TTT

Interviewee: David Weikart Session #2 (video)

Interviewers: Sharon Zane, Mary Marshall Clark New York, New York

Date: February 18, 1999

Q: David, I thought a good place to start would be to just talk a little bit about your education and your interest in psychology and you know how everything kind of came together in what later obviously turned out to be a very long trajectory.

Weikart: I see. Are we starting at college level?

Q: Yes. Your mentors.

Weikart: Pardon me –

Q: Your mentors.

Weikart: I think probably the thing that got me most interested in psychology was really very roundabout. I wanted to work in summer camps. I wanted to be involved in them, because as age fourteen I had started working in programs and had worked at doing dishes and various kinds of things, but wanted to be involved. I really liked that role and felt that by getting involved in camps, I would have to find the kind of a job that would allow me to have that summer free.

And so through -- when I attended Oberlin College as a young eighteen-year-old, I applied for summer jobs in summer camps and started working at a camp in New York State, Camp Cory in Rochester, New York, and began first as a counselor and then moved up to becoming, after five years, the director of a program for the summer camp. And this experience was very important in developing a sense of what you can do for people, what you can do for young people, and it was very -- both personally enjoyable and became a goal for myself.

I think the work at Oberlin was very important, too, because Oberlin is one of those colleges which has a very small student body, but is very intense academically and was a college with a long tradition of rights and social service and these types of things. It was one of the first colleges to admit women, one of the first to admit -- or was the first to admit women, was the first to admit minorities, blacks, and has a long tradition of service. And so, in a sense, being immersed in that environment was also important to me.

So the educational background set me up to be interested in psychology because I felt I could become a school counselor and by working in school counseling, I would then have the summers free to work in summer camp programs. So a nice sort of juvenile view of the world, something one might be able to do and carry out. And, indeed, that's what evolved.

When I came back from the Marine Corps in '55, I went to the University of Michigan and asked if I could get involved in a school counseling program, a two-year master's degree program. But I took my Oberlin training with me when I went to visit the university, and Oberlin was open on Saturday and classes and program on Saturday. So I went to the

University of Michigan, and, of course, it was closed on Saturday. The one person at the graduate school said, "Well, we're not open on Saturday. Why don't you go over to the School of Education? Perhaps somebody might be there who could help you." So with [a] kind of concern of whether I'd wasted my whole weekend in driving up to the school -- of course, I should have called and gotten appointments, but I didn't -- I went over to the School of Education, and indeed, she was correct; nobody was there.

I wandered through the four floors, and at the very top floor, about midway down the hallway, there was a man working in his office. I knocked, and it turned out to be Clark Trow, who is an educational psychologist and who had just established a new program between the School of Education at the University of Michigan and the Department of Psychology in the liberal arts college. This joint program was to enroll students in both the department and the school so that it could be a joint Ph.D. in education and psychology, with a specialty in whatever area one chose. My interest was school psychology, obviously.

Before I left his office, he had sold me on enrolling in that program, which I had no idea I was going to sign up for. He found a small job for me, he arranged for a scholarship, and he sent me back to Youngstown to spend six months in servitude at the local university to get the hours of education I needed to catch up with where I should be and do student teaching and things like that. So in a sense, I hear all this targeting about -- discussions about need for careful planning on your careers and how preparation really works, and I'm sure it does, but in my case it was all very fortuitous. But still, the overarching goal of being prepared to do something in education, of service, and to maintain and interest in camps and camping. I mean that's -- [Laughter]

Q: Before you continue on this, I just wanted to ask, in terms of educational psychology at that time, was there a sort of a main school of thought, or -- I mean --

Weikart: Educational psychology at that point was -- I couldn't say there was a mainstream of thought. There was -- Basically there was a commitment to counseling in schools. They felt that was important. There was a -- There wasn't any sense of school reform movements as we think of now. There was always, of course, a reading reform. That was the height of the *Johnny Can't Read* period, which is interesting because I'm certain -- I haven't done it, but I'm certain if people went back and reread the dialogue between Clark Trow and [Rudolf] Flesch, who wrote the *[Why] Johnny Can't Read* book, one would find the same dialogue that's occurring today between those who are convinced that direct instruction and teaching the kids the phonetic approach to reading versus those who want the whole language -- I mean, so the debate goes on. It just cycles through year after year, with no clear resolution.

I think there was also a move at that point towards a very -- an increased interest in special education for special-needs children. While that had always been available in part, it tended to be located in state schools -- a state school for the deaf, a state school for the blind, these types of issues. This was the time in the late fifties, rather, early sixties, when the move was to close those kinds of institutions and to ask local school districts to take the responsibility through a -- in Michigan, through a state system of support so that the children would be at home with regular kids in regular schools and not isolated out into separate communities. So that was occurring, this kind of shift, which has continued to

this day. That hasn't been reversed, although there's some effort today to not go quite as far as we've gone.

Q: And you graduated and ended up in the Ypsilanti school system?

Weikart: I started at the University of Michigan in the Ph.D. program in the fall of 1956 and took standard course work that year, the fall. In the summer of 1957, I got married to a woman I met at the university, and we had purchased a house, and we had saved my phone number for the house so that we could make the transfer, we'd have one phone number that would transfer over. And, indeed, the first thing in the fall, my instructor from the School of Education, who had taught me a course on psychological testing, called up and said they had a need for some part-time school examiners in Ypsilanti, Michigan, to screen children for their two classes for the handicapped they were establishing, and would I be interested in doing that. Being time-rich and cash-poor, I was delighted to undertake that venture.

But that started working in Ypsilanti, and when the screening ended, they asked me – they needed somebody to stay on. They asked me to stay on, and gradually evolved a large Special Services Department. By 1958 I was appointed full time to -- as school psychologist and then Director of Special Services and so forth to evolve these programs, and by 1960-'61, we had about sixty classrooms in operation and a full staff of psychologists and social workers and school nurses and so forth to serve both the children of Ypsilanti, and we became the county center for most of these services. It was a very much needed, obvious thing to develop with funding available through the state, so it wasn't difficult to set it up.

Q: Okay. And then maybe we could just start talking about how -- you know, how, through that, you started doing work that you did with – it was the Perry school.

Weikart: Yes. One of the interesting things that came out of this work as a school psychologist was that it could either be treated as routine -- I mean teachers referred children for psychological testing, classes had to be filled, needs -- referrals came in, liaison with counseling services in hospitals to get children assessed, working with teachers to reintegrate children back in classrooms, this type of thing. But I became very concerned over the fact that as a school psychologist, I was testing children using standardized, both achievement and intelligence tests at that point, and I became very disturbed that I could, in fact, give IQs to children by knowing their address. And that really puzzled me, because this was the early sixties, late fifties, and the notion of an environmental component to IQ was not well accepted at that point. A book by J. McVicker Hunt called *Intelligence and Experience* was published in 1961, which really opened up the whole field again. Of course, periodically genetic versus environmental components have been looked at, but the fifties were pretty much convinced that God had given the IQ and it was tattooed on the left occipital lobe and it was there to stay.

So it became very concerning -- disconcerting to me and to members of my staff as we discussed it that we could actually write down these IQs, particularly of minority children, because the range seemed to be so narrow. So if you lived -- if you were a girl, especially, and you lived in the five hundred block of Harriet Street, your IQ was eighty-two, and we could do that without even testing. We thought we could save the system a lot of money by

simply short-cutting the process. But the point, of course, was let's explore this more thoroughly. And one thing we did is we went and looked at achievement testing of children in the school where the lowest socioeconomic kids were attending school, and we found that over a decade no classroom ever performed at better than a tenth percentile on achievement tests in any classroom in any year. Then we looked across town, where the youngsters in the College Heights district, where the professors lived who taught in local college and across the community in Ann Arbor at University of Michigan, and we looked at those classrooms, and we found that no classroom over a decade in any classroom ever achieved less than ninetieth percentile. So here you have a full range.

One either could say that was bad teaching by the teachers or good teaching by the teachers or you could say it was the way the kids are, or you could do something about it. The interesting thing was, when presented this problem, the school principals and superintendent council chose to do nothing about it. In a sense, they were really expressing the viewpoint that society at large had, is that this is the way things were. I mean, "If they worked harder, they could do better, but that's the way things are. You can't change much."

Interestingly enough, there were three principals who were interested in doing more, sort of buddies in a way. They were younger men, and they were involved in running really good schools, a lot of contact with parents and children and a lot of openness in the way they approached the schools themselves, and, with me, we thought through the fact that "Let's do something before the children come to school. Let's run a preschool." So, very easy to do. The schools, it didn't bother them. They didn't have to make any adjustments.

The state had passed legislation saying this was possible, so I had a source of funding for it, and obviously we could recruit the children and to do it.

The really sticking point, though, on why it became a research project and the basis -- became then what is now known as the High/Scope Perry Preschool Project, is that I brought a group of consultants together, about four or five, from universities in the area that work with children, child development or special-needs kids. And it was interesting, at the end of the discussion one afternoon, a couple of them said that they really did not think we should run the program, and the reason was that we would hurt the kids. That this would damage them, that we shouldn't do this, it just isn't appropriate.

Well, if you think back to the early sixties, the conditions there were such there weren't preschools. There was one at the local college for the college kids to have a couple of hours. There were a couple of play groups that were run where the parents hired a teacher, and then it was two days a week or three days a week for a couple of hours. It was that of thing, but care settings? No. Mothers were home with their kids, and that was the way it should be. So the notion of running a preschool was really pretty foreign to the way people thought.

But out of this came, then, an ethical question: If these -- if the advice from these people was let's not do the program, then should I do it? The solution, then, was to develop it as a research project. Let's make it a question. Let's make it an issue and convert it from a question of just running the program. I mean from an issue of just running the program

into a scientific question. Does it make a difference if these children have these experiences? And then we described those experiences.

Key here was that as a student in university taking statistical course, research design course, I thought this was a wonderful place to apply some of these new concepts. So we actually set it up with random assignment of sample. We surveyed the entire neighborhood, we selected the kids, we assigned them at random to Group A or Group B and then flipped a coin as to whether Group A or Group B became the treatment group and the other wasn't treated, and we didn't know which group was going to be advantaged by the experience, the group that didn't come or that we would not be harming or the group that did come that we would be helping or harming. We didn't know. And, of course, now it's very clear we helped them greatly.

But that was an interesting time because the point of the schools was, "Don't ask us to make a change in the elementary, junior, and senior high school program. We'll work on that as we traditionally do with school counseling, referrals out for kids that aren't doing well, accepting school dropout, early leaving, accepting dropout from graduation, these kinds of things." So that was just the standard pattern. But they permitted -- the board of education permitted the operation of the preschool and accepted the fact this might help in the long run.

Of course, these children now have been followed for two decades. Those same children have now been followed every year through age ten, then again at age fifteen, again at age nineteen, and just recently at age twenty-seven, and next year, I'm sorry, starting now, in

1999, we will be studying these same young men and women, now age forty, and so will be looking at the development over this period of time.

The essential findings for the project are that if a child has a high-quality early education project based around child initiative with planning, opportunities to talk about it, and good support from teachers, that children with that type of program have a significantly better chance in life. There's significantly less crime, less use of welfare, higher employment, more employment, higher wages for employment, more marriage resulting in children born within wedlock, and a general sense of kind of community responsibility, capacity, participation. And at no point throughout the study has the group without the program ever done better. They didn't do better in school, they haven't, certainly, done better in adulthood, and one reason for looking at age forty is we should see, actually, health benefits. We should also see what mechanism is used for social transmission, because their kids should be doing better, too.

One of the fascinating things from the study is its much broader import than just preschool, because we did an economic benefit study here and used a standard economy, econometric procedures, and we had economists involved to assist with this aspect. And what we found, if we take the cost that we spent on the extra program for two years and then we contrast that with the cost over and above it that we spent on the group without the program -- for example, more arrests, more welfare use, more criminal justice costs, less taxes because they haven't worked as much, these kinds of things, we find that the society in this case spent one dollar on the children in the preschool program. But the children who were not in the preschool program, we have now spent $7.16 on.

So there's an interesting issue here of trying to help policy-makers, help people involved in education, to think about, yes, we have education, we're helping children, but when there's also a larger economic and public policy issue: How do we want to reduce crime in this country? There aren't very many effective ways. One of the most effective ways is incarcerating them, and we now have 1.8 million men in prison, and that has reduced the crime rate, but it means an extraordinary price. For example, in New York State, the cost now for the criminal justice prison system is several hundreds of thousands more than the cost of higher education. In Michigan for the first time, the cost of higher education, at 1.6 billion, is being caught up to by the cost of the criminal justice system, where now it's raised to 1.57 billion. Next year it will be reversed. So, clearly, states are -- the public is spending money on prisons that should be spent -- actually is probably being taken away from higher education, and being put in the prison system.

Michigan a decade ago had one employee in fourteen that was in the criminal justice system, in the prison system. I don't mean the courts, etc.; the prison system. This year it's one in four. So it's clear that this incarceration rate is an enormous issue in this country, just in terms of mechanics, I'm not talking about whether it's good or bad. Do we want to affect that? What's fascinating that we can look at early childhood as one of the few methods that, in fact, can reduce crime as adults, because in the programs it's very clear you can cut it about eighty percent, and the reason isn't because you have "Crimebusters" stickers and things at the preschool, but because you help them make decisions. They create values. They learn how to solve problems. These are things which are the specific outcome of a high-quality early education program, and therefore you affect

the lifelong process, which is evidenced by the data, and not just one group but actually there's several groups that have been studied and followed this way, so these same products are coming out of them.

So it's a fascinating thing to think about early education and the service and what we need to do, but it's equally fascinating to think about the policy implications and the need to get involved in a broader perspective on what these values and these things mean and what we should do about them and really demand that the public at large do better.

Illustration: Head Start currently is moving towards full funding. We'll be servicing about a million children. This is outstanding. The problem, though, is that Head Start is not generally terribly effective. Now, it works and is better than nothing. Day care has been studied, several major studies recently, and day care is here to stay. Women are working, dads are working, and we have to put the -- children must be somewhere, and it must be of high quality, but most of the surveys show that it's a modest quality at best, a few outstanding, a few disasters, but most are very modest quality. We don't need to do that. We can have programs that work, we know how to make them work, and it should be installed, because we need to have the long-term outcome that these things offer. So it's fascinating to see that we're at a point when public policy could take advantage of information and really make a difference across the entire society, particularly for disadvantaged kids and families.

Q: What's the barrier?

Weikart: What is the barrier to doing this? Barrier one, I think, in education is that the whole pre-service education in colleges and universities is set up around finding out what's available, and by that they mean theoretically, they mean in terms of ranges of practice, these sorts of things. For example, after studying child development, they'll come to curriculum aspects, and there will be a semester when a course will look at curriculum, and they'll take six curricula and look at each one, and three weeks on each or something. This doesn't prepare a teacher to install it and work at quality.

I think a second area is that it's been very difficult to come up with instrumentation that will assess the quality of a program. We're very good at looking at air cubic feet per minute exchange in the classroom and nutritional input to children and whether hands are washed and certain health factors. Much more difficult to reach an agreement and then assess the quality of the teacher-child interaction, but good programs have those instruments attached to them, and it can be judged. I think the issue now, now that we know this is such a valuable national asset, the issue is how to put it in broad use, and the barriers are that we've just never done it. Everybody wants to make their own decision. Teachers aren't trained to implement specific models, and, in general, there's a general suspicion that that could be done. So it's an interesting challenge.

I think Carnegie's involvement with High/Scope began before actually High/Scope existed as an institution. When I was still working for the Ypsilanti public schools in 1967, we felt quite secure about the results from the High/Scope Perry Study that this looked good. It's going to -- The data had always pointed that the children with the program were doing better than the children without the program, but we reneged with the thought that

perhaps if we started at birth, we could do much better than just starting at age three, and developmentally that made sense. There's a period of development between birth and age three that's unique and is integrative psychologically, it's integrative physiologically, it's integrative emotionally. This seems like a good time to begin.

The age three to fours -- three, four, five is interesting because the child moves out of the home, relates with strange adults easily, new peers, psychologically much more active, has developed language, is mobile, can physically move around -- indeed, you have to catch them, keep them contained, fenced in, trying to protect them. [Laughter] And so there's a tremendous difference. So if we start it earlier, could we develop a better platform?

So we wrote a proposal and sent it off to the Carnegie Corporation. Now, the only reason we sent it off to the Carnegie Corporation was because I guess I had heard of it. I didn't know it. I knew it was in New York, but I'd never been to New York. So this was an interesting event, in a sense. I don't even think I wrote and got application materials. I don't think I was sophisticated enough to realize that perhaps there was an application procedure.

So we wrote down what we wanted to do and prepared our proposal and sent it in, and in the proposal we did not mention the word "infant," because I was certain that the preschool, the idea of working with threes and fours -- this was '67. Head Start had come in, but preschool was sort of, "No, let's not do that. It's for disadvantaged kids. Not much to do." So we thought perhaps we could work with infants, and if I didn't say the word, they would see the ages, you know, three months and seven months and eleven months,

which were the groups of intervention period, and they would catch on, but they would help us play the charade of not writing down the word we were going to work with infants, because nobody worked with infants, at least not in education.

They wrote back and said they were interested and they had a few questions, and they were sending a field visitor out to visit us. Well, this threw us in a tizzy. We'd never had a field visitor before. Who are they and what happens? So we'd arranged it. And, lo and behold, Barbara Finberg, who later grew up to be executive vice president of the [Carnegie] Foundation [Corporation], came out, and her first visit -- I think it may have been near her first field visit. I'm not sure it was her first, but one of the few. She came in the fall of '67 and visited us and put us through our paces, and it was a fascinating experience, because we obviously were inordinately proud of what we had been doing, and we took her to the preschool, which was in operation, and we took her to the -- we reviewed the work we'd been doing on just visiting homes with no preschool because we wanted to test whether parents would accept the idea of teachers come into the home without any service. I mean, the service was coming to the home versus "We're coming in to get your child into a program that will help the child." We met that staff so she would be familiar with that process, and generally had a good day.

I recall that perhaps the most interesting thing of the day, though, was towards the end I had an appointment with the superintendent of schools because, obviously, he had to sign off on the application, and if the money were granted, he'd have to accept the resources in order to do this. I recall going into his office, he had a very large office, and at the far end was his desk, and he was sitting behind the desk when we came in. I said, "Paul, this is

Barbara Finberg from Carnegie Corporation. Barbara, this is Dr. Emerick, the superintendent of schools for the Schools of Ypsilanti." He said, "Oh, Barbara, I'm glad to see you. Now, I hope you'll just take your money and go back to New York. We have enough trouble without it." I was aghast, and he sort of recanted slightly during the meeting, but she clearly got the point that this was not his favorite project. But in spite of that, they took the gamble and awarded the three-year grant to us to do the work. So that was our first grant from Carnegie, and it was in an area of absolute, totally unknown. They were taking a horrendous risk. I mean, nobody was working -- or, as far as I know, nobody was working with infants at that point the way we were in terms of education. There were physiological studies – rather physical studies, nutritional studies, but not the education side, and we -- doing it via home visit was fascinating, and they responded to that and encouraged us to do it.

At the end of this project, the data from the project were exciting. It was very clear that children who had been randomly assigned by chance to be in the group with the treatment did do better on standardized IQ and language tests at age three. Now, that's a very young time to use these instruments, but it's -- you get at least the sense of it. It was clear between the two, and, of course, our process measures were positive.

Based on that, we went back to Carnegie, and we asked for funds to videotape home teaching so that we could develop training materials and document the process. With a great deal of discussion and budget adjustments because that was a very expensive undertaking, we came back and decided to do it in three-quarter-inch black and white video. In retrospect, that was not a correct decision. I should have either done less

videotaping and used sixteen-millimeter film or waited a year till all the color technology came out or paid the extra money for the color to videotape technology at the point, because the black and white ended up having very limited use simply because it was black and white. So in a way it was an excellent project, lots of information, lots of visits, and quite a number of programs developed that described home teaching and things to do with parents and things to do with kids and how to be supportive without being directive. But it didn't get used to the extent it should.

At the end of this project, we wanted to go into dissemination. We wanted to --

Q: That's now part B --

Weikart: The first project was three years doing --

[END TAPE ONE, SIDE ONE; BEGIN TAPE ONE, SIDE TWO]

Weikart: So then we did the three years of the videotaping project, organizing this. At the end of that time we wanted to do dissemination, and we felt we had a handle on the curriculum component, and we felt we had a handle on the training side. Basically, the program at this point was a home visit once a week, where the teacher went into the home and worked with the mother and the child simultaneously; bringing toys and activities into the home, but it wasn't a directive program. For example we always -- you can't ask a three-month-old or eleven-month-old or even a fifteen- or eighteen-month-old, but we would present them with choices, and the child would choose. One of the interesting things

we found in that, for example -- we even videotaped it -- if you give a child a toy, they might take thirty seconds, forty seconds, a minute with it, and they're done. But if you give a choice of two or three, they'll spend up to forty minutes with the toy they choose. And I was fascinated to look at that, because we could demonstrate it any time we wanted to just by not giving the choice or giving the choice. It was interesting to help mothers understand that and to help them see the process of letting the child not be more independent, in a sense, but by including them actively in it, that this was important.

Part of the training, too, was what now people call the ping-pong effect or things like this, where you say something to a child or -- and you wait for the youngster to respond, and then when the child responds, you respond the equivalent. So if the child gives you a short response, you give a short response back. If the child gives you a longer display, then you give a longer display back. So helping the mothers find ways of interacting with children, because many of the mothers we were working with from very disadvantaged homes had a lot of responsibilities, a lot of distractions, a lot of pressures on them, and spending this time to work, to think, to connect with their babies kind of set up a relationship which then we could see would be extended beyond that.

At the end of the project, we had found this enormous difference between the groups, but because High/Scope does longitudinal projects, a year after the project was over, we went back and interviewed all the families and tested all the children, and there was no difference on any measure, in any way, between the two groups. This is fascinating, because, in general, this what almost infant education projects find is that you can't get -- is that if you're a good program, you can get a result at the end of the project, but if you go

back and look a year later, it's gone. And there's a lot of issues for that, one of which is that you can accelerate development with very young children by doing different things, but physiologically it catches up.

It's the famous Johnny and Jimmy experiments from the forties where they trained one of a pair of twins to climb a stairs and didn't train the other one. Of course, when they tested at the end of the training, one could climb the stairs, the other couldn't, but you waited until normally children were climbing stairs, and both climbed the stairs equally. So it's a fascinating issue for the pre -- the ages up to three. At this point, Barbara brought a committee out to visit me because we were asking to be able to disseminate this. Now, of course --

Q: You mean the findings?

Weikart: Not the findings, the work, how to do it. In other words we wanted to go to other communities and train groups to do this work, based on what we found initially. Now, the committee came out and reviewed it and asked, of course, "Well, what do you think it means?" when it didn't work a year later, and I couldn't answer that except by saying, "One assumption is it may appear later and just disappeared for now. We laid the foundation. We know it because we assessed it." The other possibility is that, in fact, it's disappeared. It's the Johnny and Jimmy effect, and Johnny has caught up to Jimmy, and that's the way it's going to be, and that there isn't much you can do with an infant in the pre-operational period, to use Piagetian words. So the basic committee, then, reviewed for a day and came

back the next morning and rejected our proposal. I mean, they couldn't reject it, but they advised Barbara to reject it, and Barbara did. It was heart-rending, heart-breaking.

But two things happened then. One, Barbara was interested in something else we were doing, and so the next major Carnegie grant -- there was a small one there, kind of a transition grant of $25,000 or something, I think, at that point -- but there was a transition into a major grant to do our longitudinal follow-up, which allowed us to go back at age seven for the infants and examine them at second grade in terms of the -- because perhaps it was a sleeper effect, that there was no difference early but it would show later. It didn't, but it was a solid notion. I've always wished I'd gone back and looked at them later, but, of course, if you can't find it earlier, you're not going to find it later. So there's little reason to do that. This funded also our next phase of follow-up for the High/Scope Perry Study, and so it allowed that for a four-year period, and then it also allowed us to do the complete and follow-up of the curriculum compare study, where we looked at three different methodologies of working with young children.

Now, the High/Scope Foundation had been established in July first, 1970, and another important thing that Carnegie permitted us to do was to shift the grant for the videotaping from the public schools to the Foundation. Indeed, all of our grantors permitted that, so that it was a possible transfer of work.

So the Carnegie Corporation, then, during the seventies was really very helpful with this. But one thing Barbara did for us a number of times as part of, I think, the Carnegie philosophy at this point was that we've helped with the project and did some work and we

helped you gain information about, in this case, the long-term follow-up, which was very successful. What are you going to do with that? And she asked us questions such as, how do you release the information? How do you not just put it in journals and so forth, which is easy enough to do but nothing happens as a result of that. How do we make something happen? How do we get into the public policy arena?

And out of that, then, grew up a project which they funded until 1989, which was a project based on what we called Voices for Children, which was a way of helping states think about the information from the studies and how it could apply within their state. And our philosophy for this was to go to local communities and look at the intermediary decision-makers. We didn't go to the state government or to the state legislative bodies or state Departments of Education or social service, because we felt they were really following out the instructions of the public. What we had to do was change the public base, and our theory was that we had to change the decision-makers' base. So we didn't want a popular campaign in newspapers and so forth because that wouldn't get the right people, but Rotary Clubs, ministerial associations, business and professional clubs, the local economics club, the local Chamber of Commerce.

So we took four states, Michigan, Ohio, North and South Carolina, and we worked that way very aggressively to develop local speakers to actually go and speak to these people, to develop film strips and other materials that would support them in talking about it, and, in general, getting information across. And it worked, I think, very effectively. Governor [Richard W.] Riley in South Carolina at that time was very much involved in this and had us use our materials and our whole process as a way of his development of a kindergarten

program throughout the state and a general tax reform which then also supported some preschool education. So it was interesting to see how we could be of use and how this information people would accept and value. It was especially important that the business community was very pleased that we liked children. They were delighted. I mean, "I have grandchildren, too," they would say. You know, it was very important.

The only thing that really got through was the benefit-cost study. If we hadn't given them the dollars outcomes, they would only regard it as a kindness, but when you could talk about it from a tax perspective, it became a very different conversation. It become one of turning them to the legislators and others and saying, "Well, why aren't we doing this? Why am I paying all these extra taxes? How come we're putting up with this?" and asking those questions, and that illustrates what is still done today, that that level discussion. So the Carnegie Foundation [Corporation] --

[END TAPE ONE, SIDE TWO; BEGIN TAPE TWO, SIDE ONE]

Weikart: The Carnegie Corporation came back to us during this public policy thing and asking us frequently, "How can you make it better? How can you do broader things? What can be done?" I think that was very helpful input from the Corporation and, I think, Barbara's interest in that. They also asked something else that was very important, which was, "How can you support your institution beyond grants and contracts?" That was fascinating, because I had never thought of it from that perspective of it. So what actually happened was that in 1978 or so, the Foundation set up a press, a publishing arm, in order to say, "Well, this is something that's connected directly to what we do. It's an area where

we can have a real contribution by making materials available, we can control the costs we can keep it -- we don't have a marketing arm, etc., it can be reasonable, and we can also make sure materials are available over a long time so things don't become fugitive, disappear, gone." So the press was set up in the late seventies and then, through the eighties, grew and now is not large, but it's a very useful arm.

I think, too, it might be helpful to talk a minute about the High/Scope Foundation itself that during this period Carnegie was funding a portion of it. The Foundation was set up in 1970 as an opportunity to carry on the work that was developed in the sixties, work with infants, work with the preschool child, and work at elementary school, and work with adolescents, so the four areas that we were involved in. Both the work at the elementary level worked at trying to alter curricular practices in schools for National Follow-Through, which was a large-scale project at that point working in many schools around the nation, and our work with adolescents was developed through the summer program which had been established in the early sixties from which the name for the High/Scope Foundation was derived. Everyone always says, well, what does High/Scope mean? "High" for aspiration level and "Scope" for breadth of desire or goal for what we might try to be in the way of service.

So the -- when the Foundation was set up in June of 1970, I asked -- well, I already knew the answer, but that was the point they had to make the final decision -- would they [staff] be willing to switch from the public schools to the Foundation. From a public entity with retirement funds and guaranteed income and salary schedules and all those nice things that provide job security to a new 501(c)(3) with no financial history, no money, no security.

[Laughter] And it's fascinating to me, it's always been a bit of joy in heart is that they all transferred, and I felt that was an enormous endorsement of the work and the confidence that they had in themselves, in the work, and in my leadership. So that was always very interesting.

The Foundation today is funded basically by three major sources: the income from the press, income from training contracts, where we work around the country and overseas to help people understand and apply the High/Scope methodology, and another third from grants, contracts, things we do in research and development and services that are involved. So those are the three basic areas that's in use.

I think Carnegie has over the years been an interesting element for us. It's been one of the few continuing funders that we had from 19 -- really twenty years, from 1969 to 1989, or 1967 -- twenty-two years -- to 1989 [1968 to 1989]. We also probably transversed with them a whole range of changes within the institution, within Carnegie, certainly within us, but within Carnegie, and we also, I think it's a period of time which impacted the philanthropic field in general. Philanthropy shifted during this period. The way I see it, in the sixties there was a capacity on the part of foundations to fund people who brought in ideas that could promote change. They looked for those ideas. I think that's why they responded to the parent-infant work; it was something novel. It was not typical, it was certainly not safe, a lot of risk-taking at that era and willingness to reach out and try those things. I think both on my part and, certainly, I think, on many of the foundations', as I've talked with different executives over the years, there was an assumption that, indeed, we would find answers, and with those answers people would accept them and programs

would implement them; they would be done. But as we now know, that's not the way it works. Things were discovered. Things came out.

So then there was a sense, a period of disillusionment, I think, in the early, mid-seventies, early eighties, where all these great solutions that came up either didn't work or, if they did work, the originator has disappeared and nothing ever happened and it just didn't function. I think at that point foundations began to take more responsibility in saying, "Well, we're going to set out areas of work that we're going to have people get involved in and systematically work on," and foundations began to then more clearly define their areas of interest and almost say, "If you're going to send us an idea, it has to be in this area if you want it seriously considered." And I don't mean it in the broad area of early childhood; I mean very focused in the broad area of economic studies or something. And that certainly seems a reasonable request, except I need to convey a sense of narrowing of opportunity that occurred in working with foundations. In a sense, the project officer became much more a determinant of what was submitted and less of a responder, a colleague, in thinking about it and maybe making it work.

Q: In other words, when you describe the interaction you had with Barbara Finberg over some of those things, that that was -- that would be the way you would characterize it, that it was -- it was --

Weikart: Well, Barbara, I think, would represent the work she did in counseling us about getting more dissemination aspects that reflected both the need to move from a more parochial "We did our project, we published our results," into taking it beyond that, and

also a very refined or positive reflection of the field, saying, in my judgment, I think Barbara, in a sense -- I'm putting words in her mouth; I don't know if she would say this -- but that you hear some issues you have to think about, like longitudinal stability of the institution, how do you set that up, and asking me questions that my board was asking as well, but it was interesting to find an outside party asking the same questions.

I think then what's happened more recently is that the foundations, and Carnegie's included in this, have begun to actually become contractors for specific pieces of work, such as, in Carnegie's sense, *Starting Points*, where they funded infant programs in different places in the country, or *Turning Points*, the adolescent work where, you know, you send in your proposal from these selected states, and we will award five proposals, etc. That means that there's been a whole shift from the Carnegie or philanthropic -- because they're not the only one doing it -- which says, in a way, the board of directors and the staff officers have taken over the direction of the work. This is almost the same, then, as what the federal government has done by its laying out, specifying periods of work, direction, things that should be done, "We want work in this area. We don't care about those areas over there. We want it here," or, "We have money from Congress for this area, so I'm going to spend it in this means." But the foundations have done the same process. And why not? It's their funds and it's their staff and so forth.

The problem is, I think it's shifted the relationship, that people without money who have -- dealing with real problems, real issues, have no place to turn unless they're responding to a very narrowly described or prospective proposal area. On the other hand, the institutions with the venture capital, if you will, the ones who can take the big risks in the field, are

now saying, "Well, we're going to do it this way." And probably even more questionable is the boards of directors, who may or may not be expert in the fields, are laying out courses of study and work. And so there's -- And then ultimately this throws, then, the project officers into the person's, in a sense, spending their money instead of the public's money or the field's money. So, instead of just being accountable and responsible and charged with finding innovation and processes, they have taken on more, they're saying, "Well, this is the course of study I want. I'd like this policy paper prepared. I'd like this task done," and choosing those people who can do that. Again, it's their funds. Why not? But I don't think it's forwarding the innovation.

I can see a reason for that, because there must be enormous frustration on the part of foundations, Carnegie especially, which has been so innovative and so influential, in the fact things haven't moved so fast or beyond or haven't changed. The public school problems are still the public school problems. They aren't any different. A new reading program will be launched next month or next year or three years from now, and it'll have the same problems that we had in 1970 or in 1960 or in 1955, when I first met Clark Trow. There must be enormous frustration those changes aren't there.

I think there's probably one major area of that is very difficult for the foundations to deal with, and institutionally it's the space I've moved to, which is that at the point you do work and get the stuff done, you reach a point when it is ready to, in fact, break into new ground, do new things. For High/Scope, it's development of the High/Scope curriculum, now ready to go to large-scale national work, with thousands of trainers, with hundreds of thousands of children, and to take the responsibility of saying, "This is the benchmark.

You have to be at least this good if you're going to work with kids." Now, you can be better, because there's enormous to be known how we integrate the arts into early education. How do we integrate movement? How do we integrate music? Things the brain researchers are point out, that this is the window of opportunity and we don't do it. We wait till later, like teaching foreign languages, not the languages, per se, but the sound systems. Three, four, five is when you -- birth to five is when you do that, certainly before seven or eight or nine, but we wait until senior high school to teach them. So there's lots of things that can be done, but somehow we have to accept benchmarks, that no program should be of lesser quality than this.

It's interesting, because, in talking with several foundations about this problem, they have said, "Well, this is not our problem. This is the problem of the federal government." But it's interesting, the federal government, I don't think, can respond to this because they're not in the business, in education, of working towards specific systems or models or things, though recently they have begun to put in using only programs that are validated, but they haven't set any standards for validation, so almost anything goes. So it's an interesting problem of what next, what to do next. So I think it then swings back to the foundations of how inventive can they be and what is the new focus that they can put stress upon, how can it be moved through. So from my own personal development's perspective, that over the last forty years I've taken a concept from "Don't do it. It's going to hurt the kids," through to demonstrating it can make[1] massive, long-term difficulties, much to the benefit of society, way beyond just helping a couple of kids. Then the question is, in a brand-new field, of how do you put things broad scale, wide scale, or "go-to-scale," as it's called. And

[1] Read "correct" here instead of "make". -- D.P. Weikart, 8/99

that's fascinating because we don't have much evidence about programs that have gone to scale. We don't -- I'm not quite sure how you do it.

Now, we do in the commercial world. We'll produce a product, it's advertised, it's sold, it's put in the supermarkets, things are put out, but it's a commercial transaction and the evaluation is whether it's sold or not. It's a very straightforward function, and the people funding it have enormous goals of doing so. If I put in a million and it really goes, maybe I'll get twenty million back. And in education, it generally doesn't have it. It's interesting to note that the most marketing that's done in education has to do with child materials, which are things they can consume and use in a year and then have to be repurchased, and these are always around the least interesting things, like worksheets and numbers and sound systems and things like this that are not terribly interesting. The important things like processes of education have little market value and are ways of thinking about children, ways of interacting, and those are more difficult to disseminate, and they also have no commercial value. So it's interesting at what point do foundations look at this kind of issue and see what can be done.

I guess I'm -- oh, and the other thing that foundations are doing increasingly now is they're geographically focusing their interest, and very narrowly. Carnegie is unusual, and it's maintained a national interest and has sustained that over time and has not reneged on it. Though they do have some focus on a few special areas, geographic areas, they have generally been very, very open to this, and that's not typical of most foundations, which have a much more geocentric location, point of view. They're tied more to a state, a city, or an area, and some major foundations do that.

One foundation in the South which has some eighty to a hundred million dollars to spend every year. There are two men in charge and three secretaries, and they write five checks, and it all goes to one city. It's wonderful for the city and builds a great many buildings.

Q: A question. In this -- You may have really covered it when you talked before about Carnegie -- sort of you've known it through three stages or phases. Were those specifically what you were discussing before, you know, sort of taking ideas over the transom versus, then, sort of this middle ground to actually becoming the operatives themselves? Is that what you meant?

Weikart: Yes, that would be the thing.

Q: Where you're not tied to personalities?

Weikart: No. I think the -- probably someone who works with the philanthropic field may have a stronger sense of exactly how that's evolved, but it's not unique to Carnegie, but I think it's would be an interesting discussion as to what's the value and how it comes out and whether it works or not. My own sense is that change is -- you have to have true believers in change. You can't send out an RFP [Request for Proposal] to a state and ask them to send in a plan to work with adolescents in five communities. I just -- you don't have the heart there.

I remember coming to New York in the early days when Higher Horizons was here. That

must have been mid-sixties at that point, or late sixties. I came to see the man who was in charge, and I didn't; I saw the man who was currently in charge. And he -- the Higher Horizons program was a junior high program designed to motivate children, youth, to do better in school and go on into college, and it had a lot of after-school programming and it had teacher involvement and all kinds of things.

Well I came here perhaps three years after its great success, and I met the man in charge, and he had a desk in the hallway of some elementary school, and he had a secretary sitting beside him, and he had no idea where the programs -- which schools the programs were in and how well they were doing, and he just knew he had to fill out this paperwork and get it in. I asked where the man was who had originated the study. Well, he had been promoted downtown to Livingston Street here in New York to do some work in some other area.

And in a way, that is the cycle of invention and success and then disappearance that is so common, I think, in the education field, where we are really committed to a sort of great man, great woman, theory of how/why things work. There's one person, and it works because that person in it works within their range, and then it doesn't work beyond that. I think we've really not accepted the challenge of working with the evidence that has come out of a number of projects, that say these are things we need to do as a basis for what we do.

Q: Is that true in part, then, because -- I mean, are these foundations really able to really successfully evaluate programs like yours? I know they hire people to go do it, but are they

able to, if you're not trained, to really think through the issues and the problems and the long-range impact, the kind of work you do?

Weikart: I'm not sure what the implications are.

Q: In other words do you think they're evaluative?

Weikart: I mean, work like High/Scope's preschool program has been very clearly evaluated. There's no question of it. It's been reassessed, reanalyzed, stretched, looked at by a various range, even to the point of redoing the reanalysis of the data itself, and they find the same outcomes that we find. So there's a -- I think the analysis is there. I think in a number of programs that there is -- they've been difficult to assess. They don't know what they are; they're just processes.

We have a number of programs, of course, in wide use in this country where the data do not support the project. A good example is D.A.R.E. [Drug Abuse Resistance Education], the drug treatment [education, not treatment] program. I think almost universally the evaluations by independent evaluators have indicated that the billion dollars spent on D.A.R.E. is not well spent, and often -- in that case, primarily for developmental reasons, they're targeted at the ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen-year-old, basically ten, elevens, and that's not the age. You can get absolutely beautiful results with any project with tens and elevens. They're with you all the way, but at twelve and thirteen you begin to get the hormonal shift and the change, and by fourteen, fifteen, these are independent thinkers, and what they thought at ten does not relate to the independence they perceive themselves

as having at fourteen. So a project like D.A.R.E., which focuses on drug training at this early stage, has not demonstrated long-term success, but you can't convince anybody that's not true. So federal money goes into it, local money goes to it. Even in my little community where I live, they put $5,000 a year into the D.A.R.E. program, which they can ill afford. It's interesting where, here, research has been contrary just to popular opinion, and so it doesn't have any impact at all. So it's a mysterious event.

Q: Comparing Carnegie to other foundations that you may have worked with, how do they compare in terms of evaluation? How do they think about it as opposed to other terms?

Weikart: Carnegie has been very important as a group that has asked for evaluations and has been willing to pay for them. A number of foundations will ask for an evaluation but have no interest in paying for it, but Carnegie is often asked that. In High/Scope's sense, the projects themselves, the preschool projects, were paid for by state funds, the actual operation. So the evaluation component was one done directly with Carnegie. That they funded the evaluation. That was their component of it in that four-year period in the seventies where they were funding all of our long-term evaluations. They were very interested in long-term evaluations.

So there was a sophistication at the level of saying, "Yes, we're aware that projects need to be evaluated during their work, but do they have any impact?" That's a question not often asked by anybody. I mean they want to know at the end of the project what do you have and not what the long-term impact has. And if we're data-driven, we have to ask that question because it's very easy to get short-term impacts on any project. We've done an

international survey with some 5,000 parents asking them about the quality of the preschools their children attend in fifteen countries, I'm sorry 21,000 parents from fifteen countries, and less than one percent in any country has a problem with the preschool the kids attend. So you can always get evaluations that are very positive. It's when you get inside them and really tease them apart and look for really serious issues that you get a difference.

Q: You did say yesterday, too, you thought that this was true of a lot of foundations, that I it's -- they just sort of look at the number of dollars that have gone out for things and you know, when you can't really necessarily quantify or qualify what you've gotten at the end, that it just sort of cuts into that -- you know, the ability to sort be risk-takers.

Weikart: Well, I think one of the most interesting things in the United States is the role of the foundations. When I work in other countries -- Britain, for example, has a number of foundations. They think, though, 15,000 pounds is a big grant. So the foundation size simply isn't there for large projects of various kinds. So there's a lot more government funding, almost equivalent of foundation funding there. But outside of that, in most of the countries I've worked in, like Latin American countries, there basically are no foundations. Foundations are a fairly U.S.-specific event where philanthropists have put their resources into this type of work. So the development of risk-taking is perhaps a good example of the frontier mentality in the United States. We will try these things. And that, I think, is something that the foundations need to preserve, this risk-taking on new, novel, unpopular ideas.

Q: Other than the issue of not being able to accomplish what they thought they could, talking back about foundations going to be -- towards more centralization and ownership of their own ideas, what are some other reasons in the American culture and political process that you could think of that might account for this shift?

Weikart: I think that there's also a secular change. In the fifties and sixties, there was a dynamic societal shift. The Civil Rights Movement in the late fifties through the early sixties was definitely a point of moral and physical action within the country. Laws had to be changed, people's opinions had to shift, new viewpoints had to be attempted and tolerated. Even among the most liberal, things were different. But that also was energizing. In the late sixties, of course, was the Vietnamese War protests, the Free Speech Movement, the whole societal shift that entailed. So there were energies at that point that allowed for the risk-taking and the venturing and so forth of foundations. I think as the changes have occurred and the society has become -- Cold War over, the kinds of just overall shifts, plus the extraordinary increase of assets the foundations have experienced has introduced a whole notion of much more conservative, much more conserving kind of orientation. So I think we have to give a lot of credence to the large, macro issues of the times, as compared to individual choices and decisions.

There are still foundations that are still very risk-taking, and some of the new entrepreneurs who have set up these foundations, several in Seattle from the Microsoft entrepreneurs, who have put in very small amounts of money but commit some of their own time to it, so you not only get your $10,000 check, but you get forty hours of investment or one day a week or something that's involved. So there's a lot of alternative

strategies being developed which may set a whole new pace in philanthropic undertakings. And, of course, there's been the predictions, too, that philanthropy will become actually a massive financial source within the country, particularly in some of the current -- if the current wealth in the software and technology industries are -- is, in fact, preserved and put into some public-service form. There are huge amounts of money coming on stream that are far beyond anything which we look at today. If Bill Gates would decide to put even half of his wealth into a foundation, it would be bigger than the next three put together. So some change is coming downstream with lots of these kinds of people.

But I think the biggest challenge we face is this notion of, can you go national? Can you take ideas from small scale to large scale? And can you insist upon a level of quality that would benefit the participants and the nation? And that's a hard topic, because there's no easy -- there's no clear avenue for that to occur.

Q: That's what you're moving on to now.

Weikart: That's our goal as an institution. The other interesting thing that's come out, too, is that much of the work that's been done has been focused on the idea of doing something, like working with infants or working with preschoolers or working with adolescents or providing creative dance or-- it's in this conceptual chunk. Some studies that have come out, some of our own, have indicated that it is, in fact, how you do it, not that you do it.

Another fascinating study that we've worked with and that Carnegie funded in the seventies was the comparison of three curriculum approaches, because we felt that in the sixties, that we were getting success in the preschool but was it a method or was it just simply that three-year-olds had this opportunity to be with strange adults for several hours a day? I mean, is that all that it takes? And one of the fascinating things that's come from this study, which we call the High/Scope Three Curriculum -- our curriculum comparison study, studying three curricula -- is that the programs that are organized around telling children what they need to know, really getting them conversant with math and numbers and simple multiplication, addition, subtraction, letter recognition, simple word-recalling, writing down simple stories, simple words, doing worksheets, these kinds of things, where the teacher must be in charge and direct the child to efficiently accomplish these goals, that those programs do not assist the child effectively. As they go through elementary school, they don't achieve better, even though they've had two years of extra academic preparation, as compared to children who come through other, more child-centered methods. And the second aspect is that these kids who come through that way show a degree in school of behavior problem leading to about fifty percent of them being seen by the schools as emotionally disturbed, and then as they go into teenage and young adulthood, they show up as the problem worker, the child who's more likely to be arrested, the one who, unlike others at this age, young adulthood, are getting married, establishing families, they're not. There's a lot of irritant -- irritability. Indeed, one of the saddest parts of our data is that one third of these kids, even at age twenty-three, report that their parents don't think they're doing well, while none of the kids in other methods where they're a lot more child-initiated, oriented around child planning, child decision-making, child problem-solving, where you're not dealing with numbers directly but indirectly, these

kids don't find that. They're doing just as well in school, and out of school they don't have these problems. They don't have that irritation with the community, don't have that irritation with the family.

One of my colleagues said it's almost like the kids in the direct instruction programs are being taught so much and so hard, they don't get to make any decisions. Then at age fifteen, nineteen, twenty, when they get to make decisions, they make the wrong ones. So it's a fascinating thing, because out of these kinds of studies are coming --

[END TAPE TWO, SIDE ONE; BEGIN TAPE TWO, SIDE TWO]

Weikart: It's fascinating that there is this growing conception, I think, that we have not been able to function with what is -- what Charles [A.] Murray has called "the underclass." I guess everybody -- I can call it the underclass, the American underclass, in other words, the inner-city urban kids or the rural, really deprived, out-in-the-sticks kids whose future is to be underclass, and we haven't found a solution for that. And it seems to me that one of the fascinating things is to pick up the investment of the last forty years from High/Scope and other works, finding those few that have really worked, and seeing if you can't do something about the underclass. Because we learned from the welfare program, the War on Poverty, spending $1.5 trillion on the underclass didn't change anything. We found that doing these education programs and so forth hasn't really shifted things. The achievement gaps still exist. The problems are still there. We can help individuals. We can select and save them, but we really haven't taken the task of stepping in and saying, "We're going to make this different, and we're going to do it this way," and obviously I

think that it's going to be hard to pick and choose which ways to move, but I think we need to do that because we should not continue with what we have.

Q: That's great. Terrific. Do you have something else you would like say?

Weikart: Not within this frame. Why don't you ask me a question, or just [inaudible].

Q: Do you have a scenario for going national?

Weikart: Well, I think that the problem of going national is a very serious one, because there's lots of issues. High/Scope's solution of this, which we've tried out in small projects that only involved 1,500 people and $10 million, I mean, a small project, was to ask the question that, let's use a validated curriculum methodology which we know works and that has a validated training system so that you can help others use it and has a validated assessment system to know whether children are making progress and whether the program is actually in place. Now, unless you can answer yes on all those points, there's no point in going national, because if you don't have a validated assessment system, you'll never know whether the programs are in place. You will have done them, but you won't know it. If you don't have a training system, then how are you going to do it?

So our strategy is to work through a transfer of this capacity from our own experienced staff and those that we've trained to leaders in local communities who run child care, day care, Head Start, church-related, public-school-related programs, and to give a seven-week training program over a year's span to those trainers in those local communities. And we

go into a community, work with twenty to twenty-five people from all sectors at the same time. We don't ask just Head Start to come and then just day care or just public school. And the reason we do that is that these people, these twenty or twenty-five in a community, become the resource across the whole community for training, because their task is to train local teachers, and they need to support each other and to work cooperatively, and there's no reason to do it just in public schools or just in Head Starts. It needs to be cooperative across the group so they can share training. And also we find it enormously effective for people trained, say, who are Head Start trainers, to spend some time training in a day care setting. They learn so much, and vice versa. So we often find many communities where the trainers just trade days; they don't trade money, they just trade days so they can gain these experiences.

Our goal is to train 4,000 of these trainers nationally. That would cover most of the eighty major metropolitan districts and any other major population center would be covered by that. We'd have to think carefully about rural distant areas, but that would cover the main.

We've often been asked about, "Could you do it with distance education?" And the interesting thing is, we don't think so, because when you're passing information or training to a -- like mathematics or something like this, that's information, you're learning. Training to training and learning new methods is a personal transformation, a personal development, and we don't do that well in isolation. We need others to talk with, to share with, to go through the process with, because it's very much of a personal shift and change.

So our experience to date is it has to be personal. Those 4,000 trainers, then, would be responsible for training approximately 100,000 teachers, because each of them works with about twenty teachers a year and can work this out. Those 100,000 teachers, of course, work with a million children, because these have a ratio of about one to ten or maybe even more, a million and a half, one to fifteen in some cases. So it's interesting to look at it not as a cascade, each one train one, but High/Scope and its staff trainers and people around the country who are working with this train local individuals who become expert in the High/Scope methodology. They, in turn, train teachers and develop that responsibility and maintain the network. Through that capacity, then, the assessment is done, the support is done, and the long-term development is done.

We did a study after this large-scale project we did as a trial, and we went back four years after we had done the training, and we found that ninety-eight percent of the people we had trained as trainers were still training. So an argument often made in early education is, staff turnover is so great, why bother? It's just a wasted investment. But at this level of training people who are in charge and responsible, it's not a waste. They're there. They're still training.

So our goal is to train trainers in local communities to develop the skills and capacities that are just as good as ours and can work locally. Since there's no cost to the system, it's just a matter of training. Once that's accomplished, then the money's already in place to cover all the costs, so it's not an issue.

I think our main goal is to permit a development of an assessment system that's embedded in this national project so that we can, at all points, attest to the funders that the program is meeting this level of success, and that instrument is available and widely used now and can be done.

I think the fascinating thing, to me, is that this can only be done through philanthropy because there's no money to be made. There is not a product to sell. There's no child replacement kits to be picked up. It's something that we have to change, but it has an interesting thing because it takes a recommitment on the part of teachers, and what we find is that it doesn't fit everybody, so some teachers would prefer to stick with something else. And I think that's wonderful, and that's why we've targeted just the 4,000/1,000,000 sort of thing, because that's twenty-five percent of the kids who need the service, and we feel that that's about what we're currently affecting. Let's make that really work. So our goal is to, in a very logical way, go to scale by making it small pieces that are highly effective in their own right.

Q: That's it.

[END OF INTERVIEW]