

a good story to tell, and one that fascinates people around the world. Yet when the Aga Khan addressed the White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy in the fall of 2000, he hit upon something that is missing from our planning. We have not made an effort to make sure we listen to the stories of others. We can do this by making it possible for writers and artists from other countries to come to the United States. Indeed, the International Visitors Program did provide grants for writers to attend the Iowa Workshop for two-month stints. This effort has largely disappeared due to budget cuts, but I was very touched to hear the brilliant Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk tell PBS correspondent Elizabeth Farnsworth that he first came to understand the United States while at Iowa on an International Visitor Program grant.

One of the most important newer innovations is something called the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation. The program invites embassies from the third poorest countries in the world to submit projects for cultural preservation to a committee of regional experts, art historians and archaeologists. Small grants of up to \$20,000 are awarded to the top proposals in this annual competition. The ambassador then has the occasion to publicly announce, and then award, the grant. Ambassadors, needless to say, are wild about this program. The reason they like it so much is that it lets local people know that we value their culture. In countries where cultural artifacts are endangered through neglect, or worse, such a ceremony sends the message that the United States values cultural heritage and thinks it is worth preserving.

In this presentation I have focused extensively on countries of the developing world; however, we have to think seriously about putting money into programs in wealthy countries as well. Both Germany and Japan are eager to have more exchange programs of every kind. It is no secret we have some serious differences with our closest allies. Perhaps these differences would have been more equitably resolved had the relationships not been so neglected over the past decade. Another thing to think about when dealing with the wealthy countries of the Arab world is that we still might want to cover certain expenses. Two decades ago, there were thousands of Saudi students in the United States. Then Saudi Arabia built its own university system, and many stopped coming here. For the past decade, there has been little of the intellectual cross-fertilization that occurred earlier. It is perhaps no accident that this coin-

cided with the rise of radical Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. It might be very much in our interest to continue to encourage Saudis to be educated in the United States.

I've not spoken at length about the arts because I believe that it is so utterly self-evident that we would want to share our rich cultural life—music, painting, dance, theater, sculpture—with the rest of the world. Of course, many of our leading artists perform or exhibit in the wealthy countries of the world. They go to Japan and Europe at the invitation of local entrepreneurs. However, it is very much in our interest that our artists visit those countries that cannot afford to extend such invitations. There are Russian-trained musicians and dancers throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus who would relish performances by visiting Americans.

I believe that it would make eminent sense to create a public-private sector board dedicated to supporting such tours through corporate sponsorship. The board would include diplomats with regional expertise and experience, government officials and representatives from the private sector. Such a board could function in a manner similar to that of Fulbright. In the fall of 2000, we sent the Dance Theater of Harlem to China under such a program. Not only did the dancers perform in major cities, they gave master classes. The performances were broadcast on television, bringing this marvelous artistic experience into millions of Chinese homes. We should be doing much more of this. Unfortunately, the light lit briefly then quickly dimmed.

I'd like to mention here the conference co-sponsor, Arts International, which provides support for U.S. artists invited to participate in major international performing arts festivals and visual arts exhibitions. This fund was founded as a public-private partnership of two federal agencies, the National Endowment for the Arts and the U.S. Department of State and two foundations—The Pew Charitable Trusts and The Rockefeller Foundation. Since 2001 The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation has provided additional support for the performing arts program.

I wish you well at this conference and look forward to the day when its recommendations can be implemented. I certainly implore all of you to demand that the necessary resources be allocated for public diplomacy. There are dedicated professionals at the ready to revitalize the American cultural outreach. It may be the best way to tell an angry world that we care.

America's Global Image: Short-Term Branding or Long-Term Exchange?

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PANELISTS:
RICHARD W. BULLIET, *professor of Middle Eastern History,
Columbia University*
ANDREW KOHUT, *director,
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press*
JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, *resident scholar
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JOHN ROMANO, *screenwriter and producer*

CARTER: In 1953, my father was offered the head position of the United States Information Agency (USIA). We had a family conference about it, and I insisted, throwing myself on the floor and screaming and beating my head on the floor, that he must not do it. "Why?" he said. "Because I'll have to leave Sheila," I said. There were things that mattered on that day to me much more than the notions of what we were doing in the world, but he didn't listen, and he took off for Washington to accept, from the man he had supported in the election of '52, his mandate. He got off the plane in Atlanta and called mother and said, "I'm not doing it." She said, "Why?" He said, "Because when I go up to the Senate to talk about my new job, that Irish son of a bitch from Wisconsin is going to ask me, 'Did I know that my researcher at PM in the 1940s was a communist?' And I'm going to punch him out." So he came back up from that non-existent rendezvous, and a year later spent four months touring Asia under the auspices of the very agency he had turned down, from which he came back an even-more convinced convert to the notion that soft diplomacy in the world was at least as important in the world as heavy nuclear weapons.

Well, we go forward some 23 years thereafter, and when asked by the incoming president of the United States' minions what I wished to do, I declared, of course, first that I wanted to be deputy secretary of state, and they laughed. Then I said I'd like to be assistant secretary of state for Europe, and they laughed. Then I said I'd really like to do USIA, and they fell on the ground laughing, and they gave me the job of chief of staff at the Department of State—a job which, in its own way, mandated a reaching out to the rest of the world, as well as to the United States, in ways that tried to be somewhat persuasive, but not very soft about what it was and the virtues of our own policies.

A few years ago there was a brief moment in which it seemed that the new administration, which had inherited the collapse of the Soviet Union, might be persuaded to not back away. But that collapse that Ambassador Finn discussed rather eloquently was, in fact, a collapse of the administration that came into office in 1992. It was a deliberate backing away—from the center-left perspective—that we no longer needed to be actively in the world, because that was a Cold War relic, and now we had to be about other businesses later to be defined. We are still suffering from a variety of such beatings, which were amplified from the other side of the ideological spectrum by an all-out assault on the State Department and USIA, whose net result was the configuration we now find ourselves in, in which there's no longer a separate agency for con-

ducting our cultural and soft diplomacy in the world, but in fact a reduced presence of state.

Here we are, more than 50 years into what we do well, discussing whether we ought to do it better or at all. I think from this panel we're going to be hearing a variety of views on this subject, which is a good and sufficient thing.

KOHUT: The United States' image became the subject of The Pew Research Center's first *Global Attitudes* survey, the largest public opinion survey ever conducted. It was conducted in 44 nations—44 independent national surveys among 38,000 people. It was released at the end of last year, and it documented what everyone suspected—that is, that America had a real image problem, a growing image problem. The outpouring of sympathy post-9/11, a year and a half earlier, had been transformed into increasing hostility, not only in the Arab world, not only among Muslims more generally, but all around the world—in NATO countries, in the developing nations of Africa and Asia, even to the north and south of us. Still, in about the third paragraph of that report, we wrote, "But there's a great reserve of liking and support for the United States. It still exists in most countries." That was then.

We have since conducted surveys that measured the toll of anti-war sentiment on the image of the United States, and we changed the verbs. Rather than "America's image is slipping," "America's image has plummeted." I won't read many numbers to you, but these are so dramatic that I will. In a survey we conducted in early March, in Great Britain, we found that only 48 percent of the British public that we had spoken to had a favorable image of the United States. It had been 75 percent just six months earlier, and the State Department had pegged it at 83 percent in 2000. So it went from 83 to 75 to 48, and that was as good as it got. In the other eight countries, it was dramatically worse. In Germany, the trend was 78 percent pre-2001, 61 percent in 2002, and 25 percent in March of 2003. Even in Italy, where we have such a history of favorable attitudes toward the United States, only 34 percent of the Italians had a favorable view of us.

Unfortunately, clearly the impact of opposition to the war, among the publics of the willing nations, the coalition of the willing and the unwilling, was responsible for this. I'm not so sure that the speed of the war, or the pictures of cheering crowds in Baghdad, will change the image of America very quickly. The poll that we conducted in early March showed that despite opposition to the war, the majorities in most of these countries believed that

the Iraqis would be better off, that the region would be more stable, if the United States and its allies used force to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Seventy-five percent in France and Germany believed this. But even though 80 percent of the French and Germans were strongly opposed to the U.S. military action, the message from this poll was pretty clear: “We agree with your objectives, America, but we don’t like the way you did this.” And we still have to address the problem of the way we did this.

In the Muslim world, our problems go way beyond our approach to dealing with Iraq and our style. True dislike of America, if not hatred of America, exists very broadly across the Muslim world. Even before the war in Iraq, we found 60 and 70 percent of the people in Egypt and Jordan and Lebanon and Turkey and Pakistan saying they had an unfavorable view of the United States. Turkey was the most disappointing and the most dramatic trend with 42, or close to 50 percent, of Turks saying that not only did they dislike the United States, they “strongly” disliked the United States. Now a large part of this in the Muslim world, especially in the Mideast area, has to do with our policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That’s real simple. Another part of it, and it’s hard to figure out what the ratio is, is hostility toward the war on terrorism. In every one of the 11 countries, except Uzbekistan, where we asked questions about the war on terrorism, there was majority opposition, even countries like Indonesia and Senegal, where there was support for the United States at that point and liking of the United States.

Muslim people, inside the area of conflict and around the world, see the war on terrorism as picking on Muslim countries, not protecting the world against terrorism. That’s certainly the view of the Turks with regard to our war on Iraq. I might add, and I want to make it very clear, that attitudes toward the United States are much more complicated and contradictory than opinions of us in the Mideast and among the Muslim publics around the world. People around the world embrace us and embrace things American, and at the same time decry the influence of the United States in their world. The United States is universally, even in places like Pakistan, admired for its technology and its scientific achievements. And in most countries, including many Muslim countries, to my surprise, our cultural exports have been liked—our popular cultural exports—our movies, our music, our television. We were surprised to find how many people said, “Yes, we enjoy these movies, we like these television shows.” But we also found in every one of these countries, a large majority saying, “There’s too much America here; there’s too much America in our culture; there’s too much America in our life.”

Most common policy criticisms of the United States are easy, and they’re familiar to you: The United States acts unilaterally, our policies contribute to the gap between rich and poor countries and the United States doesn’t do its share of dealing with global problems. Attitudes are clearly most negative in the Mideast. But ironically, criticisms of U.S. policies and ideals, such as the way we practice our democracy, the way we do business, are highly prevalent in Europe and among our traditional allies. Criticisms of the United States are much more widespread in Canada, Germany and France than in the developing nations of Africa and Asia. In those countries, at least six months ago, we were still models for governing, still models for commerce. I think America’s war with Iraq

will intensify and enhance differences between us and them, and the greatest relative damage will be to the European-American way of looking at each other. That tie has been so positive for so long, but the rift is so large. The poll that we conducted in April found majorities of Europeans saying, “The problem is George Bush, the problem is not America.” George Gallup taught me never to second-guess my survey results, but in this case I’m going to second-guess them a little bit. Europeans do have a problem with George Bush. We’ve been conducting polls since the beginning of the Bush administration, and there was great hostility toward Bush early on, before the war on terrorism, but I think it’s broader than that.

We have a real big problem in the United States being transformed from the sole superpower to a perceived imperial power. There are two kinds of resentment that are apparent in the surveys we’ve conducted, in the interviews we’ve done all around the world and especially in Europe. The first is resentment of our power: After the 9/11 attacks, we were surprised and saddened by the extent to which the polls that we conducted found people around the world saying, “Well, we sympathize with the United States, but we’re glad the Americans know what it’s like to be vulnerable.” That’s a reflection of resentment of our power and discomfort with our power. The second is suspicion of our power: At the end of last year, when we questioned Europeans and Turks, but especially Europeans and Russians, about a potential war with Saddam, the Turks did not see Saddam as a threat to regional stability. The Europeans largely did, even many Russians did. And by large percentages, almost as large in the United States, Saddam Hussein’s regime was thought to be a threat to stability in that region, almost to the same extent as was the case in the United States. But when we asked the question, “Why does the United States want to remove Saddam Hussein?” overwhelmingly the answer was, “Because of oil.” That answer about oil, which is not shared in the United States even among critics of the war in Iraq, reflects the suspicion that exists of our power.

Certainly, we need all the help we can get, and we can get our money’s worth out of public diplomacy, but I think in the end that public diplomacy can only affect attitudes toward the United States on the margin, given the magnitude of the problem. It’s what we do, not our style, not our culture. It’s not the messenger, it’s the message. In the Mideast, that’s particularly the case. Our policies in Israel, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are a problem. And if we want to change the attitudes over there, we have to give the perception that there’s more fairness, more even-handedness. Secondly, our support for unpopular regimes and things that seem to repress people rather than reflect the people’s agenda is a second element of the message that we have to convey. Among our old allies, it’s policy, too. It’s finding a way to reduce concerns about that power, suspicion about that power. Beyond that, there are value gaps that have always been apparent between the United States and Europeans. These value gaps, now that we’re not bound together by a common enemy, are more divisive. There’s more support in the United States for a free-market approach; there’s more individualism here. The stereotypes are true, but there’s also less willingness to support a social safety net, less willingness to pay for environmental measures. There are really great differences between the American public and the publics of Western Europe,

and we have to acknowledge that in the way we deal with the common problems that the democracies on this side of the Atlantic and the democracies on the other side of the Atlantic have to deal with. The political pressures are very different.

I’m not sure how to sum this up, other than that I’m positive and supportive of cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, but we really have to recognize that to make big changes, you need big events. The big events that are required can only be facilitated, not brought about, by improving our cultural diplomacy.

I have never been sadder about my government than I am today, in the aftermath of the plundering of the Iraqi National Museum and the Iraqi National Library, while our Marines protected the Ministry of Petroleum.

CARTER: Andy Kohut has done a great service, not only to remind us of what the polls seem to show, but also of the fact that reality always does seem to trump image-making and the like in the long-run. What trumps it even more, of course, are deep cultural and other divisions created by history and all the forces of culture. Our next speaker, Richard Bulliet, can come at it both as a historian and as a novelist of the Middle East.

BULLIET: I’m here as an educator and as an historian. I’ve spent the last 40-some years studying the Islamic world as a social historian. I have never been sadder about my government than I am today, in the aftermath of the plundering of the Iraqi National Museum and the Iraqi National Library, while our Marines protected the Ministry of Petroleum. I think that this will prove to be our equivalent of the Sabra/Shatila massacres, where we failed to live up to the responsibilities of a military occupying force. I think it’s one of the great, great, great tragedies of modern culture. There isn’t anything else in Iraq. This is a country that’s been ravaged by war for many, many, many hundreds of years, and what there is, either underground and protected, or was in those two institutions, now has been destroyed or dispersed.

In 1957, the Operations Coordinating Board, which was a high-level operation in government, combining intelligence and USIA and diplomatic representatives, issued a secret report. In that report they made an inventory of resources in the United States for learning about Islam, resources available to the USIA for understanding Islam abroad, or simply a description of what there was in the Islamic world that would be of interest to the United States. It concluded that Islam was very important, and it said that, contrary to intuition, the communists were making more inroads into the Muslim world than we would have expected. Because, despite their atheism and despite the suppression of religion in the Soviet Union, there were great wellsprings of hostility

toward the West in the Islamic world that the communists could play upon. Of course, this was a Cold War document, this was in 1957. This was not when the United States was known for its support of Israel, because in ’56 we had actually intervened in the Suez War to force the Israelis to withdraw. So the idea that it’s policies in the short term that somehow, if miraculously reversed, would cause hostility in the Muslim world to go away is, I think, erroneous. We’re looking at much deeper issues.

That document called for the study of Islam so we would know what we are doing, and particularly noted that American representatives abroad typically learn about Islam from English-speaking, Western-educated Muslims, who, they might add, are also sucking up to the United States. They did not actually learn the languages and spend time finding out what was happening at levels below the level of the intelligentsia or the political influentials whom they saw as their proper interlocutors. This was 1957. One of things that was happening at the same time was the construction of the field of Middle Eastern studies in the United States with Columbia University taking a very important role. What is particularly striking about the field of Middle Eastern studies as it was constructed at that time is that it totally ignored Islam. Despite that being the specific recommendation of where we were weak, and where we were finding the communists were ahead of us, and where we were finding that there was great hostility toward the West, we did not teach about Islam except as a classical thing that happened long in the past. Indeed, between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, which came as a shock to academia as well as to the political world, there were only, I think, three or four books written by American-trained scholars about modern Islam. You simply could not find a book on Shiism in 1962 that would tell you anything about Shiism now.

Since the Iranian revolution, there have been about 4.2 million books on Islam published, and each one is just about the same quality as the other. We have been driven by events, finally, into looking at something. But it is striking that it is during this period from the end of World War II down to 1979 that the major figures who were drawn upon intellectually for this jihad, for this opposition in the United States, that this was when they were writing, this was when they were visiting the United States. This was when their books were being disseminated and read by university and high school students in the Muslim world, and we did not notice it. The reason is that we were driven by modernization theories that essentially said religion is irrelevant in the public sphere in the future, in the modern world that is coming to be. It’s a secular world, and, therefore, who would waste their time studying Islam?

Our assumption of secularism has been a grievous error on our part. First of all, it assumes that secularism means what we have in America, whereas secularism in the Middle East means anti-clericalism and a strong effort to destroy the infrastructure of the Islamic religion as it existed for hundreds of years. It has also failed to recognize that in the dynamic of political theory over the centuries in the Middle East, the primary check on tyranny has been, theoretically—and sometimes even in practice—Islamic law. So that when tyranny reaches a maximum, as it did under Saddam Hussein and as it has reached in a number of other countries, it is natural for a Muslim population to think the people who can do something are the people of faith, the people who can try and

reassert the primacy of Islamic law as a curb upon tyranny. We fail to understand that because we think the people who can do something are secular democrats who believe in globalization and free enterprise and want to visit the United States.

We have not grasped the long-term political system, the political culture, of the Islamic world. And, therefore, we have a very difficult time selling a message to an audience where we don't understand what is motivating the audience. I agree, we should have much more public diplomacy, but to approach it from a marketing point of view—"let us sell our product"—without doing more consumer research and finding out what it is that would cause people to actually buy our product, is a waste of money, as any marketing person could tell you. When Ambassador Finn quoted the Secretary of State saying, "Listen to the field," what I

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would say is, "Teach the field to listen." Because I'm fairly sure that we are not getting a feedback from the region, from the Muslim world, that is fully informing us. As evidence of this—and I can use Ambassador Finn, with all apologies, as an example—when you talk about Osama bin Laden and his followers as "demented fanatics, opposed to everything we stand for" etc., name-calling does not help you understand the fact that tens of millions of Muslims who would never fly an airplane into a skyscraper still agree with the political analysis of Osama bin Laden. Many people look upon it as a very sound and credible and persuasive analysis of the world, and yet they are not terrorists. When you dismiss everything he says and everything he does with pejorative labels of demonization, you miss interrogating what it is that appeals to people about his message, leaving aside the question of the terrible terrorist tactics that he adopts to advance his message.

I have spent many, many hours reviewing videotapes from jihadist sources, as a consultant for various police forces, and it's amazing how appealing they can be to a young Arab audience, and how little we seem to grasp of what is going on in the society. I believe in more public diplomacy, but the shape of it as described by Ambassador Finn seems to lack a certain point of contact with reality. I recall in the early 1980s, being in Abu Dhabi, and I was traveling with a Columbia professor who was a former ambassador, and, therefore, we were treated with ambassadorial courtesy. We had a meeting with political officers in the embassy, and I asked them, "Tell me about Islam and the United Arab Emirates." They said, "You know, with congressional delegations and business men, we hardly have time to move the paper that we have to move every day. We're not thinking much about Islam here." That was pretty much the answer I got. Then we went over to visit with the British ambassador, who didn't have a whole lot to do, sitting around in a largely vacant embassy as far as we could tell, and I

asked him, "What about Islam and the Emirates?" And he said, "Well, I had a young man—he speaks Arabic fluently—I gave him six weeks leave from his job to simply go through the Emirates and talk to people, and here's the report." I was struck at how different diplomatic cultures handle things differently.

It's good to sell. Americans are good at selling. It's an American specialty. But you have also to listen, and this is what I hope will happen. It's not just listening in the field, but it's also listening to people in this country who can talk to you about what is happening in Islam. I say that because obviously I'm writing a book, which I'd love to talk about. It's called "The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization" because one of the things that we will discover is that we're pretty much like them and always have been. Judaism, Christianity and Islam—there's not a dime's worth of difference between them at a certain level of spirituality, and we need to understand the ways in which we are like them and, particularly with respect to the American Muslim population, the ways in which we have to love the Muslims that we know, as well as fear and destroy those who would work us evil.

CARTER: Josh Muravchik has been, since I first met him, an active and ardent proponent of very distinct views about America's place in the world, the way it should comport itself in the world, and the attitudes and ideologies it should bring to the world. You could catch it in his 1991 book, "Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny."

MURAVCHIK: What we heard from Andrew Kohut reflected with real evidence a feeling we've all had, certainly that I've had very much, that never in my memory has the United States confronted so much hostility and distrust around the world. And yet, at this very moment, we find ourselves, to a very great degree, unilaterally disarmed of our capability to conduct ourselves in the war of ideas.

Not in his fondest wishes did George McGovern ever propose to cut our military defense budget as much as Jesse Helms and company succeeded in cutting our ideological defense resources in the last years, including, in fact, doing away with the only agency of government that we had, the U.S. Information Agency, that had the mission of presenting America to the world. And it may be that Andrew Kohut is right, that public diplomacy is only going to be able to have a marginal effect, but for crying out loud, we ought to try to find out. We are doing almost nothing, or just a tiny fraction of what we ought to be doing, in this realm. It's particularly shocking to realize that when we have the recent lesson of how much the conduct of the war of ideas contributed to our victory in the Cold War. That was an effort that was carried out in the early stages of the Cold War in very large measure by the CIA. After the revelations of the 1970s—which put those CIA operations out of business—a lot of similar work was carried on, that is, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty ... and other kinds of activities that had once been done covertly began to be done overtly by USIA, by the National Endowment for Democracy. Yet, as of a few years ago, we had the abolishing of the USIA under the presumed notions that its functions were being consolidated into the State Department, but the State Department was ill-equipped to carry out this work, and the work was further handicapped by the substantial reduction in resources.

The ability to conduct a war of ideas is every bit as important to us today as it was during the Cold War. I thought there might be a disagreement without a difference, without an obvious contradiction, on the point which Professor Bulliet took issue with Ambassador Finn: Of course Osama bin Laden is a demented lunatic. There's really no doubt about that, and there's no harm in saying it. But contrary to the official position of the State Department, it's also true that he has a tremendous following in the Islamic world and that defines the challenge that faces us, which is to wage an argument against this demented lunatic.

The levels on which we need to be working are, first of all, to do our best to counteract the influence of radical Islam, and that's best done by such Muslim allies as we can find—and we have to find them and support them—but we have to address the question directly ourselves. Secondly, we have to work to present our case about terrorism, because the terrible fact is that, in the Islamic world at least, terrorism is not regarded as anathema. Kofi Annan tried to put through the United Nations after Sept. 11 a new international convention against terrorism, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference turned him down flat, would not consider any compromise language, just laid down the fact that it would not support any convention that did not make an explicit exception for terrorism on behalf of good causes. They were willing to support a convention that said terrorism on behalf of bad causes is bad, so long as it said that terrorism on behalf of good causes is OK. We have a tremendous task to try to persuade people around the world that terrorism is bad on behalf of any cause.

Finally, there is this very great reaction that we face in Europe and everywhere in the world, of anxiety in the face of American power. No one can remember any time in history when there's been no balance of power and no imaginable balance of power. No combination of forces, countries in the world, could stand up militarily to the United States, and it's perfectly understandable that this is frightening to other people, or at least makes them uneasy. We have a lot of work to do to explain our concept of the proper uses of American power in a way that aims to make it less frightening to people.

So far, since Sept. 11, there's been an inchoate recognition within the government that we are missing something, but all we have done to this point is thrash about. We've brought in Charlotte Beers as under secretary for public diplomacy on the grounds that she was a great advertising executive and would rebrand America. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that she had persuaded him to begin buying Uncle Ben's rice, and, if she could do that, she could do—I don't know what. Then the President had Muslims to the White House for Ramadan, and we abolished the Arabic service of Voice of America and instead created Radio Sawa, which is devoted almost entirely to playing pop music, on the grounds that somehow we can solve this problem if we just pour a lot of syrup over it and speak to the Arab world and say, "You should like us; we like you; there are a lot of Muslims who live in our country, too." Not surprisingly, this has gotten us not very far at all.

What we need to try to do is to wage a war of ideas and of explanation of ourselves the way we did during the Cold War. To do that we need resources that pale in comparison to defense expenditures, but they need to be very much greater than they are

now. We need a way to find personnel to carry out this war of ideas, and I think we have not even begun to think about how we are going to do that. We had a tremendous reservoir of personnel for the war of ideas in the Cold War, starting with former communists who made up a kind of cadre of people who had a very deep sense of what our enemy was, what he believed, what was wrong with it, and were able to carry out a campaign of fighting back. We don't have a cadre of ex-Islamists that can play a similar role, and we need to figure out ways to develop the manpower, as well as devote the resources, to do that.

CARTER: We have for our fourth panelist someone who can speak directly from the creative side as well as from the political and the diplomatic and the side of academia. John Romano is a man who has, in the work he has coming now, examined part of the subject that consumes us all in a piece he's done on John Walker Lindh.

ROMANO: In the wake of invading Iraq, exporting dance troupes and, as I'm going to suggest, movies and television, isn't going to do a great deal for the patient while in intensive care, as it were. Let's be clear that when we talk about what public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, can accomplish, it doesn't address gaping wounds of the present. We are—I am, Hollywood is, the arts are, the Boston Symphony Orchestra—in the business of long-term healing of wounds and long-term exchanges. One remains, I think, convinced that in the long term good can be done there. I don't want to sound too silly when I suggest that returning to, revivifying programs of cultural exchange is going to do some good in the world. It's not as if I don't have CNN at home. I know what we're looking at. Now I'm going to make three points. One's going to have to do with getting the best kind of Hollywood product abroad, the second's going to have to do with Disney's "Lion King" and Julie Taymor and the third's going to have to do with John Walker Lindh.

The first point is on Hollywood. I'm a pretty happy capitalist most of the time, but there are some things the free market can't do very well, and I have no confidence in the market doing them. One of them is the way in which the free market arranges which products of my industry and of TV are broadcast, let's say, in the third world, fourth world, developing countries and beyond. Left to itself, the market has ordained that the most common shows watched abroad are "Baretta," "Dynasty" and "Baywatch." "Baywatch" is mentioned so often as the thing seen most abroad that I was sure it couldn't be right, but my assistant, who is my right brain, says that "Baywatch" is in fact the most commonly watched show in the Middle East. This is not, she went on to say, because of any closeness of the accessibility, of the values, of "Baretta" or "Baywatch" or "Dynasty" that people want to see abroad, so much as the fact that they're cheap. You can get more episodes of "Baywatch" for a nickel to run on your local broadcast—public or private, by the way—than you can of "The Practice" or "ER" or "Law & Order," which are very expensive to buy a hundred of. Therefore, I think we have to jump in.

Imagine what you would think of a culture if your only images of it had been "Baretta," "Dynasty" and "Baywatch." Kind of maundering violence of an amusing sort, and then extremes of rich and poor and terrible clothes—that would be "Dynasty"—and

then these leggy blondes on the beach. That would be your image of the culture. It's very hard to imagine what a fourth-world reaction to such a product is. When you discover that it's plentiful there, and has been going on for years, and they're ordering more, you really start to wonder. If one guesses it's going to have any effect at all—and Andrew Kohut says it actually is being watched and being consumed—we ought to get involved in seeing what material goes over there.

Not long after Sept. 11, Henry Hyde called us before his committee in Congress to talk about what and how we could get better stuff abroad. It led Norman Pattiz [founder and chairman, Westwood One] to propose Radio Sawa. It's not led to anything in broadcast, but I said, "I think you should put the finger on Hollywood studios. They certainly enjoy sufficient tax advantages and prosperity in our economy. Have them give up episodes of television and movies at-cost, or for free, God forbid." Let me be very clear about this: I think the key is to export typical "good" Hollywood product. Imagine, for example, that you exported Spielberg's "Amistad" to the fourth world. You'd be showing a movie filled with vicious anti-American propaganda, and what America did about such a problem. You'd be showing a slave revolt based on color. You'd be showing the system of American justice trying, semi-failing, to cope with it. This is clearly not jingoism ... and yet what could be more stirring, what could be more relatable to people living under tyranny, or let's say people struggling toward some social formation of justice, than to see episodes of "The Practice," rather than "Baretta."

David Kelley is a conservative, it's a conservative-slanted show. Every week he tries to make his legal problem as complex as possible, complexity being what you really want to say about America. I'm not particularly interested in Joshua's "battle of ideas." I don't want to go abroad and say, "We have better ideas than you." I want to go abroad and say, "We're kind of a mess, and the mess is invited to the table, and we sometimes come up with OK solutions and sometimes we don't. This is what freedom looks like." Send that abroad. Typical Hollywood product: Send "ER" abroad—corny, multi-racial melodrama, not always very good. Typical Hollywood product, that's what to send abroad. There's an invitation in this for people to see the human face of America, and, again, it has more of what a free society looks like than other types and kinds of products.

The other thing we can do is simply what Helena Finn suggested: How about a kind of Hollywood Fulbright Program that sends filmmakers, film writers, directors and so forth to work with people around the world? For some reason they want their movies and TV to look like ours. It won't in the end, but we'll learn something and they'll learn something. That's a project that someone just needs to write a check for. The willingness is there. There are ways in which—only addressing things in a long term—Hollywood can, and I think, would, actually be willing to act.

By way of illustration of what I consider the willingness, let me tell a fairly positive story. It's the story of Julie Taymor and "The Lion King." When Michael Eisner had the idea of turning it into a Broadway play, he turned not to a kind of song-and-dance team, but to Julie Taymor. She had been doing very odd, off-Broadway productions, mostly with dance, which she had learned by spending years in Java, and puppetry, which she had learned by spending years in Sicily and in the South Pacific. She put together

a very distinctive and profoundly multicultural signature art, which she had developed under the auspices of the Watson Foundation. So here's IBM entering the lists. They asked Julie Taymor to make "The Lion King" into a Broadway show—one of the most successful Broadway shows in history—employing with a very free hand African dance, Javanese music and Sicilian mask-artistry in a tale that derives from African folktales. It's Broadway, it's Hollywood, it's Disney, it's 42nd Street, it makes money for everyone, and it's eminently exportable.

The happy punch line to the story—when they said to Julie Taymor after years of its successful American run, "We'd like to take this abroad," she said, "Here's how: When we go to Africa—these are their stories—I want African dancers; I want to redo the dance in the villages; I want to put it on there. Let's start from scratch with native materials. That's how I became who I am, that's why 'Lion King' looks so good." And Disney said, "Done." There is no sleeping punch to this story. This is a good story about people who like making money, doing cultural diplomacy with a free hand. Why aren't there a million ways in which the State Department, government organizations, private and public organizations can back up this demonstrated interest in international cultural diplomacy?

Then we come to the story about John Walker Lindh. I've spent the last year neglecting other tasks to try and get the mystery of John Walker Lindh right. Surely I've failed. Really interesting year though. Let me begin by saying I was in the courtroom when he pled guilty to two counts of the 10 that were offered, and he identified himself happily as a "soldier of God." That's the form that pleading guilty took. He is not crazy, despite Barbara Bush's comments to that effect. He is not crazy; he is not psychotic; he is not Charlie Manson; he is not the Unabomber. He is quite simply—and this is all one needs to know—an extremely religious young man. He is a very serious student of Islam. One of his teachers at a madrasa in Pakistan, who is not a terrorist but was a serious ... the kind of fundamentalist that has been described as intelligent, learned, fundamentalist and there for years, said "I know men in their 80s who've read the Koran all their lives, and the Shariah, and who know less about Islam than John Walker Lindh did at 19." He means business, and he is motivated by a sincere appetite for international culture of a very specific kind.

His lawyers told me that the night when the deal that gave him 20 years—of which he'll serve 17—was made, they went back and forth between the State Department, the Justice Department, the White House and John in prison in Alexandria, saying, "Well, they'll settle for 40 years. We can get you 30. If we hold out we'll get you 20. Maybe they'll say 30. They want to name the prison." Like when you're buying a house, these were the terms he was offered: 20, 30, 40, you pick the prison, whatever. He was, according to one of his attorneys, spectacularly uninterested. It was as if they were talking about someone else's life. He said only one thing about the deal they were making. He said, "When I get out, if it's 20, 30, 40 years from now ..." They said, "Twenty, 30, 40 years? John, that's a big difference!" He said, "Whenever I get out, I'll be a felon, won't I? And I can't get a passport, which means I can't make my hajj, and I'm a Muslim. Can you get me a passport?" It's the only deal point that he showed any interest in. They said, "Well, you know, it's kind of tricky, we're talking to the Justice

Department, and this is really State, and they don't ..." If he was in Hollywood, he would say, "It's a deal-breaker. It's all I care about, see what you can do."

Of course, the government did give in, but the message from this is that he's serious about Islam. His mother, the day that he was sentenced, said, "One of the great things about his getting out a mere 17 years from now—he'll be in his 30s—is that he can teach Americans so much about Islam." What he's doing in prison is studying, he's going for his Ph.D. A number of academics have said, "Yeah, he's ready; I wish I had him in my class at UCLA; he's a serious student." Of course, he carried an AK-47 and he was wound 'round with hand-grenades.

The message is that as we go forward with the cultural diplomacy that in points one and two I advocated, I want the combined effect of current history and my year of research to show that "the other" is really other. What we're talking about here is not the "family of man." As we go abroad with our values, our art, our storytelling, our dance, our music and encounter "the other," we should avoid the kind of optimism that's based on the idea that all religion is basically benign, all sincere religious attitudes are fundamentally benevolent—"If we can only connect to the little boy in John Walker Lindh, or, indeed, to Osama bin Laden, whom he met and hated, then we will form a happy family." No, it's an embattled voyage that we embark upon. It is one where their values, even when they're fully understood, will clash with ours. It's not mere misunderstanding. I'm trying to sound like the syrup Joshua said we shouldn't pour over the problem, and I'll probably succeed. What we will encounter is true "other"-hood, and they hate us. As Salman Rushdie said, "They hate us for our cheese graters, they hate us for our silk stockings." It's not that they hate *us*. ... They genuinely hate what we ordinarily and simply value. Let's take that abroad; let's mingle that. Let's not expect easy solutions.

So in my third point, I want to cast a shadow over the first two. I believe in cultural diplomacy. I know spectacularly attractive stories of the joy and understanding it can bring, and I want to echo Dick Bulliet's sense that we are facing some genuine otherness in "the other." John Walker Lindh had his first exposure to Islam by watching the movie "Malcolm X" by Spike Lee. He was enchanted by Denzel's interesting performance as Malcolm X. He memorized the movie. It was his way in. He went on the Web, he found in black rap pseudo-Islamic references—this is American popular culture, forgive me, at its worst—and this was his way in. I can imagine, as I listen to Dick Bulliet, that if we had a culture that was filled with informed and available images—I'm not saying positive images, but authentic images, as good as Spike Lee's movies are—if he, as a 12-year-old boy in Marin County, had gotten interested in Islam and there were books on the shelves and teachers who knew what they were talking about, perhaps—one can only say in retrospect—he wouldn't have ended up under the influence of extremist groups that he found in San Francisco and that led him down that path. ... The outcome of this clash, which I'm foreseeing, might still in the end be positive. So three notes. I hope they converge in a dark time. The effort is still worth making. Don't look for results tomorrow.

CARTER: The Secretary gets to say a few words since I think her rather long exposition had a few glancing shots. I would only say

very quickly that one thing we've done is taken care of half the topic. No one here is in favor of short-term branding. Whatever else they are in favor of, they are not in favor of short-term branding, and so we can talk about the need for longer range or a lack of need for longer-range efforts.

FINN: For Andrew Kohut, I thank you for bringing up what's happened between the United States and Europe, because, as a diplomat who's had several tours in Europe, I'm deeply concerned about this. Europeans should be our partners. It's one thing when we talk about people in very, very different cultures from our own, having completely different value systems and so on, but we and Europe are really awfully close to one another, and what's hap-

We should avoid the kind of optimism that's based on the idea that all religion is basically benign, that all sincere religious attitudes are fundamentally benevolent.

pened is very, very disturbing, and we have to make serious efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to put that back together.

Professor Bulliet, I don't think you listened to me, because I'm just going to read you something that was in my speech. I said, "To be effective, a good diplomat should know the language, the culture and history of the country in which he or she is posted. To be effective, a good diplomat should know how to listen, both to what is said and to what is unsaid. To be effective, a good diplomat must be able to imagine the sentiments and the aspirations of those he or she encounters." On that point we are very much in agreement. No one could be a more profound supporter of language and historic training. I would like to see your students from the Middle East program coming into the State Department. They would be prized. You hit upon something else: One of the great tragedies ... is that we've got people who've done a Ph.D. with Professor Bulliet in Middle East studies, and they go out to a posting in the Middle East, and they spend all their time taking congressional delegations carpet shopping. He heard that complaint because that's a real complaint. We've lost some very good people who said, "I didn't become a diplomat of public diplomacy, or of the political section of the embassy, to spend all of my time taking visiting delegations carpet shopping." So that's a very legitimate criticism.

On the other issue having to do with the secular: First of all, I've spent a lot of time in the only Muslim country that is secular, and that secularism is not something that belongs only to a superficial elite. It's obviously being challenged now with the rise of an Islamist party. I'm talking about Turkey. But the secularism in Turkey goes very, very deep into the lowest levels of the society. That's my experience. It's very different from things that go on in the Arab world. But when it comes to the whole question of education, I spent five years in Pakistan, and in Pakistan what I saw was that people who could afford to—and I'm talking again not

just about elite-elites, I'm talking about middle-class people who could afford to—wanted to send their children to school where they learned math and science and history. It was only the poorest of the poor who put these kids in madrassas. I have nothing against a religious education, but religious education should be imparted by people who are educated themselves. They were going into schools where they were given enough food so they didn't starve at home—in a country where we've interrupted family-planning programs and people have enormous families that they can't afford to support—putting these kids in schools where they are just indoctrinated, and really with some very hateful kinds of messages. That's a distortion of Islam. I've lived much of my adult life in the Muslim world, and I have seen its huge contribution to world civilizations. What's going on there is a distortion, and I think that there are ways in which we can support people, because the vast majority of people have a peaceful outlook.

The kind of product that will sell America's image is the stuff we're already making because it's filled with social criticism, our flaws, our messiness.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Victor Navasky; I teach at the Journalism School; I publish *The Nation* magazine. I have a question for Josh Muravchik or for anybody else who wants to answer. I have always thought of Alan Harrington's definition of public relations as distinguished from journalism, as right, where he says, "Journalism is the search for truth. Public relations is the distortion of truth in favor of your client." And I am all for the kind of cultural exchange that a number of the panelists have described, and I think we have as much to learn about them as they have to learn about us. However, I wonder whether, when you cite the example of the 1950s and the Cold War stuff, you include the secret CIA culture war as a valid instrument. According to the Church Committee, the CIA subsidized over a thousand books during that period. We don't know to this day what they were, or how many of them were true information, false information. The stuff that Voice of America used to put out, not in its incarnation under Geoff Cowan but in the old days, and some of the stuff Radio Marti put out—it may be one person's version of truth and another person's not-version of truth. To me, it's just a matter of resources. I'm curious what you think about that.

MURAVCHIK: I think that the overall effort to carry out a battle against communism, and communist organizations, and communist ideas and so on, was a very positive thing. I think it's something you can't do twice, covertly—that once the whistle was blown on the CIA operation, it can never again be done by the CIA or some other covert mechanism, but there are lots of things of that type that can be done overtly. And as I said, after the Church Committee revelations, lots of similar types of stuff began to be done overtly, and to the surprise of some people, it was effec-

tive overtly. The fear had been that, if it was openly sponsored by the U.S. government, that would undermine it. Maybe it did to some extent, but it still has had a positive impact.

CARTER: Victor, let me get this thing expanded a little bit. What I'm really interested in is whether the other panelists are prepared to say yes or no to the idea that we ought to be re-entered on the governmental level into major efforts implicit—explicit, actually—in what the Secretary outlined. Whether we're ready to go back to major governmental efforts to, in effect, engage across both the information and cultural fields, as opposed to other forms and to some degree precisely—the argument would be—because the old approach simply is going to collapse under the weight of suspicion and some histories that some people share.

ROMANO: I'd like to say, "no" to that in a very specific way. My only hesitation in saying that Hollywood is willing, able and eager to participate in public diplomacy is that we will find ourselves being asked to do a type or kind of propaganda. We are terrible at it. When we do it, we don't do our best and it's no good for anyone. I was trying to say very specifically the kind of product that will sell America's image is the stuff we're already making because it's filled with social criticism, our flaws, our messiness. I remember meeting undergraduate students in the early '70s from Czechoslovakia, who'd been active in the '68 rebellion. They were inspired by the American image, and their favorite author was Allen Ginsberg, their favorite movie was Nicholas Ray's "Rebel Without a Cause"—in other words, pretty darn subversive, not mainstream stuff at all. But they got from the very existence and spirit of that kind of art a very positive image of American life. That's probably not what the State Department would ask us to make.

KOHUT: A comparison between now and the Cold War is not a very productive one. That was an argument about ideas. It was also a geopolitical struggle for power. It was an argument about ideas, not an argument about oppression. And the idea that we're going to say to people in the Mideast, "We have some good ideas." Their reaction will be, "You may have some good ideas, but get your foot off my neck." A real focus on persuading on the basis of our values and our notions about democracy is so secondary to what the real problem is. I'm going to give you one piece of data. My old colleagues at the Gallup organization did a poll in nine countries of the Mideast at the end of 2001, and in only one country was there any sense of acknowledgement or agreement that fundamentalist Muslims were responsible for the 2001 attacks. Now, we're going to wage a war of ideas when the world is seeing through the prism of such hostility and resentment toward us because of what we do? Sorry, I don't think it's a productive approach. It's useful, but the major problem is focusing on what are the complaints of these people that create such unbelievable hostility. And, with all due respect, to say that this is just a matter of this religion being hijacked by Osama bin Laden is understating the case and minimizing what the problem is. The problem is not a clash of values; the problem is one of a whole culture, a whole part of the world, thinking that we represent a reason and rationale for their failures and their inadequacies, which is only reinforced by the war in Iraq.

MURAVCHIK: Yes, but we don't. That's exactly the problem. They may think so, but they're wrong to think so, and the only people whose necks we have a foot on, in the form of recent military presence, are in Iraq right now and Afghanistan last year. The people in those two countries were quite happy to have us there. The problem is elsewhere, where we don't have any foot on any neck.

KOHUT: What they will turn around and say is, "Look at our policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; look at our support of regimes that they feel are repressive and are stifling them." I'm not going to argue their case, I'm giving you their perception.

MURAVCHIK: I'm saying we should argue our case, that's the point.

CARTER: Let me suggest one other thing that we might also remember. Despite the flavor of the moment, there's a world out there that goes beyond this specific engagement, and the United States is engaged worldwide. As we go forward with this conversation, let's not do the usual thing, which is to think that today's obsession is tomorrow's long-term, only problem. We have a lot of things to deal with and we might want to go do them.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Marion Dreyfus. I work for WSNR radio. On the one hand you have something that has not been mentioned, which is the contextualization of every error in something like Al-Jazeera and textbooks and movies, that is almost a matrix, that completely envelops those in that culture, a force for changing ideas and minds and cultural mindset, and that has a great deal to do with why Osama is popular. We saw the information minister of Iraq this past week, "Baghdad Bob," who made a fool of himself but that isn't irregular in that part of the world. You keep lying until somebody says, "But you're being invaded, right behind you is a tank!" And then he goes, "Oops! Sorry." That is very common, and that is why millions, *millions* of people think the way they do. It's not only our cultural exports. Secondly, when I was living abroad in a number of capitals, we had USIA materials, and the cultural materials that were given to us were shown in a very hothouse manifestation. Hardly anyone saw it except people who went through the particular doorway of the embassy or the cultural attachés. Very few people who were on the average ground saw such things and they meant very little.

BULLIET: Your starting point about the distortions of everything is very good, because one of the efforts that we have, that we haven't talked about, is who rewrites the textbooks for Iraqi children. Right now, somebody is going to have to decide what the history of Iraq is for the next generation of Iraqi children. In the process, that will be a litmus test of our public diplomacy. Do we write textbooks that say Israel is the friend of Iraq? Do we de-legitimize Iraq's long war with Israel? Do we de-legitimize Iraq's war against Iran, and say Saddam led you into a terrible war? Does that by reflex imply that Iran is good? Do we write a textbook teaching Iraqi children about Islam? And if we don't do it, do we vet the textbook written by a Shiite here, or a Suni there, to see whether what they're teaching about Islam is what we like? We have now taken on responsibility in Iraq, to not only rebuild the

state, but to rebuild the next generation of Iraqis, and I'm not sure we're prepared to do it. What it's going to amount to is reinventing the history of Iraq.

FINN: The term is no longer used because it's politically incorrect, but it was called "re-education." That's what all those America Houses ... there were 50 America Houses all over Germany, and that's what that was all about.

BULLIET: Let me just point out one difference. ... If we write textbooks that teach Iraqi children a certain thing about their last 50 years that is totally different from what other Arab children are learning in their textbooks, then we're setting up a very, very peculiar situation for these people.

FINN: I don't think we should write the textbooks. The textbooks should be written by Iraqis. ... The Israel-Palestine conflict is incredibly important, but it's only one thing. There's a whole lot of other things that have to go into those textbooks. There's a tremendous amount that could be done in curriculum development and so on.

CARTER: As you go forward with this conference, think Japan and argue about Japan. It's an interesting question about how all of these questions, including who writes the histories and what kind of democracy and all the rest.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Natalya Scimeca. I'm a student at the law school. You just arrived at the gist of my question, which stems from an analogy. In Germany, after the Second World War, our first cultural diplomatic strategy, which never came to fruition, was that we would bring back the German classics to the German people to de-Nazi-fy and humanize the Germans. We'd bring them German classical music and literature and so forth and obviously that would not harm our goals as well. I'm wondering whether that has been spoken about, or what your thoughts are on the subject in terms of bringing classical Islamic culture, rather than exporting American goods to the region, but actually bringing them quality—that's judgmental—but traditional non-fundamentalist ... their own culture.

FINN: That's very important. One of the things I was trying to emphasize in my presentation is that we must show respect for other cultures; that's why I think this Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation is so important. It demonstrates the value we place on other cultures. The people who write Islamic history texts don't have to be people sitting in Iraq. There are scholars around the world, and there are Muslim scholars around the world who can do some of this work, and I really believe in consensus when it comes to this kind of thing. It's not something that should be taken over by one or another group with a specific message to communicate.

Let me just go back to one other thing. American literature is a wonderful treasure that we have, and it speaks to people. John mentioned Ginsberg. We should be translating out literature into many languages and making it available to people around the world, and at the same time promoting the knowledge of the

English language because the Internet is basically English-language. That opens up a whole world for all the kids who have all kinds of crazy ideas about what actually happened here on 9/11 and everything else.

KOHUT: We have a large unreleased part of the survey that we've done in 44 countries, many of these countries are democratizing countries. What we find in the Muslim nations are very strong democratic aspirations, *very* strong democratic aspirations. In fact, in many ways the desire for equal treatment under the law, for multiparty systems, for all the things that we value, are stronger in Muslim countries than in Eastern Europe. That represents an opportunity for us, à la Japan.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Albert Maysles is my name. It was interesting that it wasn't until this woman just before me brought up this matter of how in Islamic countries they do a very good job of misinforming themselves, and that was a matter that wasn't brought up at all until she mentioned it. Right now, at this moment, there's a 41-hour television program going all over that part of the world proclaiming that Jews, "The Protocols of Zion" ... that the Jews want to take over the world. And all kinds of myths that are misinformative. Those countries don't have freedom of the press!

CARTER: We do, and we get Fox instead.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Rob Snyder, Rutgers, Newark. If there's going to be a long American cultural exchange with Islamic nations, surely the minds of the American people have to be prepared for that, too. And journalism is going to play an important role for better and for worse in that.

CARTER: Last remarks from the panelists building on what you just heard.

ROMANO: I'll use a moment of that to ask Richard Bulliet whether it is so that an exposure to classic Islamic literature and culture would be curative the way the questioner supposed. My understanding is that fundamentalism is a perfectly authentic version of Islam—terrorism may not be—but that there's nothing inauthentic about fundamentalism; it *is* Islam; it's one type and kind. That's a question for you. In a general sort of way, I think the question should broaden out to Western Europe, the exchange there. There's as much repair to be done there as anywhere, and the prospects are more hopeful, that what we share culturally, is all the greater.

MURAVCHIK: One point that we didn't touch on at all until you did a moment ago, Hodding, is the case of Japan. We haven't talked much—except Ambassador Finn did in her remarks—about what lies before us in attempting to implant a democracy in Iraq. There's a great deal of skepticism about our ability to do it, and justifiably so. But the challenge of doing that in Iraq is no greater than the challenge was of doing it in Japan. Indeed, the official State Department position going in was that it would be impossible to

do, and in fact we did it with really spectacular success.

BULLIET: In answer to John's question, there is as much range of possibility in Islam as there is in Christianity and Judaism with respect to views of the world, fundamentalism included. One point that you mentioned several times, the Internet, as somehow something that would be good—the Internet is one of the most important disseminators of Islamic jihadist doctrines. One of the illusions we have is that somehow Osama and his people are against the modern world. In fact, they use the tools of modernity with great skill.

CARTER: A subject you know perfectly better than I do, but I recollect those little cassette recorders in Iran making sure that everybody knew every word that was being said by Khomeini when he was not there.

KOHUT: There is strong support for nation building in Iraq; there was stronger support than we could've imagined given the attitudes of the American public in the 1990s for nation building in Afghanistan. The pictures are doing the job, and the American public is getting it that we just can't leave Iraq to fall apart and turn ugly again.

FINN: I'm going to go back to my main point, which is human investment, and the fact that diplomacy has to be a two-way street. One of the things that occurs to me is that—it's a sad fact—many of the greatest academic and intellectual resources, in terms of manuscripts, documents, books and research materials are in the United States. I was involved in a program with the Smithsonian before 9/11 because we wanted to start up a cultural exchange with Iran because Iranian scholars wanted to come here and study some of the fantastic miniature paintings we have in the Smithsonian collection. So I go back to human investment, and that means two-way exchange—sending Americans out, bringing people here.

Also, and this is a different point, we have to work more to educate ourselves and our kids about the world. When I was in Germany even, and other countries where I've served, we sent enormous numbers of young people to study in the United States, and it was like pulling teeth to get American kids to come even to a country where there would be a comparable standard of living. The study of foreign language is not emphasized in the United States. That's something we're really going to have to think about, because if we're going to exchange ideas with the world, we have to make that effort to understand other cultures. On this business about the tools of modernity: Yes, it's true, and you reminded me of an old Cold War argument that we should close the libraries because people could come into American libraries and read about communism, and think how dangerous that would be. I believe in openness, and I believe that it's very, very important to encourage the English language but also for us to learn the languages of these other countries. It's the world of ideas where the battle is, not the world of technology.

CARTER: On that note, I want to thank the five panelists.

Keynote Address

KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
TRISHA BROWN,
choreographer and artistic director,
Trisha Brown Dance Company

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ, *deputy director,*
National Arts Journalism Program
MICHAEL Z. WISE, *NAJP research fellow,*
and contributing editor, Architecture
NOREEN TOMASSI, *president and CEO*
Arts International

SZÁNTÓ: Yesterday we started telling a story about cultural diplomacy, and some of the big issues were put out on the table already about the political and cultural framework that surrounds this activity today. Now we zero in, we bore down into the details. Right after me, you will hear from Michael Wise, who sparked the fire for this conference. Michael is an NAJP research fellow who came to us more than a year ago with the idea of organizing this conference. This is also a very good time to acknowledge again our institutional partners who then joined us in this effort, Arts International and the Center for Arts and Culture. After Michael's overview of the day's themes, Noreen Tomassi, the president and CEO of Arts International, will introduce our keynote speaker, Trisha Brown.

WISE: In 1962, during the heyday of U.S. government-sponsored cultural diplomacy, Dave Brubeck and his wife, Iola, wrote a musical titled "The Real Ambassadors." It starred Louis Armstrong and Carmen McRae. Summing up the giddy rush of art and music that flowed across the Atlantic and beyond at the time, the lyrics went like this:

*The State Department has discovered jazz
It reaches folks like nothing we have.
Say that our prestige needs a tonic
Export the Philharmonic ...
We put 'Oklahoma!' in Japan
South Pacific we gave to Iran.
And when our neighbors called us armin
We sent out Woodj Herman ...
Gershwin gave the Muscovites a thrill
Bemstein was the darling of Brazil.
And just to sap internal mayhem
We dispatched Martha Graham.*

Of course, it was never so simple. But for decades, the U.S. Information Agency flooded much of the world with American orchestras, dance troupes, art exhibits and jazz performances. Once the communist threat waned after 1991; however, U.S. cultural initiatives abroad were cut back severely.

In 1999, the USIA itself was folded into the State Department. Whereas there were once over 30 people working within a U.S. government cultural division to send exhibits, presentations and performances abroad, today the State Department has a staff of seven assigned to this task. France, by contrast, employs 85 people

in 10 offices around the United States to promote French culture in this country alone. Whereas the State Department spends \$2 million annually to present U.S. culture abroad, Germany's Goethe Institut has been spending about \$7.5 million to showcase German cultural achievements in the United States. The once-proud network of American libraries and reading rooms overseas has now been sharply reduced, with some U.S. officials arguing that the age of the Internet has rendered them obsolete and that security concerns make it ill-advised to retain such facilities. Less than a quarter of those that remain are traditional lending libraries where readers can actually peruse current American periodicals or look at American literature. The rest are what the Department calls "information resource centers" and often consist of a single computer terminal.

But just as the American apparatus of cultural diplomacy has been largely dismantled, the United States faces an urgent task in confronting discontent around the globe. Resentment and distrust has grown most vociferously in Islamic societies, but these days the increasingly pressing question—"Why do they hate us?"—is being asked almost as frequently about attitudes toward the United States among the citizenries of our long-time European allies. There is anger and bitterness that local customs and identities are being swallowed up in an insurmountable wave of McDonald's, Ruggats and Britney Spears. This rising tide of anti-Americanism often does not take note of the wider range of American artistic accomplishments. Can strategic use of cultural initiatives help change this?

In the waning days of his administration, President Clinton held a White House conference on the same topic we consider here today. Standing beneath the chandeliers of the East Room, Clinton quipped about cultural diplomacy in December 2000: "You know, you send your artists to us; we send our musicians to you, and everybody feels better." But little came of the talk that day at the White House, and the world seems an infinitely more dangerous place than it did back then. Cultural diplomacy—best deployed in tandem with an openness to outside ideas, international collaboration and genuine exchange—has been seen over the years by many policy makers as a fuzzy, feel-good practice with little tangible benefit. However, the recognition that Washington has done a glaringly poor job of countering growing anti-American sentiment is putting cultural diplomacy in a new light.

In our opening session yesterday, former acting Assistant Secretary of State Helena Kane Finn eloquently argued that har-