University Lecture - Sheila Kamerman

At the same time, there are new calls for curtailing social policy initiatives in the U.S. and other advanced industrialized countries , including those aimed at children. Rationales are offered, premised on the globalization of the economy, and the need for each country to sustain its competitiveness and low unemployment rates by constraining labor costs and public social welfare expenditures. In the US, in addition, in the context of dramatic changes in family structure, composition, and gender roles and a diverse and extraordinarily pluralist society, this argument is coupled with a strong conviction on the part of some, that children do well only when reared in traditional families. Conservatives want government to do and to be less where it costs money, but to be even more active in advocating their moral or remoralizing agenda.

Putting aside the latter topic, which requires a separate discussion, there are those who argue that as a consequence of the combination of economic, political, and social pressures, cutting back on public investment in children is inevitable, whether by reducing direct provision of cash benefits and services or cutting special tax benefits.

The European countries are clearly already experiencing the negative impact of high labor costs, high tax burdens, and high and sustained unemployment rates, although the debate continues regarding the connection between these developments and globalization. They, too, are experiencing similar family and gender role changes. Many are now discussing or initiating retrenchment and restructuring of social policies.

In exploring these developments in Europe, I find it important to ask what, in fact is happening to child and family policies in the context of these new proposals and developments? Can the U.S. learn anything from the European experience? Is curtailing social protection -- cutting back on social policies for children and their families -- inevitable? Is it possible, even in economically hard times, to protect, if not advance, the children's cause? ^[1]

A recent "quick and dirty" survey of what is happening in several European countries with regard to child and family policies provides some insights and possible lessons.

My paper is divided into five sections: First, a brief overview of the child and family policy picture in the U.S. in the 1990s, followed , second, by a summary of current thinking about globalization and its potential impact on social policies generally. Third is a report of recent developments in a sample of European countries, both those known for their generous child and family policies and those that are more constrained. Fourth,vis a summary of the arguments offered in these countries for protecting children even when cutting social protection generally, and fifth and finally, some discussion of the relevance of these and other arguments for the US and a few comments regarding the implications for the US.

A repeated theme, characterizing U.S. social policies toward children and their families is that the U.S. has no explicit family policy nor does it have a coherent package of social policies that are targeted on children and their families (Kamerman and Kahn, 1978, 1995, 1997b; U.S. House of Representatives, 1973). Nonetheless, there is general agreement that the US does have policies that have consequences for children and their families, and that many of these might constitute "implicit" family policies. However, these policies tend to be limited in scale, coverage, and generosity and are usually categorical and narrowly focused. They lack the comprehensiveness and universality of policies in other advanced industrialized countries (Kamerman and Kahn, 1988, 1995, 1997a and 1997b). Furthermore, an analysis of public investment in children in the OECD countries between 1960 and the early 1990s, found that the U.S. has consistently invested a significantly smaller share of GDP in children and their families than almost all the other such countries.

One consequence is that the situation of children in the U.S. seems to be much worse than that of children in other advanced industrialized countries. For example, several scholars have highlighted the ongoing problem of child poverty in the U.S. Sheldon and Sandra Danziger stressed this in their case study of child poverty and deprivation in the U.S., prepared for Unicef (Cornia and Danziger, 1997) and in earlier work as well (Sandra and Sheldon Danziger, 1993). In research carried out with my colleague Alfred Kahn in the early 1990s we found that not only were poverty rates especially high among very young children, but the younger the child, the higher the poverty rate in the U.S. This is in stark contrast to most European countries where very young children are the age group that is most likely to be protected (Kamerman and Kahn, 1995). Several studies using the Luxembourg Income Study data base, the best available source of household income data cross-nationally, found that US children were especially likely to experience high and sustained rates of child poverty, higher than all but one other advanced industrialized country (Smeeding and Torrey, 1988; Rainwater and Smeeding, 19995; Forssen, 1998) In the mid-1990s, when child poverty rates in all the OECD countries except the US averaged 6.9 percent, 21.5 percent of children in the US were living in families with incomes below the poverty threshold (Smeeding, 1997). Recent research has documented in extraordinarily troubling detail the negative impacts of financial poverty on children (Huston, 1991; Brooks-Gunn and Duncan, 1997). Even scholars whose research suggests the limited effects of raising income alone on child outcomes, have emphasized the importance of adequate income to meet children's basic needs (Mayer, 1997). ^[2]

The U.S. lags with regard to income support for children. We have no universal child or family cash benefits for all families with children regardless of family income; we have no guaranteed minimum income for children nor any guaranteed minimum child support when a non-custodial parent fails to provide support (or provides it inadequately).. We finally passed a child tax credit effective in 1999, but failed to make it available to poor people who owe no taxes (and do not earn enough to benefit from the Earned Income Tax Credit). The real value of U.S. cash social assistance benefits for children and their families declined by more than a third between 1970 and 1995 and only Food Stamps and tax benefits sustained income for low-income families with children.

The U.S. lags with regard to health care for children. It ranked between 19th and 22nd, in its infant mortality rate during the first half of the 1990s ,behind several far less developed countries, and 28th in 1996 (despite a decline in its rate). It ranked 17th (or higher) during these years with regard to low birthweight (a major factor in infant mortality). (Unicef, 1998). The percentage of babies born at low birthweight was higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Between 1988 and 1993 about 13-14 percent of children under 18 lacked health insurance coverage in the U.S. and the proportion rose even higher subsequently, to 15 percent in 1997 and 24 percent of poor children -- at a time when national health insurance (or health services) covered all children in the other major industrialized countries.

The U.S. lags with regard to early childhood care and education. We have no universal system of preschool education for 3-4 year olds as exists in Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. The children of affluent and highly educated parents are far more likely to attend preschool than children from low-income families; but the latter derive more significant benefits from the experience when they participate. And we certainly have no extended child care services for younger children as exists in the Nordic countries.

The U.S. lags with regard to maternity and parental leave policies. The U.S. unpaid family and medical leave policy is a meager version of the paid and job protected leaves following childbirth that exist in more than 100 countries -- and more than 70 countries provide for a paid leave of at least three months ( the length of the U.S. unpaid leave) or longer.

I am not discussing the dynamics of US exceptionalism here, why the U.S. has been such a laggard in child and family policy, although it is a subject that I have explored and which needs further explication.^[3] In this paper, US child policy lags have been listed as a backdrop for the challenge which lies ahead.

In this context, federal legislation enacted during the 1990s seems especially important, reflecting a significant effort at improving child and family policies coupled with a debatable move toward "reforming" welfare. The decade began with the President and governors talking about "a children's decade". Some of us hoped for a repeat of the 1890s (Kamerman, 1989)

The first half of the 1990s revealed a significant expansion in federal child and family policies. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was increased. The Family and Medical Leave Act was finally signed into law. Federal funding for child care was increased, in particular for welfare recipients, along with funds for Head Start and an "early" Head Start program . Federal funding for child and family social services rose modestly while federal funding for child health care increased significantly.

Welfare reform legislation was enacted in 1996, to be implemented beginning in late 1997. Many liberals have expressed strong concern about probable negative consequences for children while social conservatives insist that expecting parents to work, limiting the duration of their stay on assistance, and placing constraints on teen mothers and unmarried mothers will be good for children in the long run even if leading to negative outcomes for children in the short or medium term (more severe poverty, deprivation, inadequate parental care, attention, and time). Some social conservatives have been quoted as stating that "we may lose a generation of children but in the long run children will be better off." I pray that this is a misquotation.

Coupled with a strong economy and lower unemployment rates, especially among women, child poverty rates declined somewhat and some health indicators improved. It is not clear what the impact of the welfare legislation will be, but there is hope that if child outcomes deteriorate and children are hurt, the Congress will enact modifications . Some progress. Some doubts. And a long way to go.

What is the potential for further US expansion and enhancements in child policy in the near future? I shall come to this topic in my final section. I turn first to the portents of doom.

GLOBALIZATION, NEO-LIBERALISM, THE WELFARE STATE CRISIS, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY

Economists, political scientists, sociologists, area specialists, and policy analysts are discussing the world economy and the implications of global economic developments for the future of social policy (Clayton and Pontusson, 1997; Cohen, 1998; Daly, 1998; Garrett, 1997; Pierson, 1994 and 1995). Some talk in terms of "globalization" while others discuss the spread and dominance of neo-liberalism and "marketization". Some who focus on "globalization" argue either that a welfare state crisis is inevitable, or probable. Others, argue the reverse. Some who focus on neo-liberalism, argue along parallel lines, either for or against it. But regardless of the term used, the ultimate concern for many is how will these developments affect social policy? A few comments provide further context for my exploration into whether these developments portend inevitable negative consequences for the children's cause.

"Globalization" is the current buzzword used to describe the growing internationalization of the production of goods, services, and the flow of capital.

There is a debate regarding whether globalization applies only to the changes occurring to the world economy as national economies are internationalized, or whether it applies as well to current changes in political, social, and cultural institutions. Despite widespread agreement that world wide competition means that economies with high wage costs will lose jobs to those with cheaper labor, there continues to be debate as well about whether such job loss is limited to unskilled work, whether, ultimately, it is good or bad for national economies, whether it will affect the composition of the wage packet -- the allocation of wages and benefits -- or just the over all size; and whether a "race to the bottom" among welfare states will follow (reducing wages and cutting social expenditures). Most importantly, there is a debate regarding the overall process of globalization, whether it is the cause of welfare state retrenchment, restructuring, and reform and whether it will lead to high rates of dependency either on unemployment benefits or social assistance or both, thereby raising social expenditures, reducing social security contributions, and leading to cuts in benefits and services.

Market capitalism emerged as the dominant political- economic ideology at the close of the 1980s with the fall of the iron curtain and the demise of communism in central and eastern Europe. Earlier in the 1980s, the Anglo-American countries, beginning with Britain and the U.S., adopted a series of market strategies, confronting the slowdown in economic growth and rising rates of unemployment with greater labor market and wage flexibility, cuts in selected social benefits, and increased efforts at the privatization of social services. This cluster of strategies were subsequently adopted by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The results have been lower rates of unemployment, higher rates of economic growth.-- and higher rates of poverty (including child poverty in particular) and greater income inequality -- a trade-off that some find troubling.

A British policy scholar (Taylor-Gooby, 1994) notes that "the trend towards economic liberalism is the nearest approximation to a universal theme in world affairs". As such it is expected by some to both facilitate globalization as well as accelerate the dismantling of the welfare state. Although acknowledging the dominance of the market ideology now, some scholars argue that neither on the domestic scene nor in the global arena does this have to mean that social policy "liberalism" in the US sense is dead.. Moreover, regardless of any interim cuts in social policy we certainly do not know whether the cuts that are implemented would necessarily affect all social policy regimes across all the advanced industrialized countries, and affect them in the same way. After all, the reasons for the very existence of the welfare state, whatever one's theory, still remains.

Thus, the concern is how will globalization and neo-liberalism affect the welfare state and the social policies that are at the heart of these societies?

A brief, conventional definition of a "welfare state" is a government which assumes responsibility for assuring individuals some basic minima of income, health care, education, housing, employment and social support, and some protection against a defined list of social risks such as old age, retirement, disability, etc. Other definitions would include management of the economy to ensure full employment.

The consensus now seems to be that welfare states are changing everywhere as a result of contradictory pressures ranging from economic and political pressures to cut social spending to demographic and social pressures that lead to increased demand for social protection. But there is no consensus as yet as to the outcomes (Daly, 1997 and Forthcoming; Esping-Andersen , 1996; Ploug and Kvist, 1994; Heikkala, et al, Forthcoming). With a social protection system that was designed to respond to an economy dominated by the manufacturing sector and industrial mass production, the symptoms of "crisis" are chronically high unemployment in Europe and rising rates of poverty and income inequality in the U.S. and other Anglo-American countries

Europe has just experienced a period of very high and sustained unemployment -- and the rates are still high even if a little lower now than a few years ago. Social spending has been constrained, and there is concern, in particular, with regard to the cost of pensions, unemployment benefits, fringe benefits, and non-wage labor costs generally. In the midst of all this, those wanting to join the EMU (the European Monetary Union) have had to meet very tough criteria regarding debt and inflation. Some people say these developments are all a long range permanent threat to the welfare state and that generous social policies need to be seen as a thing of the past. It seems clear that the experts are very divided regarding these long range scenarios. Nonetheless, we do know that the major welfare states have just experienced a period of severe fiscal and budgetary pressures. In effect, they have undergone a stress test. By examining what happened as a result, we can get some sense of the viability of the child and family benefit system under stress . Have child and family benefits been protected in countries experiencing economic hardship? And if so, what was the rationale and what are the implications?

CHILD AND FAMILY POLICIES IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES^[4]
Now, to the heart of our issue: some recent developments in the child and family policy field in a sample of countries that range in their earlier "generosity" toward children ( Kamerman and Kahn, 1997 a) from the Scandinavian countries to Britain, to see how they are responding now. It is worth noting that the main demographic and social trends in these countries are similar, despite some variations within the group. These trends include: aging populations, declining or low and stable fertility rates, declining rates of marriage, high but stable divorce rates, increased cohabitation, lone parenting, out-of-wedlock childbearing. and medium to high rates of female labor force participation.

The Scandinavian countries, in particular Denmark and Sweden, have long been considered social policy and child and family policy leaders in the OECD world . With a stress on universal and comprehensive social policies, the provision of generous social benefits, and a goal of gender equity, they have often represented the model to which liberal policy advocates aspire. Social expenditures for children and families, both cash benefits and services combined, constitute the highest proportion of GDP in the OECD countries (about 5-6 percent, the same proportion as public expenditures for education in the US and the average for the OECD countries) . The early 1990s provided a serious challenge to this model. Both challenges and the national responses are illustrated below.

Denmark began to experience persistently high levels of unemployment in the 1980s, more than a decade before Sweden and Finland. Unemployment rates peaked at 8-9 percent in the early 1990s but are now under 7 percent, lower than the OECD average. Danish social expenditures have continued to increase as a percent of GDP throughout the period, with some decline in the early 1990s but an increase in 1993 and 1994. The Danes have made some reforms in their pension system, cut the duration of unemployment benefits (previously available for several years (!), and linked work requirements more closely to receipt of unemployment benefits or social assistance, stressing training, education, and an "active" labor market policy to deal with their unemployment problem (education and training rather than income transfers such as unemployment benefits).

onetheless, in the last few years, the Danes have sustained their child and family benefits and even raised them. Support for universalism has continued and even increased. Indeed, Denmark is almost unique in that having moved earlier from universal to somewhat more means tested benefits in the 1980s, it has now returned to a universal approach, convinced of the 'rightness" of this approach for child policy.

Child and family benefits and services account for a much smaller share of GDP than pensions , yet nonetheless constitute a significant share -- almost 6 percent -- and the share increased in the 1990s. Despite high rates of children living in lone-parent families -- 1 in 3 Danish children live with only one parent -- the Danish child poverty rate (children living in families with incomes below half the median) is only about 4 percent in contrast to the comparable US rate of 22 percent (Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995).

Although child care is technically a responsibility of municipal governments, funded by a block grant that reflects the number of children, their ages, and social conditions, the Danish Prime Minister announced a few years ago that all children aged one and older, with working parents or parents who are students -- were guaranteed a place in a subsidized child care program. In effect, the Prime Minister announced a standard for all municipalities to follow and they did. As a result, there has been a significant increase in child care coverage in a country already known for its high rate. In early 1998, coverage rates in out-of-home care covering the full work day, were as follows: 50 percent of infants, under age 1, (when most mothers are at home on leave); 80 percent of the 1-2 year olds; and 90 percent of children aged 3-5.

Quality declined somewhat in the early 1990s albeit from an exceptionally high baseline (lower staff:child ratios, larger groups) but there is a beginning return to earlier standards and a conviction that quality matters and should be sustained. Given earlier economic problems, it is understandable that the first priority has been to assure a full supply of places for all children whose parents needed and wanted a place for them. The basic guarantee has been met, except for some shortages in care during irregular or unusual hours (at night; during weekends). Apart from filling these needs, the current intention is to extend coverage to the children of unemployed and at home parents who wish their children to participate. As essential as child care/preschool is if women with young children are to be in the labor force, there is growing conviction that these programs are important for all children whatever their parents' employment status.

Denmark has a 28-week paid and job protected maternity leave of which 4 weeks can be used before expected birth. Ten weeks of the post childbirth leave are available to either parent and, now, an additional 4 weeks has been added but can be taken only by fathers. The cash benefit provided while on leave is equal to 60 percent of prior wages (up to a maximum), a decrease from the earlier 80 percent; but most employers top this off, so that in effect most working parents receive their full wage while on leave. In addition, a supplementary one-year parental leave was enacted in 1992, paid through the unemployment benefit system at the rate of 90 percent of prior earnings,. In effect, working parents now have between 1 1/2 and 2 years paid leave following childbirth. ^[5]

The government has recently proposed a "children's policy package" that includes several items for public discussion including a proposal that employers must permit workers with school-aged children to take their vacations while their children are on school vacation, that firms should be strongly urged to establish more "family friendly" policies, and a proposal for more systematic and regular monitoring of the situation of children in Denmark. A Danish government official in mid 1998 commented: "The discussion in Denmark is no longer about what kind of cuts are necessary but which child policy domains are most in need of increased expenditures."

Sweden experienced its major economic crisis in the early/mid 1990s. Economic growth was negative for some years and real GDP fell. Its unemployment rate "exploded" in the early 1990s reaching a high of more than 8 percent, four times the rate during the 1980s. The cost of unemployment benefits rose dramatically and the budget deficit "boomed." Sweden leads Europe in population aging and has recently announced a reform of its generous old age pensions system. Its child poverty rate rose from 6.0 percent in 1990 to 8.5 percent in 1994 (when the US rate was 22 percent).

The Swedish economy is now recovering. Sweden's official unemployment rate is now about 7.5 percent slightly higher than the OECD average, but this counts beneficiaries of its extensive training and education programs as employed. Its "real" unemployment rate would be closer to 10-11 percent but it has had a long-standing response to unemployment that includes a stress on "active' rather than "passive" labor market policies (education and training programs rather than unemployment benefits). The Swedes continue to link receipt of social benefits to work, or preparation for work.

During the period of "hard times" in the mid 1990s, Sweden reduced its child benefit from 750 SK a month (about $100) to 640 (about $80) (the first ever cut in the nominal value of these benefits). The supplementary benefit provided to larger families with three or four children was reduced for existing large families receiving the benefit, and eliminated for subsequent ones. The child support benefit (guaranteeing a minimal level of support to children in single parent families) was reformed, linking court-ordered support awards to the non-custodial parent's income but eliminating the indexing of the minimum support benefit. The income-tested housing allowance benefit was reduced somewhat and eligibility criteria were more sharply targeted on low-income families. Of particular significance, Sweden reduced the rate at which benefits replaced wages from 90 percent to a low of 75 percent for parenting, unemployment, and sickness benefits; but the length of time recipients could receive the benefits was not cut.

With regard to services, the supply of child care was sustained but quality deteriorated somewhat. Staff:child ratios declined slightly, group size increased (from 15 to 18 for 3-6 year olds, but lower for 1-2 year olds). Parent fees rose (from 15-20 percent of operating costs to 25 - 30 percent in some municipalities, as compared with about 70 percent in the U.S.). About 15 percent of the services were privatized, about half of those now are for profit , operating largely through contracts with local government.

Despite these cuts, school meals remained free and available to all chidden during these years, Sweden's universal health care was sustained; and expenditures on social assistance and special assistance to refugees were doubled as a share of GDP. Moreover, family benefits, which were increased sharply in the early 1990s, continued to increase until 1995 when modest cuts were imposed, and began to rise again in 1998.

According to Swedish policy scholars Joachim Palme and Irene Wennemo (1998, p. 31), family benefits have been subject to "temporary retrenchment rather than reform", but the cuts were modest and there was no restructuring. Sweden experienced a combination of cuts in transfers (cash benefits), increases in taxes (higher social security contributions), rising unemployment, and declining wages. It is this fourfold combination -- this quadruple "whammy" -- that hurt children and their families most, not the cuts in benefits and services alone, which were really quite modest. Indeed, policies and programs for children and their families have clearly been protected.

Within two years, between 1996 and 1998 -- the Swedish economic situation began to turn around and child and family benefits returned to earlier levels. As of mid-1998 child allowances had returned to their nominal high of a few years ago (only slightly below the real high) and are worth about 7.5 percent of average manufacturing wages, the supplementary benefit for larger families was re-instated, benefit replacement rates had been increased to 80 percent of prior wages (from the low of 75 percent, but not the earlier 90 percent), the block grants to municipalities for social services including child care were close to the high level of the earlier 1990s, the budget was in surplus and the surplus was projected to be even larger for next year.

The Swedish parent leave has been enhanced. In addition to the 18 month paid and job-protected leave for working parents that was established by the end of the 1980s and that can be prorated over a more extended period if desired (one year at 80 percent of prior wages, 3 months at a flat rate, and 3 months unpaid ), an additional paid one month leave has now been added for fathers only. Fifty percent of eligible fathers now use the leave, more than in any other country, albeit for much less time than mothers (for about 6 weeks). In addition to the right of working parents to take paid time off to care for an ill child under age 12, employed grandparents now also have the right to take time off to care for an ill grandchild, if such an arrangement is preferred. .

All children of working parents and students are now guaranteed a place in subsidized care from the age of one and the government is increasingly stressing the need to provide access regardless of parental employment status. As in Denmark, the Swedish government is convinced that quality matters and expects to exert more pressure on local governments to ensure a return to the earlier higher quality standards. Centers are held to the same standards of quality, and charge the same fees to parents, regardless of whether they are public, private non-profit or for-profit,.

In short, the Swedish welfare state may be less generous today than a decade ago but child related benefits and services have been protected. Benefit replacement rates are slightly lower now but nonetheless, at 80 percent of prior wages, very generous. Child allowances have returned to their nominal highs and with very low inflation are close to their earlier real levels. Housing allowances are somewhat reduced and more targeted. Single parent families have been protected. In a comparative sense, the Scandinavian model remains extraordinarily generous, especially to children and their families
.

At the other end of the "generosity" scale is Britain. Despite its clear membership in the Anglo-American "family of nations", its earlier move toward economic liberalism in the Thatcher era, and its stress on means-tested rather than universal benefits, British social policy toward children historically, has been among the most generous in this "less generous" group ( Kamerman and Kahn, 1997a and b). In recent years, following the US. pattern, Britain has moved to increase its labor flexibility, deregulate wages, contain social spending, increase privatization, and has reduced its unemployment rate almost to the OECD average.

Recently published evidence from the first sweep of the new European Community Household Panel Survey found that the 1993 British general poverty rate (incomes below 50 percent of the national median for both individuals and households), was third from the highest out of the European 12, lower only than Portugal and Greece (Bradshaw, 1998). Moreover Britain had the highest child poverty rate of the 12, about 32 percent as compared with 5 percent in Denmark, 8 percent in Sweden, and 12 percent in France.

Turning to another data base, the LIS survey results for 1985 and 1990, Britain had the third highest poverty rate among the 19 countries , exceeded only by the U.S. and Russia; and it had the highest rate among those countries in which child poverty rates were higher than poverty rates among the elderly.

Under the leadership of Blair and New Labour, there are beginning efforts at reducing the assistance caseload (welfare in US terms) and linking work expectations more closely with benefits. However, despite new encouragements and incentives there is no requirement that lone mothers claiming assistance go to work, and no time limits on receipt of benefits by lone mothers. Britain has by far the highest rate of social assistance use among the European 15 . A minimum wage (a new policy for Britain) is being phased in gradually, at a level similar to the US minimum. There has been a substantial increase in the basic universal child benefit and the higher benefit for first children; but these are still not indexed. The supplementary lone parent benefit has been eliminated and as a result single mothers are worse off now than before. . There is a proposal for universal and free preschool for all four year olds (Compulsory school begins at age 5 and more than half the 4 year olds already attend school or preschool). The prior British version of the U.S. EITC (Family Credit) has been superseded by a more generous Working Families Tax Credit to be implemented in October 1999. This tax credit will also include a provision for a new child care tax credit to provide help for working families with moderate incomes. The credit will meet up to 70 percent of child care costs (in centers or family day care providers) up to a maximum of about $160 for a family with one child and $240 a week for those with two or more -- far more generous that the U.S. Dependent Care Tax Credit. The child benefit levels under social assistance have been raised. And the government has created a new unit to coordinate policies on social exclusion .

In short, as LSE economist and social policy scholar Howard Glennerster (1997) writes, "Distinctively less generous than the Scandinavian or continental European countries, the UK system of welfare is much more dependent on the market and income tested benefits but keeps its highly developed national minimum safety net and national responsibilities for health and education. It may be called "a hard core welfare state". (p. 24)". Lone parent families continue to present a major problem and the long-established policy of supporting lone mothers at home is beginning to change to one of encouraging,

if not requiring, that such women take jobs. The big gap in encouraging these women to take jobs, however, is child care, and that is only beginning to be addressed.

Like all the European countries in the 1990s, France has been faced with lower rates of economic growth, high rates of social expenditures, high and persistent rates of unemployment (about 12 percent at present and even higher earlier), a deficit in its social security system since 1991, and pressure to contain its budget deficit in order to qualify for the EMU (European Monetary Union). Social expenditures -- including education, social services, and tax benefits -- rose throughout the first half of the 1990s, from 23 percent of GDP in 1990 to 25.5 percent in 1993 and remained about the same in 1994 (the latest figures available). Pensions accounted for half the expenditures in 1994, health for one-third, and family and maternity benefits for 4.5 percent in 1996 -- from 4.2 percent in 1990. More than half the expenditures for family benefits are for universal benefits.

In 1994, constraints were placed on pensions and health care and slowed growth in both of these policy domains. The numbers of the long-term unemployed rose but unemployment benefit expenditures decreased as more of the unemployed exhausted their eligibility for benefits. Yet family benefits increased at an average rate of 11 percent during the first half of the decade. The basic benefit was increased. The maximum age for family allowances was increased to cover students in higher education, and the allowance paid parents with school-aged children, provided at the beginning of the school year, was raised substantially. The child rearing allowance for parents with very young children (those under age 3), was extended to cover those with two or more children (not 3 or more as earlier). The numbers of lone mothers benefiting from the means-tested lone parent allowance increased as did those benefiting from the income-tested housing allowance.

In 1996 some cuts were imposed on the family benefit system, as France prepared to reduce its budget deficit and qualify for the EMU.. Family benefits were frozen. The special 9 month allowance provided during pregnancy and the first four months after birth was means-tested. On the other hand, proposals to include family benefits in taxable income and to means-test family allowances were rejected. Some changes were made in the income tax system which favored high income families, to make it less generous to such families. The 24 different family allowances including both universal and income tested benefits remain. Preschool programs covering all children aged 3-5 and half the two-year olds in a full day program, and child care services for the under 3s were sustained, but not increased.

Overall, the French family benefit system is largely still a universal system. Despite high unemployment rates, severe financial pressures, efforts to reduce the budget deficit , and efforts to move towards more targeting generally including child and family benefits, thus far France has continued to protect child and family policies.

Turning now to Germany. Since 1990, in addition to the problems facing the other European countries, Germany has been confronted with the problem of adjusting to reunification with East Germany. During the years that followed, unemployment rates rose from about 7-9 percent in the old Lander or states, and 10-17 percent in the new. Female labor force participation rates increased, but female unemployment rates in 1994 were painfully high -- 44 percent in the old states and 67 percent in the new. The high rates in the eastern states are largely due to cuts in child care services that used to employ women At the same time, however, child benefit rates were increased and subsequently indexed, a guarantee for a subsidized place in preschool was introduced for the 3-5 year olds, the child support guarantee for children in single parent families was modestly improved, and the three year job-protected parental leave following childbirth was sustained. However, the cash benefit covering the first two years of the leave continued to decline in real value (it is not indexed and the benefit has not been raised since 1986 when it was first introduced) and is now income tested -- although at a level that permits most new parents to qualify for it. Finally, the income tax threshold has been raised to cover the equivalent of the tax-free social assistance benefit level. Overall, although modest, child benefits have been protected in Germany. Those living in the former East Germany experienced some cuts, especially with regard to child care, but not those in the west.

WHY DO THEY PROTECT CHILDREN?
Child and family benefits as we have seen, are favored. Why? Rationales for protecting and promoting child policy abound in a variety of national and international platforms. It is instructive to examine both the international consensus and the nation-specific arguments.

First, there is a strong moral argument for supporting child policies in almost all the countries. The 46-country Council of Europe's, Steering Committee on Social Policy report on The Crisis of the Welfare State (1998) begins with a statement of premises including the following:

" the situation of children provides a special rationale for the welfare state . Children do not choose to be born and brought up by poor parents ... If the children cannot be blamed for being poor, the reason why they are found to be in poverty is irrelevant. Whether it is unemployment, sickness, divorce, or simply indolence on the part of their parents, in no case should children be deprived of the opportunity of becoming full citizens." (p. 7)

Similarly, in many countries, there is interest in building social solidarity, across generations and classes and strong interest in tempering market forces for the good of the larger society. One consequence is that the children's cause is not associated with a particular party but rather cuts across the political spectrum and generates strong middle class support. The universal benefits and services, in particular, attract a broad-based political constituency in the Scandinavian and continental European countries with regard to child benefits; and child benefits draw relatively broad political support even in Britain. Maternity and parenting benefits, too, generate wide support throughout Europe, albeit less so in Britain than elsewhere (perhaps because British benefits are much less generous).

Still another argument in several countries is the desire to keep child poverty rates low. Extensive research in the U.S. as well as elsewhere has concluded that, as stated in an OECD (1998) report : "The well being of children is drastically reduced by being raised in poverty". (OECD, 1998 p.78; Brooks-Gunn and Duncan, 1997; Chase-Lonsdale and Brooks-Gunn, 1995; Huston, 1991)). The effects of low family income are especially pronounced "for children who live below the poverty line for multiple years and for children who live in extreme poverty (50 percent or less of the poverty threshold") (Brooks-Gunn and Duncan, 1997, p. 68) Wennemo (1994) in her study of the OECD countries from 1950 - 1985 found that poverty, income inequality, and public policies had a greater impact on infant mortality than levels of economic development. The combination of high unemployment rates and low unemployment benefits were associated with particularly high infant mortality rates while generous and universal family benefits were associated with low rates.

Pronatalism, a fourth rationale, has been a longstanding motivation underlying selected social policies in several countries, certainly at the latent if not manifest level. Fertility rates have been well below population reproduction rate (2.1 children) for most of the last three or four decades and remain there now for almost all the advanced industrialized countries (and several of the newly industrializing countries as well). The average total fertility rate for the EU is 1.4 children and 1.7 for the OECD. France has been the leader among those countries expressing pronatal concerns but the French fertility rate continues to decline (about 1.65 now). French family policy remains modestly pro-natal in that family allowances begin only with the second child and there are some benefits that accrue only to 3rd and subsequent children. Nonetheless, strong support for the children's cause does not appear to be correlated with low fertility rates. The countries with the lowest rates, such as Italy and Spain are certainly not the strongest child advocates nor are those with relatively high rates, such as Sweden and Norway, among those offering limited support.

High female labor force participation and the concomitant needs of children whose mothers are working outside of the home, is another factor that cuts across many countries and has been a strong rationale for selected policies, in particular child care services and maternity and parenting leaves. Indeed, in earlier work, we underscored the significance of this factor coupled with concern about low fertility, as the major independent variables, leading to greater public generosity towards children in the 1970s (Kamerman and Kahn, 1981). For the Scandinavian countries in particular, a policy of gender equity is key to protecting children.. Women's labor force participation is a key element in advancing family policy. As one well-known scholar has claimed (Esping-Andersen, 1996), "The contemporary family needs the welfare state in order to harmonize work and family objectives; likewise, the welfare state needs children."

This view gains potency as the Europeans confront their economic futures. Thus, numerous scholars and government officials in several countries seem convinced that increasing the demand for and supply of women in the labor force is critical if tax contributions (in particular, payroll tax contributions) are to rise and financial pressures on social policies be eased. Indeed, this is at the heart of the OECD proposed response to both demographic and economic pressures on pension policies

Promoting child well-being as a form of investment in human capital is a sixth factor and is discussed in several countries as well. An OECD social policy report (1998) confirms -- and draws on -- the findings of numerous U.S. developmental psychologists (Aber, Brooks-Gunn, Meisels, Shonkoff) in stressing the importance of early childhood interventions (child care, preschool, home visiting) .The report states that early childhood programs are crucial in establishing a firm basis for further learning and productive adulthood, and especially important for children in disadvantaged families. Some welfare state scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1996, p. 264), would agree that human capital investment should take priority even over the goal of egalitarianism, at least for the immediate future. A major policy goal in the context of globalization would appear to be improved access to affordable, good quality child care and enhanced maternity and parental benefits as well as greater flexibility in work arrangements to help parents- - both men and women -- balance their work and family responsibilities..

Still a seventh factor has emerged in recent years in Europe. This is a growing focus on children per se rather than the family unit, as targets of social policy. Certainly, there is agreement that the most important institution for rearing children and promoting child development is the family; but nonetheless, there is increased recognition of children as individuals, entitled to rights themselves, and to protection regardless of parental status or behavior. Thus, the Danish sociologist Jens Qvotrup (1994) has argued that "Children are human beings, not only 'human becomings.' " P. 18) . They warrant investment as children, not just for what they may become as adults. In this context, several reports urging the case for universal preschool, state that the rights of all children to participate in preschool education should be recognized as a matter of promoting socialization and enhancing development, as well as preparing children for school and providing care while mothers work outside the home (Council of Europe, 1998; OECD, 1998).

Here, too, support for universal policies rather than those targeted on the poor has been part of the national strategy for sustaining a broad-based public constituency supporting the children's cause; and has led to support across the political spectrum.

Nor is the European response seen as particularly burdensome. A repeated theme in discussions in Denmark and Sweden is that investment in children is visible, inexpensive, and has substantial payoff. It is relatively easy to improve child policy given the much lower shares of GDP directed at children as compared with pensions and health care.

Finally, a conventional American response to the question of why child and family benefits and services appear to be protected in Europe, is that families are less diverse and more homogeneous in Europe than in the U.S.; as a result, people feel they are helping their own. In fact , European family trends are surprisingly similar to those in the US. For example, more than half of all births in the Scandinavian countries are now out of wedlock, as are almost one third in Finland, France, and the UK. U.S. rates are slightly lower. Marriage rates in Europe are about half those in the U.S.; but so are divorce rates, although they are rising. Traditional families continue to decline in significance in Europe as in the US. Two-earner, husband/wife families, single-parent families, reconstituted families, and families headed by cohabiting but not legally married couples, now dominate the family environments in which children are reared. Whether or not they constitute the ideal environment for children, it is the reality for most children.

In sum: family benefit and service expenditures represent a relatively modest proportion of GDP when compared with pensions and health care, but are significant in several countries, in the 5-6 percent of GDP range in France and the Scandinavian countries (if less than 2 percent in the U.S.) and can constitute an important component of the incomes of families with children ( Kamerman and Kahn, 1997 a) . For the most part, these expenditures increased in Europe in the 1990s. Growth in this policy domain is especially important given declining rates of fertility and smaller child cohorts, and may reflect higher benefit levels, new benefits, and/or an increase in lone-mother families.

Despite some modest growth in income-testing (in France and Germany, for example) most of the benefits are still universal. There have been some cuts -- but they have been modest, indeed marginal, at most. . The real value of child allowances has declined in some countries with gradual inflation. Cuts were made in the nominal value of child benefits only in Sweden but now have been restored. Austria, Netherlands, and Sweden reduced certain special family allowance supplements; but these too have now been restored. Replacement rates of maternity and parenting benefits were reduced in a few countries but the duration of the leaves was extended in many more.. Expenditures for child care services increased and the supply sustained in all these countries, except with regard to care for the under 3s in Germany. Guarantees of a place in child care for all children (or all children with working parents) have been established in the Nordic countries and in Germany for the 3-5 year olds; and full coverage for all 3-5 year olds already exists (and has been sustained) in Belgium, France, and Italy, and proposed in Britain for 4 year olds. There has been some decline in quality in the Scandinavian countries (larger groups, lower staff:child ratios) but there is renewed stress now on returning to earlier quality standards. Child health care and home-health visiting services have been sustained at the same level as earlier, and so, it appears, have-treatment oriented child welfare services.

Social assistance caseloads -- welfare in U.S. terms -- may have increased somewhat during the hard times but is not what is being stressed in the OECD countries as a response to unemployment or as a form of family benefit, except for the U.S. and the other Anglo-American countries. As in the U.S., increasingly those receiving benefits are expected to work. But training, education, and job programs are provided in some countries; and far more supports are provided for mothers in out-of-home employment. And in Britain and the other non-US Anglo countries, work, is not yet mandated for women with young children; and the welfare-work policy is not caste in a punitive mode.

In exploring the policy rationales used in different countries, certain arguments emerge consistently while others are more likely to be associated with particular countries. Most importantly, there is almost universal support for a moral argument in favor of children, for intergenerational and intergroup "solidarity", and a strong conviction that children should be protected against being poor Pronatalism remains a latent and occasionally manifest rationale in some countries with low birth rates. High female labor force participation raises the need for providing care for children when parents work outside the home and for policies that help parents reconcile work and family life. Two other rationales include an emerging recognition of children as future human capital and the high visibility and relatively low cost of doing better by children.

Given these excellent reasons for protecting children and promoting child-well-being in other countries, and the various arguments used to win support for them, can we discern any implications for the U.S.?

I begin with the assumption that there is some level of consensus regarding a US children's agenda and that the problem is how to move it forward. There is certainly no shortage of statements concerning such an agenda -- whether offered by my colleague and me or other advocates and scholars. The usual items include: (1) assuring that children are reared in families with incomes sufficient to sustain them above the poverty threshold, whether through a child allowance, a refundable child tax credit, guaranteed child support, a job, or an adequate earnings --- or some combination; (2) universal child health insurance and access to health care for all children; (3) a paid and job-protected parental leave following childbirth or adoption; (4) accessible, affordable decent quality early childcare and education; (5) supportive services for troubled children and their parents; and (6) some help in ensuring access to affordable housing.

I am not discussing costs here or how such an agenda could be paid for -- but I have done that elsewhere, too. Rather I am suggesting an agenda to work on and exploring possible rationales that might merit and might mobilize Americans in support.. And I am suggesting a few strategies to begin the work of advancing the agenda. The elements are not unique, but what is unique is that it is an agenda that continues to garner strong support in countries, even when they experience hard times economically.

Pronatalism has never generated interest in the U.S. Despite a declining birth rate, the US fertility rate (2.06) is still close to a population sustaining rate. Moreover, historically, the US has always seen immigration as the source of support for its population size, not raising the birth rate. Encouraging larger families is not an objective that garners support. Indeed, there remains some latent fear that if the birth rate were to increase, it is likely to occur among minority ethnic and racial groups rather than among the "more desirable".

The moral argument -- which should be a powerful argument -- has prevailed in the U.S. only with regard to poor and dependent children, and often not even with them (Steiner, 1976). The state is willing to protect children, according to Steiner (1976), Grubb (1982) and others, only if the parents are declared incapable. The moral argument for children as the key to social reform may be effective in Europe and may have been effective a century ago in the US but does not appear to be now. Indeed, some Americans have turned this argument on its head by constraining support for children born out of wedlock or reared in lone-mother families on the grounds that they reflect the "moral decay" in the society. They would argue that the situation of children can be improved only through changed behavior on the part of parents and a re-establishment of a firm religious base in the country or a rebuilding of the traditional family (Himmelfarb, 1998; Wilson, 1998), In contrast, despite similar patterns of family diversity (and ethnic diversity), the European countries continue to provide support for children while conservatives in the US oppose such policies.

Reducing poverty was a powerful motivating force in U.S. social policy discussions in the 1960s but certainly not in the last two decades., Heclo (1997) argues that Americans place a high value on children but are ambivalent with regard to poor children -- despite the evidence of negative consequences for children -- because of the children's connection with their adult parents, and the public expectation that adults be self-sufficient. In this context, the most recent successful anti-poverty policy initiative was targeted at the working poor. This led to the enactment of the EITC, something like a family allowance that is limited, as in the immediate post WWII days in Europe, to working families. If it could be extended to all families with children it would make a significant difference, but further expansion seems unlikely at present.

Acknowledging children's rights and the value of children as such may attract some support, but there remain a significant group in the U.S. who are convinced that parental rights supercede those of children. The recent success in the U.S. with regard to child health insurance may illustrate the potential effectiveness of this approach along with Heclo's suggestion that advocates need to separate children from their "irresponsible' adult parents to be successful. A movement to focus on children's rights might facilitate this.

As in several other countries, the rising proportion of employed mothers with young children should provide a strong rationale for certain child and family policies. The U.S. has relatively high rates of female labor force participation, indeed higher rates of working women with children than all but the Nordic countries. (and rates that are equaled only by Canada and France). Although clearly, this has had some impact on US child and family policies already -- as with regard to the expansion of child care services, the establishment of the child (dependent) care tax credit, and the enactment of the FMLA-- and is likely to have more if female labor force participation continues to rise, it is certainly not sufficient by itself to ensure more aggressive support of the children's cause. Nonetheless, as female labor force participation continues to rise, working mothers and other working women may provide an increasingly loud and influential voice for children, especially with regard to child care services and maternity and parenting leaves.

An overarching rationale that has been advanced before but might be more effective now, is a focus on promoting child well-being as a form of investment in human capital, especially in the context of a global economy and the need for an educated and skilled labor force. This has been an effective argument for support of child policy in several of the Asian Pacific Rim countries, including the two Asian countries in the OECD. Both Japan and Korea began expanding their social protection systems by investing heavily in education. This has also been the case for Taiwan, Singapore, and others. Although not a major factor in the European countries, it is nonetheless present. Given recent research b economists James Hechman (1998) and Lisa Lynch (1998) on the value of early intervention as an effective form of investment in human capital, it would appear to be a very powerful rationale for U.S. child policies, with its particular interest in policies that might lead to more productive adults.

In this connection, ensuring school readiness is a high priority at present in the U.S., and an important approach to investment in children as "human capital". Moreover, there is some evidence that this goal is beginning to influence child care and preschool policies in some states. Research that documents the long term positive effects of early childhood interventions could be important in strengthening these policies. The link between selected early childhood interventions (home visiting; early childhood care and education) and enhanced high school performance, decreased school drop out rates, lower rates of teen pregnancy -- could be important motivating factors (Berrueta-Clement, 1984; Levenstein et al, 1998) -- although this points to the need for improved evaluation strategies, as well (Karoly, et al, 1998).

Finally, other countries' experience reveals the relative in-expensiveness of improving child policy, and the high pay-off as a consequence . This is a approach that has had some success in the U.S. , with regard to child health policy. The U.S. has extended child health care significantly over the past 15 years, largely in response to the growing recognition of existing gaps in coverage, the negative consequences of non-coverage, the high pay-off and limited costs.

And so I end: We have seen that tough times have not reversed the forward movement of the children's cause in other countries. The children's cause has been successfully advanced in other countries despite severe economic problems and demographic pressures -- often in response to demands that go beyond narrow political boundaries and conventional political agendas. Even under competitive pressures and resource constraints, retrenchment and restructuring are not inevitable. And even if and when they occur, they need not doom the children's cause.

Prior efforts in the U.S. at organizing a children's lobby or some other form of children's movement have not been successful. Indeed, there has been no successful effort at mobilizing for social reform around children since the beginning of the century.

What will it take to advance the children's cause in the U.S.? What will it take to garner support for children across the political/social and cultural divide? What will it take to recognize and acknowledge that there are more than economic costs involved and that not all the benefits can be monetized? Why can't we -- with more wealth and greater knowledge of what makes a difference -- make greater progress on improving the life situation of children? Can we be more effective in the rationales we choose -- in the way we shape the debate? .Can we build on the strategies that seem to appeal to Americans -- and that appear to haas been advanced before but might be more effective now, is a focus on promoting child well-being as a form of investment in human capital, especially in the context of a global economy and the need for an educated and skilled labor force. This has been an effective argument for support of child policy in several of the Asian Pacific Rim countries, including the two Asian countries in the OECD. Both Japan and Korea began expanding their social protection systems by investing heavily children is This has also been the case for Taiwan, Singapore, and others. Although not a major factor in the European countries, it is nonetheless present. Given recent research by economists James Hechman (1998) and Lisa Lynch (1998) on the value of early intervention as an effective form of investment in human capital, it would appear to be a very powerful rationale for U.S. child policies, with its particular interest in policies that might lead to more productive adults can make some progress. If those of us who are scholars of child development and child policy cannot find ways to communicate with the policy makers and the public at large about policies that make a difference, who can? If not now, when?

Behrman, R.E., ed. (1997) The Future of Children, Special Issue on "Children and Poverty", Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer/Fall, 1997

Bouget, Dennis. (1998) "The Juppe Plan and the Future of the French Social Welfare System", Journal of European Social Policy. Vol. 8, No. 2, 155-172.

Carnegie Corporation T ask Force, (1994) Starting Points: Meeting the Needs of Our Youngest Children.

Carney, Eliza N. and Simindenges, A. (November 7, 1998), "How Will They Govern?" National Journal, No. 45.

Clayton, R. and and Pontusson, J. (August, 1997). Welfare State Retrenchment and Public Sector Restructuring in Advanced Capitalist Societies,. Department of Government, Cornell University, Processed.

Cohen, Daniel. (1998) The Wealth of the World and the Poverty of Nations. Cambridge, MA; MIT Press.

Council of Europe, (1998) Steering Committee on Social Policy, The Crisis of the Welfare State. Strasbourg.

Daly, M.. (1998). Globalization and the Bismarkian Welfare States, Paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Social Policy, Lincoln, England, July 1998..

_________(1997). "Welfare States Under Pressure: Cash Benefits in European Welfare States Over the Last Ten Years." Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2

Danziger, Sandra and Sheldon. "Child Poverty and Public Policy: Toward Comprehensive Antipoverty Agenda", Daedalus. Special Issue on America's Childhood, Vol. 122, No. 1. Winter 1993.

Deacon, B. (July, 1998). Globalization and Social Policy: International Actors and Discourse. Paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Social Policy, Lincoln, England

Duncan, Greg and Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne. Eds. (1997) Consequences of Growing Up Poor. New York: Russell Sage.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1996), ed. Welfare States in Transition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

______________ (1997) :" Welfare States at the End of the Century", in Family, Market, and Community: Equity and Efficiency in Social Policy. Paris, France: OECD

Forssen, Katja. (1998) "Child Poverty and Family Policy in OECD Countries", " Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 178.

Garfinkel, I. (1996) "Economic Security for Children: From Means-Testing and Bifurcation to Universality", in Garfinkel, I. , Hochschild, J. , and McLanahan, S. eds. Social Policies for Children. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Garrett, Geoffrey. (1997) Partisan Politics in A Global Ecoomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Glennerster, H. ( 1997). United Kingdom's Social Policy: From an Old Social Contract to a New? London, Eng.: London School of Economics. Processed.

Heikkila, Matti. Et al. The Welfare States in a Colder Climate. Routledge, Forthcoming.

Himmelfarb, Gertrude. (Spring, 1998) "Democratic Remedies for Democratic Disorders". The Public Interest. No 131, 3-24.

ISSA. (1998) The Future of Social Security . Conference Papers. Stockholm, Sweden

Kamerman, S.B and Kahn, A.J. (1988). The Vulnerable, Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute

_________________( 1997a) "Investing in Children; Government Expenditure for Children and their Families in Western Industrialized Countries", in Giovanni Adndrea Cornia and Sheldon Danziger, eds., Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries 1945-1995. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

________________, eds. (1997b). Family Change and Family Policies in Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kamerman, SB. "Toward a Child Policy Decade", Child Welfare. lxviii, No. 4, July/August, 371-390, 1989.

Minow, Martha and Weissbourd, Richard. (Winter 1993) "Social Movements for Children", Daedalus. Special Issue on America's Childhood, Vol. 122, No. 1.

OECD. (1998). The New Social Policy for A Caring World. Background Documents: The Caring World: An Analysis. Paris, France: OECD.

Palme, J. and Wennemo, I. (1998). Swedish Social Security in the 1990s: Reform and Retrenchment. Stockholm, Sweden: The Printing Office of the Cabinet and Ministries.

Pierson, Paul. (1995) The New Politics of the Welfare State, Bremen, Germany: Center for Social Policy Research, University of Bremen, Working Paper No. 3/95.

Ploug, N. and Kvist, J. (1994) Recent Trends in Cash Benefits in Europe. Copenhagen, Denmark: The Danish National Social Research Institute.

Rainwater, L. and Smeeding, T., (1995). Doing Poorly: The Real Income of American Children in a Comparative Perspective. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Papers Series, Working Paper No 127, Walferdange, Luxembourg

Smeeding, T. and Torrey, B. (1988). Poor Children in Rich Countries. Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No 16, Walferdange, Luxembourg.

Taylor-Gooby, Peter. (July 1994) "Post Modernism and Social Policy: A Great Leap Backward?", Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 23, Part 3.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1998) America's Children:Key National Indicators of Well-Being. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Wennemo, Irene. (1994) Sharing the Costs of Children. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Institute for Social Research.

Wilson, James . Spring, 1998). "Human Remedies for Social Disorders". The Public Interest. No 131, 25-35.