

TTT

Interviewee: Barbara D. Finberg

Session #7 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 20, 1997

Finberg: -- Corporation's role during my period, its mission, its role in American philanthropy, I think, could be -- well, I need to tell you what my involvement was, I think, to answer that question well, or at least try. I was primarily engaged in education below the collegiate level, although higher education was a major interest of the foundation. I was concerned with elementary and secondary education, then focused almost exclusively on preschool education before I became a corporate officer.

I worked under three presidents: John Gardner, Alan Pifer, and, most recently, David Hamburg. John's primary emphasis, I think, at least in education, was individual fulfillment. In fact, he used that term in the fiftieth anniversary report as a characteristic of the corporation's program. Under Alan, he was concerned with social justice. I think in both instances and a characterization of all our work in education would be a belief in the individual and in the provision of opportunities for the individual to fulfill his or her own potential so that you would do, and have the opportunity to do, as much as you could, to go as far as you could, that your opportunities would not be closed off by economic or social or other barriers that might affect you.

We were also established for the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding, and just before I came to the corporation, we began to put much more emphasis on trying to help the public understand what we were doing and why we were

doing it, what kinds of grants were we making, why we were making them, and what happened as a result of those grants so that the role of a foundation in American life would be better understood, wouldn't be such a mystery and an unknown, particularly to those people outside of academia, because we tended to work primarily with colleges and universities and educational systems and research institutions to some extent.

Q: What have your various roles been with Carnegie Corporation?

Finberg: I began as a freelance writer and editor in very late 1959, wrote press releases, found myself taking on some writing for the annual report about 1962 or '63, when the then-editor and writer -- principal editor and writer -- wanted to move back to the West Coast whence she came, and John Gardner, then president, agreed she could do that if she would still write the Quarterly, but she wouldn't do the annual report. So I gradually took on more and more responsibility for publications.

Then in early, very early, 1965, John asked if I would like to move into work on programs. I had thought that a woman without a Ph.D. would not have that opportunity, since all of the program officers were men and, with two exceptions, all had doctoral degrees. But I was offered that opportunity and I seized it, because I really did want to work in program. I did not want to continue in the publications side. I did that from, well, basically from February of '65, when I started direct program work, until 1980, I was asked to assume the vice presidency for programs and then, in 1988, became executive vice president.

The period between 1965 and '66, I was still doing publications and beginning to get in the field of grant making or review of proposals and grant recommendations. And, again, in

1980, I was trying to do both the job of the vice president and the program officer. It wasn't possible in either case, but I think each of them had thought it might be, and we learned from experience. My grant making went from a concern with elementary and secondary education, and particularly integration of education, gradually to a focus on early childhood education, preschool education and child development, parent education, parent support around young children. That was, in large part, because we decided that we should do more in elementary and secondary education and that a concern with the education of the disadvantaged, primarily minorities, and early on we focused primarily on African Americans and Hispanic Americans, but that that should be a part of all of our programs and not segregated out as a separate program area, and that has continued to this day. We now look more at Asian Americans and at Native Americans, which I got us into early on.

I think that's the basic outline. I wound up, really, as the chief operating officer, the number-two in the organization, very much concerned with the policies and administrative nature of our organization as well, I suppose in part because I was always looking at that side of it and saying, "We could do this better," or, "Why don't we try this," and wanting to bring, particularly as we grew over the last fifteen years in the value of our assets, the number of grants, the amount that we were spending in grant-making. We had more staff, and we had to have some coherent administrative policies and management organizations, and I think we achieved that.

Q: Let's step back just a moment. John Gardner tapped you for something very special and very new, the program in early child development and education. I'd like to hear some more about that early programmatic work of yours up to and including "Sesame Street."

Finberg: That's a lot.

Q: I know.

Finberg: Let me see. You know, of course, that when he asked me to take on early childhood education, I looked at him and said, "John, I didn't study psychology, which is where most of the work is being done. I didn't study education. I've never been a teacher. I don't have children. I don't know this field at all." And he said, "You'll learn," and I did.

What I did first was basically a lot of reading of the few grants that we had made and what literature there was available in the field and try to get familiar with it, and as I began to be a little more comfortable, I had the opportunity through a conference to meet and talk with some of the people in early childhood, and that then gave me the confidence to go make site visits to programs that were in operation, either research programs on early learning, beginning with infants, or demonstration projects, experimental programs in early childhood education, and training of teachers in some of the newer techniques and methods of early childhood education.

The more I worked in that area, the more I realized, and particularly after Head Start came into being in 1965, that we had to look at what was happening with the mothers of the children as well, because more and more mothers were going into the workforce, and they had to be concerned about what was happening to their children. You know, if they were going to a Head Start program that was a half-day program, that wasn't very satisfactory for a mother who was away all day at a job. We had to have programs that were all-day programs or where a Head Start and a child-care program were combined. We needed to be

concerned with the family support for the child and, concomitantly, the support for the mother in being able to do her job, since it was mostly mothers who were responsible for their children. So, we moved more and more into looking at programs for families, particularly for mothers, and education of parents about how children learn and how to look at their behavior and how to think about it, what child development was all about.

Then we also began to look at what happens between the early education and the elementary school. I remember very well supporting a demonstration project in a somewhat rural area of Illinois, where a woman who'd done a lot of research on early childhood education was trying, with the children in that community -- her name was Dolores Durkin -- to see what would happen if you gave children the opportunity to begin to learn to read and write in the preschool program and then what would happen when they entered elementary school. She made a particular effort to help the first-grade teachers in the school know what the experiences of the children were that were going to come into their first grades, and even to provide information about how much they could read, how well they wrote, if they could -- script or printing or whatever, and then she got to watch what happened when they entered first grade.

The first thing the teachers did was give them a test to see what their pre-reading skills were, ignoring the fact that these children could already read, and they weren't unusually bright children, they were the normal range of children from average to a little below and a little above average, but the teachers just had no concept of children learning before they got to school what they were going to be taught in the first grade. That was later born out

in a study that Lauren Resnick did at the University of Pittsburgh, where they were developing a model first-grade curriculum, and they decided to test the children when they arrived in first grade and see what they knew, and they discovered the children knew everything they were going to teach them that year. So, all these things made the field particularly interesting and challenging.

In the late 1960s, maybe 1970, Alan Pifer, who was then president, became very keenly aware that many of the families in the suburbs, Connecticut suburbs, where he was living with his family, were corporate families that were moved in and out somewhat at will. They were transferred from this area, the metropolitan New York area, to a totally different area, sometimes overseas. They were brought there from overseas or other parts of the United States, but the children didn't have a stable community in which they were growing up, and he began to worry very much about what was happening to them. He also saw fathers and sometimes mothers commuting into New York or being away from home almost all day, and he wondered what that was doing to the children. There were some latchkey children who were coming home after school and there was nobody at home and they had to stay home and be careful, but nobody to talk to, nobody to do things with them, and they were forbidden from going to play with their playmates elsewhere in town because the parents wanted to know that they were home safe.

So he decided that we should have what became a Carnegie Council on Children, looking at what the place was of children in American society, what I referred to as minus nine to plus nine, from conception, really, until they were about nine years of age. We took a couple of years to get into doing that, because when we first thought about it, when Alan first had the idea, the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families in the Department

of -- I think it was still Health, Education and Welfare at that time, which was the old Head Start transplanted from the Office of Economic Opportunity into HEW and the Children's Bureau of HEW, had decided that it should do almost the same thing, and it invited a panel of persons from economics, psychology, education, sociology, psychology, to take a look at what was happening with America's young children. This was under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences.

I watched what was happening with that, at their invitation, and saw the difficulties they were having in coming to grips with the issue, in part because it wasn't a well-defined issue, it was a very broad, somewhat amorphous subject, and decided finally that maybe we could do as well or better, but at least the question was still hanging there and that it would be a useful thing for us to do. Alan was still very interested in it.

So, we did set up a Carnegie Council on Children in 1972 under the direction and chairmanship of Kenneth Keniston, who was a psychologist at Yale, who looked primarily at adolescents up until that time. Earlier in 1972, we had asked him if he thought this was a good idea and if he would be willing to take a look at the feasibility of having a commission, explore that with his colleagues and others, and come back to us and tell us what he thought. He did come back to us. He said he thought it was a very good idea. He had run some faculty seminars at Yale and talked with others in the field away from Yale, and was very strongly in favor of it.

The staff and trustees agreed that we should go ahead with it. Essentially, we administered the funds ourselves, although the offices and the project was run out of Yale most of the time because that's where Ken was and that was the easiest place to do it. He

hired staff there, which I may have mentioned to you included one Hillary Rodham at that time and some others.

The Carnegie Council on Children made its report in 1977, its principal report, called All Our Children: The American Family Under Pressure, I think was the title of it. I'm cleaning out my files now, as you know, to move out of Carnegie Corporation, and just yesterday I came across a memorandum about the number of copies of that and the other major publications from the Council on Children that had been sold maybe three years after the council ended its work. I was really surprised to see it was 53,000 copies of "All Our Children" in hardback and paperback, many more than I would have thought, and when you think about the normal sales of not popular books, because I wouldn't characterize it as that -- it was a trade book, but I wouldn't characterize it as a popular book -- that's a very high number of sales, and that wasn't the end. I don't know what the end was, but it wasn't the end.

There were several other publications out of that project, out of the council, two other council reports. Now having said that, one was by Rick DeLone called Small Futures. Now I've forgotten the other one. They were less popular, understandably. But there was a book about child care and one about handicapped that came out of the project as well, and one about the disadvantaged, written by John Ogbu, who was a very interesting Nigerian psychologist who had come to this country for his graduate work and remained here to do research and writing and teaching at the University of California at Berkeley.

We tried to build upon a report of the council. We couldn't do all of the things that it suggested. The council did not deal with early education, for which it was criticized,



because Ken and the members of the council felt that the corporation was already focused on early education, that we had supported research and experimental programs and demonstration programs, teacher-training programs, in that area, that it would be more important to focus on other aspects of young children, their health, their social setting, and their economic setting and their family support, societal support of the family, community support. So, those were the things that were focused on.

A major recommendation, I think, of the council was that children needed a stable and adequate income in order to develop well so that they wouldn't have problems of homelessness or hunger, that poverty also brought feelings of low self-esteem, and even if you try to hide that from children, that they can very well intuit what their parents are going through, and, therefore, that an income and jobs policy was very important for American society if we wanted adequately to support and help our children develop. A lot of people understood that, but a lot did not, too, or criticized it. They didn't see that that was the appropriate thing for a council on children to be talking about.

We also made recommendations about health care for children. We looked at the question of child care and of mothers working, families working, and made some recommendations about how parents might be better supported in their need to support their families, recognizing that more and more mothers were going to work, and whether you agreed or not that mothers should go to work when they had small children, they were, and you had to deal with the reality, so that we looked at ways that we could use small amounts of money from the grant-making process to try to further some of those objectives. We couldn't do anything about income distribution or income programs beyond saying that something more needs to be done.

We could look at new ways of scheduling work, flextime, part time, shared jobs, other things that would help usually mothers, although fathers could do the same things, and supported efforts in that direction. We also looked at child care and ways to improve the quality of child care in day-care centers and in day-care homes so that more parents could go to work feeling that their children were being adequately cared for and not having to worry about that during the day that they were trying to earn an income to support their families.

After 1977, when the final report, when "All Our Children" was published, we were working on those aspects of the program, and then, in 1980, I took on the job of vice president for program as well. I'm trying to think whether we supported any major programs after that. "New Directions." I think not.

But now let me come back to "Sesame Street," because that overlaps this period. In 1966, I think in the fall of 1966, Lloyd Morrisett, the then-vice president of Carnegie Corporation, was having dinner with Joan Ganz Cooney and her husband and another couple, also from what we then called educational television -- yes, we still called it educational television, not yet public television -- director of programming for WNET, Lewis Friedman and his wife, Joan's assistant, Anne Bement, and Lloyd and his wife. They fell into conversation about the problems of financing educational television and about Lloyd's concern about young children's learning.

The question came up, could television be used to teach young children? Joan, who was a producer at then -- I guess it was WNET, the New York station, New York-New Jersey station, believed that it could. She had a background in education before she went into

television. And Lloyd, who was a psychologist and had looked at research on learning, thought that it could, so they decided that perhaps we ought to explore that question. Joan was willing to take a leave from WNET in order to study the feasibility of the idea. We supported her in doing that; that is, we provided the funds for her to do that, and she spent the summer and a little more talking to a lot of people -- educators, psychologists, television people, and persons who had programs or who were engaged in the education of children and in the entertainment of children, either on television or in other ways, to see whether they thought it was feasible, number one, to use television as an educational device that would appeal to children.

So, they had to want to watch it. You couldn't just say, "Here's a good program for children," and sit them down and expect them to watch unless it was entertaining and caught their imagination, because we were going to try to aim it at the three- to four-year-old, and particularly at disadvantaged children who didn't have the opportunities for a good preschool program and maybe a private kindergarten program before they got to public school, and whose parents, perhaps, didn't have a college education and didn't have as many books in the home as others did.

Joan, on the basis of all of her conversations, decided that it was, indeed, feasible and wrote a report to that effect and had talked with persons like -- I want to say Jim Hendrix. Is that correct? The designer of the Muppets.

Q: Jim Henson.

Finberg: Henson. Thank you very much. I knew that that wasn't -- it was Jim Henson and

others who had done programs that she thought would be effective. She recommended that we try it, and we said okay, but we did a couple of other things. We knew that there were a lot of persons who were very opposed to children watching television of any kind -- many of them were educators, some of them were psychologists, some of them were parents -- that we would have to win over some of those people if they weren't going to mount vigorous opposition to the notion of a television program for young children that would encourage them to watch television rather than encourage them to go out and play or do something else, even if it was only an hour a day, that we would need to have a very high-quality program if it was to have credibility.

We had an interest in trying to change or introduce to network television, which was then the primary source of television programming for many watchers, and particularly for disadvantaged families. We thought that if we could persuade through example, or maybe even through supporting the development of a program, networks to take on a good program that would reduce in some way the amount of young children's television programs on networks that were violent in some ways, particularly cartoons, that were supported by advertisers who were then using them, at least advertising around the program and increasingly using the programs to promote their products, which nobody liked, nobody even thought young children liked.

We became convinced that networks weren't going to take on the program, in part through talking to directors of children's programming at NBC, CBS, and ABC, but that they would support the notion of something like that and be helpful in ways if they could be for public television. Joan and a young woman friend of hers who was a writer and knew something

about television and film, Linda Gottlieb, put together a very good proposal for a program, what it would be like, how it could be done, and for the research that might be done along with it, both to find out what kinds of programs children would watch through research, through, for example, having options for children, one watching a program and the other going out to play, one watching one kind of program versus on a monitor watching another kind of program, which program held their attention or attracted them, which did they turn away from.

By the end of 1967, they were ready to launch their program. In early 1968, Joan decided to have a contest to decide what the name of the program would be, because it didn't have a name when we started out. We wound up with "Sesame Street," which had a lot of appeal, it turned out. It was launched in January, I think, or early February of 1968, and it was launched with promotion and with some materials to provide for parents and for teachers in Head Start classrooms or preschool programs or child-care centers to, if the children watched, to try to encourage the parents and teachers to watch with them and help them learn how they could use the program to help the children learn. It had a focus on being entertaining, but at the same time helping children learn vocabulary, learn letters, learn numbers, learn social relationships.

As we have talked earlier, there was perhaps insufficient attention early to integration of minorities in the program, although we certainly had gender integration, men and women, we had Muppets as Jim Henson had provided, and other characters. We had one African American, I think, at the beginning of the program, but it was a stay-at-home mother, for which we were criticized; that wasn't realistic. But we didn't have enough focus on the very groups that we were hoping in part to attract: children of minority groups who were

disadvantaged. So that was one thing that we had to correct along the way -- I say "we" -- that "Sesame Street" had to correct.

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Session #8 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 20, 1997

Q: I want to ask you what difference you think "Sesame Street" made.

Finberg: What difference did "Sesame Street" make? I think it made a lot of difference. We had evidence -- I think there is still evidence -- that large numbers of young children watched it and watch it today, not just children three and four years of age, which was our target group, but we've heard of infants watching it standing up in their cribs, and older children watching it. We've even heard of adults watching it, particularly adults who were learning English. But it did make a dramatic change, apparently, in what some children knew when they entered school. We learned from preschool teachers, kindergarten teachers, and first-grade teachers that children came to school who otherwise might not have been expected to have the vocabulary or the knowledge of the alphabet or even of numbers that they brought with them, so that I think we did make a difference. I have heard -- I know of less evidence on the social side that we helped children appreciate differences and similarities among children. I can't answer that.

Q: Which programs would you highlight at Carnegie as illustrating its mission over the years?

Finberg: Illustrating the corporation's mission? Over the years that I have been at Carnegie Corporation, I think some of the programs that would highlight that period and

illustrate the mission of the foundation would be "Sesame Street," which we have been talking about. More recently, in education, our effort to improve the quality of middle-school education, an effort that grew out of the Carnegie Council for Adolescent Development, the Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, a report called "Turning Points" that was aimed at synthesizing the evidence that we have about education in roughly grades six through nine, and recommendations that would improve the quality of the education based on what we know from research and study, observation of children of that age and grade level. We know that children learn differently at that age and that you need to have a different program from that either in the elementary school or the high school, but teachers had not been trained and knew nothing about the research on adolescent development, so that we have been trying to build that into programs for children at that age to improve the quality of the curriculum, to provide and improve the quality of health care the children need and often do not get at that age, to relate the school to the community and use the community resources more effectively, and provide opportunities for children to do community service.

In a totally different arena, one of the programs that we supported that made a huge difference, I believe, was a study of poverty among blacks in South Africa, or Southern Africa. This was begun in the very early 1980s. By the time that Nelson Mandela was released from jail, in 1990, and F.W. de Klerk, then head of state in South Africa, decided that apartheid had to be abandoned and the society had to be integrated, we had not only issued our report, but he [de Klerk] even, obviously, knew what it had said. We had presented it to him, first of all. Secondly, in his statements in March of 1990 about what South Africa should do to improve the society there, he was using the same language and the same recommendations that we had made in the report. So, we were fortunate in that



that was the right time, perhaps, good timing.

There was a study done with the participation of blacks, whites, coloreds in South Africa so that it was an integrated study, one might say, of the problems of blacks in South Africa. Curiously, it built on, in a way, a report that the foundation had supported in 1929 and '30 of the situation of poor whites in South Africa who were then the Afrikaners, and the chairman of that study said that in fifty years Carnegie Corporation would need to support a study of poverty among blacks in South Africa. And fifty years later, we did.

Let's see what other things I can think of quickly. Certainly, the Commission on Educational Television was a major factor in what has happened in public television today. The commission, which was appointed in 1965, I believe, and reported in about January of 1967, recommended, first of all, that the term "educational television" be changed to "public television," secondly, that something like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting be established, and it was, and that government put some money into public television. They also recommended that there be an excise tax on television sets, which there had been until 1965, for about fifteen years, to help support public television, but until that time, public broadcasting was not well supported. In fact, it was really struggling on both radio and television, and the commission pointed out that it was a major factor in the life of people in the United States and that to the extent it reflected the individual communities, as well as national broadcasting, it could be a major force in education and providing information, news, culture, and that it needed to be far better supported than it was. The corporation was established, and we helped with an initial grant of a million dollars.

I think before my time, the study that Gunnar Myrdal did, the situation of the American

Negro, called *An American Dilemma*, was a major report that lay fallow for about ten years from its publication in 1944 until the Brown vs. Board of Education decision in 1954, but meanwhile, an awful lot of people read it, knew about it, and agreed with its results. The integration of the Army occurred shortly after World War II, and we believe there was an effect, a cause-and-effect relationship there.

What other things can I think of quickly that would illuminate? Those are some major things.

Q: Let me ask you this. To the best of your knowledge or your informed speculation, what have some of the criticisms been of Carnegie's activities?

Finberg: There, of course, have been criticisms of Carnegie's activities. I mentioned some in connection with "Sesame Street," specific ones. In general, we are criticized today by people who think we are left-leaning and that we are too much concerned with public policy and trying too much to shape or affect public policy, rather than sticking to helping communities and helping supporting research and demonstrations in the arts and other good things.

I'm sure there have been criticisms of our interest in opportunities for citizen participation, beginning with voter registration and education, thinking that that's not the role of a foundation, that a foundation shouldn't meddle in what is basically politics, although we've been very careful and do not meddle in politics. We simply think that, in terms of John Gardner's concern about individual fulfillment, every American citizen ought to have the opportunity to exercise his or her right to vote and be encouraged to take advantage of

that, that it's a responsibility as well as a right. And when, in the South and in other places, poor people and minority groups were, and are still, in some places, discouraged from registering and voting, that it wasn't inappropriate for a foundation to help them learn that they have the right to do that.

Similarly, in the redistricting following the decennial census, that minorities ought to know about the decision-making process in deciding how congressional districts and other district lines are drawn so that they can participate in that decision.

Today, the foundation is very much concerned with campaign finance reform, not that we have any answers for it; no one does. But we hope that maybe through some support of research, experimentation with ideas or developing ideas and trying them out to see what they might produce, not in fact, but in idea, that we might have some effect on what many people in this country believe is a serious problem, but nobody yet knows how to deal with in a way that offers freedom of expression and full opportunity for everybody at the same time to exercise the right to run for election as well as the right to vote.

Q: How would you compare Carnegie Corporation's role and mission to that of other comparable American foundations?

Finberg: It's hard, in a way, when you've been involved in only one foundation to compare its role and activities with other foundations. You know to some extent what other foundations that operate in the same fields in which you are operating are doing and what they see as their role or mission in those fields. Broadly speaking, our focus has been primarily on education, although not exclusively, throughout our history. We have had an

interest in some aspect of international affairs and working in the overseas territories of the British Commonwealth. Certainly from the late 1920s onward, Mr. [Andrew] Carnegie set us up to operate both in the United States and the overseas territories of the British Commonwealth.

Many other foundations, certainly take Rockefeller and Ford as two large and larger foundations, they can operate anywhere in the world, and do. As a relatively smaller foundation, we have felt that we should concentrate our funds -- not to say that the others don't, but that with smaller resources we can concentrate in fewer fields. We are less of an operating foundation than Rockefeller has been from time to time. For example, Rockefeller had its own missions in medicine and health, particularly in tropical countries, focusing on malaria, for example. We have been less operating, although the task forces and commissions and councils we've had in the studies like Gunnar Myrdal's study have been more foundation-run than representing grants to other organizations.

We characterize ourselves as a general-purpose foundation but with a focus on education and, as our new president [Vartan Gregorian] puts it, international peace. Under David Hamburg, the focus, on the international side, has been on international security and arms-control, characterized variously as Avoiding Nuclear War, Preventing Deadly Conflict.

Other foundations have had that same purpose.

We have never focused on the community in which we live to the extent that, say, the Pew Foundation has or the MacArthur Foundation is now doing in Philadelphia and Chicago. We don't have the same breadth of outreach that the Ford Foundation does, which has much more money and offices around the world. We've never had offices anywhere except

temporarily in Washington for the last few years.

I think all the large major foundations see themselves in some way or other as focused on improving the quality of life, enabling mankind to live better, more peacefully, still, with stimulation, with education, with hope and an interest in the future, a belief in the future, but we come at it in somewhat different ways, but it's more a programmatic focus than, perhaps, even in a mission. MacArthur Foundation used the term "a catalyst for change" at one point to characterize its work. I don't think we would have characterized our work in quite that way, although in many ways that's what we try to do. We try to provide the research base and the information, and, to some extent, ideas about the application of knowledge that can improve the quality of life for Americans and others.

Q: How would you characterize Carnegie's relationship with its grantees?

Finberg: On the whole, I think Carnegie Corporation's relationship with its grantees has been a good one. We try to investigate quite thoroughly the capabilities of a potential grantee before we make a grant, that is, the quality of the idea and of the plan for implementation, whether it be research or something else; the abilities of the proposers to carry out the project; the institution's support for the project or the institution itself if we're supporting an institution; the validity of the idea; the views that others in the field have of the quality of the idea and the quality of the people who propose to do it. So that when we make a grant, we are comfortable in recommending it as something that is possible and feasible. It doesn't mean it will always succeed.

And then we try to keep our hands off, to stand back and allow the grantee to conduct the

project or do his or her work in the way that they have proposed. That doesn't mean that we might not have suggestions along the way, even in the proposal stage. We try not to shape the proposal or get the applicant to shape a proposal in the way that we think it should be done.

We would rather hear from the proposer, the applicant, what he or she or they think should be done and how it should be done; if we can offer ideas, suggestions, the advice of others through our review process that are helpful to them and they're willing to take those ideas, that's fine, if it will help them through the project. And we might even do the same thing along the way, because we do try to keep in touch with the grantee once we've made a grant, to follow the progress, to learn what we can, and to share the information and ideas as we go along. Sometimes we know more about what's happening in a field because we are in touch with the people who are doing the seminal work or advancing the field in some way before they had published or made known the results of their work so that you can tell others in the field who's doing what, although they're pretty good about finding that out, too.

I think, on the whole, we have a good relationship. The other side of that coin is what happens to the people you don't make grants to, who ask for funds. There, I think, all foundations have something of a problem, in that we don't all respond to proposals, sometimes, as quickly as we should. We think it's very hard to say no, and it is when you have a good idea and you just don't have the funds to support it, or when you get a bad idea and you don't think you should do it at all. But the important thing is to say no and say no quickly, because then the applicant can go somewhere else and try to get funds for it.

Q: I wonder if you would speculate on what some of the criticisms of your grantees might be. I understand this is pure speculation, because you probably don't hear much criticism from your grantees. Someone like Marian Wright Edelman, for example.

Finberg: A grantee or would-be grantee is very unlikely to tell you what your problems are to your face. Sometimes grantees will feel that we have cut the budget too much or that we should be more generous in providing support when we've said we can only fund a half of it or a third of it, or that we will contribute toward it but we simply don't have the resources to the whole thing. And it's very hard for them, from their perspective, to understand why we're doing X and not helping them more.

I don't think there are any grantees who would say that we meddle too much, because I don't think we do that. Some might say that we don't keep close enough track about what is happening. Marian Wright Edelman, I think, would say that we should give a lot more to what Children's Defense Fund is doing, but we have supported her from the very beginning. We've been very generous with Marian Wright Edelman in lots of ways.

I'm sure there's some other ways that I could answer that question, but they don't come to my mind right this minute.

Q: Fair enough. How would you characterize Carnegie's leadership in the area of gender? I'm thinking specifically about your own growth and development professionally at Carnegie, your position as executive vice president. Has Carnegie been a leader in helping women rise through the professional ranks in the foundation field?

Finberg: Whether Carnegie has been a leader in helping women rise through the professional ranks in the foundation world, I'm not sure I would say we have been a leader. We haven't been behind, but I think we're about at the same level. Let me give you some evidence for that. We and Rockefeller Foundation had women secretaries of the corporation, that is the secretary of the foundation -- capital S -- in both instances was a woman at about the same time, and that was the highest-ranking person in those foundations and probably in any foundations at that time. This is in the fifties, sixties. We had an associate secretary and we had others in the professional ranks, but not as principal grant-makers, not as program officers. The associate secretary at Carnegie Corporation, who was a woman, did become the principal program officer for our grant-making in health education, medical education, in the 1970s, and then moved to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation as a vice president there and then became president of the Commonwealth Fund.

When I became a vice president at Carnegie Corporation, I was the highest ranking woman, and that was the first time a woman had been moved to that level, and as the number-two there, I still was the highest ranking woman and officer there. Other foundations, as you know, many other foundations larger than we are now have woman presidents: Ford Foundation, Pew Foundation, MacArthur Foundation. So I don't think -- we don't yet have a woman president, and I would be surprised if there were women on the short list or given really serious consideration at Carnegie. I don't know for a fact, but I just don't think it's probable.

On the other hand, even going back to John Gardner, he felt that women should be given the same professional opportunities, and it was under him that Florence Anderson, or



really just before him, became secretary. John was interested in providing opportunities to work part time and flex time so that women could assume roles and still take care of their children. We always still thought of women in that role. But, in part, because the foundation tended to hire program officers who had a doctoral degree, and fewer women than men in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s had doctoral degrees, it might have been more natural for us to hire men rather than women.

Under Alan Pifer and under David Hamburg as president, I think both of them felt very strongly that they were very equal in their treatment of men and women and that they made no discrimination and had none in their own minds. Nevertheless, I think they still thought of men, in many ways, as being the principal persons likely to be in the principal roles. It came naturally to them, and they weren't even aware of their own biases. I think in some ways Alan certainly tried to work against that bias, but I think it was still there in some ways.

Q: What was it like being number-two at Carnegie? How did you help David Hamburg in his role as president?

Finberg: I enjoyed being vice president under David Hamburg. I enjoyed being vice president to Alan Pifer, too, but that was for a very short period of time, and he clearly appointed me as a vice president when he had in mind a succession pattern which didn't quite work out. But in 1982, when David Hamburg was selected as the incoming president of the foundation, I felt it would be helpful to him and important to him to have more understanding than he did of the corporation, how it worked, what its program was, how we made decisions, what kinds of things we were engaged in, how we saw dissemination as

a part of our program, and who the people were who were working in the foundation. So, I made it a point to try to help him learn those things, talked with him, prepared memoranda for him, and tried to be as helpful as I could. I think he appreciated that.

David is a very positive person, and he will never criticize unless he is very concerned about something, and even then he will try to put criticism in a positive manner. You can be feeling very discouraged or very upset about something, and go talk to him about it and leave feeling good, even if he's told you what's wrong with a project. But David was very considerate of my role. I never felt that he was unavailable to me if there was something that I thought was important to talk to him about. He was always available. He tried to share with me what his goals, his interests, his concerns, his missions were, and to consult with me about what he was planning to do and how he was planning to do it, for the most part, and take my thinking into consideration. He didn't necessarily always follow it, but he shouldn't necessarily. He had his own judgment. It was very good judgment.

I learned a lot from David about administration, about management, about consulting with one's peers and others, about the way to make an organization run smoothly, and increasingly over the period of time that I worked with him, he left the management of the organization in my hands, and that freed him to do more on the programmatic side, which is where his real interest was. He's very concerned with ideas, with research, with the application of information and ideas and research, and he pursued that particularly in the two fields of greatest interest to him, children and youth on the one hand, and international peace, or international security and arms control on the other hand.

[END OF SESSION]

TTT

Interviewee: Barbara Finberg

Session #9 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 20, 1997

Finberg: -- to the role of a woman in the foundation, particularly under Alan Pifer and under David Hamburg. It's not totally the role of a woman, but the role of staff vis-à-vis the president, and the two men operated in very different ways, but I think it's of interest to note, Alan very much wanted to not only allow, but encourage professional staff development throughout his career at the foundation. He was the product of development in the foundation: he came up from a program officer to the president. Whenever he had someone coming in from the outside who particularly wanted to see him, an organizational head or university president, he would nearly always invite a staff member -- whoever seemed appropriate based on your field of activity -- to join him in the discussion, and very often would say in the course of the discussion, "Well, I find that very interesting, but let's hear what Barbara or Fritz [Mosher] or someone else has to say about it, because they're the ones really working in the field. They know better than I do, even, what's going on." If the conversation were to lead to a proposal of some sort, he would say, "Well, again, I'm very interested in this, but Barbara or Fritz or Alden is the one who's going to handle that, so that's who you should be in touch with."

When it came to meetings outside the foundation, he would encourage us to go, to participate, to make speeches, to write papers, to join him sometimes in meetings, but he always wanted the staff to have the maximum opportunity for development and for exposure, so that you could be seen to the outside world and to the grantee world or the

applicant world as somebody who was knowledgeable, experienced, and able, because that reflected well on the foundation.

David much more liked to control what was happening and the way that the foundation was seen, in part, I'm sure, because he wanted to get into some areas that were somewhat more controversial. For example, studies of the Strategic Defense Initiative efforts. If we were to support studies that resulted in reports and recommendations that the Strategic Defense Initiative was not feasible and should not be supported, or at least the evidence led in that direction, that was going to be highly controversial. It would be against the President's policies at that time, that is, the U.S. President's policies, and he felt that it was very important that what we were doing be seen as something that was research- and knowledge-based and totally apolitical, but rather coming at the issue from a question of knowledge and understanding and making recommendations or supporting studies that were neutral and not in any way political, although, of course, it's a political subject.

But that meant also that he felt it was important for him to be the spokesperson for the foundation, and the result of that was that there wasn't the same emphasis, at least consciously, on staff development, and I took that on as a concern of mine for that reason, while I was the vice president under him, because I felt it very important that -- we had very able staff and very good staff, and I wanted them to have that chance to develop, to grow professionally, and to be seen as able, both internally and externally. So that we had to work at that with him, and, increasingly, toward the end of his administration, he provided more opportunities, particularly for one or two people, to participate in activities in the White House, for example, or with members of Congress or at other meetings or conferences, and he would increasingly invite them into his office when he was talking with

somebody who was the head of an organization or an important person in one of those fields who had asked to see him.

But it did mean a total difference in style, and, I think, probably led the trustees to look differently at staff members when it came time to select a successor to Alan and a successor to David. At the time that they were selecting a successor to Alan, they looked very carefully, I believe, at internal candidates, at least one and perhaps two, or more than two. When it came time for a successor to David Hamburg, I think there was a cursory look at one person inside, but not really serious consideration of that person. They were really looking to clone David Hamburg, because he was such a successful president in their eyes, and he had achieved so much visibility and so much importance on the national scene that they tended to want someone like he was in 1997 rather than as he was when he came to the foundation in 1983.

Q: What else would you single out that is a highlight, a strong feature of that transition from the Pifer presidency to the Hamburg presidency?

Finberg: The major transition factor, I think, between the Pifer administration and Hamburg administration had to do with the way that we functioned. David chose to build on the programs that the foundation already had in place in education up to age fifteen, approximately, and our concern about international affairs, and to continue our program particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, in the Commonwealth countries, but to cease entirely activity in higher education and to focus all our education and child development activities, health and education and child development, on the zero to fifteen years. As it happened, luckily, the value of our assets grew enormously between 1983 and 1997. We were down to

about 199 million in assets in 1973, and they had climbed back up to about 300 million, I think, in 1982, maybe not even that yet. I know that our grants budget that year was a little under 13 million dollars. By 1996, our grants budget was 59 million dollars, and the value of our assets, at least before the current volatility in the stock market, was up to 1.5 billion. So that the growth in assets and thereby the growth in the amount of money that we had for grants and the number of grants that we made meant that we had to operate in a different way.

David very quickly decided that he wanted to have working groups in each of the areas that we were working on, so that we set up five working groups, which was like five mini-foundations in some sense. Prior to David's coming, in all of my experience at the foundation, and I think it was this way from the 1940s through 1982, every program officer had a field of specialization or a field in which he or she was handling grant-making -- mostly he -- and we would have weekly staff meetings at which all of the program staff would discuss the recommendations of each of the program officers that had been made at that time for grants, so that every proposal that was being recommended for a grant was competing against every other proposal.

Once we had the five working groups, each of them had its own budget, and that competition occurred within the program group, but not across program groups. It made a significant difference in the way that the staff worked and, in some ways, the kind, not necessarily the quality, of consideration that was given to a proposal when you had somebody focused on the Commonwealth, somebody who focused on integration of education at the elementary level, somebody who was focusing on state and local government, and somebody focusing on the Commonwealth program, all sitting down to

discuss a proposal to have "Sesame Street." You got a very different discussion from when you had five people sitting around the table, all of whom are focused on the education of children from zero to fifteen and whose background was in that field, discussing the proposals. There wasn't anybody there who would bring a totally different perspective to it. So, it was a major transition, but it was brought about in part by the growth of assets and in part by the way Hamburg preferred to work, as against Pifer.

Recording Technician: This should probably be the last question.

Q: What were the gains and losses?

Finberg: That's a good question to ask, to think about what were the gains and losses. I think one loss to which I've just referred was the wider perspective that was brought by having all of the program officers look at a proposal. The gain was, the obverse of that, was that the persons who were reading and reviewing a proposal and all of the staff work that had gone into it up to the point of recommendation had a little more time to read the proposal and the preparation of the recommendation so that they could apply more considered judgment to it, I think, than under the old system, and the old system would never have worked with as many grants as we had.

A loss was that each program group came to know what it was working on very well, but paid no attention to what the other program groups were working on. So, the person who was working in children and youth really had no idea of what the people in international security and arms control were doing, or what we in special projects were doing about civil rights and civic participation. Maybe they would read the agenda for the board meeting

and pick up the information. I did try to organize staff meetings to tell not just the program officers, but all staff what we were doing in each area, and that worked to some extent, but we did lose the sense, I think, across program, of congeniality. Maybe we lost the sense of competition, which may not have been all bad, across programs, but there were pluses and minuses in both ways, and I think, given the size, the new system was far preferable for what we were trying to do. [Recording interrupted.]

Q: Tell us a little bit about where you grew up, your family, the family's economic circumstances.

Finberg: My background covers -- well, I was born in Pueblo, Colorado, a medium-sized town in eastern Colorado. My family lived there for four years and then moved down into the Arkansas Valley to a tiny town, 500 people, basically to a home that my father's family had had, that they had to take back in the Depression. He left his work with a lumber, building, and supply business -- lumber, coal, and building supply business -- and went to work for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in the U.S. Department of Agriculture for about six years, and then we moved to western Colorado, the other side of the Rockies [Rocky Mountains], where my brother still lives. That became the family home for the rest of my life.

The first four years I can remember, but they're not particularly of interest. The next six years is the period when I began school, living right across the street from the school, which had its advantages. I could run home for lunch if I chose. My family was comfortable, but barely. The Depression very much affected them, psychologically if not



economically. They were very conscious of saving money, both for their children's education and for their old age, so that they counted every penny very carefully. I don't think my brother, younger than I, or I ever had a sense that we were insecure, that we did not know where the next meal or housing was coming from, but we were conscious that we had to be very careful with our money, and a nickel allowance a week was a lot for us.

When we moved to Grand Junction, we lived in an apartment for a year, the only time I lived in an apartment until I was out of college. I didn't even know what apartment living was like, because there weren't really such things in small Colorado towns.

My schooling really began the summer before I entered the first grade, with a summer kindergarten program being run in a town nine miles away from the town where I was living, but through which my father could easily pass and take me there in the morning and bring me home at noon, and that probably added to the knowledge that I had already acquired out of curiosity from my parents. So that when I entered the first grade that fall, it was obvious that I was very bored very quickly, and I was taken to the second grade, which was fun. That got boring, too, and I got into trouble as a consequence, but not too bad.

When we moved to Grand Junction, the town where I later lived and my family still lives, I entered sixth grade, and at the end of sixth grade, was given some tests, and my parents and I were told that I should go to the eighth grade instead of the seventh grade, so I did, but that meant that I was two years younger than most of my colleagues in school. By and large, it worked out fairly well, but I think it had some effect on my social attitudes and my desire for social acceptance. I still remained head of my class, so I was doing very well -- it

was a small class -- but it meant that I couldn't do some of the other things, some of the things that others did, and when I had a date, my parents picked up the young man and took us both where we were going, then came and got us and took us home, embarrassing for me as a young woman.

I wanted to go to Stanford University, which is where my mother had gone and what I had heard about all of my growing-up life, and succeeded in admission, to my astonishment and pleasure, but I hadn't visited the campus until I actually went out to enroll. I hadn't been as far west as California from Colorado. I think my goals in college were to do well, but to do well socially and extracurricularly, as well as academically, and I think I achieved that, perhaps as a cost of doing better academically. I'm sure I could have been Phi Beta Kappa, had I chosen to really concentrate on that. I made a good B average, so I'm not complaining about that, but I also was able to do a lot of extracurricular things that were very influential in my thinking about life later and what I wanted to do and in some of the people I met.

For example, in my senior year we had a mock General Assembly of the United Nations, and through one of the faculty members at Stanford, we were able to get Charles Malik, who was then the representative of Lebanon to the General Assembly, was president of the General Assembly that year, to come to campus to be the Secretary General of our mock UN Assembly. I had already had an interest in the Near East, and meeting and talking with him really stimulated it. That had a lot to do, I know, with my deciding later, when I had the opportunity for graduate school through the Rotary Foundation fellowships, that I want to go to the American University of Beirut. That gave me a wonderful year in Beirut, Lebanon, at AUB [American University of Beirut], an experience that could not be

duplicated now, because the civil war has strongly affected life there, and it is still not nearly as stable and harmonious, although it wasn't totally harmonious, as it was at that time. It was a very different world.

My interest in the Near East continued right into my work in the Department of State for a couple of years, first as an intern before AUB and secondly, for a year and a half after I came back from Beirut, working with Point Four of the technical assistance program [Technical Cooperation Administration]. I think that gives you something of my background.

Q: Where you were young, what did you dream about doing when you grew up?

Finberg: As a young person, I always knew that I wanted a career. That just was sort of a given. I don't know why particularly, because my mother wasn't working professionally outside the home, and not many women did in the thirties. Mother was very active in a variety of ways in the community. She started a day-care center, for example, in this small town. I was interested in government and public service, and at some point or other, I thought that if I stayed in Colorado I might want to run for the state legislature or even governor. I don't know why, and I don't think I had -- I didn't have a political background particularly. My father had worked for a state senator who then became a U.S. senator for a couple of years in his pre-married life, so I had heard him talk about it, and it sounded very glamorous, but I knew nothing of the substance of it. But I always had an interest in government and what public servants did and who were the members of the Cabinet and what was happening in the state legislature and in Congress throughout my pre-collegiate and collegiate days. Indeed, I decided to major in international relations as an

undergraduate at Stanford, and then went into the Department of State for a year as an intern between graduating from Stanford and going to the American University of Beirut. I had no idea, if that internship hadn't come through, what I would do. I knew I didn't want to be a teacher, which all the women in my family were, or almost all were. I hadn't really found any other profession or line of work that I thought was challenging and interesting. A lot of my friends became department store buyers or worked in fashion. I was determined that I was not going to be a secretary when I graduated. It seemed to me that men were being offered more interesting jobs as soon as they graduated from college, and women were being asked if they would like to be secretaries, and I just said no.

For some reason, I never had a particular interest in the for-profit world, and I don't think it was a conscious decision, but why it parsed out that way, I have no idea. It was things in the government world, whether it be state or federal government or international affairs, that held much more interest for me.

Q: Why do you think you wanted to come to Carnegie Corporation?

Finberg: Initially I wanted to come to Carnegie Corporation because I had two friends working there, one with whom I had lived in Washington before I was married and when I was working there, and the other a person with whom I had worked at the Institute of International Education when we both first came to New York, who I then put in touch with my friend at Carnegie Corporation and was employed to work there, a brilliant writer and editor, although she wasn't trained at that; she just was, and had that role at Carnegie Corporation.

When I stopped working at the Institute of International Education, I was looking around at what else I might do, and they asked me if I would like to come do some writing and editing for them, particularly doing précis of manuscripts that had been written under Carnegie Corporation grants, to see whether they were publishable or not, as though I had the ability to make that judgment, and to tell the program officers at the foundation, who didn't have time to read the manuscripts, what the basic theses and arguments were in the manuscripts. I did a few of those, and I actually did summaries of two books that were published as a result of corporation grants for publication, and those worked out very well.

I think they were doing exceedingly interesting things. The grants that they were making were very interesting. The people who worked there were exceedingly interesting. John Gardner was the president at that time. My two friends, Margaret Mahoney and Helen Rowan, I thought had very good minds and were wonderful people. They had wisdom, intelligence, perspective, a sense of humor. And John [Gardner] I very much admired. I had met him initially through Stanford activities. He and I were both Stanford graduates, and he came to a few Stanford alumni events in New York, and that's how I first met him. So it sort of -- one thing led to another.

At one point after I had been doing writing and editing for the foundation for maybe four years, I decided -- I was in my early thirties -- I really should decide what I wanted to do and go out and get a real job, and then I was asked if I would like to be, in fact, a junior program officer. I had assumed that I would not be offered such a position because I was a woman and they did not have any woman program officers at that time, and I did not have a doctoral degree, as did almost all of the program officers, all but two, and they were both working on the Commonwealth Program, which was a little different. So it was an

unexpected offer, and one I looked at when it came, and I've never been sorry. Every time I thought I was getting burned out or stale or bored with what I was doing, a new opportunity came along, so it's been a wonderful experience.

Q: Give me a sense of the day-to-day life at Carnegie.

Finberg: It's hard to characterize the day-to-day life, but I think I can give you an idea of some of the things that I did there, and it's varied a fair amount under different presidents.

There are always a few staff meetings of different groups of staff involved. In the earlier days, under John Gardner and Alan Pifer, we had weekly staff meetings of all of the program and corporate officers to discuss proposals that were to be recommended to the board or that staff were proposing to recommend to the board, and the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the proposals and make sure we all agreed that it was a proposal that we should recommend, the people, the ideas, the budget were of such caliber that we would be willing to stand behind our recommendation. That meant you had to read the docket, which was the proposal and the staff work that had been done in advance, records of interviews, site-visit memoranda, references that had been done on people and the idea, peer reviews of the proposal itself. A lot of your time went into gathering that kind of information, traveling for the site visits, to wherever the proposal was, answering correspondence.

Each program officer probably handled somewhere between five and eight proposals that you would not recommend for a grant, compared to the numbers of grants you would

recommend. The secretary's office would turn down an additional ten to twelve proposals at least, so the ratio, curiously, has always been about twenty to one, the number of proposals that you receive versus the number of grants that you make, that the corporation makes --

Q: You were making proposals to the board at a very early time, too, in your career there. I'm recalling an anecdote about some homework you did behind a grant renewal.

Finberg: Oh, yes. [laughter] That anecdote to which you refer relates to a time when I had been asked to attend the weekly staff meetings, but was not yet responsible for recommending any proposals for grants myself. But in order to play my part in the staff meeting, I had to read the dockets, and when a recommended grant was a renewal of an earlier grant that we had made to continue the project or complete it, whatever it might be, you needed to know something about what the first grant was made for and what the reports about the work under that grant said.

I went to the files to check on one proposed renewal. I found in the records very unsatisfactory reports. Both the institution and the staff members at Carnegie were not very happy with the work that had been done and the progress of the work. So, I simply asked questions in the staff meeting about why did we want to renew this, particularly in light of the previous unfavorable reports. I don't know why, but the proposing staff member hadn't really taken this into consideration and was a little bit caught off guard, but in the end we did not recommend a renewal of that grant. So, that was perhaps my first assertiveness, first act of assertiveness at the foundation. Whether I did it well enough that they thought I could handle proposals I'm not certain, but it didn't keep me

from becoming a program officer.

[END OF SESSION]



TTT

Interviewee: Barbara D. Finberg

Session #10 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 21, 1997

Q: More about the daily life at Carnegie. Was it, and is it, a good place to work? And some examples of why that may be so.

Finberg: Carnegie is a very good place to work, as is evident by the small turnover, relatively speaking, that we have in staff, for a number of reasons. The people who worked there are all intelligent, well educated. They have a common sense of purpose, I think. We certainly strive for that, and I think we have succeeded, but everyone believes that the mission of the foundation is to make grants in a given number of areas, to improve the quality of life or the quality of knowledge, the kind of knowledge that we have about certain ideas and fields, and we're all working toward a common goal. So that there isn't any reason for any sense of turf or ownership of a field or a given set of activities. You're all cooperating together toward common ends, so that whether you're grant-making or support staff or part of the administrative staff, the treasurer's office, the secretary's office, the personnel office, or the mail room, or the dissemination effort, the publications and other activities in dissemination, it's all toward a common goal. And that means that the staff does work very well together. There have, over time, been some problems where someone will feel they're not being treated quite right or they're not getting the same recognition that someone else is. Natural human tendencies.

It's also a place where the focus is on the work, not on keeping to strict rules. We try to

have people there at nine, and our closing time is five o'clock, but we have flex time so that if you work better on a nine-thirty to five-thirty schedule for any good reason, you may work on that schedule, or you can work on an eight-to-four schedule or an eight-to-three-thirty with a half hour for lunch. Some people come at eight and leave at six. We're very reasonable about, and recognize, obligations of family and personal life, so that if you have children and need to do something with your children, take them to the doctor, go to a school play or see the teachers or anything else, that's certainly acceptable. On occasion you can work at home when you know that you really need to be out of the office to be able to concentrate on something and not have interruptions.

The nature of the persons outside that we work with are also stimulating, interesting people, so that adds to the quality of the work: people work very well together. We have high standards, always have had, in the quality of our relationship with each other, the quality of our relationship with people outside the foundation, whoever they may be, and in everything that we do. So, the written work, the oral work, all of it.

Q: Have you formed close friendships at Carnegie yourself?

Finberg: Interesting to think about the relationships that you form. As I mentioned, I had two close relationships when I came there, and I have formed other close relationships, but there hasn't been a large amount of socializing outside the office on my part. Interestingly, I think that goes on more among the administrative staff than it does among the professional staff, simply because many more of the administrative staff, administrative assistants, secretaries, are single persons. They tend to be mostly women, not exclusively but mostly, and they don't have already the family and other ties that draw them away

from each other rather than toward each other outside office hours. They all have their own individual sets of friends, but there are some people who do some things together outside.

I and my husband have had social relationships with some of the people inside, but it's varied over the years. So, I don't think that's a basis for people enjoying their work there; it's what goes on during the working hours, but it doesn't hurt to have good relationships outside. Maybe the fact that there aren't a lot of good relationships and aren't a lot of close relationships on the outside makes it better during the working hours, because that doesn't influence the working hours.

Q: What about helping each other in times of crisis?

Finberg: It's a very strong organization in that respect. There is a sense of family there, and we refer to ourselves, even when we grew up to be almost a hundred persons, we still refer to ourselves as the Carnegie family. Maybe I do more than others, and I've fostered that in some way. I think it's good. And they help each other whatever the crisis might be. It may be in the office. You have a huge job to do, and you can't possibly do it by yourself, and people will pitch in from any level and help out.

I personally went through about five years that were very difficult. My husband's illness went up and down over that period of time, and he died two and a half years ago. During all of that time, staff could not have been more helpful or more supportive in any way. Not too long before his death, I received a very nice recognition from the New York Women's Foundation. Unbeknownst to me, my Carnegie staff colleagues had taken at least two

tables at the breakfast, and there they all were, supporting me at that point, which was a rather difficult period for me. At the time of his death, they really rallied around in every way, and I think nearly everyone, including some trustees from out of town, came for the memorial service for him, which was unusual.

Then I got sick after that, and, again, they were there helping in every way. Now that I'm trying to pack up and move on to my new life, they still are being supportive and helpful, which is wonderful. But we've all helped each other in that respect. So, that's been very good, and it facilitates close-working relationships as well. We celebrate birthdays and anniversaries.

Oh, I haven't mentioned, when you asked about what a daily life there was like, one very important aspect for people who work at Carnegie Corporation is afternoon tea. This dates way back to the founding of the corporation, when Mr. Carnegie at home had tea every afternoon, and that has continued in the corporation until this day. It simply means that there are tea and cookies or other things to munch on available in the tea room, and you may go there and join your fellow staff for fifteen minutes or so, or you may go get it and take it back to your office, or invite guests in to pick it up and take it back to the office or even to sit down with you there. But it's something that continues, and it's a way of bringing staff together from every level. It's very pleasant.

Q: Let's talk about conflict a little bit. How did the Carnegie staff handle conflict during Alan Pifer's leadership?

Finberg: Did we have conflict during Alan Pifer's leadership? Yes, we had a little bit. I

don't recall any huge conflict. There were one or two staff members who, I think, did not feel that they were being treated fairly and equitably, or that they were working for someone who made unusual demands on them, and they would talk to the director of personnel. Sometimes I was the person that they talked to because they felt comfortable talking to me, particularly after I became a vice president.

Alan was very good, also, about confronting a problem and dealing with it at the time that it developed so that it didn't fester and become an open sore of some sort, so that I think there were one or two persons who were asked to leave when they simply could not work with their fellow colleagues in a congenial manner. So that happened also.

It was different, a little bit, from David Hamburg, who has a harder time -- who had a harder time -- telling somebody that their job had come to an end or that they weren't working out. He did that on at least two occasions at the beginning of his term, one person who wasn't working out terribly well, wasn't performing at the standard that he felt was satisfactory, and another person who had been engaged under Alan to do a job working with corporations to see whether we might have some collaborative enterprises, for whom there really wasn't a job under David, because he didn't see that that was something we were going to do, hadn't worked -- not because the person couldn't do it, but simply because corporations weren't given to collaborating with foundations very much. And therefore, he didn't see any need to continue that person in that role, and she quickly found another opportunity. But he would rather ask somebody to do something else or move them around a bit than ask them to leave. He found it very hard to let somebody go.

Q: Apart from these presidential decisions and questions of hiring and firing, which we'll

get to, I'm wondering about internal staff conflict, present or not present, and how it may have been handled, if it was present, during the Pifer years and during the Hamburg years.

Finberg: At the time, toward the end of Alan's presidency, when we had these weekly staff meetings to discuss proposals, there were a few occasions when we had some serious differences of opinion about proposals and about whether, particularly at the end of the fiscal year when we had a smaller amount of money left than we had grants that were being recommended by all of the staff, the question how to deal with that, whether to cut every grant proposal slightly so that you could make them all but at a reduced level, or whether simply to do some and not others.

We had some difficult discussions, but Alan would accept staff recommendations in the end, which we finally did by secret ballot. It was interesting. We'd have a discussion in the staff meeting, and then staff could vote on the proposed grants, giving them a one, two, or three, depending on whether they liked them a lot, a little bit, or not at all, and the ones with the highest scores, because three was the worst grade, would be dropped. That was a bit hard to accept, yet it seemed fairer, in some ways, than battling out around the table, or at least it worked better.

Near the end of his term, Alan invited trustees to come to staff meetings, because he thought they needed a better understanding of how we functioned. Some did come. They did not understand the nature of the conversation going on around the table. They thought we were unnecessarily adversarial and that we would recommend grants that we didn't really believe in, because they didn't understand the give-and-take process that was going on, and that led them to think that there was more discord among staff than there was.

That was reported to David Hamburg, I know, when he became president, and probably had something to do with his thinking about how he wanted to shape the staff organization, but I think it was far less than the trustees thought it was from their attending one or maybe two staff meetings.

Q: Let me ask you how people get hired at Carnegie. What are you looking for? And how, if they do, how do they get fired?

Finberg: The corporation, under John Gardner, and, I think, prior to John, looked for professional staff, that is, program officers, who had a doctoral degree or an equivalent. We hired at least one lawyer during his term -- two lawyers; no, one lawyer and one under Alan's term -- who were flexible. Fritz Mosher, for example, came in with just completing his dissertation in the field of child development, and the first thing he did was work on state and local government. That wasn't entirely outside his experience, because his father, at that time, was a member of Congress, so he knew something about politics and state legislatures and Congress and how they functioned. But people were expected to be able to function as generalists, in one sense of the word, to work across fields and acquire the knowledge or do the background reading that would be helpful to them in making judgments and be able to switch from one field to another if the foundation decided to switch its emphasis or its program activities from one field to another or if we needed somebody to take on an additional field or look at a different kind of proposal.

Gradually -- well, not even gradually -- under David Hamburg, we hired specialists, that is, people who had a Ph.D. in the field in which you wanted them to work. Between John Gardner and David Hamburg, Alan tended to look for persons with a doctorate or an

advanced degree who could work in the field, but not necessarily in the field in which they were going to work. He wouldn't turn them down for that reason. But we became more specialists in the field in which we were working than we had previously, and there was less shifting about, in a way, although contrary to all of that, when David Hamburg came, Fritz Mosher, who had then been working in education, elementary and secondary education and education finance, was very interested in international security and arms control, and asked to work with David Hamburg on the Avoiding Nuclear War program, and, in 1983, switched over to that.

The administrative staff, secretaries, administrative assistants, generally the support staff, we have always looked for persons with college degrees. They didn't have to have them, but generally persons with that much education had more interest in what we were doing and could be more related to it, and it would be not just a job for them, but something that held some substantive interest as well, and, indeed, more than one person who began as a secretary was able to move into the program work later and did so. Even Florence Anderson, who started as a secretary in 1932, became the secretary of the corporation and a program officer in her own right before she retired.

For secretary of the corporation and for the treasurer's office, you did have to have people who were experienced in accounting, bookkeeping, functioning as a controller and with some financial knowledge. Before I went to the foundation, at some point, and I can't tell you precisely when, the foundation began to manage less of its investments in-house. It had never managed all of them, but it supervised them more closely in-house in the 1920s and '30s than it did in the late 1940s and succeeding years. So that, at one point, we had somebody who was very knowledgeable in the treasurer's office in investments. By the time



I came, that was not a requirement for the treasurer. The current treasurer has become very knowledgeable in the field of investments, and oversees our investment managers and all of our investments very closely and still reporting to the Finance Administration Committee, but she wasn't hired because she was a specialist in investments; rather, a CPA and very knowledgeable about accounting and the role of the treasurer.

Q: How do people come to the attention of Carnegie?

Finberg: Good question. How do people come to the attention of the corporation? All sorts of ways. Sometimes through a search firm. Sometimes from grantees who know about good people who are coming to the end of their graduate training and would think they would like a foundation. David Hamburg invited a couple of junior program officers whom he had known in their graduate days. Others have worked in other foundations and knew our foundation staff members. Some come in off the street and apply.

I think, rightly or wrongly, fortunately or unfortunately, the majority of the people who have come to the foundation knew somebody or something about the foundation before they came to be considered for a job. But when I hired a program officer to work with me on special projects, I simply started inquiring around, and I got a number of resumes from a lot of different sources. I wrote to grantees and others, sent them a job description, persons who might fill the job. Eventually, I hired somebody who knew about the job opening from a program officer in another foundation. He had an assistant there who he thought was very good, and when that foundation had closed out the program in which she was working, had actually sent her as a consultant to one of their field offices to organize things there. When she returned, she had gone to work as a consultant to the Ford Foundation. So when

she came to Carnegie Corporation, she'd had experience in the Rockefeller Foundation and Ford Foundation, and so, knew the foundation field well. It made her particularly helpful in many ways when she came to Carnegie. She didn't have to learn how a foundation functions. But there's no reason why we shouldn't, and we do, throw the net quite widely when we are looking for someone. It just happened that, very often, you do find somebody who's known to somebody else and who that person thinks would be very good, and they turn out to be.

How do they get fired? They may be fired because they simply don't measure up to the job for which they have been employed -- a secretary who can't get in on time, who isn't accurate in her work, who makes travel reservations that are not the right ones, who tells your husband you're coming in at JFK Airport when you arrive at La Guardia, and he goes all the way to JFK to meet you. [laughter] Makes you very unhappy.

People who don't concentrate on their job and don't do the quality work that you anticipate. At the program officer level, there have been one or two persons who really didn't find the work satisfactory, not their idea of what they wanted to do, so that it was a general agreement that they left because, in one case, it was someone who felt that he would really like not to make the grant and then keep hands off, but rather be engaged in the implementation of the project himself and felt that he would be better off on the other side, being a grant-seeker and carrying out the projects. Another person who simply did not enjoy the work and, I think, might have kept on longer had he and the president not come to an understanding that it wasn't working out well on either side. So, it's not quite firing, but it's a common agreement that things aren't working out very well.

Q: Is there any sort of unacceptable behavior in the Carnegie culture that might provoke a firing or consideration of a movement of some kind?

Finberg: Yes. I referred to the quality of the work and your own standards for the work. We have, at least on one occasion, had somebody who was really a troublemaker. Nothing was ever right, and she was always fomenting staff to rebel against something or to complain about something or, in some way, to create problems. We came eventually to realize that it was not the organization that's having problems; it was that individual, who really wasn't happy there and who would be happier someplace else, and we let that person go. We make arrangements. We do give severance pay when we terminate someone, unless it's for a cause, and we did have to fire somebody once who took some money, somebody who was coming back from the bank and left the bank with more than he arrived with. But that doesn't happen very often at all. Thank goodness.

But I think it's quality of work and ability to work with your colleagues and with those on the outside. We do not tolerate arrogance in relation to other staff members or in relation to grantees or applicants. We are there to learn and to be helpful and cooperative, and other behavior is not tolerated.

Q: People do seem to tend to stay at Carnegie for a long time.

Finberg: Yes, they do.

Q: Why do you think that's so?

Finberg: I think they stay there because (a) the working conditions are very good, the salaries are good, the benefits are quite considerate and very thoughtful and well administered, but more than that, the work itself is stimulating, and it is never the same from day to day or from year to year, so that, in general, you can always feel that you are growing. You can work in one area, as I did in early childhood, for a long period of time and feel that you have reached, at least for a while, the limits of your growth, or you don't see ways in which to make it more stimulating, you don't quite know where to turn next or you feel you've grown tired of that subject and would like to do something slightly different. That may mean an evolution in a program, or it may mean you will shift your focus or<sup>7</sup> emphasis.

I shifted it by moving into administration and management. Others have shifted it -- I referred to Fritz earlier -- shifting from one field of activity to another that may be very different. Fritz Mosher actually stepped out for a year at one point as well. He went to work with another organization. He wanted to take leave. The president thought he was really very restless and wasn't sure that he would want to come back, so gave him the choice of staying or leaving. He left. In a year, we had not hired someone to replace him yet, and he wanted to come back, and he did.

Q: I believe a sabbatical leave policy was instituted after that time.

Finberg: There was a sabbatical leave policy instituted. Only one person took advantage of it ever, to date, and that person decided on his sabbatical leave that he was quite happy on sabbatical and ready to take early retirement, and he did not return. [laughter] So that was his motion, not ours. But I think he wasn't happy inside by that time. He felt

unappreciated, and he is someone who thought he should have been vice president when I became vice president. So all things combined, he was happier doing something else, and did.

Q: The transition from program to administration for yourself, what was that like? Has it been satisfactory?

Finberg: When I was asked to be vice president, program, I was asked to continue all of the program work that I was doing while I took on new responsibilities. Those new responsibilities were not well defined -- not defined, period. I made the mistake of not going to Alan Pifer at the time and saying, "Okay. How do you see this job? How do I see this job? What can I do, and how do you expect me to do both? What is in your mind and what were you thinking about when you asked me to take on this job?" Don't ask me why I took it on without asking him those questions first. I think we did talk about it, but in a very cursory way.

So that, in effect, the transition from program work to management work was gradual. It wasn't, in fact -- I became vice president, program, in 1980. It wasn't until after David Hamburg came in 1983 that I really began to make a transition to management per se. He decided that he wanted to have program groups, as I described earlier, and he had in mind that I would do management work and the two programs concerned with children and youth would be managed by two different persons, which was fine with me. I thought that they would benefit and do a good job, and it would bring new thinking and new ideas and allow me not to try to do two jobs at one time. So that, from my perspective, that would work out very well.

I also decided that I did not want to try to tell either of those people how to run the program, because I thought if it was their responsibility, they should feel that they had the authority as well as the responsibility, that I wasn't looking over their shoulder and didn't see it as an extension of what I would do, but rather was up to them about what they would do. I did attend some of their program group meetings simply out of interest and tried to help them know that that was why I was there, not because I wanted to subtly manage what they were doing. Gradually, I simply did not have the time to do that, to attend all of the group working meetings and do all of the other things that I had responsibility for.

Over time, I had less and less opportunity to engage on the program side, although I did try to keep in touch with what each of the program groups was doing by attending some of their group meetings, by talking with the program chairs, and, of course, by reading the dockets of the proposals that were being recommended for grants for each of the four board meetings each year. That gave me the biggest insight, the greatest insight, into what they were doing and why they were doing it, that and the program budget that we instituted in the mid-1980s. That came about because we decided to assign budgets for the program to each program group, and I felt if we were going to do that, we needed to have some document for the board and for the staff themselves that outlined what their goals for the program were, at least in that year, but generally the larger goals toward which they were working and how they saw the grants that they expected to be working on during that year or the kinds of grants that they would be looking for fitting into those program goals. I proposed that we have program budget papers which staff would prepare and which would go to the board at the beginning of each fiscal year to help them understand why we were proposing a program budget of X amount for that program group, and it was working on

those papers with the program staff, editing some a lot and some only a little, that gave me greater insight into what they were doing, and then eventually trying to edit the agenda items that went into the board agenda, where thinking had to be very clear and very precise.

[END OF SESSION]

TTT

Interviewee: Barbara D. Finberg

Session #11 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 21, 1997

Finberg: He is far more comfortable, in many ways, with academics because that has been his life, than he is with others. So, we had a diverse board, and we still do. We have people from communications, lots of fields.

Q: How are board members chosen?

Finberg: As I said, it's a self-perpetuating board. Under John, I'm sure that the nominating committee, if there was one, perhaps just the chairman of the board and two or three others sat around and said, "Well, Mr. X would be a good member of this board, and I think we ought to invite him to serve," and we had some very distinguished board members and people who cared very much about what we were doing and how we were doing it at that time. I don't mean in any way to suggest they did not.

Under Alan, when we decided to diversify, we formed a nominating committee, and he asked the board members, all of them, to nominate persons to the nominating committee. He asked the nominating committee to reach out, and he asked the staff. He formed two staff task forces, both to look for women and minorities and persons under the age of fifty, one east of the Mississippi, one west of the Mississippi, and he put greater emphasis on the latter, although the east of the Mississippi could look in the South. We had a lot of Northeasterners on. The staff found a number of very good candidates, a number of whom



did come on the board, and we then had members from Iowa and Illinois and Minnesota. So it did succeed again in diversifying the board. We had some Southerners on as well, and not everybody tended to come from the Northeast or as far west as Pittsburgh or San Francisco. We very often have been bicoastal in our approach. But eventually, it is a process of nomination by a nominating committee and election by the board.

Now, under David Hamburg -- let me go back one moment. Under Alan Pifer, Alan made it a point, whenever there was an active candidate being proposed by the committee or somebody he might have spotted as well, to meet and talk with them at length. If it was in New York, he would invite a member of the staff or two to join him in talking about the foundation, probably not telling the person why they were there for lunch, but they would be invited for lunch and we'd talk about what the foundation is doing. When he went out on the road to meet them, he usually would do that alone, but he would say, "Somebody suggested you have an interest in what we are doing and in the foundation world, and sometimes we are asked about candidates for boards, and your name has come up several times. I'd like to have a chance to talk to you, to get to know you."

Under David, he tended much more to turn to people he knew or persons that other members of the board knew and recommended very highly. Persons he knew he didn't feel he had to have a lot of conversation with because he knew them already, and he could talk to the board about their strengths and weaknesses. Persons he did not know but was taking the recommendations of other board members about, he would meet with, probably with the person who was recommending them, but didn't feel the need for a conversation in depth about their interest and the reasons for their coming on the board.

He also saw some what he thought were needs among board members. He was very interested in the way we communicated what we were doing to the public at large and therefore was very anxious to have somebody from the field of media, communications, journalism on the board. We approached a number of candidates who did not come on the board for one reason or another until Judy Woodruff, who at first declined, because when she was doing the "News Hour with McNeil-Lehrer," they had a policy, as did other communications institutions, against any members of their staff serving on boards. They didn't want to put them in any potential conflict-of-interest position. They also said, "We need you when we need you where we need you, and if we need to send you to South Africa or to Georgia to cover a story, we don't want that to conflict with something else and don't want you to feel conflicted with another obligation."

So that until Judy moved to CNN [Cable News Network], she was not able to consider coming on the board. After she did, David invited her again. Technically speaking, the board invited her again, and she said yes and she came on the board. It has been difficult for her to get to the meetings and to devote as much time as is required to attend a full board meeting. On the other hand, she couldn't have been more helpful in some of our conferences to present the findings of major reports on young children from zero to three years of age, for example, or on children from three to ten years of age, the Task Force on Learning in the Primary Grades, which she was willing to come and chair a panel and moderate a panel and to help in the presentation of the ideas, so, very cooperative in that respect.

Q: Again, to get a sense of the board's changing role at Carnegie over these years, in times of crisis, for example, looking way back, say at the 1969 Tax Reform Act, but I'm hoping

there's a more recent example, has the board been supportive? Does it tend to stay at arm's length? Has this changed?

Finberg: Until David Hamburg came, the board was very little involved in the activities of the foundation, other than functioning as a board, coming to the meetings, approving the grants, looking at the budget, asking good questions, and they often did, about the proposed grants.

I don't think I can answer the question about the board's role in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. My assumption would be that they were very supportive of Alan, had he needed that support, or would have been very supportive. In his testifying before Congress and in his writings about the Tax Reform Act, Alan was very concerned that some possibly punitive or at least difficult ideas were being proposed, for example, that foundations should never have a life of more than forty years and that no foundation should be grandfathered in, so that any foundation then in existence would have had no more than a forty-year life, if that, which he opposed. And we were set up to exist in perpetuity, and we felt that was in keeping with the donor's wishes.

There was a high excise tax being proposed, and there was a high payout requirement being proposed, the combination of which would have been to diminish the value of the foundation assets and the amount of the foundation's assets in absolute dollars, and certainly the value, if you include inflation over time, and Alan fought that on our behalf, and I'm sure that the board was very supportive and would have spoken up if necessary.

So far as I know, there were never any direct attacks on the foundation or on Alan personally that would have required the board to step in.

In a different way, when John Gardner became secretary of HEW, that was a very quick decision and not known to anybody because of Lyndon Baines Johnson's desire to keep all appointments secret until he announced them, so that the only persons who knew about it were the chairman of the board and the secretary of the corporation, and John, prior to its being its being publicly announced. The minute that it was announced, the chair of the board was in touch with Alan, and the board was very helpful to him, first of all making him acting president, because they had given John leave to join the Cabinet. They told him not to resign, he might want to come back if he didn't get along with Lyndon Baines Johnson. But I think they were very supportive and helpful to Alan in that period, and when, in May of 1967, John said, "I've been gone almost two years, and before the final board meeting of this fiscal year comes up, I think I should resign so that the board can name a full president," presumably Alan, "he should do so." He resigned, and Alan was named president.

I don't recall any difficulties since, external to the foundation. Internal to the foundation, the board was getting a bit restless at the end of Alan's term, perhaps because they -- the few board members who had come to staff meetings didn't think that they liked the way we were functioning, in part because Alan himself was becoming restless and ready to focus on some other things, I think tired of being president, and he'd had a very bad accident in which he broke his ankle and was having a hard time recovering from that. His ankle was having a hard time recovering from that. It did eventually. So that he was not able to focus as much on the foundation, and I think the board felt that we were being less

imaginative, less forward-looking, less strategic in our grant-making than we had been earlier. So that when Alan decided to resign, they understood and, I think, supported that decision, and they supported it by making it possible for him to stay working on projects that he wanted to work on away from the foundation, not physically so much -- he had another office -- but outside the functioning as a foundation staff member for the three years between his time of resignation and his becoming sixty-five. [Recording interrupted.]

[END TAPE TWELVE, SIDE ONE; BEGIN TAPE TWELVE, SIDE TWO]

Q: I'm interested in the seeming contradiction between your hands-off management style with respect to the program chairs when you are vice president for program, and the possibility for your giving a good deal of direction and guidance, and, in particular, maybe, in helping develop strategies across programs. So I'd just like to hear a little bit about this position that was not delineated for you by Alan Pifer, and what you created, what you made of that position.

Finberg: Alan created the position of vice president, programs, because the other vice president, the only vice president when I was named to that position, tended to be more interested in administration, although he was very interested in program, too, but he was a physicist by training and very good mathematician, so he had a great interest in the treasurer's side and the secretary's side. Alan perceived him, also, as the heir apparent so, I think, wanted him to have a broader role, and I came out of the program side, and he thought that I could be vice president for program, even though we didn't define or agree on what that meant. I think he thought that it would relieve him to some extent of a concern about the programmatic aspects of what we were doing, and I think to some extent

I was helpful in that way. But those positions were in place when David Hamburg became president.

He agreed that we should hold on to those two titles and those two positions, at least initially, and suggested that I should meet with each program chair weekly to find out how they were doing and to give them guidance, etc., but he didn't tell me that at the same time he was doing that. He was very interested in programs himself. In fact, that's what he cares by far the most about. So long as the organization works well, he's not that concerned about management issues and questions.

Because Children and Youth and the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, or, as we called it in 1983, Avoiding Nuclear War, were fields of interest that he had both experience and a very keen interest in, he paid a lot more attention to those than he did to the other two fields which were our [Strengthening Human Resources in] Developing Countries program, primarily sub-Saharan Africa and the Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean at that time, and Special Projects, which was a sort of catch-all for things we weren't doing in other fields. He left those two areas much more up to me. I was working on Special Projects at the time, as a member of that working group, and I became chair of it when David Robinson moved on to other things. He'd chaired it initially.

Developing Countries -- going back to your earlier question about hirings and firings -- he wasn't really happy with the ideas and directions that the person in charge of that program on an acting basis when he came in, or shortly after he came in, was giving it, so he brought in a person whom he knew well from WHO [World Health Organization], who came from Nigeria, was a physician, and he thought could help focus on health, at least as

a part of our overall program in the developing countries. And therefore, I think he had more confidence in that person and felt he didn't have to give it as much attention, even though he really wasn't inclined to anyway.

Because I had an interest in those two areas, I did, from the beginning, pay a lot more attention to them, because I knew he was concerned about the other areas, and he was giving them program direction and guidance. It also really didn't make a lot of sense for me to meet with the programs chairs in Avoiding Nuclear War, Education and Science, Technology and the Economy, and Prevention of Damage to Children and Youth, which were the titles of our programs at that time, because he was meeting with them regularly, and the program chairs didn't really want to have to repeat the same things to me when they didn't expect me to give as much input to what they were doing, and they expected it from David and David would expect them to interact with him on what they were doing and why they were doing it and take their direction from him. So, gradually, I paid less attention to those three areas, although I continue to have a deep interest in them, and paid more attention to the remaining two areas.

That continued to the very end, and, in fact, I think in the end he relied on me a lot more for programmatic advice, direction, guidance, strategy with the latter two groups than with the other three groups or the two children and youth groups consolidated into one, where he worked very closely with them, and it was in those two fields where we had the task forces, commission, councils, that he either chaired or gave direct guidance to, except for one, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, which he conceived and established, but which he did not chair or serve on and didn't pay quite as much attention to, although he never neglected it totally. But in that commission, I did

help solve some problems and worked with them and with the executive director, David Robinson, who was also a member of the commission, on some management problems and scheduling problems and other things, as well as the conception.

Q: I'd like to have some examples of the nature of assistance that you gave. I have to confess that I still don't have a very clear idea of what a vice president for program -- what you as vice president for program -- did at Carnegie, what your contributions were.

Finberg: Sometimes I wonder myself. [laughter] Let me use the program in developing countries, the full title of which was Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries. There I -- particularly after the physician who was brought in from Nigeria decided to leave, and his deputy, who had worked with him at WHO, Patricia [L.] Rosenfield, who had joined us in 1987, took over the chairmanship upon his departure -- I worked very closely with Patricia Rosenfield, reading her proposed program directions and objectives, discussing them with her in advance, reading the papers that she wrote, talking to her about them, helping her very often re-draft them, rewrite them, doing some of that myself even, for her to help her sharpen the objectives, make clearer what the objectives were and how to put it together into a framework that others could understand, that didn't have so many differing purposes and objectives and techniques that you soon lost track of what you were trying to do and how you were trying to do it; in other words, to help her simplify at least the presentation of it, if not the program itself.

But she and many members of the staff in the foundation -- this is not unusual when you're in that kind of position where, if you have imagination, you can reach out in many directions, as many directions as you see needs or ideas or challenging programs. She finds



it very hard to rein in her imagination and her ambitions to a few foci at a time and try to accomplish or work toward accomplishing those or toward putting people and projects in place which will further the objectives. For example, if you're trying to increase women's development and looking at laws as they affect women and the opportunities that women have for leadership, what kinds of projects, what kinds of organizations do you make grants to, and how do you persuade yourself that training more scholars in political science -- this is hypothetical -- is not necessarily the most direct way to increase an understanding of the problems of the constitution as it affects women in any one of the sub-Saharan African countries? Rather, you look for the women's organizations, very often organizations of women lawyers, who see that there are problems in the constitution, want to draft sections for the constitution, and then advocate for change in the directions in which they think are important to persuade not only women, but men, in various constituent organizations as well as the parliament or legislature, that the current laws are not benefiting women equally to men or are inhibiting women, keeping them from inheriting land or inheriting funds, even when their husband dies, let alone when their father dies.

So to come back, my role was to really help her think about what were the strategies to achieve the objectives that she had in mind and to make those objectives clear enough that you could then develop strategies toward them. I also spent a lot of time with her talking about the ways in which her staff members were functioning and how to help her help them do a better job themselves, shape the aspects of the program on which they were working, when they wanted to make site visits, in this case going to Kenya or to Nigeria or to South Africa, asking them specifically who they wanted to see and why they wanted to see them, so that before they left they had a pretty clear idea of what they were going there to achieve.

This sounds elementary, but in a way it's not. I think, I'm going to Kenya, and I know there are a half dozen organizations there working in the field in which I'm very interested or in which the foundation is very interested. One or two of them have applied for grants. The others have not, but I'd like to know what they are doing. But unless you know precisely who you are going to see and when you were going to see them, that they were going to be there when you got there, and that they understand why you are coming so that either you don't raise expectations or you learn enough about the organization, the people, the projects, the reasons for its being, so that you can recommend grants if they are requested from that organization and have a framework into which to fit it, fit the grants, you can't make the most of that expensive trip in terms of dollars and in terms of time that you are giving it.

Does that help answer your question?

Q: That helps, and I tell you, I'm interested in understanding how substantive decisions are made about program, and also interested in evaluation of program and across programs and the sorts of decision-making that goes on between board, staff, senior officers. I'm leading us into the board, back to the board and patterns of board involvement. How has the board's composition changed over the years of your involvement with Carnegie?

Finberg: When I came to Carnegie in 1959, the board comprised fifteen -- sorry, fourteen white men, very much establishment, mostly business and law, one academic, one from publishing; one woman, who was Margaret Carnegie Miller, Andrew Carnegie's daughter, who, by this time, was -- well, she wasn't that old, she was in her fifties, I think; and the

president. So it was sixteen members altogether. It is a self-perpetuating board, and that had been its nature almost from the beginning. When the corporation was founded, Andrew Carnegie invited the heads of all the other institutions that he had established: Carnegie Institute of Technology, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, etc., plus his lawyer, to join him on the board. His wife may have been a member of the board; I don't recall. That pattern more or less continued through John Gardner's administration.

When Alan Pifer became the president, this was by now 1965 -- he became acting president in '65 and president without the acting in 1967, although he didn't -- he started to act like president in 1965. He decided that one should look around at the contemporary times and see that a board of white male Protestants, all from the establishment, was not exactly current with thinking about the role of gender, ethnicity, religion, race, in current activities.

He worked with the board and particularly with a committee under Caryl [P.] Haskins -- who was chairman of the board at one point, I can't remember whether chairman at that time; he may have been -- to think about the diversification of the board. He made it, as a consequence, his goal to change the board. First of all, we adopted terms so that no board member could serve more than two four-year terms unless you were chairman of the board. You could be chairman for five years, and those could extend your time on the board up to twelve years, but otherwise you had to get off. That enabled rotation to occur. There had been terms previously, but your terms could keep going forever. So, that opened up opportunities for bringing in women and minority group members and different religions. We had one Catholic on when I came. That was so that we would have one Catholic on. Almost all the others were Protestants. One was Jewish and academic, so he really was

different in every respect in the earlier board.

Under Alan's term, during Alan's presidency, we at one point had a board with as many as seven women on it, and we had at one time at least two African Americans and one Hispanic, and we have later had at least those -- maybe even two Hispanics and two African Americans simultaneously, and we varied from four to eight board members who are women. It may not have gone as high as eight. Seven may have been the largest number. But definitely the board has been diversified in every respect. We have Jews, we have Catholics, we have Protestants. I don't think we have any Muslims. Who knows whether we have any agnostics or atheists, but it's very definitely a much more diverse board.

There are more academics on under David Hamburg. We didn't, until David Hamburg came, have many academics on the board, for a very good reason: most of our grants were to institutions of higher education. Many of them focused on the nature of higher education, helping institutions, colleges and universities, become better places or supporting specific things that they were doing or research on higher education, and therefore we didn't want to put anyone in the position of conflict of interest. Under David, we were dropping higher -

[END OF SESSION]

TTT

Interviewee: Barbara D. Finberg

Session #12 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 21, 1997

Q: Let me ask you about patterns of board involvement over the years at Carnegie, particularly with respect to program involvement. I'm wondering, for example, the present board seems to be comprised of a very diverse and powerful group of people. I'm wondering to what extent they may shape the agenda.

Finberg: The board has always had an interest in what the foundation was doing programmatically. In my experience -- not under John, because I didn't attend -- I might have attended one board meeting before he left, but that would only have been to present a particular proposal. You came in, made your presentation, answered questions, and left. Alan instituted a process of having all of the key program staff members as well as the corporate officers present at board meetings so that board and staff could get to know each other better. That didn't necessarily involve the board in knowing any more about our program. Because board members have very busy lives, are engaged in a lot of diverse activities in addition to their professional activity, it's very hard for them to keep in touch at four meetings a year with what the program is and what the program objectives are of the foundation. So we've tried in various ways to help them know more and understand more about what we were trying to do and why we were trying to do it, but it's still difficult.

With Alan, we instituted annual retreats of the board. These started out as one-day, and

then they became two-day events outside New York City, often in places where we had some programs in operation, that is, there were projects that we were supporting with our funds, and we would provide an opportunity for the board members, in effect, to do a site visit, to go to the University of North Carolina and talk to the people who were engaged in an early childhood education program for very disadvantaged children, in that case from zero to six years of age.

At the retreats, we would talk at length. We would present a paper and talk at length about either a program area -- strengthening higher education -- or a subject matter that cut across our programs. I can remember one where we focused principally on the role of women in society and what were our various program grants and activities doing to foster the role of women. Did we see that as a problem, and how were we approaching it from the perspective of everything we were doing, higher education, day-care, early childhood education, strengthening state and local government? Another one focused on the education of disadvantaged and whether we should support litigation in favor of desegregation of education and, later, whether we should support litigation to ensure the voting rights, or to provide voting rights which should have been available, to members of disadvantaged minority groups.

The board very actively considered these questions, particularly the question of litigation -- I'd forgotten about that until you asked that question -- and gave us a lot of very good thinking, and, in the end, said that we should go ahead and do it, but that we should be focusing on the educational aspects of it and the preparation of the case for it, not supporting the actual going to court and the argument itself, so that we were contributing to the knowledge base rather than to the actual trial, and that support has continued for

that kind of activity.

Under David Hamburg, we set up, as I mentioned earlier, commissions, councils, task forces, and I never understood why they were called different things. I think it had to do with whether one term was out of fashion or overused at the time.

But except for the Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, every other commission, council, task force, has had members of the board on it, not necessarily but usually persons who had some interest or background in the subject matter that they could bring to it, but not exclusively that. For example, Helene Kaplan, a lawyer, served on the Council on Adolescent Development. She had an interest in that field, even though that wasn't her specific background or experience, and contributed to it. This gave a large number of the board members an opportunity to participate in a program activity of the foundation and insight into what we were doing and how we were doing it and why we were doing it, and they contributed a great deal.

We had two task forces, one of the Council on Adolescent Development, looking at the out-of-school time of youngsters to which two trustees, Jim [James P.] Comer and Billie Tisch, as the co-chairs, contributed an enormous amount. They were very thoughtful. They led the meetings. They did their homework for the meetings and really did make a big difference.

Two board members who were even more active, if that's possible, were the co-chairs of the Task Force on Learning in the Primary Grades, Admiral James Watkins and Shirley Malcom. The task force had just completed its work in the fall of '96. They did an

enormous amount of work for that task force and really led it, so that they participated very heavily in the work of the program. Whether they helped shape it or whether they, on the general field was decided they participated in it, is hard to say. I think in some ways, yes, they helped shape it by the very nature of their participation. In other ways, I think the outlines of what we wanted to do and why and how we would go about it were decided by David and his staff and discussed with and agreed to by the board, but not shaped that much by the board.

On the other hand, when David became president, we prepared papers, lengthy, detailed papers, about the program areas that we were proposing to enter or to continue with evolutionary changes or more drastic changes with options about the kinds of things that we might do, and these were sent to the board in advance and then discussed at board meetings, and David would summarize at the end of the board meeting what he thought the board had said. That summary always included what he wanted to do as well. He was very artful at making it all come together. But he never got disagreement from the board. They either agreed to or understood what he was trying to do and went right along.

Nevertheless, I have heard that board members have been saying to the new president [Vartan Gregorian] that they didn't feel as included in decisions about the program and didn't understand it as much as they would have liked, what our objectives were, where we were going, why we were doing what we were doing, what the options were. It's hard for board members to understand, once they have agreed upon a field, what are the options within that area. We have never thought that it would be useful for board members to have an array of proposed grants before them and ask them to decide which three we should make grants for, rather than saying, "These are the three we recommend to you," simply



because they wouldn't have the background. They couldn't do the preparation, the reading that would enable them to make an informed decision about which things we would do and which we would not do. So we've never gone that route.

I think there are some board members who have not had an opportunity -- that is, some of the board members under David Hamburg -- who have never had an opportunity to serve on a task force or council or commission, in part because of their own busy lives, but that has made them feel excluded in comparison with other members of the board. I've never heard this voiced specifically. Certainly it has never been said to me, but I think that perhaps there is some feeling about that and some of that may have been voiced to the incoming president, Vartan Gregorian, this year.

Q: I was actually thinking about the possibility of Carnegie staff feeling left out. The nature of that board involvement, the membership on commissions, councils, task forces, is a big change from the Pifer era.

Finberg: Absolutely.

Q: Can you tell me what that meant for relationships between board members and staff members?

Finberg: The involvement of board members, but even more the councils and commissions that comprised experts or others -- they were always interdisciplinary and intersectoral, so that we had people from business and we had people from academia and we had law and specialists in the field, but they could be educators, practitioners, psychologists, experts in

a given area, and then staff were hired specifically to run those councils or task forces, I think, has caused the staff members who worked in those areas to feel that they had less opportunity for input or their views were less considered, they were not consulted to the same degree in the activities that they might have been had we not had both board members and all of those other persons there.

On the other hand, I don't think that the board participation made that difference. I think it was the nature of using the council or task force. On the other hand, David did that, in part, because having those experts and influential persons from American society participate in the thinking about, and the recommendations of, the council or commission or task force and participating in the launching of the report to the public about what they had been thinking and how they came out gave much more impetus and force to the reports and the recommendations than they would have had had they been done only by staff or by one expert.

Perhaps the staff would have felt better used had they had more opportunity to actually participate in the discussions of the council and task forces and if they had had more opportunity to participate with the staff of the council or task force on the substantive issues involved. They tended to be primarily involved with the budget and the administration and the renewal of the grant each year for the appropriation for the activity. Their substantive input wasn't necessarily sought or invited, not that couldn't have, but you felt like you were having to assert yourself and insert your ideas.

So, it was a missed opportunity, in my view, for staff development and staff input, and that was different from the way Alan Pifer behaved when we had the Carnegie Commission on

Educational Broadcasting, the second one, the Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting, and when we had the Carnegie Council on Children. There he expected staff at least to monitor what was going on, but his attitude and the attitudes of the chairs of those commissions was that staff ideas were as welcome as anybody else's, so that there was a greater opportunity for staff growth.

Q: Did you ever voice this concern to David Hamburg?

Finberg: In subtle ways, yes. I had a greater concern, though, in a way, particularly with our councils, task forces, and commissions concerned with children. It seemed to me that a Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development where the members of the council ranged from no younger than forty-five, maybe older, to seventy or seventy-five, with no youth participating, was very limiting in our thinking and that people of that age, no matter how many grandchildren they have or how much they think they are in touch with young people, don't have the same perspective, don't have the same understanding of how youth are thinking.

Indeed, when the report of the task force on the time-out of school -- I've forgotten what the appropriate name for the task force was -- made its report, they did invite two young people to participate in the presentation, and one of them made a very clear plea for "letting us voice our thinking and for listening to us. We have a great deal of interest. We have something to offer." And she made some very good suggestions right then and there.

It took me back to thinking about my participation in the planning for an annual Council on Foundations meeting in the late 1970s. The planning committee in which I participated

decided that the theme should be children and youth. As we were looking at our program plans, we suddenly realized we had nobody on our committee -- that we had nobody participating in the presentations, on panels, or making presentation who was under the age of thirty or thirty-five or forty, and that that was not a good idea. We did invite a couple of young people to participate, one of whom was a seventeen- or eighteen-year-old from San Diego, a young woman who had become an emancipated minor because she had problems with her family, who made probably the most effective presentation of the entire conference, because she thought about what she wanted to say to all these foundation staff persons and trustees and had some very clear ideas and recommendations for them which were very effective. So, it just, to me, proved the value of participation of young people when you're talking about young people.

Now, if you have a task force on zero to three, no, you're not going to have any zero- to three-year-olds, but you might have some young parents or persons who have young children on that task force, as opposed to grandchildren.

Q: Did the board really never disagree with David Hamburg all those fourteen years?

Finberg: If they did, they did it quietly, which was appropriate. The only time I saw any potential conflict in any board meeting was his second board meeting when one of the trustees questioned a grant they were being asked to renew; in fact, one for which I was responsible. This person was an academic, professor of history, and said, in effect, that academics were very adept at seeking funds and finding any good excuse to ask foundations for money, and she thought that the proposed grant was simply a search for funds, not a really legitimate project, it didn't make a lot of sense, and she didn't see any reason why we

should be supporting it or to continue to support it, even though we had up to that point.

Whether or not David agreed with her, his face showed his feelings, and he pounded the table and said, "I will not have this board micromanaging the grant-making process," in a very angry tone. That was the last time that happened, and no trustee ever criticized or raised such a critical question about a proposal again, or if they had a concern, they found another way to raise that concern, either privately or through a more tactful question in the board meeting. Under David, there was no grant that was either seriously questioned after that or turned down.

Under Alan, there was one grant that was opposed vigorously by one board member, and the rest of the board supported him to the extent of suggesting that they not approve the grant at that meeting, that we look at it again and at the trustees' questions about it, and if we wanted to come back to them with our additional considerations, we could pull it. We did come back at the next board meeting with more information and with a stronger argument about why we thought it was a project that the foundation should support, and the board approved it.

Q: What was the project?

Finberg: It was a project under Ralph Nader's Public Interest Research Group. I can't remember now the specifics of the proposed research that he wanted to do, but you'll remember at that time, well, this was early in Alan's period, and our board was made up primarily of business people, and at that point Ralph Nader was very strongly attacking the automotive industry for safety in automobiles, and business people weren't very happy

about that, so it's not too surprising.

Q: What was your early action to David Hamburg's statement that --

Finberg: I was a little taken aback, as was every member of the board and every other member of the staff present. It made it very clear how he expected to proceed, but I think we could also take from that, David didn't like to be crossed, and that was an extreme example of it, but we knew that from our everyday working with him even by that time that if you didn't agree with him, you had to find a very tactful way to tell him so. He would tolerate a different point of view, but it had to be very positively put in a way.

Q: You seem to have worked very well with David Hamburg, and I'm wondering to what you attribute the success of your working relationship with him, if I can fairly characterize it that way.

Finberg: It was a good working relationship. There's no question about that. Perhaps it dates back to the time when he was asked, as a board member, to step off the search committee for the new president and become a candidate for president himself. At the time, I was staying at his home for two weeks, Monday through Friday, while I was a patient for radiation at Massachusetts General Hospital and he was living in Cambridge and teaching at Harvard. David likes to talk about things with other people and to get their ideas and input, and he was quite open in telling me what had happened. I was then a vice president on leave from the foundation, on leave for medical reasons. We talked a lot about whether he should allow himself to be considered for the presidency and why. I'm sure that I was not the deciding factor by any means, but I suspect I helped him.

Because of that relationship, which I tried not to play up or to play down with staff because I didn't want them to think I had any particular influence with him that everyone else did not have, I determined, once he had been named as president, to be as helpful as possible to him in taking over that role, so that I prepared a lot of memoranda for him, offered him various ways in which I could help him become acquainted with program, with staff, with the way we functioned, with relationships with the board that he might not have seen, anything that would be helpful to him, and did a lot for him to help him prepare for that, and I think he relied a lot on me. He felt he could talk to me openly and ask questions about relationships or projects or the way things functioned, and we would talk in the office or by telephone on weekends and other times. I think he felt I was generally very supportive.

I know from the beginning I learned what approaches he liked and didn't like, what would irritate him and what would not, and tried to approach him in a way that would be helpful. I may have mentioned to you once a particular incident in which I wrote a memorandum to others, with a copy to him, and made a humorous reference to David's attitude about something. I thought it was humorous, it was intended to be humorous and affectionate remarks in parentheses, not negative in any way. He took it as an affront and very negative, and walking home one evening, he -- because I walked home, and one evening he decided to walk at least part way with me, he suddenly turned to me and said, "I did not like that remark that you made. That was unfair and uncalled for," obviously, again, angry. Fortunately, I was cool and maintained my cool and simply said, "David, I didn't mean that. That was affectionate and meant to be humorous, and I think everyone understood that." At which point he sort of backed off. I think he accepted what I was

saying, or at least realized that he was overreacting. That, I think, was the only time when I ever encountered sharp words from him. If he had criticisms otherwise, he found more tactful ways or less attacking ways to let me know about them, but, in general, we worked very well together, and I think he felt (a) I was competent; (b) I kept my head about me and had pretty good judgment, (c) that I kept confidences very well. He could talk to me about anything and knew that I would not repeat anything that he said to me outside of the office, outside his office or the setting of the conversation, and that I was reliable.

I don't think I gave him as much support programmatically as I could have, but that was a function of time and activity. There were things I couldn't do as well as I had the ability to do. I just didn't have enough time to do everything that might have been helpful.

Q: That may have been an area, too, where he didn't tap you as much as he could have.

Finberg: Possibly.

Q: Do you recall anything specific about those conversations in Cambridge?

Finberg: Yes.

Q: And was David Hamburg surprised to be asked to consider the presidency?

Finberg: He said that he was. I can't tell you for certain. I think probably he was. In fact, when I said I don't think I was, by any means, the only influence on him, he had a very good friend who was then president of Stanford University, Donald Kennedy, who was a



biologist, so they came out of similar fields. David is a psychiatrist. They had worked together on some major projects when both were on the faculty at Stanford, and I know that David talked at length with Don Kennedy about this, and he said, and Don told me independently, that David was not inclined to do it, and Don said, "It's the culmination of everything you've been working toward. It brings together your research-based interests, your interest in public policy, your interest in using knowledge to influence public policy and the way the government functions, the way that you functioned very much while you were president of the Institute of Medicine, the way you are now functioning in an inter-faculty seminar on public policy with respect to health at Harvard, and I think you should take it." And I think that was probably the most influential conversation that he had.

Q: But what were you able to tell David about Carnegie Corporation and what it might be like to be president of Carnegie and what the foundation was all about? It seems like the kind of conversation that perhaps Vartan Gregorian does not have the benefit of, although I imagine he and David Hamburg have obviously talked.

Finberg: First of all, David was on the board. He'd been on the board about a year and a half. That doesn't mean he'd come to many meetings or have that much in-depth understanding of what we were doing yet, but at one point, because of his interest in children, he had invited me to meet with him at the Institute of Medicine while he was still there, to tell him what we were doing in childhood education. I think the things I talked with him about, Brenda, were how we made decisions about programs and about grants, about the people who were there, about what our strategies and objectives were, why I thought a foundation was an important institution in American society. Maybe he knew that for himself, but he heard from me about why I thought it was important.

Q: And why do you think it's important?

Finberg: I walked into that trap, didn't I? [laughter]

Q: Or you can think about it for another time.

Finberg: Maybe another day.

Q: That's entirely up to you.

[END OF SESSION]

TTT

Interviewee: Barbara Finberg

Session #13 - VIDEO

Interviewer: Brenda Hearing

New York, New York

Date: November 21, 1997

Finberg: There are a lot of questions being asked now about the role of foundations in American society. They are being stimulated by persons who think that foundations have too much influence, by persons who think foundations aren't following the donors' wishes, although they sometimes fail to look to see what the donors' real wishes were. They make assumptions about them. By persons who think that those who have wealth should use it during their lifetime rather than set up a foundation to do something after they are no longer around, or both, while they're here and after they're no longer around, that it's an overused mechanism for avoiding taxes.

Foundations give only about 7 percent of the total number of philanthropic dollars provided each year in the United States. About 4 to 5 percent comes from corporations, and about 88 or 89 percent comes from individuals in the form of bequests or grants, contributions while they are living. About half of that individual giving goes to faith-based organizations -- churches, by and large, but other, synagogues, temples, others. Individuals and corporations are more likely to give to people that they like or to service organizations or cultural organizations in general support, which is very important, institutions of higher education, to their churches. In the case of churches, it may be for missionary work or social services or to carry on their religious education and teaching.

By and large, neither corporations nor individuals will support basic research or will

support specific projects that cost sometimes several hundred thousand or even millions of dollars. They are less likely to be interested in trying to bring about change in society, although they may be doing that, in the case of advocacy organization, particularly in the interest of children or the environment or nuclear war. Corporations are more interested in supporting educational institutions, community organizations, community-based organizations, or the arts, but not necessarily anything that has something to do with public policy, a few in the environment, a few Children's Defense Fund, nor do they have a great interest in affecting other aspects of public policy or change generally in society.

Foundations, I think, are the one institution that are freer to do that and realize that they can, and they can provide dollars to support basic research, to support applied research. They can perhaps sometimes collaborate to make a large amount of money available for a program that none of them can support individually but that all of them together can make a difference for. They can make general support grants to colleges and universities and other kinds of institutions and do, or for performing arts centers or other things. And that isn't to say that huge amounts can't be raised. Universities are now, some of them, raising more than a billion dollars in major fund-raising campaigns, and that comes sometimes from foundations for specific projects or even general support for scholarships or teaching professorships or hospitals or performing arts organizations are raising large amounts of money.

But still, the kinds of projects that foundations are likely to support are much harder to support, particularly in large amounts of money, from any other source, and I think the things that foundations have done -- sometimes with small amounts of money, sometimes with large amounts of money -- have been very influential and very effective in bringing

about activities that benefit American society.

Let me give you a couple of examples. I think I referred in an earlier conversation to our support of the research on the role of the Negro in American life that a Swedish sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal, headed. I think that would have been very difficult to support with corporation money or individual grants in the United States. We set up and provided the funds for the Commission on Educational Television, which coined the terms "public broadcasting" and "public television" at a time when public broadcasting stations, educational television stations, as they were then referred to, were really struggling. They couldn't raise the public support, they couldn't get government support, and they were in danger of going under. At least that is what appeared to be the situation when both the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation set up commissions to look at their plight.

Out of that came the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, but, more important, out of those two efforts came a calling of attention of the American public to the value of public broadcasting, both radio and television, and to the importance of finding ways to finance it, that it could do things that the network and individual radio stations and television stations would never do, particularly if they had to do it without -- they couldn't afford to do it without advertising, and advertising was the way they supported themselves. Of course, we're now seeing that more and more advertising is creeping in in one way or another to both public radio and public television. Nevertheless, it's being kept a little bit at bay, and there are other ways to provide support for those. I think those were very important things that would not have happened without foundation money.

One can look at some individuals. Arnold Beckman, at one point in the 1970s and 1980s

who gave away a huge amount of money, I don't even know the amount, but I would say probably several hundred million dollars in support of basic research through grants to institutions to set up laboratories and programs for research and in support of professorships and scholarships for that research. He was engaged in making scientific instruments, and he appreciated the importance of science and basic research in science. But that's highly unusual.

One can look at what George Soros is doing now. He's doing it through the mechanism of foundations but, I think, is expecting that a lot of the money he's providing is going to be spent now, during his lifetime. Of course, Andrew Carnegie set out to establish some institutions to do very specific things: an institution of higher education: Carnegie Institute of Technology; libraries -- the Carnegie Library in Pittsburgh; 2,509 libraries around the English-speaking world, including the United States -- the Carnegie Institution of Washington to do basic scientific research; the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh: the Museum of Natural History and a library and an art museum there. The Endowment for International Peace because he was so concerned about conflict.

This was in 1906 or 1907, before World War I, and he thought that the way to attack these problems was to provide some funds to do research, and he was very encouraged, or very optimistic when he set up the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He said in the deed of gift that once peace had been established, then the funds may be used for other purposes. But he gave away half of his fortune, having written that it was a sin to die rich, you should make wealth and then use it for good social purposes. He still had as much money as he had given away left, and he had written, also, that you should immerse yourself in the purposes for which you are giving money. You shouldn't just -- although he

found this hard to do, give money to a library and then not participate in it, but he thoroughly believed that you should give your money away and you should participate to the extent that you could in the activities that you were supporting.

But he was getting old, and he was getting weary, and he turned to his lawyer, Elihu Root, and said, "What do I do now? I don't know that I can continue to give my money away as I would like to do it, and I don't know what to do," and it was Elihu Root who suggested to him that he set up a foundation, one of the earliest general-purpose foundations, to continue making grants in the fashion that he had done in perpetuity, and that's how Carnegie Corporation came into existence.

I would say that today institutions like Carnegie -- and we're now by no means the largest. We were among the larger ones earlier, but what Ford Foundation is doing, what Rockefeller Foundation has done in its earlier years in the elimination or close-to-elimination of malaria that came back for other reasons, or yellow fever in other fields in which it worked, were extremely important, and I don't know that those projects would have been undertaken without foundation funds. I don't know that "Sesame Street" would have come into existence without a foundation conceiving it and marshaling the funds to make it possible initially.

So, I believe strongly that foundations have a great contribution to make to American society. I appreciate those who say that money should be used during your lifetime and you should participate in deciding how the money should be used, but Mr. Carnegie did that to the extent that he could, and I think a lot of other people do, too. I wouldn't argue that everybody ought to save his money and then establish a foundation, but I think those

that exist and those that probably will yet come into being can play very useful roles. It's not easy. A foundation can simply support community organizations or activities or health institutions or the institutions of higher education, and those all need support, too. So I wouldn't denigrate that kind of activity. But I think that the larger concentrations of money can be used strategically and that American society -- maybe the world, because Ford operates all over the world and so do other foundations -- are benefiting by the existence of foundations.

Q: I wonder what contributions of Carnegie during the eighties and nineties are going to have the same resonance for people as "Sesame Street," An American Dilemma, The Corporation for Public Broadcasting. These are the often-cited examples. Any idea?

Finberg: The contributions of Carnegie Corporation under David Hamburg, in effect. The eighties -- he came to the presidency in 1983 and stayed until June of 1997. Perhaps we're too close to them to see yet. On December 10 this year, 1997, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict will release its report. The commission comprises persons from every continent and from many different fields of activity, and they have worked very hard to analyze the roots of conflict, what we can learn from efforts to prevent conflict, to resolve it once it starts, before it becomes major, and once it becomes major, to see what can be done to ameliorate it or to end it. I haven't seen the report, so I can't tell you what it says, but I don't think we will know for maybe a generation whether it has any influence or not, whether anyone reads it and whether it has an impact.

I think it's clear that some of the work of the Council on Adolescent Development is having a major impact. The one that I suspect is having the most impact, maybe because we've



seen more of what's happening as a consequence and have participated in it more, is the one concerned with education of youngsters in the middle-grade school, roughly between grades six and nine, where the corporation followed up the report with a grant-making program, working with the states and offering a request for proposals, which we hadn't normally done, from the states. The proposals had to be signed off on by the governor, who had to be thoroughly behind the project to improve the quality of education, health, and opportunities for community service for children in those grades.

We've been working most closely with fifteen states who have made major changes, at least in a large number of schools in their states, and in the whole state approach to working with school districts on what happens in education in those grades. The requirements for teachers in those grades, the training and the knowledge base, the nature of the curriculum, the relationship of health institutions to providing health care and health examinations and health education for children in those grades, opportunities for children to be related to youth-serving organizations and to engage in community service in those grades, and I think at least those fifteen states are looking very differently at education in those years, a period that was very neglected in American education.

We set up junior high schools early in the twentieth century because we knew that elementary education and high school education weren't meeting the needs of children in those years, but we didn't really tackle -- once we'd set up a new institution -- what the nature of that institution was and what the differing needs of those children were and how we were meeting them. I think that the "Turning Points" program is really doing that.

So, I'm certain that there are some other aspects of what we are doing. A national Center

on Children and Poverty at Columbia University that Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation jointly set up in the mid-1980s to look at our programs particularly for young children and to see how we could far better meet the needs of poor children and their families may have a long-term impact. I'm not close enough to it now to tell you what that impact might be, but I know that they have looked at both public policies and programs for children in that age range, have recommended, for example, that there be Head Start programs for a far larger number of children, higher percentage of children, than existed. At one point, only 19 percent of those eligible for Head Start were being served. They recommended that there be a program for children under age three, an early Head Start program, for children who would benefit from that as well.

So, I think there are some other things, probably, that will have significant effects in the long run, but I'm not sure whether we're too close to them to make that judgment yet. Certainly one that I mentioned to you earlier, the report of the Commission on Poverty Among Blacks in Southern Africa has had major effects. There's no question about that. Although that was conceived under Alan Pifer, it was really carried out and the grants to help carry it out were made under David Hamburg's presidency.

Q: Can you give me some specific examples of the effects of that report?

Finberg: First of all, a recognition, once apartheid had been ended as an official policy of the South African government, a recognition that they needed to provide housing, electricity, running water to communities that had never had any of those things at all, and that the government had to work to try to do that. I think we had probably less effect on the employment policy, certainly on education, and we were already trying to help improve

the quality of education for blacks, but the current government is trying to do a lot more about that, and they recognize the problems. But these problems had all been laid out for them and ways in which they might be approached to change the conditions where a part of the papers that were prepared for that commission. They weren't necessarily a part of the final report, but they were the background for it and were available for use by the current government.

[END OF SESSION]