DEAN MACCANNEL "THE TOURIST"

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THE TOURIST

INTRODUCTION

"TOURIST" is used to mean two things in this book. It designates actual tourists: sightseers, mainly middle-class, who are at this moment deployed throughout the entire world in search of experience. I want the book to serve as a sociological study of this group. But I should make it known that, from the beginning, I intended something more. The tourist is an actual person, or real people are actually tourists. At the same time, "the tourist" is one of the best models available for modern-man-in-general. I am equally interested in "the tourist" in this second, metasociological sense of the term. Our first apprehension of modern civilization, it seems to me, emerges in the mind of the tourist.

I began work on this project in Paris in 1968 with much disregard for theory. Shortly after my arrival, I found myself at a reception given for some American scholars by the wife of the owner of Maxim's Restaurant. We were presented to Professor Claude Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss gave us a brief statement on some recent developments in the structural analysis of society and then he invited questions. It was not possible, he said, to do an ethnography of modernity. Modern society is just too complex; history has intervened and smashed its structure. No matter how hard one searched, one would never find a coherent system of relations in modern society. (I did not bring up this matter which was so important to me. Someone else did. I just sat there listening.) Perhaps it would be possible, Lévi-Strauss concluded, to do a structural analysis of a detail of modern etiquette, something like "table manners in modern society." I admit to having

been somewhat put off by his remarks, so much so, in fact, that I turned away from French Structuralism at that point, seeking refuge in my small but growing inventory of observations of tourists. I would try to understand the place of the tourist in the modern world, I thought, outside of existing theoretical frameworks.

When I returned to Paris in 1970-71 to analyze my field notes and observations, I was surprised to discover that my interpretations kept integrating themselves with a line of inquiry begun by Émile Durkheim in his study of primitive religion. I was not surprised to discover that the existing theory that best fit my facts originated in another field: structural anthropology. This kind of theoretical transfer is commonplace. Nor was I surprised that a theory devised to account for primitive religious phenomena could be adapted to an aspect of modern secular life. I do not believe that all men are essentially the same "underneath," but I do believe that all cultures are composed of the same elements in different combinations. I was surprised because the most recent important contribution to this line of research is, of course, Lévi-Strauss's own studies of the *Savage Mind* and of primitive classification. I admit that I am still somewhat concerned about the implications of his admonition that one cannot do an ethnography of modernity, but I shall go ahead anyway, confident at least that I did not *try* to do a structural analysis of the tourist and modern society. It forced itself upon me.

The more I examined my data, the more inescapable became my conclusion that tourist attractions are an unplanned typology of structure that provides direct access to the modern consciousness or "world view," that tourist attractions are precisely analogous to the religious symbolism of primitive peoples.

Modernity first appears to everyone as it did to Lévi-Strauss, as disorganized fragments, alienating, wasteful, violent, superficial, unplanned, unstable and inauthentic. On second examination, however, this appearance seems almost a mask, for beneath the disorderly exterior, modern society hides a firm resolve to establish itself on a worldwide base.

Modern values are transcending the old divisions between the Communist East and the Capitalist West and between the "developed" and "third" worlds. The progress of modernity ("modernization") depends on its very sense of instability and inauthenticity. For moderns, reality and authenticity are thought to be elsewhere: in other historical periods and other cultures, in purer, simpler lifestyles. In other words, the concern of moderns for "naturalness," their nostalgia and their search for authenticity are not merely casual and somewhat decadent, though harmless, attachments to the souvenirs of destroyed cultures and dead epochs. They are also components of the conquering spirit of modernity—the grounds of its unifying consciousness.

The central thesis of this book holds the empirical and ideological expansion of modern society to be intimately linked in diverse ways to modern mass leisure, especially to international tourism and sightseeing. Originally, I had planned to study tourism and revolution, which seemed to me to name the two poles of modern consciousness—a willingness to accept, even venerate, things as they are on the one hand, a desire to transform things on the other. While my work on revolution continues, it is necessary for several reasons to present the tourist materials now. This book may also serve as an introduction to the structural analysis of modern society.

A structural approach to society departs somewhat from traditional sociological approaches, and I should attempt to characterize that difference. Academic sociology has broken modern society into several researchable subelements (classes, the city, the rural community, ethnic groups, criminal behavior, complex organization, etc.) before having attempted to determine the ways these fit together. This procedure has led to careful empirical research and "theories of the middle range," but it has not resulted in a sociology that can keep pace with the evolution of its subject. Now, it seems to me that sociology will not progress much beyond its current glut of unrelated findings and ideas until we begin to develop methods of approaching the total design of society and models that link the findings of the subfields together in a single framework.

This task is difficult because of the complexity of modern society and because its boundaries do not fit neatly with some other boundary system such as those circumscribing a religion, language or nation. There are pockets of traditional society in modern areas and outposts

of modernity in the most remote places. Modernity cannot, therefore, be defined from without; it must be defined from within via documentation of the particular values it assigns to qualities and relations.

The Method of the Study

The method for this study began with a search for an existing institution or activity with goals very similar to my own: an explication of modern social structure. This approach enables me to draw upon the collective experiences of entire groups, that is, to adopt the "natural standpoint" and detour around the arbitrary limits sociology has imposed upon itself. The organized activities of international sightseeing seemed reasonably adapted to my purposes. The method is similar to the way Erving Goffman reconstructs everyday life in our society by following the contours of face-to-face interaction— interaction itself being a naturally occurring collective effort to understand, or at least to cope with, everyday life. It is also similar to the method Lévi-Strauss uses to arrive at *la pensée sauvage* via an analysis of myths—myths being the masterworks of "untamed" minds.

I saw in the collective expeditions of tourists a multibillion dollar research project designed, in part, around the same task I set myself: an ethnography of modernity. I never entertained the notion that the old one-man–one-culture approach to ethnography could be adapted to the study of modern social structure, not even at the beginning. Methodological innovations such as those provided by Goffman and Lévi-Strauss, far from being exemplary, are minimally adequate. So I undertook to follow the tourists, sometimes joining their groups, sometimes watching them from afar through writings by, for and about them. Suddenly, my "professional" perspective which originally kept me away from my problem opened outward. My "colleagues" were everywhere on the face of the earth, searching for peoples, practices and artifacts we might record and relate to our own sociocultural experience. In Harold Garfinkel's terms, it became possible to stop thinking about an ethnography of modernity and to start *accomplishing* it.

Perhaps I am guilty of presenting an ancient phenomenon as if we moderns just invented it. If, as a matter of fact, I am guilty of this, I can only say that such an act is a commonplace of social science, and is

almost to be expected. Actually, self-discovery through a complex and sometimes arduous search for an Absolute Other is a basic theme of our civilization, a theme supporting an enormous literature: Odysseus, Aeneas, the Diaspora, Chaucer, Christopher Columbus, *Pilgrim's Progress*, Gulliver, Jules Verne, Western ethnography, Mao's Long March. This theme does not just thread its way through our literature and our history. It grows and develops, arriving at a kind of final flowering in modernity. What begins as the proper activity of a *hero* (Alexander the Great) develops into the goal of a socially organized *group* (the Crusaders), into the mark of status of an entire social *class* (the Grand Tour of the British "gentleman"), eventually becoming *universal experience* (the tourist). I will have occasion to draw upon this tradition and other traditions which are submerging in modernity.

At a time when social science is consolidating its intellectual empire via a colonization of primitive people, poor people and ethnic and other minorities, it might seem paradoxically out of the "mainstream" to be studying the leisure activities of a class of people most favored by modernity, the international middle class, the class the social scientists are serving. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we are eventually to catch up with the evolution of modern society, we must invent more aggressive strategies to attempt to get closer to the heart of the problem. By following the tourists, we may be able to arrive at a better understanding of ourselves. Tourists are criticized for having a superficial view of the things that interest them—and so are social scientists. Tourists are purveyors of modern values the world over —and so are social scientists. And modern tourists share with social scientists their curiosity about primitive peoples, poor peoples and ethnic and other minorities.

The Sociology of Leisure

This is, then, a study in the sociology of leisure. This field is relatively undeveloped, but it will develop quite rapidly, I think, as a consequence of the transition of industrial social structure to a "post-industrial" or "modern" type. Leisure is displacing work from the center of modern social arrangements. There is evidence in the movements of the 1960's that the world of work has played out its

capacity for regeneration. Experimental forms of social organization are no longer emerging from the factories and offices as they did during the period of mechanization and unionization. Rather, new forms of organization are emerging from a broadly based framework of leisure activities: T-groups, new political involvements, communal living arrangements, organized "dropping out," etc. "Life-style," a generic term for specific combinations of work and leisure, is replacing "occupation" as the basis of social relationship formation, social status and social action.

Wherever industrial society is transformed into modern society, *work* is simultaneously transformed into an object of touristic curiosity. In every corner of the modern world, *labor* and *production* are being presented to sightseers in guided tours of factories and in museums of science and industry. In the developing world, some important attractions are being detached from their original social and religious meanings, now appearing as monumental representations of "abstract, undifferentiated human labor," as Karl Marx used to say. The Egyptian pyramids exemplify this. Sightseeing at such attractions preserves still important values embodied in work-in-general, even as specific work processes and the working class itself are transcended by history.

It is only by making a fetish of the work of others, by transforming it into an "amusement" ("do-it-yourself"), a spectacle (Grand Coulee), or an attraction (the guided tours of Ford Motor Company), that modern workers, on vacation, can apprehend work as a part of a meaningful totality. The Soviet Union, of necessity, is much more developed along these lines than the industrial democracies of the capitalist West. The alienation of the worker stops where the alienation of the sightseer begins.

The destruction of industrial culture is occurring from within as alienation invades the work place, and the same process is bringing about the birth of modernity. Affirmation of basic social values is departing the world of work and seeking refuge in the realm of leisure. "Creativity" is almost exclusively in the province of cultural, not industrial, productions, and "intimacy" and "spontaneity" are preserved in social relations away from work. Working relations are increasingly marred by cold calculation. Tourism is developing the capacity to organize both positive and negative social sentiments. On

the negative side, for example, "social problems" figure in the curiosity of tourists: dirt, disease, malnutrition. Couples from the Midwest who visit Manhattan now leave a little disappointed if they do not chance to witness and remark on some of its famous street crime. One is reminded that staged "holdups" are a stable motif in Wild West tourism. And tourists will go out of their way to view such egregious sights as the Berlin Wall, the Kennedy assassination area and even the ovens at Dachau.

The act of sightseeing is uniquely well-suited among leisure alternatives to draw the tourist into a relationship with the modern social totality. As a worker, the individual's relationship to his society is partial and limited, secured by a fragile "work ethic," and restricted to a single position among millions in the division of labor. As a tourist, the individual may step out into the universal drama of modernity. As a tourist, the individual may attempt to grasp the division of labor as a phenomenon *sui generis* and become a moral witness of its masterpieces of virtue and viciousness.

The industrial epoch has biased its sociology in several ways. Our research is concentrated on work, not leisure, and on the working class, not the middle class.[1] Modernity calls into question the necessity of the dirtily industrial version of work, advancing the idea that work should have other than economic rewards and leisure should be productive. New species of commodities (do-it-yourself kits, packaged vacations, entertainments, work-study programs) reflect the modern fragmentation and mutual displacement of work and leisure, and the emergence of new synthetic structures as yet unanalyzed. This recent coming together of work and leisure suggests the need for a sociology of middle-class leisure that can integrate itself with our already established sociology of the working class.

The Structure of Postindustrial Modernity

The characteristics of modernity examined by social scientists are advanced urbanization, expanded literacy, generalized health care, rationalized work arrangements, geographical and economic mobility and the emergence of the nation-state as the most important sociopolitical unit. These are merely the surface features of modernity. The deep structure of modernity is a totalizing idea, a modern

mentality that sets modern society in opposition both to its own past and to those societies of the present that are premodern or un(der)developed.

No other major social structural distinction (certainly not that between the classes) has received such massive reinforcement as the ideological separation of the modern from the nonmodern world. International treaties and doctrines dividing the world into multinational blocs serve to dramatize the distinction between the developed nations and the lesser ones which are not thought to be capable of independent self-defense. Modern nations train development specialists, organizing them into teams and sending them to the underdeveloped areas of the world which are thereby identified as being incapable of solving their own problems. The giving of this and other forms of international aid is a *sine qua non* of full modern status, as dependence on it is a primary indicator of a society trying to modernize itself. The national practice of keeping exact demographic records of infant mortality and literacy rates, per capita income, etc., functions in the same way to separate the modern from the nonmodern world along a variety of dimensions. The domestic version of the distinction is couched in economic terms, the "poverty line" that separates full members of the modern world from their less fortunate fellow citizens who are victims of it, immobilized behind the poverty line in such places as Appalachia and the inner city. The field of ethnology dramatizes a still more radical separation: primitive versus modern. When the underdeveloped world fights back, the distinction is embedded in the structure of conflict, where one side uses "guerrilla" while the other side uses "conventional" warfare.

Interestingly, the best indication of the final victory of modernity over other sociocultural arrangements is not the disappearance of the nonmodern world, but its artificial preservation and reconstruction in modern society. The separation of nonmodern culture traits from their original contexts and their distribution as modern playthings are evident in the various social movements toward naturalism, so much a feature of modern societies: cults of folk music and medicine, adornment and behavior, peasant dress, Early American decor, efforts, in short, to museumize the premodern. A suicidal recreation of guerrilla activities has recently appeared in the American avant-garde. These displaced forms, embedded in modern society, are the spoils of the

victory of the modern over the nonmodern world. They establish in consciousness the definition and boundary of modernity by rendering concrete and immediate that which modernity is not.

The Tourist

It is intellectually chic nowadays to deride tourists. An influential theoretician of modern leisure, Daniel J. Boorstin, approvingly quotes a nineteenth-century writer at length:

> The cities of Italy [are] now deluged with droves of these creatures, for they never separate, and you see them forty in number pouring along a street with their director—now in front, now at the rear, circling round them like a sheep dog—and really the process is as like herding as may be. I have already met three flocks, and anything so uncouth I never saw before, the men, mostly elderly, dreary, sad-looking; the women, somewhat younger, travel-tossed but intensely lively, wide-awake and facetious.[2]

Claude Lévi-Strauss writes simply: Travel and travellers are two things I loathe—and yet here I am, all set to tell the story of my expeditions."[3] A student of mine in Paris, a young man from Iran dedicated to the revolution, half stammering, half shouting, said to me, "Let's face it, we are all tourists!" Then, rising to his feet, his face contorted with what seemed to me to be self-hatred, he concluded dramatically in a hiss: "Even *I* am a tourist."

I think it significant that people who are actually in accord are struggling to distance themselves from themselves via this moral stereotype of the tourist. When I was eighteen years old, I returned a date to her home on a little resort-residential island. As the ferry approached the slip, I reached for the ignition key. She grabbed my hand, saying vehemently, "Don't do that! Only *tourists* start their cars before we dock!"

The rhetoric of moral superiority that comfortably inhabits this talk about tourists was once found in unconsciously prejudicial statements about other "outsiders," Indians, Chicanos, young people, blacks, women. As these peoples organize into groups and find both a collective identity and a place in the modern totality, it is increasingly difficult to manufacture morality out of opposition to them. The modern consciousness appears to be dividing along different lines

against itself. Tourists dislike tourists. God is dead, but man's need to appear holier than his fellows lives. And the religious impulse to go beyond one's fellow men can be found not merely in our work ethic, where Max Weber found it, but in some of our leisure acts as well.

The modern critique of tourists is not an analytical reflection on the problem of tourism—it is a part of the problem. Tourists are not criticized by Boorstin and others for leaving home to see sights. They are reproached for being satisfied with superficial experiences of other peoples and other places. An educated respondent told me that he and his wife were "very nervous" when they visited the Winterthur museum because they did not know "the proper names of all the different styles of antiques," and they were afraid their silence would betray their ignorance. In other words, touristic shame is not based on being a tourist but on not being tourist enough, on a failure to see everything the way it "ought" to be seen. The touristic critique of tourism is based on a desire to go beyond the other "mere" tourists to a more profound appreciation of society and culture, and it is by no means limited to intellectual statements. All tourists desire this deeper involvement with society and culture to some degree; it is a basic component of their motivation to travel.

Some Remarks on Method and Theory

My approach to leisure is *metacritical* or "anthropological" in the technical sense of that term. I do not, that is, treat moral pronouncements on leisure as having the status of scientific statements, even though some might qualify as such. Rather, I have used critical statements such as Boorstin's in the same way that an ethnographer uses the explanations of social life volunteered by his native respondents: as a part of the puzzle to be solved, not as one of its solutions. I assume no one will think me motivated by a desire to debunk my fellow students of leisure. I aim only to understand the role of the tourist in modern society.

I am very much indebted to the other scholars who preceded me. Thorstein Veblen provided the most complete study of leisure in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*. I do not think I have deviated much from the spirit of Veblen's original inquiry, even though, for reasons I will try to give, there is almost no resemblance between our specific findings.

I have adopted Veblen's general thesis that leisure reflects social structure. My work departs significantly from his, however, in the selection of a dimension of structure on which to base the analytic of leisure. Veblen anchors his analysis in the class structure, calling our attention to the uneven distribution of work in society and the status components of leisure: for example, the ways it is consumed conspicuously as a symbol of social status. I am suspicious of research that insists on the primacy and independence of social class, that does not attempt to go beyond class to discover still deeper structures that might render class relations in modern society more intelligible. It is necessary to recall that Marx *derived* his model of social class relations from his analysis of the value of commodities. As new species of commodities appear in the modern world, and as the fundamental nature of the commodity changes (for example, from a pair of pants to a packaged vacation; from a piece of work to a piece of no-work), Marx's deduction must be repeated.

My analysis of sightseeing is based on *social structural differentiation*. Differentiation is roughly the same as societal "development" or "modernization." By "differentiation" I mean to designate the totality of differences between social classes, life-styles, racial and ethnic groups, age grades (the youth, the aged), political and professional groups and the mythic representation of the past to the present. Differentiation is a *systemic variable:* it is not confined to a specific institution of society, nor does it originate in one institution or place and spread to others. It operates independently and simultaneously throughout society. In highly differentiated societies such as those found in Western Europe and North America, social life constantly subdivides and reorganizes itself in ever-increasing complexity. The class structure moves from simple duality (owners vs. workers) to upper-upper/middle-upper/lower-upper/upper-middle/middle-middle/lower-middle/upper-lower/middle-lower/lower-lower. Sexual differentiation progresses beyond its typically peasant, biologically based binary opposition into publicly discriminated third, fourth, fifth and sixth sexes. Differentiation is the origin of alternatives and the feeling of freedom in modern society. It is also the primary ground of the contradiction, conflict, violence, fragmentation, discontinuity and alienation that are such evident features of modern life.

It is structural differentiation, I think, and not some inherent

quality of capitalism (its alleged fit with human nature, for example) that confines the revolution to the less developed, agricultural areas of the world. In the modern urban-industrial centers, working-class consciousness is already too differentiated to coordinate itself into a progressive, revolutionary force. In modern society, revolution in the conventional sense awaits the transcendence of sociocultural differentiation. Modern mass leisure contains this transcendence in-itself, but there is as yet no parallel revolutionary consciousness that operates independently and for-itself.

The Evolution of Modernity

Imagine what no revolutionary party or army has dared to imagine—a revolution so total as to void every written and unwritten constitution and contract. This revolution changes not merely the laws but the norms: no routine, no matter how small, can be accomplished without conscious thought and effort. During this revolution, every book is completely rewritten and, at the same time, every book, in fact, thought itself, is translated into a new kind of language. During this revolution, the cities are leveled and rebuilt on a new model. Every masterpiece is repainted and every unknown shred of the past is dug out of the earth while all known archaeological finds are buried under new meanings. During this revolution, the overthrow of capitalist economies appears as a midterm economic adjustment. This revolution is a true revolution, unlike the regressive, pseudo-revolutions of political and religious movements that make a place for themselves by burning the land and the books of others. This revolution that submerges the most radical consciousness in its plenitude is, of course, unthinkable.

And yet, our laws have undergone total change and our cities have been replaced block by block. Our masterpieces are remade in each new genre. Critical and scientific language that wants to describe these changes always risks seeming to have lost its meaning. This revolution continues. Modern culture is more revolutionary in-itself than the most revolutionary consciousness so far devised. Every major sector of modern society—politics, ethics, science, arts, leisure—is now devoted almost entirely to the problem of keeping pace with this revolution. "The Revolution" in the conventional,

Marxist sense of the term is an emblem of the evolution of modernity. Sociocultural differentiation contains the secret of its own destruction and renewal.

After considerable inductive labor, I discovered that *sightseeing is a ritual performed to the differentiations of society*. Sightseeing is a kind of collective striving for a transcendence of the modern totality, a way of attempting to overcome the discontinuity of modernity, of incorporating its fragments into unified experience. Of course, it is doomed to eventual failure: even as it tries to construct totalities, it celebrates differentiation.

The locus of sightseeing in the middle class is understandable in other than merely economic terms. It is the middle class that systematically scavenges the earth for new experiences to be woven into a collective, touristic version of other peoples and other places. This effort of the international middle class to coordinate the differentiations of the world into a single ideology is intimately linked to its capacity to subordinate other peoples to its values, industry and future designs. The middle class is the most favored now because it has a transcendent consciousness. Tourism, I suggest, is an essential component of that consciousness.

The touristic integration of society resembles a catalogue of displaced forms. In this regard it is empirically accurate. The differentiations of the modern world have the same structure as tourist attractions: elements dislodged from their original natural, historical and cultural contexts fit together with other such displaced or modernized things and people. The differentiations *are* the attractions. Modern battleships are berthed near *Old Ironsides;* highrise apartments stand next to restored eighteenth-century townhouses; "Old Faithful" geyser is surrounded by bleacher seats; all major cities contain wildlife and exotic plant collections; Egyptian obelisks stand at busy intersections in London and Paris and in Central Park in New York City. Modernization simultaneously separates these things from the people and places that made them, breaks up the solidarity of the groups in which they originally figured as cultural elements, and brings the people liberated from traditional attachments into the modern world where, as tourists, they may attempt to discover or reconstruct a cultural heritage or a social identity.

Interestingly enough, the generalized anxiety about the authenticity of interpersonal relationships in modern society is matched by certainty about the authenticity of touristic sights. The rhetoric of tourism is full of manifestations of the importance of the authenticity of the relationship between tourists and what they see: this is a *typical* native house; this is the *very* place the leader fell; this is the *actual* pen used to sign the law; this is the *original* manuscript; this is an *authentic* Tlingit fish club; this is a *real* piece of the *true* Crown of Thorns.[4] The level of authentication can be very low. After the fashion of a doctor with his ear pressed to the chest of a dying patient, a Councilman has suggested that New York City is "alive" because it makes "noise":

> Some see a certain danger in the anti-noise program. On the council floor Bertram A. Gelfand, a Bronx Democrat, said the code raised the possibility not only of a loss of jobs but also of delaying, or raising the cost of, vitally needed facilities such as new housing and rapid transit. Still others see another danger: That the code might rob the city of a certain *je ne sais quoi*. "One of the enjoyable things about New York," said Councilman Michael DeMarco, "is that it's alive, there's a lot of noise."[5]

Some tourist attractions are not merely minimal, they are subminimal or generally regarded as "pseudo" or "tacky":

> A 13-story Fiberglas statue of Jesus Christ is the centerpiece of a new Biblical amusement park called Holyland, being built near Mobile, Ala. The park . . . will include visits to heaven and hell, Noah's ark, gladiator fights, the Tower of Babel and the belly of the whale temporarily occupied by Jonah. All for just $6 a ticket.[6]

But this type of attraction in fact functions to enhance the supposed authenticity of true sights such as the Statue of Liberty or the Liberty Bell. Modern society institutionalizes these authentic attractions and modern life takes on qualities of reality thereby.

In the establishment of modern society, the individual act of sightseeing is probably less important than the ceremonial ratification of authentic attractions as objects of ultimate value, a ratification at once caused by and resulting in a gathering of tourists around an attraction and measurable to a certain degree by the time and distance the tourists travel to reach it. The actual act of communion between tourist and attraction is less important than the *image* or the *idea* of

society that the collective act generates. The image of the Statue of Liberty or the Liberty Bell that is the product of visits to them is more enduring than any specific visit, although, of course, the visit is indispensable to the image. A specific act of sightseeing is, in itself, weightless *and*, at the same time, the ultimate reason for the orderly representation of the social structure of modern society in the system of attractions.

This should not be taken to imply that sightseeing is without its importance for individual consciousness. Presumably sightseeing, along with religious fervor and patriotism, can be important for the development of a certain type of mind. It seems that individual thought and comportment add and detract almost nothing in modern society, but this is only an appearance that breeds a necessary sense of danger. It is a source of anxiety that our kind of society has the capacity to develop beyond the point where individuals can continue to have a meaningful place in it. If this development were to progress without a corresponding reconstitution of a place for man in society, modernity would simply collapse at the moment of its greatest expansion. But this collapse is not happening in fact. Tourism and participation in the other modern alternatives to everyday life makes a place for unattached individuals in modern society. The act of sightseeing is a kind of involvement with social appearances that helps the person to construct totalities from his disparate experiences. Thus, his life and his society can appear to him as an orderly series of formal representations, like snapshots in a family album.

Modernity transcends older social boundaries, appearing first in urban industrial centers and spreading rapidly to undeveloped areas. There is no other complex of reflexive behaviors and ideas that follows this development so quickly as tourism and sightseeing. With the possible exceptions of existentialism and science fiction, there is no other widespread movement universally regarded as essentially modern. Advanced technology is found everywhere in modern society, of course, and many students have examined it for clues about modernity, but it is not a reflective structure that expresses the totality of the modern spirit as, for example, a modern religion might if a modern religion existed. On this level, only the system of attractions, including the natural, cultural, and technological attractions, reflects the differentiations of modern society and consciousness.

Existentialism, especially in its popular and Christian versions, attempts to provide moral stability to modern existence by examining the inauthentic origins of self-consciousness. From a critical examination of existentialism (or sightseeing), there arises the question that directs this present study: How can a society that suppresses interpersonal morality (the old, or traditional, morality founded on a separation of truth from lies) be one of the most solidary societies, one of the strongest and most progressive known to history?

Both sightseeing and existentialism provide the beginnings of an answer to this question in their equation of inauthenticity and self-consciousness. Modern society, it is widely believed, has become moral in-itself. It contains its own justification for existence which it maintains as its most closely kept secret. The individual's place in this society, his role in the division of labor, is no longer basic to social structure. Modern man (sociology has contributed to this somewhat) has been forced to become conscious of society as such, not merely of his own "social life." As the division of labor is transformed into social structural differentiation, morality moves up a level, from the individual to society, and so does "self"-consciousness. Entire cities and regions, decades and cultures have become aware of themselves as tourist attractions. The nations of the modern world, for example, are not total structures that situate every aspect of the life and thought of their citizens, the sociologists' "ideal societies." At most, modern societies like France and Japan are relatively solidary subdifferentiations of the modern world: places to be visited, i.e., tourist attractions. Modern interest in science fiction (as well as in existentialism and sightseeing) is motivated by a collective quest for an overarching (solar or galactic) system, a higher moral authority in a godless universe, which makes of the entire world a single solidary unit, a *mere* world with its proper place among worlds.

1

Modernity and the Production of Touristic Experiences

AT the beginning of the industrial age, Karl Marx, basing his ideas on those of Hegel, wrote a theory accurate enough for several revolutionary governments to use as a guide for building new societies. To my knowledge, there is no other sociological thesis which has been so applied, and (by this standard of applicability) Marx's work remains a high point in sociological macrotheory construction.[1]

The industrial epoch is ending, however, and Marx's thought, once at the vanguard, has become separated from the revolution. European intellectuals (Sartre and especially Merleau-Ponty) saw in Stalinization the first signs of the petrifaction of Marxism. The current generation has its own evidence of the phenomenon, including *Pravda*'s denunciation of the student-worker revolution in Paris in May, 1968.

Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the recent failure of Marxist thought to articulate its content to the revolution is found in the classrooms of community colleges in New Jersey, Kansas, and California. The Marxist perspective is being taught and studied sympathetically in working-class colleges across the U.S.A. with no evident impact—as yet, anyway.[2] It might prove fruitful to reopen the books in search for an alternate path to the end of the industrial age.

Hegel was the first modern thinker to take as his proper task the incorporation into a single system of *all thought*, including the history of each department of thought which, before him, appeared to be

discrete and isolated. Hegel treated pure science, fine art, history, morality and politics as but differentiations of consciousness, and he explicates *consciousness* so understood. In his *Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel grasps intellectual movements and entire epochs of culture history as fragments of a totality. He set as his goal the discovery of the ordering principles interior to the totality which gives rise to seemingly independent ideas and particular historical periods.

Hegel held the natural, material world to be the realm of the contingent and accidental. *Order*, in his view, is a product of consciousness. For example, his analysis of the State made of it the visible, tangible spirit of a people, a reflex of consciousness transcended only by art, philosophy, and religion. These go beyond the State because they are *partial* reflections, not of the spirit of a historically existent people, but of *absolute* spirit.

Hegel was first turned around by Ludwig Feuerbach, who suggested that consciousness originates in the world of things and empirical affairs. Far from being a reflection of absolute spirit, religion, according to Feuerbach, is only a reflex of society: the Holy Family is an image of the earthly one. In his influential *Theses* on Feuerbach, Marx claims that Feuerbach's materialism is an essential reinterpretation of Hegel but degenerate. Because Feuerbach located the universality of meaning in each individual's consciousness, his materialism necessarily leads to a degraded, epicurean sensualism. It was Feuerbach who wrote, "*Man ist, was er isst.*"[4]

The difference between Marx and Feuerbach is still reflected in the political left of today in the division between epicurean vs. ascetic communism: hippies on communes vs. the Weather Underground or the Progressive Laborites.[5] Feuerbach conceived of practical everyday activity only in individual personal (social psychological) terms. Marx viewed practical activity, work, in social structural terms. Its immediate referent is whole groups of men classified according to the division of wealth and labor into groups. The activity of Feuerbachian materialism is a sterile kind of individual restlessness. For Marx, change is not merely a change of mind or social position, but a change of the total society.

Karl Marx began his analysis of social structure *not* with the

individual but with an examination of the relations between man and his productions. The Holy Family is only a reflex of the family of man, but understanding the fullness of the meaning of the human situation requires going beyond the determination of a parallelism between the (religious) ideal and the empirical world. It is necessary, he says, to demystify the relationship between the material and the nonmaterial, between quantity and quality. The family of man subordinates itself to an image of itself which it creates and then holds to be superior to itself. Marx (unlike Durkheim) read this as a sign of an agonizing alienation resting on a schism in social structure itself. This alienation of man from his creations culminates, according to Marx, in capitalist production.

Marx foresaw the flowering of the importance of *commodities* under industrial capitalism. He saw in the manufacture, exchange and distribution of commodities a novel structure. The relationship between *things*—their relative values, arrangement into hierarchies, their progressive development in production processes—is modeled on social relations in human society. Moreover, Marx found that the relations between the men involved in commodity production were developing in an opposing direction and becoming rational and objectified, or thinglike. The double movement of social relations onto a material base and of the material base into ideology is the main legacy of industrial society and Marx's understanding of it.

MARX'S SEMIOTIC

In Marx's close analysis of the commodity he finds its *value* is equal to the amount of labor (from the total available labor) required to make it. Its monetary value is only a reflection of the common denominator of all commodities: labor. Every commodity can have a price tag because each one has more or less of the same ingredient: labor. Marxists have drawn moral conclusions about the rightful place of the worker in society from this theory. I want to point out another feature of the theory, an implication of its systemic quality: there is no such thing as a commodity in isolation. Commodities originate in systems of exchanges. These systems are entirely social, entirely "unnatural," and fully capable of generating values in themselves. In other words,

in Marx's treatment of it, the system of commodity production under capitalism resembles nothing so much as a language. A language is entirely social, entirely arbitrary and fully capable of generating meanings in itself. In updated terms, Marx wrote a "semiotic" of capitalist production. As Marx himself said: "value . . . converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. . . . We try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social product; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language."[6]

Of course, Marx only wanted us to see commodities as a sign of the labor invested in them. He attempted to block their interpretations as meaningful elements in other cultural systems, but in a sense he tricked himself. Once the language-like or signifying capabilities of any object or gesture have been exposed, it begins an unstoppable journey between systems of meaning, revealing depths of religious, legal, esthetic and other values alongside the economic. In Marx's analysis of commodities, he was already beginning to draw out their other potential cultural meanings; especially in his discussion of the *fetishism* of commodities. This is the almost automatic result of his willingness to treat the commodity as a bond of objective and subjective values unified via social production processes. In manufacture, each individual's contribution is, in-itself, meaningless, and meaning occurs as the outcome of a collective effort. As such, the industrial production process is an index of the social grounds of all meaning, and the finished commodity is a *symbol*. Capitalism is the form of production that makes the commodity its most important symbol. After Marx, the search for the historical development of social facts and their eventual destruction has passed beyond a concern for the grounds of the value of commodities to a search for the *meaning* of modern social life. This is so even among Marxists as diverse as Sartre and Marcuse and among the anti-Marxists as well.

Marx was the first to discover the symbolic or fetishistic aspect of the commodity: its capacity to organize meaning and to make us want things for reasons that go beyond our material needs. But this realization called forth his antagonism, and (I am tempted to write "and so") he cut short his analysis of the fetishism of commodities. But in the subsequent history of the industrial object, it is just this feature that undergoes the greatest development, transforming the merely industrial world into the modern world: the appeal to the *gourmet* in the

processed food, the *fidelity* of the radio. Even such mundane items as automobile parts fall under this principle. An advertisement reads:

> ANTI-SWAY BARS. Don't talk sports action, experience it with positive vehicle control! Enjoy the safety and comfort of taut, flat, balanced cornering. Stop plowing on turns, under or oversteer, wheel hop and spin, boatlike handling. Eliminate dangerous body roll and rear end steering effect. Feel the thrill of a perfectly balanced car.[7]

The other aspects of manufacture are now subordinated to building in the "style," the "feel," the "ambiance." Increasingly, pure experience, which leaves no material trace, is manufactured and sold like a commodity.

I have departed significantly from Marx on the matter of the role of culture in the modern world. I am about to depart even further, but I am accepting a basic tenet of Marx's analysis, perhaps its most controversial point: that the most important relationship in modern society is not between man and man (as in peasant society) but between man and his productions. With the possible exception of life in the family and other similar social arrangements left over from a simpler time, man in our modern society is related to others only through the things he makes. I see little reason to dispute this or its projected economic consequences. There will be revolution so long as men without work are thought to be worthless. This revolution may not be successful from the standpoint of the "undesirables" who wage it, yet there is nothing more damaging to a society than uninterrupted unsuccessful revolution. A short and successful revolution, by comparison, resembles the holiday that marks it. But I have turned away from these troublesome matters, which are deductions, after all, and have pressed the original question further, to continue the examination of our society where the thing that man creates—that is, the "thing" that mediates social relations—is a symbol.

COMMODITY AND SYMBOL

One of the most striking aspects of modern capitalist societies, not often remarked, is the degree to which the commodity has become integral with culture: language, music, dance, visual arts and litera-

ture. This culminates in advertising, film, comic books and highbrow pop art. It was this integration (not the conservatism of the industrial proletariat) that Marx did not predict. There is a certain hostility in Marx's thought toward art and culture. Culture is the original system of signification and the original reflection (Marx would call it a distorted reflection) of the human condition. Marx held that anything merely symbolic could be annihilated to expose the material substratum of society. He hoped for the day when *revolutionary praxis*—action based on critical demystification of inhuman social arrangements—would replace culture as the ultimate expression of human values. But as modern left-wing Marxism (that of Mao Tse-tung, and in quite a different way, that of the Frankfurt school of Adorno and others) is trying to teach us, culture prevails and the revolution must learn to operate in and through it.

There are some families here on earth that are modeled as closely as is humanly possible on the Holy Family. In these cases, the symbolic form of social organization is the original, and the "real-life" families are mere copies. As Durkheim wrote, "social life, in all its aspects and in every period of its history, is made possible only by a vast symbolism."[8] The commodity has become an integral part of everyday life in modern society because its original form is a symbolic representation (advertisement) of itself which both promises and guides experience in advance of actual consumption.

I am suggesting that modern materialistic society is probably less materialistic than we have come to believe. We have experienced brief periods of collective guilt. During the 1950's, for example, some intellectuals worried about being too "thing-oriented" and purchased Danish Modern things which are designed to seem a little less thing-like than their traditional counterparts. There is a perennial concern for the "overcommercialization" of Christmas. Marxist planners do not let us forget that *they* are materialists as they cautiously release each new consumer item into the eager hands of Russian and Eastern European workers. But when the final reckoning is over, we see that our modern kinds of society are less wrapped up in their consumer goods than in a somewhat more complex and fuller view of themselves: that is, in the representation of modern social life in the sciences, arts, politics, social movements, lifestyles, sports, the press, motion pictures and television. Modern culture may be divided and

marketed after the fashion of a commodity, but the economic and social structure of these bits of modernity is quite different from that of the old industrial commodity.

The value of such things as programs, trips, courses, reports, articles, shows, conferences, parades, opinions, events, sights, spectacles, scenes and situations of modernity is not determined by the amount of labor required for their production. Their value is a function of the quality and quantity of *experience* they promise. Even the value of strictly material goods is increasingly similarly derived from the degree to which they promise to form a part of our modern experience. Phonograph records and pornographic movie superstars are produced and marketed according to principles that defy the labor theory of value. Moreover, the old-style material type of commodity retains an important position in modern society only insofar as it has the capacity to *deliver* an experience: TVs, stereos, cameras, tape recorders, sports cars, vibrators, electric guitars or recreational drugs. The commodity has become a means to an end. The end is an immense accumulation of reflexive experiences which synthesize fiction and reality into a vast symbolism, a modern world.[9]

THE STRUCTURE OF CULTURAL EXPERIENCES

"Experience" has a quasi-scientific origin, sharing the same root with *experiment*.[10] Like so many words in our language, the term hides a short time span. It implies an original skepticism or an emptiness transformed into a specific belief or feeling through direct, firsthand involvement with some data. The term can have a certain "hip" or "gamy," even sexual, connotation beyond its sterile scientific and occupational meanings.

Here I want to isolate and analyze a subclass of experiences I am calling *cultural experiences*. The data of cultural experiences are somewhat fictionalized, idealized or exaggerated models of social life that are in the public domain, in film, fiction, political rhetoric, small talk, comic strips, expositions, etiquette and spectacles. All tourist attractions are cultural experiences. A cultural experience has two basic parts which must be combined in order for the experience to occur. The first part is the representation of an aspect of life on stage, film,

etc. I call this part the *model*, using the term to mean an embodied ideal, very much the same way it is used in the phrase "fashion model." Or, as Goffman has written, "a model for, not a model of."[11] The second part of the experience is the changed, created, intensified belief or feeling that is based on the model. This second part of the experience I call the *influence*. The spectacle of an automobile race is a model; the thrills it provides spectators and their practice of wearing patches and overalls advertising racing tires and oils are its influence. Famous psychoanalytic case histories are models: everyone's analysis is influenced by them. A bathing-suit model is a model; the desire for a real-life girl friend that looks "just like a model" is its influence.

A *medium* is an agency that connects a model and its influence. A social situation of face-to-face interaction, a gathering, is a medium, and so are radio, television, film and tape. The media are accomplices in the construction of cultural experiences, but the moral structure of the medium is such that it takes the stance of being neutral or disinterested.[12] Models for individual "personality," fashion and behavior are conveyed in motion pictures, for example, but if there is any suspicion that mannerisms, affectations, clothing or other artifacts were put before the audience for the purpose of initiating a commercially exploitable fad, the fad will fail. It is a mark of adulthood in modern society that the individual is supposed to be able to see through such tricks. Whatever the facts in the case, the medium must appear to be disinterested if it is to be influential, so that any influence that flows from the model can appear to be both spontaneous and based on genuine feelings. High-pressure appeal in children's advertising on television permits parents to teach their children about these delicate matters, another kind of childhood immunization.

Extending conventional usage somewhat, I will term a cultural model, its influence(s), the medium that links them, the audiences that form around them, and the producers, directors, actors, agents, technicians, and distributors that stand behind them, a *production*. Cultural productions so defined include a wide range of phenomena. Perhaps the smallest are advertising photographs of a small "slice" of life: for example, of "the little woman" at the front door meeting her "man" home from the "rat race" and proffering his martini. The largest cultural productions are the summer-long and year-long festivals that tie up the entire life of a community, even a nation, as occurs in international expositions and centennials. Cultural productions of the middle range include big games, parades, moon shots, mass protests, Christmas, historical monuments, opening nights, elections and rock music festivals.[13] It can be noted that the owners of the means of *these* productions are not as yet organized into a historically distinct class, but it is becoming clear that *governments* at all levels and of all types are becoming increasingly interested in controlling cultural production.

Attending to cultural *productions* avoids, I think, some of the problems we encounter when dealing with the concept of culture. When we talk in terms of *a culture*, we automatically suggest the possibility of *a consensus*. Then, anyone who wishes to point out internal differences in society undercuts the validity of the analysis. This is a good way of perpetuating an academic field, but not a very good approach to society. To suggest, in the first place, that culture rests on a consensus reveals, it seems to me, a profound misunderstanding of culture and society. Social structure *is* differentiation. Consensus is a form of death at the group level. All cultures are a series of models of life. These models are organized in multiples according to every known logical principle, and some that are, so far, unknown: similitude, opposition, contradiction, complement, parallel, analogy. There has never been a cultural totality. Lévi-Strauss has mistakenly attributed totality to primitive cultures in order to contrast them to our own.[14] Primitive cultures achieve the semblance of totality by their small size, acceptance on the part of the entire group of a relatively few models and their isolation. But this "totality" results from demographic and historical accidents, not from any quality of culture itself.

This approach to culture permits the student of society to search for the explanation and logic of his subject in the subject itself, that is, to substitute cultural models for the intellectual and ideologically biased models of sociological theory. Cultural models are "ideal" only from the standpoint of everyday life. They are not ideal from the standpoint of any absolute such as a religion, a philosophy or a sociology. There is no "mother" representation, itself inaccessible, behind all the others copied from it. Each production is assembled

from available cultural elements and it remains somewhat faithful to the other cultural models for the same experience.

Cultural productions, then, are *signs*. Like the faces of Jesus Christ on religious calendars, they refer to (resemble) each other but not the original. Cultural productions are also *rituals*. They are rituals in the sense that they are based on formulae or models and in the sense that they carry individuals beyond themselves and the restrictions of everyday experience. Participation in a cultural production, even at the level of being influenced by it, can carry the individual to the frontiers of his being where his emotions may enter into communion with the emotions of others "under the influence."[15]

In modern societies, the more complex cultural productions are understood to be divided into types such as world's fairs, epic motion pictures, moon shots, scandals, etc. Each example of a type is located in a specific relationship to its forebears. A collective consciousness relates the bicentennial to the centennial, Watergate to Teapot Dome, *Around the World in Eighty Days* to *Potemkin*, if not always in the experience phase, at least at the level of production. Each genre of production is constructed from basically the same set of cultural elements, but precise arrangement varies from production to production or the result is perceived as "dated," a "copy," "rerun," "spinoff" or a "poor man's version" of an original. The space race petered out from the lack of significant variation on the themes of "countdown," "launching" and "moon landing."[16] Of course, once a type of cultural production has died out, it can be revived by a clever copy which is said to be a remake of a "classic." Perhaps on the centennial of man's first trip to the moon, we will send a party up in old-fashioned equipment as a kind of celebration.

The system of cultural productions is so organized that any given production automatically serves one of two essential functions: (1) it may add to the ballast of our modern civilization by sanctifying an *original* as being a model worthy of copy or an important milestone in our development, or (2) it may establish a new direction, break new ground, or otherwise contribute to the progress of modernity by presenting new combinations of cultural elements and working out the logic of their relationship. This second, differentiating, function of cultural productions dominates the other in modern society and is

at the heart of the process that is called "modernization" or "economic development and cultural change." Modern international mass tourism produces in the minds of the tourists juxtapositions of elements from historically separated cultures and thereby speeds up the differentiation and modernization of middle-class consciousness.

Even though a given "experience" (in the less restricted sense of the term) may not be influenced by a cultural model, there are usually several models available for it. For example, one might have a drug experience, a sex experience—some might even go so far as to claim a religious experience—seemingly independent of cultural models and influences. On the other hand, many recipes for very similar kinds of experiences originate on a cultural level. The cultural models are attractive in that they usually contain claims of moral, esthetic and psychological superiority over the idiosyncratic version. The discipline and resources required to organize sexual activities on the model provided by pornographic motion pictures exceed that required by mere individualistic sexual expression. And the cultural version promises greater pleasure to those who would follow it.

Cultural productions, then, are not merely repositories of models for social life; they organize the attitudes we have toward the models and life. *Instant replay* in televised professional sports provides an illustration. The "play" occurs and the sportscaster intervenes (his role similar to that of the priest) to tell the audience what is important about what has happened, what to look for, what to experience. Then, instant replay delivers the exemplar, the model, slowed down, even stopped, so it can be savored. From the stream of action, select bits are framed in this way as cultural experiences.

The structure of cultural productions is adapted to the cultivation of values even on the frontiers where society encounters its own evil and error or undergoes change. The official model of the "drug experience," which moralizes against the use of marijuana, speed, or LSD, nevertheless subversively represents the experience as a powerfully seductive force, so desirable that it is impossible for an individual to resist it on his own without terrifying countermagic. The "uplifting" experience which restores conventional morality can arise from the dramatic representation of the darkest and most threatening of

crimes. Christianity stretched the dramatic possibilities here to the limit, perhaps, as Nietzsche suggested, beyond the limit.

Cultural experiences are valued in-themselves and are the ultimate deposit of values, including economic values, in modern society. The value of the labor of a professional football player, for example, is determined by the amount of his playing time that is selected out for instant replay, that is, by the degree to which his work contributes to a cultural production and becomes integral with our modern cultural experience. Motion picture stars were the first to cash in on this structure, the "romantic experience" being among the first to undergo modernization.

Workers of the traditional industrial type are crowded on the margins of the modern economy where there is no relationship between their standard of living and the importance of the work they do. Food producers and field hands are among the lowest-paid workers, while energy producers like coal miners are among our most cruelly treated. The organization of labor into unions serves mainly as an ongoing dramatization of what our collective minimal standards are for the respectable poor. Recently, there have been some bright spots within this bleak panorama, labor movements that seem to have a "natural" understanding of the importance of articulating their programs to the society via cultural productions. Important among these has beeen Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers with its coordination of unorthodox tactics, including hunger strikes, consumer boycotts and the development and wide promulgation of symbolism for the struggle: the Thunderbird buttons, postcards, etc. Criteria for the success of this movement emerge from an entirely cultural model, involving not merely a mobilization of the workers but of segments of the society socially and geographically distant from the fields and vineyards. Not unexpectedly, this movement (which will be a model for future struggles) faced as much opposition from labor already organized in an industrial framework as it has from the fruit growers.

The economics of cultural production is fundamentally different from that of industrial production. In the place of exploited labor, we find exploited leisure. Unlike industry, the important profits are not made in the production process, but by fringe entrepreneurs, businesses on the edge of the actual production. These can be arranged on a continuum from popcorn and souvenir sales through booking agents and tour agents to the operations that deal in motion picture rights or closed-circuit television hook-ups. The focal point of such action is a cultural production that almost magically generates capital continuously, often without consuming any energy for itself. Greek ruins are an example. Festivals and conventions organize the economic life of entire cities around cultural productions.

On a national level, economic development is linked to the export of cultural products for sale to other countries. The Beatles received the O.B.E. not so much because the Crown liked their music as because their international record sales arrested the disastrous growth of the trade deficit in Great Britain at the time. Underdeveloped countries can "export" their culture without having to package it just by attracting tourists. The foreign consumer journeys to the source. Developed economies pioneer these complex cultural arrangements by experimenting on their own populations: "See America First."

CULTURAL PRODUCTIONS AND SOCIAL GROUPS

Cultural productions are powerful agents in defining the scope, force and direction of a civilization. It is only in the cultural experience that the data are organized to generate specific feelings and beliefs. Cultural experiences, then, are the opposite of scientific experiments—opposite in the sense of being mirror images of each other. Scientific experiments are designed to control bias, especially that produced by human beings, out of the result, but cultural experiences are designed to build it in. The attitudes, beliefs, opinions and values studied by sociologists are the residues of cultural experiences, separated from their original contexts and decaying (perhaps in the sense of "fermenting") in the minds of individuals.

With the exception of those involved in ethnic studies, where the relationship is obvious, I think sociologists are not attentive enough to the importance of cultural productions in the determination of the groups they study. For example, generational groups are determined by the different influences of rock music and hip fashion, and "bridging the generation gap" usually means an older person has experienced a rock music concert or smoked marijuana.[17] The mechanics of

group formation are nicely simplified when cultural production mediate in-group/out-group distinctions. Almost everyone has ha the experience of attending a show with a group and on the way hom dividing into subgroups on the basis of being differently influenced by it. When people are getting to know each other (a distinctively modern routine), they will compare the way they feel about several cultural models (Joe Namath, the "California Life-Style," a famous trial, the attitude of Parisians toward tourists, etc.) and move closer together or further away from a relationship on the basis of their mutual understanding of these matters.

In the early 1960's, I observed a group of people at Berkeley who had seen the motion picture *One Eyed Jacks* so many times that they knew every line by heart (e.g., "Git over here, you big tub of guts") and they "did" the entire picture from beginning to end around a table at a coffee house. This, of course, represents a kind of high of culturally based togetherness. Some groups were formed in this way over the teachings of Jesus. In a shining example of modern self-consciousness, the Beatles were reported to have remarked, "We're more popular than Jesus now."

It has long been a sociological truism that a human group that persists for any length of time will develop a "world view," a comprehensive scheme in which all familiar elements have a proper place. I am not certain that any group ever operated like this. Radical groups that meet periodically to try to hammer together an alternate viewpoint seem to drift aimlessly without dramatic ups and downs. This stands in marked contrast to the impact of their cultural productions, their mass protest demonstrations which shock the national consciousness. I am quite certain that if the idea that "a group develops a world view" holds a grain of truth, modernity reverses the relationship or inverts the structure. Modernized peoples, released from primary family and ethnic group responsibilities, organize themselves in groups around world views provided by cultural productions. The group does not produce the world view, the world view produces the group. A recent example is the Oriental guru phenomenon: visitors from afar promulgating a global vision in elaborately staged rallies surround themselves with devotees for the duration of their presence. Rock musicians' "groupies" and tour groups are other examples.

In industrial society, refinement of a "life-style" occurs through a process of emulating elites, or at least of keeping up with the Joneses. This requires designated leaders, so followers can know whom to obey, and regular meetings: church meetings, town meetings, board meetings, faculty meetings. The requisite of an internal group order, with its meetings of elites and followers, is disappearing with the coming of modernity. Life-styles are not expanded via emulation of socially important others until they have taken over an entire group. They are expanded by the reproduction of cultural models, a process that need not fit itself into existing group boundaries. The aborigines living near the missions in the Australian Outback have adopted a modified "Beachboy" look and play Hawaiian-style popular ballads on guitars.[18] The modern world is composed of movements and life-styles that exhibit neither "leadership" nor "organization" in the sense that these terms are now used by sociologists. World views and life-styles emerge from and dissolve into cultural productions.

From the standpoint of each cultural production (the screening of *Love Story*, for example, or a televised "Super Bowl" game), any population can be divided into three groups: (1) those who would not attend; (2) those who would attend: of those who would attend, there are (2a) those who would get caught up in the action and go along with it to its moral and aesthetic conclusion, and (2b) those who would reject the model, using their experience as a basis for criticising such "trash," "violence" or "fraud." In this last group are the American tourists who go to Russia in order to strengthen the credibility of their anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet proclamations.

It is noteworthy that recent trends in Western cultural production have been aimed at transforming the negative, critical audience into one that is "taken in" by the show. Recent fine art knows full well that it will be called "trash," and some of it does little to prevent the formation of this opinion: consider the display of ripe trash cans in art museums. Andy Warhol named one of his cinematic productions *Trash*. The effort here is basically democratic, to reach everyone with art, the detractors and the appreciators (who think of themselves as being "in" on the "put on") alike. Some of Frank Zappa's music could also serve as illustration.

Culture can continue, via its productions, to provide a basis for community even in our complex modern society. In fact, it is only culture—not empirical social relations—that can provide a basis for the modern community. Working through cultural productions, people can communicate emotions and complex meanings across class, group and generational lines. Music and games, for example, have always had deep roots in the human community because they permit anyone who knows the basic code to enjoy nuances and subtleties in the playing out of variations. Strangers who have the same cultural grounding can come together in a cultural production, each knowing what to expect next, and feel a closeness or solidarity, even where no empirical closeness exists. Their relationship begins before they meet. In modern society, not merely music and games but almost every aspect of life can be played at, danced, orchestrated, made into a model of itself and perpetuated without leadership and without requiring anyone's awareness or guidance.

As cultural productions provide a base for the modern community, they give rise to a modern form of alienation of individuals interested only in the model or the life-style, not in the life it represents. The academic provides some nice examples. Education in the modern world is increasingly represented as a form of recreation: suburban housewives vacillate between joining a reducing "spa" and taking a class at the university. Our collective image of the "college experience" emphasizes the swirling ambiance of the campus life-style, the intensity of the "rap sessions," the intimacy of even fleeting relationships between "college friends," "college pals" and "college buddies." The educational experience holds out the possibility of conversation, possibly sex, even friendship, with a "star" professor. The growth of the mind that is supposed to be the result of education can be exchanged for the attitudes that support the growth, an acceptance of change, an attachment to the temporary and a denial of comfort. A willingness, even a desire, to live in semifurnished quarters, moving often like a fugitive, holds the academic in its grip as an emblem at the level of an entire life-style of a restless spirit. There is an available esthetic of all aspects of the dark side of the college experience wherein, for example, the exhaustion of staying up all night, smoking, drinking coffee and studying for an examination with a friend is represented as a kind of "high" and, while painful at the moment, an alleged source of exquisite memories.

What I have described so far is the *model* of the educational experience found in cultural productions. No one need actually conform to it. The image of the tweedy, dry, humorless, conservative, absent-minded, pipe-sucking professor from the industrial age is being replaced by another image: that of a swinging, activist, long-haired, radical modern professor. But one finds in the *real* academic milieu some students and professors who embrace this life-style, who seem to have been attracted to their calling because they like the way it *appears* in our collective versions of it, and they want to make others see them as they see their ideal counterparts in the model.

In this academic group we find highly cultivated diversions, innocent copies of the serious aspects of scholarship. I have observed a party at which wine was served from numbered but otherwise unmarked bottles. The party was a little test. The celebrants carried cards and were supposed to indicate the house and vintage of each wine to win a prize for the most correct answers. On another occasion, a picnic, all the revelers got themselves up in full medieval drag, played on lutes and ate roast goat—theirs being a historical experience, one department of the college experience. For those who are in it for this kind of action, the university is less a house of knowledge than a fountain of youths.

Max Weber, consolidating his powerful comprehension of industrial society and looking ahead, perhaps to the present day, warned:

> No one knows yet who will inhabit this shell [of industrial capitalism] in the future: whether at the end of its prodigious development there will be new prophets or a vigorous renaissance of all thoughts and ideals or whether finally, if none of this occurs, mechanism will produce only petrification hidden under a kind of anxious importance. According to this hypothesis, the prediction will become a reality for the last men of this particular development of culture. Specialists without spirit, libertines without heart, this nothingness imagines itself to be elevated to a level of humanity never before attained.[19]

This mentality that Weber anticipated with great clarity and precision has become more or less "offical" in political and bureaucratic circles, among "the last men of this particular development of cul-

ture." While it continues to inhabit traditional fortresses of power, it is also clear that an alternate, postindustrial kind of mind is beginning to emerge in the interstices of modern culture.

Lewis Mumford discerned a dimension of this mind in the figure of Albert Schweitzer:

> In philosophy or theology, in medicine or in music, Schweitzer's talents were sufficient to guarantee him a career of distinction: as one of the eminent specialists of his time, in any of these departments, his success would have been prompt and profitable, just to the extent that he allowed himself to be absorbed in a single activity. But in order to remain a whole man, Schweitzer committed the typical act of sacrifice for the coming age: *he deliberately reduced the intensive cultivation of any one field, in order to expand the contents and significance of his life as a whole* . . . yet the result of that sacrifice was not the negation of his life but its fullest realization. . . .[20]

This emerging modern mind is bent on expanding its repertoire of experiences, and on an avoidance of any specialization that threatens to interrupt the search for alternatives and novelty. (This can be contrasted with the mind of industrial man, being in certain of its particulars a reaction against specialized and linear industrial processes.) *Tradition* remains embedded in modernity but in a position of servitude: tradition is there to be recalled to satisfy nostalgic whims or to provide coloration or perhaps a sense of profundity for a modern theme. There is an urgent cultivation of new people, new groups, new things, new ideas, and a hostility to repetition: a built-in principle of escalation in every collective work from war to music. There is a desire for greatly expanded horizons, a search for the frontiers of even such familiar matters as domestic relations. Finally, there is everywhere, including in our sociology, a repressive encircling urge, movement or idea that everyone ought to be coming together in a modern moral consensus.

THE WORK EXPERIENCE

Leisure is constructed from cultural experiences. Leisure and culture continue to exist at a slight remove from the world of work and everyday life. They are concentrated in vacations, amusements,

games, play, and religious observances. This ritual removal of culture from workaday activities has produced the central crisis of industrial society. In a fine early essay on "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" [1924], which, though available, has received too little attention in the human sciences, the linguist Edward Sapir wrote:

> The great cultural fallacy of industrialism, as developed up to the present time, is that in harnessing machines to our uses it has not known how to avoid the harnessing the majority of mankind to its machines. The telephone girl who lends her capacities, during the greater part of the living day, to the manipulation of a technical routine that has an eventually high efficiency value but that answers to no spiritual needs of her own is an appalling sacrifice to civilization. As a solution to the problem of culture she is a failure—the more dismal the greater her natural endowment.[21]

The mechanization Sapir stresses is only a part of the problem. Industrial society elevates work of all kinds to an unprecedented level of social importance, using as its techniques the rationalization and the deculturization of the workplace. As this new kind of rationalized work got almost everyone into its iron grip, culture did not enter the factories, offices and workshops. The workaday world is composed of naked and schematic social relations determined by raw power, a kind of adolescent concern for "status" and a furtive, slick sensualism all cloaked in moralistic rhetoric. Culture grew and differentiated as never before, escaping the elite groups that had previously monopolized it. It became popular, but it receded ever further from the workaday world.

Modern social movements push work and its organization to the negative margins of existence, and as our society follows these movements ever deeper into postindustrial modernity, the more widespread becomes the idea that not merely play and games but life itself is supposed to be fun. The world of work has not mounted a counteroffensive. It responds by shriveling up, offering workers ever increasing freedom from its constraints. I am suggesting that the old sociology cannot make much sense out of this if it stays behind studying work arrangements, class, status, power and related sociological antiquities.

Industrial society bound men to its jobs, but because of the

extreme specialization and fragmentation of tasks in the industrial process, the job did not function to integrate its holder into a synthetic social perspective, a world view. As a solution to the problem of culture, industrial work is a failure. It repulses the individual, sending him away to search for his identity or soul in off-the-job activities: in music, sports, church, political scandal and other collective diversions. Among these diversions is found a cultural production of a curious and special kind marking the death of industrial society and the beginning of modernity: a museumization of work and work relations, a cultural production I call a *work display*.

Examples of work displays include guided tours of banks, the telephone company, industrial plants; the representation of cowboys and construction workers in cigarette advertisements; the chapters of *Moby Dick* on whaling, etc. Both machine and human work can be displaced into and displayed as a finished product: a work. Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River in Washington State is the greatest work display of all, both in the sense of the work it does while the tourist is looking on, and in its being a product of a mighty human labor. (Grand Coulee is also fittingly the tomb of some workers who fell in while pouring its concrete.) Labor transforms raw material into useful objects. Modernity is transforming labor into cultural productions attended by tourists and sightseers who are moved by the universality of work relations—*not* as this is represented through their own work (from which they are alienated), but as it is revealed to them at their leisure through the displayed work of others. Industrial elites were inarticulate when asked to explain the place and meaning of work, responding only with an abstraction: money. Today, the meaning of work of all types is being established in cultural productions.

Marx foresaw a clean division of capitalist society with workers on one side and owners on the other and an inevitable showdown with a classless aftermath. As industrial society developed, however, the work/no-work division did not eventually reside in neatly defined and socially important classes. In prerevolutionary societies such as our own, there are subproletarian "leisure" classes of idlers and the aged. And one by-product of the worker revolutions around the world is the creation of a sterile international class of displaced monarchs, barons, and ex-puppet dictators, numerically unimportant but a visible cultural element, nevertheless: they are called jet setters and Beautiful People.

The "class struggle," instead of operating at the level of history, is operating at the level of workaday life and its opposition to culture. In the place of the division Marx foresaw is an arrangement wherein workers are displayed, and other workers on the other side of the culture barrier watch them for their enjoyment. Modernity is breaking up the "leisure class," capturing its fragments and distributing them to everyone. Work in the modern world does not turn class against class so much as it turns man against himself, fundamentally dividing his existence. The modern individual, if he is to appear to be human, is forced to forge his own synthesis between his work and his culture.