

Thirteenth

Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy

(SWAMOS 2009)

Sponsored by Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies,
convened at Cornell University

July 5-24, 2009

Morning sessions include lectures and plenary discussions, with all participants attending. Some afternoon sessions are plenaries and others split into two seminar groups. There are informal discussion sessions on several evenings, relevant movie showings, and an evening reception and seminar with people from the international relations section of the Cornell University Government department and the Peace Studies Program. The weekends are free (after 3:00 p.m. Friday), for those participants with families who need to return home for a couple days, or for those who might want to see the Finger Lakes region.

In the first section below are background reading assignments for participants to complete before arriving at Cornell. They are listed roughly in order of relation to subjects and sessions during the three weeks. Additional readings to be done each night during the three weeks of the workshop are listed under the schedule following the list. A supplementary bibliography for future reference follows.

As many of you doubtless already know, Clausewitz is one work that cannot be read quickly. He is not quite as taxing as Hegel, but more than one reputable scholar has misread Clausewitz – and misrepresented him – as a result of attempting to digest the work as expeditiously as many are accustomed to doing with normal works of social science or history. To say that he must be read slowly and carefully is not meant to endow Clausewitz with mystique or to accord him excessive reverence, but only to warn that understanding him is a more than normally demanding intellectual chore.

The curriculum gives more attention to cases and readings in U.S. defense policy than to other countries. This does not represent a supposition about what is worth studying, but reflects the aim that the workshop focus on some questions rather than attempt to survey everything, and is also due to the particular expertise of the faculty and guest lecturers.

Three evening movie showings supplement the curriculum. Other films in the SWAMOS inventory are listed at the end of the syllabus, and are available for optional viewing by groups on free evenings or weekends.

We aim to make these three weeks an intellectual hothouse. Participants are expected to spend as much time with each other as possible in afternoons, evenings, at meals, and in the 5:15 Happy Hour, exchanging ideas and developing long-term network connections.

Advance Reading Assignments

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret eds. and trans. (Princeton University Press, 1976), Book I: chaps. 1, 2, 4, 7; Book II: chaps. 1-4; Book III: chaps. 1-5, 11, 14, 17; Book VI: chaps. 1-8, 26; Book VII: chaps. 1-5, 15, 16, 22; Book VIII: chaps. 1-8. (RECOMMENDED FOR PURCHASE) (Participants should not substitute other translations. An unabridged edition in German is the only acceptable substitute. *Under NO circumstances read the widely available Penguin edition of the Graham translation, abridged by Anatol Rapoport.*)
2. Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness* (Allen & Unwin, 1988), Vol I: chaps. 1, 9; Vol. III: chaps. 8, 10.
3. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986).
4. Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Free Press, 1962).

5. T. E. Lawrence, "Science of Guerrilla Warfare," *Encyclopædia Britannica: Fourteenth Edition* (Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1929), vol. 10: *Game to Gun-Metal*, pp. 950-953.
6. *Mao-Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, Samuel Griffith, trans. (Praeger, 1961), chaps. 2, 6.
7. Colin McInnes and G. D. Sheffield, eds., *Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice* (Unwin Hyman, 1988), chaps. 2, 4, 8.
8. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (Viking, 1976), chap. 4.
9. Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton University Press, 2004), chaps. 1-7, 9-10.
10. *Field Manual 71-1: Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1998); available at: <http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/71-1/711frntf.htm>, pp. 3-1 to 3-34; 4-1 to 4-37; and Glossary.
11. Captain Jonathan M. House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Twentieth Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1984), pp. 1-6, 19-42, 79-104, 172-190.
12. *Air Force Manual 1-1: Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Vol. 1; available at: <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/afm1-1/BACKGROU.HTML>, pp.5-15.
13. *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986 edition), pp. 91-107, 129-138.
14. Francis P. Hoerber, *Military Applications of Modeling: Selected Case Studies* (Gordon and Breach, 1981), pp. 6-32.
15. Frederick William Lanchester, "Mathematics in Warfare," reprinted in James R. Newman, *The World of Mathematics* (Simon and Schuster, 1956), Vol. 4, pp. 2139-2157.

16. John A. Battilega and Judith Grange, *The Military Applications of Modeling* (Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 63-111.
17. Frederick S. Hillier and Gerald J. Lieberman, *Introduction to Operations Research*, Third Edition (Holden-Day, 1980), chap. 1.

SWAMOS 2009 Schedule

Week One

Sunday Evening, July 5: **Welcoming Reception and Dinner.**

Monday, July 6.

Lectures: Richard K. Betts, Columbia University:

1. **War and Policy: Grammar and Logic.**
2. **Elements of Military Operations.**

Seminar A: Betts:

Discussion of Advance Readings on Policy and Strategy.

Review focusing primarily on Clausewitz, secondarily on Millett and Murray, eds., Geyer, Keegan, Huntington, Lawrence, and Mao.

Seminar B: Barry R. Posen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology:

Humanitarian Military Intervention: Causes and Conduct.

Read: Barry R. Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," *International Security* 21, no. 1 (Summer 1996); Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," *Atlantic Monthly* (September 2001).

5:30-6:30ish: **Inaugural Happy Hour.** Subsequently held daily at same time. *Be there!*

Tuesday, July 7.

Lectures: Posen:
U. S. Grand Strategy.

Seminar A: Posen:
Grand Strategy: EU Case Study.

Read: Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 1; European Council, European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels, December 2003), pp. 1-14 (<http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>); "Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006" (Council of the European Union, n.d.), at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue/Docs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89603.pdf; Giji Gya, "ESDP and EU Mission Update," *European Security Review* no. 36 (December 2007) at http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_esr36_esdpmission-update.pdf.

Seminar B: Betts:
Issues in Threat Assessment.

Read: Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907," and Thomas Sanderson, "Observations on Printed Memorandum on Relations with France and Germany, January 1907," in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol 3: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6* (London: HMSO, 1928); Documents 551, 553, and 650 on the Munich Crisis, in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. II: 1938 (London: HMSO, 1949); Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Getting the Questions Right," *National Interest* No. 62 (Winter 2000/01).

Wednesday, July 8:

Lecture: Posen:
Fundamentals of Campaign Analysis.

Plenary Lecture : Posen:
Ardennes Case Study.

Optional Background Reading: Skim opening chapters of Hugh Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (U. S. Army Office of Military History, 1964), which can be found at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_cont.htm; the maps are particularly useful.

Thursday, July 9:

Lecture: Cindy Williams, Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
National Security Resource Allocation.

Read: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U. S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97); Cindy Williams, "Beyond Preemption and Preventive War" (Stanley Foundation, 2006); *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, March 2006) at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>; *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Department of Defense, February 2006) at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>.

Plenary Seminar: Williams:

U. S. Strategy and the Defense Budget.

Friday, July 10:

Lecture: Mark Cancian, U.S. Office of Management and Budget:

Analyzing Choices of Forces: Cost and Effectiveness.

Read: Roger A. Garrett and J. Phillip London, *Fundamentals of Naval Operations Analysis* (U.S. Naval Institute, 1970), pp. 161-173, 182-185.

Plenary Seminar: Cancian:

Case Study: The V-22 and Alternatives.

Read: Selections from "Testimony from the Senate Hearing Regarding the V-22 Osprey" and "Institute for Defense Analyses Study of the V-22 Osprey," (pp. 1, 5-39, 45-57).

Saturday, July 11- Sunday, July 12:
request.

FREE. Optional movie showings upon

Week Two

Monday, July 13.

Lecture: Conrad Crane, U.S. Army War College:
The Development and Content of New American Counterinsurgency Doctrine.

Seminar A: Crane:
Putting Counterinsurgency Doctrine into Practice.

Read: FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (U.S. Department of the Army, December 2006), <http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>, pp.ix-x, 1/1-29, 4/1-9, 5/1-7.

Seminar B: Betts:
The Vietnam Strategy Debate.

Read: Harry Summers, *On Strategy* (Presidio Press, 1982), chaps. 7-10; Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), chaps. 6-7; Richard K. Betts, "Blowtorch Bob in Baghdad," *The American Interest* 1, no. 4 (Summer 2006). *Review:* Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," and Lawrence, "Science of Guerrilla Warfare."

Evening: Dinner theater: Food at 7:00, movie at 7:45: ***The Battle of Algiers*** (1966), directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, screenplay by Franco Solinas (2 hours, 5 minutes). Remember that the French government did not consider Algeria a colony, but a part of metropolitan France (it had close to a million European settlers). Although fiction, several characters are composites of real historical figures; one of the FLN leaders plays himself in the movie. The realism of this film is demonstrated by the fact that after early showings the producers had to insert a notice at the beginning that it was not a documentary. While obviously pro-FLN, the film is also unusual in the extent to which it does not demonize the French, but empathizes with them.

- Were the tactics used on either or both sides illegitimate? Does the legitimacy or illegitimacy of terror or torture depend on the nature of the tactics or the justice of the cause they serve?
- By what criteria were tactics employed effective or counterproductive?
- Could either side have hoped to win without using those tactics? How are the issues of legitimacy and efficacy related?

- Is Colonel Mathieu's character evil, admirable, tragic, or something else?
- What is the difference between guerrilla warfare and terrorism?
- How do the French and FLN strategies reflect Huntington's points about the "tripartite" nature of revolutionary war or Mao's points about guerrillas and population being "fish" and "sea"?
- How similar or different are the tactical and strategic challenges to counterinsurgency or counterterrorism today?
- Did the Bush administration learn the wrong lessons from this film?

Tuesday, July 14.

Lecture: Col. Michael McMahon and Col. David Dworak, U.S. Army War College:

Campaign Planning and Theater Logistics.

Read: Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 1-8, 31-44, 52-66.

Plenary Session: McMahon and Dworak:

Campaign Planning Simulation Exercise.

Read: Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 202-230.

Wednesday, July 15.

Lecture: Betts:

American Civil-Military Relations: Are They Still a Problem?

Read: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 80-97, 143-157, 189-192; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (Free Press, 2002), chaps. 1, 7.

Plenary Seminar: Betts:

Objectives, Strategy, Operations, Tactics, and Human Capital: Why Is There

One Country Now Where There Were Two in 1863?

Read: Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (McKay, 1974). Also, review Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, chaps. 1, 3, 5.

Thursday, July 16.

Lecture: Peter D. Feaver, Duke University
Why Huntington's Civil-Military Theory Does Not Work in Theory or Practice (or, Yes, Civil-Military Relations are Still a Problem).

Seminar A: Feaver:
Civil-Military Relations and the Surge Decision.

Read: Peter Feaver, "Anatomy of the Surge," *Commentary* (April 2008); Peter Feaver and Will Inboden, "A Strategic Planning Cell in National Security at the White House," in Daniel Drezner, *Avoiding Trivia* (Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming). *Recommended:* Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (Penguin Press, 2009),

Seminar B: Betts:
Estimating the Culminating Point of Victory.

Read: Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (Free Press, 1990), pp. 103-127; Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Little, Brown, 1995), chaps. 18-20; Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II* (Pantheon Books, 2006), Epilogue. Also, review Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VII, chap. 22.

Evening: Dinner theater. Food at 6:00, followed by film and commentary by Tami Davis Biddle: **Twelve O'Clock High** (1949), directed by Henry King, screenplay by Sy Bartlett and Beirne Lay, Jr. (2 hours, 12 minutes). The problem of achieving military effectiveness at the price of driving men to the limits in the development of the U.S. "precision" bombing campaign in 1943-44.

- Through what mechanisms does operational effectiveness depend on organization, discipline, and morale?
- What is the distinction between effective leadership and command? How do social distance or fraternization between leaders and led affect unit effectiveness?
- Recall Shaara's Lee telling Longstreet: "Soldiering has one great trap.... To be a good soldier you must love the army. But to be a good officer you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love.... No other profession requires it."

That is one reason why there are so few good officers. Although there are many good men.”

- How do the strategic and operational problems of using air power effectively in World War II compare to those in the current era of *real* precision targeting?

Friday, July 17:

Lecture: Tami Davis Biddle, U.S. Army War College:
“Strategic” Bombing: Origins of the Debate.

Plenary Seminar: T. D. Biddle and Betts:

Does Bombing Coerce? A Century of Controversy.

Read: Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Cornell University Press, 1996), chaps. 2, 7; Barry D. Watts, “Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies,” *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 133-149 (only this excerpt is assigned, to keep the amount of reading manageable, but those who have time may want to read the entire article, along with Pape’s rebuttal, “The Air Force Strikes Back,” in the same issue).

Saturday, July 18-Sunday, July 19: *FREE.*

Week Three

Monday, July 20

Lecture: Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations:
Continental Warfare I: Land Tactics and Operations.

Plenary Seminar: Biddle:
Tactics and Technology Workshop.

Read: E. D. Swinton, *The Defense of Duffer’s Drift* (Avery, 1986), pp. 3-72.

Evening: Film showing at 8:00: **Zulu** (1964), directed by Cy Endfield, screenplay by John Prebble and Cy Endfield (2 hours, 19 minutes). The cinematic version of the defense of Rorke’s Drift in 1879. Distinguish questions about military effectiveness from questions about political legitimacy (the British soldiers are portrayed

as heroes in the film, but were in the service of an imperial land grab). Focus on the linkages among organization, doctrine, tactics, technology, professionalism, and combat effectiveness on both sides in the engagement.

- Why and how was the small force of British regulars (fewer than 100 functioning riflemen) able to defeat 4,000 Zulus, some of whom also had rifles?
- How was this brought off by two junior officers whose records were not distinguished?
- Why did this small force succeed at Rorke's Drift when the British force of 1,500 was completely destroyed at the Battle of Isandhlwana earlier on the same day? (Hint: The over-confident British at Isandhlwana departed from standard tactics while those at Rorke's Drift adhered to them.)
- What do you see of the importance of force-to-space ratios, training, fire discipline, and the role of NCOs?
- Is the film racist?
- Is today's disparity in conventional military capability between the USA and Third World militaries comparable to the disparity between Europeans and locals in colonial wars of the 19th century?

Tuesday, July 21.

Lecture: Eliot A. Cohen, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies:
What I Learned in the Orchard: Reflections of a Counselor.

Read: C. S. Lewis, "The Inner Ring," Memorial Lecture, King's College, University of London, 1944; Theodore Roosevelt, "Citizenship in a Republic," Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910; "The Unavowable Causes," in Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna* (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), pp. 19-20; Eliot A. Cohen, "How Government Looks at Pundits," *Wall Street Journal*, January 23, 2009.

Seminar A: Cohen:
What Does it Mean to Think Strategically?

Read: "Political Judgment," in Isaiah Berlin, *The Sense of Reality* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), chap. 2, pp. 40-53; Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, Vol. I (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 283-309.

Seminar B: Biddle:
Offense-Defense Theory.

Read: Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995); Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security* 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998); Keir Lieber, *War and the Engineers* (Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 149-158.

Wednesday, July 22.

Lecture: Biddle:
Continental Warfare II: Air Tactics and Operations.

Plenary Lecture: Biddle:
Continental Warfare III: Recent Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Read: Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1998); Brigadier General David A. Deptula, *Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare* (Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001) (available at www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf).

Evening: 6:00 Reception with Cornell Peace Studies Program and Department of Government. Stephen Biddle will speak on the development of strategy for the war in Afghanistan.

Thursday, July 23.

Lecture: Biddle:
Military Modeling.

Plenary Seminar: Biddle and Betts:
Professional Development in Strategic Studies.

Evening: **Farewell Dinner.**

Friday, July 24.

Concluding Plenary, 9:30-11:00: **SWAMOS '09 After Action Review.**

Recommended Supplementary Readings

The following list is idiosyncratic, not systematic. It includes some items of marginal importance, and may exclude other more important ones that the instructors have overlooked.

John I. Alger, *Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing, for the Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1985) (a useful reference work: comprehensive treatment of terminology, acronyms, military map symbols, and notation).

J.B.A. Bailey, *Field Artillery and Firepower* (Oxford: The Military Press, 1989).

Hanson W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (Harper & Brothers, 1950) (right-wing revisionist view of World War II strategy).

John A. Battilega and Judith K. Grange, eds., *The Military Applications of Modeling* (Government Printing Office, 1984).

Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943* (Viking 1998).

Christopher Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1990).

Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, *Israel's Strategic Doctrine*, R-2845-NA (RAND Corporation, September 1981).

Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, Second Edition (Columbia University Press, 1991).

Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Brookings Institution, 1982).

Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness* (Brookings Institution, 1995).

Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence* (Columbia University Press, 2007).

Richard K. Betts, ed., *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics* (Brookings Institution, 1981).

Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices," *International Security* 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983).

Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics* 37, no. 2 (January 1985).

Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000).

Richard K. Betts, "The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-02).

Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997).

Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?" *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999).

Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93).

Stephen Biddle, "The European Conventional Balance: A Reinterpretation of the Debate," *Survival* 30 no. 2, (March-April 1988), pp. 99-121.

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *Journal of Politics* 63, no. 3 (August 2001).

Stephen Biddle, "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," *Security Studies* 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998).

Stephen Biddle, David Gray, Stuart Kaufman, Dennis DeRiggi, and D. Sean Barnett, *Defense at Low Force Levels: The Effect of Force to Space Ratios on Conventional Combat Dynamics* (Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991), IDA P-2380.

Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army Policy and Defense Policy* (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002).

Stephen Biddle, "Military Strategy: An Introduction," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (Summer 2007)

Stephen Biddle, "Speed Kills: Reevaluating the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 2007), pp.3-46.

Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon: The Perils of Refighting Vietnam in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006), pp. 2-14.

Stephen Biddle, *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005).

Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp.139-179.

Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 19, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 171-212.

Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton University Press, 2002).

Shelford Bidwell, *Modern Warfare: A Survey of Men, Weapons, and Theories* (London: Allen Lane, 1973).

Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, Third Edition (Free Press, 1988).

[James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton,] *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance* (Congressional Budget Office, December 1977) (example of "static" analysis which figured prominently in the Cold War).

Bruce G. Blair, *Strategic Command and Control* (Brookings Institution, 1985).

Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Brookings Institution, 1993).

Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era* (Free Press, 1977).

Bernard Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (University Press of Kansas, 1976).

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, *Peacetime Influence through Forward Naval Presence* (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993).

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

U. Candan, L.S. Dewald, and L.R. Speight, *Present NATO Practice in Land Wargaming* (The Hague: SHAPE Technical Center, 1987), Professional Paper STC-PP-252.

Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (Free Press, 1989).

Eliot A. Cohen, *et al.*, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, 5 vols. plus Summary Report (Government Printing Office, 1993).

Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers* (Cornell University Press, 1985).

Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (Free Press, 2002).

Eliot Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," *International Security* 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988).

Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (Free Press, 1991).

Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Harvard University Press, 1985).

Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power* (Greenwood Press, 1982).

Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War* (Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Lt. Col. Paul T. DeVries, "Maneuver and the Operational Level of War," *Military Review*, Vol. LXIII, No 2 (February 1983), pp. 13-34.

J.A. Dewar, J.J. Gillogly, and M.L. Juncosa, "Non-Monotonicity, Chaos and Combat Models," *Military Operations Research* 2, no. 2 (1996).

Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton University Press, 1941) (the predecessor of Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* [Princeton University Press, 1986]).

L.F. Ellis, *Victory in the West*, Vol. I: *The Battle of Normandy* (London: HMSO, 1962).

William R. Emerson, "Operation Point-Blank: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters," in Harry R. Borowski, *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987* (Office of Air Force History, 1988), pp. 441-72.

John A. English, *A Perspective on Infantry* (Praeger, 1981).

John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice* (Praeger, 1996).

Joshua M. Epstein, *The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis Without Lanchester Theory* (Brookings Institution, 1985).

Carlo d'Este, *Decision in Normandy* (London: Collins, 1983).

Noble Frankland, *The Bombing Offensive Against Germany* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965).

Paul Fussell, *Wartime* (Oxford University Press, 1989) (anyone who has never taken pacifism seriously should read this).

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Praeger, 1964).

Rex Goad, "The Modeling of Movement in Tactical Games" in Reiner K. Huber, ed., *Operational Research Games for Defense* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1979), pp. 190-214.

Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

Paddy Griffith, *Forward into Battle* (London: Anthony Bird, 1981).

Mary Habeck, *Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union* (Cornell University Press, 2003).

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, Third Edition (London: Cass, 2001) (comparison and exegesis of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, Machiavelli, and Mao Zedong).

Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won* (University of Illinois Press, 1991), Appendix A, "An Introduction to the Study of Military Operations" and Appendix B, "Mobilization and Combat Effectiveness."

Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, et al., *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Harvard University Press, 1960).

Lt. Col. L.D. Holder, "A New Day for Operational Art," *Army*, March 1985, pp. 22-32.

Dan Horowitz, "Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy," *Policy Sciences* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1970).

Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford University Press, 1974).

Reiner K. Huber, et al., eds., *Military Strategy and Tactics: Computer Modeling of Land War Problems* (Plenum Press, 1975).

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Optional Available Films

Most war movies are superficial action fantasies, wartime propaganda, or pacifist tracts, and they reflect typical Hollywood vices of melodrama, sensationalism, jingoism, romanticization of combat, and either antiseptic unrealism about carnage or grotesque surrealism. In short, there are few war movies that qualify as artistic or instructive masterpieces. Among those with typical Hollywood limitations, however, are many that effectively illustrate important aspects of military sociology, moral dilemmas encountered in combat or preparing for combat, leadership, tactics, and other subjects.

Experience has indicated that many people born since 1970 are resistant to older movies, especially ones filmed in black and white, or treatments that reflect mid-20th century sensibilities, or ones made before the era of lavish special effects and astronomical budgets for filmmaking. Those who can get over the generational difference and the Hollywood limitations are encouraged to see and think about some of the older films.

The list below is in rough chronological order of the wars or events that are the subjects of the films. Asterisked items are significantly better (or at least more historically notable for sociological reasons) than the norm. This inventory is not necessarily a selection of the best of all films on war.

Breaker Morant. 1979. Directed by Bruce Beresford. Adapted from the play by Kenneth G. Ross. 1 hour, 47 minutes. An Australian atrocity and prosecution in the Boer War. Is murder in a combat environment murder? Is military justice justice?

* ***All Quiet on the Western Front***. 1930. Directed by Lewis Milestone. Adapted by Maxwell Anderson, screenplay by George Abbott, from the novel by Erich Maria Remarque. *The* classic anti-war novel and film of the interwar period.

* ***Grand Illusion***. 1938. Directed by Jean Renoir. 1 hour, 15 minutes. Caste, class, identity, loyalty, and mass society -- the confrontation of nationalism and total war with transnational aristocratic sensibilities in a World War I prison camp. (Pay attention to the scene where Pierre Fresnay asks Erich von Stroheim, "How did we get to this?" and von Stroheim intones, "*C'est la révolution française.*")

* ***Paths of Glory*** 1959. Directed by Stanley Kubrick,. Screenplay by Stanley Kubrick, Calder Willingham, and Jim Thompson, from the novel by Humphrey Cobb. 1 hour, 27 minutes. The vast distance between high command and battlefield, and the contrasts between collective and individual interests, and mission and justice.

Tora! Tora! Tora! 1970. Directed by Richard Fleischer. Screenplays by Larry Forrester (American sequence) and Hideo Oguni and Ryuzo Kikushima (Japanese sequence). 2 hours, 25 minutes. Docu-drama of planning and execution of the Pearl Harbor attack, and the failure of U.S. intelligence to detect and warn in time.

They Were Expendable. 1945. Directed by John Ford. Screenplay by Frank Wead, based on the book by William L. White (which was the true story of the experiences portrayed). 2 hours, 15 minutes. The story of the PT boats sacrificed in the doomed defense of the Philippines in 1941-42.

Destination Tokyo. 1944. Directed by Delmer Daves. Screenplay by Delmer Daves and Albert Maltz, from a story by Steve Fisher. 2 hours, 16 minutes. A U.S. submarine on a secret mission to the Japanese coast. (Incorporates a true story about an emergency appendectomy performed deep underwater by a pharmacist's mate.)

Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo. 1944. Directed by Mervyn LeRoy. Screenplay by Dalton Trumbo, from the memoir by Captain Ted Lawson. 2 hours, 19 minutes. True story of the 1942 Doolittle Raid, and one crew's escape through China.

Wing and a Prayer. 1944. Directed by Henry Hathaway. Screenplay by Jerome Cady. 1 hour, 38 minutes. An American aircraft carrier up to and during the Battle of Midway. Substantial actual combat footage included.

Guadalcanal Diary. 1943. Directed by Lewis Seiler. Screenplay by Lamar Trotti, adaptation by Jerry Cady, from the book by Richard Tregaskis. 1 hour, 33 minutes. Journalist's account of the U.S. Marines in the first battle of the island hopping campaign.

***Das Boot* [*The Boat*]**. 1982. Written and directed by Wolfgang Petersen, from the novel by Lothar-Gunther Buchheim. 3 hours, 29 minutes ("the director's cut," with restored footage). Life and death on a German submarine in World War II.

Objective Burma. 1945. Directed by Raoul Walsh. Screenplay by Ranald MacDougall and Lester Cole, from a story by Alvah Bessie. 2 hours, 22 minutes. A grim modern version of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, with a U.S. airborne special operation unit stranded behind Japanese lines.

A Walk in the Sun. 1946. Directed by Lewis Milestone. Screenplay by Robert Rossen, based on the novel by Harry Brown. 1 hour, 52 minutes. Infantrymen of a platoon cut off from the rest of their company, their officer and senior NCO killed in the Salerno landing, adapt to friction and figure out how to execute their assigned mission under pressure of combat.

13 Rue Madeleine. 1947. Directed by Henry Hathaway. Screenplay by John Monks, Jr. and Sy Bartlett. 1 hour, 35 minutes. An OSS mission into occupied France.

* **The Longest Day.** 1964. Directed by Ken Annakin, Andrew Marton, and Bernhard Wicki (for British, American, and German scenes respectively). Screenplay by Cornelius Ryan, based on his book. 3 hours. The story of D-Day, from several perspectives.

* **Saving Private Ryan.** 1998. Directed by Stephen Spielberg. Screenplay by Robert Rodat. 2 hours, 49 minutes. Paul Fussell of all people heartily approved of the first 25 minutes (the assault on Omaha Beach) as one of the least unrealistic portrayals of combat. Look at the rest of the film as an evocation of dilemmas about risking, deliberately spending, or wrongfully taking lives in wartime.

Battleground. 1949. Directed by William Wellman. Screenplay by Robert Pirosh. 1 hour, 58 minutes. The 101st Airborne in the Battle of Bastogne.

* **A Bridge Too Far.** 1977. Directed by Richard Attenborough. Screenplay by William Goldman, from the book by Cornelius Ryan. 2 hours, 58 minutes. Operation MARKET GARDEN, the airborne assault on Arnhem designed to end the war in Europe by the end of 1944.

Attack. 1956. Directed by Robert Aldrich. Screenplay by James Poe from play by Norman Brooks. 1 hour, 47 minutes. National Guard politics, cowardice, and indecision get men killed in the crossing of the Siegfried Line.

* **Open City.** 1945. Directed by Roberto Rossellini. Screenplay by Sergio Amidei, Federico Fellini, and Rossellini. Vignettes of the end of the war in Italy, focusing on trials of the civilian population. Filmed in Rome just after liberation, winner of the best picture award at Cannes in 1946.

Die Brücke [The Bridge]. 1954. Directed by Bernhard Wicki. Schoolboys conscripted into the *Volksturm* to defend a bridge in the last hours of the war in Europe.

* **The Best Years of Our Lives.** 1946. Directed by William Wyler. Screenplay by Robert E. Sherwood. 2 hours, 50 minutes. Academy Award winner, best picture, about trials of returning veterans.

The Bridges at Toko-Ri. 1954. Directed by Mark Robson. Screenplay by Valentine Davies, from the novel by James A. Michener. How the burdens of war (the air war in Korea) are not fairly distributed

among the population. Michener produced the novel after his non-fiction *Saturday Evening Post* story of his experience aboard a carrier, which was also turned into a true-story movie, *Men of the Fighting Lady*, around the same time as the fictionalized *Bridges at Toko-Ri*.

Pork Chop Hill. 1959. Directed by Lewis Milestone. Screenplay by James R. Webb, from the book by S.L.A. Marshall. True story of near-hopeless U.S. infantry attack on a Chinese position, mandated by negotiating strategy at Panmunjon at the tail-end of the Korean War. The vast distance between strategy and tactics.

A Gathering of Eagles 1963. Directed by Delbert Mann. Screenplay by Robert Pirosh. 1 hour, 56 minutes. Before watching, get over the fact that this has more standard Hollywood saccharine aspects than the other films mentioned here. In its glitzy way it presents social and organizational issues in elite unit command, personnel management, and operational combat readiness, and provides insight into the most important U.S. military organization of the Cold War era: SAC. The film is a nuclear-age echo of *Twelve O'Clock High*.

Thirteen Days. 2000. Directed by Roger Donaldson. Screenplay by David Self. 2 hours, 27 minutes. Highly fictionalized version of decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis. The title is from Robert Kennedy's memoir, but the film portrays several dramatic events that never occurred, and makes someone who was barely involved (Kenneth O'Donnell) a central character. Nevertheless, it conveys reasonably the flavor of policymakers' concerns and civil-military tension during the crisis.

Platoon. 1986. Written and directed by Oliver Stone. 1 hour, 59 minutes. Cinematic *Bildungsroman* of Vietnam combat, made before Stone went over the edge with his nutty *JFK*. The best line is the first-person narrator's voice-over at the beginning of the film: "I think I made a big mistake in coming here."

* ***Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb***. 1963. Directed by Stanley Kubrick. Screenplay by Stanley Kubrick, Peter George, and Terry Southern, based on the novel *Red Alert* by Peter George. 1 hour, 31 minutes. Black comedy of accidental apocalypse. Is Peter Sellers' Strangelove Kissinger or Kahn?

* ***Fail Safe***. 1964. Directed by Sidney Lumet. Screenplay by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler. The non-comedy counterpart to *Dr. Strangelove*. Is the President's decision at the end plausible? If not, what should he have done? Is the Walter Matthau character Kissinger, Kahn, Wohlstetter, or Schelling? Does the scenario seem implausible after the Cold War? If so, see *Crimson Tide*.

* ***Crimson Tide***. 1995. Directed by Tony Scott. Screenplay by Michael Schiffer. 1 hour, 56 minutes. Fictional presentation of dilemmas in nuclear strategy. Should a U.S. submarine commander follow orders to launch a nuclear attack on Russian missile silos when communications break down and it is impossible to know whether the order might have been revoked, but when failure to fire might allow the Russian missiles to be launched against the USA? Should the commander's subordinates mutiny if they believe he is about to start an avoidable nuclear war? (Watch for the scene early in the film when Denzel Washington paraphrases Clausewitz to cigar-chomping Gene Hackman: "The purpose of war is to serve policy, but the nature of war is to serve itself.")

* **No Man's Land**. 2002. Written and directed by Danis Tanovic. 1 hour, 37 minutes. Personal confrontation between Bosniac and Serb in a pocket of the battlefield; allegory for Bosnia War -- and UN peacekeeping -- writ large.

Canceled seminars:

Posen:

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Read: William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, Jim Walsh, "How to Deal with Iran," *New York Review of Books* 56, no. 2 (February 12, 2009); Whitney Raas and Austin Long, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007); "A Nuclear Armed Iran: A Difficult, But Not Impossible Policy Problem," Century Foundation Press Release (December 13, 2006); Jeffrey Goldberg, "Israel's Fears, Amalek's Arsenal," *New York Times*, May 17, 2009; Richard K. Betts, "The Osirak Fallacy," *The National Interest* no. 83 (Spring 2006).

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Nuclear Strategy: Practice vs. Theory?

Read: Scott D. Sagan, *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security* (Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 11-13, 22-34, 42-54, and skim the rest of chap. 1; Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994).