10                                James B. Doiiovan

proper use. This is, however, a delicate point in the intelligence
process, since the evaluator must make an expert appraisal and
yet do his level best not to permit personal predilections to distort
the information or the prediction which he will place in the hands
of those who must make the ultimate policy decisions. Improper
evaluation can have catastrophic consequences. What hindsight
has shown to be an unsound intelligence estimate—that the Jap¬
anese after homeland invasion would continue the war ro the last
ditch in Manchuria—undoubtedly led to some of the fateful de¬
cisions made at Yalta, based upon a then felt need to have Russia
enter the Asiatic conflict.

The final step in the intelligence process. General Donovan
taught, comes in dissemination. The best raw intelligence, prop¬
erly evaluated, is quite useless unless placed at the right time in
the hands of those who can use such knowledge in making de¬
cisions. A classic failure of intelligence dissemination occurred on
December 7, 1941, when the most recent information concerning
the imminence of Japanese attack was not received by our mili¬
tary commanders in Hawaii until after the event. It is to prevent
a recurrence of such a disaster that bodies such as the Intelligence
Advisory Committee have been created, seeking to assure by ex¬
pertly advising C.I.A. that there will be a coordinared flow of
strategic intelligence to the proper policy makers within our
government.

In one of my last meetings with General Donovan, shortly
before his death, he said: "Perhaps the greatest weakness we see
in the United States today is that too few are willing to die for
their country and its ideals." This may be the tragic truth. But
the observation is remembered best because it was made by a
man who demonstrated throughout his life that no personal sac¬
rifice was too great if it was made on behalf of his beloved United
States.