Syllabus

I. Conception, Perception, and Definition

1. Introduction to the class

2. Definitions of corruption

a. Public-interest-centered definitions.
b. Market-centered definitions.
c. Public-office-centered definitions.

3. Whose Corruption? Electoral corruption (political corruption) vs. bureaucratic corruption.

Readings:

Nye, Joseph. 1967. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis" American Political Science Review 61 (2) 417-27.

Heidenheimer, Handbook, pp. 3-66.

Theobald, Corruption, Development, and Underdevelopment, pp.1-18.

How is corruption perceived in different societies and at different times? Is there a universal standard for defining what is corrupt?

a. Universalist: There are two main schools of thought on how corruption should be conceptualized. The first is what can be called "universalist," which seeks to define corruption using certain common properties with the premise that these properties make certain behavior "corrupt" in all societies.

b. Relativist: This view contends that what is corrupt in one society may not be in another. The definition of corruption depends on the country and culture in question. Most contemporary scholars on corruption agree, though, that a working definition of corruption which can be applied to corruption across country boundaries should be, and indeed is, possible.

c. The evolving perception (conception) of corruption.

Readings:

Heidenheimer, pp. 66-143; 145-210; 719-800.

Theobald, pp. 1-18.

II. Explaining Corruption

Mainly historical-sociological approach to explaining causes of corruption

(1) One theory views corruption as induced by bureaucratization, or by permanent bureaucratic inertia. The former is most often found in case studies of Britain, the United States, and other capitalist industrialized countries. In these societies, corruption is viewed as a shift from the impersonal logic of the market to bureaucratic impersonalism.

(2) The other takes an opposite position, that corruption is a consequence of "mal-administration," of the lack of an impersonal and universalistic bureaucratic system.

Readings:

Theobald, Corruption, Development, and Underdevelopment, pp.19-106.

Caiden, Gerald E. 1988. "Toward a General Theory of Official Corruption." Asian Journal of Public Administration 10 (1): 3-26.

Caiden, Gerald, and Naomi Caiden. 1977. "Administrative Corruption" Public Administration Review 37: 301-9.

Eisenstadt, E.S. 1969. "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization." in A. Etzioni, ed., A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations.

Rajkumar, Renuka. 1976. "Political Corruption: a Review of the Literature." West African Journal of Sociology and Political Science 1 (2): 177-185.

Economic approach to explaining corruption, which is based on the rational choice assumptions.

(1) Micro-economic approach: Scholars search for economic reasons accentuated by the rational calculation of people involved in corrupt transactions. E.g. game theoretical model on "transaction costs" and the principle-agent model.

(2) Macro-economic approach: This mode of reasoning claims essentially that the lack of economic development and the presence of restrictive government intervention are the main structural factors for corruption. Corruption is seen primarily as a consequence of scarcity, artificially created by government desire to promote economic growth. Models of this approach include the rent-seeking theory and the "second economy" theory.

Readings:

Klitgaard, pp.52-97.

Rose-Ackerman, pp. 1-25.

Krueger, Ann. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Societies." American Economic Review 64 (3): 291-303.

MacRae, John. 1982. "Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach." World Development 10 (8): 677-687.

Kiser, Edgar, and Xiaoxi Tong. 1992. "Determinants of the Amount and Type of Corruption in State Fiscal Bureaucracies: An Analysis of Late Imperial China." Comparative Political Studies 25 (3): 300-331.

Philp, Mark. 1989. "From `Asabiya' to Moral Aptitude: A Case Study in the Definition of Political Corruption." Unpublished manuscript.

Laurence Busse, at al., 1996. "The Perception of Corruption: A Market Discipline Approach@ at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~tyavero/ip/project2.html

(1) The socio-structural approach. The analytical focus of this approach, influenced by Fred Riggs' ecological treatment of public administration, is generally the socio-cultural milieu of corruption. It pays attention to values, ethos, and "cultures of corruption." Analytical unit: society and culture.

(2) The psychological and attitudinal approach examines individual attitude or social norms for reasons of corruption. Analytical unit: individuals

Readings:

Heidenheimer, pp. 305-73; 375-88; 423-442.

McMullan, M. 1961. "A Theory of Corruption." The Sociological Review 9:181-200.

Klugman, Jeffry. 1986. "The Psychology of Soviet Corruption, Undiscipline, and Resistance to Reform." Political Psychology 7 (1): 67-82.

Roldan, Antonio 1989. "A Brief Psychology of Corruption." Psychology 26 (4): 53-55.

Sampson, Steven. 1983. "Bureaucracy and Corruption as Anthropological Problems: A Case Study from Romania." Folk 25: 64-96.

III. Patterns of Corruption

(1) Personal rule and corruption

(2) Crony-capitalism

(3) Prebendalism and rent-seeking

Readings:

Hutchcroft, Paul. 1994. "Booty Capitalism: Business-Government Relations in the Philippines," in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Weyland, Kurt. 1998. "The Politics of Corruption in Latin America." Journal of Democracy (9) 108-21.

The Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), 1996. "Governance and the Economy in Africa: Tools for Analysis and Reform of Corruption," at http://www.inform.umd.edu:8080/iris/toolkit.html

Harsch, Ernest. 1993. "Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 31 (1): 31-48.

Jones, Edwin. 1985. "Politics, Bureaucratic Corruption, and Maladministration in the Third World: Some Commonwealth Caribbean Considerations." International Review of Administration Science 1:19-23.

(1) Informal relations and modes of operation.

(2) Privatization of the state.

(3) Rent-seeking in the emerging markets.

(4) Organized crime and corruption

Readings:

Miller, William, et al. 1998. "Are the People Victims or Accomplices: the Use of Presents and Bribes to Influence Officials in Eastern Europe," Crime, Law, and Social Change, 29 (4): 273-310.

Kramer, John. 1998. "The Politics of Corruption," Current History, 97 (Oct.): 329.

Gong, Ting. 1993. "Corruption and Reform in China: An Analysis of Unintended Consequences." Crime, Law, and Social Change 19 (6): 311-327.

Lu, Xiaobo, "Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China," Comparative Politics, forthcoming.

Johnston, Michael, and Yufan Hao. 1995 "China's Surge of Corruption." Journal of Democracy 6 (4): 80-94.

Kaminski, Antoni. 1989. "Coercion, Corruption, and Reform: State and Society in the Soviet-type Socialist Regimes." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (1): 77-101.

Tarkowski, Jacek. 1990. "Endowment of Nomenclature, or Apparatchiks Turned into Entrepreneurchiks, or from Communist Rank to Capitalist riches." Innovation 4 (1): 89-105.

White, Gordon. 1996. "Corruption and Market Reform in China." IDS Bulletin, 27 (2): 40-47.

FBI, http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/bribes/fbi0910.htm

(1) Political scandals and electoral politics

(2) Public contracts and rent-seeking

Readings:

Heidenheimer, pp. 535-586; 587-638; 871-932.

Theobald, pp. 46-75.

Rose-Ackerman, pp. 127-142.

Colazingari, Silvia, and Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1998. "Corruption in a Paternalistic Democracy: Lessons for Latin American Countries," Political Science Quarterly, 113: 447-70.

Johnson, Chalmers. "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan." Journal of Japanese Studies 12, no. 1 (1986): 1-28.

(November 2 is an election holiday, no class)

1. Mexico

2. China

Reading:

Klaus M. Leisinger ,1996. "Multinational Corporations, Governance Deficits, and Corruption: Discussing a Complex Issue from the Perspective of Business Ethics," at http://foundation.novartis.com/corrupt.htm

IV. Consequences of Corruption

The debate on corruption effects:

(1) Corruption is demoralizing and unfair. It creates public distrust in government and leads to instability. It is a cancer of a polity.

(2) Corruption buys off officials who would otherwise have resisted reform, thus reducing the possibility of stagnation. It provides access to government and policy-making process for people who would otherwise have had no such access.

Readings:

Heidenheimer, pp. 933-1006.

Rose-Ackerman, pp.113-74.

Theobald, pp. 107-130.

Ben Dor, Gabriel. 1974. "Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development: the Revisionist Theses Revisited." Comparative Political Studies 7 (1): 63-83.

Waterbury, John. 1976. "Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco." Government and Opposition 11 (4): 426-445.

Abueva, Jose. 1966. "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils, and Graft to Political Development" East-West Center Reviews 3: 45-54.

The debate on the economic effects of corruption:

(1) Corruption is a form of rent-seeking, which is unproductive and socially wasteful. It distorts the market and discourage investors because of added transaction costs.

(2) Corruption is an equalizer. Under certain conditions it does not hamper overall economic growth. It may actually enliven economic activities in an otherwise stagnate and highly regulated economy.

Readings:

Heidenheimer, pp. 389-404.

Rose-Ackerman, pp. 7-26.

Mauro, Paulo, 1998, " Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research," Finance and Development, 35 (March).

Kaufmann, Daniel and Cheryl Grey, "Corruption and Development," Finance and Development, 35 (March)

Basu, Susanto, and David Li. 1998. "Corruption In Transition," unpublished paper.

V. Corruption as a Public Policy and Business Ethics Issue

1. Crony Capitalism and the "Asian Miracle"

2. Prebendalism and Underdevelopment in Africa

Readings:

Klitgaard, pp. 52-97.

Hutchcroft, Paul, 1996, "Corruption's Obstruction: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption, Capitalist Development in the Philippines," unpublished paper.

MacIntyre, Andrew, 1996, "Clientelism and Economic Growth: the Politics of Economic Policy Making in Indonesia," unpublished paper.

V. Corruption as a Public Policy and Business Ethics Issue

(1) Anti-corruption institutions, strategies, and other efforts.

(2) Case Study: The ICEC (Hong Kong) story

Readings:

Klitgaard, pp. 98-210.

Heidenheimer, pp. 801-70.

Theobald, pp. 133-161.

Rose-Ackerman, pp. 143-74.

Klitgaard, Robert, "International Cooperation against Corruption," Finance and Development, 35 (March) 1998.

Speville, Bertrand de. 1997. "Hong Kong: Policy Initiatives against Corruption," OECD Development Center Studies.

Web sites:

http://www.icac.org.hk/
http://www.transparency.de/

(1) International anti-corruption efforts

(2) US laws: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977.

Readings:

Heidenhiemer, pp. 685-700.

Rose-Ackerman, pp. 175-222.

Klaus M. Leisinger, 1994. "Corporate Ethics and International Business: Some Basic Issues," at http://foundation.novartis.com/business_corporate_ethics.htm

Low, Lucinda and John Davis, 1998. "Coping with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: a Primer for Energy and Natural Resource Sector," Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 16: 286-320.

Victor, Kirk. 1996. "Dirty Dealings," National Journal, (28): 869-73.

• http://foundation.novartis.com/business_corporate_ethics.htm
• http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/annex3.htm
• http://www.oecd.org//puma/sigmaweb/ethics/KLITGARD.HTM
• http://www.oecd.org//puma/gvrnance/ethics/symposium/rose.htm
• http://www.oecd.org//puma/gvrnance/ethics/symposium/corruption.htm
• http://www.oecd.org//dev/news/corrupt.htm
• http://www.oecd.org//daf/cmis/bribery/secgene.htm
• gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/recs/52/RES52-87.EN