elusively to the job of encouraging and facilitating both public and private investment in underdeveloped areas of the world.

We believe also that the countries of Western Europe, and now perhaps Japan, can, both bilaterally and multilaterally, contribute more to this economic development. It seems to us, however, that even other developed countries must also include a larger component of noncommercial grants and guarantees into their development policies, for the United States recently proposed the formation of the International Development Association which under the expert management of the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, can help provide more of the noncommercial requirements for economic development.

Now before closing I would like to turn briefly to one other aspect of the mutual security program, namely its administration. The mutual security program seems to generate, for reasons not wholly clear to me, more than the usual number of charges of poor administration. Of course we make mistakes. The only person who never makes a mistake is one who never makes a decision. The International Cooperation Administration, however, as you know, annually makes awards for the tallest "tall buildings," on the mutual security program which are widely praised as our mistakes, but perhaps this is too much to hope.

About 2 years ago we devoted the time and effort necessary to investigate and report on a list compiled by the House Foreign Affairs Committee of charges at which that medium has made to our society. I could perhaps do more to see that the policies of the United States are widely praised as our mistakes, but perhaps this is too much to hope.

Now to return to the main theme. In summary the major components of the current dilemma, in our opinion, or at least in mine, will in my opinion have to stand on their own feet and pay their own way. What is it worth to the United States to have strong trading partners able to stand on their own feet and pay their own way? What is it worth to the United States to have prevented economic and perhaps political collapse in Western Europe and in nations like Iran, Turkey, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Pakistan? What is it worth to the United States that we have been able to bring the two I mentioned were pure fiction. Eight did not apply to the mutual security program in the answers. We should go further. In this era of change we would ask if there are available better or less costly alternatives for achieving the goals we have set ourselves. Even should the need for defense disappear completely there will still be need for development programs for years to come. We would have an interest in these programs even though there be no competition from international communism. In the years ahead I am convinced that the economic and technical parts of the mutual security program will become even more important.

Tomorrow you will hear from several distinguished gentlemen on various aspects of the social before the conference. From the information and points of view presented, you can then draw your own conclusion about our stake in foreign aid.

UNIVERSITY OF THE AIR

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, in our current discussions of television, it is imperative that we consider some of the substantial and unique contributions that medium has made to our society.

"Through the wonders of electronics an experience that was once available to only a few of the fabrications dealing with the mutual security program, I feel confident that one or more of them would win the award hands down. The regular entries in the competition are of these like the two I mentioned were pure fiction. Eight did not apply to the mutual security program in the answers. We should go further. In this era of change we would ask if there are available better or less costly alternatives for achieving the goals we have set ourselves. Even should the need for defense disappear completely there will still be need for development programs for years to come. We would have an interest in these programs even though there be no competition from international communism. In the years ahead I am convinced that the economic and technical parts of the mutual security program will become even more important.

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ARTICLE FROM FOREIGN AFFAIRS QUARTERLY BY HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON OF ILLINOIS

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, one of the truly great leaders of this era, both in our Nation and in the world, is former Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois. Governor Stevenson has a profound knowledge and wisdom regarding foreign affairs and international questions. In the January 1960, issue of Foreign Affairs, Adlai Stevenson has contributed an article, "Putting First Things First." In this thoughtful and informative article, Governor Stevenson has called attention to our great responsibilities in maintaining freedom in the world and the huge task of spreading development funds to underdeveloped nations. He has rallied us to the urgency of the sacrifice which is necessary if we are to survive. Anybody reading this article will realize anew that Adlai Stevenson is a person of stature and intellect to hold our Nation at a time of world crisis. Because Governor Stevenson's message is
Pence is the most persuasive business in the world's most universal desire and most powerful force. The mass of humanity seems to understand better than its rulers the idiocy of war and its mortal danger to the human race. Everywhere I travel the people appear to know that all their aspirations for freedom and dignity of life are going to be destroyed if mankind ever fights a modern war.

The United States has been the source of the most revolutionary and glorious concepts of human and political freedom. It has been my hope that this recent period of cold war would be a new period of a strong America, which first split the atom, would be the tireless, fearless, indomitable leader of the cause of freedom from war. And I still think that role and pursue it with passion should be the top priority of American foreign policy.

Why haven't we really led the postwar world since the Korean war? Why are many Americans fearful that we have lost our sense of national purpose? One reason is the confusion about intellectual and moral values. Why is there a slackness about sending aid, and penetration. Encouraged no doubt by Communist trade, aid, and penetration.

To me, the most compelling, is the route to world power which the Soviets now regard as the safest and surest. And I was impressed by Khrushchev's confidence, shown both in his contemplation of the U-2 and his offer to come over to work with him and that the system under which Russia became so strong so quickly is the system which other countries must follow. We refused to believe that Hitler meant what he said, to our sorrow. We should not do ourselves the same injury again.

The main lines of American military and foreign policy are still those of 1947-52. Although Messrs. Dulles and Eisenhower opposed the policy of central planning and dictatorship. The Soviet planners expect that, as in China, the non-Communist regimes in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and part of Latin America will be unable to solve the problems of modernization and economic growth and will turn to the Communist alternative, encouraged no doubt by Communist trade, aid, and penetration.

The end of our cold war era is not the beginning of the American century, or anyone else's. It behoves us to face the reality that we Americans are not going to be alone at the center of the stage very long— and that modesty is always the better part of wisdom. We must prepare to bear through the United States suddenly emerged as the two dominant powers. Already the brief day of two-power dominance is passing and new centers of activity are emerging. By the end of the century China and India will be industrialized, and China's population will have passed 1 billion. When the USSR becomes more unified, it will too reemerge as a great center of power. And who can doubt that regional unification is going to take place in Latin America and emerging Africa?

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theirs. It will not be easy to agree on them in view of the divisions among the powers, as the United States now does, with Russia controlling Eastern Germany and, therefore, the possibility of German unification. I suspect that we may need to give that subject a higher level of attention in our common with our partners. For in peace-time democracies are at a particular disadvantage from the domestic concerns that are much more serious than the political difficulties that we are facing, especially in countries where literacy is low, hunger high, and the gap between resources and population widening.

The five conditions of success are, I think, clear. We shall be engaged on this program for at least 40 years, and we shall need professional staff, with the languages and skills needed in this whole new field of activity. Information about the needs of the undeveloped peoples to advance to self-sustaining economic and political independence and some hope of evolving a political democracy. Without an alternative to communism, we face grim prospects indeed in poor countries where literacy is low, hunger high, and the gap between resources and population widening.

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The root of East-West tension is fear. Whatever the superficial causes, they stem from a deeper fear. The fear of the West is spreading to the areas traditionally known as Communist countries. In the West, however, the fear of the Communists is spreading to the areas traditionally known as Western countries. The result is a war of nerves in which both sides are trying to outdo each other in creating a state of tension. The tension is leading to a arms race, and the arms race is leading to a general deterioration of relations. The situation is becoming increasingly dangerous, and it is important that steps be taken to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The United States has a key role to play in this situation. We are a major power, and our influence can be used to bring about a peaceful resolution. The United States has a long and successful history of promoting peace and stability, and we have the resources to make a significant contribution. There are many ways in which we can help, such as by offering diplomatic support to countries attempting to resolve their differences peacefully, by providing economic assistance to countries in need, and by playing a constructive role in international organizations.

It is important that we take action now to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. The arms race is only likely to intensify, and the resulting instability could have serious consequences for the entire world. We must act promptly and effectively to ensure that peace is restored and that the lives of all peoples are protected.
be unnecessary. And that is precisely why it is not likely. But Iran is no more secure because of military links with Pakistan, and the fate of the Middle East, unless a superpower alliance can be exploited to undermine a pro-Western regime.

I believe that we must look rather to disarmament and nonalignment, to political and economic collaboration, in the areas where great-power influence works least, like the Middle East. We still have a little time, for atomic weapons are as yet in the possession of only three powers. Ten years from now, when the weapons may be in the hands of 25 and may have them—to the detriment not only of our security but of Russia's as well. Here may be found the key to a lasting and effective approach in positive terms to our problems at the heart of any great-power interest.

In the immediate future, however, the critical point of tension lies in Europe and Germany. There we have a perilous deadlock from which neither side can disengage without grave risk. On our side the fear is paramount that any withdrawal either from the European theater or from the Berlin area could denude the Continent of American forces and undermine the defenses against a Russian advance to the Channel. It is worth noting in this connection that the United States should call upon the Soviet Union and everyone in the United Nations again and again to cooperate in the need for the further removal of the barriers and tensions which we hope will be the result of the Warsaw Pact. It is true that any withdrawal either from the Western theater or from Berlin will be the unification of divided Germany. But the West German force will beastrophy in the face. How otherwise can we face the achievements of the West German people, and everyone in the United Nations again to cooperate in the need for the further development of the forces of the West German people. It is true that any withdrawal either from the Western theater or from Berlin will be the unification of divided Germany. But the West German force will be so great that it is the most powerful force in Europe and the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world. The united Europe will be the most powerful force in the world.
the moral and material elements of new purpose and new policy. It is the task of leadership to marshal our will and point the way. We had better start soon for time is wasting.

BENEFITS FROM AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM TO ABSENTEE OR CORPORATE-TYPE FARMING OPERATIONS

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, on several occasions I have emphasized that a substantial part of the benefits of our present agricultural program accrue to the large corporate-type or absentee farming operations.

Today I am incorporating in the Record a list of the 1958 crop price-support loans of $100,000 or more as compiled by the Department of Agriculture.

Three of the largest of these received more in price-support loans on cotton than did all of the farmers of the four States of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania on all of the crops they produced in that same year.

The large firm of Anderson, Clayton & Co. received $707,907.71 in Government cotton price-support loans, which were nearly twice as much as was received by all the farmers in the States of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania on all crops they produced that year.

Many of these large corporations, the Delta & Pine Land Co., Scott, Miss., which received price-support loans of $1,212,699.80 on its 1958 cotton crop, is a wholly owned British corporation.

Why should this wholly owned British corporation receive more assistance in the form of price-support loans on its 1958 cotton crop than did all the farmers of the great State of Pennsylvania on all the crops they produced?

Why should our taxpayers support this British-owned corporation in its farming operations here in America? Remember, all this is being done under legislation enacted in the name of our small farms.

It is argued that the taxpayers do not lose under this program because these price-support loans are often repaid to the Government as the cotton is moved into world markets. That is ridiculous and discouraging. In many instances the cotton is turned over to the Government as full payment for the loan, and remember that a part of that portion which is sold in commercial channels and where the loans are repaid by the producer those sales are subsidized by the U.S. Government. Under its cotton subsidy export program, the Government is buying through commercial channels this same cotton at artificially high prices and then subsidizing at the taxpayers' expense its exports.

In the past 3 years the Government, under its export subsidy program, has purchased over 15 million bales and then exported this same cotton at a direct loss to the American taxpayers of over $600 million.

This is an average loss of over $20 for every bale of cotton which has been produced in America during the past 3 years. Therefore, the fact that many of these loans are being repaid does not mean that the Government is not losing money on these transactions.

These loans are being repaid by sales in commercial channels only by reason of the fact that the Government is spending nearly $300 million annually in supporting our domestic cotton market at its artificially high level.

Is this extravagant program actually helping the cotton farmer? In addition to wasting millions of dollars in paying for those subsidies, under our present programs we are seeing our domestic market for cotton goods destroyed.

Synthetic fibers are replacing our cotton and wool fabrics. Foreign imports are replacing our domestic products. The final result is that the cotton industry and our American textile industry are both being destroyed.

Last year I sponsored an amendment which the Senate adopted placing a limitation on the amount of support loans any one individual could obtain. This amendment will be in effect on the 1959 crop. I regret that in conference this amendment was watered down in such a manner as to create a grave doubt as to its real effectiveness.

Our whole farm program needs a complete overhaul. Congress by failing to face up to this problem and by continuing these high price supports on cotton and other crops long after the war ended and long after our need of increased production had passed has created a monstrosity, and now it has a responsibility to correct the situation. But it cannot be corrected by any piecemeal legislation.

There can be no justification for continuing support at the taxpayers' expense of the $1-billion dollar farm operations, whether they be in cotton or in any other crop.

At this point I ask unanimous consent to have incorporated in the Record a list of the 1958 cotton crop price-support loans of $100,000 or more as furnished by the Department of Agriculture. This tabulation includes only loans made on the 1958 cotton crop. Many of the companies listed in this report also received price support loans on other commodities.

Also, in order that other States may see what assistance their farmers get under this program as compared to the assistance given some of these large corporate-type operations, I ask unanimous consent that we have printed at this point in the Record a chart giving a breakdown by States on all loans made on the 1958 crops.

There being no objection, the list and chart were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: