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Detailed Vita in PDF

Before joining Columbia University, Massimo Morelli was an Associate Professor of Economics and Political Science specializing in Game Theory and Political Economy at Ohio State University. Since receiving his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1996, Massimo has spent one year at CORE as a research fellow, two years at Iowa State University as an assistant professor, and one year at the University of Minnesota as a visiting professor. In 2001-02 he became a member of the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. He obtained the joint position in Economics and Political Science at Ohio State in 2004, at the time of tenure. In Economics he has made contributions to the theory of multilateral bargaining, network formation, market games, and the theory of contracts. His main political economy contributions have been on Duverger's Law, party formation, electoral systems, legislative bargaining, international organizations, politicians' incentives in institutional reforms and constitutional design. His most recent research projects include conflict and legislative bargaining experiments.

Selected Publications:

"Political Bias and War ", American Economic Review, forthcoming.
"Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations", American Economic Review.
"Entrepreneurial Talent, Occupational Choice, and Trickle Up Policies", Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
"Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers", Econometrica.
"Gamson’s Law versus Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory", Games and Economic Behavior.
“Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems”, Review of Economic Studies.
"Retrading in Market Games" , Journal of Economic Theory.
“Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining,” APSR.
“Network Formation with Sequential Demands," Review of Economic Design.
“Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives," Review of Economic Studies.
"The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games", Games and Economic Behavior.
"Bad Politicians", Journal of Public Economics.

Recent Working Papers:

"Caucuses and Primaries Under Proportional Representation"

"Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice"

"Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework"

"Incumbents’ Interests, Voters’ Bias and Gender Quotas"

"Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars"