an absolute disconnect between the propaganda and the policy. As a result, the world isn't convinced of what we did in Iraq, and as a result there are all kinds of conspiracy theories: "What are the Americans up to?" That's perhaps an overly partisan response to your question, but I really do think propaganda is what's been happening in the last 15 months.

VON ESCHEN: I very much agree with that, and it's striking that it seems a real throwback to an earlier period, and in a sad sense what was learned from the enormous value of the arts and things that were clearly not propaganda. The question on sports I find very, very interesting, and there are many parallels. I don't think arts and sports are the same thing, but I don't want to draw a sharp distinction and say that sports are very different because it's that Olympic or versus-the-Soviet-and-Chinese intense competition that you get. But in terms of the racial politics of sports and promoting black American athletes—and you bring up the example of Mohammed Ali, which was not something necessarily promoted through the State but became this national and international symbol—I think the racial politics are quite similar.

NINKOVICH: Just a general comment on the larger implication of international opinion about hero-athletes, be it Mohammed Ali or Michael Jordan or whomever. What's important here is to try to ask yourself what the larger significance of this is. My way of understanding it, which may not be yours, is that this all connects with the development of something that we might call "world opinion." This is something that's been talked about since at least the 19th century, and the existence of which has been strenuously denied by various theoretical types, in particular realists who argue it doesn't exist, it can't exist and so on. But I think if you're talking about something like sports, you see a version of it in that narrow area. You can see it in a host of other areas as well. This is important, I would argue, because it's incontestable that we have a global society, a functioning global society, not very well at times but functioning nevertheless. The question that that raises is whether or not the continuation of this kind of society is conceivable without the formation of something like a world opinion, because you just can't have functional interconnection without some common basis in values that keeps it all together. You can't hold them together simply by power. It's a long way from sports to international society, but nevertheless there are connections to be drawn.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Roslyn Bernstein, professor of business journalism, Baruch College. I'd like to do a slight shift from political relations to economic relations and address this to everyone on the panel. Would you say as the world economy has developed, that we have seen tourism co-opt cultural relations, and, if so, what are the consequences of the global tourist industry shaping, adopting, controlling and deriving its revenue from cultural relations?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Bianca Baumler. I'm from the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. Regarding the issue of American musicians performing for the people versus the elites … I worked at the French Cultural Institute in Morocco for six months, and that was a very big issue. The issue was more how to inspire the people to come to the events. There was, maybe, a fear of coming to the French Institute and also a different culture of performance, not the sort of "sit down and watch" type of performance. Could you or anyone else on the panel respond to the issue of how to deal with that?

VON ESCHEN: I want to go back to this issue of Michael Jordan as a way of trying to sum up. It's an interesting example because Michael Jordan is associated with Nike, not the U.S.state. And for all the contradictions of the policies we're talking about, I do think there's something greatly lost when we have turned over something that is potentially democratic and accountable, something a nation is doing, something that has to do with its citizens, totally to the realm of corporations that are not accountable to anything. Back in the time I was doing research, the State Department tried to do private/public sponsorship, and they did, in a sense, and it really worked. And in another sense they would talk about, "Well, the audiences are confused. They don't know—is this Pepsi, is the U.S. government?" They did feel it was very important that these performing arts were associated with the U.S. government, the U.S.state. We lose a lot when we give up any connection to potential democracy and accountability.

BROWN: It's very important to try to define target audiences. On the other hand, having been out in the field, you try to leave the door as open as possible to everyone.

NINKOVICH: I'll just take 30 seconds on tourism, and I'll talk about what historians know about this. Historians of foreign relations are just beginning to take seriously the study of cultural interaction, and the answer to what they know about tourism is very little. What historians have to do, I think, is a bunch of micro-studies. As far as I can see, they're starting to do this, to see if we can get any hard information as to exactly what happens when people interact in various ways, what the dynamics are and what the implications are.

BERGHAHN: What really fascinated me about this country, as a young person in the 1950s, were precisely the things that we were talking about on this panel. The greatest pity of the moment is that as there are millions and millions of young people in these areas that we will talk about this afternoon, especially the Middle East, and I think their relationship with us is being ruined. The kind of enthusiasm that I certainly felt—I can't see this happening. It's not an older generation that's anti-American at the moment, but it may also continue into the next generation. If that happens, we are in for a very bad first half of the 21st century.

The Cultural Diplomacy of Other Nations

INTRODUCTION:
ELLEN McCULLOCH-LOVELL,
president and CEO
Center for Arts and Culture

MODERATOR:
ALEXANDER STILLE,
author and editor,
Correspondence: An International
Review of Culture & Society

PANELISTS:
JEAN-RENE GEHAN, *cultural counselor,*
French Embassy
ANDY MACKAY, *director,*
British Council USA
ARTURO SARUKHAN, *consul general of Mexico*
PETER SÖTJE, *director, Goethe Institut,*
United States and Canada
JEANNE WIKLER, *general director for cultural affairs,*
U.S., Consulate General of the Netherlands

McCULLOCH-LOVELL: The Center for Arts and Culture is a cultural policy center, and we work to inform and improve the decisions that shape cultural life. Cultural diplomacy, or perhaps better expressed "citizen diplomacy," is one of our signature efforts. One of our objectives is to create a written record through a series of studies, including "Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Policy" by Juliet Sablosky. That's where you can find some figures that I don't think have come out as vividly as they should, such as the 30 percent decline in support for these activities since 1993, and the fact that only about 10 percent of the Fulbright exchange program and only 5 percent of citizen exchanges, although they are signature programs of state, are arts-oriented at all. So while they're important culturally in a broad sense of people understanding each other, a very, very modest amount of those programs are devoted to exchange of artists. Another study you can get today as well is a survey of the history of cultural diplomacy and the U.S. government by political scientist Milton Cummings. Three more studies are forthcoming: a study of the private-sector funding for cultural diplomacy, best practices in cultural diplomacy—which is very important because we need to know how, and why, and if these programs work—and a comparative study of other nations' approaches, which is so relevant to this next panel that we are about to begin.

The Center is also forming a coalition with arts and humanities organizations, foreign policy NGOs and foreign service officers to expand federal, state and local government activities and cultural diplomacy. There will be other forums that will follow this, and for those of you who will ask, "What's next? What do we do about it?" I want to invite you to join this education and action agenda.

Now continuing this valuable conversation means learning from our counterparts in other countries, not only in France, England, Germany, the Netherlands and Mexico, but also Japan, Singapore, Austria,the Nordic states, Brazil, Colombia and many, many others. Alexander Stille is here to guide us in this conversation. He's an important freelance writer. His most recent book, "The Future of the Past," will be familiar to many of you—portions of it were printed in *The New Yorker*—and I can't think of anybody better qualified to guide this next panel.

STILLE: I wanted to start out by simply asking each of the participants to introduce themselves and explain what the basic cultural policy or philosophy is in their different countries, because they do vary a great deal. For example, some countries have a separate culture ministry, which has the exclusive role of promoting culture in their society. Others have culture as part of the foreign ministry and see it as a part of foreign policy. It might be interesting to understand a little bit about how that works, if they're also able to give us an idea of the resources committed to culture in their respective countries, as well as introducing themselves to all of you.

GEHAN: I'm cultural counselor at the French Embassy in the United States. So I'm a diplomat. I'm leading a service that is part of an embassy, but which is basically composed of all kinds of people, American and French. I think it's a network of more than 150, and I'm the only diplomat in this organization. All the others come from different walks of life. Our base here is in New York in terms of artistic and communication and audiovisual, and we have another main office in Washington, which is for education, universities and French schools. And then we have people all over the country. That being said, in terms of what we do, a lot of our activity, and I would say more than half of our activity, is linked to education, meaning what we do in support of French-teaching in schools, French schools in this country, and in terms of the programs we have with universities, in our presence in the universities to effect exchange between French and American universities. Additionally, we work on promotion of contemporary creation in the different fields of the arts, in music, visual arts and so on. We also promote literature, and we have also an individual program where we support radio and television and cinema. And we have also an open dialogue with the NGO. We have within our department people now dealing with that.

To be very brief, I will say three things. One, in terms of method: We are not an administration. We don't work as an administration. We are more like a little company. We work in partnership. All our action is linked to the network. We have a network of American partners, whether they are the traditional partners like Alliance Française, which are in all the countries—about 160 Alliance Française in the country. But we have partnerships with museums, with universities, with radio. Whatever project we do, we do it with the partners. We have not the means, and it's not our aspiration to direct anything. We always negotiate, meaning that if Carnegie Hall is interested in a concert, we are not going impose anything; we negotiate with them to facilitate. This is really a central theme, and we even have a foundation that we work with very closely.

Another remark in terms of addressing the general framework: What is the objective? I mean, we pay for, as I say, more than 150 people. We have a small budget, but still, why do we do that? I would say first, there is no question about it. It is called in this country "soft power." I don't like the term. It's more like image, influence, knowledge. We wish through that to make better known where our country comes from. There are many implications in terms of better knowledge, meaning intellectual implications, political implications, economic implications, that go with that when people know better. Two, we consider that the market won't do it. Most of our action, for instance, in terms of movies, is directed toward programs for the universities, to show them movies that they might not see normally. We really try to project an image that people won't get just by the market in terms of exhibits, in terms of offers that they will come and talk, in terms of philosophers. So we do all that, and we feel that the market won't do it. We feel that it's very important for people to understand France, that they have this understanding and knowledge that won't be provided by the market.

Three, I think it's even more true today, we feel that it is very important in terms of international relations, meaning that cultural diplomacy is a part of diplomacy. The French-German relationship is a good example. After the Second World War, there were a lot of political discussions, but we created the Franco-German Office for Youth, which was for the exchange of youth. There is a point where in fact—and obviously we speak in the context that we are all aware of—when you have disagreements between countries, and it becomes very serious when these disagreements become fed by prejudice and not knowing, because that's when you become an enemy. … That's when you start the process of conflict. So we feel that it's also very important to do cultural diplomacy; in fact, it's a general support of our relationship.

We obviously don't want to be an enemy of the United States, so we feel it's very important that there's discussion that exists of understanding and knowledge. Obviously today it's more important than ever that we have this discussion. That means that Americans, aside from what they see on pop news or whatever, have an understanding and a knowledge of at least some of what this country's about, so that in fact we don't rush into larger conflict. Last, we are not at the level that we were at in 1945, that's for sure. But I personally feel there's certainly a need for new initiatives to get a better understanding between French and, I would say, Europeans and Americans.

STILLE: I want to ask one specific question before moving on to our German colleague, about whether there is still a separate French Ministry of Culture. Prestigious authors such as Andre Malraux was Minister of Culture, and I was wondering if that's still the case, or whether it's been subsumed by the Foreign Ministry.

GEHAN: No, you're right on both counts, there is still a Minister of Culture, more than ever. But—it's important for the theme of the conference—the principle is that in terms of outside, the Foreign Ministry is leader, meaning, we work with the French Ministry of Culture, but the French Foreign Ministry is leader in terms of what we do abroad. But understand again, I'm not trying to sell anything. I think that people would feel that it would be propaganda. What we are doing is to try to better understand France; we are not promoting French government views. That's not what we do, that's not our mission.

SÖTJE: I'm just a couple of weeks here in New York City, as the regional director of the Goethe Institut, the German cultural institute. My responsibilities are for Canada, United States, Mexico and, last but not least, Cuba, where we will have a special institute by the end of this year. The Goethe Institut was founded directly after the Second World War and our legal framework conditions depend pretty much on the responses to our experiences with the Nazi regime and with the totalitarian system, especially with the role of propaganda in the framework of such a totalitarian system.

> There is a common understanding, that cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, is in the enlightened self-interest of our country.

That is the main reason why we have a common understanding, a deep partisanship including all political parties, that foreign cultural policy, as we call it, should be totally independent from the government. That is the main reason why the Goethe Institut is one of the main players in foreign cultural policy but not the only one. It is not dependant on the policy of the government. We have an understanding of a division of labor: I'm not a diplomat. Diplomats are abroad to explain the policies of the government. We are abroad to explain our country and to give a self-critical, controversial portrayal of our own culture, our own society. That is the reason why we are a legally private institution, but we are nearly fully subsidized by the federal government. Our advisory board members are scientists, artists, journalists and only very few politicians, and these politicians have not the opportunity to vote when it comes to decisions.

The next basic factor is that there is a common understanding in politics in Germany, interior politics, that the autonomy of institutions like the Goethe Institut or the German Academic Exchange Program, the second big player in international foreign cultural policy, that the autonomy of these institutions is an absolute pre-condition, an absolute prerequisite, for our credibility abroad. Nevertheless, we are dependent, as I explained before, because we are dependent on the financial sources from the federal government. There is, of course, a lot of debate because the Goethe Institut and the German Academic Exchange Program—not so much German Academic Exchange Program but the Goethe Institut—during the last 10 years suffered budget cuts because of indifference toward our programs in the federal government. We have the same experience as our colleagues all around the world, not only in the United States but in Europe as well, that it is a special challenge in maintaining the government's interest and funding in times when there seems to be less of a foreign policy threat. But again, there is a common understanding in all political parties in Germany that cultural diplomacy is one of the three so-called pillars of our foreign policy: one is diplomacy, the second is economic relations, the third is cultural relations. Twenty-five percent of the total budget of our Ministry of Foreign Relations is going to cultural relations; it's a quarter. And it underlines the importance of cultural diplomacy in the framework of the German foreign cultural policy. Only a third of these funds are devoted to our work at the Goethe Institut.

There is a common understanding, again, that cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, is in the enlightened self-interest of our country. And I would underline this term "enlightened" interest. It's not a short-term interest. We understand foreign cultural policy as a long-term investment. We are not serving as a trouble-shooter … but after a war situation, it's not possible to look at foreign cultural policy or public diplomacy as troubleshooting, as it seems to me it sometimes is, as the discussion of yesterday afternoon was looking at cultural diplomacy. But anyway, we have had some changes of paradigm during the last 10 years.

MACKAY: I'm the director of the British Council here in the United States. I'm not a diplomat, but for the last 16 months of my life I've found myself, since arriving in Washington, sitting in the British Embassy wearing a hat as cultural counselor as well. So I'm working very, very hard to try and be diplomatic, and I'll do my best this morning not to let the side down. Being British, I can tend only to think in fairly straight lines, so you'll forgive me if I diverge very slightly from the question, just to give you a couple of definitions that are helping me to shape the way my own thinking is going as this conference evolves.

The British Council is described as Britain's principal agency for educational and cultural relations with other countries. Culture in that sense goes back to one of the questions in the last session. It includes sport; it includes science and technology; it includes the arts; it includes all those things that are going to help us to bring greater understanding. So we take a very broad definition of what culture is, and the important thing is what we are using the culture to do in terms of increasing the understanding. We've been talking a lot about public diplomacy and about cultural diplomacy. In my own simplistic way, I try to keep a divide. For me, in my interpretation, the way I'll be talking, public diplomacy is about, generally, government messages. Government wants to get out something about a country, about what it's doing. So you have public diplomacy messages, and if you want to get them across better, you switch up the volume more, you increase the frequency, or you produce a new leaflet. Alongside that there is cultural diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy, for me, is much more what we're talking about here. It is the creation of long-term relations that will endure. They will endure because there is a mutual understanding that results from those relationships.

To answer the question a little bit more: structure—I'm afraid we're now going to great British bureaucrat-ese—the British Council is a non-departmental public body. This means that we do not answer to government, but we receive a proportion of our funding from government. About 30 percent of our funding comes through the British government. Seventy percent of our funding is generated through the services that we provide in different countries. In many countries, it's through things like the teaching of English, the delivery of British qualifications and examinations. In other countries, it's the management of development projects where they contribute to our objectives. So, semi-governmental, but the important thing is, as with the Goethe Institut, we are independent of government. So it can result in situations as we have at the moment in New York, where there is a visual arts exhibition that has some sponsorship from the British Council, where I got a call from the Consulate-General, saying, "Do you know what's in this exhibition?" I said, "Well, not really, no. It just happened, really." And they said, "Well, it's not very helpful to our public diplomacy effort, because it's actually quite *anti* the war." I said, "Well, that's your public diplomacy message. Our cultural diplomacy message is that we support the propagation of quality in the arts, so we have sponsored this exhibition, because in the judgment of our experts, this is quality." We take no responsibility for any political messages contained within that exhibition. In fact, if you think about the long term and you think about cultural relations, there are an awful lot of people in this country who don't necessarily agree with their government's position. It's going to be quite important to talk to them as well, once the war is done and dusted. Actually being able to represent the full spectrum is extraordinarily important if you're talking about true cultural relations, rather than simple public diplomacy relations. So we're non-governmental. We're established as a charity in Britain, which is a bit bizarre, but it's just for various tax reasons, I think.

The closest body we work with in Britain, as with Goethe Institut and the French, is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as it's called. In terms of our funding, it's another slightly convoluted question. In pure government funding, for every one dollar that the British Council receives from government, the Foreign Office receives about eight dollars. That said, as I said before, only 30 percent of our funding actually comes through the British government. So we actually get about $225 million a year from the British government. We generate twice as much as that through our own earnings. It's also slightly complicated by the fact that, for very boring historical reasons, not everything that happens in terms of cultural diplomacy is funded through the British Council. So, for example, the scholarship schemes with which you'd be familiar are actually funded through the Foreign Office. The Marshall Scholarships here, the Fulbright Scholarships, which are incidentally 50 percent funded by the British government—it's one of the greatest U.S. marketing ploys of all time that Fulbright is seen as purely American when it's actually funded truly internationally and bilaterally, the Chevening Scholarship scheme—which is the biggest post-graduate British scheme in countries other than the U.S. So it's very difficult to say, "This much is spent on cultural diplomacy; this much is spent on traditional diplomacy." But in a rough government sense, it's one dollar for every eight.

WIKLER: I'm the general director for cultural affairs, U.S.A., at the Netherlands Consulate General in New York. Normally, my title would be cultural counselor, like all my colleagues here are, but unfortunately, as you may understand from my accent, I'm a dual-national. I'm Dutch-American, "dual-national," meaning two passports, meaning if I'm living and working in the United States, the State Department has decided that I pay all my taxes,

all my parking tickets, have no diplomatic immunity and therefore also do not get a diplomatic title. So I had to relinquish my title as cultural counselor and find another one. Even though I am "embedded" within the diplomatic system here and work at the consulate, in fact, I personally am not a diplomat, and my background, as you may have read, is also not as a professional diplomat. I come directly from the arts.

Briefly, there are a lot of elements that have already been discussed. I'll try to take out a couple of very specific aspects of Dutch cultural policy. First of all, it is definitely a marriage between the foreign service, or the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture, Education and Science. They're both in on this. It's not so that the Ministry of Culture is only inward-focused. For the last 10 years it has been this way. They have joined forces with the Foreign Ministry to form a comprehensive international cultural policy. And I would like to state that in our view in the Netherlands, cultural policy—the way I was hearing it earlier this morning, it seemed to be foreign policy and political policy and how to use culture for it—is how you structure support for the arts in your own country and abroad. Now, you have reasons for supporting certain artists and certain groups and you have reasons for others, but they are not politically driven. They are driven by quality first of all.

Secondly, and this is another point where the Netherlands is very strong, we have what we call a demand-side international cultural policy. What is a demand-side? It sounds very market-oriented. We are a market-driven country, the Netherlands, big traders, big salespeople. The demand-side means that we first listen to what the host country wants, what they're about, what will appeal to them. Now how do they know to want something? We have to inform them. So my job is really not to promote Dutch arts and culture, although I guess you could say in the long-run it is. It's really more to broker, to make sure that the people in the host country, in this case the United States, know what we have to offer in the Netherlands, are given the opportunity to read about it, to see it. We have a very wide program for sending programmers, presenters and curators over to the Netherlands to see what we've got to offer. My job is to get the right people and the right institutions talking. I do not, and we do not as a government, make any decisions on what is to be sent over here. That decision is made by our American partners.

We also, as the British Council said, have structural relationships with a number of arts organizations, foundations, festivals, theaters here, galleries, museums. We have an ongoing relationship with them. We listen to them, what they're looking for. We make sure they know what we have to offer, and if they're interested—and we hope they are—we help facilitate that. That's actually what our job is. Our job is not to try to sell a message. If a message is anything, it's, "We're not just tulips and wooden shoes." That's the public diplomacy image, which, unfortunately, is still being used in certain parts of the country and, unfortunately, by certain of my colleagues at other posts in the United States. The message that I'm getting from the Ministry of Culture is "Smash that." That's really not what the Netherlands is about. Leave that to the Netherlands Board of Tourism. The message that we're trying to project is a modern, vibrant, maybe a little anarchistic image of our art scene. Our main goal is to help the Dutch arts and Dutch artists by exposing them to other countries, by raising their profile in other countries, sometimes by helping them measure themselves against higher standards, because we don't have the illusion that everything we do is the best in the world.

There are certain areas we're pretty good at and others that we can learn a lot from. So one of our jobs is to try to get people over here and to pull themselves up by the bootstraps, and just see actually how well they're doing rather than only measure themselves against the rather limited measure of their own cultural community. Some of the statements made yesterday—about listening to the host country, listening to what people are all about, what they're interested in—can go a lot further and that really means—and sometimes I describe my job as—infiltrating the cultural infrastructure. Get in there and make sure you understand what people are talking about, that you can speak to them on their level and know what you're talking about, know what's going on in your own country, know what's going on in your host country, and try to get the right people together. I'll end, but, before that, I would definitely say, even though it's not the system that we have in the Netherlands, I very much applaud the German and the British system of separating the cultural diplomacy from the diplomatic corps. Not so much in our case because of damage control reasons or because of trust, but rather because of professionalism and efficiency. On the whole, in my experience, diplomats—there are a few exceptions, and one of the exceptions was the most recent ambassador to the Netherlands, who will be speaking later today, who herself is an art historian and knows a lot more about Dutch art than I do—don't really know how to speak to artists and heads of arts organizations. They are either mystified by artists, or they're enthralled by them, and neither is really the appropriate attitude in order to be able to work on a professional level. So I feel that besides the possible political and trust issues, it's very important for the people doing this cultural diplomacy to be arts professionals who have a feeling and understanding of the other side.

SARUKHAN: Thankfully, as one of the two diplomats on this panel, I get to speak last and fend off some of these allegations against diplomats. I'm the Mexican consul general in New York, and I will probably beat my German colleague here, because I arrived on Saturday and yesterday was my first day at the office. Let me speak very briefly about what the traditional structures of cultural diplomacy in Mexico were, what we've been doing to try and change them around, and you will probably identify that as different from my British colleague's linearity. Many of the things I will talk about will be extremely fuzzy. Some will be quite colorful, as probably Mexico is. The lines are not as clear-cut as some of the examples that we've heard about.

Traditionally—and I will oversimplify—there have been three main structures in Mexico for promoting culture, basically in and out of the country. There's the National Council for Culture and the Arts, which has traditionally been based in Mexico and has promoted culture within the country. There is the Foreign Ministry, which promotes basically Mexico abroad, a public diplomacy-type of program, but also manages scholarships, exchange programs, the Fulbright-Garcia Robles program, which is the equivalent to some of these bilateral scholarship programs to the United States. Then you have within the Foreign Ministry a very specific office called Program for Mexican Communities Abroad that deals with the relationships within Mexican communities that live outside of Mexico, which is basically of course in the United States, given that we have at least around 8 million Mexicans living in the United States, either legally or undocumented. That was the structure that existed before 2000.

Once the Fox government came into power in 2000, there was a very specific decision. I know many of you will probably blink and say, "My God, the world is moving in one direction and these guys are going backwards." There was a very explicit decision made in Mexico to harness cultural diplomacy and cultural promotion to foreign policy. The basic reasoning behind this was that we believe that by opening Mexico up to NGOs, artists, the eyes and

> I very much applaud the German and the British system of separating the cultural diplomacy from the diplomatic corps.

ears of the world, we will be able to make democratic change in Mexico, that we will be able to anchor the democratic change that has occurred in the country. We feel that with culture and cultural diplomacy we can play an important hand. So in 2000, the Foreign Ministry pushed, lobbied and got the funds and the green light to create something that has become the Cultural Institute of Mexico. It is based loosely on what the Goethe or the Instituto Cervantes in Spain have done. It's an institute, which is based inside the Foreign Ministry, which is run by the Foreign Minister directly. It organically comes straight out of his office. Most of it is a governmental budget. We get about 70 percent governmental budget, and then we have about 30 percent matching private funds that are channeled either for the head office in Mexico City, or the Institutos de Mexicos that we have been creating in other countries and especially in cities like New York and other big cities in the United States. Obviously, I won't hide it here, there are bureaucratic problems with our friends from the National Council for the Arts, because there's a bit of "Is this our responsibility? Is this the Foreign Ministry's responsibility?" But so far we've been able to kick off a very successful program.

Usually you end up discussing whether the chicken or the egg was first. I think the Institute in Mexico has been able to capitalize on a certain newfound cultural vibrancy going on inside Mexico. There are various examples: films like "Y Tu Mamá También," "Amores Peros," "El Crimen del Padre Amaro." These tell of a certain—it would probably be bold to say a Mexican cultural renaissance—but there has been a certain effervescence going on in Mexican culture in the past five, six years which has suddenly mushroomed as a result of a freer press—sometimes uncomfortably so for those of us who are diplomats. But there is a lot that the government is doing to promote this. We're using the institutes in the United States to spearhead these efforts. In fact, I know many of you will say, "Well, if the Foreign Ministry is controlling this, is this an a-critical program?" I think it is. We, in fact, got into a tussle with the Mexican Catholic church, because when there was this whole row over the film that was Mexico's candidate to the Oscars, "El Crimen del Padre Amaro," the Church tried to ban the film. What we immediately decided to do in the Foreign Ministry was to show the film for all the diplomatic corps in Mexico City. So that the Foreign Ministry has decided to play a very active role in promoting what has been going on inside the country, but also funding, providing private support for some of the activities. It's a very mixed model, and, obviously, if you compare it to what some of my European colleagues have talked about here today, it's probably a much more centralist and government-controlled program than probably a lot of us would like to see, but given what has happened in Mexico, and given that we really believe that we can foster and anchor democratic change, accountability in Mexico via the arts, we will try and continue to do so.

GEHAN: I would just like to react very quickly, because I don't want to leave a wrong impression in terms of diplomats, because I happen to be a diplomat. As I said, I am the only one and not only that, but I just happen to be a diplomat, meaning that, in the past, my job has been regularly occupied by non-diplomats. I was actually asked to take this job because I'm a university person as well and have long-term experience in universities, and I'm a Franco-American, meaning that my wife is an American and I live in this country as much as mine. Second, I would say that in terms of the agency, it must not be also overemphasized, the difference between a ministry and an agency. We have in France a recurring debate on this issue, meaning, "Should we be an agency or should we be a ministry?" I'm not sure, to tell you the truth, that in a year or two from now we won't be an agency. It's really a question that is debatable. Three, in terms of the way we work here, as I said, we work with partners, but not only with partners. We have an evolution that is more and more mixed between public and private. We have a foundation that we work with, and actually my budget goes in large part to this foundation, which means part of my actions, I have to defend them in front of a board, which is composed of French and Americans. The executive director of this foundation, who is American, is my direct counterpart for everything we do.

A fourth thing: I would dispute what was said by my Dutch colleague, even if I agree on the rest. Obviously we have an office where we have experts, meaning that we have people who are coming from the audiovisual world, from the arts world. I agree—I certainly wouldn't feel competent, and I don't, to discuss these things. But there is no way you could have an expert on all the kinds of things that you would cover—from audiovisual to universities and to schools. What happened—and I think one of the reasons I was chosen—I think what's important is to negotiate. In my office, at least, the main thing that is important is … to be expert maybe a little bit. … I'm an expert in universities, but what's important is to be able to negotiate with your partners because this is really the key to success in terms of cultural diplomacy.

STILLE: Andy already answered this question for the British experience about the fact that there's a structural independence built-in to the British Council and that 70 percent of their money is independent. I'm assuming this puts you in the kind of situation you described where somebody from the embassy is saying, "What

about this exhibition you're putting on? Isn't that working against what we're trying to do in our foreign policy?" The fact that some of your money, and an important part of your money, is coming from another source, they give you the authority in that conversation to say, "No, I'm terribly sorry, this is how we're going to do it, and this is our—?"

I'm wondering in the case of the Goethe Institut, whether the fact that the Goethe Institut, as you indicated in your introduction, is in a paradoxical position, because it's legally independent and yet financially dependent. How does that work in terms of the kind of situation that we're describing there?

SÖTJE: It works totally because there is a common sense between the political parties and the political class in our country, that they should avoid any influence on our policy abroad. There is no problem. I remember only three examples where an ambassador tried to influence our policies abroad, and in all of these cases our ambassadors failed.

MACKAY: In the vast majority of my experience working overseas, it actually works very well for the diplomatic service to have an arm which is not purely governmental, which is able to raise the issues and say the things that they cannot, because they have to represent governmental policy. Generally, and I would say certainly in our case, we are welcomed by the diplomats because we are able to say things that they can't and to take the debate to another level. It's a very, very rare exception that that's not the case.

WIKLER: I've never heard of an instance where there's been this kind of conflict with the Netherlands. Our supply-side policy preempts that in a certain sense. In other words, we don't bring anything over that people here haven't asked for. Now that can also be a problem, because if we would like to express something that maybe is not welcomed here, we don't really have the channel to do it. But ifthere were an enormous demand for, let's say, some very politically loaded artistic expressions over here, we would bring them because there is a need for it, and I would very, very much doubt that the government, the ambassador, would interfere in that.

STILLE: One thing that is—and Jean-Rene mentioned this—a big difference, I suppose, between the United States and Europe in cultural policy is the role of government and the role of the market. Jean-Rene mentioned the idea of promoting things that the market will not promote. One of the areas that has been the biggest bone of contention in many ways between the United States and Europe is the film industry, and most European countries accept as a given that, because of their smaller domestic markets, the government has to have an active role in promoting, subsidizing, financing film. Since, Jeanne, your background is as a filmmaker, and Holland, of course, has a small domestic market, how does that work and how do you feel about it, as someone who also has long experience here and as a dual-citizen? The United States more or less operates on the principle that we have a wonderful and vibrant art scene, not just in cinema, because it's private—the fact that the government is not saying, "We want abstract expressionists;therefore, we will subsidize abstract expressionists"—the fact that the private anarchy in this country is part of its vitality. I'm curious as both an artist and cultural diplomat and filmmaker, how you see that tradeoff?

WIKLER: Whether subsidizing the film industry is a good or a bad thing?

STILLE: The arts in general. In other words, you can talk specifically about film, but whether you think it's a good idea.

WIKLER: Let me answer this in two parts because I'd like to speak just very briefly about the whole problem of film, what is seen very much in Europe as American cultural imperialism. I'd like to briefly touch on that, and what we, the Netherlands, have done about that problem. And then the second one is the general

It actually works very well for the diplomatic service to have an arm which is not purely governmental, which is able to raise the issues and say the things that they cannot, because they have to represent governmental policy.

funding, subsidies for the arts. It is true that there is an enormous flood still of American films into Europe, and a lot of it has to do with the incredible marketing resources and distribution resources of the American film industry. Some of it has to do with the fact that the movies are pretty good, actually. They're not all pretty good, and the big blockbusters that are sent over in droves—they appeal to certain segments of the population. In the last 10 or 15 years, the European Union has implemented a number of programs for all kinds of cultural activities … and that has strengthened the European film industries by helping them, not just paying for the films—as a matter of fact, production grants have been very, very limited—but by strengthening the marketing, the distribution and the training. My particular background was in film training, and what we decided to do was: Let's not see the Americans as the enemy; let's learn some of their tricks. So we invited the best that we could find to come over and have a dialogue with our filmmakers, who didn't agree in certain aesthetic ways with the way the films were being made, but in many ways were dying to learn those techniques. A lot of that has happened all over Europe, where there has been an exchange—exchanges of ideas in training, in conferences, in seminars and so on. What has happened in my country, as well as many others, is our domestic box office for Dutch films has risen dramatically. It used to be there was a tiny percentage. No one would ever go to a Dutch film. Now the Dutch films have an enormous audience, and a lot of that has to do with having strengthened the industry. Once again, not just throwing money at a producer, but training producers. How do you become professional? How do you fundraise? How do you market your film? That was what my institute was involved in, strengthening the infrastructure there. Part of it also is learning the best practices from the Americans. That's one way in which we have absolutely addressed that problem.

There are a lot more Dutch films, but we do not have a quota. There are other countries that do have a quota as far as how many of their own national films are to be shown. It's the same with radio and television. We do not have that in the Netherlands. We try to make a very natural kind of quota, an organic quota by making sure that the product is just as good as we can make it.

As far as subsidizing is concerned—we have a very, very generous subsidy system for the arts in the Netherlands. However, right now there are cries going up for more private funding for the arts. First of all, the extent to which one can fund major exhibits, or major shows, or international work is very limited, so they feel that in order to be able to compete—a museum, for example—on the international market for a wonderful exhibit, they need more than what they receive from subsidies. So, they want to learn the techniques for convincing rich people to part with their money. We're not good at that. Rich people don't give to the arts. There's actually not a charity tradition, a giving tradition, at all. There's no culture of giving in the Netherlands because we're taxed, as they would say here, up the yazoo. You know that your tax money is going to the arts; therefore, why should you give extra? On the other hand, tax money is going toward *a lot* of things. So people in the arts feel that in order to be able to compete internationally, they have to get private money.

There's also a feeling, and I do share it to a certain extent, that a kind of laziness can creep in. When you are subsidized from the cradle to the grave as an artist, you don't really have to worry about anybody ever buying a painting or coming to your performance. It really doesn't matter. One of the problems with the film industry is that the filmmakers made the films for themselves, and that's a wonderful way to start. But if you don't even have a window into how your audience is reacting to your film, you don't care because you can be as murky and obscure as you want because you've gotten your subsidy upfront, then you don't have a strong and vibrant film industry. So there have been steps certainly in the last five years, in the Netherlands to concentrate on what they call "cultural entrepreneurship," to make sure that the culture-makers, the artists, do have a sense of the market, do have a sense of their audience. It's a balance.

One of the major ways to strike that balance is to be sure that you're helping starting artists, new ones. Put a lot of money into training, a lot of money into development, a lot of money into new groups, getting them going, and then at a certain point, hopefully they'll be able to stand on their own. Now some groups who have done that have then complained, "I've been punished, penalized for my own success. We're so successful now, we don't get any subsidy anymore." Well,that is the idea basically, that you don't have a right for the rest of your life to it. There are certain art forms that will constantly and continually need to be subsidized because they don't appeal to a mass public, and those need to be cherished and they need to be protected.

STILLE: As we know, the French take the financing of cinema very seriously and see it as a fundamental part of maintaining a healthy film industry. I think there was a period, for instance, where France was making a lot of funds available for first movies, and then they found it wasn't working and that you'd have the first movie and the second, and careers would sort of fizzle out after that. It seems to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, in recent years it's been working. France has made some adjustments to its policies, and the exporting of French cinema has been more successful in the last several years. There are a number of movies, from "Va Savoir," among others, that have reached large international audiences. Has there been an adjustment to French policy in terms of film that accounts for that, or is it just the fact that certain individuals have made movies that have been successful,that draw?

GEHAN: I'm going to piggy-back on your question very briefly. I'm really struck by the commonality of much of what is being said. For instance, what was just said about the Netherlands, it happens the same in France. There has been a strong evolution toward a mix in arts funding. We just passed a recent law to encourage gift-giving. With regard to film, I don't think there's a change in terms of our policy. The real change is more linked to economy. As you know, Canal Plus was part of the system for financing, which has some problems right now.

STILLE: I had a question for Peter specifically, but it may apply to the others. We in this country, of course, have a significant problem of relations with the Arab world, and we may be able to learn something from our European cousins on this, who have longer experience in this part of the world. I know, for example, that the Goethe Institut sponsored among other things a trip of the writer Günter Grass to Yemen, which produced interesting results. I'm wondering if you could speak a moment about that and the role culture can play in terms of bridging that particular divide.

SÖTJE: This is a particularly good example of our approach to foreign cultural policy toward the so-called—I like to say "so-called"—"Islamic world," or Arabic world, because it's not a monolithic block. There are a lot of cultural differences between the so-called Islamic countries, and there's a strong movement in democratization and participation, development-oriented movements, NGOs especially, in the Arabic world. We try to collaborate with these movements. I had the opportunity to go with Günter Grass to Yemen for 10 days in early December last year. This is a very good example for this approach because the participants in these meetings are authors, intellectuals, from all around the Arabic world, coming from Lebanon, from Egypt, from Algiers, from Paris. One of the famous authors in the Arabic language is Adonis, an exiled Syrian author living now in Paris; Mahmoud Darwish from Palestine is one of the most famous authors nowadays in contemporary literature in the Arabic world. There were many exiled authors. It was a sign of generosity, of hospitality, of the Yemeni government to meet in Sana'a. The issues, which the authors and the intellectuals and the journalists included in the party focused on, are the vision of state and religion, the role of sexuality in literature, censorship, state censorship and censorship from the religious bodies, from the society, from the conservative part of the society. It seemed to me that for some of the participants, for the first time in their socio-political existence, they had this opportunity. To provide such room at the

podium is our approach for current cultural policy, especially in non-democratic framework conditions.

SARUKHAN: There's one issue where I'd like to jump in here, and I think that for some reason a lot of what we keep talking about has to do with highbrow or higher-end cultural diplomacy, but there's also a very interesting role now for "lowbrow" culture. In this, Mexican soaps have been absolutely phenomenal in building bridges with countries with whom regionally, geographically, Mexico does not have a strong relationship. An example: Almost two years ago, a very prominent Indonesian businessman was visiting Mexico and happened to stumble upon a soap opera in his hotel and watched the thing. It seems the guy actually fell in love with one of the stars on the soap opera, and after six months of diplomatic negotiations with the government, with the producer in Mexico, we were able to promote the export of two of those soap operas to Indonesia. It became a huge hit in Indonesia, crossed over into Malaysia, and now the Mexican ambassadors in Malaysia and Indonesia are the star guests in every single reception in those two countries. So there is also room to talk about what "lowbrow" culture is doing in terms of perceptions of countries that in this case—I'm not even talking about the U.S. and Mexico—I'm talking about Mexico, Malaysia and Indonesia.

STILLE: I can't remember if it was Germany or Holland that invented "Big Brother."

WIKLER: Yes, I'm afraid that's one of our major exports.

STILLE: So you're doing some lowbrow exporting of your own.

WIKLER: That's private; that's not public television. That's commercial TV; we don't support them.

MACKAY: The British Council's been doing a lot of work with the Islamic countries since the events of Sept. 11. There's a Web site: www.connectingfutures.com, which gives all the detail. I'll just say that it's grown out of a major research exercise, which was done in the leading Islamic countries at the tail end of 2001, the beginning of 2002, which threw up the complexity and the confusion of our relations with those countries—and I mean "our" in terms of the developed, Western world. There is no simple paradigm. If you're interested, have a look at the research document. It is fascinating.

WIKLER: There's one other thing about the Islamic world. Like most Western European countries, the Netherlands has a large population of, in our case especially, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their children and now their children's children. These people came as guest workers in the '70s, and when the economy was in such good shape, there were a lot of jobs left over. Although the Netherlands has not felt the need to have any new programs for the Islamic countries post-Sept. 11, one of the very important things is that we do focus on the countries of origin of the people who make up the largest immigrant populations that we have. You have so many interesting indigenous cultures here in the United States with very highly developed cultural forms. Just as the speaker this morning was talking about how jazz appealed to people abroad, I think the African-American experience could appeal enormously to the diversity of people in the Netherlands. There is quite a large black population in the Netherlands, and some of the African-American achievements here are an enormous inspiration for them. A lot of what can be done to reach out to the European countries is not just appealing to their mainstream, but appealing to their very interestingly ethnically diverse cultural world.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Natasha Gauthier. I'm with the Canadian Museums Association, based in Ottawa. My question is directed primarily to Mr. Mackay, Mr. Gehan and Ms. Wikler, in terms of how you approach cultural relations and cultural diplomacy in nations that are former colonies and particularly the recently independent colonies.

MACKAY: Our approach is, as in every country in which we work: We look at that country; we go into the field; we listen; we try to work out what it is that is going to help us to build those enduring relationships, which is what we're talking about. Anything that will help us to develop that relationship that lies within our limits and within our parameters, we do, if it is of mutual benefit, because mutuality is at the core. We have a series of things that we call "cultural cornerstones," which is a bit of a naff term, but our organization recently has started working toward these things called "cultural cornerstones" which are basic common sense about being nice to people and respecting their views and things. One of the cultural cornerstones is about mutuality, and it came up yesterday. From my own personal point of view, I can't emphasize strongly enough how important the mutuality is. If we can't achieve that mutuality in our relations between X country and Y country, whatever their economic status, whatever their political regime, then we've failed before we've begun.

GEHAN: I'll approach the question from a different angle in two respects. One is in terms of relations with our former colonies. France, as you probably know, in terms of contemporary culture, is a mixed culture. Which means that within the culture of today in France, we actually incorporate part of the culture of these countries. The new music in France is really world music or the rap or whatever. It's coming from people who are basically usually from former colonies. That's the first thing. The second thing is that we have also a general approach to the culture of these countries, which means that we actually do promote also African artists. We have programs for that. It's like the distinctions blur. We have many things happening in terms of dance, literature. The distinction between France and the countries that are linked to France is really blurred, like the French literature is also today an African-French literature. The distinction is less and less obvious between the traditional French culture and this culture that is broader, that includes those countries.

WIKLER: The Netherlands has 13 so-called "priority posts," and those are diplomatic posts around the world that have a heightened focus on culture, New York being number one of all of them. Some of them in the major Western European countries (London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, etc.) are chosen because of their importance in the global cultural landscape. If you perform at the Paris Opera, that's good for you, good for your career. The same with New York, the same with London. A number of the other posts are chosen because of historical reasons—either because they were former colonies, for example, Jakarta or Pretoria, or they are countries, as I said, of the origin of a lot of our immigrant groups, such as Morocco, Turkey, etc. There are a number of countries that are chosen for those reasons, and they also have extra money, extra staff, extra funding for culture. They pretty much report to a certain office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is Culture and Development. We have a lot of lively discussions amongst ourselves, because the way we work, the demand-side work we do here in the West, is irrelevant when you're talking about Rabat or you're talking about Pretoria—well, Pretoria a little bit—but much less so in some of the countries where there really isn't a demand at all. They pay for a lot more things than we do here, a larger percentage, and they are stimulating the local cultures as well as showing what we have to offer.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Irene Krarup of the Culture and Information Department at the Danish Consulate in New York. Allow me to address a question to my colleagues up there. It seems that we are increasingly having problems doing our part of the cultural dialogue with America. I'm talking about the visa problems. It's not only a question of Americans doing it better, or paying their half, or doing it at all. It's a question of not, at least, sabotaging what we're trying to do here. John Brown mentioned what has characterized the American cultural diplomacy of the last 15 months, and he said it's a propaganda mode somehow. We feel it. At first I thought the Danes were specifically having problems with the immigration agency, but now we're having American presenters, our venues and programming, people from American festivals and venues with an international profile, coming to us and saying, "We have to do something together here because we're not going to have very much international culture presented at our festivals because we can't get the visa to you." The question is, is it just the Danes? Do you have the same feelings? Is there some kind of mistaken thing going on in the immigration authorities, thinking that the Danish Children's Theatre groups might be suicide bombers? And how can it be that when I'm inviting a children's theater group to come here, together with American festivals as my partner, it has to prove the international standard? This just happened yesterday that Philadelphia Children's Festival, which has a Scandinavian program this year starting May 1, we didn't get the visas. The thing we had to do is to prove the international standard, and that is disturbing. A Danish filmmaker … was just casting for his next film. The Danish director in L.A. was told by the casting, "Stay away from the Brits or any other foreigners. Make it easy for us; keep to American actors." That is concerning. Is it payback time for the polls indicating anti-American feelings in Europe? What's going on? And what can we do to help keep that door open, not only for our sake, but also to have that dialogue keep going on?

GEHAN: I'll just open my heart for a second. To be representing French culture in the U.S.A. today, and at the same time being Franco-American—I could have been American at some point in my life—it's very depressing. It's not that we see so much in terms of demonstration, but you have no idea the amount of mail, hate mail, that we receive. I don't care if some people disagree with the politics of my government—that is their right. But I usually open my mail, and the other day I was being accused of being a coward, dirty, whatever. And I must say I don't know what to do because that is really the limit of what we do, for me. Maybe that's because I'm a diplomat, but I'm very concerned because basically what we do is promote, and we deal with people like you. The problem is the people who are out there, outside of this—how can we reach these people that have grown such ideas? That for me is depressing because I really don't know what to do.

We are increasingly having problems doing our part of the cultural dialogue with America. I'm talking about the visa problems.

WIKLER: We've tried intervening when Dutch groups have been denied visas, and we're told, "Just stay away." I don't know if most people in this audience know that you can get them if you pay an extra thousand dollars. Your chances are better if you pay the extra thousand. Supposedly this is because there's such an incredible back-log, that they're so busy and overworked that if you want a speedy procedure … American presenters bear the burden of getting the visas and losing incredible amounts of revenue because their groups can't come over, they can't perform. It's terrible for us bringing them over, but it's worse for the presenters who are dependent on those. A lot of it is blind incompetence by some of these people who work for the INS who can't see the difference between a children's theater clown and a mass murderer. It's the same kind of civil servant mentality, or whatever that mentality is, "These are the rules, I'm just following orders. I don't care where you're from or who you are, whatever—no. Take your shoes off."

To answer the question of my Danish colleague, I don't think it's anti-Danish, because we're all experiencing it. I don't think it's there as retribution for any kind of anti-war sentiment that any of the countries have been expressing. I think it's a general paranoia mixed with a certain amount of incompetence.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Cynthia Schneider. I teach at Georgetown University and used to be the ambassador in the Netherlands. Working at Georgetown means that I live in Washington and get to take advantage of the incredible programs that these embassies and organizations put on, and they are, every single one of them, best practices. But I want to ask you all a question—two questions, actually—about who should be doing this and for what purpose? Yesterday we heard a lot about culture as a tool for diplomacy, and now we've heard the reverse—that it should be culture for culture, done by people who know about culture. I'd like to ask about that with the following point: I found as ambassador that actually it was beneficial to have it be the official place that hosted the sometimes edgy, controversial thing—that that helped the image of the official America. One example is, we did a thing with the Dutch with that movie about drug-dealers in Mexico, "Traffic," and it was a very … well, a film that showed the

bad sides of everything. We intentionally hosted our Dutch counterparts in dealing with the drug problem, to go together with us to that movie, recognizing that it had a pretty unflattering portrayal of America. I felt that was a good thing for me officially to be doing, and I would rather have the official person do that than some separate arm where you don't get the benefit. …

WIKLER: But you weren't showing that to Dutch film professionals, you were showing it to drug-enforcement officers. … So that's a different story. That's not what we're talking about.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (CYNTHIA SCHNEIDER): OK, but I thought also other people said the idea is good to have separate from the embassy someplace that can do controversial things. I think it's *good* for the embassy to do controversial things. So what about the role of pure culture and culture as part of foreign policy? And how about your training? This isn't part of our foreign service training at all, how to do this, and I'm curious, particularly Jean-Rene, about the background. How do you learn to do this as part of the foreign service, if you do at all?

GEHAN: I was not trained for that at all. As I say, I think I was asked to do this job more because of my personal experience. But to your question: I don't think it's a real debate, from what I hear. In fact, the objective is really for us, like for my colleagues, to promote a country. It's not to promote a government. We have the same distinction; they have a press office to deal with that—we don't. The distinction between the embassy or not-the-embassy is not that important. That's the way it sits. As I say, I'm the only one, the only diplomat; all the other ones are trained for their specific fields. I don't think it's really a very important consideration because the mission, which is to promote the country, can be done by someone like me or by someone else. I'm not there to promote a government.

MACKAY: I think we're unusual in Washington. We don't have an embassy program; we do not organize cultural events through the embassy. As other countries, we do all our work in partnership with American bodies. Our aim is to get out to the audiences we want to attract. Our perception is that the audiences that we wish to attract would never dream of coming to an event in an embassy. They perceive it as something very, very different. So we partner with bodies, with agencies, with institutions, which will draw in a younger, slightly more challenging audience that we're seeking.

GEHAN: We do the same, with one consideration that might play a part. … For instance, for me, aside from any direction from anyone, my priority right now is to address the issue of this climate, aside from what we continue to do in different fields. This is something I feel as being a diplomat, and it's not because I've been directed. I think it's our mission to do that. How would you react, for instance, if you had a crisis in general relations of your country with the United States? Would you also consider it a priority, or do you really think it's something you wouldn't want to deal with? Because that's where you can make a difference.

MACKAY: As was said yesterday, I think we are heading for a crisis generally in relations between young people in the United States and the European countries, and I include the United Kingdom in that. I arrived 16 months ago with a severe question in my mind about whether the British Council should be in the United States at all, given the history of the special relationship, given the strength of the ties, given the strength of the interchange all the time. And I realized from my own personal experience of arriving, having lived in recent years in the Middle East and South America and Europe, arriving here and finding this one of the hardest cultural adjustment experiences I've had in a long time. And then talking to our partners out in the field about the struggles they have to engage the successor generation, the young, educated U.S. citizens in a global agenda, in an international agenda. I think that is absolutely at the heart of what all of us can and should be doing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: A quick comment on the visa issue: I wanted to say that for two years we've been part of a national coalition that's in place in Washington with immigration attorneys, other cultural organizations and other sectors, and we came into being at the initiation of the Premium Processing Fee in May of 2001. Things have certainly heated up since that time. I'm happy to talk to anyone off-line because we've been working directly with Department of Homeland Security, the new agencies there, and we're well on the way to some administrative relief for the processing side and trying to make some new relationships with the diplomatic corps. I wanted people to know that there is something in place. It's a pretty targeted effort. I'm with the Association of Performing Arts Presenters; the coalition is under the American Arts Alliance, and you can go to their Web site to get details.

SÖTJE: I found it extremely encouraging to be participating in a conference that is clearly aimed for re-entering the field of foreign cultural policy for the United States. I put it last night over the dinner session that my European colleagues all around the world, abroad, don't miss our American colleagues on the battlefield during the last decade, but on the field of foreign cultural policy. And one of the phrasings used yesterday afternoon sounds a little bit strange to European ears. If you say, for instance, that you need a branding of the images of a country, or to sell your own culture as a product, or to export it abroad, this is a different approach from our philosophy as it comes out here on this panel. We should look more on another edge—our ability should be increased to listen and to hear and to look at different cultures in all parts of the world as sources of enrichment for our own countries, for our own cultures. We need this increasing ability for intercultural dialogue and exchange as air to breathe, especially in a more and more interdependent and globalized world. If we do not look at each other as a part of a learning community all around the world, all these efforts to encourage foreign cultural policy are not worth doing. It's a long-term investment, a long-term achievement; credibility will not grow overnight but over decades. I think this effort is still worth making, as somebody put it last afternoon, but don't look for results the next day.

STILLE: On that wise note, we conclude for now.

Can Cultural Diplomacy Improve America's Standing in the Islamic World?

MODERATOR:
CARYLE MURPHY, *religion reporter,* The Washington Post

PANELISTS:
PETER AWN, *dean, School of General Studies, and professor of religion, Columbia University*
BERT KLEINMAN, *senior managing consultant to Radio Sawa and Radio Farda*
SAMER SHEHATA, *professor of Arab studies, Georgetown University*
FAOUZI SKALI, *founder and director, Fes Festival of World Sacred Music*

ANDRÁS SZÁNTÓ (Deputy Director, National Arts Journalism Program): As those of you who've been following this story from its beginning know, we've now canvassed several aspects of the topic. We began yesterday by laying out the political situation and how America can get its message across in the world and what, generally speaking, the role of public or cultural diplomacy may be in that equation. The challenge in all of this—and this very much applies to the next panel as well—is to bring our story back to the arts. The issues with the Islamic world and the conflicts at large in the world today could fill many conferences. The aim of this one is really quite particular. We are taking a small slice out of a very large cake. Our goal here is to turn our attention to what the role of culture, what the role of the arts, may be in reconciling our differences or building new relationships with other nations.

The next panel specifically asks the question, "Can cultural diplomacy improve America's standing in the Islamic world?" The moderator is Caryle Murphy, religion reporter at *The Washington Post.* We will then move to a second panel of former ambassadors and other notable cultural figures to look at what culture can do for statecraft.

MURPHY: My name is Caryle Murphy, and I cover religion at *The Washington Post.* I did spend five years in the Middle East based in Cairo, covering the Arab world. I've just written a new book called "Passion for Islam," in which I discuss the role of culture in precipitating some of the attitudes among Muslims in that part of the world. The title of our session today is "Can Cultural Diplomacy Improve America's Standing in the Islamic World?" I'm sure you all know that the Islamic world is not monolithic, but I'd like you to keep in mind that we are discussing the Islamic world and not just the part of that Islamic world that is most problematic for us, which is the Islamic world in the Middle East.

Just beside me is Samer Shehata, who's acting director of the Arab Studies program at Georgetown University. He teaches Middle East politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. He finished a Ph.D. at Princeton and has taught here at Columbia. He's a native of Egypt, has dual nationality and has lived in this country since he was about five. Seated next to him are Mr. and Mrs. Faouzi Skali. Faouzi is Moroccan, founder and director general of the Fes Festival of World Sacred Music. He is a highly regarded cultural anthropologist, writer and speaker, and has written on Sufism, which is the mystical aspect of Islam and one of the most popular aspects of Islam in the West. Faouzi created the Fes Festival in 1994 after the Gulf War, with the intention of bringing people together. Then in 2000, he founded the intellectual component of the festival called "Giving a Soul to Globalization." I hope, Dr. Skali,that in your remarks you will tell us why you created a music festival to sacred music. Next to Mr. Skali is Bert Kleinman, who's a radio guy. All his working life, starting here at Columbia University, from which he graduated in 1963, he's been involved in producing radio programs and stations. Right now he's the senior managing consultant to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a federal agency that produces Radio Sawa, or Radio Together, one of the popular Arabic/Western radio stations in the Middle East, and Mr. Kleinman's going to tell us why it's become popular. And finally, Peter J. Awn, who's dean of the School of General Studies and professor of Islamic religion and comparative religion at Columbia. He's written many books, also one on Sufism. In 1995 he got an award I think every teacher would like to get: He was awarded the Great Teacher Award from the Society of Columbia Graduates. I'm going to ask Samer to start our conversation.

SHEHATA: I'm going to be talking about recent U.S. efforts at public diplomacy specifically directed at the Arab and Muslim world, and I'll try to address a couple of different questions. I'll try to talk about what they are in particular, and I will talk about whether public diplomacy can really help America's image in the Muslim world. Let me just start by saying that it's clear, the polling data reveals, and it should be clear to most people—and I'm referring to the polling data by The Pew Charitable Trusts as well as Zogby International of the Arab world—that policy is really the most important factor in determining how people look at the United States. We know the policies that are the drivers of opinion toward the United States. But nevertheless, public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy can be effective if done well, if done successfully. They're certainly not a magic bullet. They're not going to solve our problem. Our problem isn't primarily one of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. It's really a question of policy.

Regarding public diplomacy efforts since 9/11—and there have been a number of them, new programs and so on—I would argue that for the most part they have been a failure. Unfortunately, that is true for the public diplomacy programs directed at the Arab and Muslim world. One of the reasons is because they profoundly misunderstand the problem. The Office of the Under Secretary for