What was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka Saying?
The Hermeneutical Transformation of Indian Aesthetics

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Undoubtedly the greatest loss to the student of Indian aesthetics is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s Hṛdayadarpaṇa (HD), the “Heart’s Mirror.” Long thought to be a commentary on the Nātyaśāstra, the HD was more likely an independent treatise at once modeled on and critical of Ānandavardhana’s mid-ninth century Sahṛdayāloka, “Light for the Lover of Literature” (some have plausibly suggested that the actual name of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s treatise was Sahṛdayadarpaṇa, “Mirror for the Lover of Literature”).¹ The text seems to have disappeared by the twelfth or even eleventh century; the great literary theorist Mahima Bhaṭṭa (c. 1025) regrets he had been unable “to look into the Mirror” before undertaking his critique of dhvani. Thereafter no one appears to have had direct access to the book.² Our principal guide to its argument is the exposition of Dhanamājaya and Dhanika (in the fourth chapter of their works, the Daśarūpaka and Avaloka, respec-
tively, both c. 975), who while never naming Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka offer virtually a systematic restatement of his doctrines, as I try to demonstrate here.3 Aside from these two works, we must piece together his thought from the scattered citations preserved by his critics—and if there is a fate worse than this, for a paradigm-shifting scholar, it is hard to imagine what it would be. But the fragments and criticisms are enough to suggest that, however tired may be the idiom of paradigm shift, it is also hard to imagine a more appropriate description for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s role in the 1500-year-long tradition of Sanskrit aesthetics.

Beyond the fact that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka wrote in Kashmir sometime between Ānandavardhana (c. 850), whom he critiques, and Abhinavagupta (c. 1000), who critiques him, we know little about him. Unlike some earlier scholars I believe it certain that the Rājatarāṅgiṇī makes reference to our author, given the date (the reign of Śaṅkaravarman, 883-902) and the rarity of the name Nāyaka, but also especially in view of the combination of talents Kalhaṇa takes pains to emphasize: “The king put in charge of his two new Śiva temples a Brahman named Nāyaka, who was at once learned in the four Vedas and himself a veritable temple for poets, the tribe of Sarasvatī.”4 Not only was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s a stunningly original voice on literary matters, he was also a remarkably inventive scholar of Vedic hermeneutics: stray references in later critics confirm what the surviving fragments clearly suggest, that he had close affiliations with the tradition of Mīmāṃsā, which had begun to powerfully transform Indian literary theory by the middle of the ninth century.5 Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka did not just borrow a term here or there from Mīmāṃsā, however, as scholars like Ānandavardhana did; he borrowed, and in doing so rethought, an entire conceptual scheme.

In order to grasp the extent of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s intellectual revolution in aesthetics in general and in the theory of rasa in particular, we need to have some picture of the aesthetic system he inherited. While most of its essentials are well known to students of the field, since they are tirelessly rehearsed in the scholarly literature (largely on the basis of Mammaṭa’s mid-eleventh-century summation in Kāvyaprakāśa 4), two closely related points that condition our understanding of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s orientation toward this system are rarely made in the way they ought to be. The first addresses the seemingly minor question of the locus or substratum of rasa (rasāśraya), but actually concerns the whole analytical focus of aesthetics. As I tried to show on the basis of Bhoja’s Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (c. 1050), which offers a grand synthesis of the “classical” system or normal science,6 all writers prior to the tenth century conceived of rasa in the first (and often in the last) instance as a phenomenon pertaining to the
characters, not the spectators (their attention to the actor and the poet are less consequential). In this conception, rasa meant the emotional response in the hero or heroine, and accordingly, the task of rasa analysis from the time of the Nāṭyaśāstra up to and including Ānandavardhana, was to understand the components into which the complex phenomena of literature could be analyzed as contributing to this emotional reality effect. The question to which their aesthetic treatises were in part answers was, How is it even possible that an emotion can come to inhabit the literary work?

Intimately connected with this formalist orientation toward textual procedures was the second question, How do we come to know about this emotion? For the earliest thinkers like Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (early ninth century?)—and this is undoubtedly the way the core of Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra understands things7—rasa is something that “comes into being” in the characters (the utpattivāda); how the audience perceives this aesthetic emotion was too obvious a question even to place on the discursive table. The ninth-century Nāṭyaśāstra commentator Śrī Śaṅkuka (fl. 840) was the first to argue from the spectators’ point of view but his doctrine, too, remains essentially text-centered and not reader-centered: rasa (i.e. in the character) cannot be directly perceived but can only be inferred from the imitation that is drama (anumitipakṣa), and it is with this imitation, and not with the viewer’s inference, that Śrī Śaṅkuka was preoccupied. Ānandavardhana, too, is completely silent on how the reader knows of rasa or experiences it. He is concerned only with textual, even formalistic, processes when arguing that rasa is something that can never be directly expressed but only suggested or implied (vyāñjanāpakṣa).

All these epistemological arguments, it seems to me, presuppose the ontology of rasa just indicated, namely, that it is, in the first instance, a phenomenon internal to the literary work, whether textual or performative, a position that seems to have maintained itself into the late tenth century, as Kuntaka’s Vakroktijīvita shows.8 The postulate that rasa is “inferred”, for example, makes sense only if we think of both its ontological locus and its epistemological focus as being external to the audience doing the inferring (you do not “infer” that you as spectator are feeling rasa).9 As for rasa’s being something “suggested” (vyāñjanā), Dhananjaya and Dhanika, who under Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s influence adopted a radically different viewpoint, leave no doubt that the very idea of suggestion becomes impossible if rasa is located—as they insist on locating it—in the reader and not in the character:
(Dhanamjaya) Rasa belongs to the spectator experiencing the rasa, and to him alone, because he is alive and present. It does not belong to the character.

(Dhanika) ... All this being the case, the view that rasas can be the object of “manifestation” stands refuted. For an entity can only be manifested by something after it has been brought into being by something else: a pot, for example, can only be manifested by a light when it has already been produced by the clay. It is certainly not possible for an entity to be brought into existence by the very things that are supposed to manifest it, and this at one and the same moment.

All this indicates, they conclude, that, since rasa is something that must be seen as pertaining to the spectators, we need a new epistemology appropriate to that new ontology.  

Such, in brief, was the conceptual field of rasa when Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka entered onto it, and which he proceeded to reshape in every particular. At the heart of his critique of traditional aesthetics was the concern with redirecting attention away from the process by which emotion is engendered in and made accessible through the literary work, and toward the spectator’s or reader’s own subjective experience of this emotion. And just as, by this move, answers to superseded questions were themselves superseded, so new answers were required for new, completely unanticipated questions (foremost among them, as we will see, the moral status of the ālambanavibhāva, or foundational factor, when the locus of rasa is shifted from the character to the spectator). And it was to make better sense of what actually occurs in this experience that he turned to Mīmāṃsā theory, and transformed it into a literary hermeneutics.

2.

Such, at least, is the story of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka I believe I can tell. But certainty is elusive when the full citation record of his work is so pitifully small (I count twelve authentic verses, two dubious, three very brief prose passages, and one more extended; see appendix), and often so obscure, even when we supplement this with exegeses that bear the full impress of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s influence like the Daśarūpaka and Avaloka. How difficult it has proven to reconstruct his thinking with any real coherence is abundantly in evidence in both modern and premodern accounts, as one example from each should suffice to demonstrate. The most accomplished recent translation of a work on Sanskrit aesthetics,
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which also offers an account of the early tradition as a whole, summarizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s central literary-hermeneutical concept, bhāvanā, as follows: “Bhaṭṭanāyaka then applied the [Mīmāṃsā] term to poetry as the aesthetic efficacy of a particular combination of determinants and consequents. This aesthetic bhāvanā, he claimed, has the effect of universalizing the determinants and other factors, so that they may bring about or realize a rasa. Upon the realization of the rasa, a third stage of the aesthetic process begins, namely enjoyment (bhoga), which Bhaṭṭanāyaka regarded as springing from a third semantic power, bhogakṛttva [sic] (enjoyment-efficacy).”13 While there be little entirely wrong here (aside from the curious notion that bhoga/bhogikṛttva constitutes a “semantic power”), there is also nothing that makes much sense (why just those two aesthetic elements? how do they exert efficacy? what is the connection of “efficacy” with “universalizing” the elements?). But consider now the assessment of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, the greatest literary theorist of early-modern India. When he claims that rasa arises for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka only when the power of abhidhā (which Jagannātha takes to mean denotation) has been “crippled” and the various narrated entities (e.g., Duḥṣyanta, Śakuntalā, place, time, their ages, and concrete situations) thereby “commonalized” (sādhāraṇikṛta-);14 when he proclaims, “The only difference between Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s thought and that of Abhinavagupta is that the former accepts ‘reproductive capacity’ (bhāvakatva); ‘experientialization’ (bhogakṛttva [sic]), however, is no different from manifestation (vyāñjanā), and the rest of their doctrine is completely identical,”15 his account, so far as I can judge, is astonishingly wrong in every particular.

It will become clear that for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, abhidhā does not have its usual sense of direct denotation, but signifies a language function far more comprehensive and by no means transcended (“crippled”) in the aesthetic process but continuously essential to it. Furthermore, given that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka redirected attention to rasa reception, that mysterious process by which the reader experiences the emotions of the literary work, the idea of vyāñjanā as a mechanism for rasa was rendered irrelevant. He states his position unequivocally: “As for the other process called ‘implicature’ (dhvani), which consists of manifestation, even were it proven to be different from the other two [i.e. abhidhā and laksanā], it would only be a component of literature, not its essential form” (appendix #9).16 Then, too, not only did Abhinavagupta fully accept bhāvakatva, taking it from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s work as he took so much else, but he placed the concept at the forefront of his reconstruction of aesthetics. In fact, by a curious fate, it is only through the appro-
p ration of his critic, I want to suggest, that we are finally able to get to the heart of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s aesthetic insight. This will become clear once we have some sense of the basic ideas of his theory, beginning with his reexamination of the ontology and epistemology of rasa.

3.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s critique of earlier views on where rasa exists and how we know it is preserved in Abhinavagupta’s two literary-theoretical works and commentators on the brief précis offered in Mammatā’s Kāvyaprakāśa (especially the oldest, Māṇikyacandra). Because of the celebrity of these sources, much of the critique is reasonably well known, but it is still worth recapitulating. First, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka argues, rasa can neither actually come into being nor be the content of a normal perceptual experience whether direct or indirect (that is, through inference). If rasa were actually produced and hence perceptible, it would have to be perceived as being in someone else or in oneself. If it were perceived as external to the perceiving subject, as present in, say, the actor, then it could not be a “taste” (that is, something experienced); it would be an object, like a pot, about which one would be emotionally indifferent. Again, if the spectator perceived the rasa externally (let alone if it actually came into being), he would be expected to be absorbed in one or another state of mind—shame, disgust, yearning—that one would feel on glimpsing with one’s own eyes the love-making of the actual people involved, Rāma and Sītā say, and this could not possibly be a rasa experience.

If, on the other hand, rasa were perceived as internal to oneself, a range of additional problems arises. First, in the case of the tragic rasa, one would feel actual pain, and never again go to the theater to see sad plays. Second, it makes no sense that a character like Sītā could be a foundational factor (ālambanavibhāva) for the spectator enabling him to perceive the rasa in himself; she is a factor of that sort only for another character, Rāma. To be sure, her being loved is a property shared in common with the spectator’s own wife, but the fact that the particular character per se cannot be what stimulates the spectator’s own latent disposition of desire in order to function as a foundational factor is demonstrated precisely in the case of Sītā, who is a royal (or divine) being: the spectator surely has no awareness of remembering his own beloved in the midst of a description of the queen (or deity), since sexual love for her is entirely inappropriate. In the case of some other rasas, however, such as the heroic (Rāma’s building the bridge to
cross the ocean, for example), even the possibility of perceiving the rasa in oneself through the functioning of a commonly shared property is ruled out: there is no stable emotion the spectator shares in common with Rāma. And one cannot have any memory of Rāma’s energy (the stable emotion of the heroic rasa) empowering him to cross the ocean, because one never had a perception of him in the first place to ground that memory; nor can one be said to have “perceived” Rāma by some other means of valid knowledge, say testimony or inference, in order to provide a basis for one’s memory, since such a mediated perception would not provide any experience of rasa. Dhanamjaya summarizes the whole critique and reconstruction in two kārikās:

That same entity [the stable emotion] is called rasa, because it is something that is savored. Rasa belongs to the spectator experiencing the rasa (rasika), and to him alone, because he is alive and present. It does not belong to the character, because (1) he is no longer alive and present; (2) the ultimate aim of literature cannot pertain to the character; (3) we would otherwise have the absurd situation of the spectator being overcome with shame, jealousy, passion, or hatred—just as if he had seen a man in everyday life in the embrace of his beloved—or else have a mere indifferent apprehension.18

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s reconstruction, it is clear, starts from foundational, if previously unacknowledged, problems of the process by which emotion in the literary text was thought to be engendered and known. All the old epistemologies and their associated ontologies fail to escape basic contradictions; an entirely new conceptualization is needed of how literary emotion is experienced and, more importantly, by whom. The core of this reconceptualization is equally basic. It is to a large degree a function of the method by which we understand textuality as such, and literary textuality in particular, to produce its effects. And for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, this method was Mīmāṃsā.

We have already seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was known as an adherent of the school of scriptural hermeneutics, a fact that his critics sometimes used to dismiss his views (jaiminīr anusṛtaḥ “He is simply following the founder of Mīmāṃsā here,” says Abhinavagupta as a retort in one such dispute).19 Mīmāṃsā’s views on the nature of discourse were the most sophisticated of any in the premodern world; only recently have Western scholars begun to make real sense of its complexity, and many aspects await serious clarification. But there are some principles central to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s transformation of aesthetic thought that we can grasp without too much difficulty.
For Mīmāṃsā, all language, a fortiori scriptural language, is action-oriented, but the idea that language use as such consists not only of speech that embodies action but speech that produces action was widely accepted outside the domain of Vedic discourse analysis as well. Dhanika is no doubt again following Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (and standard Mīmāṃsā thinking) when he states, “Every sentence, whether human or divine, is directed toward action; otherwise it would be utterly worthless, like the babble of a madman.” But Bhoja, too, argues even more explicitly that all sentences eventuate in commands or prohibitions, whether or not imperatives are used: “A sentence like ‘It is noon’ means one should have lunch; ‘There are stones in the river’ means do not bathe there.”

According to Mīmāṃsā, Vedic statements will thus always resolve into a command to perform (or avoid) some act, and it developed a general theory of this sort of language behavior that they called bhāvanā, “production”.

No concept is more central to Mīmāṃsā than bhāvanā, and perhaps no concept has been worse served by modern Indological scholarship. This is the case in part because of the very magnitude and complexity of the traditional analyses and in part because of Mīmāṃsā’s own remarkable disagreements about precisely what bhāvanā is and how it works, not just among Kumārila, Prabhākara, and Maṇḍana Miśra, but among the Bhāṭṭas themselves over a very long period (Khaṇḍadeva [fl. 1650] shows that the internal dispute lasted a thousand years). The set of questions here is large and complex because the issue, the relationship between knowledge (or linguistic conceptualization) and action, goes to the heart of scriptural understanding.

When action is not spontaneous but compelled it requires instigation (pravartanā or preranā), which is the intention of a conscious being. In the case of the authorless Veda, this intention is something unique; it is called “expression” (abhidhā) and is inherent in language. That “expression” is enunciated by the verbal mood, paradigmatically the optative or imperative, and is called śābdī (or śabda- or śābda-) bhāvanā (or abhidhābhāvanā), “modal production”. Ārthī (or artha- or ārtha-) bhāvanā, on the other hand, is enunciated by the verb stem and consists of the meaning or action of the verb; we might call it semantic production (and it is ultimately, therefore, said to be located in the agent himself). Reduced to the essentials, thus, in the commandment, “One who desires heaven should sacrifice”, the “should” is modal bhāvanā, and “sacrifice” is semantic bhāvanā. Modal production is therefore said to produce semantic production, whereas semantic production (e.g. “sacrificing”) for its part produces some real outcome, heaven and the like.
As for śābdī bhāvanā, which will concern us in the first instance here, it is in the practice of mīmāṃsakas basically an analytic tool for understanding the quasi-illocutionary force of a discourse as a whole, what precisely the injunction is prompting the agent to do. It functions according to a very formal set of procedures. To correctly analyze a scriptural commandment we must understand it as indicating (1) what is to be produced by the action, (2) whereby it is to be produced, and (3) how it is to be produced (sādhya, sādhana, itikartavyatā), which together constitute the tryaṃśa or three components of śābdī bhāvanā.24 This analytic procedure presupposes a more general axiom, namely, that the Veda is concerned with human ends; “Whatever portion of the actual Veda were not to present itself as a human end would cease to have authority. ... No enjoined activity can therefore come to an end until some human end is achieved.”25

Consider a standard example of śābdī bhāvanā analysis. When we hear the sentence, “One who desires heaven should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma”, we cannot take this mean “one should produce the sacrifice”, since sacrifice in itself serves no human end. What we must interpret the sentence to mean is that “one should produce [the attainment of] heaven by means of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice.”26 Furthermore, while a sentence like the above thus tells us what should be produced and by what means, the actual procedures for producing it may often, as in this case, need to be understood from other sentences in the large discourse unit in which the particular sentence is embedded (in this case, the sentences describing the ritual mantras to be recited and so on).27 It is, moreover, in satisfying this how portion that the narrative sections of the Veda, the arthavāda, or “description of the purpose” of a rite—which as we shall see are of paradigmatic interest to literary hermeneutics—are said to execute their specific function.

Insofar as literature is a subset of discourse as such, a real science of literature, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka appears to have understood it, will necessarily accord with bhāvanā analysis and therefore explain what literature is “producing”, and whereby and how. In one surviving fragment he puts the matter this way: “[In literature] the ‘three components’ are literary expression (abhidhā), a special type of reproduction (anyā bhāvanā), and its experientialization (tadbhogīkṛti”).28 As the fragment shows, and as will become clear in what follows, the term bhāvanā itself bears two different meanings in his system: it designates on the one hand the aesthetic process over all and on the other the second component of the process (which in stricter usage is referred to as bhāvakatva).29 Before explaining these particular components, we need to note two further general adaptations Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has made of Mīmāṃsā doctrine.
First, the action involved in bhāvanā as a literary (rather than sentential or discursive) phenomenon is experiencing rasa, which is a very special kind of action. Dhanika brings out the full force of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s fragment:

In the case of the language of literature, positive and negative evidence shows that its performance-oriented purpose, both for its message and for those who receive that, lies exclusively in savoring its incomparable pleasure. By this argument, we determine the “action” (kārya) of the language of literature to lie precisely in the genesis of the bliss proper to it. The cause of that genesis, as we come to understand, resides in the stable emotion “syntactically construed” (-saṃsṛṣṭasya) with the aesthetic elements.30

It is because the action to be produced in bhāvanā as an aesthetic process is the experience of pleasure that neither knowledge nor moral action (judgment), while not excluded as an outcome of literature, can be its primary focus for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (appendix #6). In a differentiation among discursive genres that he was almost certainly the first to draw, probably in the context of this very argument, worldly knowledge is in the province of historical discourse, which can thus be likened to a friend who advises; moral precepts in the province of scripture, which can thus be likened to a master who commands; and literature in the province of rasa, which can thus be likened to a beloved who seduces.31

Second, as Dhanika intimates in his comment here (and elaborates later), in the same way that a scriptural passage unifies its parts into a discursive whole that generates action, so rasa itself can be thought of as a “unit of discourse” (vākyārtha) in which the aesthetic elements (the foundational and stimulant factors, the reactions, the transitory emotions) are like the individual words (padārtha) “syntactically construed” into a unified whole that generates aesthetic experience: “Just as in the Veda,” says Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in a crucial fragment, “where syntactic construal and the other linguistic operations constitute sentence meaning—since sentence meaning is a unity and must bear a relation to some outcome of action—so here in literature does the erotic and every other rasa constitute a kind of sentence meaning” (appendix #12 and note). Again, the correct explication of this idea is found in Dhanika:

In everyday sentences, the verb enhanced by oblique case forms constitutes the meaning of a sentence. ... In just the same way, in literature ... the aesthetic elements may be taken to stand for words, whereas the stable emotion, desire for example, when syntactically construed with them forms a sentence meaning. Thus, literature as
such is a “Vākyapadiya”, or a work concerned at once with word and sentence, the “words” and “sentences” being the ones just indicated.32

With this rich analogy of literary discourse—of aesthetic elements to words, of stable emotion to sentence meaning, and the experience of rasa to “action” to be “produced” by the discourse—the stage is set for a full-scale hermeneutical analysis of the literary phenomenon.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka explains literary bhāvanā as a three-part process precisely modeled on scriptural bhāvanā, but its components are identified by entirely new, or newly interpreted terms. The first is abhidhā. Normally this refers to primary or direct denotation in contrast to secondary forms of signification, such as figures of speech. For Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, abhidhā is extended far beyond its narrow meaning to embrace literary expression as such, including the phonic language qualities (guna) and the figures: “To the abode of ‘expression’ belong the figures of sound and sense” (appendix #11); according to Ruuyaka’s gloss, “The language process (śabdavyāpāra) is two-fold, distinguishing between primary and secondary meaning, that is, whether an unmediated or mediated sense is at issue” (appendix #3a).

In fact, abhidhā in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s usage is best understood or even translated as “literary language”; something “completely different” from the language of scripture and everyday discourse, as Abhinavagupta describes it.33 It is crucially this kind of language that transforms objects of linguistic reference into objects of aesthetic experience; in Dhanika’s words, “It is the literary process (kāvyavyāpāra-), figures such as hyperbole and metaphor,34 that actually elevate (āhitaviśeṣa-) a thing like the moon into a stimulant factor (uddipanavibhāva), a woman into a foundational factor (ālambanavibhāva), despair into a transitory emotion (vyabhicāribhāva), and goosebumps, weeping, the play of the eyebrows, and sidelong glances into reactions (anubhāva).”35 With its figures of sense and sound and intentionally patterned sound qualities differentiating it from all other forms of usage, literary language, we might say, defamiliarizes the discourse so as to differentiate it from the everyday world and its real referentiality—the world where, for example, “Sītā” means not “woman as such” but the wife of Rāma.

Another way Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka expresses the radical difference of literary language is by highlighting not its prominence over against everyday usage but its self-subordination to a higher-order process than signification as such. Drawing for the first time a distinction about “primacy” in different forms of discourse that was to be repeated down the centuries (and that no doubt originally linked up with his celebrated analogy of master, friend, and beloved), Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka puts it like this:
Scripture is distinguished by its dependence on the primacy of the wording [that is, the Veda is more important for how it says than what it says, and it can therefore never be rephrased]. Historical narrative, for its part, is a matter of factual meaning [that is, what it says is more important than how it says it, and can be rephrased multiply]. When both these, wording and meaning, are subordinate, and the aesthetic process itself has primacy, we call it literature.

The aesthetic “process” (vyāpāra) of bhāvanā comprises two remaining components. One of these Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka calls bhāvakatva, which as noted earlier must be distinguished from (though it is sometimes confused with) bhāvanā as such, the comprehensive term for the literary phenomenon. Bhāvakatva is anyā bhāvanā, “another order of bhāvanā”, and perhaps at the same time a “unique” type, different from any other sort of productive capacity associated with language. We saw earlier some of the problems Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka perceived in the old ontology and epistemology of rasa. Bhāvakatva is his solution. Although he does not gloss the term himself (appendix #7 is almost certainly inauthentic), bhāvakatva is consistently defined as the literary process whereby the emotional states represented in the literary work are made into something in which the reader or spectator can fully participate: sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, or “commonalization”, a synonym for bhāvakatva and apparently another of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s coinages, is a conception that obviously depends entirely on the relocation of the substratum of rasa from the character to the reader. The most important exposition of this idea is again offered by Dhanika:

What then functions as the foundational factor (ālambanavibhāva) for rasa when it resides in the audience? Take the case of Sītā, who is a royal (or divine) being: how can there not be something fundamentally contradictory in her acting as such a factor for the spectator? ... Unlike a spiritual adept, a poet does not behold things with the “eye of insight” and present a character like Rāma in a state of sheer individuality (prātisvikī), as is the case with historical discourse. Rather, he creates a typological state (avasthā)—“the noble” protagonist, say, in the case of Rāma—which is given presence through the poet’s imagination (utprekṣā) by means of the process of “commonality” that each viewer undergoes (sarvalokasādhāranya); the state itself simply providing a substratum for a given rasa. Consider here a word like “Sītā”: emptied of all its particularities, such as being the daughter of King Janaka, it signifies nothing more than “woman”—and how could anything untoward come of that?
In the real world we have no natural commonality with a figure like Sītā: as a queen (or goddess) and another’s wife she cannot rightly be an object of our sexual desire. In literary hermeneutics bhāvakatva is therefore not a productive but a “reproductive” capacity, something that allows us to relive the emotions appropriately in ourselves. Aided by the alchemical powers of literary language, bhāvakatva abstracts Sītā from her particularity—this is what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka calls “the capacity to overcome the resistances of one’s deep inner perplexity” and renders her a foundational factor for the stimulation of the spectator’s own stable feeling. One of the best short descriptions of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s idea is offered by Siṃhabhūpāla (c. 1380):

Whereas with reference to the historical hero (Rāma, for example) the underlying factor (Sītā) was once completely particularized, the process that in a poem or a play is called “reproduction” consists of “commonalizing” the foundational factor by means of the process of expression (abhidhā), and thereby enables it to be imagined by the spectator as connected with himself. It thereby comes to transform itself in the mind of the spectator doing the imagining or “reproducing,” without there being any contradiction with its persistence as a foundational factor (for Rāma). Thereby, the stable emotion that Rāma feels can be experienced by the spectator, and without the least disruption through impropriety, in an experience whose nature is a pure blissful absorption.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s third and last component of the literary-aesthetic process is experience (bhoga), or—in yet another neologism—“experientialization” (bhogīkṛttva or [tad]bhogīkṛttva or –kṛti, where the tad- refers to the now “commonalized” emotional complex). The phenomenon of literary experientialization is far more than “enjoyment”, as the usual translation has it. Bhoga signifies a complex kind of living-through, of disengaged engagement with, the various emotions. It is characterized as consisting of one of four different reactions depending on the rasa, each of which corresponds to one of the four “mental planes” that constitute our consciousness. Dhanika offers the crucial exposition:

When there is a “fusion” (saṃbhedā) between the “elements of the literary work” (kāvyārtha-) (that is, the stable emotion “construed with” the factors and the rest) and the mind of the reader—that is, a mutual interpenetration, one in which the self-other differentiation [i.e., between the reader/viewer and the character] has vanished—we have the genesis of the most powerful form of bliss that is the self, namely, savoring (carvaṇā). Although in its general form rasa is single, it can occupy one of four
different mental planes according to the type of fusion produced by the causes—the factors and the rest—that are invariably associated with a particular rasa. These are: expansion (vikāsa) in the case of the erotic rasa, enlargement (vistara) in the case of the heroic, turbulence (kṣobha) in the case of the repugnant, and agitation (vikṣepa) in the case of the violent. The remaining four rasas—the comic, the amazing, the horrific, and the tragic—once they have achieved a high degree of enhancement by means of their appropriate complement of aesthetic elements, have each the same four varieties respectively.

We have in fact two traditions of interpretation regarding Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s aesthetic psychology. Dhanika knew the HD intimately, as his exegesis everywhere demonstrates. His account of four mental states is eminently coherent, explaining the psychological response to Bharata’s four primary rasas (of which the secondary four, the comic and so on, are thought of as derivates). His version, however, is contradicted by that of Abhinavagupta (and all his followers), which identifies three sorts of bhoga: druti, vistāra (sic), and vikāsa (“melting, expansion, and radiance,” according to his most recent translators). Abhinava does not explain these states, though later interpreters such as Māṇikyacandra attempt to correlate them with different configurations of the three guṇas in the psychological make-up of the reader, though this seems to me a sheer guess extrapolated from Abhinava’s vague summation and based on a misleading parallel to the yoga usage. (Mammaṭa eliminated from his account the whole reference—perhaps as being unintelligible as it stands.) But all interpreters agree that for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, “experiencing” the emotions that have been made “common” by the power of literary “expression” and thus rendered accessible to the reader—horror without the danger of real horror, or desire without the impropriety of real desire—leads to a kind of absorption in or even catheisis on the literary event.

The term used for this state by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, apparently for the first time at least in the literary-critical context, is viśrānti (which will becomes so important for Abhinavagupta). This absorptive experience is an event unique to the aesthetic and completely different from normal experience (anubhava) and memory. It is, as Mammaṭa restated it, “a full repose in the true nature of one’s own consciousness”, rendered so completely joyful and luminous that it is akin to the ecstasy of religious self-transcendence given that “the self-other differentiation has vanished”, as Dhanika says. We should remember, however, what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself tells us in one of the few preserved fragments, that this religious experience is in fact inferior: “Nothing can compare with [aesthetic rasa], not even the rasa spiritual adepts bring forth” (appendix #3).
In terms of the three-part Mīmāṁsā paradigm, these components represent the means (abhīdāḥ), the method (bhāvakatva), and the what (bhogikṛttva) of literary “reproduction”, and we may synthesize as follows: Aesthetic experience (this is the kim or śādhyā) arises thanks to a conceptual transformation of the literary elements (the foundational factor and so on) via “commonalization” (this is the kena, or śādhana or karaṇa), which for its part is made possible by the unique powers of literary language (this is the katham or itikartavyatā). The term of art by which the whole process is itself designated, bhāvanā or (re)production, is meant to suggest a grand analogy: that the same mechanism enabling us to understand and to become the subject or “agent” of a commandment of scripture enables us to understand and become the subject or agent of a literary text. It is this process itself, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka himself says, that constitutes the essential or most distinctive trait of literari- ness: vyāpāraprādhānye kāvyagīr bhavet, “when the aesthetic process itself has primacy we call it ‘literature’”.

Now, in one sense Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s “hermeneutic” turn would seem to be largely formal: conceiving of the literary text, or rather aesthetic event, as a kind of discourse (vākyā) enabled him to apply to it the three-fold process of “production” that Mīmāṁsā developed for scripture, recoding the components to fit with the new type of “sentence meaning” of an aesthetic phenomenon. But to end with this analytical formalism would be a mistake, for it is only the surface manifestation of far deeper conceptual affiliations with Mīmāṁsā. Until we understand these, key questions of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s systems will remain unanswered. What, for example, is the exact relationship between the “reproductive capacity” (bhāvakatva) and the overall process, bhāvanā? How precisely does “commonalization” (śādharanikaraṇa) enable the reproductive capacity to arise in the experience of a literary text? And why should the entire literary process be designated as “reproduction”?

The answers to these questions, and thereby the true hermeneutical force of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s insights, are contained in none of the surviving fragments of his work. But I believe we can see them emerging from the restatement of his views by his most ardent if most reluctant if not ungrateful disciple, Abhinavagupta.
As is well known, Abhinava begins his discourse on rasa in chapter 6 of the Nāṭyaśāstra with a celebrated critique of earlier views, including Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s, to which we owe much of what we know about earlier aesthetic theory. What has been insufficiently registered, however, let alone explained in intellectual-historical terms is why Abhinava should chose to begin his reconstruction (or “purification of principles” pariśuddhatattvam) in the way he does. Here is the completely unexpected argument with which it opens:

yathā hi rātrim āsata tām āgnau prādād ity ādāv arthitā-
dilakṣitasyādhikāriṇaḥ pratipattimātrād itivṛttaprarocitat prathama-
pravṛttād anantaram adhikaivopṭṭakālatiraskāreṇaivāse54 samprada-
dānityādirūpā saṃkramaṇādisvabhāvā55 yathādārṣaṇaḥ pratibhā
bhāvanāvidhyudogādībhāśābhir vyavahṛtā pratipattis, tathaiva
kāvyātmakād api šabdād adhikāriṇo ’dhikāsti pratipattih.56

[On hearing a sentence of scripture such as “They held a sacrificial session through the night,” or “He offered up [the oblation] into the fire,” a qualified individual—that is, someone who has the necessary wealth and meets the other prerequisites—has at first a bare comprehension, if one that carries the persuasive power of historical eventfulness. But thereupon a certain surplus comprehension arises, of the nature of a set of grammatical transformations whereby the original tense is suppressed and he thinks, “Let me hold a session,” or “Let me offer up”. This sort of comprehension is identified by various terms of art depending on the philosophical school, such as “intelligence”, “production”, “commandment”, “injunction”, and the like. In precisely the same way, from literary language there arises for the qualified individual a surplus comprehension.]

It is impossible to understand why Abhinava’s reconstruction of aesthetics should begin by adducing passages from scripture that contain what is known as an arthavāda, a “description of the purpose” of a rite, without some background information from Mīmāṃsā. Such descriptions are held to be supplementary to the actual commandments that make up the core of the Veda and whose capacity to compel us to act is embedded in the deontic language they employ (“One who desires heaven must sacrifice”), and toward which much of the discussion of bhāvanā is directed. In the case of the arthavādas, however, it is far less evident how they are related to the action the Veda enjoins upon us—
as they must be if they are to be considered part of the Veda—for on first glance their purpose is simply narrative. Mīmāṃsā argues that, by providing an incitement (prarocaka is a common term) for obeying the commandments and performing a rite, often by making commendatory reference (stuti) to a particular quasi-historical event (such as an earlier performance of the sacrifice and the success that the sacrificer thereby achieved), the arthavāda persuades the subject to act in the same way.

By the use of the sābdi bhāvanā analytic, the narrative passage is shown to “form a single sentence with an injunction and have the purpose of commending it”. Indeed, from a more abstract perspective, whereas the what of sābdi bhāvanā as such is some human activity, and the whereby is awareness of the syntactical connections of the sentence, the how is the incitement stimulated by those descriptive passages of the Veda, the arthavādas, that metaphorically or indirectly commend acts that should be done (or condemn those that should not), given that man’s natural indolence causes him to turn away from action. Indeed, “modal production” necessarily requires the “method” (itikartavyātā) supplied by a descriptive passage.

Abhinava goes on to explain how this process works. When a duly qualified person, one who meets the requirements for participation in a Vedic rite hears a descriptive passage such as “They once attended the all-night rite,” or “He once offered the [oblation] in the fire,” he has at first a straightforward understanding of the discourse, one that incites him to act by reason of its historical eventfulness (itivṛttaprarocita). Directly afterward, however, he develops a “surplus comprehension” (adhikā pratipatti) of the discourse, which has the nature of a set of grammatical transformations leading him to suppress the temporality and agent of the original discourse (the historical past tense, the third person plural/singular), so that he comes to personalize the discourse: “I myself should attend,” or “Let me myself offer.” Different philosophical schools may have different terms for this process—above all, bhāvanā—but they all agree that the discursive function enables a particularized statement such as “they once attended” to be dissociated from its particularity, and thereby to become available for active recreation on the part of the sacrificial agent.

It is obvious why Abhinava chose his scriptural examples from the genre of arthavāda. There is nothing really mysterious about how the force of the express commandments and prohibitions of the Veda is communicated, since they directly address the reader. But the arthavāda is not a commandment, and yet it must speak to us and prompt us to act if it is to be considered part of the Veda. As we have just seen, Mīmāṃsā typically explains this capacity through the discourse analysis of sābdi bhāvanā—
indeed, that analytic has special propriety in the case of the *arthavāda*—
by showing how such descriptions complement the express command-
ments with which they form a single *vākya*, by indicating some praise
or blame that would enable man to proceed toward or turn away from
some action. Embedded in Abhinava’s cognitive sequence is, explicitly,
an extended sense of *bhāvanā*—perhaps even a new view of *ārthī bhāvanā*
(which is strictly speaking *puruṣanīṣṭhā*, located in the agent, rather than
*śabdaniṣṭhā*, located in language). Here *bhāvanā* is not primarily a tool of
discourse analysis required for a correct interpretation of sentences. It is
instead a “surplus comprehension” leading to an incitement to reproduce
an act; in other words, a *hermeneutical* force in a scriptural text that, even
in the absence of an explicit commandment (one recovered only after-
ward, through *śābdī bhāvanā*), can impel the reader toward that act. “The
very presence of a narrative produces two things,” says the Mīmāṁsā
exegete Śabara, “both a knowledge of what occurred and an incitement
toward or repulsion from some action.”

In the same way, the literary work produces in a qualified reader a
surplus, departialized meaning that opens up the discourse to a kind
of active engagement. When hearing the first verse of Kālidāsa’s play
*Sākuntala*, which describes the fear gripping a hunted dear, the spec-
tator after first grasping the actual meaning of the sentence has a kind
of apprehension (*pratīti*) that leads him to discard all the specifications
in the sentences, whether of time or space or individuality. The deer is
stripped of its particularity, and the source of its fear (the hunter, King
Duḥṣyanta) of his absolute reality. We are left with the stable emotion of
fear, untouched by any time-space particularities; completely different
from the sort associated with such everyday notions as “I am afraid; he is
afraid; he is enemy, friend, or neutral.” Abhinava continues:

The fear thus grasped unimpeded, transforming itself before one’s eyes
and entering almost visibly into one’s heart, is the *rasa* of horror. In the
case of this sort of fear, one’s own self is neither completely obscured
nor specifically referenced—and the same is true for everyone else.
The “commonalization” is therefore not exclusive [to oneself], but
rather comprehensive: it is like grasping the invariable concomitance
of smoke and fire, or fear and trembling ... All the spectators have the
same completely undifferentiated awareness, [a realization] that serves
to enhance the *rasa* even more.

“In short,” he concludes, “*rasa* is just this stable emotion grasped in an
apprehension (*pratīti*) that consists of physical tasting.”
The extract from the start of *Abhinavabhāratī*’s reconstruction of aesthetics shows how profoundly it breathes the spirit of Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka, from the idea of “commonalization” to (very possibly) the specific wording of the details of the process.70 This general influence has been widely recognized, but less so the precise nature and extent of Abhinava’s hermeneutical turn, and what these may allow us to infer about Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka’s aesthetic system. Aside from its formal linkages with Mīmāṃsā as discourse analysis, bhāvanā, once reconceptualized as aesthetic process, enabled Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka to think of the force of the literary text in the same way as the hermeneutists thought of the force of the scriptural text. We can imagine him starting with some simple questions that his two disciplines would have forced upon him: how is it that actions that the Veda shows concern other people at other times and places are actions that we here and now are impelled to re-enact?71 And by the same token, how is it that we here and now are able in some way to experience a literary discourse that always concerns other people at other times and places? Is there a power in the literary text that makes us re-enact the text ourselves in a way analogous to our experience with scripture? And this led him to conceive of the force operating in each as identical. This force renders the meaning of a particular (past, unique) narrative significant for or applicable to us; we reproduce that meaning, in the sense of recreating it as something that relates to us, and we do this by “commonalizing” its content so that “I” can in some way do or feel what “they” once did.

Preparatory to this, the nature of literary language, with formal properties that make it unlike any other use of language, obliterates the narrative’s historical referentiality and “commonalizes” its emotions (through sādharaṇīkaraṇa) by “reproducing” them (through bhāvaktva).72 This is what enables the reader to experience (through bhoga/bhogīkṛttva) the work himself, thereby “producing” (through bhāvanā) not action, but aesthetic pleasure.73 As Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka was at pains to make clear, the output of literary discourse is thus as different from other discursive genres as its input: just as literature’s dual treatment of wording and meaning differs from that of both scripture and itiḥāsa (where wording has primacy in the one case, and meaning in the other), so does literature differ in its effects: whereas scripture leads toward moral action and history to knowledge, literature leads to pleasure (appendix #6). How radically this differs from the Mīmāṃsā textual universe from which Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka emerged is an important if more extraneous question.74
Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s bhāvanā, his vyāpāra or literary process, must accordingly be seen as a specifically hermeneutical form of knowledge, in the use of the term hermeneutics that points not so much to the conditions of interpretation as to the conditions of understanding. The poem may be about the love of Rāma and Sītā, in the same way as the ritual narrative is about Janamejaya, Brahmā, and the anonymous “they” or “he” who in the descriptive passage in the Vedic brāhmaṇa texts are said to have performed the rite in question. Yet through the force of bhāvanā the discourse of both scripture and literature comes to be directed to oneself. It is precisely this phenomenon that completes the triple movement of hermeneutical understanding, as Hans-Georg Gadamer was the first to argue out in the Western tradition. Not only are understanding and interpretation mutually constitutive—“interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form of understanding”—but understanding itself always comprises application: It “involves something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter’s present situation … application [is] just as integral a part of the hermeneutical process as are understanding and interpretation”.75

The revolutionary move made by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was to put the subjective experience of the reader front and center in his aesthetic analysis. As a result, all earlier questions about the aesthetic experience—locked as they were into a linguistic analysis of literature, and text-centric—were pushed to the margin. (And perhaps locked into radically different epistemologies: If Śrī Śaṅkuka, for example, was in fact a Buddhist, did Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s Mīmāṃsā realism also contest and replace a Buddhist idealism and illusionism?)76 Once you realize that the key thing about rasa is the reader’s or spectator’s experience, it no longer matters whether rasa is engendered, inferred, or manifested in the character—indeed, talk of engenderment, inference, and manifestation will no longer make much sense. You begin to ask how literary language transforms a discourse about people you do not know (Rāma, Sītā) into something you as reader can somehow enter into and feel is “applicable” (as Gadamer might put it), or pertinent to your own self, and how that enables an altogether unique kind of experience and knowledge. And what aids you in answering this question is the analytic method developed for scripture, which gives commandments to others that are somehow meant for you, which you make your own, and then proceed to act upon. And in the process of this action, scriptural or literary, transform yourself and your world.
What is worth stressing in conclusion, aside from how profound was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s transformation of Indian aesthetic theory, is the quality of his thinking measured against that of contemporary scholars who write on emotions and the aesthetic. I cannot go into that literature here beyond registering my conviction that, except for the more recent advances in cognitive theories of emotion, present-day efforts to make sense of aesthetic response would most certainly have gained in sophistication and depth had it been possible to read in full the “Heart’s Mirror” of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

Appendix: From the Hṛdayadarpaṇa of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka

Direct (and probable) citations

(5) Scripture is distinguished by the fact that for it, wording has primacy. Historical narrative, for its part, is a matter of factual meaning. When both wording and meaning are subordinated and the aesthetic process itself has primacy, we call it literature.

(6) With respect to literature, every reader in the first instance aims to experience rasa, not to gain knowledge or be persuaded of some moral precept.

(7) We scholars hold that the literary function is three-fold: expression, reproduction, and experientialization. Beyond that, we do not accept anything, certainly not what has been called “implicature”. Expression is an established fact in all domains of communication; production refers to the generalization of the aesthetic elements, the factors and the rest; experientialization refers to the unfettered savoring of rasa.

(8) Rasa must be completely distinguished from all acts of making and knowing. It is a unique function, something we can call “savoring”.

(9) As for the other process called “implicature”, which consists of manifestation, even were it proven to be different from the other two, it would only be a component of literature, not its essential form.

(11) [In literature] the “three components” are literary expression, a special type of reproduction, and experientialization. To the abode of expression belong the figures of sound and sense. Next, reproduction brings into being the group of
rasas, the erotic and the rest. When a reader is pervaded by the experience of these rasas, he finds aesthetic fulfillment. Although it is something entirely phenomenal [this experience] clearly participates in the nature of spiritual release.86

...

(12) Just as in the Veda, where syntactic construal and the other linguistic operations constitute sentence meaning—since sentence meaning is a unity and must bear a relation to some outcome of action87—so here in literature does the erotic and every other rasa constitute a kind of sentence meaning.88

...

Restatements of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s doctrine

(1A) From Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabhāratī on Nāṭyaśāstra (c. 1000), supplemented by Hemacandra’s Kāvyānuśāsana89 (c. 1175)

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, however, argues that rasa can neither be the object of a normal perceptual experience, nor is it a thing that actually comes into being or can be “manifested.” If rasa were perceptible, it would have to be perceived either as being in oneself or in someone else. If rasa were perceived as internal to oneself (it would have to be thought as arising in oneself, DhĀL). The first problem with this is that, in the case of the tragic rasa, one would feel actual pain oneself (and never return to the theater to see sad plays, DhĀL). Second, the perception would not even stand to reason, since a character, Sītā for example, cannot be a foundational factor for the spectator such as would enable him to perceive rasa in himself (she is a factor of that sort only for another character, such as her husband, Rāma, M). Third, the spectator cannot be thinking of his own beloved in the midst of a description of Sītā, because she is a divine/royal being for whom it is senseless to say that she has any kind of property in common with his beloved90 (and there would therefore be nothing to stimulate the spectator’s latent disposition of desire, DhĀL). Fourth, in the case of a rasa like the heroic, for example where the stimulant factor is something never experienced, as in the case of Rāma’s building a bridge across the ocean, the possibility of perceiving the rasa in oneself through the functioning of a commonly shared property is ruled out: there is no stable emotion the spectator shares in common with non-worldly beings like Rāma (DhĀL). And one cannot have any memory of Rāma’s energy (the stable emotion of the heroic rasa), as empowering him to cross the ocean, because one never had the perception of him in the first place that would be required to ground such a memory. Nor can one be said to have “perceived” Rāma by some other means of valid knowledge, say testimony or inference, in order to provide a basis for one’s memory. Such a mediated perception would no more provide an experience of rasa than would glimpsing with one’s own eyes the love-making of the
actual characters, when the spectator would be expected to be absorbed in one or another state of mind—shame, disgust, or yearning.91

If, on the other hand, rasa were perceived as external to the perceiving subject (as present in the actor or the characters), then it could not be a “taste” (that is, something experienced), but an object, like a pot (M), toward which one would be emotionally indifferent.

Accordingly, it makes no92 sense to say that there is a perception—in the form of an empirical experience or memory or whatever—of rasa. The same criticism applies to the view that rasa actually comes into being. And lastly, if rasa were something that existed only in potential form (since rasa cannot be conceived of as already existing, like some material object, M) and that was subsequently “manifested”,93 it would be subject both to the gradations of actualizing the object that are inherent in any idea of “manifestation”94 and also to the same dilemmas as before, that is, whether it is manifested in oneself, or another, and so on (DhĀL).

Therefore, there must be a second component other than expression, the process known as “reproduction”, which is something utterly different from other kinds of language by virtue of the three-fold constitution of literary language (DhĀL). This is marked in poetry by language that shows an absence of faults and the presence of language qualities and figures of speech, whereas in drama it is embodied in the four different modes of representation (gestural, verbal, and so on).95 If literary expression were not complemented by “reproduction”, literary figures of speech would be no different from those used in everyday life, and particular literary styles and norms would be meaningless (DhĀL). “Reproduction” has the capacity to overcome the resistances of one’s deep inner perplexity, and consists in essence in the commonalization of the aesthetic elements, the foundational factor and so on. By this process is produced rasa, which comes to be experienced by a form of “experience” utterly different from empirical experience, memory, and so on; one marked instead by a melting, enlargement, and expansion96 that depend on the relative degree of volatility and impassivity in the spectator, and marked by an absorption of the spectator’s consciousness consisting of a predominance of sensitivity, light, and bliss, and which shares something of the character of savoring the supreme being.

(2a) From Mammaṭa’s Kāvyaprakāśa (c. 1050)97

Rasa is not something cognized, whether as existing in someone external and uninvolved with the viewing subject, or as internal to him. Nor is it something that actually comes into being, or something “manifested”. On the contrary, in
poetry and drama there is a process in addition to expression called “reproduction”, which consists in the “commonalization” of the foundational factor and other aesthetic elements. By this process the stable emotion is reproduced and experienced in a third process called experience, which has the nature of an absorption of consciousness consisting of a predominance of sensitivity, light, and bliss.

... .

(3a) From Ruyyaka’s Sariketa on Kāvyaprakāśa (c. 1150)

In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s system all three positions concerning rasa—that it actually comes into being; that it is the content of a cognitive experience; that it is “manifested”—are critiqued, and his own position, that rasa is “experienced”, is established... . Against all three he levels a common criticism: If rasa arose in or were perceived as truly existing in oneself, it would have to be experienced in precisely the same way (e.g. sorrowfully in the case of the tragic rasa); if it arose in or were perceived as existing in someone else, one would be indifferent and hence have no rasa experience at all; if it were latent and only manifested, it would be subject to the gradations of actualizing the object that are inherent in any idea of “manifestation”, and so again one would have no rasa experience. He therefore abandons all three positions and argues in favor of “experience”. This consists of relishing rasa and amounts to the same thing as pure pleasure. And it is entirely different from the views that rasa comes into being, and so on: given that their operations must proceed under the constraints of time and space, they all are subject to the many aforementioned criticisms. “Experience”, however, is entirely different, hence has a non-worldly quality, and thereby escapes those criticisms.

To be precise: There is a three-fold “process” (tryamśo vyāpāraḥ) of literature; the three components are called expression, reproduction, and experientialization. Among these the first, namely the language process, is itself two-fold by virtue of the distinction between primary and secondary meaning, that is, whether an unmediated or mediated sense is at issue. This two-fold process is common to scripture and historical discourse as well, which may be likened to master and friend respectively insofar as the wording itself has primacy in the former, and the meaning in the latter. But the other two components are unique to poetry and drama; whereas, at the same time, literature is differentiated in its language-process from scripture and history by being likened to a wife, insofar as both wording and meaning have primacy. With respect to those components, we will first discuss reproduction. Although it is impossible for Sītā, for example, to ever be a foundational factor, reproduction comes into
being in order to bring about a state of commonality. This is made possible in poetry by the presence of language qualities and figures of speech and by the absence of faults, and in drama by the use of the four kinds of representation. For the brilliance of the wording and meaning of the literary text is derived from the brilliance of the full complement of aesthetic elements, just as the moonstone is caused to melt by the proximity of moonbeams. In the same way, from the exceptional nature (vaiśiṣṭya) of the full complement of aesthetic elements in poetry and drama there comes about this process of reproduction, which may be defined as “commonalization”. Once the foundational factor and the rest are “commonalized”, commonalization renders the stable emotion an experiential object (viṣayīkṛta) on the part of the sensitive reader. The concluding process, “experientialization”, can be defined as making this emotion an object for his relishing. It is precisely because literature has the capacity to delight such a reader that is likened to a wife. This experience is in essence a savoring of the highest bliss, and is closely approximated to savoring the supreme being on the part of spiritual masters.

(4a) From the Alaṅkārasarvasva of Ruuyaka (R) (1150), with the commentaries of Jayaratha (J) (fl. 1300) and Samudrabandha (S) (fl. 1300)

(R) When Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says that the process of manifestation is a component of literature he is admitting it only for the sake of argument and dismissively. He awards primacy to the aesthetic process as such, with the actual forms of wording and meaning subordinated to this. More specifically, over and above the first two literary processes, expression and “reproduction”, there is a third one. This is in essence the relishing of rasa, a synonym for which is “enjoyment”, and he accepts this as the dominant literary element, insofar it constitutes the place of “absorption” (viśrānti).

(J KM 8-9) Some scholars have argued that manifestation is beyond the domain of speech and therefore indefinable. To this view Ruuyaka now turns. “Dismissively”, and not by providing a definition. That is why the assertion is dismissive: he accepts something only for the sake of argument, which cannot (he says) be defined. “A component of literature,” i.e. not its essence, as (Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) says, “As for the other process called ‘implicature’, ...” What Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka means by “process” is poetic creation itself. Otherwise [that is, if literature were not something entirely different, a “process”], it would be impossible to differentiate literature either from the Vedas, where wording itself has primacy, or from historical discourse, where meaning has primacy. As (Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) has said, “Scripture, in its dependence on the primacy of the word ...”. He has declared that literature consists of three components: “Expression,
production, and aesthetic experience...” He sets forth the sphere of the first two components in the verse “To the abode of expression...” and the third component in the verse “When a reader is pervaded... .” This last component consists of a relishing of the other two that is experienced by lovers of literature. And when he states that “Although it is something phenomenal ...” he accepts this experience as the “abode of absorption”, being something similar to relishing the supreme being.

(Samudrabandha TSS 9-10) “Expression”, which here includes primary and secondary meaning, is common to literary and nonliterary language. (Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s) two other processes are specific to literature. The one, “reproduction”, is the generalization of the factors and the other components of rasa; the other, “enjoyment”, is a literary process that exists over and above/transcends (abl.?) these two, and is described as in essence the relishing of rasa. While both the author of the Vakroktijīvita and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka equally hold linguistic process to have primacy, the former awards this primacy to expression when artistically qualified, whereas the latter awards it to manifestation as related to rasa, for which a synonym is “enjoyment”.

(5a) From Mallinātha’s Commentary on Ekāvalī (fl. 1400)

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s doctrine of aesthetic experience is as follows: The “linguistic process”, which pertains to literature and plays, assists the “reproduction process”, whereby the aesthetic elements, the foundational factor and so on, are “commonalized”. Here the stable emotion is brought to consciousness as something common to the reader, since anything that pertains specifically to the actor and so on is eliminated. And it is thereby experienced by the “reproduction” process, also known as aesthetic experience, which consists of an awareness that is pure sensitivity, light, and bliss.

... .

Resonances of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s doctrine

(1b) From Rasāṛṇavasudhākara of Siṃhabhūpāla (c. 1380)

A foundational factor (such as Sītā) attains real existence through linguistic communication, its actual external reality being irrelevant. Furthermore, whereas with reference to the historical hero (Rāma, for example) such a factor was once completely particularized (Sītā being a specific individual for Rāma), the process that in a poem or a play is called “reproduction” consists of generalizing the foundational factor by means of the process of expression, and thereby enables it to be imagined (vibhāvita) by the spectator as connected with
himself. It thereby comes to visibly manifest itself in the mind of the spectator
doing the imagining/reproducing (bhāvaka) without there being any contra-
diction with its persistence as a foundational factor (i.e. for Rāma). Thereby, the
stable emotion that Rāma feels can be experienced by the spectator, and without
the least disruption through impropriety, in an experience whose nature is a
pure blissful absorption (nirbharānandaviśrānti).

Notes

Robert Goldman has stressed throughout his career how crucial traditional
interpretation is to the modern interpretation of Sanskrit literature. And
this of course is the point of studying alaṅkāraśāstra. I offer the present essay
as a token of long friendship and even longer admiration. I am grateful to
Radhavallabh Tripathi and Lawrence McCrea for their criticisms of an earlier
draft of this essay.

1. Kane 1971: 196-97. The variant reading is also found in ABh mss.

2. adṛṣṭadarpaṇā mama dhīḥ (Vyaktiviveka v. 4) No commentator on the
famous précis in Kāvyaprakāśa 4 after Māṇikyaacandra and Ruuyaka (both
mid-twelfth century) gives any evidence of knowing the original (if even
those two did). I include below a citation from Uttungodaya’s Kaumudī, a
thirteenth- or fourteenth-century commentary on the DhĀL (Appendix
#7) and a summary from Siṃhabhūpāla’s Rasārṇavasudhārakara (c. 1385;
Appendix #1b), though without any confidence that these are grounded in
the actual text.

3. Their relationship with the earlier writer is seriously understudied. Only
vague references are to be found in the standard literature; T. Venkat-
acharya, the most recent editor of DR, is completely silent on the matter.

4. dvijas tayor nāyakākhyo gaurīśasurasadmanoḥ | cāturvidyāḥ kṛtas tena vāgdevī-
kulamandiram || (Rājataraṅgiṇī 5.159; Stein, - kulamandira, “familiar dwelling
place”; but see such later locutions as Sārasvateya and kavikula).

5. For the wider intellectual-historical development, see McCrea 2009.


7. I say “core” because the text shows evidence of interpolation and manipu-
lation of a very deep and wide sort.
Kuntaka accepts the position *sthāyī eva tu raso bhaved*, *Vakroktijīvita* 3.7 ff. (see also Nanavati 1998: 39-40), and views rasa only as a textual phenomenon.

Śrī Śaṅkuka’s views have been poorly transmitted. All we can safely accept is what is said in the ABh: Rasa is to be defined as the stable emotion, in the form of an imitation of the stable emotion in the main character, being apprehended by inference from the presence of the aesthetic elements (*anukartari rasān āsvādayato nukārye bhāvatprayatītih*, p. 266). The focus remains on the textual/dramatic process, even if the cognitive aspect may have a new prominence. Later elaborations of Abhinava’s précis on the part of Mammaṭa, say, or Hemacandra have no automatic claim to authenticity since there is no reason to believe they had access to Śrī Śaṅkuka’s work.

When Viśvanātha in the fourteenth century uses the language of *vyañjanā*, he concedes the point that there is a serious conceptual problem (and seems to be the first one to do so): since rasa is only a process of tasting on the part of the spectator and not some object, it is in fact incoherent to speak of its “manifestation.” (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, pp. 79-81). What complicates this is that eventually the *sthāyibhāva*, the stable emotion, itself comes to be located in the spectator, and rasa will indeed therefore just be the “manifestation” of something that is already there (reference to the *sthāyibhāva* of the spectator is found first in DR 4.40-41ab; the fuller implications are brought out in *Kāvyadarpaṇa*, p. 150). I leave for another occasion a discussion of the acrobatics required by Abhinava to retrofit *vyañjanā* epistemology for an ontology for which it was never intended.

If I understand him correctly, K. Krishnamoorthy seems to have been the first scholar to recognize this (1979: 215).

The depth of the confusion about Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in traditional India may be gauged from the footnotes to the selections (see especially appendix #4a). I forgo here a catalogue of the nebulous formulations typical of modern scholarship.

*Bhogakṛttva* is by my lights a persistent misspelling for *bhogīkṛttva*.

My translations of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s new technical terminology will be clarified below.

*paṅgau pūrvavyāpāramahimani* (*Kāvyamālā* ed., p. 29.9); *matasyaitasya pūrvasmān* [sc., abhinavaguptasya] matād bhāvakatvavyāpārāntarasvikāra eva viśeṣah. bhogas tu vyaktih. bhogakṛttvam tu vyañjanād aviśiṣṭam (*Kāvyamālā* ed., p. 30.2). Madhusudhan Shastri ad loc. interprets *pūrvavyāpāra-* as bhāvakatva, but that makes no sense to me.
16. See also appendix #7: “Beyond [expression, reproduction, and experientialization] we do not accept anything, certainly not what has been called ‘implication.’” Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is cited frequently in the DhĀL as providing interpretations (of illustrative verses) that do away with the hypothesis of dhvani (cf. e.g., pp. 68, 72). Ruuyaka describes the HD as dhvanidhvanidhvaṃsagranthaḥ in his comment on Vyaktiveka, v. 4. See also his restatement of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s views in his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa (appendix #3a) and most compellingly, Dhanika’s elaboration in his commentary on DR 4.37.

17. Like Abhinava, Ruuyaka usefully notes that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s critique actually pertains to all earlier positions (utpatti, jñapti [= anumiti], and abhivyakti), see Appendix 3a.


20. DRA 4.37.

21. This seems more or less to accord with what Searle meant in saying, “One only refers as part of the performance of an illocutionary act” (Searle 1969: 25 [italics added]).

22. As serious a student of Indian philosophy as Daya Krishna had to send out a call for someone to explain the precise difference between the two types of bhāvanā (Daya Krishna 2000).

23. I take this account not from Mīmāṁsā but from Nyāya, Dinakara’s commentary on the Kārikāvalī (vv. 149-52, pp. 817 ff.) I now find that the term “modal” (for sābdā) has been used in Balasubrahmanya 1995: 59 (a learned discussion that does not, however, seem to truly grasp the logic of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s hermeneutical turn).


25. yāvad veda eva puruṣārthatayā sakalam ātmānāṃ na pratipādayati tāvad apramāṇam ... evaṃ sarvavidhinām prāk puruṣārthalābhād aparyavasānam (Tantravārttika, pp. 11.6-7, 14-15).


28. Appendix #11; so Ruuyaka, tryaṃśo vyāpāraḥ, appendix #3a.
29. Thus Mallinātha, appendix #5a. The use of bhāvanā at the beginning of Bhōja’s SP, beyond which rasa is said to exist (v.10), raises difficulties of its own that I cannot address here. I now see that I have been anticipated in my use of the phrase “aesthetic process” by Nanavati 1998: 47-51, but he has something else in mind, the notion that abhidhā for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is supposed to have included all three vṛttis, or linguistic functions. The historical record, however, does not support this.

30. DRA 4.37 (“aesthetic elements”: vibhāvādi-).

31. The full analogy seems to be available first only in DhĀL p. 40 (at Vāmana’s Kāvyālakāra 1. 1, the topos appears neither in the sūtra nor in the vṛtti but only in the fifteenth-century Kāmadhenu commentary).

32. DRA 4.37; see also on 4.46: “By virtue of their treatment in literature ‘word meanings’ in the form of something like the moon, despair, and goose-bumps come to be known as factors, transitory emotions, and reactions, respectively. These enable the stable emotion to be ‘reproduced’ and hence savored, and that is known as rasa.”

33. abhidhā vilakṣaṇā eva (DhĀL p. 183). Abhidhā has been misinterpreted both in both modern and traditional exegeses. “Literal meaning” (Ingalls et al. 1990: 221) and “denotation” (Gnoli 1968: 45) are incorrect (likewise Chin-tamani’s critique of S.K. De, 1926: 271 n. 1). That Uttuṅgodaya interprets Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s abhidhā as “an established fact in all domains of communication” (siddhādyā [sc., abhidhā] vyavahārabhūmiṣu, appendix #7) suggests to me the inauthenticity of the verse; see also Samudrabandha’s misreading, appendix #4a.

34. Read atiśayoktirūpakādikāvyaavyāpāra- (for Adyar’s atiśayoktirūpakāvyaavyāpāra-), see DRA 4.2.

35. DRA 4.46.

36. This would seem to explain Abhinava’s argument that abhidhā becomes something completely different from everyday discourse only through its interaction with bhāvakatva (DhĀL, p. 182).

37. Appendix #5. A somewhat confused gloss is given by Ruuyaka (appendix #3a), where wording and meaning are said to be equally dominant (contrast his remarks in appendix #4a), for which compare Vyaktiviveka, p. 483.

38. Mallinātha shows a clear grasp of this distinction (appendix #5a).

39. The word is not found in the extant fragments but associated with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in all summaries of his position (note that it is unknown to
ānandavardhana). I believe that Kangle (1973: 380) is correct to deny any such meaning to the idea of sāmānyaguṇa at NŚ 7.6+ (of which Bharata makes no further use, with the modest exception of 24.184). Dhanika’s citation on DR 4.2 is therefore an anachronism, committed in order to provide a more ancient pedigree to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s thought (so too Abhinava, ABh vol. 1, p. 275, line 6).

40. With this Dhanika is making the point that each viewer thinks the character is similar to himself, not that “commonalization” is available to all people (though Dhanika may well have thought so; contrast n. 69 below).

41. The spectator would be feeling desire toward “woman” as such, not toward the divine mother, Sītā.

42. DRA 4.40-41ab.

43. As Bahurūpa Miśra puts it, “[The aesthetic elements like the ālambanavibhāva] have their existence as such heightened by virtue of being used in literature through the refinements of language qualities (phonic texture and the like) and figures of sense and sound. These elements, each associated with their specific rasa, enable the stable emotion to be ‘reproduced’” (on DR 4.46-47ab). See also Mallinātha, appendix #5a. Ruyyaka’s understanding (appendix 3a, the aesthetic elements lend abhidhā “brilliance,” the way moonbeams transform the moonstone) seems inexplicably to reverse the process.

44. nibiḍanijamohasaṃkaṭatānivāraṇakāriṇā (ABh, vol. 1, p. 271, line 2, very possibly a direct quote). I take this to refer to the initial unconscious perplexity of the viewer reacting to an actor playing a character who should not be a foundational factor for the spectator. No metaphysical concerns need be assumed.

45. See appendix #1b and notes.

46. The term cittabhūmi is found first in Buddhist thought (Abhidharmakośa) and then in yoga, where the mind is also said to have five bhūmis (see n. 49 below). The notion of cittabhūmis is found nowhere else in aesthetic discourse.

47. DRA 4.43-45ab.


49. For example, Bhoja’s understanding of the five mental states, kṣiptaṃ, mūḍaṃ, viķśiptam, ekāgraṃ, niruddham iti cittabhūmayaḥ (Yogasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.3), especially his correlation of viķśiptam with sattva and the gods, shows that there is no connection with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s violence-related vikṣepa (see Bhoja’s commentary ad loc.)
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50. KP, p. 560; DRA, 4.43.

51. Abhinava tries, quite shamelessly, to reappropriate this triad for his own view (DhĀL, p. 189; Ingalls et al., p. 225).

52. Note vyāpāraprādhānya in Ruuyaka, appendix #2a; abhidhādivilaksanavyā- pāramātra- in Sāhityadarpaṇa, p. 74. Prabhākara Bhaṭṭa in Mithila in 1583 gracefully summarizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s system (kāvyārthaparyantābhidhā ratyādīviṣaya bhāvanā sahrdayavisyaś ca bhoga iti (Rasapradīpa, p. 26: ‘‘Expression,’ which encompasses literary meaning; ‘reproduction,’ which pertains to the stable emotions; ‘experience,’ which pertains to the sensitive reader or viewer”), though it is certain he had no direct access to the HD).

53. The one scholar I have found who appreciates the importance of this passage is P.-S. Filliozat (in his edition of Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣana, 1963: xi-xii), but his assessment of its meaning is very different from mine. It is vaguely true, I suppose, to say that for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka “le rasa est autre chose que le sense poétique et la jouissance [bhoga] du rasa autre chose que l’apprêhension de ce sens,” but that is an odd way of describing Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s hermeneutical turn. And while Filliozat rightly (and for the first time that I am aware of) flags the importance Abhinavagupta’s śruti example, instead of describing his goal of appropriation to be “pour la [sc. bhāvanā] modeler à nouveau et l’inscrire dans le cadre de sa pensée,” it would be more accurate to say that Abhinava brings out the true hermeneutical significance of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s thought (unless he is actually still borrowing from him). And what he misses most of all is the core linking concept of sādharaṇīkaraṇa.

54. Read āse, or possibly āsāi or āsīy (for āste).

55. Read –svabhāvā (for –svābhāvā) and delete daṇḍa.

56. ABh, vol. 1, p. 272, lines 21-25.

57. āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt (scriptural tradition is for the purpose of sacrificial action), Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra 1.2.1.

58. As Kumārila puts it, buddhipūrvakāriṇo hi puruṣaḥ yāvat praśasto ‘yam iti nāvabudhyante tāvam na pravartante. vidhīsaktir [v. 1.l] avasīdati; tāṃ prāśastyajñānam uttabhnāti (People who act with any deliberation do not engage in an act until they know it is commendable. The power of the deontic verb itself can falter; when it does it is reinforced by an awareness of some commendation of the act), Tantravārttika pp. 12-13.

59. Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra 1.2.7. Such injunctions must be found or presumed to be present, for otherwise the descriptive passage becomes meaningless (akal-

60. ἀλασύνη νινταρμάναμ πορυσάμ, Dinakara (p. 820), who goes on to cite the anonymous verse: 

\[
\text{λίνα 'βηδήα σαιβα ας σαβδαβύανα βηδήαν ας ταευαν πορυσαπραβρτιή / σαμβανδαβοδάγαν καραναμ ταδιαναν σαμγαγαταπαγαυυδάτα} //
\]

(Expression by a modal verb is called “modal production”, and what it produces is human action. The instrument of modal production is understanding of the syntax, and incitement [through the arthavāda] is used as a subsidiary cause [i.e. as the “method”]). This all builds on Ταντρανάρττικα, pp. 12-13.

61. Ταντρανάρττικα, p. 12 (arthavādāḥ ... śabdātmikā tu grahiṣyanti, the descriptive portions are necessarily comprised within modal production).

62. These are typical formulae; I do not believe actual texts are being cited.

63. “Grammatical transformation,” saṃkramaṇa, but the word seems unattested in precisely this sense. The -ādi presumably refers to the interpretative techniques adhyāhāra, vipariṇāma, and so on (see e.g. Śabara on Pūrvaṁīṁśāṁśāśtra 2.1).

64. The Jain Hemacandra replaces the reference to Vedic sacrifice with an account of Śaṁba’s hymn to the sun, whereby this son of Krishna cured a serious illness: A person hearing that story, according to the verses cited by Hemacandra, comes to think that he too will sing such a hymn to attain healthfulness. This alternate version raises a range of complicated questions, not least whether it was original to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as Gnoleti believes (1968: 53), but on what evidence I cannot tell.

65. For Bhoja in ŚP 6, these are all really aspects of the same phenomenon, sentence meaning: When sentence meaning has the form of some human activity, it is called bhāvanā; when it has the form of a verbal activity it is called a command (or prohibition); when it has the form of intellection, it is called pratibhā (p. 322).

66. Mīmāṁsā never seems to put the matter this way, however. The only question Kumārila raises is how an authorless text’s commandments work: the deontic verb itself is insentient and cannot actually compel anything, but since the human agent cannot logically compel himself, the deontic verb fulfills that function mediated by the consciousness of the agent (Ταντρανάρττικα, p. 12.21-22).

67. Ταντρανάρττικα, p. 12.17: arthabhāvanā is not required for arthavāda passages; they are however taken up in (required by?) śabdabhāvanā (ṭha hi līṇādīyuktesu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane gamyete, śabdātmikā cārthātmikā ca. tatrārthātmikayārθavādā nāpēṣyante, śabdātmikā v tu grahiṣyante).
68. anvākhyaṁ vartamāne dvayaṁ nispadyate yac ca vrūttāntajñānaṁ yac ca kasminścit prarocanā dvēso vā (Mīmāṃsādarśana, p. 33); see also p. 31: stutisabdā stuvantaḥ kriyāṁ prarocayamānā anuṣṭhāti upakarisyanti kriyāyāh. evam imāni sarvāny eva padāni kaṇcid arthaṁ stuvanti vidadhāti.

69. ABh, vol. 1, p. 273, lines 1-14; p. 274, line 6. At the end of this extract Abhina-va is presenting a notion of sādharaṇīkaraṇa, as a process “made common” among the viewers that I do not believe was maintained by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka or his followers (compare n. 40 above).

70. “Transforming itself before one’s eyes,” cakṣuṣor iva viparivartamānam (bhāvan) is almost certainly Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s language, see DRA 4.1 and 27 (śroṭy-prekāṇāṅam antar [bhāvakacetaśi, 37] viparivartamāno ratyādidir ... sthāyi); Rasārṇavasudhākara, appendix #1b (vibhāvādibhāvānāṃ ... sākṣād ... viparivartamānānām). Curiously, Abhinava seems not even to think of some of these ideas as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s; in ABh, vol. 1, p. 275, line 6, for example, he attributes the idea of sādharaṇīkaraṇa to Bharata.

71. Mīmāṃsā itself nowhere, so far as I can see, offers an explicit discussion of the textual psychology described by Abhinava, by which the lakṣaṇā or indirectness of the arthavāda leads the reader to transform an ancient merit- orious act into a present possibility.

72. As Ruyyaka says, it is thanks to “the exceptional nature (vaiśiṣṭya) of the full complement of aesthetic elements in poetry and drama ([vibhāvādi-] sāmāgrī-)” that “there comes about this process of reproduction” (Appendix 3a).

73. Here the analogy becomes slightly asymmetrical: the sacrificer produces exactly what the primordial “they/he” once did, and receives the same re- ward. Literary production is reproduction of the emotional state, and of a very different sort from the original, especially in terms of phala.

74. For Kumārila, a text like the Mahābhārata or the Rāmāyaṇa can only be either de- scriptive (which is useless) or didactic (which is not); if this didactic element is not explicit it has to be taken to be present by implication (sarvopākhyaṁeṣu ... kathan-cid gamyamānastutiṇindāparigrahah). The knowledge that these texts provide has nothing to do with their truth (tattva) but only with their moral value (sarve ca stutyarthena pramāṇam) (Tantravārttika, pp. 14-15; he does, however, allow that there are some passages that are utterly irreducible to any moral content and that simply give “pleasure”).


76. Gupta 1963 (I thank Somdev Vasudeva for this reference).
77. For example, Hjort and Laver 1997; Neill 2003; Robinson 2004.

78. Passages not relevant to the argument here have been omitted. The full record is available in Pollock, forthcoming, whose numbering has been preserved here.

79. \( \text{śabdaprādhānyam āśritya tatra śāstraṃ prthag viduh} | \text{arthatattvena yuktaṃ tu vадanty ākhyānam etayoḥ} | \text{dvayor guṇatve vyāpāra-prādhānye kāvyagīr bhavet} \) (cited ABh, vol. 2, p. 298 [ārthe tattvena yuktē tu], DhĀL, p. 87, Kāvyānuśāna, p. 5; Jayaratha on Alankārasarvasva, p. 9, who reads –dhīr for –gīr, “we have what we think of as literature”). Abhinava’s criticism here turns on the meaning of “process”: If the term refers to the relishing of rasa based on implicature then Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is saying nothing new; and if it refers to signification or expression as such (abhidhaiva) then this has already been shown not to have primacy (DhĀL, p. 87). Both objections are odd: Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka rejected implicature, as Abhinava well knew, and he also defined “process” far more broadly than mere expression (though Abhinava repeats the narrow interpretation in ABh, vol. 2, p. 298, line 9: bhaṭṭanāyakenāpi kuśa laśikṣitābhidhāvyāpārapradhānamāṃ kāvyam.

80. \( \text{kāvye rasayitā sarvo na boddhā na niyogabhāk} \) (cited DhĀL, p. 39). My translation is supported by DR 1.6, which echoes this v. Uttuṅgodaya (and independently Rāmaśāraka) understands that the capacity to experience rasa constitutes the qualification for literature: every person who experiences rasa is qualified for literature, every person who seeks knowledge... is not (p. 78). But there is no reason to believe, pace Ingalls et al. 1990: 73, that Uttuṅgodaya knew the HD at first hand (it is hard to believe his text was available in south India in the fourteenth century, and solely to Uttuṅgodaya), and must therefore be regarded as an unimpeachable interpreter; the only independent “citation” of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in Kaumudī is #7 below, but those are unlikely to be the words of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Another interpretation: every process in literature offers rasa (like a beloved); it does not offer knowledge (like a friend) or give commandments (like a master). Abhinava cites the verse to show that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka agrees that rasacarvanā is the principal matter in literary experience. But of course the point of contention between Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is not whether rasa is the telos of literature, but how rasa works.

81. Given the discussion of abhidhā in appendix #11, this definition is erroneous, which casts down on the authenticity of the verse.

82. \( \text{vyāpāras trividho budhair abhimataḥ kāvye 'bhidhābhāvanābhogotpādagatāt-} \)tmanā tadadhiko nāsti dhvanir nāma nah | siddhādyā vyavahārabhāmisu vibhā- vādyarthasādhanaṅkārātmā tv aparā nirargalarañāsvādātmikevāntimā || (cited Kaumudī on DhĀL, p. 79; cf. Krishnamoorthy 1979: 221). Given the art meter
used here (along with the inadequate grasp of abhidhā just noted), it is unlikely that the verse is original to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

83. viṅga evāyaṃ krtijñaptibhedhyāh svādanākhyah kaścid vyāpārah (cited Sāhityadarpana p. 74 and not attributed to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka but bearing all the hallmarks of his idiom; it is not in verse but the HD is likely to have been mixed verse and prose; Viśvanātha’s use of vistāra [sic] (p. 71) certainly and vyāpāramātra (p. 74) possibly also hearken back to him). “Making” refers to Lollaṭa’s utpatti- or poṣaka-paṅḍa, “knowing” to Śaṅkuka’s anumitipakṣa.

84. That is, primary and secondary meaning. (Rāmaśāraka erroneously understands as expression and reproduction, but implicature is not of the same order as reproduction and so not to be distinguished from it.)

85. dhvanir nāmāparo yo 'sau vyāpāro vyañjanātmakaḥ | tasya siddhe 'pi bhede syāt kāvyāṃ satvaṃ na rūpatā || (DhĀL, p. 39; Jayaratha on Alāṅkārasarvasva, p. 9). Abhinava cites the verse to indicate that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s position has been rejected by the DhĀ.

86. abhidhā bhāvanā cānyā tadbhōgikā eva ca | abhidhādhamatām yāte śabdārthālaṅkārtī tataḥ || (1) bhāvanābāhyya eso ‘pi śṛṅgārādīganaj mateḥ | tadbhōgikārīpaṇa vyāpyate sidhīmān naraḥ || (2) drṣyaṃnāthavā [corrupt?] mokṣe yātī āṅgatvam iyam sputam || (3) (cited Abḥ, vol. 1, p. 271, line 6; Kāvyānuśāna, pp. 90-91 (vv. 1-2); Jayaratha on Alāṅkārasarvasva, p. 9; in v. 1, I read -kṛti with Jayaratha instead of H’s –kṛta; in v. 2, I read mateḥ with Jayaratha instead of hi yat with Abhinavgupta and Hemacandra, which seems to misinterpret tād- in c as correlative, when it is in fact part of the compound that is a technical term, as v. 1 indicates; and again with Jayaratha –kṛti- for –kṛta-). “Participates in,” literally, “becomes a limb of.” In the original text the verses may not have been consecutive.

87. This is standard Mīmāṃsā theory: for the first, arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam (Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.46); for the second, bhāvanāvai hi vākyārthaḥ (Ślokavārttika Tadbhōtādīkaraṇa v. 330), and bhāvanā by definition is bringing forth a result.

88. sāṁsargādir yathā śāstra ekatvāt phalayogataḥ | vākyārthaḥ, tadvac evātra śṛṅgārādī raso mateḥ || (cited Abḥ, vol. 1, p. 271; Kāvyānuśāna, p. 97). Hemacandra adds (the Abh passage is I believe corrupt) the qualification that, unlike Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s doctrine of bhāvanā [sic], this view has Abhinava’s full endorsement. But in DR, the idea of rasa as vākyā is clearly part and parcel of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s argument against vyañjanā and in favor of the tātparya position (Dhanika on DR 4.37), a linkage that will be thoroughly misunderstood later in the tradition (see Kumārasvamin on Pratāparudrayāsobhūṣaṇa 4.137, and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, Rasagaṅgādhara [Kāvyamāla ed.], p. 30.2). Normally sāṁsarga is an idea associated with Nyāya, but the term is used loosely here; less likely the
“intimate association” of two words or things, and the rest of the semantic factors, see Vākyapadiya 2.315 ff.; Kāvyānusāna 1.23 ff.

89. Pp. 270-71 and pp. 96-7 respectively, supplemented by the version in DhĀL, pp. 180-81 and Māṇikyaacandra’s précis (Mysore ed., vol. 1, pp. 216-21). The account is so condensed as to be unintelligible without embedding in the translation an exegesis based on these supplements, which I have done.

90. Both texts read sādhāraṇikaraṇāyogyatvat, but taking it in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s technical sense makes for nonsense here: It is precisely in such circumstances that “commonalization” is supposed to work, as Dhanika clearly shows (on 4.40-41ab). Moreover, this is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s siddhānta—that commonality with such beings is not natural, it is produced by literature—and it would be a petitio principii to adduce it here as an argument against the pratītivāda. DhĀL’s pūrvapakṣin gives the right sense: kāntātvaṃ sādhāraṇam; and Māṇikyaacandra’s text strongly suggests something like sādhāraṇyāyogyatvat, which is what I adopt in the translation. This would also construe well with asādhāraṇyāt in the next line. It may simply be that the term is not to be taken in its technical sense (note that later sādhāraṇya itself will become a technical term identical to sādhāraṇikaraṇa, -kṛti, Sāhityadarpaṇa 3.9-11).

91. Although the final clause is found in this position in all four sources, the argument more properly belongs at the end of the following paragraph, describing a problem with perceiving rasa externally. This is how DR presents it (4.38-39). I cannot explain its current—to me clearly erroneous—position (and things are not helped by reading, as does Gnoli, pratyakṣād iva. nāyaka-).

92. I read tan na for tatra in both texts (see also Kangle 1973: 147).

93. Ingalls et al. 1990: 227 note that “manifestation” here is used in a more general, non-linguistic sense, of bringing to light a rasa supposed to preexist in latent form in the spectator’s psyche, but it is not clear to me that the general and the specific senses were ever clearly distinguished in this discourse.

94. So that one would never be said to have a full rasa experience, see Ruuyaka below (and contrast Ingalls et al. 1990: 221).

95. These are strictly the features of the expression process, but are assimilated to production as contributory elements. See also Ruuyaka appendix #3a.

96. druti, vistāra, vikāsa (H reads vistara, which is authenticated by DR 4.43; Mallinātha on Ekāvalī p. 96 notes that the form vistāra is a dubious usage in this context; Ingalls et al. 1990: 36 may have misread as vikāsa and hence translated as “radiance”).

98. I read –*satattvena* (for –*sattvena*) with Śrīdhara.


100. I read –*nikarāntikrāntatvāt* (for –*ākarakrāntatvāt*; see Śrīdhara *Kāvyapratikāśa*, vol. 2, p. 565. But what does he mean by this, that the *utpatti* of rasa in Rāma is a historically specific thing to which we here and now have no access?

101. *śabdāvyāpāra*. Note that Ruuyaka is clearly using this as a synonym of *abhidhā*.

102. Since for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it is the figures of sound and sense that are involved rather than direct and indirect meaning, we must assume that “indirect meaning” (*sāntarārtha*) is another way of characterizing figures of speech (recall that for thinkers from Daṇḍin to Bhoja, *vakrokti* was a synonym of *alaṅkāra* as such).

103. Ruuyaka’s formulation here and in what follows awkward. As extract appendix #5 clearly shows, and as Ruuyaka asserts at the end of the next sentence here, the literary language process, where both wording and meaning have primacy, cannot be “common” to scripture and historical discourse. It is only the use of troped and untroped language that is common, and it is no doubt to the latter that he refers here.

104. That is, for anyone other than her husband Rāma, such as the spectator.

105. *bhavad bhāvanam* strikes me as dubious, though it is given in both editions, and in Śrīdhara’s *Kāvyapratikāśa* commentary, which essentially reproduces Ruuyaka.


107. I omit the commentator Vidyācakravartin, who has a false reading in the first sentence (*kāvyātmatva*, for *kāvyāṃśatva*) that causes him to completely misunderstand Ruuyaka’s argument, and who has nothing of importance to add to our understanding. Clearly by his date (early fourteenth century) direct access to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s text was no longer possible.

108. The text has been imperfectly transmitted, with Jayaratha alone preserving the truth: *kāvyāṃśatvaṃ bruvatā J* (translated in text). Completely adrift are Samudrabandha, *kāvyae sattvaṃ bruvatā* (“while admitting the existence in literature of the particular linguistic function known as implica-
ture, which he designates as ‘fanciful utterance’”), and Vidyācakravartin, kāvyātmatvaṃ kathayatā (“while claiming that implicature is the essence of literature”).

109. -uttīrṇa, borrowed from DhĀL, p. 52. Bhoga is the result of bhāvakatva, and so cannot be “far beyond” it (Ingalls et al. 1990: 81).

110. The reference is to DhĀ 1.1c.

111. I read rupatā (rūpitā).

112. kavikarmanāh. I find this strange, since vyāpāra is not itself the literary work (the normal meaning of the term kavikarma) but the capacities of the literary work to produce an experience of it.

113. Page 85.

114. I read sādhāraṇiḥkṛta- (for sādhāraṇiḥkṛtena).

115. That is, most importantly, the character.


117. See DRA 4.2, p. 168.

118. Read abhidhāvyāpārena (for the disputed reading abhidhāparyāyena, which is impossible).

Abbreviations

ABh = Abhinavabhāratī
DR = Daśarūpaka
DRA = Daśarūpakāvaloka
DhĀ = Dhvanyāloka
DhĀL = Dhvanyālokalocana
HD = Hṛdayadarpaṇa
KP = Kāvyaprakāśa
NŚ = Nāṭyaśāstra
ŚP = Śṛṅgāraprakāśa
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