REQUIRED READINGS

THE BIG PICTURE: DEFINITIONS AND NEURAL MODELS

1.  Atkinson, A. P., Thomas, S. C., & Cleeremans, A. (2000). Consciousness: mapping the theoretical landscape. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(10), 372-382.

ALTERED REALITY: DEFICITS AND DISTORTIONS IN COMPONENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

2.  Heilman, K. M., Barrett, A. M., & Adair, J. C. (1998). Possible mechanisms of anosognosia: a defect in self-awareness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 353, 1903-1909.

3.  Ramachandran, V. S. (1998). Consciousness and body image: lessons from phantom limbs, Capgras syndrome and pain asymbolia. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 353, 1851-1859.

4.  Rowe, A. D., Bullock, P. R., Polkey, C. E., & Morris, R. G. (2001). "Theory of Mind" impairments and their relationship to executive functioning following frontal lobe lesions. Brain, 124, 600-616.

QUESTION FOR CRITICAL THINKING:

The question for this week is decidedly open-ended and leaves a lot of room open for creative interpretation. I suggest reading the papers at least 24 hours before deciding to write your answer to give your mind/brain time to assimilate the information.

First, compare and contrast "access (A)" and "phenomenal (P)" consciousness. Then, extend your discussion to include the various dissociations of conscious and unconscious processing we have talked about all semester (i.e., in blindsight, neglect, amnesia, somatically-based decision making). Next, consider "monitoring (M)" and "self (S)" consciousness and how these types of consciousness might be instantiated in the brain.

ADDITIONAL READINGS:

1.  Frith, C., Perry, R., & Lumer, E. (1999). The neural correlates of conscious experience: an experimental framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(3), 105-114.

2.  Tononi, G. & Edelman, G. M. (1998). Consciousness and complexity. Science, 282(5395), 1846-1851.

3.  Dehaene, S. & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79(1-2), 1-37.

4.  Engel, A. K.., Fries, P., Konig. P., Brecht, M., & Singer, W. (1999). Temporal binding, binocular rivalry and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 8(2), 128-151.

5.  O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (1999). A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(1), 127-48; discussion 148-196.

6.  Da Rocha, F., Pereira, A., Bezerra-Coutinho, F. A. (2001). N-methyl-D-aspartate channel and consciousness: from signal coincidence detection to quantum computing. Progress in Neurobiology, 64(6), 555-573.

7.  Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they can remember. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

8.  Baars, B. J. (1993). How does a serial, integrated and very limited stream of consciousness emerge from a nervous system that is mostly unconscious, distributed, parallel and of enormous capacity? Ciba Foundation Symposia, 174, 282-290.

9.  Libet, B. (1993). The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. Ciba Foundation Symposia, 174, 123-137.

10.  Ingvar, D. H. (1985). "Memory of the future": an essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4(3), 127-136.

11. Desmedt, J. E., & Tomberg, C. (1995). Consciousnesss. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 44, 227-234.