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THE MEANING OF *DHARMA* AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF
THE TWO *MĪMĀMSĀS*: APPAYYA DĪKṢITA'S 'DISCOURSE
ON THE REFUTATION OF A UNIFIED KNOWLEDGE
SYSTEM OF *PŪRVAMĪMĀMSĀ* AND *UTTARAMĪMĀMSĀ*'

Among Sanskrit intellectuals active in the last centuries prior to the consolidation of colonialism and the introduction into South Asia of radically different knowledge systems, the most remarkable in southern India, for the breadth of his learning and his striking innovation in multiple disciplines, was Appayya Dīkṣita.¹ His literary activity fell in the last half of the 16th century, possibly extending into the early 17th. But astonishingly little hard information about his life is available, despite the fact that scores of works attributed to him are extant.² What is known more or less for certain can fit on a single printed page (and that page has recently been written, in the introduction to a new edition and translation of one of Appayya's linguistic treatises).³ Both the breadth of his learning and the quality of his innovation are fully on display in two works, one truly grand, the other more modest, that deserve to be far better known than they are. The first is the *Caturmatasārasaṅgraha*, 'Compendium of Essential Tenets of the Four Schools', a monumental review of the four major Vedānta systems of Appayya's time, and, so far as I am aware, the only such systematic account ever produced in the premodern period (it is the Humvee to the Kia of Mādhava's doxographical epitomes in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*). These remarkable verse compositions (except in the case of the second, which is in prose) set out in accordance with the topics of the *Brahmasūtra* (BS) text the major tenets of Dvaita (in the *Nyāyamuktāvalī*), Viśiṣṭādvaita (*Naya mayūkhālikā*), Śaivādvaita (*Nayamañimālā*), and Advaita (*Nayamañjarī*), in what is probably an evaluative sequence.⁴ The second is the work under consideration here, the *Pūrvottaramīmāṃsāvādanakṣatramālā*, 'The Milky Way of Discourses on Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.' We might better capture the spirit if not the letter of the title by translating it 'Collected Essays in the Prior and Posterior Analytics', or perhaps instead, with a nod to Gadamer rather than Aristotle, '... in Philosophical and Theological Hermeneutics'.

‘Essays’, however, I mean quite seriously: the genre here is a new one, presenting a series of independent studies (a set of twenty-seven) of particular and often very abstruse topics in the two systems.⁵

The relationship between Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā flagged in Appayya’s title is the object of a long-standing debate in many Vedānta schools.⁶ Both knowledge systems ground themselves on the authority of the Veda, and employ many of the same exegetical principles to make sense of the Vedic textual corpus. Yet their semantics and pragmatics, so to speak – what they understood the texts to mean and how they proceeded to act upon that understanding – appeared to many traditional thinkers to be radically incommensurable, and finding a way to reconcile them was a serious challenge. Indeed, their problematic relationship is embodied in the very nomenclature that links them, in the differentiation itself of a ‘posterior’ from a ‘prior’ *darśana*, like that of a ‘new’ from an ‘old’ testament. Viewed more historically, the nomenclature seems likely to have emerged out of the dispute that hinges on this relationship and that forms the central problem of Appayya’s essay translated here.

Whatever may be the earlier history of the terminology (and I am unaware that it has ever been clearly traced), we find it distinctly if still inchoately articulated in the text that forms the *pūrvapakṣa* of Appayya’s account, namely the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja (11–12th century). Rāmānuja’s summary of the purpose of the first *sūtra* of the BS (the *jijñāsāsūtra*) runs as follows: ‘Since the fruit of works known through the *prior part* of the Mīmāṃsā (*mīmāṃsāpūrvabhāga*) is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of *brahma* – which knowledge is to be reached through the *latter part* (*uparitanabhāga*) of the Mīmāṃsā – is unlimited and permanent; for this reason *brahma* “is to be known”, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place’.⁷ It may not be without some further significance to determining this terminological history that in the summary contained in Bodhayana’s *ṛtti* (early centuries C.E.?) reproduced by Rāmānuja there is no mention of ‘prior’ and ‘latter’. But that does not mean that the problem of the relationship of the two knowledge systems was not already on the table. Indeed, what the Vṛttikāra insists on is precisely the unity (*aikaśāstrya*), as Rāmānuja puts it: ‘He [Bodhayana] will declare later on “This *śārīraka*-doctrine is integrated (*saṃhitam*)⁸ with Jaimini’s doctrine so as to make up 16 *adhyāyas*” – that is, the Treatise of Twelve Chapters, or the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* (MS) of Jaimini, and the Treatise of Four

Chapters, or the BS of Vyāsa Bādārāyaṇa, should be taken together as constituting a single work of Sixteen Chapters; ‘this proves the two to constitute one body of doctrine’.⁹

Whereas Rāmānuja provides a range of reasons in his commentary on BS 1.1.1 why the ‘latter part’ of Mīmāṃsā requires the ‘earlier’, he nowhere seems to base this on the notion that the definition and nature of *dharma*, the subject of the major thesis (*pratijñā*) of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā (‘Now, then, the inquiry into *dharma*’, *athāto dharma-jijñāsā*), comprise not only its declared topic, *karma*, but also *brahma*, whose definition and nature form the subject of the major thesis of the Uttaramīmāṃsā (‘Now, then, the inquiry into *brahma*’, *athāto brahmajijñāsā*). Arguing out this theorem appears to have been the contribution of Rāmānuja’s great commentator of the early 14th century, Sudarśanasūri in his *Śrutaparakāśikā*. It is that commentator whom Appayya has squarely in his sights when defining the limits of the term *dharma* and critiquing the doctrine of the unified knowledge systems.¹⁰ There can be no doubt whatever about Appayya’s conclusion itself: ‘Therefore, given that contradiction between the two systems – with respect to primary meanings and end-results – ever rears its head, even the rumor that they form a single knowledge system can gain no standing in the thoughts of the learned’ (*saṃgrahaśloka* 13 infra). What is unclear, to me at least, is whether this should be taken as representing Appayya’s personal view, given the complexities that remain to be disentangled. Not least of these is the fact that Śrīkaṇṭha, the founder of the Śaivādvaita Vedānta system to which Appayya apparently subscribed, declares explicitly ‘We do not hold that the two systems, the analysis of *dharma* and the analysis of *brahma*, are completely different; on the contrary, we hold that they form a single knowledge system’.¹¹ One thing beyond dispute, however, is that Appayya’s rejection of the theory should not taken as intended to undermine the validity of Vedānta itself. As he declares in his commentary on Śrīkaṇṭhaśivācārya’s text, what refuting the unity of the two systems is meant in fact to provide is scope for the commencement of the BS.¹²

Whatever his own views may have been on the points of intersection and separation in the two knowledge systems, Appayya’s work is a valuable index of Pūrvamīmāṃsā thinking on the problem of the scope of *dharma*, the system’s very keyword. Indeed, the way the essay frames the term’s meaning is crucial. Here and there throughout the history of Mīmāṃsā an anxiety is almost palpable concerning the potential expansion of *dharma*’s semantic field, about

its slippage or spread or appropriation. The present collection of essays is eloquent testimony to how very real the possibility of this extension was – an extension that, in the view of Mīmāṃsā, was wholly unwarranted. To one of the preeminent thinkers of the early-modern period in Indian intellectual history, *dharma* meant first and foremost what it meant for the Mīmāṃsā system from the beginning: ritual action based on transcendently authoritative texts, the Veda. And it is hard not to see his *Vādanakṣatramālā* as yet another attempt in the long history of attempts by Mīmāṃsā to maintain its monopoly over this primeval definition against actual historical encroachments.

Rather than dismissing the development as ‘encroachment’, however, we do better to link this to what the Egyptologist Jan Assmann has called ‘subversive inversion’, a process of transvaluation of semantic and conceptual goods across socio-religious boundaries found in many times and places. It is richly illustrated in Indian history, especially by Buddhists in their appropriation of *vaidika* categories and concepts – preeminent among them *dharma* itself.¹³ The most remarkable attempt in Sanskrit intellectual history to arrest this process of subversion by delimiting in the strictest possible terms what does and does not count as *dharma* and to defend the proposition that its sole source is the Veda is offered by Kumārila in his *Tantravārttika* on MS 1.3. There he observes that, like spoiled children who hate their parents, the Buddhists refuse, out of shame and resentment at any competing foundational claim, to acknowledge that every metaphysical truth in their system – anything concerning *dharma* – must be derived from the Veda.¹⁴

We do not have to go outside the *vaidika* world, broadly viewed, to find evidence of this process of extension as well as of Mīmāṃsā angst. A well-known example is in fact the term *veda* itself, which forms the textual reference point of the system. Despite Mīmāṃsā’s constantly reiterated restrictions on the category (the *vidhi*, *arthavāda*, *mantra*, and *nāmadheya* of the *Ṛk*, *Yajus*, and *Sāma saṃhitas*), ‘Veda’ too was a category ever at risk of illegitimate expansion. Think only of Jayantabhaṭṭa’s elaborate defense (in the fourth chapter of the *Nyāyamañjarī*) of the *Artharvaveda* as a fourth (or as he says, actually the first) Veda, or of the *Mahābhārata*’s famous claim to constitute a ‘fifth Veda’, or of the tendency of the Upanishadic corpus toward almost infinite expansion. One final related point may be made here. Mīmāṃsā itself was a prime source for terms and categories that either through inversion or extension

became keywords in Indian culture at large. The very idea of *smṛti*, for instance, or so I have suggested, originated with Mīmāṃsā – as a Vedic text no longer extant, no longer actually still being ‘heard’ (*śruti*) in its original wording during recitation, but existing only as a ‘memory’ (*smṛti*) of the original, and in new wording – and migrated thence to the wider intellectual universe, again despite Mīmāṃsā’s attempt to delimit the genre. Precisely the same thing could be demonstrated for other expressions and ideas, such as that core component of *dharma*, *puruṣārtha* itself.¹⁵

Much remains to be explored in reference to Appayya’s project in the *Nakṣatramālā*, both within the general context of early-modern Indian intellectual practices and discursive styles, and specifically in the *Auseinandersetzung* with Viśiṣṭādvaita, to say nothing of the detailed problems that confront us in just making sense of the text. The present essay has been ripped somewhat untimely from the womb so as to provide to this collection of reflections on the history of the concept of *dharma* one important local attempt to make sense of the term and its limits near the end of the creative period of Sanskrit intellectual history. It is especially valuable for us to encounter the actual arguments of those for whom *dharma* was a living reality, and who themselves struggled to understand its nature and the claims it made upon them. In my effort to make these arguments heard I have striven to provide a translation as readable and usable as possible, though the text is one that does not always yield its meaning readily, or offer easy solutions to its stylistic complexity.¹⁶

The Discourse on the Refutation of a Unified Knowledge System of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā (appayyadīkṣitāṇām pūrvottaramīmāṃsāvādanakṣatramālāntarbhāvy- aikaśāstryanirākaraṇavādaḥ)

[235] Accordingly, insofar as *brahma* has been proved [in the previous discourse]¹⁷ to exist as the ultimate referent of all language, it must of necessity also be the referent of the word *dharma*, which is used to refer to ritual action’s (*karma*) being a means to otherworldly good (*alaukikaśreyah*). Moreover, *brahma* must be directly expressed by the word *dharma* by reason of the semantic relation just noted. This is so because Mīmāṃsakas argue that the meaning of the word *dharma*, insofar as it is held to be used in reference to a thing’s being a means of securing the good as understood from the Veda, must refer to class categories, properties, and substances no less than to ritual actions. [Thus Kumārila:] ‘It will be established that class categories, properties, and substances are *dharma*. Even though these are perceptible

entities [whereas *dharmā* is imperceptible], it is not in their sensory form that they are *dharmā*. Their being means of securing the good is cognized from the Veda alone [and not from perception]; and it is in that form that they are *dharmā*, and so beyond the realm of the senses'.¹⁸ Thus, the word *dharmā* used in the [first] *sūtra* [of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system], 'Now, then, the inquiry into *dharmā*' [MS 1.1.1] must comprise *brahmā*, and *brahmā* must therefore also be an object of the examination of *dharmā* that Jaimini [the author of the MS] in that *sūtra* states as his main thesis (*pratijñā*) to undertake. To examine whether or not this is in fact the case is the reason for initiating the following discourse.

Our opponents, who argue that *brahmā* is the object of the examination of *dharmā*, attempt to prove this by the following syllogism:

[*pūrvapakṣa*] *brahmā* – its true nature, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so – is an object of Jaimini's proposed examination, because *brahmā* is a means of attaining otherworldly good, just like ritual action itself.

The long qualification beginning 'its true nature' is meant to preclude the possibility of the above inference being [vitiated by the fallacy of] proving what has already been proved, since *brahmā*, in its character of being a deity in general (since it is included as such in the 'offerings to the constellations' [*nakṣatreṣṭi*] and other similar rites), would already have to be [1] an object of Jaimini's examination of whether or not the deity is predominant or subordinate [in its relation to the act of sacrifice]; or, in that same character, [2] an object of his examination of the question whether or not deities have the right to engage in ritual action. [236] This is the first position in the debate.

[*siddhānta*] Now the second position. Were *brahmā* the object of Jaimini's proposed examination of *dharmā*, one would have expected the examination of *brahmā* to occur at the beginning of his work, but we do not find that to be the case. Nor is it possible to suppose that the great sage wanted to undertake an examination of *brahmā* but was somehow impeded from doing so, or simply forgot. This is a sage who analyzed the whole field of ritual action – its true nature, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so – in the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters* [i.e., the MS], and who, noticing that certain interpretive principles used in that text were not explicitly given in *sūtra* form, produced the *Samkarṣanakāṇḍa* as a supplement to the *Treatise* in order to gather

these principles together. How then are we to suppose that he either was impeded from examining, or just plain forgot to examine *brahma*? Nor can it be claimed that the analysis of the true nature of *brahma*, the sources of knowledge about it, the means of attaining it, and the end-results of doing so was accomplished by the same principles used to examine ritual action, and for this reason no separate examination of *brahma* had to be provided. That the interpretive principles used for the analysis of sentences concerned with *brahma* are distinct from those used for sentences concerned with *dharma* is proved by the fact that the latter were systematized in the *Treatise of Four Chapters* [i.e., the BS]. Nor is it possible to believe that the stated thesis of examining *brahma* can be brought to fruition only on the assumption that the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters* and the *Treatise of Four Chapters* form a single knowledge system. There is no valid reason to believe that they do form one system: they have different authors (*vaktṛ*); their introductions containing the statement of their major theses (*pratijñopakrama*) concern the examination of *dharma* on the one hand and *brahma* on the other, and they were undertaken to frame analytic principles regarding positive and negative objectives that are mutually distinct. [237] Hence, the inference given above is blocked. [This can be shown by a counter-syllogism:] *brahma* [an already existent thing] is not expressed [by the word *dharma*] as something to be accomplished [i.e., an action] is so expressed, because it is something different from ritual action, just as a pot [is not expressed, being different from ritual action.]

[*pūrvapakṣa*] Now the third position. My inference is not blocked, because it is possible for the theses [of the MS and the BS]¹⁹ to be brought to fruition only by the supposition that [Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta] form a single knowledge system. And there are factors lending support to such a supposition, such as the fact that both works are commentaries on a single text, namely the Veda. Nor does the fact of their having different authors militate against this supposition: the exegeses of Vāmana and Jayāditya, for example, even though the authors are different, form a single knowledge system, insofar as they are a commentary on a single work, namely [Pāṇini's] grammar. Nor do their introductions containing the statement of their major theses regarding *dharma* on the one hand and *brahma* on the other block my inference: the word *dharma* refers equally to *karma* and *brahma*, and when the thesis of the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters*, which is [thus] common (*sāmānya*) to the *Treatise of Four Chapters*, has been dealt with, it stands to reason that thereafter, after

the examination of *karma*, we should have a reference to the sub-thesis (*avāntarapratijñā*), that is: ‘Now, then, the inquiry into *brahma*’, just as we have [the reference to another sub-thesis in the continuation of the MS], ‘Now, then, the inquiry into what is subsidiary’ [MS 3.1.1]. Nor is the inference blocked by the argument that [the two systems] frame analytical principles that are mutually distinct. That there should be a distinction in analytical principles (*nyāya*) in accordance with [differences in the] objects to be analyzed makes perfectly good sense. We find in the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters* itself that distinct analytical principles are framed in accordance with the objects to be analyzed, such as the division of ritual action [MS 2], the relationship of dominant and subsidiary elements in a rite [MS 3], and so forth. Thus, my inference is not blocked, whereas yours is ineffectual.

[*siddhānta*] Now the fourth position. I do not mean, by saying that the principles are ‘distinct’, merely that they are different. I mean that they are contradictory. [238] And this contradiction is a matter of common knowledge, given that, in the *Treatise of Four Chapters*, we find that Jaimini’s doctrines are generally presented as the *prima facie* view to be refuted. These are two knowledge systems, initiated by two different authors relying on two contradictory doctrines, and it is impossible therefore to suppose that they were produced as a single system by these same two men in unanimity. As for the word *dharma*, it is used in counterpoint to *brahma* as referring to sacrifice and other ritual action in the *sūtra* ‘Jaimini [thinks] for the same reasons that *dharma* [is what brings about the fruits of actions]’ [BS 3.2.40],²⁰ which is contained in the topic ‘From him [i.e., the Lord, there comes] the fruit [of works]; for [that only] is possible’ [BS 3.2.38]. Moreover, the great sage Āpastamba uses the word *dharma* only in the sense of action to be performed such as sacrifice, when he says, ‘*Dharma* and *adharma* do not wander about saying “Here we are!” Nor do the gods and *gandharvas* or the ancestors proclaim “This is *dharma*, that is *adharma*”.’²¹ Rather, it is what the *āryas* commend to see performed that is *dharma*, and what they condemn is *adharma*’ [ĀDS 1.7.6]. In accordance with his view, therefore, the word [*dharma*] contained in the *sūtra* on the inquiry into *dharma* must be admitted to refer to sacrifice and other such action to be performed. And so it is unreasonable to suppose that the two *sūtras*, one on the inquiry into *dharma* and the other on the inquiry into *brahma*, can be distinguished as referring to a thesis that is common to both systems [MS 1.1.1] and to one meant to be a sub-thesis

[BS 1.1.1] (*sādhāraṇāvāntarapratijñāparatvavibhāga*). Therefore, your inference is blocked, and mine is not ineffectual, because anything that, under a given description, cannot be *performed* can have no connection, under that description, with being taken in the sense of the word *dharma*, since this denotes actions that are to be performed.

[*pūrvapakṣa*] Now the fifth position. It is not proved that the doctrines of Jaimini and Vyāsa stand in contradiction with each other. In some places in the *Treatise of Four Chapters* Jaimini's doctrine is not in fact presented as the *prima facie* view to be refuted. With respect to the topic dealing with human goals (*puruṣārtha*) [239], the *prima facie sūtra* containing a repudiation of *brahma*, 'On account of [the Self] standing in a supplementary relation [to ritual action], [the statements as to the fruits of the knowledge of the Self] must be narrative portions (*arthavādas*) [in praise of action], thus Jaimini believes' [BS 3.4.2] is a restatement, not of Jaimini's own position, but rather of a position that he²² includes as a supplement (*abhyuccayavāda*) [and that does not therefore necessarily reflect his own views]. And that is why, in such *sūtras* as 'To the highest [*brahma*] [the souls are led], so Jaimini believes, owing to this being the principal sense [of the word *brahma*]' [BS 4.3.12], we find a restatement of a position as belonging to Jaimini that proceeds precisely by way of recognizing *brahma*.²³ Similarly, the *sūtra* 'Jaimini [considers that scriptural passages mentioning those stages of life in which celibacy is obligatory contain] a reference only to those stages; they are not injunctions; for [other scriptural passages] forbid [those stages]' [BS 3.4.18] restates a repudiation of ascetic renunciation merely provided as a supplement by Jaimini; it is not a restatement of his own settled view. Accordingly, in the *sūtra* 'But of him who has become that [i.e., entered onto a higher life-stage] there is no becoming not that [i.e., descending to a lower stage], according to Jaimini also. . .' [BS 3.4.40], it is shown that Jaimini also disapproves of any deviation from renunciation once a person has renounced. Thus elsewhere as well, in each individual case [apparent] contradiction may be resolved through interpretation. Moreover, the use of the word *dharma* to refer uniquely to something to be performed (*anuṣṭheyāsādhāraṇya*) is also unproved. We find it used to refer generally to the Blessed One (*bhagavatsādhāraṇyokteḥ*) in the *Mahābhārata*:

The sages who know the Veda and the people who know the transcendent Self say that Krishna, the great one, is the eternal *dharma* [MBh. 3.86.22 crit. ed.].

Thus, because [1] real contradiction between the two knowledge systems does not exist; or, [2] even if contradiction were thought somehow to be present, an actual refusal to recognize *brahma* is not expressed in any *sūtra* in the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters* ; and [3] because the word *dharma* is common to the topics of both systems [*karma* and *brahma*] – for all these reasons, there are no grounds for refusing to accept that they form a single system even though the authors are different. Thus, your inference is indeed ineffectual, insofar as something not performed can very well be an object of Jaimini’s proposed examination, since the word *dharma* is found used in reference to such things.

[240] [*siddhānta*] Now the sixth position. The statement that there is no contradiction is unproved. There is an undeniable contradiction between accepting *brahma* or renunciation and rejecting them. Moreover, one cannot maintain that the *sūtra* that presents Jaimini’s acceptance of both *brahma* and renunciation is an indicator that this acceptance of the two constitutes his real settled view. For this situation can be accounted for differently: Jaimini’s thought is being represented as self-contradictory and introduced in the *Brahmasūtra* with the intention of showing its unacceptability for that reason, according to the interpretive principal enunciated in the topic ‘On Sāṃkhya’: ‘And moreover [the Sāṃkhya doctrine] is objectionable on account of its contradictions’ [BS 2.2.10].

It is also illogical to state that, while granting that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa may stand in contradiction with each other over certain either/or issues (*aikāntyādiṣu*) such as the acceptance or rejection of *brahma*, still, insofar as the rejection of *brahma* and so on is never actually *enunciated* in any single *sūtra* in the *Treatise of Twelve Chapters*, that treatise does not therefore stand in contradiction with the *Treatise of Four Chapters* and so can reasonably be said to form a single knowledge system with it. The reason this argument is illogical is because it does not prove that the principal aims [of the two *śāstras*] do not stand in contradiction with each other.

(1) For example, when Jaimini proposes a description of the means of knowing *dharma* in the *sūtra* ‘An investigation of the conditions [of knowing] it’ (MS 1.1.3), the description of these means offered in his first chapter is already in contradiction [with the BS]. To explain: One *pūrvapakṣa sūtra* reads ‘Since the purpose of the Veda lies in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda that do not serve that purpose are purposeless; and with regard to those parts the Veda must be said to be non-eternal [unreliable]’ [MS 1.2.1].²⁴ This means

that scripture in its entirety, if it is to culminate in something purposeful, must of necessity have some action as its purpose. Those portions of scripture not having that purpose – that is, portions whose purpose is not action insofar as they are not concerned with action-sentences (an action-sentence is something like ‘He who desires prosperity should sacrifice a white animal dedicated to the Wind Deity’) – are said to be ‘purposeless’, that is, without any function. [241] Therefore, it is claimed [in the *prima facie* view] that the whole range of sentences that do not have action as their purpose have no validity. On the basis of this *sūtra* thus understood the MS goes on to raise a doubt about the validity of the narrative portions of the Vedas. The *siddhānta sūtra* on this topic reads ‘Since [these narrative portions] form single discursive units with commandments, [they can acquire validity] through the purpose of commending [the actions that actually are the object of commandments]’ [MS 1.2.7]. This *sūtra* means that narrative portions concerned with already-accomplished entities can have a purpose by way of the function of commending commandments [that is, substantiating their credibility, value, etc.], since these portions form discursive units with commandment sentences. On the basis of this *sūtra* thus understood, the validity of such portions of the Vedas is established in the topic ‘On the *arthavāda*’ [MS 1.2.1-18] insofar as these do form single discursive units with commandments. And this position is corroborated in the topic ‘On the *audumbara* post’ [MS 1.2.19-25]) by referring back to the matter raised in ‘On the *arthavāda*’ when it is said, ‘But the fact of such sentences being taken along with other sentences has already been explained [i.e., the narrative passages are to be taken along with other injunctive passages]’ [MS 1.2.22]. Now, if the proposed inquiry into *dharma* were meant to be inclusive of an inquiry into *brahma*, then the proposed description of the means of knowing *dharma* given in the *sūtra* ‘An investigation of the conditions [of knowing] it’ would be inclusive of a description of the means of knowing *brahma*. And if that were in fact the case, then, given the doubt about the purposelessness of non-action matters, this [purposelessness] would have to have been refuted [in the MS] by the following sort of division: that the validity of some would be established by their being considered supplementary to commandments regarding acts like sacrifice that are means to ends, and the validity of others, by their promulgating entities such as *brahma* that are ends in themselves. There are additional substantive contradictions raised elsewhere in the epistemology chapter that would have to have been reconciled.

(2) Likewise, a topic in the eighth chapter [beginning] ‘When there is [apparent] conflict [between commandments], the procedure should be determined by the sacrificial substance, since the act as such bears upon the substance’ [MS 8.1.32-34] is introduced in order to ascertain that the procedure to be followed in the case of the cake offering to the god Indra should be that of the rite of cake offerings to the Fire god, given the identity of sacrificial substances; rather than the procedure of other rites relating to Indra using other substances, given the identity of the deity in question. Here the reasoning approved by Jaimini is that ‘deity’ is a secondary element, since it is merely a verbal referent. Yet this view stands in contradiction with the view of Vyāsa [242]. In Vyāsa’s system, in the topic ‘On the deity’ [BS 1.3.26 ff.], it is maintained that the deities are actually present in the sacrificial space and are to be considered predominant elements since they are consumers of the oblation.

(3) Another example: In a topic in the second chapter, ‘Commandment, however, is an undertaking’ [MS 2.1.5],²⁵ Jaimini has maintained that ritual action produces its end-results by means of a ‘transcendental potency’, *apūrva*. That position is contradicted by Vyāsa’s as expressed in the topic ‘From him [i.e., the Lord, there comes] the fruit [of works]; for [that only] is possible’ [BS 3.2.38]. There he argues that it is [not *apūrva* but] the supreme Lord who bestows the end-results when his grace is gained by ritual action and worship. What we have therefore is a contradiction between the two knowledge systems themselves [and not just between their authors].

(4) There is also a contradiction between them occasioned by the repudiation of *brahma* and renunciation. To explain: There are discourses [in the BS] concerning *brahma*, such as ‘That art Thou’, which make known the identity of *brahma* and the individual soul. Now, by the Mīmāṃsā rule ‘Because it forms a single discursive unit with a commandment’ [MS 1.2.7], whereby a discourse unrelated to action is held to be supplementary to a commandment [of action], these discourses are said to be supplementary to a commandment to perform worship. Acts of worship, for their part, by another Mīmāṃsā interpretive principle (on ‘sprinkling’ [MS 2.1.9-12]), become supplementary to sacrificial rites insofar as they purify a ritual substance, namely, the agent himself who is engaged in the rite. [This is so for the following reason:] An agent pure and simple (*kārṣmātra*) is something common [to both ritual action and] worldly action, since worldly action is possible even if the Self is held to be identical to the body.²⁶ [Nevertheless] the Self referred to as an element to be

purified by worship in those Vedānta [i.e., Upanishadic] passages that are not found in the context of any specific ritual activity, such as ‘One should worship the Self’, must have an existence separate from the body: this is presupposed by the commandment to sacrifice as well as by the Self’s being said to be an enjoyer of heavenly rewards. This Self is thus necessarily connected with ritual acts; and thus, by way of both [the syntactical association of the Self-as-agent with the act to be performed] and the scriptural passage ‘One that is performed with knowledge. . .’ [CU 1.1.10], it makes sense to connect these [acts of worship] with ritual acts.²⁷

It will not do to object that acts of worship of the Self cannot be supplementary to a sacrificial rite because *brahma* [=the Self] is proved to transcend the individual soul in view of the scripture that ascribes to *brahma* qualities such as absolute purity that are unimaginable in the individual soul [243]. For Jaimini established a hard and fast rule that all non-action discourses must be taken as supplementary to commandments, and only by violating this rule in the topic ‘On coherence’ [BS 1.1.4 ff.] could the [passages of the] Vedānta pretend to acquire validity independent of action. And it is, after all, only when this putative validity is established with respect to *brahma* and its qualities – by means of indications of general purport such as [congruence with] an introductory passage (*upakrama*) – that *brahma* can even be proved to transcend the individual soul through qualities such as absolute purity. But according to the view of Jaimini, the mention of such qualities is only supplementary to ritual commandments: the description of them has in fact the purpose of commending the individual soul, and it is this that provides for the coherence of the discourse as a whole. Who would dispute this? We find in various *mantras* and narrative passages of the Veda commendatory descriptions of unimaginable qualities of one entity or another that is connected with the ritual, as in the following: ‘Do not scratch the heaven with your index finger, nor harm the atmosphere with your middle, O origin of the earth’; ‘Let your smoke ascend to the heaven, your flame to the atmosphere; fill the earth with your ash, *svāhā*’; ‘The seasons are devoid of sin’; ‘This universe was water’.²⁸

Moreover, when *brahma* has been repudiated, the means of attaining *brahma*, namely renunciation, has likewise been repudiated. And this is why Mīmāṃsakas commonly hold that renunciation is nothing but a ruse for self-advancement²⁹ on the part of those disqualified from participating in ritual action, blind people, for example,

or cripples. It is therefore incorrect to hold that there is no contradiction between these two knowledge systems.

(5) It is also incorrect to hold that the word *dharma* ultimately expresses the same thing as the word *brahma*. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that the purpose of the *Mahābhārata* sentence you cited earlier – ‘They say Krishna, the great one, is the eternal *dharma*’ – is commendation, just like the sentence ‘Rāma is *dharma* incarnate’. Therefore my inference is not blocked, [244] and yours is indeed ineffectual.

[*pūrvapakṣa*] Now the seventh position. My inference is not blocked for the following reasons: (1) It is possible to avoid the contradiction revealed in the description of the means of knowing [*dharma*] found in the first chapter of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* in the following way: In the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, it is true that the premises of validity and the doubt about the lack of validity of non-action passages (on the grounds that they would be purposeless) would seem to apply equally to discourses concerning *brahma*. But whereas Jaimini enunciated an argument for validity with respect to narrative portions that are supplementary³⁰ to commandments of ritual action – namely, that they have their purposefulness precisely through such supplementation – he hid his intention with regard to the discourses on *brahma*, and did not openly broach the argument for validity [that he really did believe, namely] that these have intrinsic (*svata eva*) validity, irrespective of their supplementing commandments of ritual action, because their object is *brahma*, which in itself is the supreme human goal.

(2) It is possible to avoid the contradiction cited for the topic in the eighth chapter. In the settled view of this topic, ‘When there is conflict. . .’ [MS 8.1.32], the argument is not that the deity is a subsidiary element, because then there would be no difference between a substance’s being a subsidiary element and a deity’s being such. Rather, the fundamental argument (*mūlayukti*) of the passage is indicated by the rest of the *sūtra*, ‘since the act as such bears upon the substance’: The identity in the sacrificial substances is decisive because what we see pertaining to these substances is the ritual act itself, which has the form of the offering of such substances: It is the substance and not the deity that we actually see being offered up.³¹

(3) It is possible to avoid the contradiction in the topic ‘Commandment, however, is an undertaking’ [MS 2.1.5]. Here it is only said that there exists an instrumentality of ritual action. It is not maintained that *apūrva* and *apūrva* alone is the instrument while dismissing the role of the Lord’s grace.

(4) It is possible to avoid the doubts about, among other things, the repudiation of *brahma*. The rule ‘Because it forms a single discursive unit with a commandment’ [MS 1.2.7] is concerned with establishing the authoritativeness only of narrative discourses like ‘The Wind is the swiftest...’ [245] and so on, by their supplementation of commandments; it is not concerned with discourses dealing with *brahma*.

(5) Last, it is unreasonable to assume that the statement in the *Bhārata* has merely the purpose of commendation. According to the *Bhārata*, the word *dharma* expresses merely a means to other-worldly good, and so it can be used equally to refer to *brahma*. The assumption that the accurate use of *dharma* requires additional modifiers such as the fact of being something commanded or performable, so that its primary expressive power should exclude *brahma*, lacks explanatory parsimony, and is thereby vitiated. Therefore, my inference is not blocked, whereas yours is ineffectual.

[*siddhānta*] Now the eighth position. First of all, your resolution of the contradiction [between the MS and] the matter in the first chapter [of the BS] is incorrect. It is ridiculous to assume that Jaimini, after having resolved doubts about the authoritativeness of some discourses not concerned with action, should have ‘hidden his intention’ with respect to other similar discourses [i.e., those of the Upaniṣads], given that the general thesis (*sāmānyapratijñāna*) [regarding authoritative knowledge about *dharma*] and doubt about lack of authoritative knowledge applies equally to both. Jaimini established the authoritativeness with regard to *dharma* of the Veda in all its four parts – commandments, narrative portions, *mantras*, and proper names – and in their specific modalities (*sapprakāram*) [by directly commanding, by commending, and so on], and went on to establish the authoritativeness of Vedic texts remembered (*smṛti*) and of the practices of those learned in the Veda to the degree necessary there [in MS 1]. Now, how are we to believe that the same man proposed an analysis of the means of knowing *dharma*, in common with [in your view] an analysis of the means of knowing *brahma*, and raised certain doubts about the authoritativeness [of some discourses on *dharma*] because of their apparent purposelessness – something common also to those narrative portions of the Vedānta section that are concerned with *brahma* – but only resolved the doubts about the narrative portions that are supplementary to action, and not those related to the narrative portions of the Vedānta that are concerned with *brahma*? Why would anyone who understands the principles of interpretation (*nyāyavid*) place trust in such empty speculation? [246].

Furthermore, the thesis of examining *dharma* and the thesis of examining the means of knowledge about it apply [according to your view] to both ritual action as well as to *brahma* and the worship of *brahma* equally. Now, in the topic ‘On narrative portions’ [MS 1.2.1-18], one of the *sūtras* that state the prima facie view reads ‘Because of the purposelessness [that would be entailed] of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4].³² The target of this *sūtra* is not only those passages that narrate the end-results of commandments for ritual action (such as ‘By means of the final oblation one attains all desires’) but also those passages that narrate the end-results of commandments for worship, since the objection, the ‘purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’, applies equally to both. Thus:

[1] If the narrative of the end-result of the ‘Prajāpati Wisdom’ [CU 8.7.1] – ‘He attains all worlds *and* all desires who understands in accordance with a knowledge of this Self’ – were meant to be taken literally, then the worship of the ‘*brahma* consisting of bliss’ would be pointless, since that is described in scripture as merely for the purpose of attaining all desires (‘He enjoys all desire’ [TU 2.1.1]); the worship of the ‘subtle’ (*dahara*) [CU 8.1.1 ff.] would be equally pointless, since it is described in scripture as merely for the purpose of attaining all worlds (‘Those [worshippers] become able to wander at will through all worlds’).

[2] If by the aforementioned acts of worship one attained not only all worlds and all desires but also liberation, then the ‘Wisdom of the Honey’ [CU 3.1] whose end-result is the attainment of liberation along with pure pleasure of the sort enjoyed by the Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Maruts, and Sādhyas; the ‘Upakosala Wisdom’ [CU 4.10], whose end-result is liberation preceded by the attainment of the three worlds (the Gārhapatya and so on); the ‘Akṣara Wisdom’ [BAU 3.8.7 ff.] and all others whose end-result is liberation pure and simple, without the addition of one or another enjoyment contingent on the attainment of a particular world – all these would be pointless.

[3] Now consider the person authorized to perform worship but who is completely indifferent to the enjoyment of objects and wishes only to attain the bliss of *brahma*. For him the end-result is not the attainment of a particular world or the enjoyments found there – on the contrary, these are held to be merely obstacles to the attainment of the results he really wants. [247] Thus, since the ‘Akṣara Wisdom’ and others are prescribed in scripture as affording the desired results immediately and without obstacle, others such as the ‘Honey Wisdom’ that are not so described would be pointless.

[4] If the end-result of all forms of *brahma* wisdom – whether enhanced by greater or lesser degrees of [acts of] the *dharma* of social orders and life stages; whether endowed with greater or lesser excellences; or unregulated by length of time, that is, whether undertaken at no regulated time or throughout one’s entire life – were unqualified liberation, then those forms of *brahma* wisdom that are described as superior in regard to excellence, act, or time, would be pointless.

[5] If the narrative portions concerning the end-result of wisdom (such as ‘[The man of wisdom] becomes spotless and goes to a highest state of perfection’ [MU 3.1.3]) were meant to be taken literally, then liberation too would be obtained as the end-result of this commandment. If this were so, then two other statements on the attainment of all desires (‘For all desires the new and full moon sacrifice. . .’; ‘For all desires the *jyotiṣṭoma*. . .’) would likewise have to comprise liberation. And thus since one could obtain liberation from performing the new and full moon offerings just once, or the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice just once, then all acts of worship of *brahma* meant to be performed throughout one’s life, along with all [acts of the *dharma*] of social orders and life stages, would become pointless.

Since the *sūtra* on ‘the purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ would have this kind of broad application, a rejoinder that applies equally to all [such passages on both *karma* and *brahma*] would have to have been enunciated in a *sūtra* [by Jaimini]. What we find however is that the *sūtras* offering this rejoinder, MS 1.2.16 and 17 (‘The mention of “all” refers to the fact of the man being entitled [to perform all acts and obtain all their rewards]; The result being accomplished by means of actions, the difference in the results could be due to the magnitude of the actions’), apply only to narrative portions concerning commandments of ritual action. In the case of the first of these two *sūtras*, the word ‘knowledge’ is carried over from the previous *sūtra* (1.2.15, ‘It is praise of knowledge’): We are to understand that in the discourse on the final ladle offering, mention of the ‘complete attainment of desires’ is merely for the purpose of commending the rite, and is not intended literally to be enunciating the end-result, and also because the final ladle offering is a ritual purification of fire [248] and is enjoined independent of any end-result. The ‘complete attainment of desires’ mentioned for the sake of praise is concerned with the question of qualification: Only after the final ladle offering has been made and the sacred fire has been fully ‘accomplished’ does a man become qualified for sacrificial rites with their full range of end-results. The accomplishment of such results is contingent on the performance of the full-ladle offering, and so the complete attainment of results is mentioned as the result of the full-ladle offering, for the purpose of praising it.

One might object that, by reference to the end-results of ritual acts accomplished with fire, the full-ladle offering itself should not be praised as the means for the attainment of all desires, because there are things that in fact are not attained by acts accomplished with fire, such as the ability to fly or the acquisition of heavenly virgins. But the matter is expressed this way because the reference to ‘all’ in the statement about the full-ladle offering is contingent on a contextual

proviso: its scope is limited to the domain of end-results provided for in the command statements of ritual acts. We see such limitation by context or other factor at work in such [everyday] statements as ‘He has eaten all the rice.’

This aspect of commendation, however, cannot be posited in the case of statements that communicate actual end-results like ‘He enjoys all desires’, just as is the case with the narrative of the Evening Session [cf. MS 4.3.17].

The second *sūtra* [MS 1.2.17] obviates the doubt that, insofar as heaven is achieved by the *agnihotra* ritual, all other rites like the [full and new moon] sacrifice, the *soma* sacrifice, and so on are pointless; and it does so by stating that a multiplicity of ritual acts produces a multiplicity of end-results, on the analogy with farming. Now, the doubt raised here applies equally to the section concerning worship, but we do not find that doubt to be obviated in the section containing the system’s settled views. For in the section [on worship] the principle of a multiplicity of end-results in consequence of a multiplicity of ritual acts does not even apply. The *sūtra* expressing the prima facie view, ‘Thus because of the absence of any end-result’ [MS 1.2.3], enunciates that the stated result does not occur, and this would be a cause of its invalidity. This putative invalidity is common to the narrative portion concerning end-results found in the ritual section (such as ‘His face shines who has this wisdom’) [249] and the narrative portion concerning end-results found in the *brahma* section (such as ‘Anyone who knows this will become handsome and famous’) [CU 3.13.8], but it is only with reference to the former that a *sūtra* obviating the doubt is found: ‘There is commendation of wisdom’ [MS 1.2.15]. The wise man’s face is said to shine thus only from his understanding the meaning of the Brāhmaṇa passage on the Gargatrirātra, not, as in the case of a woman’s face, by reason of natural beauty. Thus the wisdom is being commended. But this mode of obviating [the doubt regarding the end-result of worship] cannot apply to the statement ‘Anyone who knows this will become handsome and famous’, since these two states, being handsome and famous, are held to be the actual end-result of attaining the ‘Light Wisdom’ [CU 3.13.7 ff.]. In short, *sūtras* such as ‘Because of the purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4] must inevitably be held to apply equally to narratives about the end-results of the various commandments for worship, yet we find that various *sūtras* on the system’s settled views have been composed that apply only to narratives about the end-results of the commandments for ritual

action. So who would not find it a ridiculous attempt at a way out to claim that in one place Jaimini revealed his rebuttal and in another hid his true intentions?

So [Jaimini] believes that the acts of worship of the Self must be supplementary to ritual acts, and the narratives about their end-results are not to be taken literally, any more than the narrative ‘Not hearing any evil report of oneself’ [regarding the end-result of making one’s ladle of *palāśa* wood, MS 4.3.1] is to be taken literally. It is in view of this that the doubt about the ‘purposeless of other [enjoined actions]’ and the arguments obviating this doubt are not raised in connection with them. And that is why there is the prevailing attitude of the followers of Jaimini that ‘the Vedānta [i.e., the Upaniṣads] is the wasteland of the Veda’, that is, they hold it is without substance insofar as there is nothing therein [relating to action] to deliberate over. And that is why your resolution of the contradiction [of *Uttaramīmāṃsā*] with the matter of the first chapter [of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*] is completely without merit.

The same holds true for your resolution of the contradiction with the topic in the eighth chapter. You argue as follows: Although all that is seen is the oblation, the sacrifice is something meant to conciliate the deity, and it is the deity, once its grace is won, that bestows the end-result, so the deity must be the predominant element; hence, [250] the similarity of deities trumps any similarity of oblations. It is precisely to dispel this doubt that the following *sūtra* is offered: ‘The scriptural reference to the deity is as a subsidiary element’ [MS 8.1.34]. Nor can one respond that this can be construed as referring to a supplementary position [*abhyuccaya*, that is, one that Jaimini himself does not actually hold but only reports]. For in the ninth chapter Jaimini makes the following argument. He offers the *prima facie* view first with this *sūtra*: ‘Or, it is the deity that motivates, since the feeding of a guest is for the sake of a guest’ [MS 9.1.6], which is to say: hospitality consists of paying worship to a guest, and since it is intended to please the guest, the guest must be the predominant element in the act; in the same way, a sacrifice consists of paying worship to a god, and since it is intended to please the deity, the deity must be the predominant element in the act – it is the deity, being thereby pleased, that bestows the end-result. This *prima facie* view Jaimini answers with the following *sūtra*: ‘No, rather, it is the act of sacrifice itself that is predominant, since it is the act that follows from scripture; the scriptural reference to the deity is as a subsidiary element’ [MS 9.1.9], which is to say: the predominant element in a

sacrifice is not the deity, since it is sacrifice itself that, by way of a ‘transcendental potency’, *apūrva*, generates the end-result, not the deity pleased by the oblation. Rather, the deity is referred to as something subordinate to the sacrifice, since it is the reference point for the [offered] substance. After enunciating this settled view Jaimini shows the disanalogy of hospitality to sacrifice in the following *sūtra*: ‘With respect to a guest, it is he who is predominant in [the act of hospitality]; but this is not so in a ritual act, because [in hospitality] it is the pleasing of the guest that is predominant [and this is not the case with a deity in a ritual act]’ [MS 9.1.10], which is to say: in hospitality the pleasing of a guest is required, that is, one is required to act in such a way that the guest is pleased, and so it makes sense that the guest should be predominant there; but in a sacrificial act, no pleasing is required, that is, one is not required to perform the act in such a way that the deity is pleased, and so the deity is not the predominant element in a sacrifice. Hereby Jaimini has refuted the predominance of the deity in the sacrifice unequivocally.

Hereby fails your resolution of the contradiction with the topic ‘Commandment, however, is an undertaking’ [MS 2.1.5] [251]. For it can be ascertained that, having clearly refuted the predominance of the deity, Jaimini too must hold the position adopted by all commentators on the topic ‘Commandment, however...’ namely that *apūrva* alone is the instrument [by which ritual produces its end-results, not the grace of the Lord].

Also incorrect is the resolution of the contradiction of the repudiation of *brahma* and the means of attaining it, namely renunciation. Jaimini holds that the discourses concerning *brahma* communicate the nature of the individual soul, which is the object of acts of worship supplementary to ritual in the form of purifications of the agent [of the sacrifice]. Given this belief, there is no longer any proof at all for the existence of *brahma* [since the discourses on it are now shown to refer to something else], and accordingly it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that both the two [*brahma* and renunciation] are indeed repudiated.

It is for this reason that [Kumārila,] the author of the *Vārttika*, in the topic ‘On narrative portions’ [MS 1.2.1 ff.], after corroborating the view that narrative portions such as ‘Wind is the swiftest...’ are supplementary to commandments, states: ‘Hereby is explained the non-deontic character (*nairākāṅkṣya*) of the Upaniṣads too.’³³ But the fact that, in the topic ‘On grammar’ [MS 1.3.24 ff.], the author of the *Vārttika*, after citing certain discourses on the commandments

and end-results of acts of worship of the supreme Self, asserts that these [Upaniṣads] function as the means of achieving a state of flourishing and final bliss independently [and not supplementary to commandments of sacrificial rites],³⁴ is something he has done entirely as a result of his own anxiety about repudiating *brahma* and renunciation; it is not in accordance with the doctrine of the author of the (Mīmāṃsā) *sūtras*, since we have shown that the *sūtras* of Jaimini and those of Vyāsa stand in clear contradiction with each other.

You also make the argument that, in order to avoid the charge of lack of explanatory parsimony with regard to accurate usage, we must necessarily accept that the word *dharma* is used equally to refer to *brahma* [as well as ritual actions], and that therefore there is no reason to suppose that the statement of the *Bhārata* [where *dharma* is used in reference to Krishna] must have the purpose of commendation [instead of being meant literally]. This can be answered as follows: True enough, there is no reason to *suppose* it is meant as mere commendation – for this is something actually *proved* from the context itself, which after all is a commendation of Krishna. That [context] does not sustain the argument that the word *dharma* expresses simply a means of other-worldly good [and not specifically sacrificial action] [252]. Were that the case, then the word *dharma* would refer equally to individual souls, which are means of other-worldly good insofar as they are agents, and to a host of other things insofar as they are causes – and then in what way would it be praising the Blessed One to say that the word *dharma* refers to him? Therefore we must accept that the word *dharma* signifies simply ritual acts such as sacrifice if we are to preserve the prevailing and natural meaning (*svārasyaprasiddhyartham*) of the passage cited from the *Bhārata*. And it would then indeed be praise of him to say that the Blessed One, having descended to earth in order to preserve *dharma*, is himself *dharma* incarnate.

Or let us accept, for the sake of argument, that the word *dharma* [in the *Bhārata* passage] somehow can refer to *brahma* as well. Even so, the word *dharma* mentioned in the [very first] *sūtra*, on the ‘inquiry into *dharma*’ – just like the word *dharma* in the *sūtra* ‘Jaimini [thinks] for the same reasons that *dharma* [is what brings about the fruits of action]’ [BS 3.2.40] – has to be taken to exclude *brahma*. This is so because the *dharma* proposed as the object of examination is said to be something defined by Vedic commandment (in the *sūtra* ‘*Dharma* is a good defined by Vedic commandment’ [MS 1.1.2]). The word ‘commandment’ (*codanā*) is derived from a verbal root (*cod*) that

means ‘impel’ [*Dhātupāṭha* 10.53] and so it must enunciate a statement that prompts action. Therefore a commandment is a direct source of knowledge about *dharma*, whereas a statement providing information about already-existent entities that is transmitted in connection with this or that commandment can be a source of knowledge about it only insofar as it forms a unified discourse with such a commandment, by way of offering commendation or other [supplementary information about the act in question]. The end-result enunciated in narrative portions (on the Evening Session and the like) is to be taken literally only insofar as these form a unified discourse with a principal commandment, because this end-result is required by the commandment in question. By contrast, the end-result enunciated with respect to acts of worship of the Self, which are only subordinate elements of ritual acts since they are purifications of the agent, cannot be taken literally because that end-result is not required by a commandment. It is precisely with this in mind that Jaimini did not bother to answer criticisms [about such acts of worship] such as that deriving from [the prima facie view expressed in the *sūtra*] ‘Because of the purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]’ [MS 1.2.4].

The blessed Bādarāyaṇa, however, [253] observed that Jaimini believed that *dharma* takes the form of sacrifice, produces an end-result that is only a state of flourishing, something both perishable and non-ultimate, and thereby constitutes the meaning of the entire Veda. And he observed further that Jaimini had no understanding of the fact that *brahma* is proved to exist by the entire Vedānta [the Upaniṣads], whose central idea is communicated by its introductory passages and similar [aspects of discourse] (*upakramādi*); that the end-result of acts of worship of *brahma* was final liberation, the eternal and ultimate human goal; and that ritual action was only contributory to this means. And he thought that, lest the world go completely astray by focusing on Jaimini’s system, he would confer a benefit on the world by composing the knowledge system that starts ‘Now, then, the inquiry into *brahma*.’ Accordingly, there is indeed a very great contradiction between the two knowledge systems of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. Since they cannot form a single knowledge system your inference is blocked, whereas mine is not ineffectual, and this for the following reason: Jaimini proposed as his object of analysis only action such as sacrifice,³⁵ whose end-results are both perishable and non-ultimate; therefore, whatever is other than sacrifice cannot be for him an object of analysis in this system.³⁶ You cannot object, on the

grounds that we do find [in the MS] analysis as to essential nature, physical dimensions, and the like, of things such as the sacrificial post, the oblation fire, milk-pail, and so on that are strictly speaking ‘other than sacrifice’, that *brahma* too, accordingly, could be an object of analysis. For what is meant by the word ‘ritual action’ is the object of an act aimed at an end-result that is perishable and non-ultimate. Nor can you charge that the inferential reason [namely, that *brahma* is included in ‘whatever is other than sacrifice’] is unproved given that *brahma* is in fact connected with the sacrifice, insofar as it is a deity. The deity may be the addressee of the spent oblation, but it is only the word that refers to the deity that is the object of an act – i.e., of the effort made to pronounce the word – and therefore the deity itself is not the actual object of the act.

Thereby is also laid to rest the following doubt [raised by our opponents] [254]: Although the *dharma* that Jaimini aims to analyze is concerned with action, and so cannot in any direct way be connected with *brahma*, it cannot be denied that [Jaimini’s notion of *dharma*] must also be concerned with acts of worship [of the Self], and accordingly it must have a connection with *brahma* since *brahma* is both the end-result and the object of those acts; and therefore by somehow dismissing the contradiction, on the grounds [of its being subsumed under] the common thesis [MS 1.1.1] [the BS] can be said to form a unified system [with the MS]. For we have already stated that the word *dharma* is concerned only with action whose end-result – as an examination of the totality of the *Later Sūtras* (*uttarasūtraajāta*) themselves shows – consists of a state of flourishing, something both perishable and non-ultimate. For there is a Vedic usage of the word *dharma* in this sense of mere action:

Other than *dharma* and *adharma*, other than this, what is done and not done, other than what is both past and future – speak to me of what there is of this sort that you have insight into.

This *mantra* from the *Kaṭhavalī* [KU 2.14] is concerned with three things, agent, end, and means, that are different from the action constituting the means of producing perishable and non-ultimate end-results, the end-results themselves produced by those means, and the actor active with such means. Both sides agree on this [interpretation].³⁷ But in the *sūtra* ‘And there is question and explanation relative to three things only [not to the *pradhāna*]’ [BS 1.4.6], the *mantra* has been explained by our opponents in the following manner to obtain the aforementioned three entities:

'*Dharma*' refers to sacrifice and the like whose end-result is a state of flourishing; 'other than it', i.e., 'a *means* that is different from sacrifice.' '*Adharma*' refers to what is other than *dharma*, i.e., what is achieved by *dharma*, namely a state of flourishing (heaven and the like); 'other than it', i.e., an *end* different from heaven. 'Than this' refers to the agent of the sacrifice who is present to our awareness, that is, the human person who is inclined toward end-results in the sphere of transmigration; 'other than this', i.e., an *agent* different from this person. 'What there is of this sort', the triad of agent and so on, 'that you have insight into.' 'What is done and not done. . . what is both past and future' are qualifications of all three, *dharma*, [*adharma*, and 'this']: 'done and not done', that is, the whole mass of things undertaken but not completed; 'speak of' some triad different from this familiar triad of means, [end, and agent] that is past, present, and future.

Another interpretation of the passage [they offer] is as follows:

'Other than *dharma* and *adharma*' is a question about what is not a *means* of normal good and evil; 'other than this, what is done and not done, [255] other than what is both past and future' is a question about an eternal *end* different from the non-eternal ends that have a past, present, and future. The question about the *agent* is included in the question about the end, since the agent is eternal and already implied by the end.

Now, the first interpretation is flawed because the construction is awkward for the following reasons: interpreting the word *adharma*, which is commonly used in the sense of evil, as the end-result (heaven and so on) of *dharma*; interpreting 'than this', which can be understood as an adjective to 'done and not done', separately as referring to the agent himself; taking 'what is done and not done', which can be understood as the substantive construing with the adjective 'than this', as an adjective referring to all [three], *dharma* and so on; interpreting 'what is both past and future', which can be understood independently because of their construing with the word 'other' that is used separately in the clause, as an adjective referring to all [three], *dharma* and so on.

The second interpretation is flawed because the question about the agent is not really made available: If you agree that the agent is comprised in the second question on the grounds that the agent is (a) eternal and (b) already-implied, an agent different from the agent of the end-results of sacrifice and the like is not made available, since (a) the agent of the end-results of sacrifice is also eternal and so can be included within the comprehensive concept of being other than something past, present, and future; and (b) it is already-implied insofar as it is the entity qualified by heaven and the like, just as the liberated being is qualified by the manifestation of absolute purity and so on.

Thus the opponents' constructions are unacceptable; ignoring them we offer another, correct interpretation: By the first quarter-verse is posited a *means* different from both the one that has end-results that are perishable and non-ultimate but unaffected by any powerful adversity, and from the one that has end-results that are so affected. By the second quarter-verse is posited an *agent* different from agent of sacrifice, which is denounced in another *mantra*: 'These are unsteady boats, these sacrifices, [256] in which is found the eighteen-fold action, and which fools welcome as the ultimate good – only to progress to old age and death forever more' [MU. 1.2.7]. (Here the interpretation of 'what is done and not done' is [as a *bahuvrīhi* compound]: one whose deeds are 'not done', i.e., as good as undone.) By the third quarter-verse is posited an *end* different from such ends as heaven; the two 'ands' construing with 'past' and 'future' are meant to include the present, which has the form of both past and future.

Since the set of three questions is composed eloquently by the three quarter-verses in order, with respect to an instrument, agent, and their end-results such as are different from those made known by. . .³⁸ why do they torture it for the sake of a construction that produces just this meaning?³⁹

Thus, on both sides there is no dispute about the fact that in the *mantra* the word *dharma* is concerned solely with action whose end-result is perishable and non-ultimate.

Furthermore, even though we find this sort of usage [throughout the Vedas and in the MS], it would be a mistake, in view of later idiom (*agrimavyavahāra*), to assume that Jaimini's usage alone is concerned with [ritual action], that no other such concept of *dharma* exists [elsewhere].⁴⁰ For we find, in a *sūtra* of Kaṇāda ('Now, then, we shall explain *dharma*' [VS 1.1.1]), that the word *dharma* is posited as an object of examination, and that the *sūtras* that follow are concerned with *dharma* [as we understand it] if only slightly: For though in the beginning no consideration is paid to the type of performance concerned with sacrifice and the like, in the first section of the sixth chapter consideration is paid to the *dharma* of giving and receiving [257], and in the second section to some extent⁴¹ the *dharma* of the four life-stages is considered synoptically.

Therefore it is proved that the thesis of examining *dharma* is rightly considered not to comprise an examination of *brahma*. Here follows a summary of the two views:⁴²

1. 'For a thing to be *dharma* there must be a relation to a class property, substance, or attribute, and this can pertain equally⁴³ to *brahma*: Acts of worship of *brahma* are undoubtedly *dharma*.
2. 'The thesis of considering *dharma* directly envisions this.⁴⁴ *Brahma* would have to be considered⁴⁵ like heaven or as [some other] end-result of action.'
3. Those who have insisted thusly that the two Mimamsa systems form a single knowledge system must be enlightened so as to remove any such hope.
4. If the thesis of the Prior System, through its various discourses, is supposed to touch on *brahma* the way it is conceived of by you [Viśiṣṭādvaitins] as an object of its inquiry,⁴⁶ then there must be such inquiries, and why are they not present? Surely, at all events, any contradiction [in the MS with *brahma*] would have to have been removed.
5. The word 'command' contained in the definitional *sūtra* [MS 1.1.2, *codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*] means an 'injunction' prompting action. It necessarily implies⁴⁷ that discourse not concerned with action is purposeless – implies, that is, the *prima facie* view⁴⁸ of the interpretive principle of 'narrative portions.'
6. The purposelessness of narrative portions is obviated by their being held to be supplementary to commandments. Does that commandment pertain to the discourses of [Upanishadic] scripture? Surely even in your eyes that is equally present in them.
7. If it does not pertain to these [scriptural discourses],⁴⁹ then Jaimini would have had to compose an explicit *sūtra* to the effect that they are ends in themselves. On what grounds could one assume that [although he did not] such must have been his 'hidden intention'? [258] Only a dimwit would do so.
8. How far are we asked to believe that this hidden intention of the great seer extends? Such arguments as those based on 'The purposelessness of other [enjoined actions]' [MS 1.2.4] and on the end-results of commandments⁵⁰ should apply equally to your [Upanishadic texts as well]. Or why, when the definition [of *dharma*] was being set out [by Jaimini in MS 1] to establish the entire and perfect⁵¹ source of knowledge of *dharma* that applied equally to *smṛti* and custom⁵² – why didn't⁵³ the Vedānta portion similarly follow the way of *smṛti*?⁵⁴
9. Who would put any trust in your boast that the two form the work of a single system...⁵⁵

10. In the eighth and ninth chapters Jaimini says that the deity is a subordinate property of the sacrifice, whereas Bādarāyaṇa says it is predominant in itself. What resolution of this conflict can present itself here?⁵⁶
11. And no resolution is possible for the disagreement that exists between the one who holds that *apūrva* alone is the instrument of the sacrifice, and the other, the Lord's grace.
12. Therefore, in the Prior System, the *dharma* under analysis is the object of a person's willed action (*kāmikārya*) and has end-results that are perishable and determinate. And with respect to this *dharma* the sage Jaimini holds that the Veda in its entirety is the source of valid knowledge. The Blessed One of the Lotus Eyes himself composed [new] *sūtras* for the knowledge of *brahma*, in order to make known to those devoted solely to ritual action that the view of their teacher was detrimental (*ahitam*).
13. Therefore, given that contradiction between the two systems – with respect to primary meanings and end-results – ever rears its head, even the rumor that they form a single knowledge system can gain no standing in the thoughts of the learned.

NOTES

¹ I am grateful to Ethan Kroll and Samuel Wright (Chicago) for their suggestions, and especially to Lawrence McCrea (Harvard) for his careful critique of an earlier version of the translation.

² The traditional number of his texts is the sacral 108. The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* lists 62. The Srimad Appayya Deekshitendra Granthavali Prakashan Samiti, Hyderabad, which has been issuing volumes intermittently since 1971, is planning to publish what I count as 41 texts in 15 volumes.

³ Gerow (2001: i).

⁴ A new edition – and in the case of the *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, the editio princeps (on the basis of a manuscript held by the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, one of only two, it seems, that exist) – was published by the Samiti in 2001.

⁵ We are only beginning to understand the innovations of late precolonial Sanskrit scholarship. For a sympathetic account of Appayya's literary science, see Bronner (2002, 2003).

⁶ See for example Clooney (1993).

⁷ *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 21. The translation is that of Thibaut slightly modified, p. 5 (italics added); he gives 'earlier' for *pūrva*, but I find no suggestion in the original of temporal antecedence; Rāmānuja seems to have in mind, rather, an almost spatial relationship between two parts of a single text.

⁸ Vedāntadeśika remarks on this: 'Their being called *saṃhita* implies that "unified system" means not only that they constitute a single knowledge-discipline (*vidyāsthāna*) but that they constitute a single text (*prabandha*)' (*Tattvaṭīkā*, p. 39).

⁹ Trans. Thibaut (emended). Appayya has the Viśiṣṭādvaita *siddhāntin* cite precisely this passage of the *Śrībhāṣya* to clinch the argument for system unity (*Caturma-*

tasārasaṅgraha Nayamayūkamālikā, p. 122). *The siddhāntin* also notes that in the traditional list of fourteen *vidyāsthānas*, the term ‘mīmāṃsā’ must comprise both *pūrva* and *uttara*, since otherwise the number would have been fifteen (p. 123).

¹⁰ See *Śrutaprakāśikā* (in *Śrībhāṣya*) pp. 24 ff.

¹¹ *na vyaṃ dharmabrahmavicārarūpayoḥ śāstrayor atyantabhedavādināḥ kiṃ tv ekatvavādināḥ*, and he goes on to say, of the text stretching from the first *sūtra* of the MS to the last of the BS, *etāvaparyantam ekam eva śāstram* (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śrīkaṇṭhaśivācārya, p. 49).

¹² *tasmād dharmavicārasāstreṇa brahmavicārasya siddhyabhāvāt tadartham idaṃ śāstram ārambhanīyam* (*Maṇḍīpikā* on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śrīkaṇṭhaśivācārya, p. 27).

¹³ See Assmann (1997). The case of the early Buddhists is discussed in Pollock (2004).

¹⁴ *vedamūlatvaṃ punas te tulyakakṣamūlākṣamayaiva lajjayā ca mātāpitṛdveṣiduṣṭaputṛvan nābhyupagacchanti* (*Tantravārttika*, p. 113.21; cf. p. 81.17 ff.) Kumāriḥ’s text engaged the energies of commentators for much of the following millennium; the last great contributors to this conversation, the seventeenth-century Varanasi scholars Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, and Khaṇḍadeva, are discussed in my forthcoming edition of the *Bhāṭṭadinakara*.

¹⁵ On *dharmā* see my 1990 article, on *smṛti*, 1997; an essay on *puruṣārtha* is planned.

¹⁶ Appayya’s work was published only once, from Srirangam in 1912, on the basis of two palm leaf manuscripts in private collections and ‘Mss. at the Mysore Government Oriental Manuscripts Library’ (p. 9). In addition to this printed edition, I have been able to consult two manuscripts of the work, one from the Adyar Library and Research Centre (referred to here as ‘Adyar’; this appears to be a transcript of one of the manuscripts originally used for the edition, since they share some errors) and one from the British Library (referred to as BL). It has proven impossible, however, to get access to any of the more than a dozen other manuscripts that exist and that undoubtedly would help clarify lingering uncertainties in the constitution of the text. A number of the arguments that are set forth at great length in the *Vādanakṣatramālā* are briefly adumbrated in *Nayamayūkamālikā* (*Āturmatasārasaṅgraha*, pp. 120 ff.), as well as in Appayya’s commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha’s *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, the *Maṇḍīpikā* (see especially pp. 48 ff.) and these occasionally shed light on the present text.

¹⁷ Brackets contain translator’s additions; parenthesis, by contrast, indicate material contained in the text but subordinated typographically in the interests of clarity.

¹⁸ *Śloka-vārttika Codanāsūtra*, 13–14. Only vs. 14 is actually cited by Appayya; I add the preceding vs. for obvious contextual reasons.

¹⁹ Or perhaps the thesis of just the former, or less likely, of just the latter.

²⁰ The translation of Thibaut is generally followed here and throughout.

²¹ The text reads *dharmāḥ*, and omits the *na* at the beginning of the citation.

²² Read *tadīyasya* for the *madīyasya* of the printed edition (so BL, and, it seems, Adyar; see below, *tadīyasiddhāntasya*).

²³ In the *Maṇḍīpikā* (p. 49) a different argument based on this *sūtra* is offered: ‘Although in such *sūtras* Jaimini is presented as the *pūrvapakṣin*, the very fact that Jaimini did not include these *prima facie* views in the *śāstra* devoted to the analysis of *dharmā* shows that it makes perfectly good sense to hold that the *śāstra* devoted to the analysis of *brahma* was composed as part of a single knowledge system with the other.’ This is essentially the same as the view advanced below, ‘even if contradiction. . .’ (the fifth position).

²⁴ Here as occasionally elsewhere the translation of Jha is followed.

²⁵ Understood traditionally to mean ‘*apūrva* exists, however, [given that] action [is enjoined].’

²⁶ *dehātmabhāvenāpi* [*laukikakriyopappateḥ*]; Adyar, *dehātmabhāvenārtham api* (corrupt); BL unclear, but apparently: *dehātmabhāve 'pi*. The passage is obscure to me. Presumably the *upāsana* produces a *saṃskāra* in the *ātman* without perceptibly changing it, just as the *prokṣaṇa* does for the rice. The Mīmāṃsā *nyāya* of *prokṣaṇa* is usually invoked to identify an *apūrvavidhi* (an act we would never do except for the fact a Vedic injunction tells us to), which does not seem relevant here.

²⁷ I owe my understanding of this complex passage to discussions with L. McCrea. Upanishadic passages are generally given in the translation of Olivelle.

²⁸ The citations (not always exact) are, respectively, TS1.3.5.1; KS 3.3. and 6.6.; AB 4.25; TA 10.22.1.

²⁹ *kathamcid gatyupanyāsaḥ*. Or perhaps, less cynically, 'a suggested course of action.'

³⁰ Reading *kriyāvidhiśeṣa-* (as two lines below) for *kriyāviśeṣa-* of the printed text and for Adyar's *kriyāvidhiviśeṣa-* (BL has a large lacuna here). The printed text would give: 'narrative portions belonging to particular ritual acts.'

³¹ And this, implicitly, has no bearing on the actual presence of the deity at the sacrifice (I read *tadupāsyatvāt* for *tadupākhyatvāt*).

³² If texts that do not enjoin actions but simply describe existent things, such as results, were to remain true and authoritative about matters of *dharma*, then texts that describe such things as attaining all desires by a single rite would render all other rites meaningless. Such texts are therefore not to be taken literally but must be interpreted as subservient to other ritual action.

³³ Presumably referring to *Tantravārttika* on MS 1.2.7 (especially p. 13 ff.), though I do not find mention of the Upaniṣads here nor this exact quote.

³⁴ Presumably referring to *Tantravārttika*, p. 227.

³⁵ We should probably read with Adyar *yāgādīkarmaiva* (for the printed *yāgādīkam eva*).

³⁶ In what follows the printed text shows a lacuna through haplography; Adyar (folio 129) has the correct reading: *na ca karmānyate 'pi... iti tadvad brahmaṇo 'pi kiṃ na syād iti vācyam. kṣayaṣṇusātiśayaphalodeśyakānuṣṭhāne viśayasya* [read: *-anuṣṭhānaviśayasya*] *karmaśabdena vivakṣitatvāt. na ca brahmaṇo 'pi devatātvena...*

³⁷ It is not clear to whom the 'both sides' refers, since Mīmāṃsā is unlikely to be one of them.

³⁸ The printed ed. and BL (*anyatra dharmam anumā*) as well as Adyar (*anyatra dharmam anumānā*) all seem to be corrupt, but a reasonable conjecture eludes me.

³⁹ This is a *saṃgrahaśloka* of Appayya.

⁴⁰ Ed. *bhrāntikṛtā kalpayitum*. BL: *bhrāntikṛtam api kalpayitum*; Adyar: [*prayogādarśane...*] *bhrāntikṛtam avikalpayitum*. I am uncertain whether I have grasped the true meaning of the sentence.

⁴¹ Ed. *kiyān api cintitaḥ saṃgrahataḥ*; BL: *kiyān saṃgrhītaḥ*; Adyar: *kriyāt saṃgrhītaḥ* (corrupt).

⁴² The verses show a number of text-critical problems, and their real meaning is not always clear to me.

⁴³ I read *samam eva* with BL, Adyar (Ed. *samavetam*).

⁴⁴ BL: *tatsākṣātkṛtigocaraṃ... -pratijñānam*; Ed., Adyar: *tatsākṣādgocared... -pratijñānam* (Adyar *pratikriyā*).

⁴⁵ Ed. *vicāryaḥ*; BL, Adyar: *vicārya* [Adyar omits *vā*, hypometric]. Conjecture *vicāryam* (cf. vs. 4b)?

⁴⁶ In place of the printed text (which gives *tat tad vaco hi*) I read with Adyar *tattadvacobhi[h]*.

⁴⁷ Literally, 'does not abandon' (*nojhati*).

⁴⁸ Adyar *pūrvapakṣiṇam* (for *pūrvapakṣatām*).

⁴⁹ BL *ca tāni* (for *tato hi*).

- ⁵⁰ Adyar and BL *vidhiphaloktyādi* (for *viphalatoktyādi*).
⁵¹ Adyar and BL *anagham* (for *-manasam*).
⁵² Adyar and BL *smṛtyācārādivad vā* (Ed. *smṛtyācārādi tadvat*).
⁵³ Adyar and BL *na* (for *nu*).
⁵⁴ Ed. and Adyar *smṛtipatham* (BL *smṛtiphalam*). I am unsure of *pādas* bcd here.
⁵⁵ *Pādas* ab are dark to me: ‘When the matter cannot be hidden, [as?] when the syllable OM itself is clearly mispronounced’?
⁵⁶ The Adyar ms. has a lacuna here to the end of the chapter.

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APPAYYADIKṢITĀNĀM PŪRVOTTARAMĪMĀMSĀVĀDA-
NAKṢATRAMĀLĀNTARBHĀVYAIKĀŚĀSTRYANIRĀKARAṆAVĀDAḤ*

[235] evaṃ sakalaśabdavācyatvena siddhaṃ brahma alaukikaśreyaḥsā-
dhanatvapravṛttinimittakakarmavācidharmaśabdavācyam api bha-
vati; sāḥśād api uktapravṛttinimittasaṃbandhena tad vācyam
bhavitum arhati 'śreyaḥsādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyate /
tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmān nendriyagocāraḥ' iti vedāva-
gamyāśreyaḥsādhanatākatvapravṛttinimittakatayā abhyupagatasya
dharmaśabdasya karmavat jātiguṇadravyāṇy api artha iti
mīmāṃsakair uktatvāt; tena 'athāto dharmajijñāsā' iti sūtragatadhar-
maśabdagṛhitatayā brahmaṇo 'pi jaiminīyadharmavicārapratijñā-
viśayatvam asti na vā iti vicārārthaṃ kathāntaraṃ prastūyate –

tadastitvavādināṃ pareṣāṃ idam anumānam – brahma svarūpa-
pramāṇasādhanaḥ saha jaiminīyavicārapratijñāviśayaḥ, alau-
kikaśreyaḥsādhanatvāt, karmavat; brahmaṇo 'pi nakṣatreṣṭyādiṣu
devatātvenānvayāt jaiminīye yāgeṣu devatāprādhānyatadabhāva-
vicāre devatāsāmānyātmanā viśayatvam asti, devatānāṃ karmā-
dhikārānadhikāravacāre ca tadātmanā viśayatvam astīti si [236]
ddhasādhanaḥ svarūpapramāṇasādhanaḥ saha – iti
viśeṣaṇam – iti prathamā kakṣyā.

atha dvitīyā

brahmaṇo jaiminīyadharmavicārapratijñāviśayatāyām agre tad-
vicāreṇa bhāvyam, na tv asau tatra dṛśyate; na ca tam api cikīrṣato
maharṣeḥ vighnaḥ kaścit utprekṣitum śakyate; nāpi vismaraṇam, yo
hi dvādaśalakṣaṇyāṃ svarūpapramāṇasādhanaḥ saha kar-
majātaṃ nirṇīya tatrāsūtritān kāṃścit tadupayuktān nyāyān ālakṣya
tatsaṃgrahārthaṃ dvādaśalakṣaṇīśeṣaṃ saṃkārṣaṇakāṇḍam akārṣīt,
tasya maharṣeḥ brahmavicāre vighnaṃ vismaraṇam vā katham ut-

* In preparing the Romanized Sanskrit text the printing conventions of the original Vani Vilas edition have been followed.

prekṣāmahe; na ca karmavicāropayuktanyāyair eva brahmaṇo 'pi svarūpapramāṇasādhanaḥpralambanirṇayaḥ sidhyatīty abhipretya prthak tadvicāro na kṛta iti śakyam vaktum, karmaparavākyaṅrthanirṇayakanyāyebhyo vilakṣaṇānām eva brahmaparavākyaṅrthanirṇayakanyāyānām caturlakṣaṇyām grathanadarśanāt; na ca dvādaśalakṣaṇīcaturlakṣaṇyoḥ aikaśāstryābhyupagamena brahmavicārapratijñānirvāhaḥ kalpayitum śakyah, bhinnavakṛkayoḥ dharmabrahmavicārapratijñopakramayoḥ parasparavilakṣaṇasādhyāsādhyārthanirṇayakanyāyagrathanapravṛttayoḥ tayor aikaśāstryakalpane pramāṇā [237] bhāvāt; ato bādhitam idam anumānam iti – brahma noktaṃ sādhyavat, karmānyatvāt ghaṭavat – iti.

atha tṛtīyā kakṣyā

na bādhitam madanumānam, aikaśāstryakalpanena pratijñānirvāhopapatteḥ; na ca tatkālpakābhāvaḥ, vedarūpaikagranthavyākhyātvasya tatkālpakatvāt; na ca vakṛbhedah tatkālpānābādhaḥ, vakṛbhedo 'pi vyākaraṇarūpaikaprabandhavyākhyānavena vāmanajayādityavṛttayoḥ aikaśāstryadarśanāt; nāpi dharmabrahmavicārapratijñopakramau tadbādhaḥ, dharmasābdena karmabrahmasādhāraṇena dvādaśalakṣaṇīcaturlakṣaṇīsādhāraṇapratijñāyām vṛttāyām karmavicārānantaram 'athāto brahmajijñāsā' ity asya 'athātaḥ śeṣalakṣaṇam' itivat avāntarapratijñāparatvopapatteḥ; na ca parasparavilakṣaṇanyāyagrathanam tadbādhaḥ, nirṇeyārthānusāreṇa nyāyavilakṣaṇyopapatteḥ; dvādaśalakṣaṇyām api karmabhedasēṣasēṣibhāvādinirṇeyārthānusāreṇa vilakṣaṇanyāyagrathanadarśanāt; ato na bādhitam madanumānam, tvadanumānam tu aprayojakam – iti.

atha ca caturthī kakṣyā

nyāyānām iha vilakṣaṇyām bhedaḥmātram na vivakṣitam, kiṃ tu [238] virodhaḥ; prasiddho hi virodhaḥ; caturlakṣaṇyām jaiminimatasya prāyaḥ pūrvapakṣikaraṇadarśanāt; na hi parasparaviruddhamatadvayāvalambanena dvābhyām pravartitam śāstradvayam tābhyām aikamatyena ekaśāstratayā kṛtam iti kalpayitum śakyam; dharmasābdaś ca brahmapratikoṭitayā yāgādikarmaparavāna 'phalam ata upapatteḥ' ity adhikaraṇe 'dharme jaiminir ata eva' iti sūtre prayuktaḥ; āpastambena ca maharṣiṇā 'dharmādharmau carata āvām svaḥ iti na devagandharvā na pitara ity ācakṣate ayam dharmo 'yam dharmā ity yat tv āryāḥ kriyamāṇam praśamsanti sa dharmah yad

garhante so 'dharmah' iti anuṣṭheyayāgādāv eva dharmāśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ; atas tadanusāreṇa dharmajijñāsāsūtragatasyāpi tasya yāgādyanuṣṭheyaparativam vācyam iti dharmabrahmajijñāsāsūtrayoḥ sādharmaṇāvāntarapatijñāparativavibhāgakalpanam api na yuktaḥ; tasmāt bādhitam tvadanumānam, madanumānam ca nāprayojakam, yat yena rūpeṇa nānuṣṭheyam tasya tena rūpeṇa anuṣṭheyapara-dharmaśabdagrāhyatvayogāt iti

atha pañcamī

asiddho 'yam jaiminīyavaiyāsikamatayoḥ virodhaḥ, caturlakṣanyām kvacid api jaiminīyamatasya pūrvapakṣikaraṇābhāvāt; yat tu [239] puruṣārthādhikaraṇe 'śeṣatvāt puruṣārthavādo yathānyeṣv iti jaiminiḥ' iti brahmāpalāpaparam pūrvapakṣasūtram, na tat jaiminīyabhimatasya pakṣasya anuvādakam, kiṃ tu madīyasyābhuyuccayavādasya; ata eva 'param jaiminir mukhyatvāt' ityādisūtreṣu brahmābhyupagamenaiva pravṛttasya pakṣasya jaiminīyatenānuvādaḥ; evam 'parāmarśam jaiminir acodanā cāpavadati hi' iti sūtram samnyāsāpalāpasya jaiminīnā abhyuccayavādatvena upanyastasyaivānuvādakam, na tu tadīyasiddhāntasya; ata eva 'tadbhūtasya tu nātadbhāvo jaiminer api niyamādrūpābhāvebhyaḥ' iti sūtre samnyastavataḥ samnyāsāt pracyutiḥ jaiminer api na sammatā ity uktam; evam anyatrāpi tatra tatra virodhāparihāra unneyaḥ; dharmāśabdasya anuṣṭheyāsādhāraṇyam api asiddham, 'ye ca vedavido viprā ye cādhyātmavido janāḥ / te vadanti mahātmānam kṛṣṇam dharmam sanātanam' iti mahābhārate bhagavatsādhāraṇyokteḥ; ato virodhābhāvāt kathamcit virodhasadbhāve 'pi brahmānabhyupagamādeḥ dvādaśalakṣanyām asūtritatvāt dharmāśabdāsādhāraṇyāc ca kartṛbhede 'pi aikāśāstryāṅgikāre na kācit anupapattiḥ; tvadanumānam tu aprayojakam eva, ananuṣṭheyasyāpi dharmāśabdagrāhitatvena jaiminīyavicārapratijñāviśayatvopapatteḥ iti.

[240] *atha ṣaṣṭhī kakṣyā*

yad uktaḥ virodho nāstīti, tad asiddham, brahmasamnyāsābhyupagamānabhyupagamābhyām virodhasyāpratyākhyeyatvāt, yat tu jaimineḥ tadubhayābhyupagamapradarśakam sūtram, tat tadabhyupagama eva tasya siddhānta ity asya jñāpakam iti na avadhārayitum śakyam, 'vipratīsedhāc cāsamañjasam' iti sāmkyādhikaranoktanyāyena jaiminimatasya parasparaviruddhatayā anupāde-

yatvodghāṭanaparātvena anyathāsiddheḥ; yac coktaṃ brahmāna-
 bhyupagamataadabhyupagamaikāntyādiṣu jaiminibādarāyaṇayoḥ
 virodhasadbhāve 'pi brahmānabhyupagamādeḥ dvādaśala-
 kṣaṇyāṃ asūtritatvāt aviruddhāyās tasyāḥ caturlakṣaṇyā saha aika-
 śāstryam upapadyata iti, tad apy ayuktam, aviruddhārthatvāsiddheḥ;
 tathā hi 'tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ' iti dharmapramāṇanirūpaṇaṃ prati-
 jñāya prathamādhyāyena yat tatra pramāṇanirūpaṇaṃ kṛtam, tat
 tāvad viruddham; tatra hi 'āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam
 atadarthānāṃ tasmād anityam ucyate' iti sūtreṇa – āmnāyasya
 kṛtsnasyāpi prayojanaparyavasānāya kriyārthatvāvaśyambhāvāt
 atadarthānāṃ 'vāyavyaṃ śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ' ityadi-
 kriyāvākyaṇapekṣitatayā kriyārthatvarahitānāṃ ānarthakyam niṣpra-
 yojana [241] tvam, tasmāt akriyārthavākyaḥ apamāṇam ucyate – ity
 etadarthakena vedeṣv arthavādānāṃ apramāṇyam āśaṅkya, 'vidhinā
 tv ekavākyaṭvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ' iti sūtreṇa – siddh-
 rthavādānāṃ vidhivākyaena ekavākyaṭvāt vidhīnāṃ stutirūpeṇārthe-
 na saprayojanāḥ syuḥ– ity etadarthakena teṣāṃ vidhyekavākyaṭvāyā
 pramāṇyam upapāditaṃ arthavādādādhikaraṇe; audumbarādādhikaraṇe
 'pi – 'uktaṃ tu vākyaśeṣatvam' iti arthavādādādhikaraṇoktārtha-
 smāraṇena tad dṛḍhikṛtam; dharmavicārapratijñāyā brahma-
 vicārasādhāraṇe hi 'tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ' iti dharmapramāṇani-
 rūpaṇapratijñāpi brahmānabhyupagamānirūpaṇasādhāraṇī syāt; tathā sati
 akriyārthānāṃ ānarthakyaśaṅkāyāṃ keṣāṃcid akriyārthānāṃ
 phalāsāadhanayāgādividhiśeṣatvena keṣāṃcit svataḥphalabhūta-
 brahmapratipādakatvena ca pramāṇyam upapadyata iti vibhajya
 pariharaṇīyam; evam anyatrāpi pramāṇādhyāyārthavirodho 'nu-
 samdheyāḥ; tathā 'vipratipattau haviṣā niyamyeta karmaṇas
 tadupākhyatvāt' ity āṣṭamikādādhikaraṇe aindrapuroḍāśeṣu haviṣā-
 ānyāt āgneyavidhyantaḥ, na tu devatāsāmānyāt aindravidhyanta
 iti nirṇayārthe pravṛtte – devatāyāḥ śabdena uddeśyamātrarūpatvena
 guṇatvāt iti yuktiḥ jaiminyabhimatā; tad api mataṃ vaiyā [242] sik-
 amataviruddham – vaiyāsikatantre devatādādhikaraṇe devatānāṃ
 yāgadeśe samnidhānasya havirbhoktṛtvena prādhānyasya ca sam-
 arthitatvāt; tathā 'codanā punar ārambhāḥ' iti dvaitīyikādādhikaraṇe
 karmaṇāṃ apūrvadvārā phalāsāadhanatvaṃ jaimininā samarthitam,
 tad api 'phalam ata upapatteḥ' iti vaiyāsikādādhikaraṇena viruddham;
 tatra karmopāsanaprasāditasya paramēśvarasya phalapradatvasa-
 marthanāt; tasmāt śāstrayor eva virodho 'sti; brah-
 masamnyāsāpalāpaprayukto 'pi tayor asti virodhaḥ; tathā hi – 'tat
 tvam asi' ityādibrahmaviṣayāṇi vākyaṇi jīvaṃ brahma bodhayantīti
 'vidhinā tv ekavākyaṭvāt' – iti akriyārthānāṃ vidhiśeṣatvoktyā teṣāṃ

upāsanāvidhiśeṣatvam uktaṃ bhavati; tadupāsanāś ca kratūpayuk-
takarṣṇrūpadravyasaṃskāratvāt prokṣaṇādinyāyena kratuśeṣatām
bhajante; karṣṇmātrasya laukikakriyāsādhāraṇye 'pi dehāt-
mabhāvenāpi laukikakriyopapatteḥ; 'ātmānam upāsīta' ityādiṣu
anārabhyādhīteṣu vedānteṣu upāsanāsaṃskāryatvenānūditasya
ātmanaḥ svargādibhokṣyāgādividhyākṣiptadehātiriktātmarūpatvena
avyabharitakratusaṃbandhitayā taddvārā vākyapramāṇena 'yad
eva vidyayā karoti' iti śrutipramāṇena ca tāsāṃ kratusaṃbandho-
papatteḥ; na ca apahatapāpmatvādijīvāsaṃ [243] bhāvitag-
uṇāmnānena brahmaṇo jīvād adhikatasiddheḥ tadupāsanānam na
kratuśeṣatvaprasaktir iti vācyam, akriyārthānāṃ vidhiśeṣatvaniyam-
asya jaiminyabhimatasya samanvayādhikāraṇena bhaṅgaṃ kṛtvā
vedāntānāṃ svātantryeṇa upakramādītātparyaliṅgena ca brah-
matadguṇeṣu prāmāṇye vyavasthāpīte khalu apaha-
tapāpmatvādiguṇaiḥ jīvādhikāṃ brahma sidhyet, jaiminidṛṣṭyā teṣāṃ
vidhiśeṣatve tathābhūtaguṇavarṇanasya jīva eva stutyarthat-
venānvayam ko vārayet; dṛṣyate hi kratvanvayitattadvast-
vasaṃbhāvitaguṇavarṇanaṃ tattanmantrārthavādeṣu – yathā 'divam
agreṇa mā lekhīr antarikṣaṃ madhyena mā himsiḥ pṛthivyā
saṃbhava', 'dyāṃ te dhūmo gacchatu antarikṣaṃ arcīḥ pṛthivīm
bhasmanā pṛṇasva svāhā', 'apahatapāpmāno vā ṛtavaḥ', 'āpo vā idaṃ
sarvam' ityādiṣu; evaṃ brahmāpalāpe sati tatprāptyupāyāḥ saṃnyāso
'pi apalapito bhavati; ata eva karmānadhikāriṇāṃ andhap-
aṅgvādīnāṃ kathāṃcit gatyupanyāsaḥ saṃnyāsa iti mīmāṃsaka-
pravādaḥ; tasmāt śāstrayor virodho nāstīti ayuktam; dharmasābdasya
brahmasādhāraṇyavacanam api ayuktam, 'te vadanti mahātmānaṃ
kṛṣṇaṃ dharmāṃ sanātanaṃ' iti bhāratavacanasya 'dharmo vīgra-
hāvān rāmaḥ' itivat stutyarthatvenāpi upapatteḥ; tasmāt mada-
numānaṃ na bādhi [244] tam, tvadanumānaṃ tu aprayojakam iti.

atha saptamī

na tāvat bādhitam madanumānam, pūrvatantre prāmāṇyapratijñāyā
akriyārthānāṃ ānarthakyaenāprāmāṇyaśānkāyāś ca brahmapa-
ravākyasādhāraṇye 'pi, kriyāviśeṣārthavādeṣu vidhiśeṣatvena sārtha-
katayā prāmāṇyaprakāram uktvā, brahmaparavākyeṣu svataḥ
puruṣārthabrahmaviśayatayā kriyāvidhiśeṣatvam anapekṣya svata
eva prāmāṇyam iti tatprāmāṇyaprakāram anudghāṭya, tadviśaye
gūḍhābhisaṃdhir āsīt jaiminir iti prathamādhyāyodghāṭitavirodha-
parihārasaṃbhavāt; 'vipratipattau haviṣā niyamyeta' ity
āṣṭamikādhikāraṇasiddhānte devatāyā guṇatvam na yuktiḥ, dravya-

syāpi guṇatvāviśeṣāt; kiṃ tu ‘karmaṇas tadupākhyatvāt’ iti sūtraśeṣoktā – havistyāgarūpasya yāgakarmaṇo haviḥṣu upalabhyamānatvāt haviḥsāmānyam baliyaḥ, havir hi tyajamānam upalabhyate, na devateti eṣaiva mūlayuktiḥ – ity āṣṭamikādhi-karaṇavirodhparihāralābhāt; ‘codanā punar ārambhaḥ’ ity adhikaraṇe karmaṇam dvārasadbhāvamātram uktam, na tv īśvara-prasādapratyākhyānena apūrvam eva dvāram iti samarthitam iti tadvirodhparihāralābhāt; ‘vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt’ ity atra vāyukṣe [245] piṣṭhādivākyānām eva vidhiśeṣatvena prāmāṇyam uktam, na brahmaparavākyānām iti; ata eva brahmāpalāpādisāṅkāparihāralābhāt bhāratavacanānusāreṇa dharmasābdasya alaukikaśreyaḥsādhanamātravācitayā brahmasādhāraṇyasambhave tatpravr̥ttinimitte vihitatvānuṣṭheyatvādiviśeṣānupraveśena brahmavyāvṛt-tasāktikalpanasya gauravaparāhatatayā bhāratavacanasyastut-yarthatvakalpanānupapatteḥ; tasmāt na bādhitam madanumānam, tvadanumānam tu aprayojakam eveti.

athāṣṭamī kakṣyā

prathamādhyāyārthavirodhasamādhānam tāvat ayuktam, ‘sāmānyapratijñānāprāmāṇyaśāṅkayoḥ sādharāṇye, keṣucid akriyārtheṣu aprāmāṇyaśāṅkāṃ parihṛtya keṣucit gūḍhābhisaṃdhir āsīt iti kalpanasyāpahāsyatvāt; yaḥ khalu vidhyarthavādamantranāmādhyētmakavedasya dharmaprāmāṇyam saprakāram upapādyā smṛtyācārayor api tatra sambhavat prāmāṇyam upapādayāmāsa, sa katham jaiminiḥ brahmapramāṇavicārasādhāraṇyena dharmapramāṇavicāram pratijñāya brahmaparavedāntabhāgarūpārthavādasādhāraṇyena ānarthakyād aprāmāṇyaśāṅkāṃ udbhāvya kriyāśeṣārthavādamātre parihāram āha, na tu brahmaviśayavedāntarūpārthavādeṣu – iti katham idam asāram utprekṣaṇam nyāyavidāḥ [246] śraddadhīran; kiṃ ca dharmavicārapratijñāyās tatpramāṇa-vicārapratijñāyās ca karmabrahmatadupāsanādisādhāraṇye ‘anyānarthakyāt’ iti arthavādādhikaraṇapūrvapakṣasūtrasya ‘pūrṇahutyā sarvān kāmān avāpnoti’ ity ādikarmavidhiphalārthavādavat upāsanāvidhiphalārthavādā api viśayā bhaveyuh, tulyam hi teṣv api anyānarthakyacodyam – yadi ‘sarvāṃś ca lokān āpnoti sarvāṃś ca kāmān yas tam ātmānam anuvidya vijānāti’ iti prajāpatividyaḥ phalārthavādo ‘pi vivakṣitārthaḥ syāt, tarhi ‘so’ śnute sarvān kāmān’ iti kevalam sarvakāmāvāptyarthatvena śrūtānandamaya-brahmopāsanā, ‘teṣāṃ sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro bhavati’ iti kevalam sarvalokāvāptyarthatvena śrūtā daharopāsanā ca vyarthā

syāt; yadi uktopāsanābhiḥ sarvalokakāmāvāptisahitā muktiḥ, tarhi vasurudrādityamarutsādhyatattulyabhogamātraprāptisahitamuktiphala madhuvidyā gārhapatyādilokatrayaprāptipūrvakamuktiphalopakosalavidyā lokaviśeṣaprāptitratyabhogarahitakevalamuktiphalaḥakṣarādividyā ca anarthikā syāt; yadi sakalaviśayabhogaviraktaṃ brahmānandaikaprepsum upāsanādhikāriṇaṃ prati lokaviśeṣaprāptiḥ ttratyabhogaś ca na phalam, kiṃ tu svepsitaphalaprātau antarāyamātram iti iṣyate, tadā nirantarāyāvilambitepsitaphala [247] prāpakatvena akṣarādividyāḥ śrutā iti atathābhūtā madhuvidyādayo 'narthikāḥ syuḥ; yadi aniyatakālārambhatvena yāvajjīvatvena ca aniyatakālāparimāṇāḥ nyūnādhikaguṇāḥ nyūnādhikavarṇāśramadharmānuḡhītāś ca sarvā api brahmavidyā aviśiṣṭamuktiphalaḥ, tadā guṇataḥ karmataḥ kālato vā adhikā anarthikāḥ syuḥ; yadi 'nirañjanaḥ paramaṃ sāmīyam upaiti' ityādayo vidyāphalārthavādā vivakṣitārthāḥ syuḥ, tadā mukter api vaidhaphalatvaprātau 'sarvebhyaḥ kāmebhyo darśapūrṇamāsau', 'sarvebhyaḥ kāmebhyo jyotiṣṭomaḥ' iti sārvakāmyavākyaḥ tatsaṃgrāhakatvam api syād iti sakṛtprayuktābhyāṃ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ sakṛtprayuktena jyotiṣṭomena vā muktisiddheḥ sakalavarṇāśramasāhityena yāvajjīvam anuṣṭheyāḥ sarvā api brahmopāsanāḥ anarthikāḥ syuḥ – ity evam anyānarthakyaśūtrasya sarvaviśayatve ca sarvasādhāraṇena parihāreṇa sūtritena bhavitavyam; karmavidhyarthavādamātraḥviśayatvam eva ca parihārasūtrāṇāṃ dr̥śyate 'sarvatvam ādhikārikam', 'phalasya karmaniṣpatteḥ teṣāṃ lokavat parimāṇataḥ phalaviśeṣaḥ syāt' iti; tatra ādyasūtreṇa 'vidyā praśamsā' iti pūrvasūtrataḥ praśamsāpadānuvṛttiyuktena pūrṇāhutiḥvākye yat kāmāsarvatvam, tat praśamsāmatram, na tu sāksāt phalam, agniśamskārasya [248] ca pūrṇāhuteḥ phalānapekṣatvāt, praśamsārtham upādīyamānakāmāsarvatvam ādhikārikam, pūrṇāhutyānantaram agnisiddhau satyām eva hi nānāphaleṣu karmasu adhikriyate puruṣaḥ; teṣāṃ phalānāṃ siddhiḥ pūrṇāhutyadhīneti tat phalāsarvatvam pūrṇāhutiphalatvena praśamsārtham upādīyate; na ca agnisādhyaśarmaphalagrahaṇena sarvakāmāvāptisādhanatayā pūrṇāhutiḥ praśamsitum na śakyate, ākāśagāmyamarakanyālābhādeḥ agnisādhyaśarmaphalatvābhāvād iti śāṅkyam, yataḥ pūrṇāhutiḥvākye sarvatvam ādhikārapekṣam – yāvat phalajātam karmavidhivākyeṣv adhikṛtam, tāvaty eva saṃkucitavṛtti, sarvaudano 'nena bhuktaḥ – ityādaḥ prakaraṇādīnā saṃkocadarśanāt ity ayam artha ucyate; na ca itthaṃ praśamsārthatvam 'so 'śnute sarvān kāmān' ityādiṣu rātrisatrārthavādat phalāsamarpakeṣu aṅgikartum śakyam; dvitīyasūtreṇa agnihotrataḥ svargasiddheḥ

iṣṭisomādyānarthakyaṃ – ityādiśaṅkāparihārāya kṛṣṇīyāyena karmabhūyastvāt phalabhūyastvam ucyate; tatra śaṅkā tāvat upāsanābhāge 'pi samānā; tatparihāraḥ siddhāntabhāge na dṛśyate; na hi tatra karmabhūyastvāt phalabhūyastvanyāyaḥ pravartate; 'tathā phalābhāvāt' iti sūtroktam ucyamānaphalābhāvarūpam aprāmāṇyakāraṇam 'śobhate 'sya mukhaṃ ya evaṃ veda' [249] ityādikarmakāṇḍagataphalārthavādasya 'caḥṣyaḥ śruto bhavati' ityādi-brahmakāṇḍagataphalārthavādasya ca sādharmaṇam, karmakāṇḍagatārthavāda eva parihārasūtram dṛśyate; 'vidyā-prasāmsā' iti viduṣo mukhaṃ evaṃ gargatrirātrabrāhmaṇārthavedanenaiva śobhate, na vanitāmukhaval lāvanyena iti vidyā prasāsyaata iti; nāyaṃ parihāraḥ 'caḥṣyaḥ śruto bhavati' ity atra pravartate, caḥṣyatvaśrutatvayoḥ jyotirvidyāphalavābhyupagamāt; evam anyānarthakyaśāntānām avarjanīye tattadupāsanāvidhiphalārthavādasādharmaṇye tattatsiddhāntasūtrāṇām karmavidhiphalārthavādaviśayāṇām eva grathane 'pi, jaimineḥ kvacit parihārodghāṇam kvacid abhisamdhinīgūhanam ity evaṃ gatyāśrayaṇam kasya nāpahāsyam; tasmāt ātmopāsanānām kratuśeṣatvātapāpāślokaśravaṇādivat tatphalārthavādā avivakṣitārthāḥ ity abhipretya anyānarthakyaśaṅkā tatparihāraś ca teṣu na pravartitāḥ; ata eva vedoṣarā vedāntā iti vicāraṇīyābhāvāt asāratvābhiprāyojaiminīyānām pravāda iti prathamādhyāyārthavirodhasamādhānam tāvad ayuktam eva; tathaiiva aṣṭamikādhikaraṇavirodhasamādhānam api; tatra hi – haviṣo dṛśyamānatve 'pi yāgasyadevatārādhānarūpatvāt devataiva prasannā phaladātrī pradhānabhūtā; ataḥ [250] tatsāmānyam haviṣsāmānyāt baliya iti śaṅkānirākaraṇārtham sūtram – 'guṇatvena devatāśrutiḥ' iti; na caitad abhyuccayaparatvena yojayitum śakyam, navamādhyāye jaimininā 'devatā vā prayojayed atithivad bhojanasya tadarthatvāt' iti sūtreṇa yathā atithipūjātmakam ātithyam atithiprītyarthaṃ sat atithipradhānam – evaṃ devapūjātmakam yajanam api devatāprītyarthaṃ sad eva devatāpradhānam, saiva ca prītā devatā phaladātrīti pūrvapakṣam kṛtvā 'api vā śabdapūrvatvāt yajñakarma pradhānam syāt guṇatvena devatāśrutiḥ' iti sūtreṇa na devatāpradhānam yajanam; tad eva apūrvadvārā phalajanakam; na tu haviṣā prītā devatā; tasyās tu dravyoddeśyatayā yāgopasarjanatvenaiva śrutir iti siddhāntam abhidhāya, 'atithau tatpradhānatvam abhāvaḥ karmaṇi syāt tasya prītipradhānatvāt' iti sūtreṇa ātithyavaiṣamyam yajane darśitam – ātithyam atithiprītidhānam – yathā atithiḥ prīyate tathā kartavyatayā vihitam iti tad atithipradhānam yujyate, karmaṇi tu nāsti prītidhānam – yathā devatā prīyate tathā karma kartavyam

iti; ato na devatāpradhānaṃ yajanaṃ iti kaṇṭhata eva devatāprādhānyasya nirākṛtatvāt; etena ‘codanā punar ārambhaḥ’ ityadhikaraṇavi [251] rodhasamādhānam api nirastam, jaimininā devatāprādhānye spaṣṭam nirākṛte ‘codanā punar ārambhaḥ’ ityadhikaraṇe vyākhyātr̥bhiḥ vyavahṛtam apūrvam eva dvāraṃ jaiminer api abhimatam iti avadhāraṇāt; brahmatatprāptyarthasamnyāsāpalāpavirodhasamādhānam api ayuktam, brahmaviṣayavākyaṇām kartṛsaṃskārarūpakarmāṅgopāsanāviṣaya-jīvātmasvarūpasamarpakatvam abhyupagacchataḥ jaimineḥ mate brahmaṇi pramāṇābhāvenaiva tadvayāpalāpasiddher anivāryatvāt; ata eva arthavādādhikaraṇe vārtikakāraḥ ‘vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā’ ityādyarthavādānām vidhiśeṣatvasamarthanānantaram uktam – etena upaniṣadām api nairākāṅkṣyaṃ vyākhyātam iti; yat tu vārtikakāraḥ vyākaraṇādhikaraṇe paramātmopāsanāvidhitatphalavacanāny udāhṛtya tāsāṃ svātantryeṇa abhyudayaniḥśreyasasādhanaṭvam uktam, tat sarvadhā brahmāpalāpabhīrūṇām teṣāṃ eva maṇiṣikayā pravṛttam, na tu sūtrakārbhimatatayā, jaiminīyavaiyāsikasūtrāṇām sphuṭavirodhasya darśitatvāt; yat tu pravṛttinimittagauravaparihārārthaṃ dharmāśabdasya brahmasādhāraṇyāvaśyaṃbhāvāt bhāratavacanasya stutyarthatvaṃ na kalpyata iti; tatredam uttaram – addhā tasya stutyarthatvaṃ na kalpyam, kiṃ tu kṛṣṇastutiprakaraṇād eva siddham; tat dharmāśabdasya alaukikaśreyaḥsādhanaṃātravācītayā na nirva [252] hati; tadā hi anuṣṭhātṛtvena alaukikaśreyaḥsādhanaṇām jīvātmanām nimittatvena tathābhūtānām anyeṣāṃ ca bahūnām dharmāśabdaḥ sādharmaṇa iti tadvācyatvoktyā bhagavataḥ kā stutir labhyate; tasmād udāhṛtabhāratavacanasvārasyaprasiddhyartham eva dharmāśabdasya yāgādikarmamātravācītvam aṅgikartavyam – dharmasamsthāpanārtham avatīrṇo bhagavān sākṣāt svayam eva dharmāḥ ity uktyā stuto bhavati; astu vā yathākathaṃcit dharmāśabdasya brahmaṇy api vṛttiḥ; tathāpi dharmajijñāsāsūtroktaḥ dharmāśabdaḥ ‘dharmāṃ jaiminir ata eva’ iti sūtragata iva brahmavyāvṛtta eva grāhyaḥ, ‘codanālakṣaṇo rtho dharmāḥ’ iti vicāryatvena pratijñātasya dharmasya codanālakṣaṇatvokteḥ; ‘cudapreraṇe’ iti dhātoḥ niṣpanno hi codanāśabdaḥ pravartakavacanam ācaṣṭe; tasmāt codanā dharme sākṣāt pramāṇam; tattacodanāsamnidhyāmnātāni siddhārthabodhakāni vacanāni stutyādivārā tattacodanaikavākyatayā tatra pramāṇāni; pradhānavidhyekavākyeṣv eva rātrisatrādyarthavādeṣu śrūyamāṇam phalaṃ vidhyapekṣitatvāt vivakṣitam; kartṛsaṃskāratvena karmāṅgeṣu ātmopāsaṇeṣu śrūyamāṇam tu phalaṃ vidhyanapekṣitatvāt na vivakṣitam ityabhiprāyeṇaiva na teṣu jaimininā anyānarthakyādi-

doṣaparihārās cintitāḥ; bhagavān bādarā [253] yaṇas tu kṣayiṣṇu-
 sātīśayābhyudayaphalaṃ yāgādirūpaṃ dharmam eva saka-
 lavedārthaṃ manvānaḥ jaiminiḥ upakramādyavagamitamahātāt-
 pāryasakalavedāntapramāṇakaṃ brahma nityaniratiśayapuruṣārth-
 arūpamuktīphalāni tadupāsānāni karmaṇāṃ tatsādhanasahakāri-
 bhāvaṃ ca nāñāsīt – ity etad ālocya jaiminīyaparyālocanena loko mā
 momuhat iti lokānugrahāya ‘athāto brahmajijñāsā’ ityādiśāstraṃ
 praṇināya – iti asty eva jaiminīyabādarāyaṇīyayoḥ śāstrayoḥ mahān
 virodhaḥ; ataḥ tayor aikaśāstryāsambhavāt bādhitam tvada-
 numānam, madanumānam tu nāprayojakam, kṣayiṣṇusātīśayapha-
 laṃ yāgādikam eva vicāryatvena pratijñātavataḥ tantre tadanyasya
 vicāryatvayogāt; na ca karmānyatve ’pi yūpāhavanīyagodo-
 hanādīnāṃ svarūpapramāṇādibhir vicāro drṣṭa iti tadvat bra-
 hmaṇo ’pi devatātvena yāgādyanvayasadbhāvāt hetvasiddhiḥ,
 devatāyāḥ tyajyamānadravvyoddeśyatve ’pi tadvācakaśabdasyaiva
 uccāraṇārthakṛtirūpānuṣṭhānaviśayatvena tasyāḥ tadviśa
 yatvābhāvāt; etena jaiminīye vicāryaparasya dharmāśabdasya
 karmaparavtena sāksāt brahmāsparśitve ’pi upāsānarūpakarmapa-
 ratvasyāpratyākheyatayā tadviśayaphalarūpabrahmasparśitvam
 avarjanīyam iti pratijñāsādhāraṇyāt yathākathaṃcit virodham
 avadhūya aikaśāstryam [254] samarthanīyam ity api śāṅkā nirastā,
 dharmāśabdasya uttarasūtrajātaparyālocanayā kṣayiṣṇusātīśayābhyu-
 dayaphalakarmamātraparatvasya uktatvāt; asti hi dharmāśabdasya
 tathābhūtakarmamātre ’pi vaidikaḥ prayogaḥ – ‘anyatra dharmād
 anyatrādharmād anyatrāsmāt kṛtākṛtāt / anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc
 ca yat tat paśyasi tad vada’ iti; ayam kaṭhavalīmantraḥ
 kṣayiṣṇusātīśayaphalasādhana-karmatatsādhyaphalatatsādhaka-
 kartṛvilakṣaṇasādhana-sādhya-sādhakatrayapara iti matadvaye ’pi
 samānam; ‘trayāṇām eva caivam upanyāsaḥ praśnās ca’ iti sūtre
 paraiḥ uktatrayalābhārtham ittham ayam mantra vyākhyātaḥ
 – dharmo ’bhyudayaphalakayāgādiḥ, tato ’nyatra tadvilakṣaṇam
 sādhanam, adharmo dharmād itaraḥ tatsādhyāḥ svargādir abhyu-
 dayaḥ, tato ’nyatra tadvilakṣaṇam sādhyam asmāt, buddhisamnihitāt
 yāgādisādhakāt sāmsārikaphalapraṇavāt puruṣād anyatra tadvil-
 lakṣaṇam sādhakam ca – iti yat tat sādhanādītrayam paśyasi,
 kṛtākṛtāt bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ceti dharmādīnāṃ trayāṇām api
 viśeṣaṇam, kṛtākṛtam prārābhāparisamāptam yat prakāram ucyate,
 tena bhūtabhaviśyadvartamānātmakāt prasiddhasādhana-deḥ vi-
 lakṣaṇam sādhanādītrayam vada ity uktam bhavati; yad vā anyatra
 dharmād anyatrādharmāt – iti prasiddhapuṇyapāpayor asādhana-
 praśnaḥ, anyatrāsmāt kṛtākṛtāt [255] bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ceti

bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānātmakānityasādhyetarānityasādhyapraśnaḥ, sādhakapraśnasya tu sādhyapraśna evāntarbhāvaḥ, sādhakasyāpi nityatvāt; sādhyakoṭitvāc ceti; tatra adharmasābdasya pāpe prasiddhasya dharmaphalāsvargādīphalatvena, asmāt ity asya kṛtākṛtavīśeṣaṇabhāvena pratīyamānasya vibhidya svayam eva sādhatvena, kṛtākṛtād ity asya asmāt ity etadvīśeṣabhāvena pratīyamānasya dharmādisarvavīśeṣaṇatvena, bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca ity anayoḥ pṛthak anyatrasābdyogāt svāntaryeṇa pratīyamānayoḥ dharmādisarvavīśeṣaṇatvena ca yojanā kliṣṭeti prathamaprakāre doṣaḥ; dvitīyaprakāre sādhakapraśnālābho doṣaḥ, nityatvena prāpyakoṭitvena ca dvitīyapraśnasamgrahītavābhyupagame yāgādīphalāsādhakavilakṣaṇasādhakālābhaḥ yāgādīphalāsādhakasyāpi nityatvena bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānānyatvarūpasamgrāhakakroḍīkṛtatvāt, apahatapāpmatvādyāvīrbhāvavīśiṣṭatvena muktasyeva svargādivīśiṣṭatvena prāpyatvāc ca; tasmāt anupapannā parakīyā yojaneti, tām upekṣya asmābhiḥ anyā rjivī yojanā darśitā, prathamapādena yat balavadaniṣṭānanubandhikṣayiṣṇusātīśayaphalam, yac ca tadanubandhi tathābhūtaphalam, tadubhayavilakṣaṇam sādhanam upanyastam, dvitīyapādena 'plavā hy ete 'dṛḍhā yajñarūpā aṣṭādaśoktam avaraṇ [256] yeṣu karma/etac chreyo ye 'bhinandanti mūḍhā jarāmṛtyū te punar evāpiyanti' – ityādīmantrāntaraninditayāgādisādhakavilakṣaṇaḥ sādhaḥka upanyastāḥ; tatra kṛtākṛtāt ity asya kṛtam apy akṛtam akṛtaprāyam yasya tasmād iti vyākhyā, tṛtīyapādena svargādisādhyavilakṣaṇam sādhyam upanyastam, tatra cakārābhyāṃ bhūtabhavyānvitābhyāṃ bhūtabhavyobhayākārasya vartamānasya samgrahaḥ, evam –

anyatradharmamanunā prathitetareṣu
praśnatraye karaṇasādhakatatphaleṣu /
pādatrayeṇa suvace kramaśo nibaddhe
klīśanti taṃ kim iti tatparayojanārtham //

iti matadvaye 'pi tatra dharmasābdaḥ kṣayiṣṇusātīśayaphalakar-
mamātrapara iti nirvivādam; kiṃ ca tathāvidhaprayogadarśane 'pi
agrimavyavahārānusāreṇa tāvanmātraparatvaṃ jaiminīyaprayo-
gasya tāvān eva dharmo nānyo 'stīti bhrāntīkṛtā kalpayitum śakyam;
dṛṣṭam hi 'athāto dharmam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ' iti kaṇādasūtre
vicāryaparasya dharmasābdasya agrimasūtrānusāreṇa kiṃciddhar-
maparatvam; agre hi yāgādyanuṣṭhānaprakāro na cintitaḥ; kiṃ tu
ṣaṣṭhādhyāye prathamāhnikē dānapra [257] tigrāhadharmaś cintitaḥ,
dvitīyāhnikēna cāturāśramyadharmāḥ kiyān api cintitaḥ samgraha-

taḥ; tasmāt yuktaṃ dharmavicārapratijñānasya na brahma-
vicārasādhāraṇyam iti siddham. atrāyaṃ matadvayasamkṣepaḥ –

jātidravyaguṇānvayi dharmatvaṃ brahmaṇo 'pi samavetam /
tadupāsana-kriyāyā niḥsaṃdehaṃ ca dharmatvaṃ //1//

tat sāksād gocarayed dharmavicārapratijñānam /
svargādivad vicāryaḥ kriyāphalatvena vā brahma //2//
ity aikaśāstryam ubhayor mīmāṃsāśāstrayor yad āsthiṣata /
tatrāśāṃ apanetuṃ teṣāṃ pratibodhanaṃ kriyate //3//
bhavadabhimatārūpaṃ brahma tattadvaco hi
spṛśati yadi vicāryaṃ pūrvatantrapratijñā /
kim iti na bhavitavyaṃ tadvicārais tad āstām
nanu parihaṇyāyaṃ sarvadhā tadviruddham //4//
lakṣasūtragatacodanāpadaṃ prerakaṃ vidhipadaṃ hi nojjhati /
akriyārthavacasāṃ anarthatām arthavādanayapūrvapakṣatām //5//
arthavādavacasāṃ anarthatā paryahāri vidhiśeṣabhāvataḥ //
tat kim āgamavacāṃsi na spṛśec codanaṃ tava samaṃ hi teṣv api //
na spṛśed yadi tato hi jaiminiḥ sa svayaṃphalaparāṇi sūtrayet /
[258] atra gūḍham abhisamdhim alpadhīr asya kalpayati kena hetunā //7//
itthaṃ gūḍhabhisamdhīḥ kiyati tu viśaye kalpanīyo maharṣer
anyānarthakaryukyādy api hi viphalatokyādisādharaṇaṃ te /
kṛtsnaṃ dharmapramāṇaṃ kalayitum anasaṃ lakṣaṇe tanyamāne
smṛtyācārādi tadvat smṛtipatham āgamat kiṃ nu vedāntabhāgaḥ //8//
atra nirbharam aśakyasaṃvare prasphuṭe pranava eva visvare /
śraddadhīta ka iveha tāvakīm aikamatyakṛtikatthanāṃ tayoḥ //9//
aṣṭame ca navame ca devatām adhvareṣu guṇam āha jaiminiḥ/
svapradhānam atha bādarāyaṇas tatra vā parihṛtiḥ krameta ka //10//
dvāraṃ yāgādīnāṃ yad apūrvam devatāprasāda iti /
vaiśamyam tatrāpi pravartate naiva parihṛtiḥ kāpi //11//
tasmāt pūrvatra tantre kṣayanīyataphalaḥ kāmikāryo vicāryo
dharmas tatraiva vedaṃ sakalam api munir jaiminir mānam ūce /
etat karmaikaniṣṭhair gurukṛtam ahitaṃ tanmataṃ bodhayiṣyan
brahmajñānāya sūtrāṇy akuruta bhagavān puṇḍarikākṣa eva //12//
iti tantrayor virodhe pradhānabhūtārthaphalasaṃmālambe /
jāgrati na dhīsu viduṣāṃ labhate padam aikaśāstryavārtāpi //13//

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	<i>Aitareya Brāhmaṇa</i>
ĀDS	<i>Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra</i>
BAU	<i>Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i>
BS	<i>Brahma Sūtras</i>
CU	<i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i>
KS	<i>Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā</i>
KU	<i>Kāṭha Upaniṣad</i>
MS	<i>Mīmāṃsā Sūtras</i>
MU	<i>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad</i>

TA	<i>Taittirīya Āraṇyaka</i>
TS	<i>Taittirīya Saṃhitā</i>
TU	<i>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</i>
VS	<i>Vaiśeṣika Sūtras</i>

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