State Formation Processes in Rentier States: 
The Middle Eastern Case

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Introduction

The present paper aims to arrive at a set of guidelines that help to study state-formation, state re-formation and state de-formation processes in the post-colonial states of the Arab Middle East. The object of analysis is the impact of external rents on state-formation processes in the Arab Middle East and the effects of wars on state de-formation and state re-formation respectively. The present paper aims to provide tentative answers as to which factors are central in explaining processes of state-formation in the post-colonial Middle East and which factors are of minor importance. More specifically, the present paper takes issue with the standard explanation in the literature on state formation, based on the work of Charles Tilly, and aims to highlights its shortcomings with regard to the empirical reality of the post-colonial Middle East. Based on a theoretical and empirical critique of this standard explanation, the present paper offers an alternative account of state formation processes in the Arab Middle East.

For the purpose of this paper we assume that the notions of state-formation and state-making are interchangeable. State-formation, or alternatively state-building, will be understood here as the state’s ability to accumulate power. State-building is thus the process by which the state not only grows in economic productivity and government coercion, but also in political and institutional power. It is thus closely linked to the process of the bureaucratisation and the centralisation of the state. Similarly state-making will be understood as the elimination or neutralisation of the internal rivals and the production of durable instruments of surveillance and control within the state’s territory. Nevertheless, it should be said at the outset that our focus is

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1 This paper is part of an ongoing PhD thesis at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. The paper draws on the author’s Mémoire Prélminaire de Thèse under the title “State-Formation, State De-formation and State Re-formation” (Geneva, October 2003).

2 The term “Arab Middle East” is used here in a political rather than in a geographic sense. It shall include not only the Middle East proper (that is, the Arab Mashriq region plus the Gulf peninsula), but also the North African States of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya. The total number of states in the Arab Middle East thus includes 16 plus the special case of Palestine.


not on how the states of the region were made, that is how they came into being, but how the states have consolidated after their independence, that is how they formed thereafter. Here the focus of our inquiry will be on the infrastructural power of the state, understood as the state’s ability to extract resources — both human and material — from its society.

The starting point for this paper is the Tillyian model of state-formation processes. The strength of this model for the explanation of state-formation processes in Western Europe, but also its weaknesses in explaining Third World state-formation processes have already been alluded to. Therefore, the present paper introduces two concepts, which are to help amend the Tillyian model to make it applicable for the analysis of Third World states: this is firstly the concept of rentierism and secondly the notions of state de-formation and state re-formation.

**The Standard Account of State-Formation**

State-formation can be generically understood as those processes that lead to the centralisation of political power over a well-defined continuous territory, and with a monopoly of the means of coercion. Initial academic research into the processes of state-formation attempted to identify and isolate primary forces and categories. Following Charles Tilly, these efforts can be grouped into the following four dominant explanations:  

1. capitalist dynamics and class conflict explanations, which advance the logic of, and contradictions in, productive systems and economic modes of production within the state;
2. statist explanations, which identify semi-autonomous political changes that produce governability crises and threats to political power for the ruling elite. These statist analyses focus thus mainly on the consequences of events within the state.
3. world system analyses, which focus on the logic of an (emergent) capitalist world-economy and the place of the state within that world economy;
4. geopolitical analyses, which highlight the competitive logic of the state system and the place of the state within that system. The focus hereby is thus on the role of interstate forces in producing variations in state power.

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Between these four dominant explanation a rough distinction can be made between internal vs. external explanations (while explanations (1) and (2) are internal and (3) and (4) external) and economic vs. non-economic explanations (with explanations (1) and (3) stressing mainly economic factors and (2) and (4) political factors). Michael Barnett has stressed the fact that the “initial search for a modal process, a master variable and a mono-causal explanation has yielded to a greater awareness of the vagaries and complex compounds that have produced the outcomes under investigation, of how the same variable can lead to highly differentiated outcomes, and of equifinality.” Barnett has further claimed that “there are many paths towards state formation” which resonates the explicit aims of the present paper already alluded to in the introduction. In light of this, we may add to Barnett’s claim that there are not only many paths towards state-formation, but also many paths towards state de-formation and state re-formation.

A central feature in all the analyses of state-formation processes centres around the notion of bureaucratisation, that is the means by which the state administers, monitors and regulates society, and extracts revenues from it. Otto Hintze, one of Charles Tilly’s intellectual teachers,

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7 Ibid., p. 105.

8 State De-formation refers to cases where war-making, contrary to Tilly’s account, has served as a destructive force. This scenario does not simply describe the fact that war-making diminished the state’s infrastructural power (this aspect forms part of the discussion on state-formation), but rather refers to the fact that war-making led to a functional destruction of the state, in the sense that the state is no longer capable of fulfilling its most basic functions, such as providing welfare, security and representation to its citizens. These cases of state de-formation should be distinguished from cases of state collapse, where the institutional framework of the state disintegrates totally or where the territorial state ceases to exist.

State Re-formation refers to states that have developed proper state institutions and where most of the functions of the modern state (either one or two out of the three) are fulfilled. These states are indeed functioning entities – and should thus be distinguished from cases of state de-formation or even state collapse – yet are distinct from the states that emerged in Western Europe. This difference often relates to the proper role of state institutions, where the basic functions of the modern state are often fulfilled by non-state actors and where state institutions are deliberately or accidentally bypassed. In the Middle Eastern context this is highlighted by the informal character of politics and the existence of alternative loyalties other than to the state. State Re-formation thus either describes situations where war-making has served as a catalyst for social and political reforms within a state (somewhat similar to Tilly’s notion of war-making leading to state-making) and where this has hence lead to changes in the way states fulfil their basic functions or it describes situations where modern state institutions have emerged that differ in their institutional raison d’être from the Western European model. It denotes in both cases an organic process of state-formation, one that might simply be termed “just different” to the European experience.
offered a more general version of the theory for the evolution of large, strong territorial states in Europe:

“It was the situation of the European state system that made the formation of greater states historically necessary. France was forced into this direction by her struggle with the Habsburgs; and once France had set the example, it became a necessity for the other European states to follow her example if they wished to preserve their independence. The development of military and political power and constant military preparedness were possible only on the basis of a larger, centrally ruled and administrative territory. The militarist system, with all that it entailed in political terms, proceeded from the struggles and rivalries of the Continental states after the close of the Middle Ages.”

Charles Tilly has captured this logic in his now famous dictum that “war made states and that states made wars.” The institutional mechanism that provided this link between the waging of external wars and the expansion of states (both in terms of territory and in terms of centralised institutions) were political, administrative, and fiscal. Politically, it became necessary for absolutist monarchs to extend rights of representation in government to those capable of paying the taxes necessary to finance wars they wished to fight or felt compelled to be able to fight.

Development of the “national” idea and the expansion of political rights to the gentry, the bourgeoisie, and later the working class thereby became associated with states whose relative legitimacy permitted them to raise more taxes, build larger military capabilities, and fight more wars to victorious conclusions or at least prevent their destruction as states at the territorial expansion of other expanding states. The much larger and technologically sophisticated armies and navies sponsored by these states also required more developed and effective administrative structures to extract resources (that is both in terms of manpower, i.e. conscripts, and in terms of taxes), direct their growth, and create broader indigenous industrial and agricultural bases to


assure logistical support.\textsuperscript{12} The use of these enhanced capabilities to prosecute successful wars then led to even greater administrative and political capacities to tax and extract other resources.\textsuperscript{13}

Building on this predominant explanations of state-formation, the present paper starts with the empirical observation, that this connection between war-making and state-making is absent from many if not most state-formation processes in the Third World. Goerg Sørensen has argued that Third World states have often been fighting the ‘wrong kind of war’ to promote state-formation.\textsuperscript{14} The state-creating wars in Europe analysed by Tilly were largely territorial, designed either to protect existing states against invasion by their neighbours, or to extend state control over previously autonomous areas. The territory of modern Third World states nowadays is, on the other hand, largely given. Several scholars have developed the view that that the survival of weak states in the Third World is due to the support of an international political order that upholds existing boundaries and existing regimes against internal threats and challenges.\textsuperscript{15} They have contrasted the actual weakness and political incapacity of these ‘quasi-states’ to the strength and capacity of the authentically sovereign states that arose in Europe and North America before the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. These ‘empirical’ or ‘real’ states, in Robert Jackson’s terminology, earned their status by exercising effective control without external existence over the territories and peoples.

In view of the fact that state-formation processes in the Third World show a strong and remarkable neglect of interstate conflict, Michael Barnett has made the case to turn the focus of analysis on the state’s war preparation strategies and its impact on state-formation. In shifting the focus away from the actual fighting or non-fighting towards the war-preparation strategies (in this reading, these war-preparations are understood to be prepared for ‘real’ fighting and can thus


be treated as a substitute for actual war-making; this helps to analyse cases where interstate wars have had only a very short duration, such as the War between Israel and its Arab neighbours in October 1967), Barnett is able to apply the same logic between war-making and state-making, as outlined above, to cases of the Third World where interstate conflict remains rare or absent. A similar line of reasoning, which sees no fundamental difference between a state’s war-preparation strategies and that state actually waging war, has been given by Immanuel Kant some 200 years earlier, when he wrote:

“We have to admit that the greatest evils which oppress civilised nations are the result of war – not so much of actual wars in the past or present as of the unremitting, indeed ever-increasing preparation for war in the future.”16

While the quote by Immanuel Kant supports the focus of the present paper on a state’s war-preparation strategy, it also highlights two further interesting points: firstly, the idea of ‘civilised nations’ implies that war is somehow a natural behaviour for ‘uncivilised’ nations and secondly it suggests that war-preparation might be a source of instability and not, as Tilly’s model would suggest, the basis for successful state-formation. Finally, Barnett claims that his focus on war preparation strategies can equally fill another lacuna in the literature, namely one that overcomes the apparent reliance of most academic studies on either an internal or an external explanation of state-formation (see the fourfold classification by Tilly above). Through his approach and focus, Barnett further claims, both the internal and the external side of state-formation can be taken into account.17 The present paper follows Barnett in this regard and sees the state embedded in both the international and the domestic context.18 The present paper goes,


however, even further in arguing that a state’s war preparation strategy is but one factor that will tell us something about the course state-formation processes will take. Other factors that account for theses processes include the financial resources available for a state, what will be termed rentierism in the present paper, as well as a state’s need (or lack thereof) to extract financial resources from its society. These aspects will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

The Fiscal Sociology Paradigm and State-Formation in the Middle East

The now famous dictum from Charles Tilly that “war makes states” \(^{19}\) has received renewed interest in recent years with the experience of state-collapse and state-failure in many parts of the Third World. Tilly’s argument that the activity of war-making is an essential ingredient of the process of state-making is as straightforward as it is convincing; it claims that the ability of getting ready for war and then actually waging war requires power holders to get involved in actions that are very frequently also conductive to state making: Firstly, this includes the effective extraction of resources for the purpose of war making. This extraction activity presupposes state control, which in turn requires an efficient bureaucracy. Secondly, in cases were there is or was nothing or little to extract from society, war making also required the promotion of capital accumulation which then makes war making possible. Here also this activity requires the growing strength of a centralised bureaucracy.

Tilly’s argument grew out of his own study of the macro historical processes of state-formation in Western Europe.\(^{20}\) His argument has further been supported by several empirical studies.\(^{21}\) One may therefore constant that today an extensive and generally convincing literature


suggests that the experience of warfare has played a central and indeed essential role in the processes of state-formation in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{22}

With regard to the Middle East there is a remarkable absence of studies that concentrate on the interplay between war-making, or rather a state’s war-preparation strategy, and state-formation processes. This seems even more surprising given the many regular interstate wars and violent conflicts of others sorts in the post-colonial Middle East.\textsuperscript{23} In view of this lacuna, there seems ample reasons to consider the Middle East as an ideal region to which insights from research on state-making processes should be applied. Lisa Anderson has pointed towards the many possibilities to combine insights from research in state-making processes and Middle Eastern politics, when she argued that “the recent work on state formation in Europe suggests that violence is a natural, perhaps necessary, concomitant to state formation and nation building merits serious attention from scholars of regional politics in the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{24}

Secondly, against this clear research desiderata, it is astonishing to notice that academic studies analysing these two interrelated processes have been very rare and mostly absent. The works by Michael Barnett, Gregory Gause and Yahya Sadowski are notable exceptions in this regard.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, there is a great lack of academic study that analyses state-formation processes in the Middle East and takes at the same time the effects of rentierism into account.


The work by Thierry Gongora thereby explicitly mentions this rentier effect as an aspect that may be linked to war-making (and thus state-formation), without, however, applying a systematic analysis of the two compounding effects.26 The edited volume by Steven Heydemann, the study by Simon Bromley and the work by Keith Krause remain rare and notable exceptions.27 The reason for this remarkable lack of academic studies combining insights from rentierism with the study of state-formation processes and security related issues, might be due to the general absence of academic studies that combine insights from Middle Eastern Studies and social science theory at large.28 Given this lacunae, systematic studies using and applying the effects of rentierism to security related problems and issues of state-making seems thus desirable and paramount.

In recent years, scholars in the field of Middle Eastern Studies (MES), have paid more and more attention to ‘the state’ as the focus of analysis in understanding political developments. The renewed interest in the study of ‘the state’ in the Middle East goes along with the resurgence of ‘the state’ in the field of Comparative Politics (CP).29 Lisa Anderson, for example, has argued that the state should be introduced as a conceptual variable in the study of the Middle East.30 Moreover, an entire edited volume has been devoted to the study of the Arab State.31 Other authors have similarly stressed the centrality of the state in understanding the dynamic political


patterns of the Middle East. While much of the academic work in the field of CP had centred around the issue of state autonomy and with regard to the analysis of states in the Third World, on the issue of strong versus weak states, similar distinctions have been made with particular reference to the Arab Middle East.

While there are broadly speaking three distinct uses of the term ‘strong state’ in the political science literature, it is interesting to note that according to all but one definition the current states in the Arab Middle East are considered to be weak. Given this variety of defining states either as strong or as weak, it seems astonishing to find that many scholars of the Middle East have opted for the one and only definition that sees the current states of the Arab Middle East as strong states. There is of course no denying the fact that the current Arab states show a high degree of authoritarianism and a clear resistance to pressures for democratisation. This alone, however, does not make a state strong in itself. Rather such a narrow view impedes a more detailed view of the current Arab states that point to their limitations in actively influencing political outcomes.

Michael Barnett has provided a useful definition of state power, according to which state power refers to “the resources available to state managers in their governance of society in relation to societal actors.” State power, then, speaks less to the ability of state managers to get societal actors to do what they would otherwise not do and more to the enduring resources contained within the state apparatus in relationship to societal constraints that condition governmental behaviour. The central focus is thus on “power to” rather than “power over”. On

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37 Barnett (1992), Confronting the Costs of War, p. 40.

38 Barnett (1992), Confronting the Costs of War, p. 11. Emphasis added.
the basis of this, Barnett goes on to make a distinction between *infrastructural* state power and *despotic* state power, where the former refers to the ability of the state to implement its policies (“power to”) and the later refers to what the state can do without major societal protest (“power over”). Following Michael Barnett the present paper will focus on the infrastructural power of the state.

In his comparative analysis of war preparation strategies in Israel and Egypt, Michael Barnett has proposed to evaluate ‘state power’ empirically through the level of tax revenues accrued to by the state.\(^3^9\) In order to measure infrastructural power, the present paper follows this line and further relies on another conventional indicator, namely the ratio of external rents on state revenue. With regard to tax revenues, problems may arise, however, if one considers that states may choose to levy less taxes than they actually can.\(^4^0\) Yet, if we contemplate that the focus of this paper is on measuring ‘state power’ via infrastructural state power, then power may be understood as a resource that exists regardless of whether actors decide to call on that power.\(^4^1\) Anthony Giddens has similarly underlined this point by arguing that “forms of domination cannot be reduced to acts of decisions taken, or policies forged, by individual agents ... ‘Decisions’ and ‘contested policies’ represent only one aspect of domination.”\(^4^2\) The present paper follows this approach and puts the focus on the enduring properties of the state and society that empower state actors in their governance of society.

In the contemporary Middle East we find nation states, which on the one hand consist of large bureaucratic state apparatuses but on the other hand possess only a weak legitimacy vis-à-vis their societies. Their infrastructural power as well as their capacity to actively influence


\(^4^0\) Barnett himself refers to this problem. See Barnett (1992), *Confronting the Costs of War*, p. 47. Some scholars have therefore used the notion of “tax effort” indices that measure the ratio of actual tax share to the predicted tax share based on a set of economic variables. However, these indices are still in their infancy as tools of comparative political analysis. See Hood (2003), *The Tax State*, p. 216 and Fauvelle-Aymar (1999), *The Political and Tax Capacity*, p. 393.

\(^4^1\) Barnett (1992), *Confronting the Costs of War*, p. 41.

political outcomes independent of societal constraints is limited. They can thus be considered weak states. Given the apparent fragility of the Arab territorial state on the one hand and the fact that these states are “here to stay”, Bahgat Korany has explicitly talked about “the contradictions of the Arab territorial state.” Much of the academic inquiry in the field of MES centres around the puzzle about the durability and the persistence of the current Arab states.

There are broadly speaking two strands in the academic literature of Middle Eastern Studies (MES) which provide tentative answers to this puzzle and whose findings and insights are relevant for the present paper. The first strand in this body of literature concentrates on political economy related issues, while the second strand deals with socio-political and political-cultural factors.

**The Political Economy Approach**

The publication of the edited volume *The Arab State* by Giacomo Luciani in 1990 marked the beginning of a renewed and intensified debate about the first strand in this body of literature: the political economy approach to the study of ‘the Arab state’. The most important and influential contributions to this volume were the two articles by Giacomo Luciani on “Allocation vs. Production States” and Hazem Beblawi on “The Rentier State in the Arab World” in which the authors argued that those states that derived most or a substantial part of their revenues from the outside world and whose functioning of the political system depends to a large degree on accruing external revenues that can be classified as rents, showed a remarkable different political dynamic than other (i.e. productive) states. Rents were defined as “the income derived from the gift of nature” and are thus usually understood to be income accrued from the export of natural

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resources, especially oil and gas. However, Beblawi and Luciani argued that the rentier effects are not confined to the oil-exporting states alone. This is firstly due to the fact that to a limited but still significant extent the rents of the oil state have been recycled to the non-oil Arab states through migrant workers’ remittances, through transit fees and through aid. Secondly, the authors stressed that external rents may also be conceived of as bilateral or multilateral foreign-aid payments, such as foreign development assistance or military assistance, which are termed ‘strategic rents’. Hazem Beblawi thus concluded that:

“the oil phenomenon has cut across the whole of the Arab world, oil rich an oil poor. Arab oil states have played a major role in propagating a new pattern of behaviour, i.e. rentier behaviour.”

These two theoretical contributions by Luciani and Beblawi soon became benchmarks in the literature and their political economy approach was used as the basis for single-country studies, cross-country studies and thematic studies. Thematically, the 1990s saw the emergence of a vast literature which analysed the issue of economic liberalisation and privatisation in the countries of the Arab Middle East from a political economy perspective. These studies include cross-country analysis, such as the edited volumes by Henri Barkey and Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy as well as several single-country studies. Furthermore, Martin Beck and Oliver Schlumberger have tried to make a synthesis of these single-country studies by coming up with some general observations in this thematic field. In their cross-country study on the Middle East, they come to the conclusion that the degree and kind of rentierism will determine the level of economic liberalisation of the state.

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47 Beblawi (1990), *The Rentier State*, p. 98.


Similarly, there is a vast literature that has applied this political economy approach to the issue of political liberalisation. Again, the theoretical key text in this regard was provided by Giacomo Luciani, in which he laid out the connection between economic and fiscal crises of the state and the initiation of a process of political liberalisation.\textsuperscript{51} Other theoretical considerations in this regard include the contributions by Giacomo Luciani, Michael Brumberg and Samih Farsoun and Christina Zacharia to the edited volume on ‘Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical considerations’.\textsuperscript{52} Applications of these theoretical considerations to single country cases, include Rex Brynen’s work on Jordan\textsuperscript{53} and several contributions in the edited volume ‘Democracy without Democrats?’ by Ghassam Salamé, most notably the chapters by Roger Owen on Egypt\textsuperscript{54}, Abdelbaki Hermassi on the Maghreb\textsuperscript{55} and Volker Perthes on Syria.\textsuperscript{56} In addition to this, a host of other country case studies have been published in 1998 in the second volume of ‘Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Empirical Considerations’.\textsuperscript{57} All these empirical studies confirmed the theoretical claim made by Luciani that the rentier nature of the state is a strong factor in discouraging democratisation in states that have access to a significant oil rent.\textsuperscript{58} More recently, a time-series cross-national study using data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 confirmed these initial empirical studies and showed that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Luciani (1994), The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis, p. 152.
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oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{59} In the same vein, the political economy approach with its focus on the rentier effect has resulted in academic studies that centre on the political dynamics at large in certain individual counties of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, several authors have taken a more thematically oriented focus and have stressed the effects of rentierism on a state’s foreign policies, on a state’s human rights policy or aspects of political succession in authoritarian states.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{The Political Culture Approach}

The second strand in the literature of MES relevant for the present paper suggests the important aspects of Arab and Islamic political values and thereby points towards an incompatibility between these values and fundamental principles of modern state organisation, particularly democratic governance. It has been suggested, for example, that Islam’s emphasis on divine rather than popular sovereignty puts many of the most important issues of public policy outside the realm of public, participatory decision-making. Furthermore, scholars often point to a lack of fundamental equality within Islam for various groups, notably women and religious minorities.\textsuperscript{62} Additionally, several scholars, such as Elie Kedourie and Bertrand Badie, have stated a categorical incompatibility between Islamic political thought and the concept of the sovereign states.\textsuperscript{63}


Other academic studies have located the problem elsewhere, namely in the socio-political norms underlying Arab political culture. This, it is suggested, is characterised by (a) the patrimonial nature of social interactions, such as the importance of clientelism and ‘wasta’ as the societal norms underlying Arab societies and polities and (b) primordialism, that is the existence of strong tribal, clan, and sectarian loyalties. Several authors have stressed that the later aspect is of paramount importance when analysing political developments in countries with strong primordial and tribal elements, such as Yemen or Saudi Arabia. Margaret Law, for example, has noted with particular view to Saudi Arabia, that “the royal family becomes an extension of the tribal family.”

Amatzia Baram has equally stressed the importance of tribal politics for the continuous functioning of Iraq and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman has emphasised the existence of contested identities among the Berbers of North Africa. Central to all these studies is the emphasis on strong loyalties other than those towards ‘the state’ which can be found in most of the Middle Eastern societies. For many people in the Arab Middle East ‘the state’ is thus a vague, distant and essentially alien concept.

With regard to the first characteristics, namely the patrimonial nature of social interactions in the Arab world, several authors have noted that social interaction and decision-making in all fields of politics are determined by highly elaborate networks of patrons and clients, by rent-seeking, by informal group structures and neopatrimonialism. Particularly important in this context is the notion of ‘wasta’, the Arabic term for ‘intercession’ or ‘mediation’, which is the social mechanism that determines allocative political decisions in society, economy and politics. ‘Wasta’, it has been argued, is to be seen as the “lubricant of the


patronage system” and as “the “societal norm” in the Arab world. Rather than labour, personal capacity or merit, it is the personal contact to political decision makers which determines and facilitates how resources are allocated and thus how the material well-being of the individual, the family, the clan etc. is secured. It is noteworthy, in this regard that material well-being does not only imply the successful pursuit of material benefits, but also embraces non-material enhancements (jobs, positions, licences, access to information etc.). The result is a reversal of the genuinely capitalist relations between labour and productivity, on the one hand, and reward or profit on the other. With regard to the informal nature of societal and political interactions in the Arab Middle East, James Bill and Robert Springborg have thus spoken of the “precedence of personal ties.” Robert Cunningham and Yasin Sarayrah have further suggested that ‘wasta’ should be seen as directed against governmental effectiveness and economic growth. The emphasis of this body of literature on societal and governmental resource allocation, on the possible negative effects of ‘wasta’ on governmental effectiveness and on the irrelevance of formal institutions and associations, make it thus obvious to be linked to the theoretical body of literature on state-formation. While authors working on the issue of state-formation processes with a focus on the Western European experience have generally emphasised the role formal institutions, such as the judiciary, the civil administration or the parliament, play in this process, such a focus would be – in view of the social and cultural elements stressed above – misleading in the Middle Eastern context. Thus it seems imminent to include regionally-specific contextual factors in our analysis of state-formation processes in the non-European context in order to fully and adequately grasp how states have developed politically and


economically in other parts of the world. Similar conclusions have also been drawn by authors who have applied Charles Tilly’s argument of state-formation processes on Africa and on Latin America.\footnote{Jennifer Widner contends, for example, that Tilly’s argument does not adequately capture state-making in today’s African developing states since it omits important contextual elements, such as the impact of extended family structure or the existence of parallel political authorities among others. See Widner (1995), \textit{States and Statelessness in Late-Twentieth-Century Africa}, pp. 142-146. Jeffrey Herbst offers an alternative view of important contextual differences between modern African state-making and Europe’s historical experience when he stresses the importance of political geography (e.g. the attempt to establish authority over inhospitable territories with low densities of people). See Herbst (2000), \textit{States and Power in Africa}, p. 11.}

With regard to an evaluation of the contributions in this body of literature, it must be critically noted with respect to the claim about the incompatibility between Islamic political values and the organisation of the modern state, that there is not any such thing as an overarching Arab-Islamic political culture and that political behaviour and attitudes are to a large extent adaptive to social settings and shaped by political context. For the present study, such a culturalist aspect is thus discarded and insights from this strand of the literature will only be taken into account as a negative point of reference, namely as a warning against any “culture blinded particularism.”\footnote{On the different Latin American context, Miguel Centeno mentions the delegitimation of political authority after Spain’s departure, the fragility of elite coalitions and the lack of national identity. See Centeno (1997), \textit{Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America}, pp. 1582-1583.}

On the positive side, several insights from this body of the literature seem nevertheless valuable to be included in the present study of state-formation processes in the Middle East, most notably the aspect of different (from the Western experience) patterns of societal and political organisation in the contemporary Middle East and particularly the socio-political norms underlying Arab political culture laid out in the paragraph above.

The reasons why these insights are relevant for the present paper are straightforward. Firstly and on a very general level, it seems important to understand against which background such political developments as state-formation processes occur in order to know whether the socio-political or political-cultural background may inhibit or foster (or perhaps neither) the examined processes.\footnote{See Morten Valbjørn (2003), \textit{Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations}. University of Aarhus: Unpublished manuscript.} Secondly, the present paper is committed to a theoretical understanding of
the state which takes its fragmentation into account and which can be found in Joel Migdal’s “state-in-society approach”. An application of these and similar theoretical ideas to the Middle Eastern case should thus take two insights from this body of the literature into account: (a) the informal character of many if not all political processes in the Arab world and (b) the importance of tribes, clans and family in the everyday political dynamics of Arab Middle Eastern state. The study by Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner on the linkages between tribes and processes of state-formation in the Middle East is a rare piece of scholarship in this regard, which can serve as an example for the present paper. The contributors to this edited volume examine not only the momentary and present interaction of tribes and states in the modern Middle East, but also look at the macro historical developments and changes in that interaction and are thus able to draw conclusions as to how those changes have produced similarities and differences in state-forms as well as why tribal structures continue to be viable in contemporary times.

In sum, there seems thus to be fruitful grounds to combine several insights from both these bodies of literature in the field of MES, namely the political economy approach and the political culture approach, with Charles’s Tilly’s analysis of state-formation processes, since both approaches make valuable contributions to the understanding of the relationship between state and society, be it in their emphasis on the mutual constitution of state and society or in their emphasis on resource allocation (i.e. additional state capacities) and on the additional resource income due to the exportation of oil (i.e. a diminished need for the state to extract resources from society). The standard account of state-formation processes based on the works of Charles Tilly has already been outlined above. The following paragraph points towards its weaknesses with regard to the analysis of state-formation processes in the post-colonial Arab Middle East and provides an alternative argumentation.

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77 Some authors have indeed argued that the socio-political aspects sketched out above are the result of the economic structures of rentierism and have thus established a causation between them. See Schlumberger (2000), Arab Political Economy, p. 263 fn. 14. A critique of this view is found in Volker Perthes (2000), Vom Krieg zur Konkurrenz: Regionale Politik und die Suche nach einer neuen arabisch-nahöstlichen Ordnung. Baden-Baden. pp. 295-300.

78 Migdal (2001), State in Society. For the basic features of this approach, see our discussion above.
Rentierism and State-Formation in the Middle East

The analysis of state-formation processes in Western Europe between roughly 1500-1900 by Charles Tilly serves as the starting point for our analysis. Initially, Tilly had been quite cautious about the extent to which early modern Europe might give lessons that could be generalised to more recent periods and other regions. Thus he warned, that “our ability to infer the probable events and sequences in contemporary states from an informed reading of European history is close to nil.” Despite this initial claim, however, Tilly has been quite inconsistent in his view of the utility of the European experience as a basis for cross-regional and cross-historical research. In the same writing he asserted further: “the European historical experience, for all its special features, is long enough, well-enough documented, and a large enough influence on the rest of the world that any systematic conclusions which did hold up well in light of that experience would almost automatically become plausible working hypotheses to be tried out elsewhere.” Although Tilly has since slightly retreated from his position, he nevertheless acknowledges that there is a value in comparing the contemporary experience of Third World states with that of national states in early modern Europe.

The standard argumentation regarding state-formation processes following the work of Charles Tilly can be summarised as follows:

Table 1: War-making and state-formation in Western Europe (1500-1900)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War-making</th>
<th>State-formation</th>
<th>Strong State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


80 Tilly (1975), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, p. 82.


83 Tilly (1990), Coercion, Capital and European States, p. 196.

The argumentation in table 1 reads as follows: The activity of war-making is closely connected to the process of state-formation, that is to the emerging centralisation of political power over a well-defined territory. The institutional mechanism that provides this link between the waging of wars and the expansion of states is the fact that wars need to be financed and hence taxes levied. The levying of taxes by the state associates those who have to pay these taxes with the state, whose relative legitimacy in turn permits it to raise even more taxes, build larger military capabilities, and fight more wars to victorious conclusions or at least prevent its destruction as a state at the territorial expansion of other expanding states. The use of these enhanced capabilities to prosecute successful wars then leads to even greater administrative and political capacities of the state to tax and extract other resources. The final outcome of this argumentation process is a highly centralised state which exercises effective control over its territory and which can hence be considered an institutionally strong state.

The few studies that have analysed the interplay between war-making and state-formation with particular view to the Middle East, have made interesting observations and findings, most notably findings that are counter-intuitive to the arguments proposed by Tilly. While on first sight, one may be tempted to conclude that war-making has indeed led to state-making in the Middle East (as in the cases of Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Israel), several authors have equally noticed that war-making activities (including war preparations) in the Middle East have often not increased the state’s infrastructural power, but to the contrary lead to a decline of state power.

Drawing on the empirical findings of these authors, one may therefore conclude that war-making has by and large not led to state-formation in the Tillyian sense, that is to the creation of effective, centralised and legitimate states, in the Arab Middle East. First tentative empirical

85 In terms of infrastructural power. This denotes the power of the state to extract resources (human or material) from society. Michael Mann has defined infrastructural power as “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” See Michael Mann (1993), The Sources of Social Power, vol.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 55.

86 Barnett (1992), Confronting the Costs of War; Gongora (1997), War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East; and Bromley (1994), Rethinking Middle East Politics.

observations suggest that there are currently no strong states in the Arab Middle East, assuming that the existence or non-existence of strong states can adequately be measured through the level of tax collection and through the degree of militarisation. It should be noted in this regard, however, that the case of Tunisia poses somewhat a puzzle, in the sense that it may be the only contemporary case of a strong state in the Arab Middle East. The data on the level of tax revenues on government revenues provided by Robert Springborg and Clement Henry gives a percentage of 24,8% of tax revenues on government revenues for the year 1998.\textsuperscript{88} Data provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit indicate a level much higher with on average 80% for the years 1993-1996.\textsuperscript{89} We hold that the latter percentage numbers reflect a more accurate picture of the situation in Tunisia. Apart from contemporary Tunisia there is a second case of a strong state in the post-colonial Arab Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia prior to the oil-boom of the 1970s. In 1949/50 taxes accounted for 67% of Saudi state revenues (with 37% coming from direct taxes).\textsuperscript{90} Despite these two cases, we may conclude that the correlation between war-making and state-formation in the Middle East is weak and that the Arab Middle East has by and large not followed the path of Western Europe between the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century.

The present paper is committed to filling the theoretical and empirical gap in the literature outlined above. Our tentative answer to the puzzle why war-making and state-formation have not walked in tandem in the Arab Middle East puts the emphasis on the rentier nature of the Arab states in the Middle East and argues that the rentier effect offsets the process that links war-making to state-formation. The logic behind this argumentation that links rentierism to state-formation is straightforward and compatible with the argument made by Tilly: The large and considerable amount of state revenues accruing to rentier states in the form of external oil rents gives the state additional resources and serves thus to reduce the state’s need to extract money from its society. Based on the notion of ‘no taxation without representation’, the diminished need


\textsuperscript{90} Kiren Aziz Chaudry (1997), \textit{The Price of Wealth. Economies and Institutions in the Middle East}. Ithaca. p. 65. The author thus concludes that “the patterns of Saudi state-building matches the broadest sequencing patterns of state making in early modern Europe.” Ibid. p. 98.
of the state to levy taxes from its citizens impedes the emergence of a strong state that legitimately represents its citizens. The process through which war-makers are civilised due to their need to forge a symbioses with nascent civilian state-makers in order to extract resources for war-making from society, thus never materialises in rentier states. This argument is summarised and visualised in table 2:

Table 2: War-making and state-formation in the Arab Middle East since 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>war-making</th>
<th>state-formation</th>
<th>strong state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rentierism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The argument in table 2 should be read as follows: Rentierism sets off the Tillyian process that links war-making with state-formation. The level of rentierism thereby becomes a better indicator as to whether state-formation will occur or not and to what degree. The point made here relates not so much to the fact whether state-formation as opposed to state de-formation will occur, but rather whether the outcome of the state-formation process will be a strong state, as in the Tillyian analysis of early modern Europe, or an institutionally weak state. Hence table 3 presents the argument of this thesis in the following modified way.

Table 3: Rentierism and state-formation in the Arab Middle East since 1945

| rentierism | Ø state-formation | Ø strong state |

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The argument presented in table 3 proposes that the notion of ‘rentierism’ should be the *central* factor in analysing state-formation processes in the post-colonial Arab Middle East. The level of rentierism best explains the emergence of institutionally weak states in the contemporary Arab Middle East. In other words, the argumentation presented in table 3 does not argue that rentierism will lead to state de-formation, but rather to a process of state-formation, albeit one that differs in its outcome from the Tillyian account. The mechanism that links rentierism to the emergence of weak states is again straightforward. A high level of rentierism will negatively affect the function of the modern state to represent its citizens.\(^2\) This is due to the fact, that has been claimed by many scholars, that the existence of a rentier state serves as a strong impediment to democratic rule.\(^3\) The failure of the majority of the Arab states to provide a level of representation that is deemed to be representative and legitimate in the eyes of its society is thus a second aspect of our argumentation why the process of state-formation in the Middle East has not followed the path of the Western European experience.

The third tentative aspect that may account for the fact that war-making and state-making have not walked hand in hand in the Arab Middle East has also to do with the rentier nature of the states under consideration and is linked to the economic function of the modern state in providing welfare and wealth to its citizens. Many scholars of the Middle East and the Third World in general, have argued that the availability of external rents has led to the development of what Hartmut Elsenhans has termed a “*state class*”\(^4\) or for what William Reno has coined the term “*shadow state*”.\(^5\) Both terms describe the same phenomena, namely a self-serving ruling elite that has control over the natural (economic) resources of the country. With regard to the Middle East the high level of wealth and welfare allocation in rentier states as the basis of an

\(^2\) On the functions of the modern state, see Milliken/ Krause (2002), *State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction*, pp. 753-774. Here at pp. 757-760.


“implicit social contract” that substituted political rights for state-provided welfare has been noted by several scholars. While this “informal pact” may only be sustainable as long as there are enough resources to be allocated both for the ‘state class’ and for the whole of society, the chances for political change increase if the state fails to fulfil his part of this ‘implicit social contract’ and thereby also fails to fulfil his welfare function.

Conclusion

The present paper has argued that the level of rentierism is a better indicator for the path state-formation has taken in the Arab Middle East than a focus on the war-making capacities of states. While most academic work on state-formation processes has stressed the overall importance of war-making on state-making – a process through which the state extracts resources from its society for the purpose of war-making, builds a centralised bureaucracy, grows subsequently in strength, and finally increases its ability to extract even more resources from society – this logic may hold true for state formation processes in Western Europe, but not for the Arab Middle East. Here the rentier nature of the Arab states offsets the process that links war-making to state-making: The large and considerable amount of state revenues accruing to rentier states in the form of external rents serves to reduce the state’s need to extract money from its society. The process through which war-makers are civilised due to their need to forge a symbioses with nascent civilian state-makers in order to extract resources for war-making from society, thus never materialises in rentier states.

The present paper has highlighted a second important aspect with regard to the process of state formation in the post-colonial states of the Arab Middle East. This aspect relates to the fact that rentierism also has an impact with regard to the institutional framework of states. Not only

does the existence of a rentier state serve as a strong impediment to democratic rule\textsuperscript{97}, it also helps to conserve socio-political norms in Arab societies and polities, such as the patrimonial nature of social interactions and primordial loyalties. These aspects thus represent a second reason why the process of state-formation in the Middle East has not followed the path of the Western European experience.

\textbf{Bibliography:}


\textsuperscript{97} See among others, Luciani (1994), \textit{The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization} and Ross (2001), \textit{Does Oil Hinder Democracy}?


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