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petty dynasties, which once again rescues their histories from oblivion. This section begins with 'The armies of Ifriqiya', which turns from the composition of armies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to the importance of a citizen militia, and the evidence this offers for civic consciousness on the part of the townspeople. Such consciousness under the direction of leading citizens at a time of crisis is illustrated in the subsequent paper, 'Muslim justice under infidel rule', which deals with the occupation of most of the coastal cities of Ifriqiya by the Normans of Sicily in the middle of the twelfth century; as in article V, 'Islam and trade', the attitude of the Law is seen to play a crucial role. In the penultimate article, 'The city-state in mediaeval Ifriqiya', the controversial question of the character of the city in Islam is first analysed and then discussed in the case of Tripoli, which intermittently enjoyed some four hundred years of independence between the beginning of the eleventh and the beginning of the fifteenth century. Its account of local politics is followed in the last paper, 'Ibn Khaldun and the dynastic approach to local history', which describes the oasis city of Biskra over the same period of time. Here, the struggle for power within the city is directly related to the struggle for power in the countryside, which is described in articles X, 'The way of the nomad', and XI, 'Arabs, Berbers and holy men', and serves as a useful conclusion.

I should like to thank the editors and publishers of the journals and books in which these articles were first published for their kind permission to reproduce them as part of this collection.

MICHAEL BRETT

SOAS, London
August 1998

***PUBLISHER'S NOTE**: The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.*

Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and quoted in the index entries.

I

THE ISLAMISATION OF MOROCCO FROM THE ARABS TO THE ALMORAVIDS

The Arab conquests of the 7th and 8th Centuries created an empire extending from the Atlantic to Central Asia and northern India. The Moroccan empire was created by the conquests of the Berber Almoravids in the 11th Century. Between these two momentous events stretches the Islamisation of Morocco, set in train by the Arabs and reaching a peak with the Almoravids. The problem is to explain how this conversion of the country to the new religion came about. The problem begins with the literature, which is entirely in Arabic, and therefore written from the point of view of the converted, whether Arab or Berber. Almost without exception, moreover, its authors were foreigners, or later than the events they describe, or both. The spread and development of Islam in Morocco in these early centuries is witnessed only by outsiders in space and outsiders in time, and certainly never from within the pre-Islamic traditions of a country confronted by the challenge of the new faith. Instead, the literature is governed by the intellectual and cultural preoccupations of the new religion and the civilisation to which it gave rise. As Robert Brunschvig showed in his analysis of the 9th Century Egyptian writer Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, these preoccupations serve to obscure rather than reveal the historical reality. [1] In the case of Morocco, for example, the story of how the heroic conqueror 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' rode into the Surrounding Ocean, the Atlantic, as a sign that he had carried the holy war to the end of the world, becomes in the 14th Century Moroccan historian Ibn 'Idhārī a detailed account of the conquest of the whole of the country as far as the Sous and the Draa. [2] Criticised on the grounds of improbability and the lack of early evidence, [3] the story was given a new lease of life by the publication in 1954 of a second narrative of his conquest of the High Atlas by a second Moroccan historian of the 13th-14th Century. [4] Its editor, Lévi-Provençal, considered that its factual style was proof of its veracity; but this seems to be no more than a characteristic of late mediaeval authors like Ibn Khaldūn, who rationalised essentially legendary material to produce a straightforward account. The purpose of the text was almost certainly to provide an Islamic pedigree for the tribes of the High Atlas after the collapse of the Almohad empire which they had created. [5] The conclusion of Roger Le Tourneau, that subsequent accounts of the Arab conquests in particular cannot be taken at their face value, remains unshaken. [6]

The Arabs spent some fifty years, from 655 to 705, in the conquest of Byzantine Africa, that is, eastern Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania, and its conversion into their own province of Ifriqiya, capital Qayrawān. With remarkable speed they then advanced in the space of five years to Tangier, going on to conquer Visigothic Spain between 711 and 715. [7] E.-F. Gautier regarded it as a "great leap forward" from one centre of ancient civilisation to another in search of booty and tribute. [8] So it was; but the important fact is that in doing so the Arabs remained within the boundaries of the old Roman empire in North Africa, to the north of the *limes* or frontier of the former Roman provinces of Mauretania Caesariensis and Tingitana, which ran from Salé eastwards through the Taza gap along the southern edge of the high plains of western Algeria to the Hodna depression, before veering away towards Biskra and Tripoli. The Mauretanias had long since relapsed into independence under their own kings and chieftains, even Septem or Ceuta, where the legendary Count Julian who assisted the Arab invasion of Spain may never have existed.

[9] But they had clearly survived as a political and social reality revived by the Arab invasion, whose immediate effect was to reaffirm the old Roman division of North Africa between civilisation and barbarism. I use these words without prejudice to the societies on either side of the border, in the historical sense of a division between lands directly and indirectly affected by fifteen hundred years of empire-building in the Mediterranean, and in the Classical sense of a distinction between peoples inside and outside the pale of imperial society and its cultural values. The values in question had turned from Roman citizenship to Christianity to Islam without losing any of their force. In the west, the political and religious division created by the Arab conquests between the lands of belief and unbelief excluded from the newly-constituted Arab empire the whole of central and southern Morocco, the Anti-, High and Middle Atlas, the Sous, the Draa and the Tafilelt, a distinction which is the necessary starting-point of the discussion of Islamisation in the Maghrib al-Aqsā or Furthest West.

It was a division which nevertheless contained the seeds of its demolition. Paradoxically the Arabs chose as their principal allies in the Maghrib, not what remained of the civilised Latin-speaking Christian population of North Africa, but the Berbers, the majority of the inhabitants of North Africa, tribesmen traditionally despised as barbarians for the incomprehensible language they spoke. This lack of civilisation was reflected in the Arabs' own definition of the Berbers as pagans rather than Christians, who could not be reduced to the rank of *dhimmī-s* or protected persons who were allowed to keep their old religion on payment of a poll tax, but had to be forced to submit to Islam. Ironically they were thereby ennobled, transformed from the barbarous speakers of a language which was neither Latin nor Greek into the Barbar or Berbers, a recognised nation or race in line of descent from Noah. This nation, moreover, was actually or potentially Muslim, embraced by the religion of the conquerors and thus identified with their *mission civilisatrice*, their destiny to fulfil the word of God. Its conquest was not easy - the confounded race would have apostatised twelve times - but resulted in principle in the inclusion of the whole of the population of the Maghrib within the pale of the dominant civilisation for the very first time. It was a major conceptual advance over the attitudes of Antiquity, one in which the traditional roles of the inhabitants of North Africa were reversed.

Not that this reversal was immediately apparent. The steps towards its realisation were taken with feet of clay, in accordance with ancient prejudice. The alleged apostasy of the Berbers served in practice as the justification for levying a tribute of male and female slaves from peoples who had made their *islām* or submission to the conquerors and were in theory free. [10] The men at least were inducted into the army of the Arab faithful as *mawālī* or clients, forming regiments of second-class Muslims to augment the numbers of the invaders as they pressed on to the west. Tāriq, the Berber *mawlā* of the Arab governor Musā Ibn Nuṣayr, who led the invasion of Spain in 711, may have entered Arab service in this way, though he may equally well have been a Berber chieftain who had commended himself to the conqueror. [11] The final defeat of the Ifriqiyan opposition at the beginning of the 8th Century brought in Berber warriors as allies rather than slaves, a huge influx which created the armies as well as the demand for the next great advance to satisfy the expectation of plunder. By the time that advance was achieved with the conquest of Spain, a highly unstable relationship had been established between the Arab invaders and the native peoples they had co-opted in this way for the holy war.

On the one hand the conquests continued. From Spain the armies of Arabs and Berbers crossed into France. [12] In North Africa in the 730s they opened up a new front in the Sūs, the name given to the desert fringe of southern Morocco from Figuig to the valley of the Sous itself. [13] The campaigns in this direction were launched south-eastwards from Tlemcen, the old Roman city that the Arabs had appropriated as their principal *miṣr* or garrison city *en route* from their capital Qayrawān to their base at Tangier. Diverging in this way from the line of their advance into Spain, these expeditions broke new ground not only for the Arabs but for the whole tradition of Roman imperialism

which they had inherited, and which had been confined in western Algeria and northern Morocco to the band of Mediterranean climate inland from the coast. In striking out for the Sahara, the Arabs were looking not so much for slaves as for the silver of the Anti-Atlas and for the gold which materialised in this country from the Bilād al-Sūdān to the south of the great desert; and their enterprise was a crucial factor in the subsequent history of Islam in Morocco. But it was almost immediately halted by the great Berber rebellion which broke out at Tangier in 740 and spread right back across the Maghrib to Tripoli and the Fezzan. After the conquest of Spain, the Arabs had chosen to remind the Muslim Berbers of their obligations as tributary subjects to supply the Caliphate at Damascus not only with men but maidens, and other luxuries such as the skins of unborn lambs, at a time when they had begun to think of themselves as members of the community free from such impositions. Meanwhile those Berbers conscripted as *mawālī* into military service joined the poorer Arabs in protest at their treatment as second-class soldiers or even as branded slaves. [14] Their revolt, however, less than fifty years after their initial resistance had finally been overcome, was a measure of the Arab achievement. It was directed at the right which the conquerors represented, against the wrong that they did; in other words it turned to Islam to claim the equality of all believers. It went still further when its adherents seized upon the national identity so recently conferred upon the Berbers by the Arabs, to assert that the Arabs had betrayed the faith of Muhammad, and that they themselves belonged to the race of pure and simple believers which the Prophet had chosen to bring back the religion of God to its home in the Sacred Places. [15] Their justification was provided by Kharijism, essentially the doctrine that by committing a sin, sinners had apostatised, renouncing their faith and thus incurring the penalty of death. [16] Turned by the Berbers against the Arabs whom they accused of flouting the law of God, the doctrine provided an ironic twist to the argument of the conquerors for the enslavement of their race.

The Kharijite revolt in the Maghrib showed that Islam for the Berbers of the 8th Century was fundamentally a question of membership and non-membership of the ruling community of the faithful. At the same time it was the beginning of more widespread rebellion in the empire which turned on the question of the rightful ruler of that community in succession to Muhammad. The overthrow of the Umayyads by the 'Abbasids in 750, however, was not a victory for the doctrine of Kharijism, that the Caliph or successor to the Prophet should be the best Muslim, irrespective of race, but a triumph of the call for a member of Muḥammad's family. Confined to the Maghrib, the revolt of the Berbers succeeded only in breaking the political and religious unity of Islam. While Ifriqiya became a province of the 'Abbasid empire ruled from Baghdad, southern Libya, western Algeria and northern Morocco reverted to independence. Kharijite leaders established themselves as rulers of the faithful at Zawila in the Fezzan, at Tāhart or Tiaret, at Tlemcen and at Sijilmāsa, a new foundation in the Tafilelt by Berbers from the north who resumed the abortive thrust of the Arabs into the Sūs. Having failed to win the whole of Islam for their version of the faith, however, their followers began to develop along sectarian lines into separate communities with their own mosques or places of worship. [17] Meanwhile the revolution which had overtaken and overshadowed their great rebellion conspired to restrict their achievements still further. Andalus or Muslim Spain became a separate state under a prince of the Umayyad dynasty in flight from Damascus. Northern Morocco, on the other hand, welcomed a refugee from the victorious side, a member of the Prophet's family who had challenged the claim of the 'Abbasids to the Caliphate on the grounds of better birth. This was Idris, a direct descendant of Muḥammad through his daughter Fātima, her husband 'Ali, and their elder son Ḥasan, who arrived at Walila, that is Volubilis, the old Roman capital of Mauretania Tingitana, in 788, and went on to found the city of Fes in 789. He died in 791, but the city was refounded in 808 by his son and successor Idrīs II. It became the capital of a dynasty which reconstituted the old Roman province as a family domain stretching as far east as Tlemcen, from which the Kharijites had been driven in 790 [18]

By the beginning of the 9th Century, therefore, not only were the Arab conquests at an end, but the Arab empire itself had vanished from the western Maghrib. Destroyed by the faith it had preached, it left behind a Muslim community divided in its political and increasingly in its religious allegiance. The membership of that community, moreover, was still unclear. Uncertainty over the status of the Berbers was to some extent resolved in their favour, in that the tax-collectors of the 'Abbasid regime in Ifriqiya levied tribute from the tribes of the interior under the Islamic name of *sadaqāt* or "alms" due from believers. [19] It seems likely that over the whole of the region overrun by the Arabs there was a disposition to regard all Berbers as Muslim in virtue of an original submission of the nation, which for many of the more remote mountain peoples may have been purely theoretical. But what this nominal Islam meant in tribal practice is obscure. At least it avoided the necessity for holy war upon paganism. In central and southern Morocco, which had never been conquered, the situation was rather different, and the evidence points to a more militant confrontation between the faithful and the native inhabitants. Before the Almoravids, al-Murābitūn or Men of the Ribāṭ in the 11th Century, however, there was no question of a holy war of conquest to "make good the Islam of the Berbers" in the manner of the Arabs at the beginning of the 8th, [20] and thus bring the whole of Morocco finally into the faith. To explain the progress of Islam in Morocco in the intervening centuries, a different word is required, not conquest but colonisation. It is the colonisation of Morocco by Islam, leading up to the wave of militancy that finally came at the end of the period, which is the real subject of this paper.

Not only the word is called for. To understand its meaning in this context, economic must be added to political history. The Arab conquests were rewarded with booty and tribute. Despite the protests of victims like the Berbers, and its interruption by rebellion, tribute turned to regular taxation as the state itself developed into a routine institution. Wherever it was levied to the west of Egypt, such taxation was consumed locally; but the routes along which the Arab armies had flowed from the East into North Africa and Spain, sending their profits back down the line to Damascus, continued to serve as the arteries of long-distance travel and trade. The main road ran from Fusṭāṭ, the capital of Egypt, through Barqa in Cyrenaica, Tripoli, Qayrawān, Tlemcen and Tangier to Cordoba, the capital of al-Andalus, turning all these erstwhile *amṣār* or garrison cities of the conquest into thriving commercial centres inhabited by civilians rather than soldiers, as the nucleus of the Muslim community changed from an army into a cross-section of local society. As it did so, it put down its roots to form a string of settlements whose colonial character was maintained by the constant flux of arrivals and departures from East and West. The basis of this urban network may have been local agriculture and pastoralism, but its life came from the long-distance trade which had transformed the Arab empire into a huge market whose ramifications extended far beyond its borders into Asia, Africa and Europe. [21] The implications for Islam, which provided this society and economy with its political and cultural identity, were equally vast.

In North Africa, the result was a second wave of colonisation which boosted the cities created by the first, and went on to establish a second set of towns, of which the best example is Tāhart. Founded in 761 by the leader of the Ibāḍī Kharijites in the course of their battle for control of Ifriqiya, it became the seat of the Rustumid dynasty which he founded, and the political and religious capital of a sect which stretched eastwards as far as Zawīla in the Fezzan. [22] Planted at the point where the main route westwards across the high plains of the central Maghrib entered the coastal ranges of the Tell on the way to Morocco and Spain, it was at the same time a major commercial centre populated by so many immigrants from the East that it was called "the Iraq of the Maghrib". [23] From the east and south it was supplied by the migrations of the nomadic Berber Mazāta, who belonged to the sect. To the north a more direct route led to Spain across the mountains to the port which the Rustumids had created at Marsā Fārūkh near to Mostaganem, opposite Almeria and Cartagena. [24] To the south-east a regular connection with the Ṣufrī Kharijite

rulers of Sijilmāsa was expressed by a marriage alliance.

Tāhart was nevertheless situated on the border between Kharijism and the realm of the Hasanids, that is, the descendants of Idris at Fes and of his brother Sulaymān at Tlemcen. By the time al-Ya'qūbi was writing towards the end of the 9th Century, the offspring of Sulaymān had colonised the Tell westwards from Algiers to the Moulouya, while those of Idris had multiplied in northern Morocco. [25] Unlike the Kharijites or their own Husaynid Shi'ite relatives in Iraq, they were not sectarian but simply royalist on the strength of their claim to be the hereditary leaders of the community. In the Maghrib they formed a class of rulers rather than a ruling class, scattered across the countryside in the fortresses or fortified townships which they took over or built. A common denominator was the trade which their little capitals attracted, so much so that the market or *sūq* often gave the place its name, like Sūq Ibrāihim on the Algerian coast and Sūq Kutāma, El-Kasr al-Kebir. [26] They were certainly markets for the surrounding population, but the more important were located, like Tlemcen and Fes, upon the highway to al-Andalus, and flourished on the traffic. Fes, developing rapidly into a major city, welcomed the refugees from al-Andalus on the one hand, Ifriqiya on the other, who gave their names to the two halves of the modern city, the Andalusian and Qayrawanian banks of the river, with their respective mosques. [27] Meanwhile in Arshqūl, Rachgoun at the mouth of the Tafna, the older metropolis of Tlemcen had a major port to compare with Marsā Fārūkh as an opening to Spain. [28] Jarāwa, yet another Hasanid foundation to the east of the Moulouya, had a port at the mouth of the river, [29] as did the important city of Basra, today a ruin, in Tushummus at the mouth of the Safdad or Loukkos. [30] As the maritime connection with Spain developed, these ports multiplied, especially along the western Algerian coast, where the distance across the Mediterranean is no more than 200-300 km., and the harbours matched those from Almeria to Denia. [31] Shipping was mainly Spanish, and Andalusian seamen settled in considerable numbers on the North African shore. Tangier and Ceuta were already well-established, but Asila on the Atlantic was first peopled by immigrants, mainly from Spain, then provided with a citadel by an Idrisid prince. [32] Oran was founded by Andalusians at the beginning of the 10th Century. [33] About 875, Tenes was created by Andalusians who were joined by people from the Hasanid settlement of Sūq Ibrāhim. [34] In this way, in the course of the 9th Century, the old Roman Mauretanias became increasingly thickly studded with townships particularly associated with the proliferation of the Hasanids, and extensively though not exclusively populated by immigrants. It seems appropriate to speak of the colonisation of a largely rural region by urban Muslim communities springing up in the midst of an agricultural and pastoral native population.

To match these transformations, Islam itself had moved on from the crude argument over the membership of the community which had culminated in the Kharijite revolt. At the hands of the scholarly jurists, whose great centre in the Maghrib was at Qayrawān, the doctrines of the Shari'a, the Law of God revealed to His community, had evolved to organise the life of the community around the cardinal poles of worship, the family, property, taxation and trade. [35] Equally important was their insistence that the faithful should live according to these laws; that indeed they could not be true Muslims if they did not live in a land where the rule of the Law was assured by the presence of a *qāḍī*, a judge appointed by the Islamic state. This emerges very clearly from the first of two *fatwā-s* issued by the great jurist al-Qābisi at Qayrawān around the year 1000, in which he agreed with Ibn Abi Zayd that trading in the pagan lands of the Bilād al-Sūdān to the south of the Sahara was forbidden, since the Muslim travelled there outside the reach of the *qāḍī*, and thus at the peril of his soul. [36] The converse of this opinion can be seen in the second *fatwā* on the subject of a dispute which had actually arisen in the Bilād al-Sūdān. Given that despite all prohibitions, Muslims did travel to trade in the pagan lands of Black Africa, al-Qābisi approved their choice of a *nāẓir* or watchman to supervise their affairs as best he could according to the Law, in the absence of a properly appointed *qāḍī* [37] The two

rulings, which reveal the concern of the jurist to provide for the administration of the Law at almost any cost, are equally important as a guide to the situation within the Dār or House of Islam itself.

The requirement of a *qāḍī* to ensure the application of the Holy Law was a requirement for the Muslim state which appointed him. In Ifrīqiya, a state of long standing, this was no great problem. In the lands to the west, which had elected to leave the Arab empire, there was no central authority to create and maintain the elaborate legal hierarchy which developed under the Aghlabids and Fatimids in the eastern Maghrib. [38] As reconstituted by the Kharijites and the Hasanids, the Muslim state in western Algeria and northern Morocco was a very different affair of scattered centres of power with no clear dominion over the whole of the territory. The demand for justice at Tāhart was fulfilled by the Rustumid rulers in person, assisted by the clerics of the sect, who after the demise of the dynasty formed their own republic in the oases of the Mzab in the northern Sahara. [39] In the realm of the Hasanids, as Hopkins observes, it was open to any ruler, however petty, to appoint a *qāḍī* to his capital, but the absence of information may mean that outside Fes and Tlemcen, such appointments were rare. [40] In places like Jarāwa or Sūq Kutāma, it is more probable that the demand for the Law was met by an officer at once more grand and much more humble, the *muḥtasib*.

The *ḥisba* or duty to "command the right and forbid the wrong" was a comprehensive obligation upon all Muslims and their leaders to obey the Law themselves, and see that others did so. From that point of view the Caliph himself was the supreme *muḥtasib*, directing the community in its obedience to God, and the *qadi*, the judge identified with the administration of the Law, the *muḥtasib par excellence*. But the *ḥisba* in practice was normally associated with the regulation of the marketplace, and the *muḥtasib* typically figures as an inspector of fair trading under the municipal authority of the *qāḍī* [41] Somewhere in between the two extremes were the good men whom the Rustumid Imam sent to scour the markets for malpractices at Tāhart. [42] In smaller townships it is probable that the two functions of the *muḥtasib*, the very general and the very specific, were combined in the one person, a magistrate who fulfilled the requirement of the community for a *nāẓir* or "watchman" to ensure the operation of the holy Law, [43] and did so with particular regard to trade.

The close relationship of Islam to trade in this period is clearly visible in the close association between the market and the mosque at the centre of so many cities like Tunis and Fes. Pedersen, indeed, writing in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, considered that the mosque had originally embraced the market in a central meeting-place comparable to the old Roman forum, and continued to preside over its transactions. [44] It was certainly important that God's justice should prevail in the *sūq*, for the market was the likeliest place for unexpected disputes to arise between members of His community. The risk of conflict was greatly increased by the presence of strangers. For those who were travelling the long-distance routes into and out of Spain, the availability of God's Law was essential to their safety and their business. Just as in the Bilād al-Sūdān, a *nāẓir* or *muḥtasib* was required to guarantee their moral and material welfare wherever they might be. The benefit was not all in the one direction; thus al-Bakri says that Ibn Yāsīn, the prophet of the Almoravids and the magistrate of his community, allowed his judgement of a commercial dispute between one of his own people and a foreign merchant, to be corrected by a visitor from the metropolis of Qayrawān armed with superior knowledge. [45] As a result of such exchanges in the course of constant litigation, we might expect to find a growing conformity with the Law as taught in the schools of Andalus and Ifrīqiya.

Long-distance Muslim travellers, however, were not the only strangers to be expected in the market. Tlemcen had a long-standing Christian community, [46] Fes a large immigrant Jewish community of merchants. [47] The Christians, who may have survived the Arab conquests only at Tlemcen, were dying out, but the Jews had evidently profited from the creation of the Arab empire to emerge as a dynamic minority with whom Muslims

were obliged to deal. [48] The Shari'a made specific provisions for Christians and Jews; [49] much more problematic were the Berbers of the surrounding countryside, the majority of whom preserved their 'urf or customary law down to the 20th Century. At one extreme were the tribal followers of the Ibāḍi Imam at Tāhart, whose government depended on "the swords of the Nafūsa and the wealth of the Mazāta". [50] Members of each Berber nation lived permanently in the city as warriors and merchants in contact with their peoples as far away as the Djerid of southern Tunisia. At the other extreme were those Berbers of southern Morocco considered to be pagan or heretical, who were obliged to pretend to be Muslims or would-be Muslims in order to enter the cities or territories of Islam to trade. [51] In northern Morocco the situation of the tribal population is likely to have been around the middle of this spectrum. It is clear that its members regarded the new towns and cities as a source of prosperity. The foundation of Tenes by Andalusian immigrants was at the invitation of the Berbers of the interior to settle there and establish a market, [52] although a similar pact at Oran broke down. [53] Inland, cities such as Baṣra [54] and Jarāwa [55] were centres of an agricultural and pastoral countryside. A substantial proportion of the population of each town was clearly Berber, and in many cases was probably entirely so, for example in the Jebala, where Aftas, Zahjūka and Yujjājin along the route from Ceuta to Fes were peopled by the Kutāma, the Zarhūna and the Masāra respectively. [56] All these places were the little capitals of Idrisid princes, who like the Rustumids of Tāhart relied upon the tribesmen for their warriors. In much the same way we can suppose that Berbers entered the cities and the service of the Hasanids of Fes and Tlemcen as buyers, sellers and fighters, on condition that they, like their fellows further south, professed Islam if only in appearance. The result can be seen in the case of Nukūr.

Nukūr, in the Bay of Al-Hoceima on the Mediterranean coast of the Rif, was with Tahart the principal exception to the rule of the Hasanids in western Algeria and northern Morocco in the 9th Century. The whole of this stretch of coast is cut off from the rest of Morocco by mountains, and does not lie on any through route by land. Instead of the Idrisids, it was occupied by a dynasty of Arab origin allegedly dating from the time of the Arab conquest, which founded the city itself about the same time as Fes. A Berber market from across the river was then brought within the brick walls and gates, which enclosed a mosque and various baths, the other essential features of a town. Five miles from the sea, Nukūr was surrounded by orchards and gardens, and traded across the Mediterranean with Malaga, a voyage of a day and a half. The prince in his citadel was a petty sultan with an army of slaves and retainers, including Saqāliba or Slavs from the Balkans. The Berber peoples of the mountains were taxed, and attacked if they would not pay. Rebellions broke out, in which the prince was besieged in his capital; but most of these were led by rival princes fighting for power, the tribes allying with one side or the other. The Berbers appear to have looked to the dynasty for leadership as much as the dynasty looked to them for support. [57]

Horrified as the jurists may have been by their lack of conformity to the Shari'a, the Berbers of northern Morocco seem to have benefited in this way from the longstanding presumption in favour of their Islam, coupled with the fact that they were nominally under the control of Muslim princes, and were within reach of justice in the mosques and markets of the cities in their midst. The same presumption appears to have operated in southern Morocco, in the Sūs, in the region where the Arab conquest had been cut short by the Kharijite revolt. The lure of copper, silver and gold which had first attracted the Arabs gave rise in the following century to an extension of Muslim colonisation into fundamentally pagan territory to the east and south of the High Atlas as far as the Atlantic, following the same route from the direction of Tlemcen to the Tafilelt, the Draa and the valley of the Sous. The first permanent Muslim settlement was Sijilmāsa in the Tafilelt, founded in the wake of the Kharijite rebellion by Sufri (as distinct from Ibādi) Kharijites belonging to the Miknāsa Berbers from the steppes of Tlemcen and the Moulouya to the

north-east. The traditional date is in the 750s, but not until the beginning of the 9th Century did Sijilmāsa clearly emerge as a city with walls and a mosque, the capital of a Muslim ruler who had peopled it with the inhabitants of other places in the valley of the Ziz whom he transported by force. His dynasty, the Banū Midrār, thus ruled as conquerors over the oases of the Tafilelt, living off the rents and taxes of this fertile region, whose population had doubtless little choice but to accept Islam as a sign of obedience. [58]

In the Tafilelt, the Banū Midrār had a larger agricultural base than the Rustumids of Tahārt. Like Tahārt, however, Sijilmāsa depended for its wider importance upon trade. The city was closely connected with the Ibāḍī capital. Its Ṣufrī rulers allied with the Rustumids by marriage, while the Tafilelt became an important centre of Kharijite learning, frequented by the Ibāḍīs from further east. Underlying this political and religious association was the commerce of the south-west, to which Sijilmāsa was the point of entry from Tahart as well as Tlemcen and the Moulouya valley. From Sijilmāsa, the routes went westwards via Ouarzazate to the valley of the Sous, but south-westwards round the Anti-Atlas to the lower valley of the Draa, where it emerges from its canyon and runs for 500 km to the ocean. This lower valley of the Draa, dry for most of the year, is the frontier of the Sahara, along whose length were the points from which the routes ran south across the desert, eventually to the gold of the western Sudan. [59] Wealth, however, was more immediately at hand at Tāmdult, the most conspicuous of these points, a Muslim city founded about the middle of the 9th Century in the mountains above the Draa to exploit a large silver mine. [60] Tāmdult was equally closely connected with Īgli in the valley of the Sous, all the more because both were ruled, and perhaps founded, by yet more Idrisids, unexpectedly far from their home in the north. [61] The valley of the Sous was noted for copper, which it exported across the desert to the south, but also for the sugar produced by extensive irrigation. From Īgli the way lay back across the High Atlas by the Tizi N-Test and the valley of the Nfiss to Aghmat near Marrakesh, from which the route to Fes was roughly that of the modern road. [62] More important perhaps was the way to the coast at Massa or Massat, whence, says al-Ya'qūbī, sailed the kind of boats to be found in the Indian Ocean, made by sewing the planks together. [63] This puzzling statement nevertheless explains the appearance of a whole series of little ports to the north of the High Atlas: Mogador; Qūz at the mouth of the Tensift; Safi; and Fedala, [64] as stages for shipping from the Sūs to Salé, Asila and points beyond. Central and southern Morocco was thus encircled by a ring of Muslim cities and settlements established for the purpose of a lucrative commerce.

What is so striking about this Muslim geography is not the length but the thinness of the line. The details are provided by the 11th-Century Andalusian al-Bakri, but his information goes back to the 10th. What he is describing is the frontier between the Bilād al-Islām or Muslim territory to the north and the Sahara or wilderness to the south, [65] occupied by nomads who knew nothing of civilisation in its original sense of urban life, [66] and by implication, nothing of true religion. Nul, i.e. Noun at the mouth of the Oued, is thus the last *madīna* or city of Islam before the desert. [67] On the other hand it is the first *balad* or town of such civilisation for those coming out of the wild. [68] The border is precisely the same as the distinction drawn by the jurist al-Qābisī between the land of the Law and the territory of paganism, where Muslims should not go. [69] But as in the cases with which he was dealing, it was crossed and recrossed by the merchants who had established themselves at Awdaghast on the southern edge of the desert to trade for gold with the kings of Ghana, and whose extensive operations provided al-Bakri with his detailed knowledge of the western Sudan. [70] They were indeed the same people, who called upon the Shari'a to govern their dealings with each other, and to identify them in their dealings with non-Muslims as friendly foreigners willing to treat with these enemies of God on a basis of mutual respect. Such a treaty is the background to al-Qābisī's second *fatwā*, [71] and the concessions to paganism endorsed by the jurist evidently provided for the spectacular development of commercial relations across the Sahara, and the nominal

acceptance of Islam by some at least of the Berber tribes of the desert.

It is all the more surprising that the lands within the loop of the line of urban settlement thrown around central and southern Morocco should have remained for so long unincorporated into the body of Islam in the Maghrib. On the Day of Judgement, said a *hadith* of the Prophet reported by al-Bākrī, the Daran or High Atlas, along with all its inhabitants, will be led to Hell like a bride to her husband. [72] The Idrisid rulers of Īgli and Tāmdult presumably crossed the mountains where people still worshipped a ram, [73] by the route from Fes through Aghmat and the valley of the Nfis. At the lower end of the valley, the town of Nafīs was a Muslim settlement with mosque and market, where a third member of the family is supposed to have reigned. [74] Nafīs had allegedly been attacked from Fes by Idrīs II, [75] who would have left the region of Dāy to his son Yaḥyā, [76] a prince whose name is associated with Tāmdult. [77] Day, according to al-Bakrī, was a fortress in a forest on the way back to Fes, perhaps in the neighbourhood of Beni Mellal, where a market attracted merchants from Basra, Fes and Sijilmāsa. [78] But it was not apparently Muslim; and no great chain of Idrisid foundations stretched down towards it from the north. As far as al-Bakrī is concerned, the great rendez-vous north of the High Atlas is Aghmat on the Ourika near to Marrakesh, connected to Īgli and the valley of the Sous through Nafīs and the Tizi N-Test; to Sijilmāsa and the Tafilelt via the Tizi N-Tichka and Ouarzazate; to Fez through Dāy; and to the sea at Qūz by the mouth of the Tensift. It was, nevertheless, far from Islamic, a curious double town of which one was the residence of the *ra'īs* or headman, to which the merchants and foreigners came, since they were not allowed to enter the other. [79] The headman changed every year in accordance with tribal custom; [80] and the picture is of a closed Berber community presiding over the growth of an open city centred on the marketplace, in which Muslims behaved much as they did in the Bilād al-Sūdān, as aliens co-existing with the masters of the country.

The picture is extended by the late 10th-Century author Ibn Ḥawqal, who passes from a description of the Berbers beyond the frontier to an account of those within the loop of Muslim settlement, specifically those that line al-Bakrī's route along the inner edge of the Atlas arc from Fes to Aghmat and the Sous, and control the way across the mountains from Fes to Sijilmāsa. From travellers they require fees for protection and duties on their merchandise. In matters of religion they are those same obstinate Kharijites who pretended to be unbelievers in search of God to gain admission to Muslim territory in the north, just like the worshippers of a ram in the mountains above Īgli, who disguised themselves in order to enter a Muslim market town. [81] Whether in fact they were Kharijites at all is doubtful. [82] We should perhaps think of them as traditionally pagan peoples falling increasingly under the spell of the dominant civilisation which had transformed the politics and economy of their country until eventually they were accepted, like their fellows in the north, as members of the community of the faithful.

Such a process of acclimatisation, however, was by no means as peaceful as the merchants and the jurists may have wished. According to Ibn Ḥawqal, the Muslims themselves were at each others' throats in the Sous, where they were divided between crudely anthropomorphic Sunnites of the Māliki school, and Shi'ites who believed that Mūsā al-Kāẓim, the seventh out of the twelve Imams of the Ithnā 'Ashariyya, was the Hidden and Expected One. [83] Ibn Ḥawqal was an admirer of the Fatimid Caliph of Ifriqiya and Egypt, the descendant of Mūsā's brother Ismā'il, whose aim was to abolish such discord, [84] but whose ambition to rule the entire Muslim world had swept away the Ibāḍis of Tāhart, the Hasanids of Tlemcen and Fes, and the Banū Midrār at Sijilmāsa, only to replace them with Zanāta Berber chieftains fighting each other in the name of the Fatimids on the one hand, their rivals the Umayyads of Cordoba on the other. Moreover, the doctrinal battles which had subsided into mere local conflicts since the end of the Kharijite rebellion had returned to the highest levels of empire. Like the Kharijites in the 8th Century, the Fatimids had appealed to the native Berber population to rise up in the name of Islam against the tyranny of their Muslim oppressors. In response to that appeal

the Kutāma tribesmen of Kabylia in eastern Algeria had made a new Islam to form a new community to wage the holy war on behalf of the Mahdī, sent by God to restore the kingdom of heaven to earth. Born out of the success of their campaign in Ifrīqiya in 910, the Fatimid dynasty pursued its imperial ambitions by propaganda and by force of arms in a much more conventional manner. Beneath the surface of this grand design, which resulted in the emigration of the Caliph to Egypt in 972, the Fatimid revolution nevertheless lived on as an example of the power of Islam to transform the tribal Berber population on the fringe of Muslim civilisation into a force of the first magnitude. Ironically, that power had already been demonstrated in Morocco by the Barghawāṭa.

Rabat, the modern capital of Morocco, owes its name of Ribāṭ al-Fatḥ or Fortress of Victory to the Almohad conqueror 'Abd al-Mu'min, who built the Qasba of the Udaya in the course of his preparations for the invasion of Spain. But the Qasba was built upon the much earlier site of the *ribat* of Salé. [85] The term *ribāt* carries the connotation of binding together; binding together for the holy war; a place where the faithful bound themselves together for this purpose; and the holy war itself. But in the Maghrib in the 8th and 9th Century it was particularly associated with the garrison of the frontiers against the infidel, for which purpose a string of castles was built along the coast from Tripoli to Asila on the Atlantic. The infidel in the Mediterranean was Christian, basically the Byzantine empire with its naval base in Sicily and southern Italy; in the Atlantic at Asila it was the pagan Norseman in the century of the great Viking expansion. [86] The garrisons of *murābiṭūn* or men of the *ribāṭ* were made up of volunteers, performing a religious duty either in turns or more permanently. As the Byzantine threat faded in the Mediterranean, the *ribāt-s* of Ifrīqiya became more like monasteries, and their occupants zealous ascetics rather than warriors. But the military sense came out strongly in Muslim Spain along the border with the Christian kingdoms of the north, and certainly never disappeared from Morocco. [87] The *ribāṭ* of Salé defended the line of the Bou Regreg against the infidels of central Morocco, that huge region ringed by Muslim settlement but scarcely Islamised even along the inner edge of the Atlas, from Dāy to Aghmat to Qūz.

One reason for the lack of penetration of the area to the south-south-west of the old Roman frontier must have been economic. There was no call for its land in northern Morocco, where Muslim colonisation was in full swing. Nor were there commercial possibilities to compare with those beyond the Atlas. Central Morocco was a land of extensive rather than intensive agriculture and pasture, without precious metals or minerals before the discovery of phosphates. But in the 9th Century the entry of Islam from the north was forestalled by an imitation of the faith among the peoples of the Tamesna, the plains around Casablanca, who called themselves the Barghawāṭa. They traced the origin of their movement to the Kharijite rebellion, but this appears to have been a historical explanation for a doctrine which was 9th and 10th Century in character. It centred upon a Prophet called Sālih, who had revealed to his followers a Qur'ān or holy Book in Berber, but was preached about the middle of the 9th Century by Sālih's grandson, Yūnus. As a prophet on behalf of a Prophet, Yūnus would have killed all who refused to accept the message among the Barghawāṭa and their neighbours. His authority would have passed at his death to his nephew Abū Ghufayr, the founder of the dynasty which ruled the state of the Barghawāṭa in the 10th Century. By then, the leader was a monarch with a household retinue and army, who led the Barghawāṭa in annual expeditions against the Muslims to the north and the Berber tribes to the east and south, while a distinctly Fatimid feature had appeared in the form of a belief that Sālih was the Mahdī who would return in the time of the seventh king. [88]

Ibn Ḥawqal, our authority for the *ribāṭ* of Salé, speaks of the continuous raids of the Barghawāṭa and of a customary state of peace with the Muslims almost in the same breath. [89] At the same time he tells us that, although they traded with merchants from Baṣra, Fes, Sijilmāsa, Aghmat and the Sous, they were in fact self sufficient; and certainly they maintained themselves successfully in isolation for at least two hundred years.

Understandable attempts have been made to present them as Christian heretics in a land where Christianity had been the religion of civilisation for so many years before Islam. But although the details of their beliefs, as reported by al-Bākrī, may lend themselves to such an explanation, in its broad outlines their creed bears witness to the powerful appeal of Islam. The Islam in question was not that of the marketplace but of the conquests, a religion which promised to transform its followers into the rulers rather than the outcasts of the world. It was the appeal of Kharijism to the Berbers in the 8th Century, revived and recast as the appeal of the Fatimid Mahdī to the tribesmen of Ifriqiya at the beginning of the 10th. In Morocco it ran well ahead of the creed elaborated by the jurists in the new towns. In the mountains of the Rif, amidst a Berber population given to magic, yet another false prophet appeared under the name of Hā Mīm, establishing his own community on the basis of his revelation until he was killed in 927. [90] Beyond the frontier of the faith, the challenge of the Barghawāṭa was far more serious. Paying the religion of Allah the supreme compliment of imitation, they perpetuated the ethos of the *jihād*, keeping alive the militarism of the holy warrior against the pacifism of jurists willing to compromise with the infidel. As the repercussions of the Fatimid revolution re-echoed across the Muslim world, that militarism rebounded upon Morocco from the south.

From the year 400 onwards, says al-Bākrī, that is about the year 1050, the Saharan tribes of the Lamtūna and Gudāla swore to defend the right, to renounce the wrong, and to abolish all unlawful impositions, when summoned to the *ribāṭ* or holy war upon iniquity by the prophet 'Abd Allah ibn Yasīn. [91] Ibn Yāsīn was himself a Saharan of the Gazūla people, sent by his master Waggāg ibn Zalwī at the behest of Abū 'Imrān al-Fāsi, the great jurist of Qayrawān, to rescue the peoples of the desert from their ignorance of the holy Law. Waggāg was a teacher variously located at Malkūs near Sijilmāsa and Aglū near Tiznit, waging the *jihād* in the spiritual sense of the *hisba* to command the right and forbid the wrong, [92] perhaps in the manner of the *sālihūn* or holy men who inhabited the *ribāṭs* of Māssa and Qūz as soldiers of the Lord; he represented the militant streak of the Law in its dealings with the tribes along the Muslim frontier. [93] Abū 'Imrān, on the other hand, was a man from Fes who belonged to the group of eminent jurists of the Maliki school who had persuaded the Zirid sultan of Ifrīqiya to abandon his traditional allegiance to the Fatimids in Cairo, and to turn instead to the 'Abbasids at Baghdad in 1048. [94] We are looking, not at the isolated inspiration of an individual, but at the effect upon southern Morocco of the great revolt of Islam in North Africa against the Shi'ite doctrine of the supreme Imam introduced by the Mahdī in 910. Preached on behalf of Qayrawān to the peoples of the Sahara by the zealots of the Sūs, the movement led by Ibn Yāsīn was a counter-revolution which made the same appeal to a tribal population on the fringe of the Muslim world, to make a new Islam to form a new community to fight for the faith under the dictatorial command of its religious leader. In the absence of the Law, its prophet became a self-appointed *nāzir* or watchman, commanding the right and forbidding the wrong in absolute authority over the warriors he called al-Murābiṭūn, the Men of the Ribāṭ *par excellence*, the Almoravids. [95] At his command, they carried the holy war back into the Maghrib as the champions of the faith.

The Almoravids achieved what the Arabs had not, the conquest of the whole of Morocco. Ibn Yāsīn himself died fighting against those old enemies of Islam, the Barghawāṭa; but his successor Abū Bakr returned across the High Atlas to establish the city of Marrakesh in 1070. From this new capital, Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn conquered both Fes and Tlemcen from the Zanāta, which with Sijilmāsa gave him control of all the lands for which Islam had contended over the past 350 years. By the end of the 11th Century he was the ruler of al-Andalus, turning the energies of the Almoravids from the war upon iniquity in North Africa to the battle with Christianity in Spain. A great empire had been created, one which was consolidated and extended when the Almoravids themselves were overthrown in the middle of the 12th Century by the Almohads. Based upon those God-forsaken peoples of the High Atlas, the movement inspired by the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart was

the third and last of the three great revolutions which between them transformed the face of the Maghrib, and bequeathed to posterity the state of Morocco. Their significance for the future, however, can only be appreciated in the light of the past.

Marrakesh, the city founded by the Almoravids near to Aghmat, was the point of departure for an empire which a hundred years later stretched as far as Tripoli in Libya. It stood at the very opposite pole of the Maghrib from Carthage, the capital of the previous empire of Rome which the Arabs had conquered and incorporated into their own. Moreover, where Carthage and Qayrawān had divided North Africa between the lands inside and outside the pale of civilisation, the empire of Marrakesh unified them in a single whole. It did so because it relied upon the energies of the tribal population of the region which the Romans had striven so hard to exclude or to marginalise. That reliance was made possible by the new religion, which on the one hand perpetuated the distinction between townsmen and countrymen, but which on the other hand had invited the Berbers to claim the world for themselves as God's elect. Between the 8th and the 11th Century, between the Arabs and the Almoravids, the Islamisation of Morocco in particular had overturned the millennial frontier between civilisation and barbarism, and made possible the unification of North Africa by Islam.

Notes

1. R. Brunschvig, "Ibn Abdalh'akam et la Conquête de l'Afrique du Nord par les Arabes", *Annales de l' Institut des Etudes Orielltales* (Algiers), VI (1942-7), 108-55.
2. Ibn 'ldhārī al-Marrakushī, *Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Maghrib*, Vol. 1, ed. G.S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal, Leiden, 1948, 25-7.
3. Cf. Ch.A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 2nd ed., Vol. II, R. Le Tourneau, *De la conquête Arabe 1830*, Paris, 1952; Eng. trans., *History of North Africa from the Arab Conquest to 1830*, London, 1970, 8-10.
4. E. Lévi-Provençal, "Un nouveau récit de la conquête de l'Afrique du Nord par les Arabes", *Arabica*, 1 (1954), 17-52.
5. Cf. M. Shatzmiller, *L'historiographie mérinide*, Leiden, 1982, 124-35, for the Almohad loyalties of Ibn 'Idhārī and his contemporaries at Marrakesh under the Marinids of Fes.
6. Julien, *History*, 1-3.
7. For a general account of these conquests and their character, cf. M. Brett, "The Arab conquest and the rise of Islam in North Africa", *Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. II, ch.8.
8. E.-F. Gautier, *Le passé de l'Afrique du Nord; les siècles obscurs*, Paris, 1952, 282.
9. Cf. R. Collins, *The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710-797*, Oxford, 1989, 35-6.
10. Cf. Brunschvig, "Ibn Abdalh'akam et la conquête"; Brett, "Arab conquest", 505-7; M. Talbi, *L'émirat Aghlabide*, Paris, 1966, 25-33.
11. Brett, "Arab conquest", 511-12.
12. Cf. Collins, *Arab Conquest*, 86-96.
13. *Bayān*, I, 51-2. This was the Sūs al-Aqṣā or Further Sūs to distinguish it from the Sūs al-Adnā or Nearer Sūs, the desert fringes of Ifriqiya in the east; by Ibn 'Idhārī's time the Sūs al-Adnā had become the plains of central Morocco to the north of the High Atlas: *Bayān, I*, 26.
14. Cf. Brett, "Arab conquest", 516-18.
15. Cf. the Ibādī Berber *Kitāb Ibn Sallām*, ed. W. Schwartz and Sālim Ya'qūb Wiesbaden, 1986, 121-5.
16. From *kharaja*, "to go out", i.e. "to leave" the community: cf. Brett, "Arab conquest",

518, and W. Montgomery Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, London, 196-48, 32-60.
17. Cf. G. Marçais, *La Berbérie musulmane et l'Orient au Moyen Age*, Paris, 1946, 101-16; H.R. Idris, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Zirides*, Paris, 1962, 741-3.
18. Cf. C. Marçais, *Berbérie musulmane*, 116-26; H. Terrasse, *Histoire du Maroc des origines a l'établissement du Protectorat français*, 2 vols., Casablanca, 1949, I, 10725.
19. Cf. Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, 24, 31, 257, 264, 289, 358-9.
20. Cf. Brett, "Arab conquest", 512. 21. For the overall picture, cf. M. Lombard, *The Golden Age of Islam*, Amsterdam, Oxford and New York, 1975; K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean*, Cambridge, 1985, chs. 1 and 2.
22. Cf. G. Marçais, *Berbérie musulmane*, 101-16.
23. Al-Ya'qūbī, *Kitāb al-bulddān*, ed. de Goeje, *Bibliotheca geographorum arabicorum* VII, Leiden, 1892, 353; trans. Wiet, *Les pays*, Cairo, 1937, 217. Cf. G. Marçais, *loc. cit.*
24. Ya'qūbī, loc. *cit.* 25. Al-Ya'qūbī, 352-3, 355-8; trans. 216, 221-4. Cf. G. Marçais, "La Berberie au IXe siècle d'après El-Ya'qoubi", *Mélanges d'histoire et d'archéologie de l'Occident musulman*, 2 vols., Algiers, 1957, I, 37-49, where the emphasis upon their holiness is perhaps anachronistic.
26. *Al-Bakrī, Description de l'Afrique septentrionale*, ed. and trans. M. de Slane, Algiers, 1911-13, reprint Paris, 1965, 110, trans. 215-16.
27. *Ibid.*, 115-17, trans. 226-30.
28. *Ibid.*, 76-8, trans. 155-9.
29. *Ibid.*, 143-3, trans. 272-4.
30. *Ibid.*, 110-11 , trans. 21 6-17; Ibn Ḥawqal, *Sūrat al-ard*, ed. Kramers, Leiden, 1938, 80; trans. Kramers and Wiet, *Configuration de la terre*, 2 vols, Beirut and Paris, 1964, I,76.
31. Al-Bakrī, *Description*, 81-2, trans. 163-7.
32. *Ibid.*, 111-12, trans. 218-21.
33. *Ibid.*, 70-1, trans. 144-5.
34. *Ibid.*, 61-2, trans. 128-9.
35. Summarised in the second half of the 10th Century in the *Risāla* of Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, ed. and trans. Bercher, Algiers, 1949.
36. Cf. M. Brett, "Islam and trade in the *Bilad al-Sūdān*, tenth-eleventh century A.D.", *J. African History, XXIV* (1983), 431-40: 433; Ibn Abī Zayd, *Risāla*, 318-19.
37. *Ibid.*, 433-4. 38. Cf. J.F.P. Hopkins, *Medieval Muslim Government in Barbary*, London, 1958, ch.8.
39. Cf. G. Marçais, *Berbérie musulmane*, 106 ff.; E.A. Alport, "The Mzab", in Gellner and Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers*, London, 1973, 141-52.
40. Hopkins, *Muslim Government* 123, 131.
41. *Ibid.*, 134-7.
42. *Ibid.*
43. For a comparable use of the term "watchman", "wakeman", meaning mayor in mediaeval England, cf. the Ripon town hall inscription: "If the Lord keep not the city, the wakeman waketh in vain", translating a Latin commonplace inscribed, e.g. on the gateway of the castle of the Knights of St John at Bodrum. Psalm 127:1; Ezekiel 3:17; 33: 1-19.
44. *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v.* Masdjid.
45. Al-Bakri, 170, trans. 320; N. Levtzion and J.F.P. Hopkins, eds., *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History*, Cambridge, 1981, 75. Cf. Brett, "Islam and trade", 43X. 46. Al-Bakri, 76, trans. 155-6.
47. *Ibid.*, 115, trans, 226.
48. Cf. B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, London, Melbourne and Henley, 1984, 76.
49. *Ibid.*, ch.l.
50. Cf. G. Marçais, *Berbérie musulmane*, 111.

51. Al-Bakri, 161, trans. 305: Berbers of the High Atlas who worship a ram, and so disguise themselves when they come to market; Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ṣūrat*, 102-3, *Configuration*, 101: heretical Berbers of the High and Middle Atlas who profess to be polytheists seeking instruction in Islam in order to come north to trade.
52. Al-Bakri, 61-2, trans. 128-9.
53. Ibid., 70. trans. 144-5.
54. *Ibid.*, 110, trans. 216.
55. *Ibid.*, 142, trans. 273.
56. Al-Bakri, 114, trans. 223-4: Aftas is probably El-Had on the crossing of the Loukkos.
57. *Ibid.*, 90-9, trans. 180-97.
58. Ibid., 148-52, trans. 282-90. Cf. Levtzion and Hopkins, 64-6.
59. *Ibid.*, 156-9, 163 ff., trans. 296-303, 309 ff. Cf. Levtzion and Hopkins, *Corpus*, 66-70.
60. Ibid., 162-3, trans. 30X. Cf. B. Rosenberger, "Tāmdult: cité minière et caravanière présaharienne", *Hespéris-Tamuda*, XI (1970), 104-39.
61. *Ibid.*, 161-2, trans. 305-8; Ya'qubī, *Buldan*, 359; *Les Pays*, 226.
62. *Ibid.*, 154-5, 160-1; trans. 293-5, 303-5.
63. *Buldān*, 360; *Les Pays*, 226.
64. Al-Bakri, 86, 153-4, trans. 175, 292-3.
65. *Ibid.*, 163, trans. 309.
66. Lit. *madīna*, "a city": *ibid.*, 149, trans. 284; also *hādira*, "a city distinguished by its (Muslim) civilisation": Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ṣūrat*, 101; *Configuration*, 99.
67. *Ibid.*, 161, trans. 306.
68. 'Umrān, the term employed by Ibn Khaldūn: *ibid.*, 86, trans. 175.
69. See above, nn.36, 37.
70. *Ibid.*, 156-9,172-84; trans. 296-302, 324-43; Levtzion and Hopkins, *Corpus*, 62-87.
71. Brett, "Islam and trade", 433-7.
72. Al-Bakri, 160, trans. 304.
73. *Ibid.*, 161. trans. 305; see above, n.51.
74. *Ibid.*, 161, trans. 303.
75. *Ibid.*, 123, trans. 240.
76. *Ibid.*, 124, trans. 242.
77. Al-Ya'qūbi, *Buldān*, 359; *Les Pays*, 225. Cf. Rosenberger, "Tāmdult".
78. Al-Bakri, 154, trans. 294.
79. *Ibid.*, 153, trans. 291-2.
80. Cf. E. Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, London, 1969, 81-8.
81. *Surat*, 102-3; *Configuration*, I, 101. See above, n.51.
82. The term used is *shurāt* for the people, *sharāya* for their beliefs; cf. Lane, Lexicon, s.v. *shārin*; Kramers and Wiet translate as "heretics".
83. *Sūrat*, 91-2; *Configuration* 1, 89-90. Cf. W. Madelung, "Some notes on non-Ismā'ili Shiism in the Maghrib", *Studia Islamica*, XLIV (1976), 87-97.
84. *Ibid.*, 98; 1, 96.
85. *Ibid.*, 81-2; 1, 78.
86. Al-Bakri, 111 - 12, trans. 218-21 .
87. Cf. G. Marçais, "Note sur les ribats en Berbérie", *Mélanges, I*, 23-36.
88. Al-Bākri, 135-41, trans. 259-71. Cf. M. Talbi, "Hérésie, acculturation et nationalisme des Berbères Barghawata", *Etudes d'histoire ifriqiyenne et de civilisation musulmane médiévale*, Tunis, 1982, 81-104; H.T. Norris, *The Berbers in Arabic Literature*, London and New York, 1982, 92-104.
89 . *Sūrat*, 81-3; *Configuration*, 78-9.
90. Al-Bākri, 100-1, trans. 197-200.
91. *Ibid.*, 164 ff., trans. 311 ff.
92. Cf. Norris, *Berbers in Arabic Literature*, 110.

93. Al-Bākrī, 86, 161, trans. 175, 306.
94. Cf. M. Brett, "The Fatimid revolution and its aftermath in North Africa", *Cambridge History of Africa*, II, ch. 10, 631-6. The specific association between the Mālikis, the Zirids and the Almoravids is demonstrated by A. Launois, "Influence des docteurs malékites sur le monnayage ziride de type sunnite et sur celui des Almoravides", *Arabica*, XI (1964), 127-50.
95. Cf. Brett, "Islam and trade", 437-40.