Jonathan Pollack examines "China’s Strategic Debate over North Korea"

At the close of Jonathan Pollack’s lecture on October 19, 2009, Gerald Curtis commented that we always end conversations about North Korea with more questions than answers. But Dr. Pollack’s insights about North Korea-China relations certainly led to deeper understanding of the evolving relations between both countries.

As part of Weatherhead East Asia Institute’s “North Korea and a Changing Northeast Asia” brown-bag series, Pollack, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College, lectured on “China’s Strategic Debate over North Korea: How Real? How Far? To What End?”

In light of the recent visit to North Korea of China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, Pollack focused on the historical and evolving nature of China-North Korea relationship and the ways in which many growing numbers of Chinese observers are becoming less satisfied with the status quo. He began with the question: “Are Chinese-North Korean relations like the movie Groundhog Day?” His reference to Groundhog Day questioned whether North Korean behavior proves more cooperative over time.

The answer to that question can not be fully predicted, but Pollack explained that many Chinese believe that North Korea’s political course is unsustainable. One "example of China's changing calculations" came this past summer, when China did not release a statement on the anniversary of the 1961 alliance between the two countries. Relations have now become only more complex and less certain.

Pollack sees the Chinese as less prepared to accommodate to North Korean demands and expectations.  There is now open disdain in the Chinese press about North Korean internal affairs and some senior Chinese officials express mounting frustration about the North’s recent actions, including its second nuclear test. 

Pollack divided current internal Chinese debate about North Korea into three schools. The first school of “hard-liners” views deteriorating relations as stemming from North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear capabilities, justifying heightened cooperation with the United States to curtail North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The second “stability-first” school continues to view North Korea as a potential buffer state that China needs to assist economically, which also fears that nuclear tests might trigger destabilizing outcomes, such as increased military pressure from the United States or the collapse of the North Korean state. Meanwhile, a third school focuses on developing trade and business contacts with the North and plays little heed to their nuclear actions.

Although it is evident that China has yet to alter its fundamental policies with North Korea, the increased discontent within China is bound to affect the ways in which Hu Jintao’s government can bring about further cooperation between the two countries. In the meantime, China will need to pay increased heed to the calls for policy change, and its future policies will aim toward risk prevention by taking into account the implications of North Korean nuclear ambitions. 

 

-Ryan McElveen

 

 

October 21, 2009