

---

# Base Motives

## The Political Economy of Okinawa's Antimilitarism

Alexander Cooley

Kimberly Marten

*Barnard College, Columbia University*

The Japanese prefecture of Okinawa has witnessed a great deal of protest activity against the U.S. military bases on the island. Antibase sentiment is regularly expressed by the local press and the local cultural and educational institutions. A brutal 1995 crime committed by U.S. military personnel on the island inflamed public opinion against the bases. Yet the U.S. base presence endures, and the antibase activity of the late 1990s was defused rather quickly into tacit continuing acceptance by Okinawans of the base presence, even as U.S. bases elsewhere in the world closed in response to protest activity. What explains this puzzle? The authors argue that the Japanese government's unique system of "burden payments" provides incentives to Okinawans both to highlight the negative effects of the U.S. presence and to support the continuation of the bases for economic reasons. The trilateral base-bargaining relationship serves the interests of Washington, Tokyo, and a politically critical majority of Okinawans themselves.

**Keywords:** *Okinawa; military bases; United States; Japan; protest activity*

In September 1995, three American servicemen stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa abducted a twelve-year-old schoolgirl in the local town of Kin. They pulled her into their rental car, beat her, bound her with duct tape, and gang-raped her. U.S. military authorities apprehended them shortly afterward.<sup>1</sup> The incident immediately propelled the U.S. military presence on the island into the national and international spotlight. Okinawans were shocked at the incident's brutality and further incensed that U.S. officials refused to turn over the perpetrators to Japanese authorities for more than three weeks afterward. Outraged community activists and Okinawan

---

**Authors' Note:** An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia, PA, 2003. The authors are grateful to Deborah Avant, Thomas U. Berger, Daniel Deudney, David Lake, Paul Midford, Andrew Oros, and Jack Snyder for their comments on earlier drafts. The authors acknowledge the generous financial support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York through a grant to the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. We thank Takako Hikutani, for her invaluable assistance on our research trip to Okinawa and Tokyo, and Lyudmila Gorokhovich, for her research assistance.

politicians reacted by challenging the legal foundation of the American military presence, outlined in the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Washington and Tokyo created the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in response, to develop plans for downsizing the U.S. base presence and for moving existing bases to less heavily populated areas.<sup>2</sup> Street protests nevertheless became frequent and increasingly large; in October, 85,000 demonstrators participated in the largest protest action in the island's history.<sup>3</sup> Peace activists from nongovernmental organizations based on the island presented their grievances at international venues ranging from UN conferences to U.S. congressional hearings and networked with advocacy groups from a variety of other countries that hosted U.S. facilities.<sup>4</sup> The international media picked up the story and followed its aftermath.

Emboldened by this groundswell of support, the governor of Okinawa prefecture, Masahide Ota, launched an all-out political campaign against the U.S. base presence, arguing that the United States should leave Okinawa by 2015. He organized Japan's first ever prefecture-wide popular referendum, asking whether the U.S. military presence on the island should be reduced. He also announced his refusal to sign the spring 1996 official lease renewals for the landholders in Okinawa whose property was occupied by U.S. military facilities, an annual ritual that kept the American base presence legal.<sup>5</sup> His refusal to sign the renewals plunged Tokyo's relations with the prefecture into crisis, leading to an unprecedented supreme court hearing on the matter and forcing the government of Japan to exercise the Law for Compulsory Use and sign in place of Ota.

These pressures cast serious doubt on the future of American bases in Okinawa. After all, with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet threat, one of the main strategic rationales for maintaining the U.S. military presence on the Pacific island had been removed. Base closures elsewhere in the world had become regular events as the United States reduced its armed forces and cut military expenditures. Even installations that were previously thought to be indispensable to U.S. security interests, such as those in the Philippines and Panama, closed in response to antibase political opposition.

Yet the U.S. military presence on the island endured, and subsequent political developments demonstrated that the Okinawan public was not nearly as opposed to the U.S. basing presence as Governor Ota and the antibase movement had hoped. The much-anticipated public referendum took place in September 1996. While 89 percent of those voting did agree with the vaguely phrased proposition that the presence of American bases in the prefecture should be reduced, voter absenteeism was an unexpectedly high 40 percent, despite an all-out media blitz by the prefecture government to ensure a big turnout. This meant only 53 percent of eligible voters agreed with the ballot proposition. Robert Eldridge, who specializes in Okinawan politics, finds this result remarkable and argues that rather than vote "no" on the proposition, many probase factions refused to vote.<sup>6</sup>

Even more remarkable, two-term Governor Ota was narrowly defeated in his 1998 reelection campaign by Keiichi Inamine, a candidate supported by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—a party committed to preserving the U.S.-Japanese security alli-

ance. While Inamine, like Ota, portrayed himself as antibase, his campaign criticized Ota's zealotry on the base issue. Inamine promised to look after Okinawa's economic interests and to usher in a more constructive dialogue between Okinawa and Tokyo.<sup>7</sup> In November 2002, Inamine was overwhelmingly reelected and antibase populism subsided. In October 2005, after years of consultations, Tokyo and Washington finally agreed to reduce the number of Marines on Okinawa by 40% over a six-year period, but even when this is completed in 2011, 11,000 combat Marines and thousands of other U.S. service personnel will remain on the island.

The defeat of Governor Ota, the weakening of mass protest movements against the bases, and the persistence of the U.S. basing presence throughout a period of political and social turmoil during the mid-1990s present a puzzle. The prevailing analysis of Okinawan culture and politics argues that strong norms of antimilitarism and pacifism, institutionalized by Okinawa's unique historical experiences, lead Okinawans to resent and actively oppose the presence of the U.S. bases.<sup>8</sup> Such beliefs are reinforced by the prevailing antimilitarist norms and political culture of Japanese society more generally—a topic that has been more widely studied by international relations theorists.<sup>9</sup> Yet just three years after a horrific incident that symbolized the most negative aspects of the U.S. military presence, Okinawa's culture of antimilitarism was insufficient to sustain a popular campaign against the U.S. presence or even to reelect a once-popular governor running on an antimilitarist normative platform.

What explains this puzzle? We argue that the economic payoffs and incentive structures that characterize relations among Tokyo, Okinawa, and Washington help sustain the U.S. presence in a relatively stable political equilibrium. Material incentives, properly targeted at the micro level, have overcome the prevailing antimilitarist norms and become the primary source of political interests in the base discussions. Using an elaborate set of both public goods and selective incentives, the Japanese mainland government has secured Okinawa's majority acquiescence to the continuing U.S. presence.<sup>10</sup> This explanation of Okinawa's "base motives" is consistent with the patterns of institutionalized bargaining and rational action observable in other cases where the United States provided compensation packages to host countries in exchange for basing rights.<sup>11</sup> But it also suggests that studies of basing politics, rather than exclusively focusing on the bilateral relations between the United States and a host country, should analyze in greater depth the incentive structures and interactions that characterize center-periphery relations within the host country. This may be especially important as the United States extends its global basing network into new countries in Central Asia and elsewhere in the arc of instability.

## Background on Okinawa

Analysts of Okinawa emphasize that the island's distinct collective memory of conflict and occupation infuse its identity with a set of antimilitarist narratives and broadly held antibase attitudes.<sup>12</sup> Specifically, three distinct historical episodes—Okinawa's forced annexation by imperial Japan, its bloody experience during World War II, and

its occupation by the U.S. military until 1972—inform contemporary Okinawan identity and norms, infusing its antimilitarist culture with a sense of betrayal by mainland Japan, as well as resentment toward the contemporary U.S. military presence.

Okinawa's culture of antimilitarism and its strained relationship with the mainland can be traced back to the time when it was an independent island-chain kingdom known as the Ryukyus. The kingdom's economy was based on international trade, and the inhabitants had a reputation for welcoming foreigners with gentle hospitality.<sup>13</sup> The Ryukyus had significant commercial relationships with both China and the regional Satsuma Domain in Japan but lacked a large military force. In 1609, Satsuma invaded the Ryukyus and easily overwhelmed it. After this, the Ryukyus retained titular independence but were forced to pay tribute in rice to the Satsuma regime and to gain prior approval from Satsuma for all new trading arrangements made with China. Then, in 1879, during the Meiji restoration, the islands were forcibly annexed by Tokyo under the presence of a police force from the Japanese mainland.<sup>14</sup> Although the Ryukyus tried to negotiate to remain an independent, tribute-paying state, the kingdom was coerced into becoming the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa.<sup>15</sup> Hence, the society had long-standing historical reasons to suspect the intentions of large foreign military forces.

Perhaps the most significant source of Okinawa's modern antimilitarism stems from islanders' memories and oral accounts of the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. The battle—the most costly of the U.S. Pacific campaign in terms of American deaths—levelled the island and killed somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000 Okinawans, approximately one-third of the population. To this day, Okinawans accuse the Japanese military of sacrificing their island in a bid to stall the American advance, without offering any additional reinforcements for its defense. The Imperial Japanese army is also accused of committing horrible atrocities against the Okinawan population.<sup>16</sup> For example, Japanese officers instructed the Okinawans to commit suicide rather than allow the Americans to capture them as prisoners of war. A memorial stands to this day to recognize 210 schoolgirls and their teachers who blew themselves up with grenades given to them by the Japanese forces, when they found themselves surrounded by American troops.<sup>17</sup> As Japanese troops withdrew, they reportedly shot thousands of Okinawans without trial, under the accusation that they had spied for the Americans. Several legal battles have been waged against the Japanese Ministry of Education in a bid to change history books to officially acknowledge this.<sup>18</sup> In June 1995, the prefecture commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the battle by unveiling the Cornerstone to Peace Monument, a memorial that has the names of the battle's over 240,000 victims engraved on its marble walls.

A third source of Okinawa's antimilitarism can be traced to the U.S. military's occupation of the island from 1945 to 1972.<sup>19</sup> Immediately after the Battle of Okinawa, while the war still waged between Washington and Tokyo, American forces herded Okinawans into overcrowded detention camps to prevent them from aiding the Japanese.<sup>20</sup> After the war, first fearing a Japanese military resurgence and then in response to the perceived external communist threat, U.S. military authorities expropriated 85 percent of Okinawan lands for the construction of military base facilities,

with scant regard for the needs of local inhabitants.<sup>21</sup> Much of this land was gradually returned, and today, U.S. bases take up about a fifth of Okinawan territory.<sup>22</sup>

The U.S. military occupation of the island continued for twenty-one years after mainland Japan achieved sovereignty under the peace treaty. As with the Battle of Okinawa, Okinawans perceive that Tokyo exploited and betrayed the island, this time as a bargaining chip to secure Tokyo's independence from U.S. occupation. Even after the island reverted to being a Japanese prefecture in 1972, the U.S. military presence—with its rowdy soldiers, military exercises and training accidents, and environmental and noise pollution—contributed to the radicalization of many of the island's social institutions.

Taken together, these three historical legacies endow Okinawa's identity with a broadly held collective norm against militarism and the current American military presence. Several social and political actors invoke these antimilitarist norms in their efforts to undermine support for the U.S. bases.

First, social actors, most notably, the media and the education sector, actively link the imagery and experience of Okinawa's past militarist "burdens" with the continued U.S. military presence. The island's two major local newspapers—*Ryuku Shimpo* and the *Okinawa Times*—are strongly antibase in their editorial stances and coverage of U.S.-Okinawan community relations;<sup>23</sup> each commands 200,000 readers, out of a total circulation of 460,000 subscribers on the island, giving the antibase view great prominence.<sup>24</sup> Okinawa's educators are also prominently involved in antibase movements and protests. The Okinawa High School Teacher's Union organized an effort in the 1980s to compile data and local oral histories to challenge prevailing mainland accounts of the World War II battle, while the union also has an established tradition of developing peace education and curricular materials.<sup>25</sup> Okinawan educators also developed the now-popular "peace guide tours," school study trips for mainland children designed to promote awareness of the Okinawan viewpoint on World War II and the basing situation.<sup>26</sup>

Second, the link between Okinawa's antimilitarism and the U.S. base presence is reinforced by a number of activist organizations that protest against mainland government policies and the U.S. military presence. The most prominent of these is the Okinawa Peace Network, which promotes antibase awareness and periodically organizes antibase rallies and demonstrations. At the July 2000 G8 summit, 27,000 protestors linked arms and surrounded the Kadena Air Force Base. Women's groups such as Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, mobilized after the 1995 rape incident, have taken their antibase message to the United Nations and networked with similar organizations in other base-hosting locals such as South Korea, Puerto Rico, and even certain military districts in the United States.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the antibase "one-tsubo landowner" movement also frames its antibase activities in terms of Okinawan identity and norms. The movement seeks to expand the number of Okinawan landowners with claims on base territory by acquiring tiny plots of land (3.3 square meters) just big enough for a single person to occupy, yet sufficient to symbolically connect each protestor with the land and the pacific values held by the Okinawan social movement.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, members of the island's major political institutions such as the prefectural assembly and governor's office publicly advocate these antimilitarist and antibase norms in both their political campaigns and their high-level meetings with national and foreign dignitaries. The Okinawan assembly on January 19, 2001, unanimously passed a resolution calling for a reduction in the U.S. basing presence, critically singling out the U.S. Marine Corps, at a time when the prodefense LDP held a majority of seats.<sup>29</sup> The LDP governor Inamine, in the course of a tense meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on November 19, 2003, handed the secretary a seven-point petition of grievances against the U.S. bases.<sup>30</sup>

Yet despite the prominence of the antimilitarism and antibase norm in Okinawan identity and society, the overall policy preference of Okinawan society remains supportive of the bases. This is primarily due to Tokyo's use of selective economic incentives to secure political support for the bases, a policy that has ensured that a critical mass of Okinawan actors acquiesce to and support, albeit tacitly, the U.S. basing presence. Indeed, the appeal by local political actors to Okinawa's norm of antimilitarism has become an effective instrumental strategy to use in pursuit of material interests. Local actors have incentives to highlight and exaggerate incidents meant to portray the U.S. presence in its most negative light. In fact, many of the protests against allegedly bad conduct by U.S. forces are scripted in a predictable manner. For example, one U.S. commander maintains informal contacts with two of the three mayors whose townships include his base's land and says that these mayors usually apologetically inform him prior to any political protests against the base.<sup>31</sup>

This is not to imply that antibase sentiment and the resulting protests are all fabricated; some crimes committed on Okinawa by U.S. personnel have been egregious, and serious military accidents do happen. However, the incentive structure is such that even a minor negative social incident or accident involving the U.S. military can be blown out of proportion or made to follow a particular script for the sake of reward. As a result, individual "norm entrepreneurs" actively link these new "incidents" with long-standing negative symbols, powerful historical narratives, and images associated with the U.S. military presence to extract material benefits from the Japanese central government.

## **The Incentive Structure of Okinawa's Bargains**

The political economy of Okinawa's base bargains is an intriguing variation on the general pattern of cold war bargains that the United States made with overseas hosts. In many cases, the United States had to provide substantial compensation packages—even to NATO members such as Turkey, Greece, and Portugal—in exchange for securing basing rights.<sup>32</sup> What sets Okinawa apart from this pattern are the nature of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty and the trilateral nature of the Tokyo-Okinawa-U.S. political dynamic.

The overall U.S.-Japan security relationship requires a U.S. basing presence.<sup>33</sup> U.S.-Japanese defense relations are governed by a uniquely one-sided security treaty

and also by Japan's postwar constitution (put into place under heavy U.S. pressure and guidance) that prohibits Japan from creating a military organization with offensive capabilities.<sup>34</sup> While provisions of the pacifist Article 9 of the Japanese constitution have been reinterpreted over time to allow Japan to create well-armed self-defense forces, Japan still relies on the United States to come to its defense, while maintaining that it is constitutionally prohibited from returning this favor for the United States or for American allies like South Korea. Consequently, the United States provides Japan with a security guarantee, and in return, the Japanese state contributes over 57 percent of the annual direct stationing costs of the United States Forces Japan (USFJ).<sup>35</sup> This means that Japan is an inexpensive place for U.S. bases to be located.

Second, the nature of the political relationship that governs the U.S. bases in Okinawa is trilateral, as opposed to bilateral.<sup>36</sup> The United States, the Japanese mainland government, and the Okinawa prefectural government constitute three distinct actors, each with separate identifiable interests. The *quid pro quo* arrangements in other U.S. basing cases are usually bilateral, between Washington and the host government. Here, in contrast, the key compensatory relationship is not between Washington and Okinawa but between Tokyo and Okinawa. The Japanese government effectively externalizes the permanent U.S. military presence on its territory by foisting it onto Okinawa, which provides 75 percent of the territory for USFJ installations despite being only one of forty-seven Japanese prefectures (and despite having an overall land mass only about the size of metropolitan Tokyo). The main Okinawan island hosts thirty-eight major installations covering 23,500 hectares, or about 18 percent of Okinawa's land mass.<sup>37</sup> All four U.S. military services—including the huge facilities of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force and the Kadena Air Force Base<sup>38</sup>—are represented on the island. The number of U.S. military personnel on the island at any one time is about 25,000 (around a quarter of the entire U.S. presence in Asia), and the combination of their dependents and U.S. civilian contractors brings the total American defense-related presence up to 50,000. Compounding this sense of bearing an unfair basing burden, Okinawa remains relatively underdeveloped compared with mainland Japan. Its per capita income is about 75 percent of the Japanese average, making it the least wealthy Japanese prefecture.

In exchange for asking Okinawa to bear this "special" or "unequal" burden, the Japanese central government offers public works projects and budget subsidies to Okinawa's prefectural and municipal governments and selective incentives to certain of Okinawa's economic sectors. Taken together, these economic payoffs are sufficient to sustain Okinawan acquiescence for the U.S. military presence.

A key component of Okinawa's political economy is the carrot-and-stick policy periodically wielded by Tokyo over the prefecture in annual budget appropriations, especially the awarding of massive public works projects that mushroom across the island. Fiscal transfers from the center have steadily increased since Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japanese sovereignty and, by the late 1990s, totaled 900 billion yen, more than the combined annual value of Okinawa's other three big income sources—tourism, agriculture, and direct base revenues.<sup>39</sup> Between 1972 and 1999, developmental subsidies from Tokyo totaled in excess of 5 trillion yen.<sup>40</sup>

Providing these fiscal transfers is always a better strategy for Tokyo than renegotiating the SOFA or the actual terms of the U.S.-Japanese security agreement, options that antibase activists would prefer. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular perceives that too many SOFA demands could cause the United States to leave.<sup>41</sup> If the United States were to pull out completely, then Japan would have to create a national military organization that could truly defend Japanese security interests from potential threats—including those coming from North Korea or from instability in the China-Taiwan relationship. This would require a difficult and drawn-out constitutional revision battle in Japan to deal with the thorny Article 9, not to mention a major shift in state budget priorities.

Consequently, Tokyo regularly offers large-scale economic inducements to Okinawa to acquiesce to the evolving U.S.-Japan basing agenda. For example, funding of the Western Okinawa Developmental Project, an ambitious plan by the Japanese government to landscape and develop a large strip of the island's largely underutilized western coast, is tacitly contingent on the successful implementation of one piece of the SACO plan, namely, the relocation of the Naha military port away from the overburdened capital facilities area to the nearby Urasoe city piers.<sup>42</sup> Some commentators also allege that Tokyo linked its surprising decision to make Nago (a relatively small and isolated Okinawan town) the host of the 2000 G8 Summit to both the town's and the prefecture's commitment to support the SACO-mandated relocation there of the Futenma Air Base (a charge officially denied by Tokyo).<sup>43</sup> Even antibase Governor Ota, prior to his electoral defeat, succumbed to Tokyo's economic pressures. In exchange for Ota's dropping his opposition to renewing the base leases in 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto agreed to an economic package for the prefecture that included 5 billion yen (\$45.7 million) in developmental aid.<sup>44</sup>

Beyond Tokyo's broad economic assistance to the prefecture government, the U.S. basing presence also provides additional income and selective incentives to politically important groups within Okinawan society. Perhaps the biggest material beneficiaries from the U.S. basing presence are the private owners of the land where USFJ facilities are located. Unlike the mainland, where the percentage of private base-related land-ownership is just 9 percent, in Okinawa, 67 percent of the land used for military facilities is privately owned.<sup>45</sup> Landowners receive direct rental payments from the government of Japan for the use of their property, and in return, Tokyo provides it free of charge to USFJ. Most of this land belongs to owners who have become dependent upon these leases as a primary source of income.

In 2001, 31,704 landowners in Okinawa received base-related rental payments totaling 85.43 billion yen.<sup>46</sup> Of these, 16,590 (52.3 percent) received annual payments of less than 1 million yen (around \$8,000), 12,195 (38.5 percent) received between 1 and 5 million yen, and 2,919 (9.2 percent) received more than 5 million yen.<sup>47</sup> The rent coming from Tokyo is generally agreed to exceed fair-market value. According to one informed Okinawan observer, both local governments and Tokyo have an incentive to hike the rental payments frequently: local governments get more tax revenue if the property value appears higher, while Tokyo can appease both the local population and the U.S. government by demonstrating that its contribution to U.S. basing costs has

increased.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, in many cases, landowners are permitted to work portions of their land or to sublet it to others (the so-called tacit farmers) to do so, thereby earning additional income from the property. On several Okinawan bases, U.S. military officials allow local farmers to use the ring of land immediately within the outer perimeter fences to grow sugarcane, sweet potatoes, soybeans, and other crops.

Politically, landowners are organized into associations based on locality. The vast majority of these associations are represented by the Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes, which negotiates and lobbies the prefecture and central government on rent-related issues. The federation was strongly opposed to the 1996 base-reduction referendum, and in areas with the highest proportion of private landowners, voter turnout was lowest.<sup>49</sup> Plans for the reduction or closure of U.S. facilities usually precipitate a drop in the value of the related land prices.<sup>50</sup> It is understandable why landowners, then, want to see the bases remain open.

Another category of targeted recipients of base-related funds is the communities adjacent to U.S. bases, whose citizens can claim that their well-being has been disturbed by the U.S. presence. The Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) provides “burden-easing” funds to municipalities as a function of the number of U.S. servicemen they have on their territory. These funds go to build such things as city halls, public libraries, and swimming pools, which are often spectacularly luxurious in relatively small and economically disadvantaged towns.<sup>51</sup> The DFAA also makes compensation payments to individuals for noise pollution, environmental countermeasures, and violations of fishing rights in traditional waters. Individual citizens and local townships can petition the DFAA if they have a verifiable grievance that is shown to be a direct consequence of the U.S. basing presence.

A related group directly benefiting from USFJ presence in Okinawa is local construction companies, who build the agreed-upon public works and developmental projects. DFAA officials have no formal quotas for awarding projects to local companies, but they face political pressure to choose Okinawan companies when possible. Construction is the leading industry in Okinawa, and these companies are a key constituency in the island’s probase business lobby. In 2001, out of the 204 base-related contracts granted to Okinawa Prefecture, 176 (86 percent)—valued at 14.6 billion yen—were granted to contractors based in Okinawa.<sup>52</sup> This percentage and total value would be even higher if they were not constrained by the Japanese state’s strict contracting procedures. According to the laws governing the tender process, any contract worth over 240 million yen must be awarded to a “category A” firm, where category status is based upon the number of employees and the structure of the corporate hierarchy. No Okinawan construction company yet fits this profile.<sup>53</sup> Hence, the largest of these projects are undertaken, by default, by mainland companies that in turn, may subcontract much of this work back to local firms.

Local base workers and small businesses receiving contracts from USFJ also benefit from the base presence. USFJ facilities directly employ about 8,300 Okinawans, making the bases the second largest employer on the island after the prefectural government. In 1998, base-worker salaries, paid by Tokyo, totaled about 535 million yen.<sup>54</sup> In 1999, U.S. forces spent an additional \$489 million in base-related contracts

with Okinawan vendors.<sup>55</sup> Since the prefecture has historically had among the highest unemployment rates in Japan, the question of reducing the base presence has created severe political divisions within organized labor, which, in Japan, has traditionally been linked with the anti-American socialist and communist parties. Prior to the 1996 referendum, approximately 6,300 workers were members of the Okinawa Chapter of the All Garrison Forces Labor Union, a leftist organization that participated in campaigns against the U.S. basing presence.<sup>56</sup> However, this stance so dismayed certain members during the run-up to the 1996 campaign that they formed a breakaway group, the All Okinawa Garrison Forces Union, which proceeded to campaign openly against the referendum and to network with other opposition groups.<sup>57</sup>

Small retail business such as shops and restaurants located near the bases also support the U.S. presence and were among Governor Inamine's most vigorous backers in his successful election campaigns. By one estimate, local consumption by U.S. base personnel and their dependents totals 477 million yen per year, including rental payments for off-base housing in addition to consumer goods and services.<sup>58</sup> In 1999, U.S. service members paid over 13 million yen in local road taxes and locally provided car insurance alone.<sup>59</sup> As a total contribution to economic activity, U.S. bases over the past decade have directly accounted for about 5.5 percent of Okinawa's annual gross prefectural product.<sup>60</sup>

When one considers the sum of the selective material benefits that accrue to Okinawan societal sectors such as landholders, construction companies, base workers, and small businesses, as well as the financial support provided to the prefecture and local governments for bearing this special burden, it is not surprising that Tokyo has co-opted and maintained Okinawan support for the American military presence. Many local economic actors are skeptical of attempts by antibase activists to promote structural change away from the base-dependent economy. For example, an effort in 1997 to create a tax-free economic zone on the island, to encourage new business activity unrelated to the bases, was strongly opposed by local business groups and agricultural associations.<sup>61</sup> By controlling material incentives through the funding and administration of the bases as well as the national annual budget, the Japanese government has successfully ensured that Okinawans' political interests are driven by readily identifiable material interests, and not by their collectively held antimilitarist norms. As one Okinawan taxi driver who supported Inamine's candidacy after twice voting for Ota reasoned, "Ota has been a good governor, but I think Inamine will be able to deal with Tokyo better to get more projects for Okinawa."<sup>62</sup>

## The Game of Compensatory Claims

The process of base-related claims in Okinawa is heavily politicized. Because Okinawa is both geographically far removed and ethnically distinct from the Japanese mainland, the Japanese public does not usually pay a great deal of attention to events on the southern islands, and Okinawa is not normally covered in much depth in the national media. However, when the local Okinawan press can make a base incident

seem alarming, these reports will be picked up by the international wire services. In turn, this will galvanize the national Japanese press to cover the issue. At that point, members of the Diet who do not usually focus on Okinawa, but who may have other related political points to score, can latch onto the reports and call the responsible bureaucratic officials from the DFSA, the Japan Defense Agency, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the prime minister's office in for public questioning.<sup>63</sup> The national authorities in Tokyo have an incentive to preempt this process by paying off complainants before they generate too much negative publicity in the domestic or international media.<sup>64</sup>

In general, Okinawan norm entrepreneurs are more likely to secure compensation payments from Tokyo if they bring complaints about incidents that evoke the most historically disruptive and socially offensive aspects of the American presence. The more a complaint conforms to these negative stereotypes, the more likely it is that Tokyo will provide some economic remedy. The payback pattern means that Okinawans have an incentive to take what the U.S. military considers small issues and to blow them seemingly out of proportion.

For example, a continuing concern of the local population is the danger that military accidents might pose for the civilians living near the facilities. There have been some serious accidents in the past, such as in 1965, when a parachuting exercise conducted at the Yomitan airfield went wrong and a trailer was dropped off course, hitting and killing a young girl in the yard of her home. Now, however, accident reporting is taken to extremes. Across the street from Kadena Air Force Base, a multistory complex is being built that American officials have dubbed "Spy Hill."<sup>65</sup> One of the local mayors whose township overlaps with Kadena property is officially building the site as a tourist facility, so that interested locals can watch the planes take off, but according to American and Japanese officials, it is also used by local newspaper reporters to monitor radio traffic from the base. Reporters pay special attention to what are called "in-flight emergencies communications," transmissions that indicate a potential problem requiring an aborted mission for the sake of safety. Such transmissions are apparently a regular occurring part of normal base activities everywhere in the world, and most turn out to be either false alarms or minor problems that would not have actually caused a crash. However, every one of these transmissions gets counted by the press and used in complaints about the base presence.<sup>66</sup> In turn, antibase activists and compensation claimants can count these events as U.S.-base-related "incidents" as they tally the disruptive activities of the U.S. presence.

### **The Delay of the SACO Process**

The structure of Okinawa's base bargains makes locals reluctant to bid farewell to U.S. installations in which they have strong, entrenched economic interests. The evolution of the SACO proposals provides some of the most compelling evidence of this self-interested reluctance. Formed after the 1995 rape incident as a bilateral Japan-U.S. commission, SACO was charged with reviewing SOFA provisions and basing

rules and with creating a phased plan to return over 12,000 acres of U.S. base land in Okinawa to civilian use. This involves the relocation of some key U.S. military facilities to smaller parcels of land located away from Okinawa's main population centers. Both Japanese and U.S. officials hoped that locals would embrace the SACO relocation process as it would ease concerns about safety and noise pollution, as well as decrease the visible U.S. military presence in populated areas.<sup>67</sup> However, local politics and bargaining over base-related compensation has hamstrung some of the most significant of these relocations. In fact, relocations that should be favored by the Okinawan public for normative reasons are severely delayed precisely because they threaten to alter the prevailing base bargains and entrenched economic interests of certain Okinawan groups.

One example is the scheduled relocation, noted above, of the 835th U.S. Army Transportation Battalion from Naha Port to the neighboring coastal area of Camp Kinser in Urasoe City. This port facility is the major embarkation point for deployments of the U.S. Marines stationed on Okinawa, as well as the movement point for most military cargo on and off the island. Currently, the facility is in a congested commercial area, so it is an inconvenience and potential hazard for the locals. It is also located on a channel whose maximum width is 700 feet; because the configuration of the channel requires that ships turn around before going back out to sea, only ships under 700 feet can use the port. This requirement effectively excludes the biggest (and fastest) U.S. transport ships from using the facility, significantly reducing transportation efficiency for the U.S. forces. By contrast, Urasoe is on open coastline in a much less populated area.<sup>68</sup> Yet the move, endorsed by the SACO process in 1996, has not begun, even though the mayors of both Naha and Urasoe support it.<sup>69</sup> Reportedly, the landowners in Naha are holding up the transfer because they fear their rents on the commercial market will not equal what they currently receive.

The proposed SACO transfer that has gotten the most publicity is one that has taken nine years to put in motion: the movement of the Futenma Marine Air Station heliport to an area off the coast of the northern Okinawan town of Nago. The 1996 proposal was supposed to have been completed in five years, but no ground has yet been broken. The October 2005 accords state that the transfer will now be completed within another six years, a decade later than original envisioned. Once again, at least on the surface, a quicker move would seem to have benefitted both Okinawans and the U.S. military. Futenma is in the heavily populated town of Ginowan, where a helicopter crash could be devastating; the proposed Nago site is off the sparsely populated village of Henoko, a one-time relaxation spot for soldiers that has been in an economic slump since the Vietnam War ended.<sup>70</sup> The fact that the base is on the books as moving imminently also means that capital repairs and long-term maintenance have been put off; hence, the U.S. would prefer the relocation to happen quickly.<sup>71</sup>

Several factors complicated the move. First was the ongoing concern about the environmental impact of the new base. The area off Henoko contains a unique coral reef that is home to the dugong or sea cow, a marine mammal found on southeast Asian

shallow coastlines ranging from Okinawa to Australia. Environmental-protection concerns have been subsequently incorporated into the U.S. base construction plans because the United States is eager to make the move. Second was the question of what the new facility should look like. Three proposals were circulated: that it be a floating base offshore (the original SACO proposal), that it be sunk into steel piers, or that it be built on landfill. According to one cynical Okinawan observer, this is how the politics of the choice broke down: the floating-base proposal would benefit only the shipping companies but was preferred by Governor Ota because the structures would be temporary and easily shut down in the future.<sup>72</sup> Since the maintenance costs to be paid by the Japanese government for the floating base would be huge (reportedly, it would have cost Tokyo 100 times more per year than Futenma), Tokyo did not really support the proposal.<sup>73</sup> The sunk-pier proposal would benefit only the steel companies who would make the posts and would therefore never fly politically. But the landfill proposal would benefit the local Okinawan construction companies because it required relatively simple techniques that they could perform easily. Not surprisingly, the landfill proposal was the ultimate victor, and it is presumably the option that will be implemented.

The third complicating factor has been local electoral politics. Antibase activists submitted a referendum question to Nago voters in December 1997. Despite massive efforts by Tokyo to woo the voters with promises of great resources if the move took place, a slim majority of Nago residents voted against it.<sup>74</sup> The antibase activists rejoiced, even though the referendum had no binding legal impact on SACO or Tokyo. Yet just two months later, the population of Nago repudiated the referendum vote by electing a new probase mayor, Tateo Kishimoto. It appeared that the first vote was an effort to up the ante and get more payback from Tokyo.

Meanwhile, Okinawa Governor Inamine tried to chart a middle course on the Futenma relocation issue, pledging he would ensure that the move is conditional on the United States turning the new Nago heliport into a joint-use facility for civilian planes within fifteen years of its construction. There is general agreement that this statement is both safe and meaningless, however. Landfill sufficient to support the kind of activity planned for the heliport reportedly requires years to settle before surface construction can begin, and construction itself would not be instantaneous. When the timing for the actual move is added, many observers say that the Inamine statement implies joint use in three decades at the earliest—a time when he will be long gone from the political picture and will not have to worry about whether his promise is fulfilled by the U.S. and Japanese governments. When all these complicating factors are sorted out, there still seems to be no clear explanation of why construction on the Nago facility has been off to such a slow start. All of the actors involved seem to be either satisfied with the move or powerless to do anything about it. So what is holding things up? As in the case of Naha, it appears that the Ginowan landlords do not want to give up their rent.<sup>75</sup>

## Conclusion

When the incentives are outlined, the behavior of Okinawan political agents becomes readily explainable. Although antimilitarist and antibase norms may inform the collective identity of a society, they do not necessarily generate actual political interests. Collective identities are important but often remain politically indeterminate when they are overridden by well-targeted material incentives to groups and individuals. Even in a society like Okinawa, where a strong and pervasive norm of antimilitarism dominates local institutions and collective memories, the government of Japan can secure tacit acquiescence to the continued U.S. basing presence through an elaborate set of economic inducements. The triangle of interests held by Washington, Tokyo, and local Okinawans has allowed the American base presence to endure despite decades of protest, while other bases (such as those in the Philippines and Puerto Rico) have been shut down in the face of seemingly similar activism.

These findings matter as the U.S. military grapples with basing decisions now and in the future. As part of its Global Defense Posture Review, the United States is currently establishing an onshore network of bases, albeit individually smaller than the Okinawa facilities, in areas where it traditionally has not maintained a military presence. The United States recently established military bases in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Singapore), and the Middle East (Qatar) and is negotiating for additional bases in Africa and the Black Sea area. In addition, the U.S. military presence may become semipermanent in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries where local politics will play an important role in these countries' overall democratization and political consolidation. The Okinawa case would suggest that if the United States wishes to secure local political support for an ongoing military presence in these areas, it must offer both public goods and targeted economic incentives in addition to security guarantees and/or promises of a democratic future.<sup>76</sup> In addition, U.S. planners should be careful that these base agreements and local inducements do not exacerbate center-periphery tensions within a country to the point where issues of bilateral and international politics become enmeshed in domestic political bargaining.

If a wide variety of local actors benefit from the U.S. basing presence, antibase protestors and populist politicians will have a harder time making a politically persuasive case. Simultaneously, our findings also have something to teach antibase social movements, including the Okinawan activists. If they want to generate enough political momentum to expel the U.S. bases along with their associated social, environmental, and safety problems, then they must find a way to satisfy the economic interests of the locals who benefit from the base presence. Fundamentally, it is the political economy of base bargains that maintains the ongoing U.S. presence in Okinawa.

## Notes

1. Chalmers Johnson, "The 1995 Rape Incident and the Rekindling of Okinawan Protest against the American Bases," in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 116-17.

2. Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

3. Mike Millard, "Okinawa, Then and Now," in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 96-97.

4. Authors' interview with an Okinawan prefecture assembly member who is also a nongovernmental organization activist, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

5. Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions: One Question, Several Answers," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 10 (October 1997): 879-904.

6. Ibid. A 2001 poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office in Tokyo found that 45.7 percent of Okinawans believe that the U.S. bases are "necessary" or "unavoidable" for Japanese security, while 44.4 percent said the bases were either "unnecessary" or "dangerous" for Japanese security. See Kyodo News Service, "Pro-U.S. Bases People in Okinawa Exceed Opponents for 1st Time," *Japan Economic Newswire*, May 19, 2001. The estimate that half the population of Okinawa is probase was repeated in the authors' interviews with the prefecture assembly representative, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

7. Patrick Smith, "Japan: The Enigma of American Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 195-213.

8. For recent examples, see Matthew Allen, *Identity and Resistance in Okinawa* (Oxford, UK: Rowan & Littlefield, 2002); Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power* (Oxford, UK: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003); Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Okinawa: Cold War Island* (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999); and Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Owl Books, 2000), chap. 2.

9. Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 119-50; Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317-56; Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 84-118; Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Aminta Arrington, "Cautious Reconciliation: The Change in Societal-Military Relations in Germany and Japan since the End of the Cold War," *Armed Forces & Society* 28, no. 4 (2002): 531-55.

10. Our findings rely in part on interviews we conducted in May and June 2003 in Okinawa and Tokyo. In Okinawa, we interviewed prefecture and municipal officials, local antibase activists, journalists, and business people, Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) officers based on Okinawa, and representatives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). We also heard in-depth briefings and conducted interviews at five U.S. bases in Okinawa, as well as at the U.S. consulate. In Tokyo, we met with representatives of the Japanese Defense Agency, SDF officers, MOFA officials responsible for basing matters, Japanese Diet (national legislature) members actively involved in basing issues, and members of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA). In Tokyo, we also heard in-depth briefings and conducted interviews at United States Forces Japan (USFJ) headquarters, U.S. Navy bases in Yokota and Yokosuka, and the U.S. embassy.

11. See C. T. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Duncan L. Clarke and Daniel O'Connor, "U.S. Base Rights Payments after the Cold War," *Orbis* 37 (1993): 441-57; and Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 79-92.

12. Johnson, *Okinawa*; Matthew Allen, *Identity and Resistance in Okinawa* (Oxford, UK: Rowan & Littlefield, 2002); Julia Yonetani, "Future 'Assets,' but at What Price? The Okinawa Initiative Debate," in *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power*, ed. Laura Hein and Mark

Selden (Oxford, UK: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003); and Julia Yonetani, "On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over Peace and the Past in Contemporary Okinawa," *East Asian History* 20 (December 2000): 145-69.

13. George Feifer, "The Rape of Okinawa," *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 36.

14. Okinawa Prefectural Government, "Ryukyu Cultural Archives," [http://museum.mm.pref.okinawa.jp/web\\_e/index.html](http://museum.mm.pref.okinawa.jp/web_e/index.html).

15. On the historiography of this period of Japanese expansionism, see Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the 'Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 951-76.

16. Steve Rabson, "Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and 'Reconstruction,'" in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 144.

17. See Okinawa Prefectural Government, "Tourism and Cultures: Travel Information in Okinawa, part 2," available at <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/kanko-2/kanko-2nd.html>.

18. Koji Taira, "The Battle of Okinawa in Japanese History Books," in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 39-49.

19. On the U.S. occupation of the island, see Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000).

20. *Ibid.*, 30

21. *Ibid.*, 31. See also Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 311-12.

22. To this day, if the owners of U.S.-military-occupied land in Okinawa refuse to voluntarily sign the annual rental agreement allowing base operations to continue, the prefectural government of Okinawa is obligated to sign as the proxy.

23. Japanese and U.S. officials both referred to the editorial boards of these newspapers as "antibase," a characterization that was not denied in our interviews with journalists working for these newspapers. However, one journalist also pointed to the generational differences within the media, observing that older reporters and commentators are more explicitly antibase than their younger counterparts.

24. Authors' interview with a high-ranking official from MOFA, May 2003.

25. Gerald Figal, "Waging Peace on Okinawa," in *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power*, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Oxford, UK: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003), 82-83.

26. *Ibid.*, 81-94.

27. See Carolyn Bowen Francis, "Women and Military Violence," in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).

28. Laura Hein and Mark Selden, "Culture, Power, and Identity in Contemporary Okinawa," in *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power*, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Oxford, UK: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003), 6-7, 26-27.

29. *Ryukyu Shimpo*, "OPA Resolution Demands USMC Cuts," January 29, 2001, [http://www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp/english/enews/e000129.html#enews\\_01](http://www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp/english/enews/e000129.html#enews_01).

30. For a full transcript, see <http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=4587&page=1>.

31. Authors' interviews, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

32. Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*; Clarke and O'Connor, "U.S. Base Rights"; and John W. McDonald Jr. and Diane B. Bendahmane, eds., *U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece and the Philippines* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).

33. For recent assessments of the U.S. basing presence in Japan and the evolution of the broader security relationship, see Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*; Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Changes in an Era of Uncertain Power* (London: Macmillan, 2003); and John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *Reinventing the Alliance: US-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change* (London: Macmillan, 2003).

34. For an outstanding discussion of the role of the United States in creating Japan's constitution, see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999).

35. American Consulate General, "Okinawa and the U.S." (Unpublished briefing, Naha, Okinawa, Japan, May 29, 2003).

36. On the dynamics of this trilateralism, see Masaaki Gabe, "Futenma Air Station: The Okinawa Problem in Japan-U.S. Relations," *Japan Echo*, June 2000, 19-24.

37. These figures do not account for the ongoing implementation of the SACO initiatives adopted in 1996. SACO anticipates that eleven facilities and areas will be completely returned or reduced, decreasing the total area occupied by USFJ to 18,500 hectares.

38. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force is the only permanent forward-deployed Marine force with an integrated air-ground-logistics capability. Kadena airbase is the largest air force base in East Asia and home to a hundred aircraft of the Fifth Air Force Command's Eighteenth Wing.

39. Military Base Affairs Office of the Prefecture of Okinawa, *U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa* (Naha, Okinawa, Japan: Author, 2000), 13.

40. Masaaki Gabe, "Okinawa Summit No Solution to U.S. Base Issues," *Japan Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (January-March 2000): 12.

41. Authors' interviews with MOFA officials in Tokyo, Japan, June 2003.

42. Authors' interviews with three U.S. military representatives in Okinawa, Japan, June 2003.

43. Gabe, "Okinawa Summit," 14-15. See also Feifer, "Rape of Okinawa," 39; and Kenzaburo Oe, "Soul of Okinawa," *Japan Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (July-September 2000): 63-86.

44. Eldridge, "1996 Okinawa Referendum," 899-901.

45. DFAA, "Progress of the SACO Final Report" (Unpublished memorandum, Tokyo, Japan, 2003), 8.

46. DFAA, "Changes in Okinawa Related Budget" (Table from an unpublished briefing, 2003).

47. DFAA, "The Distribution of Annual Rent Related to U.S.FJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa" (Table from an unpublished briefing, 2003).

48. Authors' interview at Ryukyuu University, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

49. Eldridge, "1996 Okinawa Referendum," 896-97.

50. Authors' interview with members of the DFAA, Tokyo, Japan, June 2003.

51. *Ibid.*

52. DFAA, "Awarded Contracts of Construction to Companies Located in Okinawa Prefecture" (Table from an unpublished briefing, 2003).

53. Authors' interview with representatives from the construction industry, Naha, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

54. Total for 1998. Prefecture of Okinawa Military Base Affairs Office, "U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa" (Naha, Okinawa, Japan: Author, 2000), 13.

55. USFJ, "Economic Impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa" (Unpublished briefing, 2001).

56. Eldridge, "1996 Okinawa Referendum," 895.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Authors' interview with several high-level representatives from the construction industry, Naha, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

59. USFJ, "Economic Impact."

60. *Ibid.*

61. Masayuki Sasaki, "Sustainable Development in Okinawa for the 21st Century," in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 249-51.

62. Quoted in Gregg Jones, "U.S. Bases at Okinawa on Political Edge; Economy is Key to Island Support," *Dallas Morning News*, January 3, 1999.

63. Authors' interviews with two American diplomatic officials, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003. The basic outline of this process was repeated in most interviews we had with American military officers in Okinawa.

64. The actual grants for public works construction, as well as the rents paid to those who own the land where U.S. bases are located, come from the DFAA. The DFAA is located hierarchically within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), the organization below the cabinet level that administers all defense-related programs. The JDA is, in turn, under the oversight of MOFA, the cabinet-level organization that has broad responsibility for maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as well as the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.

65. This term was independently used by interviewees at three different American facilities in Okinawa and Tokyo.

66. Authors' interviews with Japanese officials in Tokyo and with U.S. military officers at Kadena Air Force Base and White Beach Naval Facility in Okinawa, Japan, May 2003, and at USFJ headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, June 2003.

67. Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 309; DFAA, "Progress of the SACO."

68. Authors' interview, Military Traffic Management Command at Naha Port, May 2003.

69. Authors' interview, Okinawa prefecture government official, May 2003.

70. Masamichi Sebastian Inoue, John Purves, and Mark Selden, "Okinawa Citizens, U.S. Bases and the Dugong," *Bulletin of Critical Asian Studies* 29, no. 4 (1997), <http://csf.colorado.edu/bcas/campaign/okinawa.htm>.

71. Authors' interview with a U.S. official, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003; and Logistics roundtable briefing given to the authors at USFJ headquarters, Tokyo, Japan, June 2003.

72. Authors' interview with a local newspaper editor who specializes in the base issue, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

73. Chalmers Johnson, "The Heliport, Nago, and the End of the Ota Era," in *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 230.

74. Inoue, Purves, and Selden, "Okinawa Citizens."

75. Authors' interviews with U.S. diplomatic and military officials and an Okinawan academic, Okinawa, Japan, May 2003.

76. Alexander Cooley and Kimberly Marten, "Lessons of Okinawa," *New York Times*, July 30, 2003.

**Alexander Cooley** is an assistant professor of political science, Barnard College, Columbia University. He is author of *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations* (Cornell University Press, 2005). *Address for correspondence:* Alexander Cooley, Barnard College, Columbia University, Department of Political Science, 3009 Broadway, New York, NY 10027-6598; e-mail: [ac210@columbia.edu](mailto:ac210@columbia.edu).

**Kimberly Marten** is a professor of political science, Barnard College, Columbia University. Her most recent book is *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (Columbia University Press, 2004). *E-mail:* [km2225@columbia.edu](mailto:km2225@columbia.edu).