I.

1. If a group is formed, not necessarily large, but of representative persons, ready to give expression to a moderate point of view as to Palestine, somewhat along the lines of the pamphlet PALESTINE, A BI-NATIONAL STATE, he would be ready to forward such proposals to his Government, and, more than that, would be ready to advocate these proposals. He thought these proposals just the thing to meet the situation, and he failed to understand why they had not been embodied in policy up to the present time.

2. If such a group were formed, he would be ready also to forward to his Government what he regarded as the important suggestion that, should the impending negotiations to be held in London break down, a Mission be sent to Palestine with full authority, similar to that of the India Mission, in order to negotiate with all parties concerned for the purpose of finding a solution to the problem.

II.

I had permission to convey I.I to If. I asked him if it would be possible for me to tell the group I would try to organise that such a group giving expression to moderate and practical proposals might be helpful.

The answer was that nothing could be said which might convey the impression that the Department was giving official sanction to any proposals at the present time. By reason of the political difficulties involved, the Administration had decided to keep hands off, at least for the present. This was to be regretted. It resulted in a virtual impasse or deadlock as far as the Department was concerned.

It was permissible to say, however, that the absence of such a group, which would make a moderate and practical statement as to Palestine, was to be regretted. It might well be that such proposals would have their day. This would depend upon the outcome of the negotiations which were to be held in London.
The situation among the Arabs is as follows:

1. There is the official attitude which opposes any other solution than that of Palestine as an independent Arab State.

2. There is a considerable body of non-official opinion. This holds that it is "time to stop all nonsense and to begin to build." A further opinion is that "it is time to build together with the Jews." This second version has some powerful support.

3. The Arabs will sign no agreement of whatever nature other than that for an Arab Palestine State. They will however "acquiesce in an imposable solution," i.e., in a moderate and feasible solution imposed from the outside by a firm, friendly, authoritative hand.

4. Just whose "hand" this is to be is a subject of discussion. It will probably be Great Britain's, if Great Britain can get at least the moral support of the United States. This moderate and feasible solution will have to be imposed within the near future, before the meeting of the UNO Assembly, if possible. The reason is that Russia must be kept out of the picture, and this is impossible if the matter is brought before UNO.

5. It would be very bad if the matter were brought before the UNO Assembly. It would mean that 52 nations would be discussing the question emotionally and without the facts.

6. A proposal is being discussed, which is not to be favored, namely, that Palestine's independence be declared, and that the Mandatory make a treaty similar to that with Transjordan.

7. The question of the retention of British troops in Palestine, if Palestine becomes a Trusteeship Territory, is not clear. The plain meaning of the Charter is that troops can be kept in a Trusteeship Territory only if the Security Council of UNO authorizes this.

8. The idea of an authoritative Palestine Mission, if the impending negotiations in London should break down, is a very good one.