Landslide

Page Two / PER OHLSSON

AFTER THE LANDSLIDE

September 16, 2003

So daily life has returned after Sunday’s resounding no in the euro referendum. But it is like no ordinary daily life: a landslide has hit the establishment.

Valu, Swedish Television’s election survey, is based on interviews with over 10,000 voters. It’s not exact: Nevertheless, the result based on Valu material, presented on Sunday evening, serves as a guide for anyone looking for explanations as to why things went as they did.

As well as a few lessons for the future.

One difference between the euro vote and the referendum on the EU in 1994 was the split in the non-socialist parties. One of them, the Center Party, was on the no side. As if that weren’t enough:

A majority of the Christian Democrats, 53 percent, voted no, as well as not insignificant minorities among the Moderates and the Liberals: 24 and 26 percent, respectively. This can be seen as an expression of a negative Persson effect. Some non-socialist voters saw the referendum as an opportunity to demonstrate discontent with a Social Democratic prime minister. Last summer retiring Moderate leader Bo Lundgren was forced to urge their supporters publicly not to cast a protest vote against Göran Persson in the euro question. This says something very important about the mechanisms of block politics.

The Social Democrats were split right down the middle: 49 percent voted yes, 49 percent no. It was—and is—a problem. But Persson had just as much success, or just as little, as his predecessor Ingvar Carlsson in 1994: also in the EU referendum the party was split down the middle. According to conventional wisdom, Persson was worse than Carlsson at attracting Social Democratic yes votes. Persson’s constitutionally correct but politically controversial observations against the government’s five no ministers led to heated internal debate in which he was compared to Stalin. But Persson did not get a majority of the party against him; the battle for the party is by no means lost.

Two of these parties on the no side, the Left and the Greens, want Sweden to get out of the EU. But up until 8 p.m. last Sunday evening, when the polls closed, the anti-EU part of the no side were careful not to raise the question. It was a wise tactic: 60 percent of the voters wanted Sweden to stay in the EU. Only 24 percent wanted Sweden to leave the union. Among those who voted no on the euro, over one third, 34 percent, wanted Sweden to remain a member of the EU. Parties starting to make the demands for withdrawal are hardly headed for the winner’s circle.

But this is not only about what Sweden wants. How is the conflict to be resolved between a no to the euro and a new EU treaty, in which the euro is a formal obligation? Will the other EU members agree to give Sweden a dispensation? How will the expansion be affected next year if the Poles and Slovaks can point to Sweden and demand special treatment on account of domestic policies?

During the election campaign the opponents of the euro were forced to defend themselves against accusations of nationalism. The Sweden Democrats and other small parties on the far right found themselves on the no side, of course.

The great majority who voted no last Sunday are good democrats, naturally: there are a number of politically and intellectually respectable reasons to be skeptical about the EMU and the euro. But Valu nonetheless suggests that there is a national aspect in the no opinion.

Among questions of very great significance for no voters, independence came in second place: 62 percent. Among those who voted yes, the question wound up only in tenth place: 22 percent.

Voters with a background in some other European country voted yes by a wide margin: 72 against 27 percent. But the most interesting figures are the following:

Among voters who during the past twelve months have made several visits to countries that have the euro as currency, 64 percent voted yes and 35 percent no. Among voters who had never visited a euro land the picture was the reverse: 34 percent yes, 64 percent no.

One can describe Sunday’s rebellion against the elite in many different ways. Geographically: only in Stockholm and Skåne did yes get the most votes. In terms of education: 65 percent of the members of LO, the blue-collar trade union, voted no while 57 percent of voters affiliated with the academics’ union SACO voted yes. Right-left: 75 of the Moderates voted yes, 88 percent of the leftists voted no.

But most ominous, at least from an EU-friendly perspective, is the generation factor: In the age group 18-20 years of age, 66 percent voted no, 29 percent yes.

Lessons to be learned? Possibly these:
*In European policy the disunity of the non-socialists is at least as great a problem as a Social Democratic split.
*The connection between the euro and the whole EU project was introduced too late in the yes campaign.
*The antagonism between people and elite in EU questions may, if it is not handled more sensitively and carefully, can become a breeding ground for populist welfare nationalism.
*The young people must be won over to the idea of Europe.
*The more we come into contact with the euro, the less fixated we come with the crown. This may be crucial next time—in 2010 or so.

Swedes are, after all, a traveling people.

-- trans. Verne Moberg