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THE POTOMAC CONFERENCE, October 5 - 6, 1992

Organized by Tibet Forum and Center for Modern China

Funded in part by National Endowment for Democracy
     and hosted by The Freedom Forum


Monday, October 5, KEYNOTE REMARKS

  Ambassador Winston Lord
    Former Ambassador to China
    Chairman of National Endowment for Democracy

Charles Overby, The Freedom Forum, Introduction

Ambassador Lord

Questions & Answers

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President, The Freedom Forum, Introduction

Good afternoon.  Please continue to eat, but in the interest of time and 
so we can get the maximum amount of insight from our speaker, we'd like 
to move ahead.  I'm Charles Overby, President and CEO of The Freedom 
Forum, and I want to add my welcome to that of Chris Wells to all of you 
here.  It's an honor to welcome you here to the world center headquarters 
of The Freedom Forum and its newly completed rooftop conference facility.  
When we built these facilities they were designed to attract the best 
minds in the world to talk about the most important issues of the day.  
Your presence here confirms the validity of those goals.

It is my special pleasure to introduce to you our luncheon speaker.  You 
know, if you stop and think about it there are very few of us who are 
going to make it into the history books.  Most of us work with a 
commitment to high principles, but historians are very discerning, and 
they limit the names of the people who actually make it into the history 
books.  Well, I can tell you with certainty today, that Winston Lord will 
be in the history books for what he has done, and for what he has yet to 
do.  He will be in the history books for his work in opening doors with 
governments, with countries, and with people.  All of you know that he 
played a key role with President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger in opening the diplomatic doors to China.  He prepared 
President Nixon's briefing books, and he helped write the communique that 
established the diplomatic relations between the US and China.  He worked 
on the issue of China for twenty years before it bore fruit.  He met with 
Chairman Mao five times and he spent hundreds of hours with Zhou Enlai.

Appropriately, President Reagan named him US Ambassador to China from 
1985 to 1989.   And as Ambassador, he was the first US Ambassador to 
travel to Tibet as part of his far-reaching diplomatic mission in Asia.  
His continuing aim was to open doors.  Since his return to the United 
States, it would have been easy for Winston Lord to rest on his laurels, 
but he has not.  As one of the nation's most widely quoted and respected 
foreign affairs experts, he has used his influence and his leadership to 
discuss ways in which we can improve the world for the future.  As 
Chairman of the Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the 
New World, he recently issued a report that is receiving now  worldwide 
discussion.  This report demonstrates that he cares deeply about 
establishing a coherent vision at home and abroad to carry us into the 
next century.  That is why many people are speculating that Winston Lord 
is a leading candidate for a high diplomatic post in a Clinton 
administration.  Winston, if the vote were today and it were here, you'd 
have it!

Those of us at The Freedom Forum have gotten to know Winston Lord 
through his spouse, the best-selling author Betty Bao Lord, who is a 
valuable member of our Board of Directors.  One last word about Winston 
Lord's ability to open doors.  When Winston and Henry Kissinger were 
flying to China back in 1971 on that first secret flight to open the 
doors to China, Winston went to the front of the plane as the Pakistani 
airplane was taxiing on the runway, and when the airplane finally came to 
a stop Winston had positioned himself at the door.  He opened it, and he 
stepped out and thereby became the first American to set foot on Chinese 
soil since 1949.  He was wise enough and smart enough to get out ahead of 
Henry Kissinger, to be the first American!  (laughter)

It's been that way with Winston Lord all his life.  He knows how to open 
doors and he knows how to be the right person at the right place, at the 
right time.  We're happy that he's here with _us_ today, as the right 
person at the right place, at the right time.  Please welcome Ambassador 
Winston Lord.



Thank you Charles, and thanks to The Freedom Forum for hosting this 
conference and luncheon in this magnificent new setting, in one of the 
country's outstanding  conference centers - certainly now the most 
modern.  I'm really embarrassed and humbled by your introduction.  I 
can't wait to hear what I have to say!  It reminds me of how I introduced 
Henry Kissinger, who's an old friend, who has a certain amount of ego as 
you know.  He's used to these flowering introductions and I usually end 
up by saying, "And now, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to present to you 
a man who is clearly a legend in his own mind!"  (laughter)

This conference is very meaningful to me on many personal grounds.  We 
are here at The Freedom Forum, and as Mr. Overby mentioned, my wife is on 
the Board.  I'm also Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, 
which is happy to support this worthwhile venture.  And, indeed, the 
phrases _freedom_ and _democracy_ are frequently heard throughout your 
deliberations.  Also, Betty and I have been long associated with China, 
her longer than I, since she was born in Shanghai.  I'm usually 
introduced as the husband of Betty Bao Lord, and I am proud of it, and I 
have worked with this relationship for over two decades, as Charles said.

I left China as Ambassador just as the Tiananmen demonstrations were 
picking up steam, and while we were there, as mentioned, I was the first 
American Ambassador to go to Tibet.  Since then, both Betty and I have 
tried to support the goals of the people in this room, both Chinese and 

Since that Tiananmen demonstration and the tragedy there, the 
international landscape has indeed been transformed.  The winds that 
gusted in Tiananmen Square have been temporarily extinguished in China, 
but they swept across the world, around it to eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, indeed even back to Outer Mongolia.  And we've seen 
democracy advancing in southern Africa, Latin America, and many other 
areas.  And I think we also saw the future of China in June of 1989, in 
May and April.  I firmly believe that within a few years there will be a 
freer China and, therefore, the people at this conference will be 
important - both with respect to the Chinese here, and Tibetans, in 
shaping that future of that great nation.

One of the central challenges you and your colleagues across the ocean 
will be facing, will be an issue that indeed is challenging the entire 
world.  You are trying to work out what should be the future relationship 
between the Han Chinese and minorities, including Tibetans, and indeed, 
whether it's in Yugoslavia, or the former Soviet Union, in Iraq or in 
Somalia, we're witnessing one of the most volatile and complex features 
of the new landscape:  the tensions and, indeed, the conflicts between 
national unity and self-determination, between the will of the majority 
and the rights of the minority, between collective purpose and ethnic 
pride, between democracy and human rights.  Now, I think these goals can 
be compatible and, indeed, mutually reinforcing, in China and elsewhere.  
But it's going to take sustained effort, mutual respect, vision and 
compassion.  So I congratulate the organizers of this conference who seek 
now to prepare for the future of China, including this difficult 

It seems to me that one of the hopeful results of the Tiananmen tragedy 
has been the greater understanding between Chinese and Tibetans, due to 
their shared sadness and the recognition now of common goals.  Those 
who've been shot at, or rounded up or exiled from Beijing certainly must 
now have greater empathy for those who, before them, were suffering 
similar fates in Lhasa and elsewhere.  Now, I'm not so foolhardy to 
predict, or so arrogant as to prescribe, the future course of 
Sino-Tibetan relations.  I do believe, however, that the next step should 
be to reflect the courageous proposals that the Dalai Lama has made over 
many years, and should reflect the imperative of direct dialogue between 
him and Chinese authorities.  America should not directly intrude itself 
in this process, but I think we can lend our encouragement and support 
for this dialogue, for a peaceful resolution that will benefit Chinese 
and Tibetans and, indeed, set an example for others around the globe who 
are grappling with similar problems.  Now, my own view is that such a 
process will not begin so long as the current regime rules in China.  I 
believe that repression will continue in Tibet so long as it is 
continuing in China, as a whole.  But I believe the process can and will 
begin once there is greater freedom and respect for human rights in 
China, and I believe that that day will arrive within a few years, soon 
after the first generation of revolutionary leaders have passed from the 

There I go again, making predictions about China - which is very 
foolhardy for anyone, especially outsiders, especially in this company of 
experts!  How could I be so foolish?  Particularly so, given an 
experience that Betty and I had in China which reveals the lack of 
understanding of China we have, even though we've been associated for so 
long.  This is an absolutely true story.  We were traveling outside of 
Beijing, and we came to this Buddhist temple.  The head monk came out, 
and his eyes went up when he heard I was the American ambassador and my 
wife was a famous author.  He said, "Would you do a great honor for this 
temple and its future visitors?  Would you each write something in 
English to guide and instruct all who come to this hallowed place?"  And 
we were very flattered; this is an honor that's reserved for emperors and 
great poets and scholars.  And so the monk went away and he came back 
with two ornate wooden plaques, and he said, "Now, to guide and instruct 
our future visitors would you write in English on this plaque the word 
"Ladies," and on this plaque the word "Gentlemen?"

So I'm somewhat humble about my understanding of what's happening in 
China, and certainly this audience knows that scene, and the future, much 
better than I do.  But it seems to me that as always in China the surface 
is not the reality.  On the one hand, this group above all, knows about 
the dead and the disappeared, the untold missing, and the unacceptable 
sentences, the farcical trials, harassment, surveillance, intimidation 
and the muzzling of the press, the smothering of academia, the crimping 
of culture.  And the circumspection and persecution, if you will, the 
discrimination against religions.  Not only Tibetan, but Christian, 
Muslim and others.  But, at the same time, the situation seems to me also 
somewhat looser and more porous, particularly outside Beijing.  Unlike 
previous times of political repression, citizens are protecting one 
another, they're not informing on each other.  Officials themselves are 
ignoring hard-line edicts.  And there are even some overt signs of 
resistance, sort of pushing the envelope of what's permissible in that 
society, whether it's a labor leader from Beijing or a journalist from 
Shanghai.  And I think the government's somewhat unsure of how to respond 
to these signals.  On the one hand, they're scared of dissent, but 
they're also solicitous of world opinion.

And, increasingly, Chinese people are concerned with taking advantage of 
the more open economic climate to better their lives, to lie in wait for 
better days politically, but to get on with improving their livelihood in 
the meantime.  This is precisely the gamble, it seems to me, of Deng 
Xiaoping and some of the other, older reformers in their twilight years - 
believing that a combination of political repression and economic 
progress will preserve Communist Party rule in China.  They have been 
watching what happened in the Soviet Union, and this of course, was the 
purpose of Deng's trip last January to the south, and the renewed 
momentum of economic reform ever since.  So I think he believes that if 
the Chinese people have enough to eat and enough to buy, they won't care 
about political freedom.  It won't work - not for very long, in my view, 
with the Chinese people, and it certainly won't work with the Tibetans 
either.  When the Chinese government has failed to win over, either 
through repression or through economic subsidies.  Man or woman does not 
live by rice alone.  Just take Thailand, for example.  Here's one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world, and in recent months we've seen 
demonstrations and pressures for democracy there.  So, it takes more than 
just keeping people materially happy, certainly over the long run.  As 
one of America's revolutionary leaders said in 1775, Benjamin Franklin, 
"Where complaining is a crime, hope becomes despair."

Now, in June of '89 millions of Chinese people peacefully expressed 
their hopes for the future, as this audience knows, but many tend to 
forget in the West, it was not just students and scholars but people from 
all walks of life.  And it was not just in Beijing, or Lhasa, but in over 
two hundred cities throughout China.  This rule remains; the Chinese 
people wear masks and enact charades, and you have other forces, I think, 
bringing closer a more open society.  The very process of economic reform 
and opening, inevitably, has cultural and political impact as well - 
indeed, many of the conservative leaders recognize and fear this.  
Nepotism and corruption feeds yearnings for equality of opportunity among 
the Chinese people.  And in a de-centralized market economy there must be 
increasing decentralizing of political decisions, greater pluralism and 
individual initiative.  To modernize in today's age of information and 
technologies, countries must open up _within_ their societies, as well as 
to the outside world.  In this age of faxes and CNN, tourists and 
travelers carry values and ideas and images around the world, which raise 
expectations, particularly among the young as they compare their fates, 
not as in previous decades with the images manufactured by repressive 
regimes, but with the images of reality of what's happening around the 
world.  And thus, China today really has two faces:  a declining dynasty 
- I think probably the last dynasty - and a booming economy at the same 
time.  But in this case, ironically, this booming economy is not helping 
the regime.  I think it's helping to undermine it.

Now finally, just a few words on US policy, and then I'll take some of 
your questions.  I think it's interesting, by the way, by coincidence, 
that the important Chinese party congress and the US election are taking 
place just a few weeks apart.  Now the destiny of China and Tibet will, 
of course, be determined by Chinese and Tibetans, many in this room and 
those across the ocean, but the US can make clear where it stands, and we 
can lend hope to those struggling in the dark.  I think China will be a 
very important country in coming decades, for a variety of reasons - 
population, nuclear weapons, UN Security Council seat, the economy, its 
civilization, its impact on proliferation and regional disputes, its 
importance in global issues like the environment - so even though the 
Cold War has ended and the balance of power dimension has gone, I do not 
agree with the conventional wisdom that China is going to be less 

On the other hand, we of course have this repressive regime - I needn't 
outline for this group what is happening there - so the challenge for 
American policymakers is how do we get from here to there?  If China is 
important, as I've said, if you have an unpleasant regime to deal with, 
as I think we would all agree, but if you also believe that within a few 
years, as I do, that there's going to be a more humane and open Chinese 
government in Beijing, the challenge then is for us to have, in effect, a 
holding action.  One where we can express our ideals, our support for the 
future of China, for the reformers and those in favor of democracy, but 
also conduct necessary business on some of these difficult issues and 
stay in touch with the reform elements.  I think we can do both.  I don't 
think our choices are between isolating China, which is a straw man put 
up by the administration against its critics, as if that's the only other 
choice, as opposed to absolving the current regime.  I think we can 
maintain links with progressive forces _and_ conduct cool and sober 
relations with the government.  

More specifically, I think we should maintain a dialogue on issues like 
trade, non-proliferation, certainly human rights in some of these 
regional disputes, but it can and should be in a sub-cabinet level rather 
than sending secret emissaries, or even public summit meetings which 
provide photo opportunities and tend to legitimize the regime.  In our 
rhetoric, we can support human rights and freedom in China, and avoid the 
blatant double standard that we've seen from the current administration.  
We can maintain selective sanctions.  But, at the same time, I think we 
should preserve our economic links with the reformers in China, continue 
this process which is undermining the Chinese political system, extend 
Most Favored Nation - I'd rather not lose it - it hurts some of the wrong 
people, it hurts Hong Kong, it hurts American business interests - but 
condition it, use it as leverage.  It's very important to the Chinese 
with a $15 billion dollar trade surplus.  Condition it on humanitarian 
conditions that I think they will be able to meet over a year so that you 
can improve the lives of Chinese citizens but still maintain MFN from 
year to year.  We should preserve our academic, scientific and cultural 
ties with progressive forces in China, wherever these are productive.

I'm a strong proponent, and have testified as has my wife, on behalf of 
Radio Free Asia to bring truth and information to the Chinese people.  In 
this way, America can both project its ideals and promote its interests.  
We can help both Chinese and Tibetans on their path toward freedom.  And 
we can make the difficult path toward freedom somewhat easier, although 
of course, this is going to be up to the Chinese peoples themselves.

In conclusion, I would say that a freer China will enhance our bilateral 
relations - it's in American interest, not just in Chinese interest - and 
ease and erase a bitter issue in our national debate.  A freer China will 
be a more positive and powerful contributor to a new world order; when 
China respects the popular will, it will be a more responsible global 
power; when it reduces commercial barriers it will be a more expansive 
economic partner; and when it respects human values it will be more 
natural political partner;  and a freer China will bring with it a freer 
Tibet.  Thank you very much.



I'll be glad to take any questions on these issues. Yes?


[China/Tibet tourguide]  I'd like to ask what is your most hoped for 
positive scenario seeing the future of Tibet.  And I ask this knowing 
that in your background you are not really quite straightforward about 
any future hopeful signs for Tibet, and I know as a diplomat you need to 
be careful, but as the person who led the applause that you might be 
appointed in the Clinton administration, because I feel when I read 
between the lines I see the direction you're going.  I'd like to beg from 
you a clearer, hoped-for scenario for Tibet.


Well, you're not going to get it, not because I'm a diplomat - I'm not a 
diplomat - but I think it's arrogant for me, I'll be very honest, for me 
to sit here and say what the precise relationship should be between Tibet 
and China.  Now clearly, repression has got to end.  Clearly, cultural, 
economic, political identity [of the Tibetans] has to be strengthened.  I 
would suspect, over time, you will either see an independent Tibet or an 
extremely autonomous one where the Tibetans freely wish to remain 
associated in some broad federation.  But I really don't think it's up to 
Americans to prescribe this.  We can say what's wrong, and what's wrong 
is what's happening in Tibet now, what has been happening for many 
decades.  We can encourage and support direct dialogue, but I think it's 
up to the Tibetans and Chinese to work that out.

It's clearly going to be one of the two scenarios over the long run, to 
be precise as I can.  It's either going to be a Tibet that has much 
greater autonomy, political and economic rights, human dignity, but is 
somehow associated with China _voluntarily_, because if the Tibetan 
people wish that, and the Chinese leaders are enlightened enough to make 
that possible, and then I wouldn't rule that out.  But it has to be 
_freely_ chosen by both sides.  But it may be that the forces will carry 
them to independence at some point.  So those are the two outcomes, I 
don't see any other over the long run.  But I don't think I can either be 
smart enough nor would I be _arrogant_ to be more precise than that.  I 
hope that comes a little bit closer to what you're looking for.


[Journalist, _The [London] Observer,_ former China scholar]  Is the 
present administration in a rather ambiguous policy toward China, of a 
kind of cautious friendship - is that really essentially George Bush 


Yes, it is.  

JONATHAN MIRSKY [continuing]

And if it is, and if there is a new democratic administration, do you 
think or foresee some kind of significant change in American foreign 
policy toward Beijing?


Of course I can't speak for the next administration on either front, and 
I don't know where Charles got these rumors going, so I'll give you the 
usual bureaucratic hedge you get in Washington.  I really mean that, 

First, I think the current policy does largely reflect the President, 
but I think Mr. Scowcroft fully agrees with it, as well.  Mr. Baker - 
we're not sure how he feels about it because if it's an unpopular policy 
you won't see him too close to it - so that I think it's essentially the 
President's policy based on a combination of personal ties with Chinese 
leaders, a sincere feeling that maybe there'll be instability and there's 
the constant theme of going for stability over freedom and 
self-determination, and a feeling that the economic processes at work 
will bring political change, if it's not Russia.  And these other, I 
think somewhat outdated now, balance of power considerations.

So, I don't think it will change if the President is re-elected, unless 
there is a change forced as there already has been to a certain extent, 
and a more tough posture by the administration on some issues like trade 
and proliferation.  But not of his own free will.

Clinton has made quite clear in his speeches, including one on democracy 
just a couple of days ago, that he would change - it's one of the areas 
where there is a significant difference between the two.  What this means 
precisely is hard to tell.  He made it clear that he would have favored 
the legislation which, again, has been vetoed successfully, on 
conditioning MFN on certain conditions.  So he would change that specific 
policy.  I think his rhetoric would be much stronger in terms of 
democracy and human rights, and be more consistent with our worldwide 
posture on those issues. 

I suspect, however, that he would agree that we ought to maintain these 
other contacts that I've suggested, and we should have a dialogue on a 
sub-cabinet level.  So, there would be a significant change in the tone, 
but I don't think he would seek to totally isolate the Chinese, feeling a 
combination of staying in touch, but also greater emphasis in his 
rhetoric on human rights could perhaps speed the process there.

JONATHAN MIRSKY [continuing]

If that is so, some people say that there is a strong taste of the same 
there and that the Chinese tend to dig in when they are pushed from 
abroad.  Now what was your experience when you were ambassador.  When the 
Chinese are pushed by foreigners to do something which feels to them to 
be, I mean by that the leaders in Peking.  Is it the case - and this is 
often a defense against pushing them, that they always do the opposite of 
what they're being pushed to do. 


I mean, you've got to have some nuance here.  Obviously, you can't be 
totally frontal in your assault and totally insulting, and leave them 
sort of no back door to get out of, but this is an excuse for being too 
soft on Beijing, in my opinion.  The Chinese respect strength.  They 
don't respect, in my view, an administration that says right after 
Tiananmen Square "we'll have no high level contacts since there's been a 
slaughter over there" and three weeks later the National Security Advisor 
goes over privately.  That's not a way to show strength, in my view.

Furthermore, the Chinese are a great nation and we should treat them, 
even the current regime, in a non-insulting way.  But the fact is that 
the leverage we have is considerably greater now than it was a few years 
ago.  With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, even though I agree 
and maintain and have said that China will continue to be important to 
us, the fact is they don't have particularly good options.  They've been 
successful, tactically, since Tiananmen Square, is try to restore 
business as usual in terms of trade, investment, tourism, high-level 
visits, diplomatic relations - they've been quite skillful in their 
diplomacy - but that's a tactical success.  They have a strategic 
quandary:  as they look around the world over many years, where are they 
going to get geopolitical balance, and where are they going to get 
economic help?  They're certainly not going to get any economic help from 
Russia, and they have long-term historical tensions with Russia, or the 
former Soviet Union.  Japan can give them economic help, but because of 
the scars of World War II, they don't want to be overly dependent on 
Japan, they want to balance Japan off and, therefore, that's not a likely 
alliance.  They can't return to isolationism because of the need for 
technology and information and opening up to the world economy.  They're 
not going to lead the Third World, that's always been more rhetoric than 
reality.  So, you still have the "far barbarian," namely the United 
States, which is important to them to balance off the "near barbarians" 
and help them economically.

I suspect there's a debate going on among the Chinese leadership between 
those who cite those arguments and say, therefore "We should maintain as 
good ties as we can with the Americans, even thought they're annoying and 
intrusive and they are moralistic.  Make a few gestures, try and keep the 
relationship going."  Deng and some of the other Vice Premiers and 
regional leaders would probably fall in that camp - versus the more 
conservative types who say that "Geography means less in an age of 
information and technology.  The world has shrunk and, indeed the 'far 
barbarian' with his moralistic human rights and his democracy is more 
dangerous than the 'near' ones.  And, therefore, we ought to just give up 
on the Americans and be harder-line."  In any event, whatever the debate, 
they have less leverage, they respect strength and, of course, you've got 
to have some nuance - I'm not saying cut off all ties - but I don't buy 
this argument which is usually a rationalization for being soft on them 
that if you press them too hard they're going to turn inward.


Do conditions on MFN really represent meaningful leverage, or are they 
just a sort of fig leaf for business as usual?  And particularly in terms 
of how the Chinese would perceive them.  It seems to me that, ultimately, 
a year down the road, two years down the road, even at our end, we're 
going to have to ask ourselves how meaningfully the Chinese have complied 
with them.


You're right, in a sense, in that part of your premise that they're very 
good at cosmetic gestures and get enough votes to preserve MFN, or to 
preserve a defense against further sanctions.  Here _is_ the dilemma we 

I do think the argument that if you revoke MFN completely, that you hurt 
some of the wrong people, has validity.  The economic reformers on the 
coast along the south of China, certainly Hong Kong is an innocent 
bystander.  And that this process does help to open up the country more 
generally.  But I equally would reject the argument that we shouldn't use 
it as leverage because this is the one point of leverage we do have.  
Trade is _so_ important to the Chinese in terms of development and, 
therefore, political stability as they would define it, and they have a 
15 billion dollar surplus, they will do some things in response to using 
this.  So that's why I come out in this middle position.  And I think if 
you stipulate, as the present legislation which has just been vetoed 
does, that they have to release political prisoners and account for all 
political prisoners, I would also add stop jamming Voice of America, some 
of these humanitarian conditions, I think they'll move on those!  They 
won't admit while they're doing it over the course of a year.  And if 
they don't, then you cut off MFN!  But once you've cut it off you no 
longer have it as leverage.

So we shouldn't be fooled.  I would agree with, I think, the thrust of 
your question that the current regime, at least, is going to do nothing 
so fundamental that they think it will jeopardize their political rule.  
But I think that our best combination, given our limited leverage now, is 
to try to make some improvement in these areas I've just mentioned in the 
course of a year but, hopefully, not lose MFN for the other reasons.  So, 
I would stick by that but I would not be fooled by whatever concessions 
they make, but it may help some Chinese, some get out, some families 
learn about who's missing, and hopefully stop jamming Voice of America.

POLICY ANALYST  [continuing]

Would you put a deadline on it, say, a year?


Oh yes, you extend it [MFN] for a year - I'm sorry, I should have made 
that clear.  I would extend it for a year and then a year from now the 
President has to report to the Congress and say they've made enough 
progress or they haven't, in terms of extending it another year.  So you 
use it as leverage but, hopefully, not cut it off right away because some 
of the most ardent reformers and democrats don't want to cut off MFN if 
they can help it.  But, most believe that we should use it as leverage.  
I think this is the way you square that circle.  And that's the way I 
would come out on it, certainly.


Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for sharing your insights, again, 
about the future, not just the past.  

Before we go to our next sessions we will now hear from Jigme, who has 
been a moving force in this conference.


Again, we - the organizers - are very pleased that you have showed great 
interest in this conference, and we are deeply indebted to Mr. Charles 
Overby and all the other people from The Freedom Forum, to Ambassador 
Lord and all the people from the National Endowment For Democracy and the 
Institute for Asian Democracy who made this conference possible.  Thank 
you very much.