THE POTOMAC CONFERENCE, October 5 - 6, 1992
SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Organized by Tibet Forum and Center for Modern China
Funded in part by the National Endowment for Democracy
Hosted by The Freedom Forum
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Proceedings of The Potomac Conference on
SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Editors' Introduction
On October 5, 1992, in the belief that dialogue between Tibetans and
Chinese might facilitate mutual understanding and perhaps promote the
resolution of the Tibetan question a two-day conference on SINO-TIBETAN
RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE was convened across the Potomac River
from Washington, DC.
BACKGROUND
A review of the environment in which planning for The Potomac Conference
took place will provide a framework for analysis. The history and
complexity of Sino-Tibetan relations suggest that achieving a peaceful
resolution of the Tibetan issue and effecting a smooth transition are
long-term endeavors. With unprecedented movements toward human rights,
the rule of law, democracy, and pluralism, major principals of TIBET
FORUM and CENTER FOR MODERN CHINA (recent exiles from China and Tibet),
recognized an opportunity while in the West to engender a climate of
understanding. They further shared a belief in their responsibility to
work in cooperation wherein the issues of Tibet and the concerns of the
Chinese democracy movement could be researched, debated, and assessed.
Previous government negotiations between the Tibetans and Chinese have
taken place to little avail. In exile, dialogue has been generally
sporadic and unsustained. Even since Tiananmen, Chinese conferences have
been either academic or generally have had a single-minded focus on the
organization and political activity of the Chinese exile community.
However, several Chinese meetings have included Tibetan spokesmen. For
example, in 1990, the Federation for Chinese Democracy invited a
representative of the Dalai Lama to make a presentation in Paris before a
group of students and dissidents; however, no agreement was sought or
reached. Subsequently, various Tibetan conferences focused almost
exclusively on Tibetology or activism in the West. Remarkable for the
time, in the summer of 1990, a Chinese student prominent at Tiananmen
Square addressed a meeting of Tibetan and Western activists. A
multi-ethnic conference in April 1990, sponsored by the School of
Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, focused mainly
on Tibetan politics. Notably, the September 1991 conference at Columbia
University, organized by Buddhologist Robert A.F. Thurman, brought
together human rights activists, cultural experts, and well-known Tibetan
and Chinese figures, including the Dalai Lama and Fang Lizhi. This
latter conference represented the first opportunity for Tibetans and
Chinese to meet face-to-face in open discussion on cultural and religious
affairs although dialogue on the political situation was peripheral.
Joint activity and cooperation in exile has been intermittent and
countenanced by only a few from each side who, at best, risk being
labeled outside-the-pale. Although planning for The Potomac Conference
SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE antedates the Columbia
conference by several months, the mere _possibility_ of meeting provided
a shift in the prevailing wind which presaged these two conferences.
THE CONFERENCE
Convened in Arlington, Virginia, just across the Potomac River from
Washington, DC, at the facilities of The Freedom Forum, the meetings
brought together exiled Tibetan and Chinese scholars and public figures.
Selection of participants was based on the desire to achieve a broad and
reasonably representative range of ideas by bringing together people who
were not so extreme in their views that dialogue would be impossible.
There was, of course, a degree of contradiction here. By inviting only
the more moderate Chinese and Tibetans, the altogether adamant and
uncompromising were not heard. Still, debate was lively enough. Dialogue
was generally constructive and substantive, albeit at times emotionally
direct.
Altogether, there were over 150 scholars, policymakers, Tibetan exiles,
Chinese exiles, and other interested parties in attendance. Twenty-eight
Chinese and Tibetan speakers from around the world made presentations.
There were two keynote speakers, Ambassador Winston Lord and Ambassador
John McDonald. The panel presentations and open discussions were
moderated by five Western scholars with expertise on China and Tibet. At
a reception mid-conference, Carl Gershman, President of National
Endowment for Democracy which strongly supported the goals of the
conference, made a presentation.
THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
These proceedings have been compiled using submitted papers as well as
transcriptions from the audio tapes. If a participant spoke or wrote in
a language other than English, it is so indicated at the beginning of the
passage and, if a speaker switched mid-passage to a different language,
this is also noted. In most cases, the simultaneous English
interpretation was transcribed, although some of the more difficult
passages have been double-checked against the original language
recording. One particularly controversial paper (by Xu Bangtai) was
meticulously retranslated to make certain the meaning remained true to
the original.
Every effort to standardize spelling has been made. With Chinese, the
pinyin system has almost always been used. Standardization has been more
difficult in the case of Tibetan, due to the lack of a universally
accepted transliteration system. Dual names for geographic locations are
given in some instances. Unfortunately, the spelling of a few proper
names was impossible to verify.
A word regarding our approach to style and semantics. Extemporaneous
speech is not read in the same way as the written word. Sometimes a good
bit of rambling dialogue and discussion is rendered here basically unedited,
but we believe that it is worth wading through to get to the
pith. In translating and editing this material, generally we have taken
the view that it is necessary to let the spoken words stand - let the
Tibetans be Tibetan and let the Chinese be Chinese - and we have resisted
making massive revisions just because it might make the text easier to
read in English. In a few instances, however, we have put notes in
square brackets [ ] for clarification.
Nonetheless, the reader should be aware that sometimes the speakers use
terms for which there is no mutually agreed upon meaning, or in ways that
are so subtle as to defy full conveyance of (often multiple) meanings in
translation. (Some of the speakers and participants addressed this issue
at various times during the conference.) Terms denoting ethnicity in
particular present this difficulty. In English, it usually suffices
simply to speak of "Chinese" and "Tibetans." But the Chinese have
various terms for "Chinese," the most common of which (Zhongguo ren) in
the Chinese view includes Tibetans. When they mean to specify
ethnic-Chinese as distinct from "the minorities" (also sometimes referred
to as nationalities), they use the term "Han." The speakers at this
conference use these terms, but sometimes they appear to do so out of
habit (perhaps habit engendered by propaganda) rather than to make a
specific political point. However, when someone _is_ making a political
statement, a phrase such as "Han-Tibetan" carries significantly different
baggage than "Sino-Tibetan," where the latter may or may not imply two
equal national entities and the former may or may not imply a
superior-inferior racial or ethnic difference within one political
entity. When a speaker intends to make these semantic distinctions and
we are able to discern this, we keep the original (transliterated)
vocabulary. (In some cases, the speakers were deliberately vague or
appeared to misunderstand when questioned on usage.) Nor was it possible
to go back to the original in all cases, and we leave the reader to make
his or her own judgments based on the context.
Likewise, the Chinese and the Tibetans have very different ideas
regarding geography. "Tibet" to most Chinese is seen as roughly
equivalent to today's Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Because Chinese
authorities have controlled the map-making, and western cartographers
since at least 1913 have tended to take their cues from the Chinese, this
relatively small area is what shows up on most maps as "Tibet." But
Tibetans have a far different understanding. For most, the TAR per se has
no legitimacy, as it comprises only U and Tsang, areas traditionally
administered locally by Lhasa and Shigatse, respectively. In their view
there is much more to Tibet than this. Indeed, ethnogeographically, it
is made up of the entire Tibetan plateau, including Amdo (known now to
the Chinese as Qinghai and Southern Gansu) and Kham (which includes what
the Chinese consider Western Sichuan), and a small part of Yunnan. Even
if one wanted to make the case that the Lhasa government rarely fully
administered these areas in recent centuries, they are ethnically Tibetan
and geographically distinct from China proper. Even Chinese tend to
consider this as all one geographic entity ("the plateau"), referring to
the other provinces as "neidi," which literally means "interior," but
actually refers to the Chinese heartland. Traditionally, "neidi" was the
opposite of "bianwai," meaning the lands _outside_ of China's national
boundaries. The difficulty with these distinctions is further compounded
by the fact that social and economic statistics, gathered and reported by
the Chinese, are nigh impossible to recalculate for the greater Tibetan
area. Even the Tibetan speakers are reduced to reporting on Tibet by
referring only to the TAR, perhaps then hazarding a guess as to the
extrapolated figures of the whole.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to acknowledge Conference organizers Chen Yizi, Huan Guocang,
Jigme Ngapo, Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, and Yin Lu-jun. In preparing these
proceedings, we are grateful to the professional interpreters at the
conference and to our translators and transcribers Dekyi Sezhen Geziben,
Tseten Dolkar Liushar, and Leah Napolin, among others. For computer,
gopher, and design help, we wish to acknowledge: Patrice A. Childers,
Leslie di Russo, David Magier, and Peter Salkeld. Jeanne Marie Gilbert
wishes to convey a particularly special "thank you" to SP for whimsy as
well as desktop publishing advice.
We are grateful to the following for their extraordinary generosity of
spirit: John S. Major, Kathleen W. Peterson, Franc de la Vega, Elsie M.
Walker, and Kelsang Gyaltsen.
We also recognize with sincere appreciation the National Endowment for
Democracy, The Freedom Forum, The Institute for Asian Democracy, and
other supporters of the conference whose belief in the value of exploring
the issues, especially democracy and human rights, was exemplified by
their generous financial support.
* * *
We trust that by holding this conference, and making available these
proceedings to the public, we have advanced the cause of mutual
understanding, and perhaps contributed in some small way to the
resolution of the chronic problem of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. If
so, thanks are due to all those who attended the conference: panelists,
speakers, keynote speakers, moderators, and audience participants, all of
whom contributed to moving the discussion to new ground.
Jeanne Marie Gilbert and James D. Seymour
New York, November 15, 1996
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