Seminar: Cognitive and Behavioral Neuroscience Seminar (603)
Meeting Date: September 21, 2000

Chairs: Herbert S. Terrace, John Gibbon, Peter Balsam, Jon Horvitz, Yaakov Stern

Speaker: Clive Wynne, University of Western Australia

Topic: Is a Behavioral Account of Consciousness Possible?

Participants:
Kate Lynch, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Tammy Moscrip, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Anja Soldan, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Dustin Merritt, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Won Yung Choi, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Mike Drew, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Brady Butterfield, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Lisa Son, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Nate Kornell, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Peter Balsam, Department of Psychology , Barnard College
Hadassah Paul, Hofstra University
Martha Leah Chaiken, Hofstra University
Colin Beer, Department of Psychology, Rutgers University
Jon Horvitz, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Jennifer Mangels, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Lance Kriegsfeld, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
SiNae Pitts, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
Yaniv Eyny, Department of Psychology , Columbia University
James H. Schwartz, Department of Neurobiology and Behavior, Columbia University
Taffeta Elliott, Department of Neurobiology, Columbia University
Karyl Swartz, Department of Psychology, Lehman College
Robert L. Thompson, Hunter College
Michele Miozzo, Department of Psychology , Columbia University

Rapporteur: Ilona Kovary

Summary:
Dr. Wynne began by reviewing Skinner's argument that the mind is determined by the environment and that people are trained as children to describe their mind. Since we don't have direct access to each other's thoughts, this can be an unreliable way to learn. Unlike external events, thoughts cannot be verified by consensus.

Dr. Wynne differentiated between mind as output, a 3rd person perspective and mind as experience, a 1st person perspective. As illustrated by the classic toothache example: the toothache is private, others cannot see it, but can respond to a child's complaints. With training, the child learns to describe the experience and thereby becomes conscious of it. In this view, consciousness is an experience that arises because the community trains people to label private events with verbal terms. As Wittgenstein said, "You learn the concept of pain with language".

Dr. Terrace asked, "Before an individual learns words, how does that individual perceive private stimuli? Are they conscious?" Dr. Wynne replied that a verbal label is needed to experience pain as "pain". Therefore, pre-verbal individuals are not conscious. Mr. Eyny asked how qualia fit into Dr. Wynne's definition of consciousness. Dr. Wynne explained that qualia do not have an important place. Dr. Horvitz then suggested that this implies that babies have no qualia, and Dr. Wynne agreed. Dr. Balsam asked why private stimuli have special status. Dr. Wynne replied that the principle applies to any stimuli that impinge on an organism, not just internal, proprioceptive stimuli. Dr. Terrace asked whether Dr. Wynne's definition of consciousness meant that awareness equals consciousness. Dr. Wynne answered affirmatively. Dr. Wynne went on to address the implications of this theory. Consciousness develops in children and is not inborn. Conscious perceptions (qualia) depend on naming the experience, as for example, in the case of descriptions of pain and color.

Dr. Wynne noted that qualia are not the same across individuals. As an example, he cited studies on color perception (Berlin and Kay). Languages have a restricted set of color terms. English has 11 basic colors. Other languages have as few as two color names. Some color terms occur more often. The evolution of color names begins with black and white. Black is then associated with cool colors and white is associated with hot colors. This may seem like a contradiction because conscious experience comes out of physiology, but cultural practices play a role. For example, in Japanese the "green" traffic light is referred to as "blue", because blue refers to youth and movement. Japanese Americans remember the green light in Japan as being bluer the longer they live in the U.S.

Dr. Paul raised the question of labeling. She asked, "are you saying that because some cultures use one label for different stimuli that they don't discriminate?" Dr. Wynne replied that this does not mean that people in these cultures cannot discriminate. Rather, "they use a qualifier plus the label. For instance blue like the sky, versus blue like the leaves on a tree. So they do have ways of distinguishing the colors."

Dr. Wynne provided additional evidence concerning cultural influences on consciousness, which he described as less compelling then the evidence he had already presented. In 1978, Julian Jaynes pointed out that The Iliad contains no reference to consciousness. Jaynes hypothesized that Homer had no knowledge of intellect or soul. Dr. Wynne noted that several texts are needed to anchor meanings in vocabulary. When did Homo develop consciousness? Could human language have evolved 30,000 years ago? If so, then we've been conscious for that long and you would expect a more recent text, as The Iliad is, to refer to consciousness. Dr. Paul pointed out that many texts were written before The Iliad, (laws, punishment procedures, etc). Some languages have written narratives from 4000 BC.

Dr. Terrace pointed out that in Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner proposed that consciousness must be present to possess responsibility; for society to be able to hold people accountable for their actions. Dr. Wynne agreed and added that in court not knowing, or being aware, is considered a special plea.

Other cultures have other forms of consciousness. Dr. Wynne addressed these by looking at the classics and anthropological studies. Karl Marx said, "Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conception, in one word man's consciousness, changes with every change in conditions of his material existence." This statement is similar to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that consciousness depends on culture which Wynne hopes to revive.

Dr. Wynne suggested that people who learned language as adults would be good subjects with whom to address this issue. He proposed that researchers could ask these individuals what they felt; were they conscious? However, such cases are very rare and difficult to interpret. For example, Wynne cited Wittgenstein's exploration of William James' account of Mr. Ballard, a deaf mute. In their separate conclusions, William James proposed that a person could have thought without consciousness, while Wittgenstein did not.

Dr. Miozzo brought up Genie, the girl who at 13 years old had been raised without any social interaction and who had not learned language. He asked, if Dr. Wynne believed that Genie felt pain. Dr. Wynne said that we cannot tell, however, Dr. Chaiken pointed out that Genie did talk about her early experiences. Dr. Terrace pointed out that infantile amnesia is supportive of Dr. Wynne's view. Dr. Wynne replied that in such cases there would be nothing to remember if it could not be encoded linguistically.

Dr. Wynne continued with a discussion of children's theory of mind (TOM) and the use of false belief tasks. In the standard paradigm, a child is shown two boxes; a Band-Aid box, which is empty, and a similarly shaped box that has Band-Aids. The researcher asks the child, "where will the doll look for Band-Aids?" The answers are correlated with conversations with caretakers about state of mind.

Dr. Wynne addressed the implications of a theory of the development of consciousness. For example, there may be individual differences in understanding other minds that may result from differences in social experience. As an example, affective perspective taking might correlate with joint play. As another example, Dr. Wynne referred to studies in which pain perception differs as a function of an individual's culture or the instructions they receive. For example, in studies of pain perception. Southern Europeans request that a heat lamp be turned off sooner than Northern Europeans under the same conditions. Dr. Wynne pointed out that this could be due to a difference in fat or nerve endings. Distraction also affects pain tolerance. With distraction, subjects could tolerate pain 3 times longer than counterparts who had no distraction.

To conclude, Dr. Wynne outlined an empirical program for studying a behavioral account of consciousness. The questions to be addressed by this program are:

„ How does language contribute to the development of consciousness (c.f. Humphrey)?

„ How does consciousness develop in children?

„ What species are conscious? (How much reporting of experience is required?) On this subject Dr. Wynne reminded the seminar of Wittgenstein's (1958) remark, "If a lion could talk we would not understand him", (to which Dennett replied, "If a lion could talk that lion's experience would be so different from other lion's that we wouldn't learn anything").

Discussion:

Mr. Eyny asked whether Dr. Wynne believes that language is causing consciousness. He stated that he did not think that this conclusion necessarily followed from the arguments presented. Dr. Wynne responded by citing the study of color perception (green/blue/turquoise) conducted with Japanese Americans. He proposed that the green/blue experience is created by having a word for that experience. Mr. Eyny pointed out that associations become different with language, but perception is the same.

Dr. Horvitz suggested that tasks in which pain thresholds are measured while a subject's attention is divided is not an ideal way to study consciousness. He asked, "if you knock out language and cause a subject pain with no language to identify it are they not conscious?" Dr. Wynne answered that adults don't lose consciousness when they lose language. You therefore don't need to sustain language to sustain consciousness.

Dr. Miozzo pointed out that people with phantom limbs feel pain, which supports Dr. Wynne's case. Dr. Wynne replied that this phenomenon involves the aspect of consciousness that incorporates private stimuli. In this case, nerve endings are firing. Dr. Wynne believed that such studies are not relevant to the issue.

A participant proposed that based on the present discussion, Helen Keller became conscious when she grasped the concept of water from her teacher spelling it in her hand.

Dr. Paul clarified that Helen Keller became aware of the concept of labels Š not of consciousness. A participant commented that before a label can be applied you must have something to apply it to. Dr. Wynne agreed, saying that labels are applied to private stimuli. A participant asked why it is even necessary to develop the word, "pain"? Dr. Wynne stated that it serves to share the experience.

Mr. Drew asked if computers have consciousness. Dr. Wynne replied that without community there would be no consciousness.

Dr. Terrace observed that language sustains experience. Before language there is acknowledgement of momentary perception. Language helps to sustain it so that the experience can be acted on. Dr. Terrace also suggested that if a baby has theory of mind Š labels accelerate the process. In this case, words are not necessary - just joint awareness. Dr. Wynne countered that theory of mind only develops at 3 years.

A participant asked about people who experience no emotion due to brain damage. Dr. Wynne explained that we cannot draw much from brain damage. The mechanisms that develop consciousness may not be necessary to maintain it.

Dr. Mangels summed up the issue as being a chicken or egg, consciousness or language, debate. Organisms need to be conscious of reactions to stimuli in order to survive. Dr. Wynne stated that categorization before language was not conscious categorization.







Abstract

Developing some insights from B. F. Skinner, we argue that consciousness
arises through the experience of naming oneās private stimuli. Skinner
rejected the mind as an explanatory principle in psychology, but did not
deny the existence and importance of the experience of consciousness.
People become conscious as they are taught by the social environment to
label their private stimuli. Consequently, the route by which we learn
to describe (and become conscious of) our private experiences is
peculiarly indirect. We review evidence that the social environment
forms an individualās conscious experience. We take this evidence from
developmental studies of the development of childrenās notions of
consciousness; from cross-cultural studies of pain and color perception
(implying a revival of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis); from the classics
and anthropology. We conclude that this approach offers an empirical
approach to the mysteries of consciousness.