rest of the world.

We started language training programs in high school in languages that we thought were as important as French and German. Chinese—this is the 1950s—Chinese, Arabic, Russian and Japanese. And we would encourage two high schools to get together, like New Trier [Township High School] outside of Chicago and [New] Utrecht High School also outside of Chicago. On

the West Coast with someplace else in Wisconsin. And we had about four or five clusters around the country. New York—Columbia did some of the teaching manuals, I think, for the Russian perhaps. And Seton Hall [University] was involved. This was to train high school teachers. So the way we thought of building the field was to train the high school teachers, get the high school students involved. And train undergraduate teachers—we had a Brookings [Institution] program to train undergraduate teachers in foreign affairs, a series of summer seminars, and get those students, and then the graduate training. And we worked hand in glove with the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies to deepen this. And then, of course, the government came in, first with the Fulbright [Program] at the end of World War II and the National Defense Education Act, which provided Title VI. And then Ford came in with huge money. And once Ford came in with huge money, we felt, “We’ve built this field. We can move to something else.” And in fact, it’s still out there, for sure.

Q: Now a great deal of the thrust of their area studies, it must be noted, came as a result of the Cold War.

Rosenfield: No, it started before the Cold War. So sorry to—

Q: It started before the Cold War but the real thrust—

Rosenfield: I’d say that’s not reading the conversations. I’d say the Russian studies part was very much, “We better understand this country that we’re now at loggerheads with.” Although, as soon as we were allowed to send students over there, we sent students over there, so it wasn’t

putting up the Iron Curtain. We wanted to penetrate that as soon as possible. That affected that, but it was really—if you read Devereux Josephs's comments from 1946, this was before the Cold War. It was actually the dropping of the atom bomb, I think, that had tremendous [influence]. "We can't ever do this again." It was peace. Yes, it had [connections to the] Cold War. But these three foundations said, "We can't go to war again because war is the end of civilization," as Carnegie wrote presciently in his 1905 speech. So it was really for peace. And then you had the overlay and the underlay [laughs] of the Cold War. But it started as a peace initiative. And the only way that we're going to have wise decisions is if Americans hold their leaders accountable for what we're doing overseas in our foreign policy. And how can they hold them accountable? They better know what's going on.

Devereux Josephs in 1946—his speeches, his writing to the board and discussing with the board—the board really felt quite strongly that this was a role for Carnegie Corporation. And I know Rockefeller, in reading their material, and Ford Foundation, in their early days, felt that. The Cold War complicated things. But—at least from our point of view—it didn't change us. It didn't necessarily increase the Russian studies that we were funding. We continued. And John Gardner's writing on this is absolutely brilliant. I think Jim Perkins was involved, James [A.] Perkins. Oliver [C.] Carmichael, John Gardner, of course, as I said. But they were dedicated to this idea. [E.] Pendleton Herring. This was what they thought was important. So this is getting at the root cause—not the Cold War. Eventually it was seen to be but that was because we need better decisions.

I'd say what always surprised me though—we did some really interesting things on China. The same board member who really pushed us to get into Russia, Frederick [H.] Osborn, who is a very controversial character in his own right—after we'd been doing Russia for a number of years, he said, "You know, there's a country out there that we don't know very much about. And we better know something about it. Carnegie Corporation ought to do something about that. That's China." And we funded a series of studies, "Understanding Chinese Culture," "Understanding Chinese Mind," with SSRC, a whole working domain. Rockefeller had then moved on to some other areas. They had, of course, been in China for decades. But we funded quite a lot on Chinese language studies as well.

But one thing we did was, we had very clear recognition—John Gardner and Alan Pifer wrote about this—that communism is not a monolith. It's multiple societies, multiple perspectives. And so we funded, through the American Council of Learned Societies, a series of comparative studies on comparative communist societies: Yugoslavia, China, Southeast Asia, European as well as Russian and in the Americas. And we funded that for many years. And then we had all these other area studies and a lot of attention to the problems with modernization—the potential for conflict. We were very much into modernization. The Vietnam War still happened.

We worked with the state. We tried to involve them as much as we could, not for power purposes, as some of the Marxists might think, but we wanted them to be educated. We wanted them to have depth. We wanted the Defense Department people to know what they were getting into. So this is where we talked about at the beginning: how do you get knowledge to stick? It's not just memories. How can you get real information when you have political motivation?

And we were doing this—granted, Vietnam has a much earlier history—but we were working on this and we were working towards this with this passion for peace. And it’s almost comparable—and I hadn’t thought about it before—to Andrew Carnegie’s frustration when he tried very hard to prevent World War I and failed. But that same sense of, “We don’t have it right yet. We don’t know really.”

So it’s not only how philanthropy can make a difference. It’s really—your question, how can philanthropy communicate better so that actually wise policies are made and so the knowledge that’s generated by grantees—not the funders but the grantees—seeps into the decision-making? Now sometimes—and we’ve seen this happen—our grantees go into the State Department and all of a sudden they become more foreign policy-maker than scholar. And they lose some of that scholarship. It would be a very interesting study to look at what happens when the grantees of a foundation who are really deeply knowledgeable about a field go in and then become the Assistant Secretary of State for that field. I think that that actually would be a very, very, very rich set of studies to understand the pressures of decision-making and how knowledge might be reformed by that—I don’t want to say deformed—but it might be reformed by those pressures.

Q: [Laughs] I don’t think there’s any doubt that intellectuals from the university, who have a particular kind of sense of objectivity, change quite drastically when they move down to Washington and [laughs] drink the waters of the Potomac.



Rosenfield: I mean, what could happen—and this does happen—is to have more interaction with scholars. That’s where the think tanks play a role, but I think with the deep scholars as well. And I know on Islam that has happened. Several of our Scholars have been in briefings in the Defense Department, in the State Department and in other agencies that care, and certainly in Congress. We, in the 1990s, tried—didn’t succeed—to build a greater constituency in the United States for Africa. A very frustrating issue, perhaps less so now as Africa takes a different role in the global agenda. But we found that the most effective outreach that we could fund—and this was with Aspen Institute, something called the Overseas Development Council [no longer exists] and the African American Institute—was the congressional staff seminars. We did work very hard with the Aspen Institute on bringing policymakers together and getting congressmen and senators together. But working with their staff was very important. Because they [the staff] learned. And they were really keen to get as much information as possible. So in one sense, even though, through IRS legislation, we can’t influence the legislative process, these meetings with our grantees would bring in not just other people we were funding but a wide range of expertise to inform the staff. [The congressional staff seminars] proved to be the most important in terms of wise legislation.

It may be that one of the things that we should be working for—and this does take place, I know International Peace and Security does this a lot—is rather than worry about the Assistant Secretary or the Secretary of State, to really work closely and involve actively the staff in those departments. Because they’re the ones who have to write reports. They have to do the research. And if we can reduce their burden, in a sense—“here’s some material” or “here’s the websites that seem to be the most effective and the most objective”—it might work best.

Q: You mentioned a couple times root causes.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: Root causes. And they have been defined differently at different times.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: But certainly one of the root causes that Carnegie has devoted an enormous amount of attention to has been racism.

Rosenfield: Oh, thank you. Yes. Indeed.

Q: Do you see that as a major theme of the—

Rosenfield: It's been a major theme, sometimes with more attention than other times. Andrew Carnegie himself was extremely open on this, very colorblind, really. But it was not dealt with explicitly really till the 1930s. And we're, I have to say, on all sides of that agenda in a sense.

South Africa, we knew we were getting into trouble with our [Carnegie Commission on the] Poor White [Problem in South Africa]—the first trip report that Frederick Keppel and James Bertram, the corporate secretary, wrote from the first Africa trip, they said, "We don't even

know how to get into this. But clearly this is the problem for South Africa. How are they [the Afrikaner] dealing with the native question?" Still, we funded the Poor White Commission because that's what we knew would at least make a difference in poverty. And it turned out to be positive and negative—positive in that some very interesting survey methodology developed, negative in that it also gave more heft to the apartheid movement. Apartheid was also well under way but we gave them data. We gave them Afrikaner sociology, which was also in the process of being developed all of a sudden. They had a huge amount of information. But we also fully intended to fund the same on black poverty. And it's just that the person who was going to do that for us, who kept pushing us to do that—there were three people, Charles [T.] Loram, Ernst [G.] Malherbe and—oh, I'm so sorry. I'm just blanking on the other. But anyway, we knew that we needed to do this. And it's very much there in writing. I have documentation on that. It was not really talked about before but I have found that documentation.

What we did on race though—and this is a program that needs to have a light shone on it in such a bright way and really look at it and what difference did it make because I couldn't begin to do this. And I'm sorry to go into such depth on this but it was the precursor for what set in motion, I think, everything else. It was called the Primitive Peoples Program at Yale. Now, if you are interested in race, this is probably the last thing—you're thinking, "Oh my god, this is Ku Klux Klan right here. It's racist. I don't want to touch this with a ten-foot pole." And I had avoided it. "Do I have to write about this? We've already been excoriated for the Poor White Commission. Well, I better just look at it." And I had gotten all the files from Jane Gorjevsky, our wonderful previous archivist at Columbia, and I couldn't stop reading it. It is the most anti-racist program. Charles Loram came to Yale, convinced [James R.] Angell, our former president, who was then

president of Yale, that it was really important in the sociology department to start this program. He said, “Any time a foreign power goes into another country it becomes damaging to the races of those countries. Discrimination develops, exploitation develops, and you see racial prejudice develop. We need to understand this better. We need to fight this. We need to have students.”

So he had Master’s students, Ph.D. students, special students. Phelps Stokes [Fund] gave a little bit of money. And Yale, under duress, gave some—they don’t usually do this—they funded faculty. And we funded it for ten years. Keppel said, any time Loram would write to him and say, “I need seven thousand dollars more,” Keppel would write to him and say, “Are you sure?” [Laughs] He would give him a hard time but he was very excited about it. And they were looking at the urban discrimination in South Africa. He had blacks and whites from South Africa. There is no other place, at that time, I’m positive, where this [sort of program] was taking place. He had blacks and whites from the United States. He had Hindus, Muslims, Jews, everybody. These students, they just were a real cosmopolitan place. I have been able to just skim the surface of this material. And this core of knowledge—what resulted, who were these people? I didn’t recognize the names but perhaps they went back to their—and they came from many countries. They weren’t just Americans. And he would take them on field trips. They went to Hawaii to look at the race question there because they were very concerned about the Asian dilemma, that Asian dilemma, in Hawaii, and prejudice against Asians.

Loram unfortunately died early, in 1940. But for his last field trip—he died soon after—he took students through the American South. They went to all the historically black colleges. They went to some of the white colleges. They went to Hampton [University]. They went to Tuskegee

[University]. They went through Texas to look at some of the problems there. Then they went to the Southwest to look at the Native American Indian reservations. They went to Los Angeles to see what was going on there, especially with Native Americans. They went back—this was a long trip—to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to talk about this. And the trip report, which was written by a British missionary based in India but who was now a student in the program, details the questions that they asked. And she said, “Professor Loram would encourage us to ask these challenging questions about: What’s the difference. Why are you treating black people like this? Why is this happening? Why don’t they get to go to college? What’s the poverty? And everybody answered us very politely.” But she ended this report by saying—this was written in 1941—“It is very clear to all of us that the problem of race in the United States is not going to be solved for another two hundred and fifty years.” I said wow. Why does nobody know about this?

We didn’t document this. This was never documented by Lester. Of course, Keppel stopped being president, he retired. It just didn’t get any publicity. And this is, to me, a wealth of knowledge about how an American university, through a South African faculty member and an international student body, were tackling the question of American race. It goes very closely to what Keppel also did, which was a major—I’d say our work in South Africa and Loram’s project and a board member, Newton [D.] Baker [Jr.], who asked about this, led—

[Interruption]

Q: We were talking about the issues of race. And you were describing the Yale studies, et cetera. Originally I’d asked that question in terms of thinking about the Myrdal study.

Rosenfield: Well, I'm getting to Myrdal.

Q: But your response leads to another thought in my mind that these foundation archives, now I've been through two or three of them, are an enormous store of wealth—

Rosenfield: Oh. They're just—

Q: —about what happened in the past that we know so little about.

Rosenfield: They're a treasure chest. That's all I can say. I know when current foundation officers start seeing what's in these archives they get very excited. And so it's one of things I hope we can accomplish next year, is to bring more practitioners to the archives to see what's there. And they start—you see the handwriting—I mean, it is an issue of what will happen with electronic files. But there's still enough material that I think people will be able to benefit from the history that's being made today long into the future. It's just—I mean, these Primitive People files—who would know about this program? As you said, there are many scholars who have been working on many aspects of philanthropy. Practically everything's been touched on. I've tried to reflect that in the book to some extent. This—nobody! I can't find anything on it.

I should say, before we come to Myrdal—which is important because Myrdal does have a direct connection with the subsequent activities of the Corporation—George [P.] Murdock, who was part of the program, was the brains behind the Human Area Relations file at Yale. Now it's a

consortium of universities and it's an independent entity and we've helped get it started; the most important resource on cultures all over the world. For any scholar who wants to go anywhere, you go there first, in anthropology, ethnography. So there's a history. But this Primitive Peoples Program, it never existed, as far as anybody knows. And there it is. Ten years, twelve years, and so many students going through it. It would be a great book for somebody and an important social history document for this country.

But Myrdal. I don't want to gloss over issues with regard to race because certainly, we didn't fund W.E.B. Du Bois, we funded Thomas Jesse Jones. There's a whole lot of other detail that I try to go into in the book, and many, many other people have gone into this. But Myrdal was a real act of courage on the part of Keppel because he knew he didn't want to get mixed up in the controversies of an American doing this. Any American, white, black, anybody doing it.

And he thought that Myrdal—I don't know if he knew how superb an economist he was, and a sensitive social economist, really—was the right person. And he gave him every bit of support he could possibly. In one of the introductions by Myrdal's daughter to one of the volumes of *An American Dilemma*, she talks about how important Keppel was. And this shows—it's sort of like Keppel learned. I don't think he started out this way. I have to just say that he's come under some controversy for this Poor White Commission and some other things but in World War I he was in the war department and really worked hard with Mr. [Emmett J.] Scott, who was responsible for the African American troops, to make sure that there was real fair treatment. And he was not allowed back at Columbia, basically, by Nicholas Murray Butler because he was both

religion-blind [laughs] and race-blind in admissions. Particularly because he was religion-blind, Butler didn't want him back.

But he [Keppel] said to Myrdal—because Myrdal was going to get a room at Columbia, I think, and sort of do his research, set up his library—and he said, “No way. Here is some money. Get on a train and go see. You need to observe with your own eyes. You don't want to read the material. Then you can do whatever reading you want.” And that's what made the difference. And so Keppel knew. And I think that's because of Loram.

And also there was a General Education Board—this is an aside. One of the things I learned in this study, and of course it's obvious, is you can't make a definite claim that this is the only thing that happened. There's always a history. And people haven't connected the Myrdal study and approach with the General Education Board. But there's a connection. And the funding of the schools in the South, and the Jeanes Education Program. There's a continuity there that could be made in terms of the importance of looking at what was going on in the South, also the North, but the kind of education that was going on, the understanding of the role of community, how you deal with community education versus higher [education]. So these issues keep cropping up but they're connected in fundamental ways and particularly to the issue of race in this country and elsewhere.

The Myrdal study—I have to say for public consumption here—many years later a member of staff, two members of staff, wrote about how terrible it was that Carnegie Corporation did nothing to promote the Myrdal study. And I think this is an inaccurate reading of the times.



Because in 1944 when it came out, Walter [A.] Jessup, the president, said—in the summer—“It’s in its third printing.” So it was getting press with Carnegie not having to do anything. It sold thousands of copies. We didn’t need to do anything. This was a case where the writing was so powerful, the material was so revolutionary—so dramatic—and the author himself was able—the whole style was so powerfully done, we didn’t need to do anything. So we didn’t put it under the radar screen. There was a hiatus, which was not to squash it—he had to go back home to Sweden because it was World War II and he had to make sure his family was okay, and then we got him back here to finish it. And we had many people who worked on it, who actually deserve quite a lot of credit, along with him. So I’d say that’s something I’m trying to set straight in the book, without saying about the Carnegie staff, “Oh, bad, bad for saying that.” It’s really quite important to know that sometimes if the product is really exciting, the book is really exciting and important, you don’t need to do anything. This took off like wildfire. And of course, it had major influence for the Supreme Court decision in 1954. There was Thurgood Marshall. We didn’t need to do anything about that either because he was involved.

Q: When I took Sociology I, it was the text. Was there a version—Arnold [M.] Rose, particularly?

Rosenfield: There are many, many editions of it.

Q: Yes. But it was one of our assigned texts.

Rosenfield: You had to read it. Right. One has to read it.

Q: Yes.

Rosenfield: But then the issue of race was given major attention by John Gardner and Alan Pifer. Eli Evans, with his work on the public interest bar—this is revolutionary work, in a sense, and really revolutionary in the sense that: “Let’s say that blacks can be lawyers.” And, for us, what was revolutionary was supporting litigation. Now litigation is another way of getting at root causes. We had not done that before. Actually, I’m sorry. Elihu Root, over there to my left [refers to bronze bust], he helped—we got into working with the American Society of International Law and others. But the way we looked at medicine, public health, adult education, art and culture, museum studies, and international studies, we weren’t really doing that with law. Bits and pieces of grants but not major. But this work in the South that Eli did with Alan Pifer’s blessing, was just so important—and other foundations were there too, Ford and Rockefeller. Very important.

So race began to fall under the rubric of social justice. And I think it was vitally important. And then that led us to help start the legal defense funds. Well, NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] was there, but Mexican American, Asian Pacific, others, started late ’60s, early ’70s, and we’ve been continuing to work with them. In the ’90s we were actively involved with them through our Special Projects work. And now with Geri Mannion’s program so much involved in them—Gregorian’s continued it as we look at immigrant integration but we have the Four Freedoms Fund, which is no longer about just race. It’s race and ethnicity. And it’s still a social justice agenda that’s been maintained.

It's a consistency. And it hasn't been put forth as one, actually, because we usually start with the public interest bar in the South. But there is the fifty years before. Now, of course, South Africa—as I mentioned before in the collaboration in South Africa, we had stopped grantmaking in South Africa for several years because apartheid was so egregious. There was just nothing he could've done—with no conscience could you do anything. But when there's a moment, an opening, you can still work in an egregious society if you feel you can make a difference and not do more harm. And we realized with Ford Foundation, especially Bill Carmichael, the vice president, and Frank Thomas that we could make a difference then. And I would say race is still the fault line in American society and foundations need to probably tackle it much more explicitly than we have. But we still have our very active social justice agenda with the immigrant integration program as part of education.

Q: A more recent example of a root issue would be the role of women. Now that's something that was not originally part of—

Rosenfield: Not explicitly. Although I have to say I just found—

This is the problem. You go to the archives and—I'm not adding one more word—I've had to cut—

Q: [Laughs]

Rosenfield: —hundreds of pages from my overwritten book. As you can see from the answers to this question, I can talk and write massive amounts on this material.

We made a grant to, actually, I think it's something called the Inter-American Union [Inter-American Commission of Women], I may have the name slightly wrong—for the support and study—this was in 1941—of conditions confronting women all over the world. I mean, where did this come from? I hadn't seen it. I've gone through this book a hundred times. There are all my markings in the archival copies here. Where did I miss this? Because it actually didn't have an international name to it, I said, "Oh. No." But actually in the '20s and '30s we funded a lot of women's colleges, endowment grants, library grants. We're a big believer in women's education at the time. And that hasn't been really fully documented. We do have a very nice study of support for women and education but we could do more documentation on that. We funded Bryn Mawr College for Russian studies later. We funded Wellesley [College] to the hilt, Mount Holyoke [College]. All the women's colleges got quite a lot of support from us.

Now in terms of the conditions confronting women, it was really only after the trustee review of the Commonwealth Program in 1975. This is when we stop funding universities—not stopped—we continued to fund some. But our major focus shifted to three areas, keeping some of the grants going, but mainly in South Africa and on women in development, and then better information about Africa in the United States, and information communication in Africa. We started in a major way with a very good program officer, Kristin Anderson, who had been at Ford Foundation as an associate program officer working on these issues, the role of women in development. And that became a mainstay of our activities from about '76 onwards—through the

1980s, through the 1990s—funding women’s organizations. We helped create something called originally the Women and Development network in the Caribbean under Peggy Antrobus that’s phenomenal and still going strong today in a slightly different institutional setting. It was the first time to connect women in the region and then it became global, the WAND [Women and Development Unit] network. We funded other basic activities. We helped fund the women’s conferences. And we continue doing that.

Under this current era, for this oral history, what’s really important—and I think we need to look at how transformative this can be—is the women’s scholarship support at the undergraduate level that was part of the African partnership program [Partnership for Higher Education in Africa]. In all of our partner universities we provided funds, whether it was either for scholarships or for covering additional fees—South Africa was slightly different for a while—for women undergraduates. And I think there’s been a total of ten years’ worth of support. And happily Makerere University is keeping it going, raising money specifically for women students. [University of] Dar es Salaam is looking at the same thing.

So this is something that became a major, major area. Andrea Johnson, who’s a terrific program officer, very strategic, made that happen. What she also noted, very importantly, is why weren’t women going to college and universities in Africa? Money was vitally important. This is where money made a big difference. Because if anybody was going to get any money to go to college, it would be the men. But even if a woman, a girl, went to these places, the dorms were not good, the environment, the attitude towards them, and sometimes worse than just attitude, the actions towards them. And so she, working with our universities, who were really keen to do this

Comment [RIS1]: Insert "PHEA"?

because they needed the diversity in their student body, set up—the sort of general name is gender mainstreaming. I don't think we've quite called them that. But they looked at the environment that women faced in these universities and worked on that, everything from physical space to faculty attitudes and student attitudes. And it's been transformative. They've stayed. Very few drop-outs. And it's sometimes more for family reasons than because of the ambient conditions. And so I think women will stay. We will always have women as part of the scholarships that we now do.

I don't know whether we'll come back to women. There are now many, many players. This is an area where I get very frustrated because of the costs and benefits of redesigning the wheel. Because there's not a lot of knowledge of all of this history all of the foundations became very active in women's issues in the '80s and '90s. It became a very big issue. Maternal mortality, which Carnegie Corporation took the lead on, and then Rockefeller did some very important things too, and Ford, was another major area where we looked at women's health in a very particular way. So we've looked at this.

Q: Well, it was your own particular interest originally, was it not?

Rosenfield: Well, no. I have to give credit where credit's due. I was part of the program. But it was Dr. Adetokunbo [O.] Lucas who was the chair of the program. We had worked together in the tropical disease research program in Geneva and he came here to run the program. And he said, "I don't want to fund work in tropical diseases because there might be a question of bias. And I want to see with this foundation what's another fundamental issue that we could look at.

And this is the excess number of women dying in childbirth.” No one was really looking at it at the time. There’d been one paper written by Allan [G.] Rosenfield from Columbia and Deborah [P.] Maine—[Allan is] no relation—on “Where’s the M in MCH, Maternal and Child Health?” [“Maternal Mortality-A Neglected Tragedy”]. What’s happening? And Lucas, someone had given him that paper and he said, “This is what we’re going to do.” And so with Allan and Deborah we developed this program in West Africa that yielded very important fundamental information about why is there so much excess maternal mortality, mainly because women die in childbirth and it’s a matter of the delay in getting to the hospital, emergency obstetric care, having access to that. There are a lot of more complicated things, age of marriage and all, that we worked on with our Women in Law [and Development in Africa] program. But we were able to use that as a major vehicle, working with WHO, the World Health Organization, and their Safe Motherhood Initiative to really transform thinking. And so a lot of that knowledge was not there. And this is from the 1980s. For heaven’s sakes, people who start working in this field in 2000 don’t know about this.

One of the things that Susan King did, and Vartan encouraged, was to do a *Carnegie Results*. And so now we have a paper on the work on maternal mortality, which is quite comprehensive but very crisp. I want to keep using that word crisp because it means it’s accessible to a reader. And so it’s codified. We need to do more on the women’s scholarship and some of the other women in development programs.

**Comment [RIS2]:** Need full title? "Maternal Mortality—A Neglected Tragedy. Where is the M in MCH?"

Q: Right. I think if we walked outside to the general public and mentioned Carnegie Corporation, education would come to their mind. I think that in many ways Carnegie, over the years, is really identified by education programs. They're fundamental to the organization, are they not?

Rosenfield: And they're completely consistent with the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding. Where better but the schools to work on that, and the universities? Although I think libraries also come to mind. There were twenty-eight hundred libraries all over the world, literally all over the world. So that's a big thing. But for the Corporation itself, education. And it's been consistent. Every era from day one has focused on it. Higher education and lifelong learning were much more the themes until, under Alan Pifer, Barbara Finberg, our wonderful executive vice president in the '90s, and [Frederic] Fritz [A.] Mosher, her colleague who also worked on the Africa program, started the program on early childhood. And those were major, major studies, high school and other fundamental programs and *Sesame Street*. But they were all aimed at educating children and then through the schools developed more and more as time—and now we're K-12, basically, and looking at school reform in a major way. Overseas was a little different. Education was always there with universities or the community education approach that we used in African settings. But universities were always front and center for our grantmaking and libraries until, really, it was the trustee review in 1975 that changed that.

Q: Oh, really? That recent?

Rosenfield: 1975, yes. I mean, it was always—what we did would differ. We kept trying to hone and hone it till it was a scope and a focus where we would be filling a niche, because there was a



lot of money going into education in Africa from other sources. Basically because of some of our initiatives, the Greenbrier Conferences and others, much more money started going into Africa, African development initiatives, Ford Foundation, USAID [United States Agency for International Development], other countries and Rockefeller Foundation to some extent. So we really carved out a niche in higher education, especially through something called the Ashby Commission on [Post-School Certificate and] Higher Education in Nigeria that set the standard for how you approach higher education and really codified the importance for national development. But all the newly independent countries in Africa valued education and especially higher education. But as more and more players came in, we said, “Okay. What can we do? What’s important?” So first we looked at teachers. And with Columbia, with Teachers College, we had this fantastic program called the Afro-Anglo-American Program for Teacher Education where we funded teacher connections with the institutes of education all over the continent. Soon a lot of people were funding that and it became the [African Teachers Education Association](#) [[Association for Teacher Educators in Africa](#)], which is in Nairobi, still going strong.

**Comment [RIS3]:** the right way to deal with this?

So we said, “Okay, teachers. What else can we do? We’ve got teachers. Now there’s a lot of other players.” And then we got into early childhood. What are they learning? Are there different ways of learning? And this is where, unlike the public interest bar, we didn’t take the experiences from Africa. And I think it’s a missed opportunity, actually. We had this fantastic work on early childhood in the United States. We were then starting some fantastic work on early childhood in Africa. Through the program officer, Fritz Mosher, they met. He was funding both sets of grantees. Basically, there was perhaps a little teeny overlap in people but they went their own way. And it would have been interesting had they made that more of a global program in the

sense that they connected those dots. So that was education. But again, it was through the universities and through the institutes.

Then '75 comes and [the trustee review] says, “No, we’ve done this. We’ve really succeeded. We can be comfortable knowing that every single vice chancellor in English-speaking Africa has been a travel grantee. We’ve done all this, so that’ll go on and we can go focus on the apartheid issues in South Africa and education about them in the U.S. and women in development.” Unfortunately—that’s another issue—it was the wrong time to do that. But the concept or the theme of education, per se, and education-related initiatives came back with Gregorian. We didn’t focus on that in the 90s so much.

Q: On the international side, I was interested in some of your notes in reference to the Australian university system—

Rosenfield: Oh, yes.

Q: —which became modeled after the American educational system. And actually that’s true for Africa as well. The foundation penetration—Ford Foundation, Carnegie, other penetration—was a movement away from the British model of the university toward an American model of the university. There is a way in which these programs—they spread a kind of American system but a far more democratic system.

Rosenfield: We were very careful, actually, in Africa and the colonies to consult with the colonial office. We had a series of something called the London Conferences every other year where we would talk about what we're doing. So Africa was—

Q: It's particularly an issue for Carnegie in the dominions.

Rosenfield: Yes. In the dominions. South Africa had well-established universities. We didn't change—African colonies, we actually handled in a slightly different way. Now, currently, there's a lot of movement afoot. And this is more generated, I would say, possibly by the institutions themselves, but you're right, very controversial. In Australia, though, our sense was that—and actually Keppel wrote about this—that Australia was much more like America than Britain. The wide open spaces, the adventurous pioneering, open society in a sense. And he felt comfortable with connecting all these Australian education researchers with American researchers. There was a lot of movement back and forth and essentially Australian universities were transformed. And what you're referring to is this fabulous conference that took place in Australia, organized by the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, in February 2010 on Carnegie Corporation grantmaking in Australia, its centennial. And nobody here—I only found out about it because I was in touch with another Carnegie scholar. I'm not even quite sure, I think I found something he was working on in libraries in Australia and New Zealand and we'd gotten in touch. And then he said, "Maybe you'd be interested in this." They hadn't contacted us. They didn't know who to contact. And because we hadn't kept up any contacts whatsoever with Australia, it could have happened and we might not have even known about it. It is entirely possible. But what was so fantastic about that conference is that they were willing to look in a

non-ideological but constructively critical way at how Carnegie Corporation had reshaped their society.

And once I read all their papers—and I met with the organizers because they came through the States on some meetings—I said, “Oh my goodness.” I have to step back and say what the Marxists accuse us of—Inderjeet Parmar, who’s a very dear friend and a wonderful person—promoting American power. Well, in fact, we were promoting American ideas. But, I assure you, Keppel did not think that funding the Australian Council for Educational Research was going to transform Australian society at its core. He thought it might improve education the way they wanted to. And in fact, he never commented on paper. It was always what they wanted to do—his lesson that Gregorian has picked up on. But once they saw a different system that was more open that seemed to make sense pedagogically, they instituted it. And the questions are being raised by Australian scholars today. “Was this the right thing? What kind of country would we have been otherwise? Would this have worked out differently? Would that have worked out differently? What was our role in the commonwealth? Would it have been different, our relationship with Britain? After all, we’re a British colony. It was created that way.” And they really talk about it quite critically.

So I have started talking with colleagues in South Africa, which is a major recipient of foundation money over the decades now, saying “Don’t you think you might want to have a conference on what—not just Carnegie Corporation, as major as it’s been—American philanthropy has meant for South African society?” And there are some people very keen about this. And there was no Carnegie money behind any of this. If we had known about it, I would

Comment [RIS4]: could not find middle initial

have strongly encouraged us to fund the Australian meeting because I learned a huge amount. I learned about programs I had no idea we had done. And then in New Zealand—New Zealand was a little more British in its orientation but they too reformed education. The New Zealand Council for Educational Research is very effective, still going strong.

It leads me, if I could continue this on a different line, to another issue. This gentleman Tom Watson wrote about it, kind of touched on it today, what foundations actually fund—institution or project? And what do they fund when they fund an institution? Well, what we fund at Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation, and funded in the early days of both foundations, were endowments. Endowing what basically became the Brookings Institution. Making it possible for the National Bureau of Economic Research to raise its endowment. Something called the Stanford Food Research Institute. The **Institute of Land Economics** still is now existing with a slightly different name. The Institute of International Education. The Council on Foreign Relations—we didn't but Rockefeller did. Some fundamental institutions of American life. Whatever one thinks of them, the Corporation and the foundation put in money, in our case, over ten years. We had a very clear exit strategy. But it was endowment money to show that if they could raise and get additional money and get really good programs that proved their worth over time then we would have done something important. And we said, "Okay, after ten years we'll know whether you're going to be strong and succeed or not."

Basically, with the two institutes, the councils in Australia and New Zealand, we did the same thing. It wasn't really endowment support but it was core support. And so if you're reluctant to give endowment support—and that's a possibility because only a certain percentage can be used

**Comment [RIS5]:** I couldn't find this

and you want your money to be used—provide core support, general purpose grants for the institution. And that's very hard to get through because everybody wants their projects done. But for universities as well as free-standing institutes and free-standing organizations, that's the most precious money they can get. And Carnegie's done a lot of that over the years, which is very, very important.

Q: Do they still do that? Because I know in a lot of foundations—

Rosenfield: Less so.

Q: —there's a real hesitancy about giving—

Rosenfield: Because you want the money to be put to use. There's a lot of pressure, this impact grantmaking, which I have my thoughts about. But I think there's much less of it. And as a result, people are spending all their time fundraising. I chair an NGO board. And I know that's what we all do. And I've been on other NGO boards. What you mainly talk about is how much money is the executive director or the president raising? Where's the next money coming from? Should we have an endowment campaign? That doesn't go anywhere. Should we have a special campaign? It's not always, "What difference is this money making?" The donors keep asking that question but in fact that comes at the end of the day. All day long they're raising money. And if they had the core costs at least, they wouldn't need to do it quite so much.

Q: Back to education for a moment, when I think of Carnegie and education, I think of the [Joan Ganz] Cooney report and *Sesame Street*, kind of—

Rosenfield: The Cooney report. Yes.

Q: —two different ways of approaching education, one a kind of study of an institution or institutions, the other a kind of non-institutional way of educating people.

Rosenfield: Well, I think that's the openness to advancing knowledge at all levels. There's always been an interest in educational technology, always. It's not brand new today. Keppel was interested in it. Andrew Carnegie, I'm sure, would have been, had they had more developments in his era. *Sesame Street*, of course there was just the fiftieth anniversary of Channel Thirteen—

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: —where, fortunately, Joan Cooney talked about the dinner party, the famous dinner party, where Lloyd [N.] Morrisett [Jr.] suggested that she work on this and she did. Children's Television Workshop was the really important grantee—and the Children's Defense Fund—so we see education and root cause of poverty going hand-in-hand at a certain era. We're more, now, on reforming the school system as a root cause of failure in education. But at that time we also saw the importance of children in poverty and HighScope [Educational Research Foundation] was very much that. Education is what Carnegie Corporation stands for.

It is our comparative advantage in whatever dimension, whether it's in a formal institutional setting—certainly in the late '20s and '30s we helped create the [American] Association for Adult [and Continuing] Education and that whole field is really a function of Carnegie Corporation in the United States. That's learning from the commonwealth, actually, where they had, especially in Britain, very strong programs for lifelong learning. So perhaps we need to look more at lifelong learning as a different way of approaching aging. Obviously the internet is very important, but what does one do with it? Alan Pifer was very concerned about that [aging] in his retirement; he looked at that a lot, opening up the vision of what education is and higher education.

**Comment [RIS6]:** this was not part of the original name, but it's the name used today

Certainly Vartan Gregorian has made that a major hallmark of his administration, his era. Now, are we looking at throwing open the whole system and saying, “Well, maybe you don't want institutions anymore,” and examining the costs? I think there are some real issues in the value of education from the societal perspective, in addition to an educational perspective, and that those are perfectly legitimate and credible issues for Carnegie Corporation to be tackling in some form in the future. And I'm sure they will be.

Q: In your study of the Corporation system and your own experiences here, how would you describe the shifting nature of the staffing? Internally, how has it evolved or how has it changed? Or what have been the major tensions in staffing internally? I'm sure you've thought about—

Rosenfield: In answering the question, what works and what doesn't work, something that didn't work was Andrew Carnegie's deep aversion to overhead costs.



[Laughter]

Rosenfield: He did not want to hire any staff for this Corporation. There were a couple of clerks to make sure the checks got out. And so the original Corporation had no staff. It was run by the trustees. They got a small honorarium and they were the chief cooks and bottle washers [laughs] in the foundation. They were all running their other institutions, except for James Bertram, who was the Corporation secretary and board trustee, and Robert [A.] Franks, who was the Corporation treasurer. And both of them had worked personally with Andrew Carnegie. That worked well when you spent a huge amount of money on endowments and you could write big checks and use up a lot of your endowment for this. But Carnegie really didn't want one penny of that money to go to Carnegie Corporation staff. Rockefeller, Russell Sage and Milbank did their own projects. He didn't want to have staff doing projects. He wanted this to help support the work of others. He wanted the trustees, in their wisdom, to set up the programs. He wanted to continue funding some of his own initiatives through the Corporation. So for the first ten years of the Corporation, no staff. Except people who helped get the work done was administrative staff; they're important, critical. They couldn't have done it without them. But it is amazing that it functioned. Because certainly Rockefeller had a full component of staff. And that's why they were everywhere all the time.

When Andrew Carnegie died and the question was, "Okay, what do we do?" the trustees could have said, "Well, we'll split up the money between us." But they realized he created it in perpetuity. He had a mission. They bought into the mission. They were responsible for his legacy

and they said, “We can’t do this anymore. Let’s hire a president. We won’t hire any staff, but we’ll hire a president.” And they did hire a president. Elihu Root acted as president for a few months or a year or so and then they hired James Angell. He brought on one staff member, Beardsley Ruml, a very important person in the history of philanthropy, actually. So it’s two staff members and a couple of people who also worked with him as administrators. He left after eight months [laughs] to become the president of Yale. That’s another story. And all of a sudden they said, “Oh my God. We have to go through another search?” Well, rather than do that, they didn’t hire any staff. They did set up a search but Henry [S.] Pritchett, a trustee, became president. So the first twenty years of the foundation—well, I’m wrong—the first fifteen years, we had the founder as president, a trustee as acting president, a president for a short period of time, and another trustee as president. Finally, in 1923, they hired Frederick Keppel, who becomes president and brings on a couple of assistants. Also, the trustees, still—many of them had worked with Carnegie—did not want to hire staff because he did not want overhead to go towards the Corporation. Gradually, a few more—but this was not a staff. These were there as staff assistants to Keppel. They were talented people: James Russell, John [M.] Russell went on to head the [John and Mary R.] Markle Foundation, Dollard became president of Carnegie Corporation, others. But there were no program officers. They were the staff. They would run programs with Keppel but basically Keppel was program officer in charge and they were program assistants.

Walter Jessup becomes president. It’s World War II. The Corporation changes and the tensions were—there was the problem with Keppel. He had ideas of his own. The trustees, many of whom were still used to running the place, thought they were still running the place. So they would try to run the place. And basically, Keppel was such a charming person and so very

people-oriented aside from also being very strategic. He knew how to win them over and basically never said no to them. But they tried to get their own programs and he funded—we developed some programs around their ideas as well, which is also very smart. And some of them were very important ideas. But there was always this kind of tension: who's running the place, you or us?

Devereux Josephs, who had been running TIAA-CREF [Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund] or TIAA at the time—a large, by that time, life insurance company filled with staff—comes to this place and finds a few program assistants, who were very senior people, and a corporate secretary and a treasurer and a few administrative staff. And he says, “What is this? We’ve got to bring on program staff. I need really talented people to help me run these programs. Because now our assets are still pretty good. We’ve got a whole new world out there.” And he totally internationalized the foundation. “We’ve got to get these programs going and those programs going and I can’t do all of this. I need partners.” And he called them partners. And so basically he hired—and then that continued.

The trustees, though, [laughs] still thought of themselves as running the place. And so what we had to do gradually over time—and it finally led, in 1971, '72 to a trustee policy statement under Pifer that laid the ground rules for the role of the trustees in setting the strategy, giving guidance, bringing their own networks to bear. They were trustees and stewards of the institution but they were not making the grants. Because even under Gardner and Pifer several of them thought that—because they still held over from that earlier ethos.

Once you brought on lots of staff—and we built up not a huge staff but everybody had their own pocket—you had to do something to get people to talk to each other. Otherwise silos would be created. There was definitely competition. So Gardner and Pifer had program officers meet and discuss things. And so they started. You can get very many staff, then, working—but these were superb generalists. They became specialists in their areas but the policy was to hire generalists and get them to really work with the fields because they felt that the generalists wouldn't bring their own bias to the problem. They'd be open on the best people and they would know how to bring the best advisers around them.

All foundations now are filled with specialists. Very few have generalists. And the challenge is to become [laughs] a generalist. A really good program officer, no matter what specialty you come in with, has to become a generalist because you always should be thinking, how do I build the connections? How do I move on? What's the next idea that's going to come follow on this? And it may not be anything I know anything about, but it's highly relevant to what's going on now. How do I move into that area? So there's always that tension with your own knowledge and what the foundation should be doing. And so you have the individual tension—the really best program officers know how to resolve that through a lot of reading, a lot of talking, a lot of site visits, bringing people together. And then you have to convey that to the directors and the president and the board.

It's not a tension, it's a sadness that I feel that happened as soon as Devereux Josephs set up the Developing Countries program, then called the British Dominions and Colonies Program, as a separate program. It's the only named program until David Hamburg. BDC, the British

Dominions and Colonies. It had different names but it was set up separately with a separate director. Nobody else was director, but they brought in Whitney [H.] Shepardson as director. And as Alan Pifer or Stephen [H.] Stackpole, the two people who were in the program, write about it, and especially in their oral histories, it's very poignant. The offices at the time—not here but elsewhere—had a long hall. All the program people were in one place. The British Dominions and Colonies people were all the way down the hall. And so while they would sit in project proposal meetings together they were off in their own little corner. And they were always making long site visits. Because in the 1950s, to get to Africa, or if they were going to Australia or New Zealand, still part of the program, was a very long way, months and months of travel. Even with air travel, still they had to justify. They spent weeks and weeks or months and months in the field. And Shepardson himself was always travelling. So they basically became isolated from the work of the Corporation. This is even more than a tension and I touch on it in the book, but it is something that really shows how the grantmaking could have been strengthened.

It's similar to what I was saying about the Early Childhood Initiative. Here we were. Carnegie Corporation was funding the most provocative work on development assistance—actually, [laughs] that's another series of lectures, it's on tapes at some point—and modernization and development. Highly critical stuff. What does it mean? There we are in Africa dealing with newly independent countries, modernization on everybody's tongue. And here we had all these top scholars from Europe and the United States studying this issue. As far as I can tell, there was no interconnecting on that, no cross-fertilization. Yes, they sat in on all the proposal discussions. But I don't see the minutes saying, “Oh, well we're funding Myron Weiner to look at this issue as societal modernization and conflict. And perhaps it might be interesting in Nigeria where you

**Comment [RIS7]:** There are a remarkable number of Myron Weiners. This is the one without a middle initial.

have this little problem going on in Biafra.” [Laughs] Timing’s a little off on all this. But it strikes me that that—it’s not a tension. It’s a loss. It’s a loss.

Strategic grantmaking developed in the ’70s. Although Gardner gets credit for it, the strategic plans and everything, the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation with [Donald] Don [B.] Hoffman really pioneered doing that. Everybody became strategic philanthropists—not venture [philanthropists] but how do we set up the strategy? What are the program designs? And when David Hamburg became president he thought a better way of tackling these problems was to not have this general set of staff members but to put them into programs and create generalization for them. And so it’s not that people are competitive, and have tension over financial resources, budgets. That always happens in any institution. It became very difficult for people to—not difficult—but because people were so busy, you really didn’t work together. And at least domestically, while everybody had their own program areas, you could at least talk to each other and share ideas. Here, under David, as exciting and as strategic as the programs were—and the Avoiding Nuclear War program was cutting-edge beyond belief—within the Human Resources in Developing Countries Program, we rarely talked about programmatic issues and the lines of connections weren’t there. The Democracy Program and the Education [and Healthy Development] of Children and Youth—they had separate programs, one on technology, one on education—they talked a little more but not much so.

And what Gregorian has done is he’s now set up an International Program and a National Program in an effort to increase communication. But it’s still very hard. Because everybody still is used to doing their own thing. And it’s almost as though you have to start from scratch so

that's very hard to do when you have everybody the same. The tension is there when you have a lot of people and you have a demand for resources.

I'd say we've resolved the relationship with the board. The—'71, '72 trustees under Pifer led that discussion and that was renewed under Hamburg and renewed under Gregorian. So the trustees know, as much as they may want to raise critical questions—and they do, they should—their role is strategy and stewardship. The president is the lead of both the board and the foundation, and the staff members are coming up with ideas. There are always tensions but not in the same way that you see earlier—who's running the place, the trustees or the president. That's been resolved. And that was a major issue.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: A long-winded way of saying it. [Laughs]

Q: What you've just given me is kind of a report from the trenches. So the question I really didn't ask but should have asked, which was the professionalization of the foundation world and the consequent division of labor that comes with that professionalization—that's the question I should have asked. You have given me a wonderful answer from the trenches to that question that was never asked.

Rosenfield: So then maybe the tension, even, it's an inner tension for the individual program officer but then is played out in aggregate is between professionalization and generalists,

professionals and generalists. I think in the complex world of today generalists are going to win out, even though we're focusing on science and tech—

Q: Well, it raises the question, what—

Rosenfield: —this is my [laughs] controversial statement here—

Q: —what is a—

Rosenfield: —because I think you need to be able to connect all the dots.

Q: —what is a philanthropic professional?

Rosenfield: I got into an interesting conversation in one of the staff luncheons where I was talking about this. And I think it's a profession of practice and that people ought to be very proud. Everybody who's in a foundation, whatever you're doing, is a practitioner of philanthropy in one form or another. So it is a practice. It means there can be a degree of practice. And it's not just practice in how you make a grant. The procedural part is what you learn and you can get that internalized. It's the practice of decision-making. It's really a decision-making profession, if you get to the actual program officers. They have to be very astute in pulling together a great deal of knowledge. They have to be excellent writers and analysts. They have to be people-oriented because there are grantees—you have to be able to work with them. You do site visits. You have to be able to be critical and still constructive. So that's the practice of philanthropy. And it can



actually define a very—there’s a new Ph.D. program, I can see it, absolutely—but I hope what might come out of my time at the Rockefeller Archive Center is a Ph.D. in philanthropy. History of philanthropy as a specialty in the history departments.

You have to have the practice. Now, do you need to have licensing and all? I don’t think so. I’m also deeply concerned about the ethics of philanthropy. It doesn’t come into this book so much but separately I’ve written about that—ethics beyond “do no harm,” which is pretty obvious. It’s really ethics in the sense of the independent sector’s definition of obedience to the unenforceable. And as a program officer, you have to have a core ethics. You don’t write about your grantee’s work, for instance. You don’t take credit for it. You have to give credit to the grantees. You try to promote your grantees rather than yourself. That’s good practice, best practice, actually. If you’re a good practitioner, you should know the history. You become a better practitioner. You can see my platform.

But right now all the foundations are hiring specialists. Oh, we need an information person here. We need an education reform person. They’re pretty general. But we need someone who knows this part of educational technology. We know this person who knows innovation. We know this person who knows states at risk as opposed to peace and security writ large or peace studies or something. It’s trite to say this but I think the jury’s out on what is more effective grantmaking. I actually think generalists who can become specialists but keep their generalist orientation will be the successful—

Q: Does that kind of specialization show up in the grants?

Rosenfield: I think it probably does. I haven't thought of examining the grants from this perspective and looking at the changing nature of the grants because of that but—well, area studies is—

Q: The targeted—

Rosenfield: Right. I think the targeting, it is possible that you start with the people that you know or the institutions you know, maybe not the people but you know these institutions are good. So you start with them because you have to get started someplace. And the question is, how do you branch out? And it's perfectly appropriate to start with something you know is going to succeed. But then, how do you take the risks? So maybe the question is, do specialists engage in enough risk-taking? Because philanthropy—that's where having limited resources vis-à-vis national budgets and even private giving and certainly corporate resources—it's got to be taking the risks that nobody else wants to take. And do specialists do that? I don't know. And that's a really, really interesting question to pursue.

Q: Boy, coming from the academic world where we love to specialize in people just like ourselves.

Rosenfield: Oh, my gosh, yes.

Q: And it's the death of the department when we're all alike.

Rosenfield: Yes. Of course. Well, I come at this perhaps because of my own interdisciplinary training and my own work on this field of transdisciplinarity where you have to be able to connect ideas in order to make a difference in problem-solving. But I think it works. And if you have—

[Interruption]

**Comment [RIS8]:** some deleted shop talk gives context

Rosenfield: You're not comfortable taking risks. And this is not because it's the people you know or the institutions. It's the field you know. Are you going to branch out to another field? Are you going to say, "Well, you know, I'm working in the field of economics"—Russell Sage, with its behavioral economics, took a big risk by bringing in psychologists. Do we look enough in an interdisciplinary way? Now, I think at Carnegie, certainly Vartan Gregorian has written about interdisciplinarity too, in the academic setting. To a large extent, we do bring grantees together a lot and that's another—

I know what I was going to say. One way of resolving the specialist/generalist issue is to make sure that you bring people together from different fields in the meetings you hold so you don't just have all of the same tradition in one field. I saw this with the Scholars program. We had such a great time with the first five years of the program. Basically, we had the external selection committee made up of four to five people over the years—impeccable academic and scholarly credentials—so the first five years of this, we were looking at fields pushing everybody beyond their boundaries of knowledge. So we were extending the boundaries of the Corporation's

programs, peace and security, economic development in Africa, democracy, education, and cross-program. And they had to read all the proposals and I brought the staff together for the first level of review, where everybody, the four or five staff members who worked with me on this, had to read proposals outside of their program areas. And it was wonderful. And I had to read all these proposals. It was a fantastic learning experience.

It got a little broad. And when we focused on Islam, Islam is extremely broad and rich. Even though it sounds narrow—Islam and Muslim communities and societies, Islam as the religion and Muslim communities and societies—it still covers so many different dimensions and so many countries and so many changing understandings, and such a historical perspective as well, that we **did transform the committee** to specialists, in a sense. But they had to become generalists in the field of Islamic studies in order to be able to read these grants and make fair conclusions, as did staff. It was a real education in the field for the staff members because we kept the review committee at the same. It was pushing the intellectual boundaries for everybody. And I think that should be happening because it keeps those synapses [laughs] ready to be crossed all the time.

**Comment [RIS9]:** is this change ok? (formerly "that we had a committee that we did transform it")

Q: But there's another sense of risk.

Rosenfield: Yes.

Q: And that's the risk the public will not understand what you're doing. And certainly the Muslim program, or the program on Islam, has that potential.

Rosenfield: I couldn't agree with you more. So the first risk was in doing it—though I have to say, quite foolishly, my colleague, Heather McKay, who is my wonderful right-hand person running the program, and the vice president at the time, Neil Grabois—when Vartan said, “look, I've been wanting to do Islam since the moment I got here. We've done all these meetings. Let's at least build the scholarly base,” we were getting hundreds of proposals coming in, nominations coming in. We were known as the Carnegie Scholars of Vision program. We thought, oh, why are we changing what's succeeding? What kind of risk are we taking? Maybe nobody's going to nominate anybody. We thought we'd be faced with five nominations because we knew there were these departments out there but they were moribund to some extent. There wasn't a lot of energy in the field at that time, in 2004, 2005. But we were inundated. So that was no risk.

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: But we realized we had always had this as a public scholars program. And Ira [I.] Katznelson from Columbia was our great adviser in what the issues are in public scholarship. We had to say to our scholars, “Look, in this field you need to take the risk and be out in front. Because you have the deep knowledge.” And I remember a meeting we had of our Scholars where one of the Scholars, Elizabeth [F.] Thompson from University of Virginia, doing very provocative work on the Ottoman Empire, said, “How do I have time to be a public scholar? I'm raising my children. I'm taking care of my students. I'm doing this research. I'm teaching my courses. I'm doing other research. How do I have time?” And Noah [R.] Feldman, who is now at Harvard but had been at NYU, who is a great constitutional lawyer, has done wonderful work, always has—I haven't seen it recently, but he used to have, regularly, articles in the *New York*

*Times Magazine* section and was out there all the time—saying, “Look, if you don’t answer the journalist who calls you, someone else who doesn’t know what you know and doesn’t know it as well, is going to—”

Q: Right.

Rosenfield: And that transformed everybody’s thinking. And Elizabeth herself—this is my sort of poster-scholar in the era of public scholarship—she has a fellowship at, I think, the [U.S.] Institute of Peace. I’m not sure. I don’t remember what institution. But she was putting her children into Washington’s public schools and she was trying to be very friendly and talk with the mothers. And they were saying, “What do you do?” And she started telling them what she did. She said, “I do research on the Ottoman Empire in Syria.” Now this was before Syria was an issue, even. So they had no—eyes glazed over the moment she said it. “Ottoman? What’s that? Something you put your foot on?” [Laughs] Basically. And she said, “Oh my gosh. I have to figure out how to communicate. If I can’t communicate with my daughter’s friends’ mothers—I’ve got to learn this stuff.” And she became—we had a meeting in Washington of the Women’s Foreign Policy Group that the public affairs people had funded with our women scholars of Islam and Elizabeth is the most incredible public speaker now. She starts off with a little vignette of Lawrence of Arabia that just wins everybody over. I assure you, three years before that she would not have done that. She saw the need for it. We provided some communications training for people to be able to figure out how this—but there is no question, it is a risk area to be in. Vartan, from day one he saw that, 1997. He said, “This is the fastest growing religion in the world. Americans should know something about it.”

It's still a challenge. And it's a challenge even for people who want to know because it's very complicated. And how do you reduce the complication? So in one sense, another way of looking at the risk is, how do you reduce the risk of people spending time that they could be spending doing something else that they know is a good for them, making this a good for them [too]—to be educated about something that is very complicated? And I think that's an area of education that we probably need to look at.

We use our website very well but maybe there's a better way of presenting the deep scholarship that Carnegie continues to fund in many areas, that actually is a communication vehicle to educate Americans who are on the web and have even a separate website that might be used for that. I know many of our grantees are bloggers and we encourage them to do that and tweeting but that doesn't—blogs can convey a lot of deep knowledge but I don't know how much sinks in. So you have to figure out what sinks in.

And why I'm saying this, I know it's risky at many levels. The Carnegie Endowment for Peace just had a very interesting panel discussion on the options in front of us in the Muslim world and Iran in particular. It was a pouring rainy day last week and people made it—it was pretty well attended and it was a public opening, a public gathering. And the questions by people who really, really seemed to pay attention to this field showed they weren't even sure of the boundaries between Iraq and Iran. They weren't sure what was really happening there. They got mixed up on a little bit of the history. And the questions were formulated in such a way—I was very impressed at how the panelists answered them, not missing a beat, no condescension. They were

excellent. Anne-Marie Slaughter, for instance, was just superb. Karim Sadjadpour from Carnegie Endowment. But how could they—here we have spent all this time trying, not just us, but there are a lot of serious journalists out there. And it wasn't as though they were coming at this with a negative. It wasn't in the most extremist sense. They just didn't know.

**Comment [RIS10]:** could not find middle initials

Q: We're coming to the end. But it raises an interesting question here, in terms of the diffusion of knowledge. It's kind of like the old progressive ideology that if you provide the public with the information in a democratic way, they would then make the rational and the best decisions possible. We seem to live in a time where, despite the fact that we have an enormous outpouring of information, we have a profound ignorance and also a profound hostility to even knowing that information, denying it. It's very pessimistic but I feel like at the close of my life, I'm reaching the end of an era or an epoch.

Rosenfield: So this is a wonderful question to end on. It's what I wanted the Scholars program to focus on next, which was the advancement and dissemination of knowledge and understanding with a focus on discernment. We don't have the tools for discerning between information and knowledge. And another former Columbia person, Lisa Anderson, and the SSRC website on transformation, I think, has written a very, very important article on this overabundance of information and the coming age of anarchy and how that's represented in what's going on in the Middle East now. Because there is so much information. Real-time communication overwhelms you. And how do you act? You act in whatever is going to be the path of least resistance, which could be violence, it could be something else. And so I think this is a really, really important issue to tackle. How do you provide—rather than the open Google search, not to close it—but to

**Comment [RIS11]:** could not find middle initial--and unfortunately there are several other Lisa Andersons



say, is there a way to create a search mechanism that enables you to distill what's valuable from the vast amount of information, much of which is just not grounded in knowledge, not grounded in anything? It's somebody talking off the top of their head. Yes, people should be able to air their opinions. But how do you separate opinion from evidence, information from knowledge, and give someone some security about what they're learning—? The medical websites are a key cause of concern but people tend to do a lot of triangulation. But on some of the other more public issues or more policy issues, people might not be so inclined because it's not directly affecting them. But then it affects their interaction with others.

And so I think it's the key question—it's what a foundation dedicated to our mission, as we are, could tackle. It requires improving technology. It requires improving thought process, as to what does this mean? It's a cognitive science question as well. And so you could bring together a number of disciplines to bear in it. But I think it's a key question. Otherwise what Lisa's writing about could absolutely happen, that people will just be so overwhelmed that either they tune out and they say, "Forget it. I'm not even interested in knowing." No matter how much education they have, they might just get tired of all of this. Or they put it to use that's inappropriate. But more positively, it is an area at high risk to do it. It is a perfect issue, a societal problem with a deep, deep root cause that we could get at and figure out what to do. So it is exactly the kind of issue that a foundation like Carnegie Corporation could tackle in its future.

Q: In true Ciceronian form, we've come back to where we began.

[Laughter]

Rosenfield: Yes. I always like to.

Q: Thank you very much.

Rosenfield: Well, thank you. Great questions. I appreciate it. Great.

Q: Okay.

Rosenfield: Thank you.

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