

Warped Space

Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture

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The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

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Skin and Bones


Folded Forms from Leibniz to Lynn

The House of Folds

In his exploration of the spatial characteristics of Leibniz's philosophy considered as "baroque," Gilles Deleuze introduced what has proved to be a provocative formal theme for contemporary architects: that of the "fold" or *pli*, registered both as a material phenomenon—as in the folds of Bernini's sculpture of Santa Teresa, for example—and as a metaphysical idea—as in the "fold" that joins the soul to the mind without division. As Deleuze expands on the implications for the fold, and its cognates the pleat and the crease, it gains an almost ontological status as the defining characteristic of baroque space and thought; its place in the theoretical and design culture of the 1990s is almost equally secure. In Deleuze's terms, as derived from an exceedingly original reading of Leibniz, the fold is at once abstract, disseminated as a trait of all matter, and specific, embodied in objects and spaces; immaterial, and elusive in its capacities to join and divide at the same time, and physical and formal in its ability to produce shapes, and especially curved and involuted shapes. This last characteristic has been of especial interest to architects, always searching for the tangible attribute of an abstract thought; but it is not at all clear that folds, in the sense of folded forms, correspond in any way to Deleuze's concept, or even less to Leibniz's model. For Leibniz, and also for Deleuze, to say that folds are manifested in "pleats of matter" is not simply to refer to a crease in a piece of cloth; matter is, in these terms, everywhere, in the void as well as in the solid and subject to the same forces. Folds then exist in space and in time, in things and in ideas, and among their unique properties is the ability to join all these levels and categories at the same moment.

To clarify this difficult concept Deleuze sketches what he calls an "allegory" of these relations, figured in what he sees as the "Baroque House"

21. Gilles Deleuze,
 "La maison baroque
 (allégorie)," *Le pli.
 Leibniz et la baroque*
 (Paris: Editions de
 Minuit, 1988), p. 7.



imagined by Leibniz. It consists of a ground floor, four windows and a door wide, the door approached by a flight of three curved steps. Above is a second story composed of a closed room, with five small openings in its floor to let in emanations from below. This room, in Deleuze's drawing, is hung with five curtains, "a drapery diversified by folds" that fall loosely through the openings below. Evidently, the five openings below represent the five senses, the five curtains their receptors, and the closed upper room a kind of mental space, based solidly on the lower physical body. In a nice touch, Deleuze lightly joins the two stories with a baroque scrolled motif on one side—the tie between body and head, so to speak.

This house is, for Deleuze, an image of Leibniz's "great Baroque montage that moves between the lower floor, pierced with windows, and the upper floor, blind and closed, but on the other hand resonating as if it were a musical salon translating the visible movements below into sounds up above."¹ Or, put in Leibnizian terms, a figure of the relations between the material, sensing body on the ground and its "monad" or soul, to which it transmits the knowledge given by its senses. Itself without senses, the monad nevertheless registers the

impulse of the outside world as it does the inner and innate knowledge with which it is endowed from birth.

Deleuze matches this image with others drawn from studies of baroque architecture, and especially the formal analysis of Wölfflin, whence he derives the idea that the baroque

is marked by a certain number of material traits: horizontal widening of the lower floor, flattening of the pediment, low and curved stairs that push into space; matter handled in masses or aggregates, with the rounding of angles and avoidance of perpendiculars . . . spongy cavernous shapes, or to constitute a vortical form always put into motion by renewed turbulence . . . matter tends to spill over in space, to be reconciled with fluidity at the same time fluids themselves are divided into masses.²

In other words, an architecture of endless folds. Here the abstract formalism of Wölfflin has been used to advantage in order to delineate an architecture of substances and masses, a curved architecture always in virtual motion, an architecture of waves and infinite spatial extension. Such a "baroque" had, as we have seen, a powerful influence on the spatial imagery of modernism, and it is not surprising that a digital decade has seen in Deleuze a prophet of the morphing, warping, and complicated curvatures of virtual space.³ Constructed in this way "through" a Wölfflinian perspective, translated into architecture through the late nineteenth-century reading of a baroque that was, in retrospect, more a fiction of the new psychology of the body than a historical account, Deleuze's Leibniz emerges as a more complex entity than the seamless textual ecstasy of *The Fold* leads us to suspect. And indeed, a return to the Leibnizian texts from which Deleuze derived his "House" seems to introduce an unexpected rupture in the kinds of transactions intimated by the Deleuzian fold—a different and perhaps more analytically precise model through which we might begin to measure the special *effet du pli* of the last decade.

Deleuze formulated his Leibnizian model from a combination of readings, two of which were primary. The first, Leibniz's celebrated essay the *Monadology*, described the characteristics and forms of the monad; the second, a response in the form of an imaginary dialogue with the British philosopher John Locke entitled *New Essays on Human Understanding*, includes an

important modification of Locke's image of the brain as a camera obscura. This second text, which provides so to speak the architectural structure for the *pli*-House, is couched in terms of an extended clarification of Locke's dark room metaphor for discernment. Locke's assertion seemed rational enough: "The understanding is not much unlike a small room [*un cabinet entièrement obscur* in Leibniz's French] wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external and visible images; would the images coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man."⁴ The spatial setting of the understanding is thus a pinhole camera, only with more than one opening for the purpose of transmitting images (Locke says "pictures" in the original) from the outside, and there seems to be an ordering principle within the box, ready to line up the images in what Locke would term a chain, ready for the associations, thence ideas and reflections, that constituted the understanding.⁵ Locke's camera, like that of perspective artists since Alberti, was assumed to transmit reality, clearly and in focus, undistorted and ready for its transformation into representation. Leibniz accepted this space, but extended and adapted it to his own purposes:

To increase the resemblance we should have to postulate that there is a screen/canvas/curtain/membrane [*toile*] in the darkened room [*la chambre obscure*] to receive the species [*les espèces*, or beings, sensible species] and that it is not uniform but is diversified by folds [*diversifiée par des plis*] representing items of innate knowledge; and what is more, that this screen/canvas/curtain/membrane, being under tension, has a kind of elasticity or active force, and indeed that it acts (or reacts) in ways that are adapted both to past folds and to new ones coming from impressions of the species. This action would consist in certain vibrations or oscillations, like those we see when a cord under tension is plucked and gives off something of a musical sound. For not only do we receive images and traces in the brain, but we form new ones from them when we bring "complex ideas" to mind; and so the screen which represents our brain must be active and elastic. This analogy would explain reasonably well what goes on in the brain.⁶

Leibniz has, in this way, considerably complicated the picture space. Rather than accepting the back surface of the camera as a receiving surface, standing in, so to speak, for the painter's canvas, he has himself stretched a canvas in the space, as a receptor of the images. This screen, moreover, is not the flat picture plane of classical representation; it is from the start ridged and folded, in ways that depict already innate ideas. Locke's tabula rasa, or white sheet of paper, has no place in this box of miracles. Further, this canvas is in no way a passive instrument of the "real"; rather it moves or "oscillates" like a plucked string, according to the nature of the images coming in from outside. These movements in turn create new folds in the surface of the screen, turning it into something like a diaphragm, elastic and mobile, a two-dimensional oscilloscope responding to the activity of the brain. The brain, meanwhile, is itself no static collector of pictures, but acts to construct new images out of combinations of those already received.

Locke's camera has here been transformed into a kind of wheezing, churning barrel organ furnished internally with stretched diaphragms that give out a sound in pictures, a tone played out so to speak across the scarred surface of a canvas that has been riven by every picture it has held, and accessible only to the "inhabitant" of the dark room—our brain but also our soul. Or rather than a simple "inhabitant" of this little house, the soul would *be* the dark room, somewhat like a monad: "As for the soul, which is a simple substance or 'monad': without being extended it represents these various extended masses and has perceptions of them." In the *Monadology* Leibniz clarified the formal nature of the monad as entirely internalized: "monads," he writes, "have no windows through which something could enter or leave." So the closed room, itself a soul, has no windows. Its only furnishing, to use Bernard Cache's term, is that of the screen, which represents the brain, a pulsating, organic substance, "active and elastic," "not unified, but diversified by folds."

Hence of course Deleuze's need to provide a lower story for this unlivable house without windows, one which, with five openings to let in the five sense impressions, operates as a kind of bodily anteroom to the monadic soul, a filtered way in for the brain, already innately active, to be fed and renewed from the outside. But this is not necessarily the Leibnizian solution, which rather than building a baroque house according to the rules of Wölffinian

architectonics, themselves derived from a psychology of bodily projection, prefers to set its monads free in space, unified on the outside, folded on the inside. The entryway by which impressions reach the screen of the brain is no simple opening; for the "space" in which Leibniz sets his monads is itself a thick and full substance, one that at once fills the dark room and constitutes its impregnability: "We should think of space as full of matter which is inherently fluid, capable of every sort of division and indeed actually divided and subdivided to infinity." Finally, this fluid space, like the screen in the dark room, is never uniform; it too "varies from place to place, because of variations in the extent to which the movements in it run the same way."⁸

In this viscous universe, two points of distinction between Leibniz and Deleuze emerge. The first is that Leibniz posits no necessary connection between the folded screen and the room in which it is placed. He simply notes that "it must be supposed that in the dark room there is a screen to receive the species." The canvas, screen, or membrane stretched like a musical string is thus independent of its container. There is a box without openings, and inside this box an elastic membrane the folding of which is continuously shifting according to new combinations of received and innate images. Secondly, the characteristic of the "fold" precipitated by these forces is at once less ambiguous than Deleuze would want and more extensively connected to the relationships between inside and out. If the membrane is stretched, and not simply hanging as Deleuze depicts it (and as a "curtain" and not a membrane, it is hard to see how it might oscillate as if being plucked like a stringed instrument), then the folds appear and disappear on its two-dimensional surface like the striations of a geological map thrust into three dimensions. The *toile* is an interior function, working as a receptor of vectors from outside and as a condenser of traces generated from inside.

The consequences of these distinctions for "folded" architecture are significant, especially as designers and theorists have tended to see the Deleuzian model as an invitation for a rather literal folding of the envelope, a complex curving of the skin, that tends to ignore rather than privilege the interior. According to Leibniz, a fold could in no way be replicated simply by the curved surface of a tentlike or bloblike structure, and not only because of its external qualities. The Leibnizian fold is in continuous movement, enveloping former folds and creating new ones on the surface of the diaphragm. Secondly, the

digital modeling and drawing on the observations of Deleuze and Cache, among others, as a way of sidestepping the traditional modernist and postmodernist polarities of simplicity/complexity, harmony/opposition, form/*informe*, and, of course, construction/deconstruction. Admittedly somewhat literalized versions of Deleuze's theory of the "fold" in philosophic discourse have interested those searching for a formal method that, as Greg Lynn has reiterated in a number of essays, might go beyond the degree zero-sum game of the Wittkower/Rowe nine-square grid.¹² Such "reductive typologies" are replaced in Lynn's practice by an open-ended set of mathematical/topological experiments that disturb if not replace the formal paradigms of postmodernism. In a series of essays that add up to a mapping of the discursive field of the architectural *informe*, Lynn deploys the investigations of nineteenth- and twentieth-century biologists, morphologists, and mathematicians against the static geometries of modern and postmodern typologies. Forms are now "proto-geometric," "anexact," "bloblike," "pliable," "viscous." Form is no longer conceived of as a geometric "original" distorted or broken to incorporate complexity or represent conflict, but rather as seamlessly countercontradictory, a topological surface the movements of which register the synthetic result of forces applied by computer models, as if organically generating new species in a speedup of Darwinian evolution. Here the metaphorical relations between animation as a digital technique and animate as a biological state are, by a process of conscious literalization, deployed in the service of an architecture that takes its authority from the inherent "vitalism" of the computer-generated series.

This biotechnological *informe* differs from the *informe* of Bataille, however, on at least three levels. In the first place, where Bataille's quasi-Darwinian evolutionary explanation of the architectural monument—that "morphological progress" in which the human stood somewhere as an intermediary stage between "monkeys and great edifices"—was a deliberate provocation to the humanist theorists of the monument as analogically proportional to the body, merging the two into their third logically consistent "simian" form as an attempt to close the evolution of both the human species and architecture, Lynn's spatial morphologies are generated to offer potential evolution to architecture if not to the species; they seize on the metaphor not to end monumentality but to change its formal nature. Secondly, while for Bataille the *informe* was precisely that—a phenomenon entirely resisting any formal categorization—

of Reconstruction for a European Capital," and detailed plans for an office block (the models of which were photographed by Man Ray), a public monument, and an apartment building.

His city, he acknowledges, might well be termed a "Ville Surréaliste," suitable for Picasso's frescoes and in which Marcel Duchamp would be in charge of the interior design of the apartments—he had, noted Jean, already invented "a door at the same time open and closed."¹¹ The design of the office block was built up out of elliptical formulas ($P1(U)$ for $G2 = 0$ and $G3 = 4$) and responded to what Jean understood as the functional requirements of orientation, light, and air, while the city as a whole was developed according to a plan that inscribed its name in letters formed by the lines of office blocks (lit up at night), and that included a labyrinth and gigantic symbolic structures in the form of horses and bodies. "One notes," he writes, "bridges without any precise destination, cupolas, spiral pyramids, a mathematical monument ('constant negative curved surface of Euneper, derived from the pseudo-sphere')." Buildings composed of huge folded planes, emulating tissue; freeways transforming themselves into buildings; a monumental national library (or a union headquarters) built up in the form of a kneeling female nude, as if in emulation of the nineteenth-century vision of the Saint-Simonians, completed the picture of a riotous assemblage of biomorphic and mathematical forms that would achieve, at last, the "non-Euclidean" city. When juxtaposed in the same number of *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* with the following articles on "Formes imaginées. Formes concrètes" by the structural theorist Robert Le Ricolais, and on "L'architecture naturelle" by Jacques Couëlle, Jean's allegories took on all the force of a manifesto for a bioarchitecture. Informed by the Bergsonian doctrine of "spiritual energy," and controlled by a precise and meticulous three-dimensional analysis of biological and mathematical form, this new architecture merged the psychological with the evolutionary, in such a way as to give the ancient biological analogy scientific support and realization. Such experiments were thrown into sharper relief to the prevailing modernist doctrines as they formed the sequel to Le Corbusier's own introductory article in the same number, "L'espace indicible."

Marcel Jean's fantasies seem to anticipate, in form and philosophy, a number of more recent projects by architects who have sought to develop a new alliance between spatial theory and biotectonics, utilizing the potentials of

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Leibnizian fold, as an interior mechanism which at once reflects the outside and represents the forces of the inside, is more of a mediating device, a spatial instrument, than an object acted on from one side or another. Here the nature of Leibnizian space is crucial; thick and full, container and contained, it recognizes no distinctions between the solid and the void, and thence no real division between the inside of a fold and its outside; the matter out of which a fold is constituted is after all the same matter as forms the space in the pleat, under the pleat, and between pleats.

Animistic Architecture

To construct our city we have utilized elements directly taken from human anatomy, on one side, and on the other “mathematical objects”: plastic figurations, in three dimensions, of sometimes three-dimensional mathematical problems. . . . Humane or totally cast off—and by this finding again their humanity—these are allegorical forms with which we propose to construct the architecture of tomorrow. . . . Perhaps these new cities will palliate, to a certain degree, psychological catastrophes and others that prepare humanity for a miserable “reconstruction” in its spirit as in its material means.

Marcel Jean, “Allegorical Architecture,” 1946⁹

Surrealists, save for the occasional flights of fancy of a Matta or a Dalí, generally eschewed concrete expressions of an architecture that might better remain insubstantial to retain its psychic dimensions, its alliance with dreams and drives. In the complex intersection of the animal psychology explored by Roger Caillois and Jacques Lacan and the structural investigations of biomorphic theorists such as Raoul Francé and Robert Le Ricolais, however, there emerged a form of architectural utopianism that, just before the Second World War, proposed a form of “allegorical surrealism” built up out of mathematical topology and psychological fantasy. Such was the project of Marcel Jean, the surrealist sympathizer and friend of Man Ray, who first published his “mathematical objects” in 1936.¹⁰ After the war, in a direct and amusing critique of Le Corbusier’s geometrical metropolis, Jean proposed a hallucinatory landscape of mathematically and anthropomorphically derived forms for a “Plan

Lynn's *informe* is in fact highly formalized. The almost obsessive return to Rowe's application of Wittkower's Palladian schema to Le Corbusier's villas seems to admit that what is being sought is not so much a nonformal outlet to this perceived geometrical closure, but more a rejection of the formal-dialectical method on which the analogy rests, in favor of an all-subsuming "solution" in formal continuity. Thirdly, the psychodynamics of Bataille's post-surrealist shock tactics, with all the counterhumanist overtones of the *informe* imaged as a "gob of spit" or illustrated as a mess of blood on the floor of an abattoir, and "space" understood as an all-devouring force, breaking down the walls of prisons and cannibalistically envisaged as a process wherein "one big fish eats a smaller," is transformed in Lynn's technobiologism into the elegant play of topological mutation according to the "natural" permutations of models that indeed "model" nature. Certainly, there is a moment of shock in the assimilation to architecture of "blobs" "that threaten to overrun a terrorized and deterritorialized tectonics like a science fiction horror movie," but that shock is inevitably blunted by the technical details of blob construction, or the sheer hyperbeauty of the bloblike iterations of force fields and topographic mappings on the screen.

But if there is little trace of avant-garde shock left in these surface permutations, even as talk of an "anarchitecture" derived from the passionate and violent performance acts of Gordon Matta-Clark seems little more than the intellectual domestication of a previously unthinkable event, the notion of an architecture developed out of topologies rather than typologies nevertheless introduces a fundamental rupture into theory if not into practice. For the generation of form from the outside, as envelope or skin, subjected to mathematically generated "force fields," removes the humanistic subject definitively from all individual consideration. If the "human" is introduced as a force, it is as movement—crowd or swarm—and not as a generative instrument in itself; indeed where the eye, and its mental corollary, visual abstraction, stood at the vision point of generative perspective, and thence of classical space, now all trace of optical or bodily accommodation is removed in favor of "an abstraction based on process and movement"; and not the process and movement inherent to either the eye or the body, but rather one that is genetic, so to speak, to machine dynamics.

The “inside” of architecture, then, to return to an early theme of Lynn, would not be shaped by occupation or by any other attribute than its profoundly *residual* character—like the fortuitous insides produced, say, by the external necessity to fashion a shape like that of the Statue of Liberty. In this sense, the notion of the “death of the subject” takes on a positive role in the rejection of all pretense to conventional functionalism. If form could never have been precisely calibrated to function according to the first biological analogy, and with the variously derived cultural-symbolic-spatial substitutes in post-modernism degenerating into mere stylistic bickering, as Lynn would have it, then only abstract, mechanical authority can hold. The ethical imperative shifts from sociopolitical authenticity to formal impartiality. And with the imputation of animate life to inanimate animation, our own participation in, if not imperial domination of, the biological process of evolution is assured.

Such an interiority for architecture, one “without windows,” to paraphrase Kracauer paraphrasing Leibniz, would be perhaps like that described more than a century ago by Victor Hugo in his image of the monumental elephant built of wood and plaster at the Place de la Bastille during the Napoleonic era. This forty-foot-high “monster,” “blackened by wind and weather,” a “ponderous, uncouth, almost misshapen monument . . . endowed with a sort of savage and magnificent gravity,” served as shelter to the street urchins of Paris. An elephant from the outside, inside it looked like a great wine barrel, or perhaps the whale of Jonah: “a huge skeleton.”¹³

A long beam overhead, to which massive side-members were attached at regular intervals, represented the back-bone and ribs, with plaster stalactites hanging from them like entrails; and everywhere there were great spiders’ webs like dusty diaphragms. Here and there in the corners were patches of black that seemed to be alive and had changed their position with sudden, startled movements. The litter fallen from the back of the elephant on to its stomach had evened out the concavity of the latter, so that one could walk on it as though on a floor.¹⁴

The space inside, then, residual, entirely formed by the dictates of the outer skin, and structured according to the needs of that skin’s support, was

occupiable, indeed served a conjuncturally useful purpose—almost functional, in Hugo's detailed description; but it was a space that, like a cave or a burrow, was only incidentally for human occupation. Of it Hugo observed: "The unforeseen usefulness of the superfluous!"¹⁵

This "superfluous" characteristic of space, a direct resultant of the abstract generative process, should not be mistaken as evidence for an indictment along traditional humanistic-functionalist lines. This is rather the implacable and inevitable space of the contemporary, post-political, post-psychoanalytical subject, a somewhat fluid character of the kind outlined in the preceding chapter. Formed by the nonreflectivity of screens, immersed in the indeterminate depth of their spatial opacity and semitranslucency, this subject no doubt feels entirely at home inside the elephant, the dinosaur, the anthill, or the viscous blob: as if the subject itself were at one with the surfaces of its enclosure, its body no longer imitated, dissected, or deconstructed by its environment, but now enveloped and dispersed at one and the same time, its own surfaces, inner and outer, mapped by the same processes that generate its multiple outer skins, if any "outer" or "inner" may any longer be distinguished. Perhaps this would be the logical, evolutionary trajectory of the Nietzschean/Corbusian aerobic subject of modernism, first merging with the infinities of ineffable space, then synesthetized by the multimedia play on the warped surfaces of the Philips Pavilion, now finally at one with its surroundings. One retroactive interpretation of the modernist-functionalist fiction would be, after all, that, architecturally speaking and despite the claims of humanist perspective, we have been "here," in the elephant, so to speak, all along.


But in fact we do not have to search for extra-architectural examples to make this point in terms of built form. Gilles Deleuze reminds us that this forced separation between inside and outside, this "severing," was a property of the baroque: "Baroque architecture can be defined by this severing of the facade from the inside, of the interior from the exterior, and the autonomy of the interior from the independence of the exterior, but in such conditions that each of the two terms thrusts the other forward."¹⁶ Working out from Wölfflin, Deleuze wants the baroque to construct what he sees as an entirely new kind of link/nonlink between inner and outer, upper and lower, that corresponds to the structure of the Leibnizian monad, "the autonomy of the inside, an inside without an outside," with "as its correlative the independence of the

facade, an outside without an inside.”¹⁷ The outside may have windows, but they open only to the outside; the inside is lit, but in such a way that nothing can be seen through the “orifices” that bring light in. Joining the two, as we have seen, is the *fold*, a device that both separates and brings together, even as it articulates divisions acting as invisible go-between and visible matter: “the fold affects all materials,” it “becomes expressive matter, with different scales, speeds, and different vectors (mountains and waters, papers, fabrics, living tissues, the brain),” and thus “determines and materializes Form.” Here again the architectural metaphor serves philosophy: “the facade-matter goes down below, while the soul-room goes up above. The infinite fold then moves between the two levels.”¹⁸ The fold is here a stair, but one with a complicated kind of reduplicative perspectivity—that of the perspective conundrums of Desargues, a favorite of Deleuze.

But philosophy, as Bernard Cache and others have registered, also serves art and architecture; the ever-expanding delimitation of Leibniz by the equally disseminated notion of the baroque emerges in Deleuze’s writing as a new model of architecture, one that moves beyond the traditional antinomies of modernism—the implied conflict between the “bearing principle” and the “covering principle,” between, as Deleuze hazards, Gropius and Loos—and establishes a post-Leibnizian house for a new “harmony” of inside and outside. But where the modernist “baroque” drew on the spatial ambiguities of its seventeenth-century antecedent on behalf of a synthesis between space and time, for Deleuze the new baroque house exists to join animate and inanimate, to fold the one into the other with insistent force. Where once was a “closed chapel with imperceptible openings,” now we have the model “invoked by Tony Smith, the sealed car speeding down the dark highway.”¹⁹

In generating form by means of digital animation software, Lynn has explored the potential image of such an architecture in evocative ways.²⁰ Thus “House Prototype in Long Island” begins by a multiple-level site analysis that takes account of visual obstacles and destinations, physical forces, movement forces, and the like to produce a composite fieldscape of attractions and repulsions into which certain prototypical “house” organizations are inserted and warped accordingly. Different values ascribed to different levels of forces produce different distortions; different structures and coverings are tested against interior forces and exterior vectors; the resulting forms are gridded and

22. Greg Lynn, Cardiff
Bay Opera House
competition, 1994.
Computer-generated
bird's-eye view.



simplified into skeletal systems; the "prototypes" thus produced reveal, like the plastic forms of animated cartoon characters, all the deformations of pressure and release. On a larger scale, the Cardiff Bay Opera House project literalizes the site as an empty insect shell, a "chrysalis," out of which the new construction emerges. This construction is figured as a "hull," the voided space of former waterfront hulks, with ribs and casing turned over and merged into a system of ovoid forms that, animated as "polyps," in the final iteration house the functions of the Opera House. Not unexpectedly, the plan of the complex resembles a section through an insect carcass, with head, tail, extensions, and attached young, while the model realizes this image in three dimensions, with raised head, pincers, feelers, and the like. In both of these projects, and in others such as the larvalike Yokohama Port Terminal, or the pupalike Henie Onstad Kunstsenter installation, the serial implications of "animate" form are described in ways that demonstrate the potential for producing a "counter-architectural" morphology that materializes, in a way unattainable throughout the modernist period, all the phantoms of the biological analogy.

In these terms, the apparent "destination" of animate form would be to construct not so much the folded skin, the severed facade or twisted bodywork, nor the all-enclosing interior as an independent and windowless entity, but

rather the fold itself. No literal interpretation of "folding" or of material folds, whether of fabric, facade, or space, can perform the Deleuzian/Leibnizian function; it would not be so much a question of illustrating complex folds, with all the geometrical rigor of computer-generated images, as it would be of discovering the equivalent "form" that might join the two floors of the material and immaterial. Deleuze is clear on this: our monads are no longer closed interiors that contain the entire world; they are opened up, prised open "as if by a pair of pliers," penetrating other monads, rupturing the previous distinctions between private and public like a Cage or Stockhausen performance, a Dubuffet "plastic habitat." Deleuze's example is musical (the baroque, he states, is the abstract art par excellence) in the formulation "Music has stayed at home; what has changed now is the organization of the home and its nature,"²¹ but if we substitute "architecture" for "music" the point is clear. The baroque house that Leibniz/Deleuze designed possessed an inside and an outside, the one torn away from the other, each independent of the other, and with two stories, the one material, the other spiritual, joined by a stair of infinite folds. A neo-Leibnizian house would not, however, replicate this construction, but would expand beyond it with partial and intersecting velocities, into the city. In the new baroque, "the same construction of the point of view over the city continues to be developed, but now it is neither the same point of view nor the same city, now that both the figure and the ground are in movement in space."²² In this new framing of the neo-baroque house, both the modernist solution to the monad (Deleuze gives the example of Le Corbusier's chapel at La Tourette) and the postmodernist (one might imagine the gestalt of Rowe's Collage City, with its stable interplay of figure and ground) are supplanted by a folded city, one where above-ground and below-ground, private inside and public outside are forced into each other, "overtaking," in Deleuze's terms, "monadology with a 'nomadology.'"²³