bad sides of everything. We intentionally hosted our Dutch counterparts in dealing with the drug problem, to go together with us to that movie, recognizing that it had a pretty unflattering portrayal of America. I felt that was a good thing for me officially to be doing, and I would rather have the official person do that than some separate arm where you don't get the benefit. …

WIKLER: But you weren't showing that to Dutch film professionals, you were showing it to drug-enforcement officers. … So that's a different story. That's not what we're talking about.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (CYNTHIA SCHNEIDER): OK, but I thought also other people said the idea is good to have separate from the embassy someplace that can do controversial things. I think it's *good* for the embassy to do controversial things. So what about the role of pure culture and culture as part of foreign policy? And how about your training? This isn't part of our foreign service training at all, how to do this, and I'm curious, particularly Jean-Rene, about the background. How do you learn to do this as part of the foreign service, if you do at all?

GEHAN: I was not trained for that at all. As I say, I think I was asked to do this job more because of my personal experience. But to your question: I don't think it's a real debate, from what I hear. In fact, the objective is really for us, like for my colleagues, to promote a country. It's not to promote a government. We have the same distinction; they have a press office to deal with that—we don't. The distinction between the embassy or not-the-embassy is not that important. That's the way it sits. As I say, I'm the only one, the only diplomat; all the other ones are trained for their specific fields. I don't think it's really a very important consideration because the mission, which is to promote the country, can be done by someone like me or by someone else. I'm not there to promote a government.

MACKAY: I think we're unusual in Washington. We don't have an embassy program; we do not organize cultural events through the embassy. As other countries, we do all our work in partnership with American bodies. Our aim is to get out to the audiences we want to attract. Our perception is that the audiences that we wish to attract would never dream of coming to an event in an embassy. They perceive it as something very, very different. So we partner with bodies, with agencies, with institutions, which will draw in a younger, slightly more challenging audience that we're seeking.

GEHAN: We do the same, with one consideration that might play a part. … For instance, for me, aside from any direction from anyone, my priority right now is to address the issue of this climate, aside from what we continue to do in different fields. This is something I feel as being a diplomat, and it's not because I've been directed. I think it's our mission to do that. How would you react, for instance, if you had a crisis in general relations of your country with the United States? Would you also consider it a priority, or do you really think it's something you wouldn't want to deal with? Because that's where you can make a difference.

MACKAY: As was said yesterday, I think we are heading for a crisis generally in relations between young people in the United States and the European countries, and I include the United Kingdom in that. I arrived 16 months ago with a severe question in my mind about whether the British Council should be in the United States at all, given the history of the special relationship, given the strength of the ties, given the strength of the interchange all the time. And I realized from my own personal experience of arriving, having lived in recent years in the Middle East and South America and Europe, arriving here and finding this one of the hardest cultural adjustment experiences I've had in a long time. And then talking to our partners out in the field about the struggles they have to engage the successor generation, the young, educated U.S. citizens in a global agenda, in an international agenda. I think that is absolutely at the heart of what all of us can and should be doing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: A quick comment on the visa issue: I wanted to say that for two years we've been part of a national coalition that's in place in Washington with immigration attorneys, other cultural organizations and other sectors, and we came into being at the initiation of the Premium Processing Fee in May of 2001. Things have certainly heated up since that time. I'm happy to talk to anyone off-line because we've been working directly with Department of Homeland Security, the new agencies there, and we're well on the way to some administrative relief for the processing side and trying to make some new relationships with the diplomatic corps. I wanted people to know that there is something in place. It's a pretty targeted effort. I'm with the Association of Performing Arts Presenters; the coalition is under the American Arts Alliance, and you can go to their Web site to get details.

SÖTJE: I found it extremely encouraging to be participating in a conference that is clearly aimed for re-entering the field of foreign cultural policy for the United States. I put it last night over the dinner session that my European colleagues all around the world, abroad, don't miss our American colleagues on the battlefield during the last decade, but on the field of foreign cultural policy. And one of the phrasings used yesterday afternoon sounds a little bit strange to European ears. If you say, for instance, that you need a branding of the images of a country, or to sell your own culture as a product, or to export it abroad, this is a different approach from our philosophy as it comes out here on this panel. We should look more on another edge—our ability should be increased to listen and to hear and to look at different cultures in all parts of the world as sources of enrichment for our own countries, for our own cultures. We need this increasing ability for intercultural dialogue and exchange as air to breathe, especially in a more and more interdependent and globalized world. If we do not look at each other as a part of a learning community all around the world, all these efforts to encourage foreign cultural policy are not worth doing. It's a long-term investment, a long-term achievement; credibility will not grow overnight but over decades. I think this effort is still worth making, as somebody put it last afternoon, but don't look for results the next day.

STILLE: On that wise note, we conclude for now.

Can Cultural Diplomacy Improve America's Standing in the Islamic World?

MODERATOR:
CARYLE MURPHY, *religion reporter,* The Washington Post

PANELISTS:
PETER AWN, *dean, School of General Studies, and professor of religion, Columbia University*
BERT KLEINMAN, *senior managing consultant to Radio Sawa and Radio Farda*
SAMER SHEHATA, *professor of Arab studies, Georgetown University*
FAOUZI SKALI, *founder and director, Fes Festival of World Sacred Music*

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ (Deputy Director, National Arts Journalism Program): As those of you who've been following this story from its beginning know, we've now canvassed several aspects of the topic. We began yesterday by laying out the political situation and how America can get its message across in the world and what, generally speaking, the role of public or cultural diplomacy may be in that equation. The challenge in all of this—and this very much applies to the next panel as well—is to bring our story back to the arts. The issues with the Islamic world and the conflicts at large in the world today could fill many conferences. The aim of this one is really quite particular. We are taking a small slice out of a very large cake. Our goal here is to turn our attention to what the role of culture, what the role of the arts, may be in reconciling our differences or building new relationships with other nations.

The next panel specifically asks the question, "Can cultural diplomacy improve America's standing in the Islamic world?" The moderator is Caryle Murphy, religion reporter at *The Washington Post.* We will then move to a second panel of former ambassadors and other notable cultural figures to look at what culture can do for statecraft.

MURPHY: My name is Caryle Murphy, and I cover religion at *The Washington Post.* I did spend five years in the Middle East based in Cairo, covering the Arab world. I've just written a new book called "Passion for Islam," in which I discuss the role of culture in precipitating some of the attitudes among Muslims in that part of the world. The title of our session today is "Can Cultural Diplomacy Improve America's Standing in the Islamic World?" I'm sure you all know that the Islamic world is not monolithic, but I'd like you to keep in mind that we are discussing the Islamic world and not just the part of that Islamic world that is most problematic for us, which is the Islamic world in the Middle East.

Just beside me is Samer Shehata, who's acting director of the Arab Studies program at Georgetown University. He teaches Middle East politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. He finished a Ph.D. at Princeton and has taught here at Columbia. He's a native of Egypt, has dual nationality and has lived in this country since he was about five. Seated next to him are Mr. and Mrs. Faouzi Skali. Faouzi is Moroccan, founder and director general of the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. He is a highly regarded cultural anthropologist, writer and speaker, and has written on Sufism, which is the mystical aspect of Islam and one of the most popular aspects of Islam in the West. Faouzi created the Fes Festival in 1994 after the Gulf War, with the intention of bringing people together. Then in 2000, he founded the intellectual component of the festival called "Giving a Soul to Globalization." I hope, Dr. Skali,that in your remarks you will tell us why you created a music festival to sacred music. Next to Mr. Skali is Bert Kleinman, who's a radio guy. All his working life, starting here at Columbia University, from which he graduated in 1963, he's been involved in producing radio programs and stations. Right now he's the senior managing consultant to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a federal agency that produces Radio Sawa, or Radio Together, one of the popular Arabic/Western radio stations in the Middle East, and Mr. Kleinman's going to tell us why it's become popular. And finally, Peter J. Awn, who's dean of the School of General Studies and professor of Islamic religion and comparative religion at Columbia. He's written many books, also one on Sufism. In 1995 he got an award I think every teacher would like to get: He was awarded the Great Teacher Award from the Society of Columbia Graduates. I'm going to ask Samer to start our conversation.

SHEHATA: I'm going to be talking about recent U.S. efforts at public diplomacy specifically directed at the Arab and Muslim world, and I'll try to address a couple of different questions. I'll try to talk about what they are in particular, and I will talk about whether public diplomacy can really help America's image in the Muslim world. Let me just start by saying that it's clear, the polling data reveals, and it should be clear to most people—and I'm referring to the polling data by The Pew Charitable Trusts as well as Zogby International of the Arab world—that policy is really the most important factor in determining how people look at the United States. We know the policies that are the drivers of opinion toward the United States. But nevertheless, public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can be effective if done well, if done successfully. They're certainly not a magic bullet. They're not going to solve our problem. Our problem isn't primarily one of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. It's really a question of policy.

Regarding public diplomacy efforts since 9/11—and there have been a number of them, new programs and so on—I would argue that for the most part they have been a failure. Unfortunately, that is true for the public diplomacy programs directed at the Arab and Muslim world. One of the reasons is because they profoundly misunderstand the problem. The Office of the Under Secretary for

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, an office of the State Department, has been incredibly active since 9/11. As many of you might know, Charlotte Beers was appointed the under secretary for public diplomacy in October of 2001, about three weeks after 9/11. She comes from Madison Avenue, is a very successful advertising executive famous for marketing Uncle Ben's Rice and Head & Shoulders and so on. In addition to Charlotte Beers' appointment, the office created a number of new programs and spent millions of dollars trying to win the war for the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world. So, for example, they've developed a number of Web sites targeted at the Arab and Muslim world about 9/11, about terrorism, about Muslims in America. They've produced a number of publications and pamphlets, including the ones I have here, "Muslim Life in America" and "The Network of Terrorism," as well as other ones on Iraq, such as "Iraq: From Fear to Freedom." This one is actually particularly interesting, because 1.3 million copies of this pamphlet were produced, making it the largest publication ever in the history of the State Department. It was translated into 36 languages in an effort to have some effect on how people view the United States, as well as specifically the events of 9/11.A very nicely made publication.

Another endeavor has been Radio Sawa. As we heard, "Sawa" means "together." It's an FM and AM radio station that targets specifically a younger audience in the Arab world. The idea was—I can assume only—that these are the people that are very important in terms of potential acts of terrorism, or who-knows-what, and that they're really not being served properly in terms of radio. That's really the target audience. The format of Radio Sawa is 56 minutes of music—an Arabic song followed by a Western song—and then four minutes of news. I think $35 million so far has been spent or appropriated for Radio Sawa, but we can hear about that later.

A number of mini-documentaries have been produced by the Office of Public Diplomacy under a kind of campaign, titled the "Shared Values" campaign. These mini-documentaries, really commercials, have been viewed in a number of Muslim countries, and I'll talk about them. They're also about Muslim life in America—Muslims talk about their lives in America. And there are more initiatives in the works: a proposed teen magazine in Arabic, a "Sesame Street" for teens in the Arab world—"Sesame Street" already exists in the Arab world, but this is particularly for teens—and most recently, although the thinking has been around for some time, a proposed Arabic-language TV station directed at the Arabic world.

A lot of these things have failed. I think almost all of them have failed. The Web site is quite obvious. It's simply a question of connectivity. There is only one region in the world that is less connected to the Internet than the Arab world, and that is Africa, sub-Saharan Africa. Those people that do have access to the Internet aren't really, I would imagine, spending their time surfing State Department Web sites. They're probably doing other things. "The Network of Terrorism" and "Muslim Life in America"—I don't think they're going to be terribly effective. There is a tremendous amount of skepticism and cynicism in the Arab world directed at all government publications, whether it's *Al-Ahram*, the national newspaper in Egypt, or these types of things. People have come to be savvy and cynical,after years of government-controlled media. So I'm not sure really whom these things are directed at. In other words, I don't know what effect this would have if they were distributed in the Jenin refugee camp, for example, or Tikrit. I don't think it would really persuade anyone.

Radio Sawa is interesting because it really has been heralded as a success, and I must say it is incredibly successful. I myself listen to Radio Sawa when I'm back in Egypt, and all of my friends do, too. I haven't really seen any serious polling data about Radio Sawa. I'm told that there is a study, but I don't think it's publicly accessible. However, there was an interesting BBC segment done about Radio Sawa on "The World Service," and I'll just read a little bit because it gets at least my impression and my informal survey of how people are reacting to Radio Sawa in the Arab world. They did this program in September of 2002, in which a BBC reporter in Jordan spoke to a number of young Jordanians about Radio Sawa, who actually listen to Radio Sawa. He asks the first person named Samir about Radio Sawa. Samir says, "I listen to the music *bes*"—meaning "but" in Arabic—"I turn to another station once the news starts." The BBC reporter asks, "Why do you do that?" Samir answers, "Because it's like listening to Israeli radio. It's biased. I feel like it's propaganda to serve the Israelis." The BBC reporter then asks another person named Dina, and he says, "Do you want to talk about your impressions regarding the station?" Dina says, "I have the same to say, basically, because when you listen to what they say on the news, like they say, 'Arab extremists,' or 'Palestinian extremists'—that is not fair at all. Basically they're like, you know, a mouthpiece for the Americans, and I think, sort of, they're brainwashing Jordanians, Syrians, whoever, you know, is listening to these people." Then he asks Nisreen; he says, "What part of the radio do you like to listen to mostly?" Nisreen says, "I think the songs, because they are so much updated and they have the mixture of Arabic and foreign songs as well. But I think it's biased somehow"—now she's talking about the radio station generally—"because maybe it's sponsored by the U.S.A. or funded by them. Sometimes the news is shallow, not accurate." And finally he asks the fourth young person, Elias, and Elias says, "Well, sir, if we're talking about entertainments—songs and music—Sawa is number one. But if we're talking about news and media, the material they're producing is very cheap and they should be more balanced. We don't need advices," he says, "and we don't need their point of view." You basically get the idea.

Radio Sawa has been incredibly successful. Everybody is listening to it. Certainly there was that kind of need in the market. But are people buying the message? Certainly not. People aren't listening to the four minutes of news, and they realize it's coming from a particular perspective. In that sense, it's been a failure. The mini-documentaries I talked about—"paid media programs"—quote, unquote—they have also been a tremendous failure. They were actually pulled recently. About $15 million was spent developing them. They were screened in a number of Muslim and then Arab countries via satellite. Basically the message was: Muslims love America, and America loves Muslims. Muslims talking about their experiences after 9/11 … I find it terribly problematic. First of all, because it's not really true. We all know about the increase in hate crimes, indefinite detentions, the Patriot Act and so on. And secondly, this isn't the issue that's really behind public opinion in the Arab world. They're not so concerned about Muslims in America. They're concerned about U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and they're concerned about Iraq. Those are really the drivers of public opinion.

Let me conclude by saying that public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can be incredibly effective. It's not a magic bullet, and it's not going to change things immediately but certain programs work and others are likely to work, including the Fulbright program, the Hubert Humphrey program, American cultural centers, American educational institutions in the region like the American University in Cairo, the American University in Beirut, the American Research Center. There are a number of other initiatives that have been proposed that are likely to work, but things like this really, in the words of John Brown and others who spoke in the morning, are more akin to propaganda than cultural diplomacy.

SKALI: For me, culture has to be understood in the anthropologists' meaning. Like the global way of life, the global behavior, the way each society organizes itself. The representation,the symbolic representation of each society has a very huge meaning in such a world. Of course, I'm a little bit biased in this definition by the fact that I'm an anthropologist myself. But it's very important to see that there is an extraordinary diversity of culture around the world. I'm also very interested and involved in the question of Islam and Sufism. After the first Gulf War in 1991, I felt compelled to do something, to express that this "clash of civilizations" is not fatal. It is not something that is absolutely necessary. We can do something about it. We can try to develop some kind of cultural diplomacy. We can act. It was obvious to me that, through media and all this sort of conflict, we would have, from my point of view, a very false understanding of what Islam is.

I'm in an Islamic country and a very Islamic city, which is Fes. It is very ancient and has a very rich Islamic civilization. And I know from my own experience, from my father, that Islam is not extremist, that Islam is this understanding of culture that I've spoken about. Its way of life is value, which is absolutely universal, which we share together, and love, compassion, acceptance of the others. And I was wondering how through media, through conflict, through politics, it could seem absolutely the reverse. It is so amazing to see ourselves through media as so completely different from what we feel.

So came the idea of creating an international event that could bring people together to share this fact that the world is built upon diversity and universality. Both are important, and both have to be learned together. Diversity is the different civilization, different tradition, different music, for instance. Universality is the great value that we share together with every human being. So the idea came to create this festival of world sacred music, and bring it to Fes for 10 days: Jewish tradition, Christian tradition, Islamic tradition, Hindu tradition, Buddhist tradition, and people coming from all around the world and together sharing this event. This event says a lot more than we can express by words. It says that I recognize you like you are, in this city of Islam, in a city that has a great heritage, where there were important encounters between Christians, Jews and Muslims for many centuries. It worked, of course, also because music is beyond words. You have just to feel; you have just to share;you have just to discover.

To give an example: For the first meeting, and it was not so far from this first Gulf War, this was the concert between Munir Bashir, who was Iraqi, one of the most famous lute-players, and Gerard Edery, who is American, Jewish and a very great player of guitar. They played together before an international audience coming from all the cultures of the world. It was clear that we had to be very careful in how we approach the sacred, and about the fact that the culture had to be unassimilated by political issues. In preparation for the first edition of the festival, which took place in the desert of Morocco, and in the moment of preparation for that, I was with a friend and when we arrived at the desert. It was so beautiful, and I told him, "It's incredible. In the desert, it's like if you meet God." And he said, "It's normal,there is nobody." It's to me so interesting. This emptiness gives everybody the liberty to approach God. God doesn't belong to any special culture. He's the universal by itself. And so it means that the sacred could have this understanding of creating this universal space where everybody can meet and discover and know the other. It is about the mutuality, the mutual acceptance. The problem is not how to spread our value—the Islamic one, the Western one, or any value it would be.

The world is built upon diversity and universality. Both are important, and both have to be learned together.

American values are well known in Eastern society through lots of tours, film, theater, music, a lot of things. And I can tell you that people like America. They like this culture, or else they would not accept it like that. But the question is: How do we improve cultural diplomacy so that we could recognize each other? Sometimes people have the feeling they are not recognized. They are not taken as they are, really. There is not a great effort to understand "the other."

Creating positive images of "the other" is the best cultural diplomacy that we could have. If we can see a movie and have the feeling that in fact we are recognized in the eye of "the other," in the heart of "the other," it will open everything and encourage us to build the real bridge for that. We need democracy, but democracy is not Westernization. And having a different culture is not to be against the West. What we need is a global democracy of cultures. I'm sure that America plays a key role in the world for promising that, because it is very important to see that a multicultural society is something like what exists here. It's a reality here, but people don't realize that outside America. There is a difference between life here and the image that people have outside this country.

KLEINMAN: We're going to go from the world of the sacred to the world of the popular. And yet, I could not agree more with what Dr. Skali has just said. In a way, I hope I can explain to you that so much of what he just said is exactly what Radio Sawa is, not in the sacred but in the popular. There were some statements made about Radio Sawa that I'd like to add to and comment on. Let me first correct a misapprehension that has been in the press. Radio Sawa is not part of the public diplomacy of the State Department. U.S. International Broadcasting, of which Radio Sawa is a part, was at one time part of the USIA, before 1998.

Then Congress, during the Clinton Administration, passed a law that set up a civilian commission, called the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which is four Republicans and four Democrats and with the Secretary of State *ex officio* as the ninth member. This was an attempt to take U.S. International Broadcasting, which included at that point the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti and Radio Free Asia, and to create, if you want, a firewall, as one has in Canada with the CBC, as one has with the BBC in England. And Radio Sawa is one of the first new projects of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. We are not part of public diplomacy. I've never met Charlotte Beers. We didn't have anything to do with the branding of America or the selling of America or Uncle Ben's Rice. It is not our intention to be propaganda. We are not the voice of the U.S. government, although we are clearly perceived as such by many people.

Sawa tries to be what it is that people like about the United States. And, quite frankly, right now that's not our foreign policy.

The goals of U.S. International Broadcasting—I'm going to have to quote to you some language here—are "to communicate with the peoples of the world by radio, and to get their attention and respect." In the Middle East the second part is particularly important, and respect, of course, is a two-way street. A second goal is "to report the news fairly and objectively and in a balanced manner." Of course, an American perception of what that is, is not necessarily what an Al-Jazeera perception of what that is. And a third: "To represent the different segments of America with the multiplicity and the diversity of America; and to reflect American values and ideas; and to present responsible discussion of American foreign policy." That's what we're about. This is very different from the idea of public diplomacy at the State Department, which was to sell America. If people happen to like, or if people do like, America because of Radio Sawa, that's wonderful. But we're not a sales operation or a propaganda operation.

Radio Sawa was born out of a project that began with a gentleman named Norm Pattiz, who was head of the Mideast subcommittee. He's also the chairman of the board of Westwood One, which is one of the largest American broadcasters. He was part of a review of what was going on in the Middle East in the beginning of 2001. At that point, the Voice of America (VOA) was broadcasting seven hours a day on shortwave. The largest audiences they had were reaching 2 percent of the public. It was almost entirely male. In some places they couldn't find anybody who was listening to the Voice of America. At the same time, the Middle East was an extremely important region to the United States—70 percent of the population was under the age of 30—and so the decision was made to do two things.

First, to use American commercial radio techniques—if you want, private enterprise ideas and techniques—and to try and make a radio station that would broadcast and fulfill the mission to people under the age of 30. I cannot stress how important a target is. I don't care what media you are, or what kind of culture you're doing, what kind of art you're doing, generally one has some target audience in mind. Is one talking to 50-year-old, university-educated people, or is one talking to 15-year-old rappers? Who are you talking to? The VOA Arabic service wasn't working, and we had the opportunity—which some people consider unusual and I considered extremely surprising—to get FM licenses from a series of nations in the Middle East. We actually have FM licenses throughout the Gulf and also in Jordan. In other places we were able to get AM transmitters to broadcast, for example, to Egypt. And we put together a format, which I would call a full-service format. It involves music; it involves news, but most of all it involves projecting the American spirit of optimism, of hope, just why it is—as Dr. Skali said—that people all over the world love the United States.

Sawa tries to be what it is that people like about the United States. And, quite frankly, right now that's not our foreign policy. That doesn't mean that we don't report on our foreign policy and events, but we are, if you want, to represent the American spirit—those great words, "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"—which is not only the goal of Americans but is the goal of people throughout the Middle East. One of the unique things we do—and we do this with pop music and it was never done before on the radio in the Middle East—is we alternate one Arabic song, with one Western song. This was such a revolutionary idea that when we went out to test it—and we've done a lot of research in the Middle East—we tried to explain to focus groups what it was we wanted to do, to see if they thought it was a good idea, and people couldn't even understand what it was we were talking about. They said, "No you must mean one hour of Western music, and then one hour of Arabic music." "No, no, no. One Western, one Arabic, one Western, one Arabic." I have a little piece of audio, it's 50 seconds long. This is actually a promo from Radio Sawa. The announcer basically says, "Radio Sawa: The best of Western music and the best of Arabic music." But it will give you a sense of the pop music that we play, and how Western and Arabic pop music does work together. That is a very radical political statement. It may not sound that way to you, but when we put it on the radio and people heard it, all of a sudden here they were hearing an intermixture of cultures. Here we are the Americans, and we're putting Arabic music on the same plane as Western music.

However, we are a lot more than just a unique mix of music. We do a lot more news than some people think. We broadcast between five and 15 minutes of news per hour. During the war we broadcast about 20 and sometimes 30 minutes of news an hour. To Iraq right now we're broadcasting 30 minutes of news per hour. Clearly, this was a time when our news department had to step up to the plate. Our audience desired a great deal more news.

The BBC is, of course, our competitor in Jordan. We had some focus groups, and we saw the same thing: It's not fashionable for young Arabs to say, "Oh, yeah, I listen to the American news and I really like it!" Have you ever heard an American say, "You know, I watch Al-Jazeera, and I really like that stuff?" Maybe there are some people who do. I've rarely run into anybody who said that they look at the pictures in *Playboy* either. As far as polling results are concerned—I'm not comparing us to *Playboy*, by the way—we do weekly research in three major cities in the region. Large surveys were done last October when we had been on the air for six months. In Jordan, among people 15 and above, 36 percent were listening to us at least once a week. That compared to 2 percent for the Voice of America. In Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, the figures were between 23 and 25 percent. When you get down to our target audience, which is 17- to 28-year-olds, in Jordan the numbers approach 90 percent that listen to us. I am sure there are people who, when the news comes on, say, "Oh well, I'm certainly not going to listen to that." But they listen.

How do we measure the success, not just in numbers, but what have we accomplished? I'll say two things: Have we changed dramatically opinions in the Middle East? No, we're only a radio station. Have we created a situation where sometimes some people give America more of the benefit of the doubt? I think so. Is the Middle East better off today because Radio Sawa exists? I think so.

AWN: One of the great dilemmas we have as Americans is our fundamental lack of familiarity with foreign cultures in general, in that especially the Islamic world, to us, still appears to be monolithic. I remember with the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis in '79 through '80; it took about two or three weeks for most media to figure out that Persians weren't Arabs. It was a fundamental revelation, that not just linguistically, but culturally they were radically different one from the other. We don't train people in languages. In the '70s with the old Peace Corps, and when Iran was governed by the Shah, we had hundreds and hundreds of young Americans who spent two and three years in Iran come back incredibly familiar with the culture, and many went on to advanced degrees or went to work in companies that had some sort of affiliation with Iran. We've lost that. And Persian studies in the United States is, to be blunt, in the toilet. We have very few people bothering to take the language because we don't encourage students to do research there. We produce no more Ph.D.s of any substance, except at one or two major universities. So once again we'll be forced to play catch-up. Crises will arise, we want to somehow communicate ideas, but we have nobody who can speak the language.

This is equally true when we look at the largest parts of the Islamic world—Indonesia, Malaysia and Africa don't exist in the minds of 95 percent of the American population. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the largest and most vibrant Islamic cultures. What do people know about it? Nothing. They couldn't even tell you where Nigeria is on a map. We have to put much more effort, in cooperative efforts, rather than silly American efforts in terms of cultural diplomacy. As many of us have said, we're not selling toothpaste. Our credibility would appear much more serious if we were working with local groups and institutions in a number of areas, and I'll line some up for you in a moment.

I would also say, let's get over thinking that Muslims are more pious than anyone else. It is absolutely baloney. Muslims may believe in God. Do they pray? Do they fast? Who knows? It's really their business, but they are Muslims. … I am very much a part of my cultural heritage, but don't tell me I'm going to have my wife veiled, I'm going to do this or do that. I'm a very modern individual, and I can be a Muslim at the same time. I would argue that that's where our focus ought to be, and not constantly be worrying about the conservative religious establishment whose power comes because we give them the power. In a sense, we hand over power to the religious right in this country and elsewhere because we're too afraid of standing up and saying, "Keep your nose out of public discourse and stop trying to shape the way society functions." Americans have no ability to critique religion in any positive way. Someone can come up to you and say, "Well, I go home every night and worship an albino marsupial." I guarantee you will nod and walk away smiling, rather than saying, "I will defend your right to do that, but I also think it's an incredibly stupid thing to do." If you couch anything in terms of religion, somehow it takes on greater power and prominence, which I think is silliness.

Where are these cooperative ventures we should be focusing on? Education is a cultural phenomenon, and I would love to see us put far more money in cooperative educational ventures in various parts of the Islamic world. Believe it or not, I wouldn't put it all in universities. I'd put it in secondary schools. That, I think, is where the action is. You get people when they're younger. This isn't in a sense indoctrination, but it's putting serious money behind it, so you're not dealing solely with the elites.

Baghdad College, in the old days in Baghdad, as well as my university, were American-Jesuit operations. Where they missed it was that it was solely American. I knew someone who taught at Baghdad College, and he couldn't figure out why every day—he was teaching one of the lower grades—the kids would plead with him, "Can we sing that song you taught us last week?" The song was "Zip-a-dee-doo-dah, Zip-a-dee-ay." He couldn't figure out why they wanted to sing this. Well, "zip" in Arabic sounds like "zib," which means penis. So they were delighted to sing "Zip-a-dee-doo-dah, Zip-a-dee-ay" all day long. And he stood there, as a delightful Bostonian with a fabulous accent, and just said, "Gee, aren't they really into this?" Well,they were.

It's cooperative efforts that will make the difference, that will show we have respect for the language, the culture, but also for the American value of teaching people how to make up their own minds and how to think. Diversity really is that ability to respect differences of opinion and to give people the foundations to do so. Yes, we can do that on the university level, but I have a feeling we'd have far more success on the secondary-school level. I'd also hope that we'd spend more time trying to articulate better our values in terms of diversity in the separation of church and state. Unfortunately, I think, given the current administration's attitudes toward religion and especially our very, very conservative religious movements, we don't really have a lot of credibility in this area.

But what is my problem? My problem is that the heart of traditional religion is not the privileging of diversity but the privileging of homogeneity, especially in many parts of the Islamic world. The ability to engage in substantive debate—the way they did in the '50s—argues for the privatization of religion and diversity in the public sphere, but without imposing either secularity or conservative religion on anyone. We have to represent that better. I don't think we do. So much of the rhetoric being used in the current conflicts has religious overtones. It is not lost on the Muslim populations that this really does seem to be a war of Christians against Muslims. Unfortunately, I'm afraid that the first arrival in Iraq of cultural diplomats will be missionaries under the guise of social-

service agencies. So you ask yourself, how can we be credible about core American values when we sell them out ourselves?

But, let's not be too antiquarian about it. There really is an enormous amount of modern art that is of high value in various parts of the Islamic world. We should try to create cooperative environments where we're funding and sponsoring the creation of all kinds of music, theater, sculpture, painting and the local modern arts in various Islamic environments. Cultural preservation: To me, we show our own values by helping local areas preserve their own cultures. I'm sure you saw the videos of the museum that was ransacked in Baghdad. Much of that is from the University of Chicago's excavations over the last quarter century, if not longer. We need to provide the funding so that people can preserve their heritage, and, much more importantly, teach them how to use that as a way of reaching out to their own populations. There is not that great tradition of educational institutions tied to museums.

Finally, the values of environmentalism, social and public health and their ability to enhance the economy are areas we really haven't focused on enough, and we could do a lot of work together. If the music festival in Fes represents anything, it is that cooperative spirit—sharing common values by having joint efforts rather than simply trying to sell the abstract American values.

MURPHY: Many people when I was overseas, both in Africa and the Middle East, expressed to me how much they loved the USIS libraries. These libraries, many of which I think have closed, are a very passive form of cultural diplomacy. I think that's one reason why they were so popular. They were there; everybody knew they were there. I know a lot of kids used to go there after school—it was quiet; they could study. There were books there; there were resources there. This is where they came to find out how they could get a visa to get into the United States. But we should not lose sight of the fact that some very successful cultural diplomacy can be done passively, just by being there.

I'll start the discussion by asking Peter about cultural preservation. It's in the news. What could the United States do, as a government, to repair their negligence in protecting the museum in Baghdad, as a cultural statement?

AWN: It would be an enormously valuable contribution to our own credibility were we to spend some money in terms of helping the local populations, not only repair the damage that's been done in Iraq to various sites, but also to begin cooperative efforts between American museums and museums in the Islamic world, to share preservation techniques, management techniques, educational techniques—

MURPHY: But specifically on this disaster, is there something we can or should do to help retrieve those objects?

AWN: The level of destruction was enormous when you see the tapes. Things were broken just to be broken. So it wasn't as if people were just stealing them to put them out on the black market. Enough of that goes on already. We can do something there, but to me it's the much broader commitment—cultural preservation is tied to economic development. If you don't have the money, it's the museums who get hit the worst. We should be there trying to enhance people's ability to truly preserve these amazing, amazing cultures. I also think that would show that we recognize that to be an Iraqi is not to be an Egyptian. You have a very different and equally amazing cultural history of which you should be proud, and which we therefore respect, both in its ancient forms and its modern forms.

KLEINMAN: I have been struck by the blame that has been put on the United States for this. No doubt the soldiers should have done more to protect the museum, but it's not American soldiers that plundered the museum. It was Iraqis. … If we really care about this, then shouldn't we not only try and retrieve these things? But does all the blame belong just with the American soldiers? Is there not one person who took something from there, who destroyed something, who could be blamed?

SHEHATA: I'd like to say, moving on a little bit, why not immediately set up a fund, whatever it may be—$5, $10 million—very, very small stuff, less than the cost of one new Apache helicopter—and have a special commission immediately in Baghdad to buy these things back, what is left, from the people who stole them, no questions asked? Some specialists would be there to authenticate what it is, and that would be the beginning at least of an attempt to rectify this incredible, incredible tragedy and really irresponsibility. Did they not foresee that this was likely to happen?

MURPHY: Apparently they had been warned, yes. Absolutely. Dr. Skali, I would like you to address this question. You go to any country in the world—forget if it's Muslim or non-Muslim—and American culture is all over, and this is American TV culture. You see it on billboards; you see it on TV; you see it in the movie theater—action movies, violent action movies, "Dallas." Why isn't it that Martha Graham dance troupes get the same visibility overseas? How can the United States promote its sort of "highbrow" culture versus its popular culture?

SKALI: We speak a lot, of course, about globalization. We can speak about what has happened since the end of the Second World War—of political globalization, with the U.N. and multi-laterality and things like that—and then came economic globalization, when everybody was just working on economic issues, markets and making all the world one market and six billion consumers in the world. But it doesn't work, so now we are shifting to something that is very important and strategic for all of us. This is to understand the cultural diversity of the world. Public diplomacy must now be on the surface for cultural diplomacy in the world.

MURPHY: So governments do have a role?

SKALI: Yes, but not the leading role. People from all around the world must have this leading role, creating events, creating space to encounter, creating programs, real cultural programs and not propaganda from each side, of course, from every side. It is very sad that a lot of people in Muslim or other countries know only the superficial level of American culture.

MURPHY: Peter, what is your feeling about the role of government/private sector in what Dr. Skali was saying? Do you agree with him or disagree?

AWN: I do agree. Would I love to see the private sector more heavily involved? Absolutely. But I do think that to get these processes going, government really ought to be involved on some levels.

MURPHY: In a secondary role?

AWN: Hopefully, yes. Because I really do think if you have cooperative ventures going, you're really looking at the experts in the field and not having it solely appear to be a government-sponsored operation.

MURPHY: There's a proposal [for a U.S.-funded Arabic-language television station] to compete with Al-Jazeera. I'd like to address this to you, Mr. Kleinman. The question is: Should these funds be spent, perhaps in cooperative educational ventures instead, such as the ones Peter suggested?

KLEINMAN: I believe that both the House and the Senate, with the supplemental that was passed yesterday, have fully funded a satellite television channel for the Middle East. When you say "to fight Al-Jazeera" you make it sound like it's an all-news channel, which it's not going to be. It's going to be a channel, which has news and also has other cultural, informational and educational-type programs—what you would consider not super-highbrow—but a combination, a television channel that you would, if you looked at it, say, "very interesting," brain food.

MURPHY: How much money is being proposed to spend on this?

KLEINMAN: Sixty-two and a half million dollars. That involves capital expenditure and then operating expenses. I will say something about television in the Middle East. … The reason that "Seinfeld" is on television there, and all the American knock'em-sock'em movies, and "How to be a Millionaire," is not because the United States is putting that stuff on television in the Middle East. In fact, it is the governments in the Middle East who control virtually all of the television that is not controlled by families that are connected to the government, that are purchasing these programs. They're putting them on because they get the highest ratings. I would also add that—which I'm sure everyone in this room knows—Al-Jazeera is a government channel, as is Egyptian state television, as was Iraqi state television, and one of the things that is kind of a slippery slope when you start getting non-democratic governments involved with cultural things of that sort is they're not always as independent as we would like them to be. I do think there are arguments, by the way, for having exchanges, for spending money to work with local Arab media. The BBC tried it. They had connection with NBC, which is Saudi-owned. That fell apart. The United States tried it at one point. The problem is that everything works very well when we're spending the money and everything is working fine, and when there's something that somebody doesn't want on the air, then it becomes a problem. So we're not dealing with a free media environment. I believe it was the Heritage Foundation—I could be wrong on this—that rates press in all areas of the world, and the least-free press of anywhere in the world was in the Middle East.

MURPHY: Samer, what do you think about this proposal for a U.S.-funded Arabic-language television station?

SHEHATA: I think it's an incredible waste of resources. I wish the money would go to real public diplomacy efforts, real, substantive public diplomacy efforts that provide tangible benefits to people. For example, sending a jazz group to tour the Middle East, more Hubert Humphrey and Fulbright scholarships, educational initiatives, funding English-language learning in primary schools. Is there a better way to endear yourself to the parents of a student than to provide education for their children?

Al-Jazeera is just as good as any of these cable stations or CNN. It's not inherently propaganda. It's not anti-American.

Let me just say one other thing about the Al-Jazeera. It's incredible, the obsession with Al-Jazeera in this country. People are fixated. I'm quite frankly sick of people who don't speak Arabic, who haven't watched the station, slam it. Al-Jazeera is not any worse than MSNBC or CNN. I watch Al-Jazeera. I watch it regularly. I watch it in Europe, here and in the Middle East. Of course, Al-Jazeera has a particular perspective and that perspective is more interested in the suffering of the Iraqi civilian population than it is in how many people fit nicely into an Abrams tank and how many miles per gallon it gets. But it is not inherently anti-American, by any means. In fact, before 9/11, all of the writing and all of the work about Al-Jazeera in this country was pro Al-Jazeera: "Al-Jazeera—it's criticizing all of the Arab states." "60 Minutes" did a show on this. Every single Arab country has lodged a complaint against Al-Jazeera because it reports things that the Egyptian television is not going to report or that Jordanian television is not going to report. Al-Jazeera is just as good as any of these cable stations or CNN. It's not inherently propaganda. It's not anti-American.

Also, let's examine the model of the Arab media consumer that we're using to trash Al-Jazeera. The model is a passive receptacle that sits in front of Al-Jazeera consuming everything uncritically—anti-Americanism, as it were—and then it having a result. That's nonsense. Consumers of media in the Arab world, like here, are critical. They have brains. They realize that different things have different perspectives and different lines. That's why I read *The Washington Post*, but I also read the *Guardian*, as well as the Arabic press. People in the Arabic world are similar, so we have to examine the assumption and get over the obsession with Al-Jazeera. Real public diplomacy can have some impact; it's not the magic bullet. It's policies that are primarily important, but let's do real public diplomacy as opposed to the stuff that really isn't going to get us anywhere.

KLEINMAN: I was not trashing Al-Jazeera. I was merely stating that they were government-supported. I think that is an example, by the way, of the fact that a government-supported television does not necessarily have to be, as you used that example, like Egyptian television. I also happen to agree that we need to spend a tremendous amount of money as well on public diplomacy. The biggest tragedy of 9/11, which no one has mentioned here yet, is that students are not coming to the United States from the Middle East. That has been cut off. Not just because of our government but because parents don't want to send their children here. I cannot tell you how many people I ran into in the Middle East who were educated here and then go back there. They may or they may not like us;they may or they may not love us, but the people who come and study here at the very least have some understanding of the reality of America. That's extremely, extremely important, and it's one of the big tragedies of 9/11 that that has stopped.

MURPHY: I'm going to direct this last question to Peter because you've had the most experience in different parts of the Islamic world. I want to step out of the Middle East for the moment. Can you tell us your opinion of where you think American cultural diplomacy has been the most successful in predominantly Muslim countries? In which country or countries do you think it's been the most successful?

AWN: I really don't know. It really depends on the current political situation in a particular region. In the past, we had made enormous headway, but it simply was because the societies were more stable. Now that that isn't the case, to me, the ball game is totally different. So to say where we are currently being successful—I just don't see places where that's occurring to any great degree because we're looked upon with such enormous suspicion.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Kearney, student at the Columbia School of Journalism. Two items just concerning U.S. policy: Nicholas Kristof quoted a columnist for *Al-Hayat* in a recent column, saying, "Regardless of cultural diplomacy, it's the policy, stupid." What do various cultural diplomats feel about the fact that many people in the Arab world are not so gullible to believe that this is going to assuage their concern for the effects of U.S. policy in the Middle East? Secondly, in Paris, there's a museum, a beautiful museum designed by Jean Nouvel, called the Institut du Monde Arabe. It's a very sophisticated, well-funded museum devoted to the Arab world. Somehow I have a very hard time imagining such a museum in Washington, D.C. Why is that? And will that change?

KLEINMAN: To the "policy, stupid" question: Of course, American foreign policy is a major component of our relationship with the Arab world. The question is, do we therefore do nothing, and do we let the entire dialogue between America and the Arab world only be over our foreign policy? Clearly, Americans have an issue with what they perceive to be, let's say, "Islamic extremism"—I'm just taking a buzz word. Is that the whole, is that 100 percent of what our feelings are, or could be, or should be about the Arab world? We're trying at Sawa and at other things, and the people at this table, if you want to—I'm not going to say, "in spite of American foreign policy" but—even while that continues, we've got to keep on trying to connect. We've got to keep on trying to find things where we have something in common. Otherwise it's just going to be hopeless.

SHEHATA: I agree that policy is most important, and that's what I've been saying. Nevertheless, public diplomacy is very important and it can actually help. It can affect different segments of that population that we're trying to factor or influence or target, if you will, but it has to be done properly.

The problem is not American people; it's not American culture; it's not our educational institutions; it's not Madonna. Those things might bother Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda folk, but for the vast majority of people, that's not the issue. The polling data actually says that. One poll I have here in front of me says that over

> I think there was a complete meltdown within the government itself, the highest levels of the government, in the lead-up to the negligence, as someone had said, at best, in connection with the museum in Baghdad.

50 percent of people in five Arab countries—Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates—viewed American freedom and democracy very, very favorably. They realize the political freedoms, the civil rights, all of those things that we have here. They would love to send their children to Disneyland; they would love to come here and so on. The Institut du Monde Arabe question is very, very good. Maybe it's a residual Orientalism in the United States, broadly, that makes something like that less imaginable. It would be wonderful if something like that could be established in the United States, an educational and cultural institution.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Ken Jones, and I'm the executive director of the New York Foundation for Architecture. Last night I was watching "Antiques Roadshow," and there was a woman and her mother on TV, and they were talking about a vase that the father had "liberated" from France, when he was in the U.S. Army during World War II. Your conversation today made me think: How do you feel about encouraging our cultural institutions in this country to return some of the artifacts that have been "liberated" from countries overseas?

AWN: That's a snake. The museum people will really get on my case. I think it becomes an impossible task. Can one do something in terms of a symbolic gesture? Yes. But are the Elgin Marbles going back to Greece? The answer's no. What we see is that collecting is based on economic development. I can remember how appalled some of the Europeans were, and Americans were, when the Japanese started buying up 18th-century European textiles and frocks to establish costume museums in various parts of Japan. It seemed totally incongruous that they'd be outbidding the British government on an Elizabethan dress or bodice. There is, to me, the concern that objects not be looted and sold on the black market. And the amount of Afghan material showing up in this country is extraordinary—Afghan Buddhist material. … So it's not just Iraq. The Afghan war created another whole series of clandestine art markets. To me, controlling that ought to be our first cooperative effort, to help people to preserve their cultural identity.

MURPHY: Best done bilaterally, or at the United Nations?

AWN: I would hope the U.N. would be heavily involved in something like that. But it needs some teeth; it really does, in terms of legal sanctions for people who are caught doing it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name's Jim Fitzpatrick. I'm a lawyer from Washington involved in the arts community and also a member of the board for the Center for Arts and Culture. I think there was a complete meltdown within the government itself, the highest levels of the government, in the lead-up to the negligence, as someone had said, at best, in connection with the museum in Baghdad. The government was indeed warned. I was part of a group that went first to the Defense Department and identified sites, hundreds of sites, including the National Museum. The Defense Department was basically identifying sites around the country that were of high cultural value. The group that went included the World Monument Fund, the head of the American Association of Museum Directors, senior people in the arts world and a leading archaeologist who knows Iraq backward and forward. In the afternoon, we met with the State Department, and the people were worried about civil authority post-Saddam and urged the State Department to create an additional working group, dealing with material culture, which they did. And we talked about the necessity of guarding the museum. We offered the assistance of the American museum community—

MURPHY: Did this get communicated to the Pentagon?

AUDIENCE MEMBER (JIM FITZPATRICK): Yes. The State Department and Defense were talking. The museum community wanted to help with conservation, restoration of the museum system and providing American resources as a palliative. Then we come up to the time of the actual crisis in the last 96 hours. I talk about a meltdown. You had, at the highest level of the State Department, apparently a complete inability to convince the Defense Department, which was well about guarding the Oil Ministry, to send the troops to the museum. Indeed, we got calls asking, almost in desperation, "Can anybody get in touch with the senior members of the administration?" We talked with Wolfowitz and with Scooter Libby, who was the senior assistant to Cheney, all without benefits.

My question is this: The State Department now has an opportunity take a very strong initiative in terms of getting the cooperation of the American museum system, the auction houses, dealers and so forth, in terms of getting materials back. There are procedures under the government in terms of keeping stolen materials out of this country, which is what this material is. … I'm wondering if the panel agrees that the State Department, in light of the earlier problems, should undertake aggressive efforts in this regard.

SHEHATA: Sure, I agree with you. They're concerned with Syria right now, if I'm not mistaken.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yesterday Afghanistan, today Iraq, tomorrow Syria.

AWN: I would say that's an essential thing to do, but to presume that the museum community can fund a great deal of this is naïve, given the state of museum finances in the current economy—that most are facing serious deficits. Will they provide expertise? Will they provide as much onsite assistance as they possibly can? I would think the answer would be yes, but the money's got to come from somewhere else.

KLEINMAN: Clearly, we bear some of the responsibility for what happened there, and we have a responsibility to do whatever we can. But this is not an isolated incident. This didn't just happen in a vacuum and is perhaps indicative of the whole place of culture in our country and how we regard national treasures of ours and other people. This is not just something that happened; it happened in a context.

SKALI: We have to be careful not just now—after the destruction—to consider the rebuilding of Iraq through this issue of the museum and things like that, a very important thing. Museums are built by people and managed by people, so we have to manage how to re-give to the Iraqi people the power to do what they want to do, to help them assuredly, but to give them the freedom and the power to rebuild their country, including this cultural side.

MURPHY: One of the big problems here, and I think that Mr. Kleinman alluded to it, is that if we try to help the Iraqi people do this under a regime that is like most regimes in the Middle East now, the government would want to control that cooperation. The government would be saying, "You must help the museum through us, and nobody else." Now this is what apparently the U.S. government is hoping to break in Iraq by installing at least a more representative regime with a bigger space for civil society because it's only in civil society that these cooperative cultural ventures are going to work.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Max Anderson, director of the Whitney Museum of American Art and the president of the Association of Art Museum Directors. I was with Jim at the Pentagon and at the State Department some months ago, and wrote an op-ed piece in *The Washington Post* in November, urging that the museum be protected, which led to our meeting. The article was co-authored with Ashton Hawkins. To Mr. Kleinman: I'm concerned a little bit about the "context" statement. The context I know is that an institution, which was by all accounts the richest trove of antiquities for the region, was in jeopardy, and the Defense Department decided, in variance with what we were told

some months ago, to ignore the situation. As museum directors, we had a board meeting yesterday to talk about the situation, and we expect to be very much active and hope to supply a mechanism, a mechanism both in fomenting the creation of some funds to provide for those who return artifacts and for amnesty, which is as important as a fund. What context do you feel makes this separate from or not-distinctive as an unusual circumstance?

There was discussion of branding and talk about sales and market research and so forth. For cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy we may need to think of a different language to use, because America isn't a commodity.

KLEINMAN: First of all, I agree with your efforts. I think it's totally appropriate, and I would totally support it. What I was referring to was the fact that in our country, as someone said, "They were worried about the oil wells." And that the problems that you and other people are having—getting the attention of our society in terms of protecting this art—is part and parcel of a whole attitude toward culture in the United States, which results in under-funded museums, etc. I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm saying, you look at this, and you can say, "It's horrible, it's terrible." And I can give you some other things, maybe not quite so bad, but it happens in that same context. It doesn't excuse it at all.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (MAX ANDERSON): Thank you. I did want to assure you that the museum community is actively engaged and organized, and we hope to have something to contribute soon.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Larry Blumenfeld. I'm a freelance writer, and I focus very much on music. For those of us old enough to remember eclectically formatted radio stations in the United States, that 50-second promo for Radio Sawa was really provocative. I have two questions: one for Mr. Kleinman and one for anyone on the panel related to Radio Sawa's music formatting. The first question is: Who is doing the programming, selecting the American and Arabic music, and what is their criteria? The larger question for anyone else is: It's clear who your demographic is, and it's clear that you're working with commercially popular music for the most part—or it seems that way—and that's logical in terms of the target market, considering that I bet that many of us in this room look away from commercial radio (and toward NPR and other places) with disdain not just for the actual content but the cultural content of commercially popular music in the West. Is this well-aligned with your larger goal?

KLEINMAN: The first question about programming: Our approach was to create a radio station that was connected to its audience, which is something that is unique in the Middle East. In most radio stations in the Middle East, you have whoever happens to be at the radio station—sometimes it's a sheikh who owns it; sometimes it's a businessman;sometimes it's just the guy who happens to be program director—he picks whatever music he wants. It is very common for record companies to purchase plays on the radio in the Middle East, etc. We decided to do a radio station that was research-based, which is very similar to what is done with many commercial radio stations in the United States, in the sense that we use one of the top American research companies, and we literally go out and we research all of our basic music. We spent months and months and months doing this. Then we conduct actual research about current music in Amman, Cairo and Abu Dhabi every week. And so this gives us a handle on what music is popular with the target audience we want to reach.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (LARRY BLUMENFELD): Who are the "we" doing the research and selection?

KLEINMAN: There's a company called Edison Media out of Somerville, N.J. They are one of the major American research firms in terms of music and radio positioning research, and they subcontract out to the top research companies in the Middle East to execute the actual research because the local Middle Eastern companies are more aware of the cultural issues involved and how to get the research executed. The second question as to whether we should be a pop-radio station or an eclectic NPR radio station or an all-classical music radio station or a jazz station: One makes one's choices. We were asked, based upon U.S. taxpayer money, quite frankly, to reach a large audience, to reach the broad audience of young Arabs under the age of 30, and that's what we're attempting to do. That doesn't mean that other types of radio are not valid or couldn't be very good. If you ask me to reach 60-year-old males, university-educated, I'd do a different radio station.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (LARRY BLUMENFELD): If I may, while I respect what you said, as a marketing-strategy that makes sense, but since the motive here is not to sell records, as commercial radio is or to sell advertising, does that choice of programming align well with your actual purpose, building an understanding?

KLEINMAN: Yeah, look,most people will tell you, and Samer has quoted some research, about the tremendous anti-American feeling in the Middle East, and this is true particularly among young people. The difficulty is normally when you ask, "What's your opinion of the United States?" you don't get a cultural answer; you get a political answer. So when you look at the research,there's a lot of admiration for some things American, but when you say, "What do you think about the United States?" people don't like the United States. Even Radio Sawa listeners, over 50 percent don't like the United States, but that's less than the population in general. If we are not communicating and connecting with people who don't like us, what are we doing? All we're doing is just spending taxpayers' money to get the people who already like us, and that doesn't make any sense. So we've got to engage with people who are skeptical of us, and it's very, very, very difficult. If you've ever walked into a room to face, face-to-face, someone who you know really doesn't like you, and you have to try and talk and establish a relationship with that person, that's not easy. It's not always as successful as you would like it to be, but we have to try. Because if we don't try, the only thing out there would be the policy, and everybody agrees that would be terrible.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Bianca Baumler from the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. In discussing the most effective ways of furthering cultural diplomacy, we've talked about Fulbright programs, we've talked about bringing jazz musicians, often versus, or maybe in addition to, or better than or worse than, U.S. government-funded television in the Middle East. One thing I think of, though, when I think of Fulbright programs and jazz musicians is: Who benefits from this? It's definitely a very small, small proportion of the populations we're trying to reach. It's a very elite part of these populations. It's probably not going to get to the poorer parts and larger parts of the population. What does all this do if it's not linked to some sort of economic development programs? My question is: Is there a link, should there be a link, with economic development, and what can cultural diplomacy do without more of a solid economic basis?

KLEINMAN: I'll address one quick part of it, and that is the question about whether you spend a lot of money getting to a relatively small number of people or a large number of people. One of the things we're trying to do with Sawa and with Middle Eastern television is not just get to the elite, but get to the broad masses.

SKALI: It is sometimes a very small event somewhere that has very great and intense strength of symbolism and could then be spread all over the world by the media. In Fes last year, we had gospel from New York, and more than 50,000 people were clapping. It has been recorded on CNN and then spread all around the world. That, I think, could be a very, very strong thing. We have to keep in mind that what is very important in our time is the connection between media and cultural diversity. It could give another impact to the meaning of this cultural diversity in our world, because of the media precisely.

SHEHATA: I was actually asked to speak to some members of Congress last year about some of these issues, and we've advocated things, like primary-school education and so forth,that obviously reach much larger audiences than Fulbright. Things like collaborative training programs for not only archaeologists but people involved in hotel managements and tourism and so forth. I think those things are important and would certainly reach a larger audience. The other thing I'd like to say, to end with, is I'm uncomfortable with the language of marketing and some of the language of capitalism. Yesterday there was discussion of branding and talk about sales and market research and so forth. For cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy we may need to think of a different language to use, because as John Brown said, and others: America isn't a commodity. Hopefully that's not the type of exchange or model we're thinking about. I would think that there'd be more reciprocity and that the goal would be mutual understanding as opposed to profit, as it were. Maybe if we try to find a different language to use also—one that is a little removed from marketing, sales and branding—it would get us some place.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (HELENA KANE FINN): I'd like to make a point that Fulbright does not exist just to benefit the individual professor. When that professor does research here and goes back to his country, he writes books, he goes on television and he influences generations of students, thousands of students. So this is not just to benefit the individual, and it works the other way, too. We send someone out to Morocco or Egypt or Turkey, that person comes back here and is an enormous resource for our students and our culture. So don't get the idea that Fulbright is some sort of elitist project;it is not.