BOOK IIL  CHAP. IX.                          107
 

CHAPTER   IX.

ARGUMENT.

This chapter consists of definitions and explanations of several terms
expressive of moral qualities.

1.  Although some men have by nature more courage than others, yet
this quality may be strengthened by precept and practice (§ 1—3).

2.   Wi^dmn, and discretion {(ra}(ppo(Tvpri) cannot be separated; since
every one who knows the right, and acts accordingly, is both wise and
discreet. But as every one does what seems best to him, he who does not
the right, is not only not discreet, but not wise (§ 4).

8. Justice, and every other virtue is wisdom (aocpla) (§ 6).

4.  The opposite of wisdom is insanity {jiapioi); but ignorance is not
insanity, yet self-ignorance is next akin to it. Great aberration of under¬
standing is commonly called insanity, but Socrates understood by it the
mistaking of the good, which has its foundation in want of self-know¬
ledge (§ 6, 'J).

5.  Envy is the pain or sorrow felt at the prosperity of friends. It is
the companion of fools and not of wise men (§ 8).

6.  Idleness is not entire inactivity, for all do something, but a vacuity
of all useful employment (§ 9).

Y. Those who bear the sceptre are not necessarily kings and princes,
but only those who have the skill and ability to govern (§ 10—13).

8. The best employment of life is evirpa^ia, good conduct, which is
to be distinguished from evrvxia, good fortune; as irpa^is from tux^
(§ U, 15).
 

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aet yiyvea^at*   bp& ^dp   iv toIs avTols viptots Te Kal
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