MIGRATING TEXTS AND TRADITIONS: DĀRĀ SHUKOH AND THE TRANSMISSION OF THE UPANIŚADS TO ISLAM*

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Hospitality, says Kant in *Towards Perpetual Peace*, is a cosmopolitan right, the right of a stranger to make use of that shared possession of the human race, the surface of the earth, to visit other places, the right “not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another” as long as no violence is committed upon the host (8: 357–9). What might it mean to say that the stranger has a right to hospitality when the movement involved concerns texts and ideas? Viewed from the other side, what does it take for a tradition to have the ability to show hospitality to an intellectual stranger, in the form, most likely, of a migrating text?

In order to explore these questions, I will take up an example of textual migration which is of particular interest for many reasons. In the seventeenth century, India was under the political control of the Mughal Empire. The Mughals had brought with them a rich Persianate culture, with strong ties to the wider Islamic world, a culture that perpetuated and preserved itself in the course of many centuries of dominant rule in northern India. The migration I want to consider concerns the movement of a Hindu text into that tradition. It was in or around 1656 that the crown prince Dārā Shukoh, the eldest son of Shāh Jahān and the great grandson of Akbar, began to assemble a team of pandit-translators to help him in his project of rendering into Persian three great Hindu texts: the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, and the Yogavāsiṣṭha. This project would indeed prove to be of historic importance, for

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European scholars had Persian but not Sanskrit, and it would be through Anquetil-Duperron’s translation of the Persian into Latin that the Upaniṣads would bear upon nineteenth century European thought. This was the text that would be read by Schopenhauer, whose reading would in turn directly influence the early Wittgenstein; this was the text a copy of which was held by the poet William Blake, and which was studied by Schelling. That further migration is not, however, my present interest. What I would like to explore is the character of the hospitality Dārā Shukoh showed towards these Hindu texts in inviting them to enter the world of courtly Persianate learning.

The nature of this project was, it should be immediately acknowledged, quite different in character from another large-scale translation project involving Sanskrit texts – the Tibetan reception of Indian Buddhism. One reason for being hospitable is prudential: one might welcome the stranger because one has something to gain from them. This was certainly the motive for the Tibetan interest in Sanskrit Buddhist texts, which were regarded as repositories of great, much welcomed, and hitherto unavailable knowledge. No such thought motivated Dārā Shukoh, however. As a devout Muslim and an adept Sufi practitioner, he was already firm in his convictions about the true nature of things. He had no expectation of learning something fundamentally new from the Upaniṣads and the other Hindu texts, nor indeed any real openness to the possibility of doing so. Dārā Shukoh’s hospitality had its roots in a different idea altogether, that the stranger, if welcomed and understood, would turn out to be no stranger at all. Dārā Shukoh hoped to show that treating the Hindu as an alien and an Other was a fundamental mistake, that there existed between Hinduism and Islam a pre-existing affinity, even an identity. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality is, perhaps, the right to have one’s common humanity affirmed. Dārā Shukoh repeats the famous verse of the Sufi poet Sanā‘ī, in the misquoted version Akbar’s biographer Abu’l Fazl had had engraved on a temple in Kashmir used by both Muslims and Hindus: “Infidelity (kufr) and islām (imām) are both following your path, crying, ‘He alone, he has no partner!’”, the two being, in his words, parallel locks of hair neither covering the face of the Incomparable One (1929: 37; cf. Ernst 2003: 187 n. 54).
Carl Ernst has made the most thorough study of Persian translations from the Sanskrit to date. With regard to the translations made of metaphysical and mystical texts, he notes their unusual method of production:

This type of translation typically mediated Vedāntic philosophical and mystical texts through a loose oral commentary provided by Indian pandits; this was rephrased in the Sufi technical vocabulary, presenting the texts as a kind of gnosis (Persian ma ‘rifat), and frequently amplifying their contents by the insertion of Persian mystical verses. (2003: 183).

While possibly true of many of the translations produced, the laxity implied by this description of the process could not be held against the translation of the Upaniṣads prepared under the auspices of Dārā Shukoh. If one compares that translation with the original, one finds it to be remarkably accurate; indeed, even the Latin text is a fairly close rendering. It was Dārā Shukoh’s avowed intention to make “without any worldly motive, in a clear style, an exact and literal translation”; and he included in the translation a Sanskrit-Persian glossary. At the same time, it does display a “rephrasing” of Indian philosophical terms and names of the Vedic gods in terms of Sufi parallels. For example, Mahādeva becomes Isrāfīl, Viṣṇu becomes Mikā‘īl, Brahman Jibra’il or Adam; and likewise brahma-loka is rendered sadrat-ul-muntahā, om as ism-i-A’zam (Hasrat 1982: 259–60). There are indeed also interpolations into the translated text, but they derive from Śaṅkara’s commentary, which has clearly been used as a guide in preparing the translation of those Upaniṣads upon such commentary is available.

Of Dārā Shukoh’s translation of the Upaniṣads, Ernst says

What is most distinctive about Dara Shukuh’s approach to Indian texts is that he treats them as scripture, in the same category as the Psalms of David, the Gospel, and the Qur’an. Sufis such as Mirza Mazhar Jan-i Janan (d. 1781) also made this theological concession, but typically with the stipulation that such ancient scriptures had been abrogated by the most recent revelation, the Qur’an. Dara Shukuh viewed the Upaniṣads as hermeneutically continuous with the Qur’an, providing an extended exposition of the divine unity that was only briefly indicated in the Arabic scripture. (2003: 185–6).
It is not the case that the Upaniṣads provide access to new truths; rather they provide a more detailed description of truths already sketched but less than fully explained in the Qur’ān. How, though, can an imported text from an alien tradition be thought of as in this way “hermeneutically continuous” with Islamic scripture? For the answer, we will turn first to Dārā Shukoh’s own “Preface” to his translation.

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Dārā Shukoh called his Persian translation of fifty-two Upaniṣads Sirr-i Akbar, “The Great Secret”. What might that secret have been? In his remarkably informative “Preface” to the translation, Dārā Shukoh reveals a great deal about his thinking. He was, first of all, thirsty for a resolution to a variety of “subtle doubts” about it that had occurred to him in the course of his studies. And:

whereas the holy Qur’ān is mostly allegorical, and at the present day persons thoroughly conversant with the subtleties thereof are very rare, he [Dārā] became desirous of bringing in view all the heavenly books, for the very words of God itself are their own commentary; and what might be in one book compendious, in another might be found diffusive, and from the detail of one, the conciseness of the other might be comprehensible. He had therefore cast his eyes on the Book of Moses, the Gospels, the Psalms and other scriptures, but the explanation of monotheism (tauhīd) in them also was compendious and enigmatical, and from the slovenly translation which selfish persons had made, their purport was not intelligible. (trans. Hasrat 1982: 265).

Dārā Shukoh represents his quest as a kind of research work, looking to a variety of sources in order to find answers to his questions. Among any variety of sources, some will offer clearer and more comprehensible accounts of certain details than others; it is therefore only rational to consult all of them. The unspoken assumption, of course, is that all religious texts have a common subject matter, whatever their varying stylistic merits or drawbacks might be. In the background, then, is what might be termed a religious cosmopolitanism, a belief that there is a common spiritual heritage to all humanity. This is a manifestation of the Sufi doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd (‘Unity of Being’), which, as Muzaffar Azam has shown, contributed to the shape of Hindu-Muslim relations in northern India throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from Akbar to ‘Abd al-Rahman Chishti (Azam 2004: 91–8).
Suggesting that the Indians have tried to conceal their spiritual treasure from the Muslims, Dārā Shukoh then goes on to make a second legitimizing argument for the hospitality he shows towards the Upaniṣads in translating them into Persian:

Then every difficulty and every sublime topic which he had desired or thought and had looked for and not found, he obtained from these essences of the most ancient books, and without doubt or suspicion, these books are first of all heavenly books in point of time, and the source and fountain-head of the ocean of Unity, in conformity with the holy Qur’ān and even a commentary thereon. (Hasrat 1982: 267).

That the Upaniṣads supply answers to the problems he had encountered in his Sufi studies is proof enough that they are genuine sources of spiritual insight, and they might even be said to provide a commentary upon the Qur’ān in so far as they explicate its puzzlingly allegorical statements. To a modern-minded religious pluralist, such a statement might seem almost unintelligible; but within Dārā Shukoh’s religious cosmopolitanism, it makes perfect sense. Just as there is one astronomy or chemistry, which different peoples at different times have found out different things about, so too there is one spiritual adventure to which all the world is party. Dārā Shukoh does not think of himself as bringing two distinct religious traditions into conversation or dialogue, but as drawing together different strands of a common resource. Seyyed Nasr rightly states that “the translations of Dārā Shukoh do not at all indicate a syncretism or eclecticism” (1999: 141), the reason being that he does not acknowledge the difference that a syncretic mission presupposes. His final legitimization of his project is, however, the most daring of all. He now claims that the Upaniṣads are actually mentioned in the Qur’ān, and designated as scriptural texts:

And it becomes clearly manifest that this verse is literally applicable to these ancient books: “Most surely it is an honoured Qur’ān; in a book that is protected. None shall touch it save the purified ones. A revelation by the Lord of the worlds (Qur’ān lvi 77–80).” It is evident to any person that this sentence is not applicable to the Psalms or the Book of Moses or to the Gospel, and by the word “revelation”, it is clear that it is not applicable to the Reserved Tablet; and whereas the Upanekhat, which are a secret to be concealed and are the essence of this book, and the verses of the holy Qur’ān are literally found therein, of a certainty, therefore, the hidden book is this most ancient book, and hereby things unknown became known and things incomprehensible became comprehensible to this faqīr. (Hasrat 1982: 267).
Dārā Shukoh concludes his “Preface” with a final definitive statement of what I have been calling his religious cosmopolitanism. The words of God, of which the Upaniṣads are a part, are available to all who are free of prejudice and bias:

Happy is he who having abandoned the prejudices of vile selfishness, sincerely and with the grace of God, renouncing all partiality, shall study and comprehend this translation entitled the Sirr-i-Akbar, knowing it to be a translation of the words of God, shall become imperishable, fearless, unsolicitous and eternally liberated. (Hasrat 1982: 267–8).

The final sentiment sounds as if it has been inspired by the Upaniṣads themselves, and perhaps we can hear just a slight influence of his Indian source on his own thinking, overt denials that any such thing is possible notwithstanding. For although Dārā Shukoh has gone to extreme lengths to argue that there is no spiritual wisdom in the Upaniṣads that is not already contained in the Qur‘ān, if only allegorically, it would not be surprising if their distinctive rhetoric of immortal freedom and release were to have infused itself into Dārā’s own spiritual vision.

The formal translation of the Upaniṣads did not precede, but rather came after an extensive study of their contents. Two years before, in 1655, Dārā Shukoh finished the composition of his great comparative masterpiece, The Meeting-Place of the Two Oceans (Majma-ul-Bahrain). This is the work we must turn to if we are to understand in more detail what the migration of the Upaniṣads into Persian signified for him. A translation into Sanskrit, possibly made by Dārā Shukoh himself, is entitled Samudra-sangama. Divided into discussions of twenty-two metaphysical topics, this work too begins with a revealing ‘Preface’. Dārā states that

Now, thus sayeth this unafflicted, unsorrowing fākīr, Muhammad Dārā Shukoh, that, after knowing the truth of truths and ascertaining the secrets and subtleties of the true religion of the Sūfis and having been endowed with this great gift, he thirsted to know the tenets of the religion of the Indian monotheists; and, having had repeated intercourse and discussion with the doctors and perfect divines of this religion, who had attained the highest pitch of perfection in religious exercises, comprehension, intelligence and insight, he did not find any difference, except
verbal, in the way in which they sought and comprehended Truth. Consequently, having collected the views of the two parties and having brought together the points – a knowledge of which is absolutely essential and useful for the seekers of Truth – he has compiled a tract and entitled it *Majma-ul-Bahrain* or “The Meeting-Point of the Two Oceans,” as it is a collection of the truth and wisdom of two Truth-knowing groups. (1929: 38).

The extraordinary idea that Sufi and Hindu thought differ only terminologically determines the structure of the whole work, which seeks to establish notational isomorphisms in the philosophical vocabulary of the two systems. It is perhaps obvious that the execution of such an ambition will demand its author to be selective, and with bodies of literature as large and varied as these, careful selection will certainly be possible. With respect to the Upaniṣads, we must remember that this is itself a diverse, complex and diachronic collection of texts. Apart from the so-called ‘major’ Upaniṣads, the ones upon which Śaṅkara would write extensive commentaries in his attempt to impose a monistic vision in the seventh century CE, there are a great number of ‘minor’ and ‘sectarian’ Upaniṣads, the latter specifically connected with the Śaiva, Vaishnava and Śakta traditions. The fifty-two chosen for inclusion in Dārā Shukoh’s translation is an eclectic mix of major and minor (with none from the Śakta tradition). While the very earliest Upaniṣads are probably pre-Buddhist, many of the minor ones are much later, the bulk probably in existence by the fifth or sixth century CE, a few very much more recent. It is certainly possible, then, that even if the paṇḍits with whom Dārā Shukoh sat had not relied on Śaṅkara’s monistic exegeses, there would have been plenty of material to choose from the later ‘minor’ and ‘sectarian’ Upaniṣads for him to draw upon in his search for substantial doctrinal affinities, these later Upaniṣads displaying significantly theistic elements. It is hardly surprising that from such a mass of spiritual writing, Dārā should be able to find terminological groupings that looked more or less isomorphic with those aspects of Sufi doctrine to which he wanted to give prominence. His paṇḍit guides would naturally have introduced him to the later Upaniṣads, both because of the greater doctrinal affinity, and also because the Sanskrit of the later verse Upaniṣads is more likely to have been accessible to him than the more difficult prose of the earlier texts.

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As a reasonably representative example of Dārā Shukoh’s method of notational congruence, let us take the section dealing with the self or soul (rūḥ). Here it is in full:

The soul is of two kinds: (i) a (common) soul and (ii) the Soul of souls (abul-arwāḥ), which are called ātmā and paramātmā, respectively, in the phraseology of the Indian divines. When the ‘pure self’ (dhāt-i-baht) becomes determinate and fettered, either in respect of purity or impurity, He is known as rūḥ (soul), or ātmā, in His elegant aspect and jasd (body), or šarīr, in His inelegant aspect. And the self that was determined in Eternity Past is known as rūḥ-i-a’zam (or, the supreme soul) and is said to possess uniform identity with the Omniscient Being. Now, the Soul in which all the souls are included is known as paramātmā or abul-arwāḥ. The inter-relation between water and its waves is the same as that between body and soul or as that between šarīr and ātmā. The combination of waves, in their complete aspect, may be likened to abul-arwāḥ or paramātmā; while water only is like the August Existence, or sudh or chitan. (1929: 44–5).

Here we find a terminological triad. In addition to the individual soul (rūḥ), and its body, there is another soul (abul-arwāḥ, the ‘soul of souls’) in which all the individual souls are ‘included’; and there is also a supreme soul (rūḥ-i-a’zam) that is the Omniscient Being and the August Existence. Neither the relationship between the individual souls and the soul of souls, nor that between the soul of souls and the supreme soul, is stated explicitly, other than to say that the first relationship is one of ‘inclusion’. Rather, these two relationships are clarified with the help of a rather beautiful metaphor: the individual souls are like waves on the surface of the ocean; the soul of souls is the single pattern of waves that includes each of them; and the supreme soul is the mass of water upon which both the individual waves and the pattern supervene.

I cannot speak of the Sufi sources on which Dārā Shukoh will have drawn in presenting this structure. What, though, of his attempt to bring it into isomorphism with terms and concepts drawn from the Indian literature? The Persian rūḥ is mapped onto the Sanskrit ātmā, and the Persian abul-arwāḥ onto the Sanskrit paramātmā. Strangely, no mapping is provided for the third element of the triad, rūḥ-i-a’zam, the supreme soul, a lacuna which is indicative, perhaps, of a difficulty. First, the term paramātmā (‘highest self’) is not in early Upaniṣadic discourse; it is of
comparatively later use. Although one Upaniṣad says “He brings together the self in the higher self” (Brahma. 3), the term is most often used as a synonym for brahman: “He, it is said, is indeed brahman, the highest self” (Haṃsa. 1). Yet brahman is also that which is defined as existing (sat), thinking (cit) and bliss (ānanda), and is clearly, therefore, the August Existence or Omniscent Being to which Dārā Shukoh also refers (his śudh is sad or sat, his chitan is cetana or cit). The metaphorical identification of this supreme self with the ocean is indeed a venerable Upaniṣadic one, where it functions as an image of that into which the individual rivers flow and in so doing lose their identity and individuality (Chāndogya 6.10.1; Muṇḍaka 3.2.8; Praśna 6.5); or, in Śaṅkara, of the metaphysical unity that the individual waves are strictly non-different from (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 2.1.13).

It is not immediately clear how the provision of terminological mappings is meant to be explanatory of Qur’ānic doctrine. The idea, probably, is that these mappings will provide the Muslim reader with a tool with which to assimilate the Hindu texts once translated. The reader will now be able to appropriate the text as speaking about his or her own concepts, saints and doctrines. Just as the translated Bhagavadgītā would be read as an exposition of the Sufi doctrine of mir‘āt al’haqā‘iq (‘All is He’; Azam 2004: 97), so too Dārā Shukoh’s Meeting-Place would furnish the essential prerequisite for a Sufi reading of the translated Upaniṣads. It is perhaps not by chance that he published this book before setting the translation project into motion.

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I would like to canvass, albeit briefly, a further explanation for the “hermeneutical continuity” (Ernst 2003: 186) Dārā Shukoh finds between his own Sufi beliefs and the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and for the “subterranean cultural bonds” (Azam 2004: 96) he and other Persian-speaking scholars were to explore throughout the period. The possibility I am interested in is that what Dārā has done, in effect, is to discover within Sufism the archaic remnants of another migration. For it is possible that the translation of the Upaniṣads into Persian in 1657 was not the first time that they journeyed on an easterly wind. Many scholars have noted interesting affinities
between the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the thought of Plotinus (204–270 CE), the founder of Neoplatonism. Born in Lycopolis, Egypt, he studied philosophy with in Alexandria under the enigmatic Ammonius. Wanting to study Indian philosophy in more depth, he joined the military expedition of Emperor Gordian III to Persia in 243. When Gordian was assassinated by his troops, Plotinus instead made his way to Rome, where he remained until his death. We do not know how much Indian philosophy Plotinus was able to learn, either in Alexandria or later, but similarities and parallels between his Neoplatonic doctrine and ideas to be found in the Upaniṣads, especially the later ones, are certainly striking (Staal 1961; McEvilley 2002). And it is, of course, the incorporation of Neoplatonic thought into Islam which is one of the decisive ingredients in the formation of Sufism. Just possibly, then, what Dārā Shukoh has managed to perceive are the fragmentary remains of this much older journey of Upaniṣadic ideas, ideas that no doubt bear many signs of transformation and modification, but which nevertheless contributed to the constitution of Dārā Shukoh’s own religious world view. If, as there seems to be, there was in Dārā Shukoh’s mind a hint of the thought that the Upaniṣads were the ur-text of both traditions, then how appropriate for him to name his comparative masterpiece after the place in Khartum where two tributaries of the Nile rejoin: majma-ul-bahrain, “the meeting-place of the two waters.”

The triangular relationship between the individual souls, the soul of souls which includes them, and the supreme soul upon which both supervene has its origins in Plotinus himself. Richard Sorabji summarises Plotinus’ rather complex overall position in Enneads 4.3 [27] 2 as follows:

[T]hat there is a plurality of souls is shown by the fact that Plotinus is keen to insist that our souls are not parts of the World Soul which makes the stars revolve, but that that is a sister soul derived, like ours, from the hypostasis soul. The human and world souls can be called ‘parts’ of the hypostasis soul only in the special sense in which theorems, though derived from a whole system, can also be called parts of it. (2004: 343–5).

Enneads 4.3 [27] 2 reads:

Is it not then a part in the way that a scientific theorem is said to be a part of a particular science? The science is in no way diminished, and each division is a sort
of expression and actualization. In such a case each part potentially contains the whole science, which is thereby nonetheless a whole. To apply this analogy to the soul as a whole and parts: the whole whose parts are of this kind would not be the soul of something, but soul pure and simple; so it would not be the soul of the universe, but that too will be one of the partial souls. Therefore all souls are parts of a single soul and are uniform.

Each scientific theorem is a ‘part’ of the scientific theory as a whole, and both presuppose the mathematical system which permits their derivation. This analogy is similar to the one used by Dārā Shukoh, of waves and the single pattern they form, and the body of water on which they both supervene. He has taken an Upaniṣadic metaphor and given it a Neoplatonic twist.

Another distinctively Neoplatonic idea inherited by Dārā Shukoh is that of the ascent and descent of the soul. Once again, he seeks an isomorphism with the Indian theory:

According to certain Sufis, the worlds, through which all created beings must needs pass, are four in number: nāsūt (the human world), malakūt (the invisible world), jabarūt (the highest world) and lāhūt (the divine world)... According to the Indian divines the avashūt, which term applies to these four worlds, consists of four, namely jāgart, sapan, sakhūpat and turyā. Jāgart is identical with nāsūt, which is the world of manifestation and wakefulness; sapan, which is identified with malakūt, is the world of souls and dreams; sakhūpat is identical with jabarūt, in which the traces of both the worlds disappear and the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘thou’ vanishes ...; turyā is identical with lāhūt, which is Pure Existence, encircling, including and covering all the worlds. If a person journeys from the nāsrūt to the malakūt and from malakūt to jabarūt and from this last to the lāhūt, this will be considered as a progress on his part. But if the Truth of Truths, whom the Indian monotheists call avasan, descends from the stage of lāhūt to that of malahūt and thence to jabarūt, His journey terminates in māsūt. And the fact that certain Sufis have described the stages of descent as four, while others as five, is a reference to this fact. (1929: 45–7).

It is not difficult to identify the Upaniṣadic source for the doctrine Dārā Shukoh speaks about here; it is the Māṇḍūkya description of the constitution of the self:

Brahman is this self; that is this self consisting of four quarters. The first quarter is Vaiśvānara—the Universal One—situated in the waking state (jāgarita-sthāna), perceiving what is inside, possessing seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and enjoying gross things. The second quarter is Taijasa—the Brilliant One—situated in the state of dream (svapna-sthāna), perceiving what is inside, possessing seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and enjoying refined things. The third quarter is Prājña—the
Intelligent One—situated in the state of deep sleep (śūpta-sthāna)—deep sleep is when a sleeping man entertains no desires or sees no dreams—become one, and thus being a single mass of perception; consisting of bliss, and thus enjoying bliss; and having thought as his mouth. He is the Lord of all; he is the knower of all; he is the inner controller; he is the womb of all—for he is the origin and the dissolution of beings. They consider the fourth (caturtha; =turiya BĀ 5.14.3) quarter as perceiving neither what is inside nor what is outside, nor even both together; not as a mass of perception, neither as perceiving nor as not perceiving; as unseen; as beyond the reach of ordinary transaction; as ungraspable; as without distinguishing marks; as unthinkable; as indescribable; as one whose essence is the perception of itself alone; as the cessation of the whole world; as tranquil; as auspicious; as without a second. That is the self, and it is that which should be perceived. (Māṇḍūkya 1–7; trans. Olivelle).

A world made of ordinary experience, a world made of dreams, a world characterised by the absence of dreams or experience, and a world uncharacterisable in terms either of their presence or their absence—this elegant model of the mental spaces available for human habitation is brought into isomorphism with a Sufi account of four worlds the passage through which is a form of spiritual progress or descent. The ultimate source of Dārā Shukoh’s account of the two-fold journey is again Plotinus, who describes the soul’s descent in “emanation” from The One, through Nous (‘intellect’), to Psyche (‘soul’) and down to the world of the senses, and back up in a process of “contemplation” (Enneads 4.8, 1.6).

The Upaniṣadic texts were welcomed by Dārā Shukoh as a stranger might be, not as someone with knowledge of their own to offer, but as offering external comment on one’s own endeavour. The stranger is a means by which we see ourselves more clearly. For Dārā Shukoh, that is exactly how the importation of the Upaniṣads into Persianate Islam was justified: they enabled the Sufi seeker to find answers to his own questions. The migrating text performs an important service to the tradition that hosts it, but a service largely extrinsic to itself. Allowing itself to be so used is perhaps the way for the migrating text to retain its own secrets.

APPENDIX Francois Bernier
In the travel writings of Francois Bernier (1625–1688) we find a fragment of testimony to the aftermath of Dārā Shukoh’s translational project. Bernier was a French doctor who travelled to India in 1659, where Dārā Shukoh immediately took him on as his physician, just before the final battle with Aurangzeb. Before embarking on his travels, Bernier had been the protégé of the French Epicurean philosopher, scientist and mathematician Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655). In a letter written in 1667, some ten years after the Varanasi project, Bernier describes how he had taken into his employment one of the pandits, fluent in both Sanskrit and Persian, whom Dārā Shukoh had used, how they had exchanged the latest medical and philosophical knowledge, and, fascinatingly, how he had translated work by René Descartes (1595–1650) and Pierre Gassendi into Persian for the pandit’s benefit:

Do not be surprised if without knowledge of Sanskrit I am going to tell you many things taken from books in that language; you will know that my Agha Danismand Khan paid for the presence of one of the most famous pandits in India, who before had been pensioned by Dara Shukoh, the oldest son of Shah Jahan, and that this pandit, apart from attracting the most learned scientists to our circle, was at my side for over three years. When I became weary of explaining to my Agha the latest discoveries of William Harvey and Pequet in anatomy, and to reason with him on the philosophy of Gassendi and Descartes, which I translated into Persian (because that is what I did during five or six years) it was up to our pandit to argue. (Letter to Monsieur Chapelain, Despatched from Chiras in Persia, the 4th October 1667, reproduced in his Travels in the Mogul Empire 1656–1667. Trans. Saiyid Rizvi (1989). Cf. (1934) pp. 323–5).

Since this letter was sent from Shiraz in 1667, and since the pandit was in Bernier’s employment for three years, it cannot have been more than a handful of years after the end of the translation project. It is of considerable interest to those who are interested in the migration of texts to learn here that the work of Descartes, the leading French philosopher of the time and one who is regarded as the father of modern philosophy, was available to the Varanasi pandits already in the early 1660s, barely ten years after his death. The global circulation of ideas was already extremely swift. As for the name of Bernier’s pandit, and the nature of the hospitality he afforded to the work of Descartes or Gassendi, that is a story which remains to be told. We do know, however, that Bernier’s report of his travels, which he published in Paris in 1670, was to be the inspiration for John Dryden’s
masterpiece *Aureng-Zebe*, first performed in the Spring of 1675, depicting in terms favourable to the victor Aurangzeb’s defeat of Dārā Shukoh and subsequent reign.

Bernier concludes his letter with a fascinating account of the secret doctrine which Dārā Shukoh had thought he had rediscovered in the Upaniṣads, a doctrine he describes as having been the source of a considerable degree recent fuss:

In conclusion, I shall explain to you the Mysticism of a Great Sect which has latterly made great noise in Hindoustan, inasmuch as certain Pendets or Gentile Doctors had instilled it into the minds of Dara and Sultan Sujah, the eldest sons of Chah-Jehan. (345).

The doctrine in question is one which Bernier finds even in the work of the Greeks:

You are doubtless acquainted with the doctrine of many of the ancient philosophers concerning that great life-giving principle of the world, of which they argue that we and all living creatures are so many parts: if we carefully examine the writings of Plato and Aristotle, we shall probably discover that they inclined towards this opinion. This is the almost universal doctrine which is held by the sect of the Soufys and the greater part of the learned men of Persia at the present day. (345–6).

Bernier is explicit about the causes of his antipathy towards the doctrine in question: in the version defended by Robert Flud, it had been refuted by his philosophical mentor Gassendi. Bernier’s presentation of the doctrine is clearly the result of his acquaintance with Hindu pandits, presumably the one in his employment. God, the supreme being, produced everything out of himself, and

... this production is not formed simply after the manner of efficient causes, but as a spider which produces a web from its own navel, and withdraws it at pleasure. (347).

The apparent world is unreal, and is as if a dream. Asked to justify such a claim, similes but not reasons will be given, in particular the simile of the ocean and its waves:

That God is as an immense ocean in which many vessels of water are in continual motion; let these vessels go where they will, they always remain in the same ocean, in the same water; and if they should break, the water they contain would then be united to the whole, to that ocean of which they were but parts. (348).
Bernier concludes by reminding his reader of the motto with which he had begun his letter, which at the beginning reads, “From which it will be seen that there is no Doctrine too strange or too improbable for the Soul of man to conceive” (300); and as re-stated at the end, “There are no opinions too extravagant and ridiculous to find reception in the mind of man” (349). These passages are enough to reveal one final onward migration of our texts. For it is with exactly this sentiment that David Hume (1711–1776) decries the Hindu belief that God is a spider, in Section VII of his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, in his discussion of the notion that the world has a soul:

The Brahmins assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our globe.

It is as likely that Hume read Bernier directly as that he received the simile from Bernier’s correspondent Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), whose *Historical and Critical Dictionary* was published in French in 1697, and includes information from ancient Greek sources about the Indian Brahmins as well as from contemporary travellers’ accounts. While it was certainly rhetorically convenient and effective for Hume to ridicule the notion in its Indian formulation, his attack on the rationalistic explanation of the unity of the world brought the career of that widely admired cosmopolitan idea decisively to an end. It is perhaps a shame that the unnamed pandit engaged by Bernier did not consider his employer sufficiently able to master the complexities of mature Indian philosophical thought, but rested instead on the use of metaphors and similes that were open to caricature. Bernier would, in any case, continue to pursue the neo-Epicurean ideas of his mentor Gassendi: in 1668, still in Shiraz, he sent an essay to Claude Chapelle entitled *Concerning His Intention of Resuming His Studies, On Some Points Which Relate to the Doctrine of Atoms, and To The Nature of the Human Understanding* (Tavels, p. 349, n.1).


