tional inversion; the stream of milk hitting the chin to signify the sailor’s diaphragm muscles; the flower-like exfoliation of the entrails connecting sex with loss and suggesting love and birth as pain; the daring apparent allusion to the Pieta in the image of the youth carried by the sailor; all these have poetic intuition and human authenticity. If a more ideal artistic logic may be imagined for them, Mr. Anger is still to be congratulated for having the courage to give them any artistic status at all.”

Parker Tyler

Parker Tyler, “Rashomon as Modern Art,” Cinema 16 Pamphlet (1952)

Rashomon, the new Japanese film masterpiece, is a story about a double crime: rape and homicide (or possibly suicide). The time is the Eighth Century A. D. It is told in retrospect, and in successive layers, by the three participants, the dead warrior (through a mediumistic priestess), his raped wife, and a notorious bandit perhaps
responsible for the warrior’s death as well as for his wife’s violation, and by a woodcutter who alleges himself to have witnessed, accidentally, the whole episode. The quality of the film narrative is so fine that an astonishingly unified effect emerges from the conflicting stories furnished by the three principals and (following the inquest) by the lone witness. The bandit and the woman have separately fled the scene of the crimes, where the woodcutter claims, at first, to have arrived only in time to find the warrior’s corpse. Nominally, the film comes under the familiar heading of stories that reconstruct crimes. However, this story does not go much beyond the presentation of each person’s testimony.

The woman claims to have killed her husband in an irresponsible fit of horror after the rape took place; her husband claims to have committed hari-kiri out of grief and humiliation; the bandit claims to have killed him in honorable combat; and the woodcutter confirms the bandit’s story while picturing the conduct of all participants quite differently from the ways they respectively describe it. As no trial of either of the living participants is shown, and as no consequent action reveals anything conclusive as to the crime, the decision as to the actual truth of the whole affair falls to the spectator’s option. Since technically the woodcutter is the only “objective” witness, he might seem the most reliable of the four testifiers. But his integrity is not beyond question; the version by the warrior’s ghost has contradicted his version in an important detail—one inadvertently confirmed by the woodcutter’s implicit admission (in an incident following the inquest) that he stole a dagger at the scene of the crime. The ghost has testified that he felt “someone” draw from his breast the dagger with which he alleges he committed hari-kiri.

Logically, if one’s aim be to establish in theory the “legal” truth of the affair, the only obvious method is to correlate all the admissible facts of the action with the four persons involved in order to determine their relative integrity as individuals—a procedure complicated necessarily not merely by the given criminal status of one participant but by the fact that all but the woodcutter have willingly assumed guilt. A further difficulty, in general, is that nothing of the background of any character is given beyond what can be assumed from his visible behavior and his social status; for example, there is only the merest hint of something unusual in the journey of the warrior and his lady through the forest. Again, even from direct observation, we have to depend a great deal on these persons as seen through the eyes of each other. So, unless one be prejudiced for one sex or another, one social class or another, it seems almost impossible to make a really plausible choice of the truth-teller (if any). Are we to conclude, in this dilemma, that Rashomon amounts to no more than a trick piece, a conventional mystery-melodrama, left hanging? My answer is No. There are several things about the movie which argue it as a unique and conscious art, the opposite of a puzzle; or at least, no more of a puzzle than those modern paintings of which a spectator may be heard to say: “But what is it? What is it supposed to mean?”

Perhaps more than one profane critic has wisecracked of a Picasso, a Dali, or an Ernst, that it demands, a posteriori, the method described by the police as “the reconstruction of the crime.” My opinion is that the last thing required for the elucidation of Rashomon’s mystery is something corresponding to a jury’s verdict. Such a judgment, esthetically speaking, is as inutile for appreciating the substance of this movie as for appreciating the art of Picasso. In Rashomon, there is no strategic effort to conceal any more than a modern painter’s purpose is to conceal instead of reveal. The basic issue, in art, must always be what the creator desires to reveal. Of such a painting as Picasso. But this enigma rather than an inquest into complex poetry. This great Japan mystery as complete mystery because a movie of this character has to be explained.

Chagall with his creative analysis of the painting, as it can be seen in the old symbols. Rashomon is a pulsating life, a unilatera a space where famous dog, an atmosphere that was illustrated except that the photographer has the camera on the pendulum—on the same place in some movement of images. The amplement is that, for substituted, an evasive viewpoint is the same time the differenter meant to substitute.

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Chagall with his levitated fantasy-world and childhood-symbols, Picasso with his creative analysis of psychological movements translated into pictorial vision—such painters set forth nude mysteries of human experience; each, in the static field of the painting, reveals multiple aspects of a single reality, whether literally or in symbols. Rashomon, as a time art, cinema, corresponds with multiple-image painting as a space art. The simplest rendering of time-phases in an object within the unilateral space of a single picture is, of course, in Futurist painting, such as Balla's famous dog, ambling by the moving skirts of its owner; the dachshund's legs are portrayed multiply with a fanlike, flickering kind of image similar to images as seen in the old-fashioned "bioscope" movie machine. The same dynamic principle was illustrated by Dr. Marey's original time-photography of a running horse, except that the register there was not instantaneous but successive; at least, the photographer had the cinematic idea of keeping pace with a running horse to show the pendulum-like span of its front and hind legs while its body seemed to stay in the same place (treadmill dynamics). Even in the contemporary movie camera, some movements may be so fast that one gets the sort of blur shown in Futurist images. The analogy of Rashomon with such procedures of stating physical movement is that, for the single action photographed, a complex action (or "episode") is substituted, and for the single viewpoint toward this action, multiple (and successive) viewpoints. The camera in this movie is actually trained four times on what theoretically is the same episode; if the results are different each time, it is because each time the camera represents the viewpoint of a different person: a viewpoint mainly different, of course, not because of the physical angle (the camera is never meant to substitute for objective vision) but because of the psychological angle.

"Simultaneous montage" in cinema is the double-exposure of two views so that multiple actions occur in a unilateral space visually while existing in separate spaces literally and possibly—as when a person and his visual recollection are superimposed on the same film-frame—also in separate times. A remarkable aspect of the method of depicting memory in Rashomon is its simplicit: each person, squatting in Japanese fashion as he testifies, squarely faces the camera and speaks; then, rather than simultaneous montage, a flashback takes place: the scene shifts wholly to the fatal spot in the forest. The police magistrate is never shown and no questions addressed to the witnesses are heard. When it is the dead man's turn to testify, the priestess performs the required rite, becomes possessed by his spirit, speaks in his voice, and the scene shifts back as in the other cases. Thus we receive the successive versions of the action with little intervention between them and with the minimum of the "courtroom action."

Of course, there is a framing story, which retrospectively reveals the inquest itself. The action literally begins at the Rashomon Gate, a great ruin where the woodcutter
and the priest, who has brought the woman and been present at the inquest, are sheltered during a rainstorm; joined by a tramp, these two gradually reveal everything that has taken place according to the several versions. What is important is the inherent value of the way the technique of the flashback has been variously used. The separate stories are equally straightforward, equally forceful; no matter which version is being related, his own or another's, every participant behaves with the same conviction. As a result (it was certainly this spectator's experience) one is compelled to believe each story implicitly as it unfolds, and oddly none seems to cancel another out. Therefore it would be only from the policeman's viewpoint of wanting to pin guilt on one of the persons that, ultimately, any obligation would be felt to sift the conflicting evidence and render a formal verdict. Despite the incidental category of its form, Rashomon as a work of art naturally seems to call for a response having nothing to do with a courtroom.

Of an event less significant, less stark and rudimentary in terms of human behavior, the technical question of "the truth" might prove insistent enough to embarrass one's judgment. The inevitable impulse, at first sight, is to speculate on which of those who claim guilt is really guilty of the warrior's death. But whatever conclusion be tentatively reached, what eventually slips back into the spectator's mind and possesses it, is the traumatic violence of the basic pattern: that violence that is the heart of the enigma. The civilization of this medieval period is turned topsy-turvy by the bandit’s strategy, in which he tricks the man, ties him up, and forces him to witness his wife's violation. It is only from this point forward that the stories differ: the woman's reaction to the bandit's assault, the husband's behavior after being freed from his bonds—everything is disputed by one version or another. But is not the heart of the confusion within the event itself? Is this happening not one so frightfully destructive of human poise and ethical custom that it breeds its own ambiguity, and that this ambiguity infects the minds of these people?

All the participants are suffering from shock: the warrior's agonized ghost, his hysterical wife, the bandit, when caught, seized with mad bravado. Unexpectedly—for the paths of the couple and the bandit have crossed purely by accident—three lives have been irretrievably altered after being reduced to the most primitive condition conceivable. Two men (in a manner in which, at best, etiquette has only a vestigial role) have risked death for the possession of a woman. Basically, it is a pattern that was born with the beginnings of mankind. Such an event, in civilized times of high culture, would of itself contain something opaque and even incredible. What matters morally is not how, from moment to moment, the affair was played out by its actors but that it should have been played at all. The illicit impulse springing up in the bandit's breast as the lady's long veil blows aside, is so violent that its consequences attack the sense of reality at its moral root. Regardless of what literally took place in the forest's depths that mild summer day, each participant is justified in reconstructing it in a manner to redeem the prestige of the moral sense, which consciously or not, is a civilized person's most precious possession. It should be emphasized that it is the Japanese people who are involved, and that to them honor is of peculiarly paramount value; even the bandit is quick to seize the opportunity to maintain—truthfully or not—that he behaved like a man of caste rather than an outlaw; he has testified that following the rape (to which, he says, the woman yielded willingly) he untied the husband and worsted him in fair swordplay.

Hence, a psychological episode—one of the perspectives is simply told—of the moral reality objective reality can not be recovered. Of course, except as a special story that the tramp would not open its scene, state similar to and apparently to the priest an a deuce of the may have with that took place may raise bewi subconscious e as disgraceful e that even a sim chaos of this in account in con conclusion that reality, howw be accurate to; is forced t observe. In this as a crude nor is the literal tr: woodcutter ad- relationship of this ment of all, if c.

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Hence, a psychologically unilateral, indisputable perspective exists in which the tragic episode can be viewed by the spectator: a perspective contrary to that in which one of the persons appears technically guilty of the warrior's death. This perspective is simply the catastrophe as a single movement which temporarily annihilated the moral reality on which civilized human consciousness is based. The "legal" or objective reality of the affair (what might be called its statistics) is exactly what cannot be recovered because the physical episode, as human action, has been self-annihilating. Of course, then, it might be claimed that the woodcutter, not being involved except as a spectator, is a disinterested witness of the episode, and accordingly his story that the three actors in the tragedy really played a grim farce, in which two cowards were the heroes and a shrew the heroine, is the correct version. But the opening scene of the framing story makes it plain that the woodcutter's mind is in a state similar to that of the participants themselves; indeed, he is evidently dismayed and apparently by the fact that all their testimony belies what he proceeds to reveal to the priest and the tramp as "the truth." However, as the shocked witness of such a debacle of the social order—in any case a victory of evil over good—this peasant may have withheld his testimony out of superstitious timidity. If, in fact, he saw all that took place, then the added confusion that the participants contradict each other may raise bewilderment in his simple mind—may even tempt him to exploit his subconscious envy and resentment against his betters by imagining their behavior as disgraceful and ludicrous. It seems within Rashomon's subtle pattern to suggest that even a simple, disinterested witness should be drawn psychologically into the chaos of this incident; after all, there is no proof that he did not invent his own account in competition with the others'. This assumption would lend credit to the conclusion that the real function of each witness's story is to salvage his own sense of reality, however close his version to the event as it took place. Perhaps it would be accurate to add that the facts themselves have no true legal status since each witness is forced to draw on his subjective imagination rather than on his capacity to observe. In this case, each is in the position of the proto-artist, who uses reality only as a crude norm; the sense of invention enters into reality. On the other hand, there is the literal truth of the denouement, the climax of the framing story, in which the woodcutter adopts a foundling baby who has been left in the Gate's interior. The relation of this incident to the story proper strikes me as the most problematical element of all, if only because the film would have remained intact without it.

Morally, of course, this incident functions as a reinstatement of human values in the sense of good. But the specifically religious view that humanity has hopelessly degraded itself in the forest episode (the view represented by the priest) is more external than essential to the whole conception. The priest thinks in terms equivalent, logically, to the law's terms: truth or falsehood. Since some lying is self-evident, the sin of concealment is added to crime; i.e., concealment of the truth, not of the crime, for all profess crime. Ironically enough, confession has become a sin. What seems significant to the whole is the collective nature of the liars: they literally outnumber the truth-teller (whichever he may be). The "sin" involved has gone beyond individual performance and exists objectively as would a natural cataclysm such as a volcanic eruption. That each participant assumes guilt, including the dead man, reveals the comprehensiveness and irresistibility of the disorder. A lie, then, actually becomes the symbol of the operation by which these people mutually regain their moral identities. These identities having been destroyed as though by an objective force beyond anyone's control, any means seems fair to
regain them. Since, however, they cannot separate themselves from the sense of tragedy, they prefer to be tragedy’s heroes—its animating will rather than its passive objects. But why should the three tragedies seem as one?

To revert to our analogy with the visual media of painting and still photography, the plastic reality with which we have to deal in Rashomon is multiformal rather than uniform. Within one span of time-and-space, reality (the episode in the forest) has been disintegrated. While the witnesses’ stories accomplish its reintegration, they do not do so in terms of the physically unilateral except in the final esthetic sense in which the totality of a work exists all at once in a spectator’s mind. The analogy is complex, but literally it is with the Futuristic image of the walking dog; like this image, the total image of Rashomon varies only in detail and degree. There is no variation on the background and origin of the tragedy; no contradiction as to the main physical patterns of the rape and the death of the warrior by a blade-wound. So the main visual aspect is held firmly, unilaterally, in place. Another image of Futurist painting renders the angles of air-displacement caused by the nose of a racing auto. Such “displacements” exist in Rashomon severally in the respective accounts of a physical action deriving from one main impetus: the desire to possess a woman.

The total psychological space in this movie, because of its complexity, is rendered in literal time as is music. A similar psychological space is rendered simultaneously in Picasso’s Girl Before Mirror by the device of the mirror as well as by the double image of profile-and-fullface on the girl. Her moonlike face has a symbolic integralness as different “phases” of the same person; that is, her fullface denotes her personality as it confronts the world and her profile her personality as it confronts itself: the mirror image in which the fullface character of her aspect is diminished. To Meyer Schapiro we owe a basic observation as to this painting: it plays specifically on the body-image which each individual has of himself and others, and which is distinct from the anatomical image peculiarly available to photography. The mirror-image in Picasso’s work thus asserts a psychological datum parallel with the dominantly subjective testimony of each witness in Rashomon’s tragedy. The mirror of the movie screen is like the mirror in the painting as telescoped within the image of the total painting; successively, we see people as they think of themselves and as they are to others; for example, at one point during the woman’s story, the camera substitutes for the viewpoint of her husband toward whom she lifts a dagger: we see her as conceived by herself but also as she would have been in her husband’s eyes. In revealing, with such expressiveness and conviction, what novels have often revealed through first-person narratives or the interior-monologue, the film necessarily emphasizes its visual significance. The sum of these narratives in Rashomon rests on the elements of the tragedy in which all agree: one raped, one was raped, one killed, one was killed. The “variations” are accountable through something which I would place parallel with Schapiro’s body-image concept: the psychic image that would apply especially to the memory of a past event in which the body-image is charged with maintaining, above all, its moral integrity, its ideal dignity. In a sense, Picasso’s girl reconstructs and synthesizes her outer self-division within the depths of the mirror; so in the depths of each person’s memory, in Rashomon, is recreated the image of what took place far away in the forest as consistent with his ideal image of himself.

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In modern times, the human personality—as outstandingly demonstrated in the tragi-comedies of Pirandello—is easily divided against itself. But what makes a technically schizophrenic situation important and dramatically interesting is, paradoxically, the individual’s sense of his former or possible unity, for without this sense he would not struggle morally against division: he would be satisfied to be “more than one person.” In analytical cubism, we have a pictorial style expressing an ironic situation within the human individual’s total physique, including his clothes; we do not perceive, within an individual portrayed by Picasso in this manner, a moral “split” or psychological “confusion”; rather we see the subject’s phenomenal appearance portrayed formally in terms of its internal or “depth” elements, its overlaid facets, or complex layers of being, which—though presumably not meant to signify a conflict in the personality—correspond logically, nevertheless, to the moral dialectic within all consciousness (subjective/objective, personal/social, and so on). The same logical correspondence is seen even more plainly in the anatomical dialectic of Tchelitchew’s recent paintings, where the separate inner systems are seen in labyrinthine relation to the skin-surface. Indeed, man as an internal labyrinth is common to diverse styles of modern painting, all such styles necessarily implying, as human statements, the sometimes bewildering complexity of man’s spiritual being. Great beauty is justifiably found in such esthetic forms, which indirectly symbolize an ultimate mystery: that human mystery to which Rashomon so eloquently testifies in its own way and which comprises the transition from birth to death, from the organic to the inorganic, which is the individual’s necessary material fate.

Against the awareness of his material fate, the individual erects many defenses: art, pleasure, ethics, God, religion, immortality—ideas, sensations, and acts whose continuity in him are preserved by constant cultivation, periodic renewal, unconscious “testimony.” These constitute his moral identity in the social order. In them resides the essence of his being, the law of his contentment (such as it be), and his rational ability to function from hour to hour. In the lives of the persons of Rashomon, where this objective order prevailed, utter chaos was suddenly injected. Each person was shaken out of himself, became part of that blind flux which joins the intuition of the suspense-before-birth with that of the suspense-before-death and whose name is terror. This was largely because of the tragedy’s physical violence, which temporarily vanquished human reason. If we look at the terror of war as depicted in Picasso’s Guernica, we observe a social cataclysm of which the forest episode in Rashomon is a microcosm. Curiously enough, Guernica happens to be divided vertically into four main sections or panels, which Picasso has subtly unified by overlapping certain formal elements. Thus, while the great massacre is of course highly simplified here in visual terms, it is moreover synthesized by means of four stages or views. As wrenched by violence as are the individual forms, they congregate, so to speak, to make order out of confusion. Though Picasso was not recomposing from memory, he might have been; in any case, the drive of art is toward formal order and the individuals in Rashomon, as proto-artists, have this same drive. As gradually accumulated, the sum-total of Rashomon constitutes a time mural whose unity lies in the fact that, however different are the imaginations of the four witnesses, whatever harsh vibrations their mutual contradictions set up, the general design (as the film-makers have moulded it) remains and dominates the work’s final aspect of great beauty and great truth.