As Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the 1780s,
John Jay confronted many of the issues that would later be addressed by
the treaty of 1794 that bore his name. Despite their signing the
Treaty of Paris of 1783, both the British and Americans continued to breach
its terms in a host of ways. Britain's continued occupation of military
posts on American territory had Jay warning Congress to prepare for war
in 1786 (see
John Jay to Congress, 5/8/1786, Jay ID #4567). Jay was well
aware, too, of demands by their former owners for the return of slaves
taken by the British. For their part, in contravention of the treaty's
terms, American state courts impeded the collection of debts owed the
British and upheld the confiscation of Loyalist estates. Jay himself,
in a report that he prepared for Congress, affirmed that the Americans
had been first to breach the peace treaty, an opinion that he indiscreetly
shared with Sir John Temple, the British consul general in New York. The
failings of the states in these matters contributed powerfully to Jay's
support for a strengthened national government, a government that might,
in addition, be able to negotiate a commercial treaty with Britain, something
that had proved impossible under the Articles of Confederation (see
John Adams to John Jay, 7/19/1785, Jay ID #11846). By 1794
a turbulent international context augmented these residual tensions. Now
at war with France, Britain had by an Order in Council issued on November
6, 1793, widened its attacks on neutral ships to include any trading with
the French West Indies. Widespread depredations followed
over 250 American ships were seized. At much the same time, news arrived
of British incitement of Indians on the Northwest border. President
Washington responded to these threats by urging Congress to take defensive
measures while at the same time sending an envoy to London to explore
the possibility of reaching an accommodation with the British. John
Jay, by that time the Chief Justice, was chosen for the mission (see
George Washington to John Jay, 4/19/1794, Jay ID #4962).
Jay was briefed by Alexander Hamilton to
seek compensation for spoliations of American ships and to clarify
the rules governing British seizure of vessels. He was also
to insist that the British relinquish their posts in the Northwest
and so adhere to the terms of the Treaty of Paris. In return,
the United States would take responsibility for pre-Revolutionary
debts owed to British merchants and others. In addition,
if possible, Jay was to seek limited access for American ships
to the British West Indies (see
Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, 5/6/1794, Jay ID #10765).
Arriving in London in the summer of 1794 (see
John Jay to Edmund Randolph, 6/23/1794, Jay ID #4272),
Jay found it difficult to secure the British ministry's full attention.
War with France, after all, took precedence over negotiations
with the largely impotent United States. Eventually proceeding
through several drafts (see
John Jay to Lord Grenville, 8/6/1794, Jay ID #3991,
Lord
Grenville to John Jay, 8/30/1794, Jay ID #8531, and John
Jay to Edmund Randolph, 9/13/1794, Jay ID #4312), the
treaty that emerged from these discussions was a bit of a mixed
bag, but probably the best America could have hoped for, given
the realities of the situation. Jay made little headway
in attempts to get compensation for slaves taken by the British
during the War of Independence and was unable to secure British
recognition of the neutral rights of American ships. Neither
did he succeed in persuading the British to remove their naval
vessels from the Great Lakes or desist from aiding the Indians
during times of war. Nonetheless, he did achieve the key
objectives outlined by Hamilton. The British were to relinquish
their military posts on the Northwest frontier, mixed commissions
were to resolve the spoliation, pre-Revolutionary debt, and boundary
issues, while vessels under seventy tons would be allowed access
to the markets of the British West Indies for a limited number
of years.
Jay's concessions on the West India question,
as well as agreement to surrender the right of commercial retaliation
for ten years, fueled opposition to the treaty when its terms
were leaked by a Democratic Republican senator and so became known
to the wider public in the summer of 1795. For the incipient
Republican interest, any concessions to the British were intolerable.
Meetings were organized to denounce the treaty, Jay was
burned in effigy, and Republican newspapers railed against the
treaty's perceived surrender to the British. As Jay himself
realized, differences in the way the treaty was received played
a significant role in the development of political parties (see
John Jay to General Henry Lee, 7/11/1795, Jay ID #12870).
Though the opposition was intense, it was also short lived.
By 1796, after the treaty had been ratified, America was
enjoying a buoyant prosperity as a result of its dominance of
the Atlantic carrying trade while European powers continued to
wage war. Moreover, with the removal of the British from
their posts, Americans began to pour into the Old Northwest to
settle rich farm lands. By 1796, then, many Americans had
come to view the Jay Treaty as a significant success.
James Baird
Columbia University
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