PAKISTAN
AS AN ISLAMIC STATE

Preliminary Draft

Wilfred Cantwell Smith
Professor of Comparative Religion, Faculty of Divinity
and Director, Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
Montreal, Canada

SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
KASHMIRI BAZAR - LAHORE (PAKISTAN)
Summer, 1951
Reprinted December 1962

This essay is based partly on the writer's conversations with a number of Pakistanis during a visit in the winter and spring of 1949. Since these conversations were personal and frank, not intended for publication, quotations from them are here given without the mention of any names. The writer is very indebted for the readiness with which these men were willing to discuss matters with him.
PAKISTAN AS AN ISLAMIC STATE

The student of modern Islam who visits Pakistan in quest of new religious developments there is in danger of not seeing the wood for the trees. He may confine his attention to difficult questions as to where the community is going, without seizing the significance of the fundamental fact that the community exists and is going somewhere. At least, it will be our thesis here that this fact has religious significance. Within the confusion of Islamic modernism, and alongside the hesitancy of much of Islam’s contemporary self-statement, the emergence and development of Pakistan stand out, as dramatic, and creative, self-disclosure.

If one is asking oneself, and is asking Pakistanis, as to the meaning of Islam for the twentieth century, and how it is apprehended by the contemporary Muslim, one’s attention necessarily is drawn to this or that spokesman expounding an answer, setting forth the religious’s implications and its claims for the
PAKISTAN AS AN ISLAMIC STATE

present day; or one considers the discrepancy of the interpretations; or notes the surprising paucity or the inhibitions of the spokesmen. All these are important, and we must heed them carefully. But we shall return to the recognition that the great, and indeed monumental, and the almost unanimous religious development of Indic Islam in our day is Pakistan itself. The fashioning of this dominion is a practical expression of Islam beside which the ideological expressions of a Mawdudi or an Usmani, and the inabilities or intellectual expression of most modernists, are but minor.

Minor factors may, of course, in the end prove crucial. If for want of a rope a ship may be lost, how much more for want of an idea in the minds of officers and crew. To emphasize the prior importance of the ship and the progress through the waters is not to decry the significance of the many voices which, in the absence of a chart and a known destination, clamour with proposals as to how the course should be set, or of those many voiceless who, admitting something between inarticulateness and ignorance, sail by feel. The great debate is be-

tween, on the one hand, those who insist on the course as before—sometimes without knowing closely what that course was, but sensing it as good—and, on the other hand, those, higher on the bridge, who with varying illumination are aware that these are quite new waters, and are able to discern new rocks that lie threatening in the old straight line, and to catch sight too of new vistas that open up invitingly. The former have the advantage of knowing what they want; or at least of seeming, to themselves and others, to know, since they can put it into words. The latter’s advantages are that they have hold of the helm, and are graduate seamen. Both are somewhat conscious, especially the more venturesome modernists, that some kind of substantial agreement among the groups is a basic if eventual prerequisite for continuing to sail.

The Muslims of Pakistan have acquired a state of their own. They came, therefore, under the sudden necessity of deciding what to make of it; or, more accurately, the sudden necessity of making something of it, with or without decision. The stupendous cataclysm
of the country's birth evoked a quick and unreflecting agony of activity, to salvage the tottering situation and to make something of Pakistan rather than letting it disintegrate or succumb in ruins to circumstance and foe. The imperious need to make Pakistan survive overshadowed at first all questions of giving it this or that form, of selecting some shape for its destiny. This need of survival continued to be important, if not actually dominant; one may imagine that it will be some while yet before our relentless modern world allows such a nation the luxury of choosing, or even of thinking to choose, its course quite freely. Yet as the first wild months were mastered and the new dominion rose to its feet from the bludgeonings of its inauspicious inauguration, it began slowly to cast about for guidance and to consider where it wished to go. These two considerations have pressed, with varying forcefulness, on the nation's populace since: what steps they must take if their country is not to collapse, and what kind of country they would like it to be. The two are distinct, even if not always distinguished.
clarifies for itself the presuppositions which henceforth it shall take for granted, constructing for itself the arena within which future debates shall be held and the drama of its life enacted.

If confronted with the question, what kind of country they wish Pakistan to be, Pakistani Muslims are in fairly general accord that the answer is, "Islamic". Again there is the Communist party which would scoffingly reject this answer; there are the country's non-Muslim minorities; there are political persons or groups who, whatever their own personal views, recognize that a programme must be advocated as "Islamic" if it is to win popular support; and there is a small group of Muslims who would 'keep religion out of politics' now that Pakistan has been achieved, and construct in it a frankly secular state. (We shall return to consider each later.) All the dissidents, however, as they themselves are clearly aware, comprise a relatively small section of the community, and at the moment can perhaps influence but certainly cannot create national policy. By and large the consensus is that the Pakistanis would like to see their domain Islamic.

To return, then, to our previous discrimination, we may reword the proposition so as to state that the nascent nation faced two chief problems: how to make Pakistan viable, and how to make it Islamic. We said that the two were distinct. Indeed, some might envisage them as, in certain situations, contradictory, while in kinder circumstances, supplementary. Yet though distinct, they are not separate. If it is important, for analytical purposes, that one distinguish them theoretically, it is important also that one recognize—as we shall elaborate presently—that they cannot be unrelated. For the possibility, and perhaps even the meaning, of each in some fashion embraces the realization of the other.

Our concern in this essay is not primarily with the political history of Pakistan but rather with the religious history of Islam. It might, therefore, seem that we have to do primarily with the second question, that of making Pakistan Islamic. It is superficially true that our investigation is essentially an endeavour to elucidate the concept "Islamic" in that context. What does it mean to speak of Pakistan's
becoming Islamic? To be more precise, or anyway more methodical: what does this phrase mean to the Pakistani Muslims? That it somehow means a great deal to them seems clear from the facts not only that apparently they will vote into office only a government which is pledged to this objective, but also that many are willing to devote themselves with an arduous eagerness to helping in the enterprise. In this sense, the ideals and aspirations, the feelings and motivations and the morale, of Pakistan's Muslims would be our primary subject matter. The objective events in Pakistan's development would, then, be relative to the enquiry as illustrating how far they had been able to work out their ideals in practice and what methods they had employed in doing so; and as suggesting what chances they might seem to have of ultimate success.

Here, probably, more strikingly than anywhere else in the modern world, is a body of Muslims vigorously engaged in building a new and indeed modern society, and evidently inspired thereto by an Islamic ideal. Let us, then, it would seem, ascertain how that ideal is conceived in their case, and let us see how they are translating it into effective action.

The relation, however, between theory and practice, between ideal and historical development, between religion and state, is not so straightforward as this approach would imply. It would be a gross oversimplification to picture the Pakistan Muslims as a community possessed of a clear-cut religious ideal, to which they are consciously and jointly endeavouring to make their society conform or approximate. It would be misleading, even, to suppose that it had several such clear-cut ideals, or varying but positive interpretations of the Islamic ideal, each advocated by one or another group within the society in competition for that society's choice. Yet equally it would be a gross underestimate to ignore or belittle the fact that Pakistan, by virtue of being "Islamic", in whatever sense, has had a morale and integration which have proved of prime significance in creating and sustaining the nation and in impelling it forward to energetic construction. This integrating morale and creativity distinguish Pakistan sharply from a country such as
India, despite the latter's having started with immensely greater advantages in resources and opportunities, and also from Muslim (though not "Islamic") countries such as Iran or Egypt; all of which seem unable to elicit any comparable degree of constructive loyalty from their citizens.

We said that making the country viable, and making it Islamic were in practice intertwined. That the latter depends on the former is evident enough. Manifestly the most idealistic Muslim cannot bend the shape of Pakistan to any preconceived model unless he ensures, or is willing to let the government ensure, that nation's continuing existence. This would seem platitudinous, but is in effect exceedingly significant, inasmuch as survival in to-day's technological and embattled world necessitates inter alia industrialization and a number of other modernities which might not at first glance appear implicit in his preconceived model (perhaps derived from past history).

That Pakistan's viability depends, in turn, on its Islamic quality is also true; partly because it is only this that can call forth the loyalty and morale without which it would never have survived its first six months and would hardly survive the numerous other challenges with which for some time it will doubtless continue to be faced.

This loyalty and morale are already operative; and delineate a matter of eminent importance, namely, that Pakistan is, in some sense, Islamic already. In this sense it has been Islamic from its inception. Indeed, it owes its birth to the fact that it was Islamic from its conception. The very idea of Pakistan as a separate state for the Indian Muslims, once it was conceived in the '30s and especially once it was given form, however abstrusely, in a political programme by the Muslim League's Lahore Resolution of 1940, attracted unprecedented attention and enthusiasm from those Muslims and swiftly succeeded in becoming realized in 1947, just because it was Islamic.

We return, then, to the point with which we began: that the existence of Pakistan is itself an Islamic development of prime significance. It is prior, both in time and in import,
to that Islamic ideal of what a society ought to be like, to which Pakistani Muslims are endeavouring to adapt their nation now that it exists. There is a sense in which Pakistan is already an Islamic society; and there is another sense in which it is not yet an Islamic society but may become one. To understand what is going on, it would seem imperative to discriminate between these two notions; realizing firmly that they differ, though again, of course, they are not unrelated.

An endeavour, then, to apprehend what new developments are under weigh in Islam among this community involves an attempt to appreciate what the term “Islamic” severally means, for Pakistani Muslims, in the two propositions, that Pakistan is Islamic and that Pakistan ought to be Islamic.

They themselves have not made this discrimination explicit or perhaps even conscious. Hence arises some of the considerable confusion that is apparent in discussion on these matters. Yet hence too, perhaps, arises some of that driving loyalty which is offered to both the ideal and the actuality in the society diffusely.
it called forth an immense volume of talk and enthusiasm in Pakistan's earliest years. Yet inquirers, whether Pakistani Muslims themselves or outsiders, found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discover what, even for those who talked and were enthusiastic, the phrase meant.

What is an Islamic state?

A certain amount of obscurity stems from the confusion of two meanings of the term 'state'—as referring to a body of people politically organized on the one hand, and to the form and instrument of their organization on the other. We shall examine this point presently. A more fundamental ambivalence arises from a subtler variation in the universe of discourse. Pakistanis evinced such fervent enthusiasm for an Islamic state that the question was repeatedly put to them: What kind of state is that? In many cases, no answer could be given. In others, replies ranged widely, from historical examples taken from earlier Islam, more or less idealized, to descriptions seemingly more or less indistinguishable from patterns known or idealized in the modern West. The questioner was searching for characteristics which would distinguish an Islamic from other kinds of state; to find wherein it differed from a democratic or a secular or a liberal or, for that matter, a Christian state. And there was a temptation to conclude that the concept was meaningless except in so far as this difference could be isolated and emphasized; and even to suppose that the enthusiasm was for that margin of difference. Yet in fact the enthusiasm was often for precisely those aspects of the Islamic state which seemed common to it and to the best Western concepts: democracy, brotherhood, justice and the like. And, of course, the supposition left unexplained the enthusiasm of those many who could give no answer at all. In some instances, the question is legitimate, and elicits a series of meaningful responses, which we shall have to analyze in due course. But in others, and perhaps to some degree in all, it fails to relate itself with what is in the mind and heart of the Muslim,

It may, then, be suggested that the approach is inadequate. For many, an Islamic state is not so much a form of state as a form
of Islam. It is to be distinguished not so much from other kinds of state—liberal, democratic, and the like—as from other expressions of Islam as a religion. As there is Islamic art, Islamic theology, Islamic mysticism, so there is or may be an Islamic state. Before August 14, 1947, the Muslims of India had their art, their theology, their mysticism; but they had no state. When Jinnah proposed to them that they should work to get themselves one, they responded with a surging enthusiasm. Their attainment, on that date, of a state of their own was greeted with an elation which was religious as well as personal; it was considered a triumph not only for Muslims but for Islam. Islam, as a living force in world history, is carried by the Muslims: their art is its art, their theology is its theology. And to some degree, their misfortunes, their sufferings, their weaknesses, are its woe. Art, theology, and other such creative expressions of religion are to some extent imperishable; mosques, miniatures, and manuals may be preserved long after the ages in which they are produced, but states rise and fall, and vanish leaving only memories behind. Islam

in its recent history, e.g., the 18th and 19th Centuries had, after eras of brilliance and might, gone through a low period in which it had lost many things, preserved many things, but in most of the world had lost its political power. In most parts, it had no state. The Muslims of India, by their struggle through the Muslim League, in 1947 gave it one.

This is the more relevant in that the whole principle on which Pakistan was mooted and then established was Islamic. It was not a territorial or an economic community that was seeking a state, but a religious community. The drive for an Islamic state in India was in origin not a process by which a state sought Islamicness but one by which Islam sought a state.

Its success in finding one helps to explain, then, the enthusiasm, the sense of triumph, the loyalty, of its citizens. And in this connection (not in others), the kind of state is, for the moment, irrelevant. ("My friends used to think me a fool when I kept asking, What sort of Pakistan?") It is the sheer fact that Pakistan exists which has significance from this point of
view: and it is, as we suggested, in the modern history of Islam in this area a monumental fact. This helps us understand, then, the first of our two queries: what does it mean to say that Pakistan is Islamic. We have by now arrived at a position where we may apprehend in what sense Pakistan is already an Islamic state.

To appreciate this, we must recognize why Islam sought a state for itself. We have called it a form of Islam. It is more; it is an especially appropriate form. And yet it is not a form in which all religions have sought expression. Westerners have particular difficulty in appreciating what is involved, since Christianity has had quite other emphases. Islam is a religion; and, like other religions, is transcendent, ineffable; no form can contain or exhaust it. Like other religions, however, it has been (partially) expressed in many forms—artistic, intellectual, mystic—and, more than some others, social. In fact Islam is characterized among the religions partly by the particular emphasis which it has from the beginning given to the social order. The Prophet Muhammad not only preached ethics; he organized a state. Indeed, Islamic history is calculated to begin not the year Muhammad was born (after the fashion of the Christian era) nor when he began to receive divine revelations, but when the Muslim community came to power in a state of its own. The year 1 A.H. marks the establishment of Islam as a religio-political sovereignty in al-Madinah. That state was organized in accordance with God’s revelation; it prospered and expanded, and Islam as a process in human history was launched on its career. That career has continued until today, with many human ups and downs, many variations of fortune and of form, many vicissitudes, both of achievement and indeed of aspiration. But never very far from central has been its concern with itself as an organized community.

There are many illustrations of this fact. One is the superlative importance, in Islam, of the Law. As theology is the dominant symbol of Christian faith, so the Law is the dominant symbol of Islamic. In modern times, Christians have been talking in terms of a social gospel; Islam has been a social gospel from the beginning. Major sectarian differences in Islam have had to do with divergences not primarily over
dogma but over questions as to how the community should be organized. While Protestantism seceded from the Catholic Church on a point of doctrine, the Shi'ah seceded from the majority community on a point of political leadership; while Christian groups (denominations) organized themselves around diverse interpretations of theology, Muslim groups (the madhahib) organized themselves around diverse interpretations of procedure. There is in Arabic and indeed in all the Islamic languages no term quite corresponding to the Christian concept “orthodox”; the nearest counterpart (Sunni) would better be rendered “orthoprax”. And so on. Islam is by tradition and by central genius a practical religion, a religion of ethics, including social ethics; and of organized, legalized ethics. As the Muslims like to put it, “Islam is a way of life.”

This is not to say that there have not been individualists, and even individualisms, in Islam; or that the Muslim has not found other expressions for his faith, as well as or even at times instead of the social one: ritual, artistic, sufi, and many others. Nor is it to suggest that Christianity has been without ethics, or that its ethics has been always personal rather than social; it too has had an emphasis on the organized community. Yet even here there has been a difference, in that the chief religious expression of the group life in the Christian tradition has been the Church, an institution unknown in Islam. In the Western tradition, the striving towards autonomy for the religious community has led to a struggle between Church and State; in the Islamic, to a struggle for a state.

In Christendom it is not impossible for a church to exist under a tyrannous or unsympathetic state, and many such have in the course of historical development existed. But that church has within itself, by virtue of being a religious community with its own transcendent norms, an impulse towards self-fulfilment which aims at independence from state control, and which has, when a suitable occasion provided itself, either challenged the state in overt conflict or produced the modern-Western “secular” state—that is, a type of state which refrains from interfering in the church’s internal self-development.
Comparably, it is not impossible for a Muslim community to exist under an alien or even tyrannous or non-sympathetic regime, and many such communities have historically existed. However, the Muslim community has within itself, and pre-eminently so by virtue of being Muslim, with Islam’s legal and community norms, an impulse towards social self-fulfilment which aims at independence not only from alien control but also for self-implementation.

The Muslim community in India found itself in the past under the British raj, which, out of the Western tradition, was a secular state in the sense indicated: that is, it recognized a community’s inherent right to religious autonomy, and was willing to go fairly far in defining the limits of the religious sphere in which this right obtained. The Muslims apprehended that in a united independent India they would find themselves in a considerably less “secular” regime. The religious impulse towards Islamic community autarchy, therefore, already simmering under British secularism, became ebulliently operative at the threat of Hindu “domination”. (“No, it was not Iqbal who produced Pakistan; it was the Hindus.”)

In all this, there is a rough parallel (in some aspects, very rough indeed) to the case of Communism, which prior to 1917 was an ideological movement driven by the nature of its own aspirations to seek political power, through which alone it could implement itself. When Lenin and his party seized office in the October Revolution, Communism passed from being a movement carried by an organized community without a state of their own, living in other people’s states, and advocating that society ought to be organized in a certain way, to a new stage of development. From 1917 it could be said that Russia was a Communist state: not in the sense that it was any particular kind of state, organized from the beginning in the way which Communism advocated, for this it was not and did not claim to be; but simply because it was a state at all, and one which the Communists in charge could now endeavour to construct according to Communism’s principles.

If there is a similarity between this instance and that of Islam’s acquiring a state for itself in Pakistan in 1947, there are also many
differences, some of them vast. There is the preliminary one that Islam's ideal of how a society should be organized differs radically from Communism's. This is not the place to go into this divergence; nor into many of the other fundamental contradistinctions between the two movements, which extend into questions of the nature and destiny of man, of the universe, of society and the state, of reason, and so on. For our present purposes, we should note especially simply the profound and crucial distinction that while Communism treats ideals as instruments for attaining political power, Islam treats political power as an instrument for attaining ideals.

(1) This is a serious indictment, and should therefore be documented. Cf. "Lenin defined Marxism as the revolutionary theory and tactics of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat"—V. Adorovsky: Dialectical Materialism, opening sentence, Indian edition, New Thought Library, vol. 1, National Book Agency, Calcutta, n.d., p. 5.

Cf. also: "... Communist ethics. But is there such a thing as Communist ethics? Is there such a thing as Communist morality? Of course there is... We deny all morality taken from superhuman or non-class conceptions... We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. We deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat... For us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class struggle"—Lenin. On Communist and Religious Ethics, from a speech given to the 3rd All-Russia Congress of Young Communist League by (sc. "of") ? the Soviet Union, Oct. 3rd, 1920, as reprinted in V. I. Lenin; Religion, Burman Publishing House, Calcutta, n.d., pp. 76 ff.

Pakistan, then, by its own dynamic seeks a state for the social expression of its faith. The Muslims of India established Pakistan in order to live Islamically; as their Constitution puts it, they are setting up a "sovereign independent State of Pakistan... wherein [they] shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam..."  

The intention here involved is decisive. An Islamic state is not one merely in which Muslims live or rule; but one through which their purpose is to live or rule (in a democracy, live and rule) as Muslims. Some Pakistanis would draw a distinction on this score between their own newly-won dominion and, say, Egypt; pointing out that most of the populace of such a state as Egypt may be individually Muslims, but they are politically, not only by statute but by intent, Egyptians; the integrating and guiding principle of their state is not and does not pretend to be their religion. In the case of Pakistan, on the other hand, the whole raison...

d'etre of the state is Islam: it is Islam alone which brought it into being, and Islam alone which holds it together. We shall not consider here the Egyptian aspect of this judgment, for which neither we nor the Pakistanis who proffer it have the evidence; but so far as Pakistan is concerned the point is relevant. A country is not more Islamic than its people intend it to be.

In our endeavour to elucidate the concept Islamic state, we said that the phrase had two meanings, an actual and an ideal, so that variously (1) Pakistan is an Islamic state, and (2) Pakistan ought to be an Islamic state. In the pursuit of the former, if we have been at all successful in our understanding, we may now give a formal definition. An Islamic state in sense (1) is a state which its people are in the process of endeavouring to make an Islamic state in sense (2).

Accordingly, the degree to which a state is Islamic (actual) depends not on the extent to which its citizens have succeeded in arriving at their goals, but on the vitality and sincerity and intelligence with which they are in pursuit of them. Pakistan is already an Islamic state not because its form is ideal but because, or in so far as, its dynamic is idealist.

The point is of considerable practical importance: as is illustrated by the striking case of Mawlama Abu-l-A'la Mawdudi. This rigorous thinker, one of the most incisive and influential exponents of what a classical Islamic state ought to be, argued that Pakistan in actuality is not that, and that therefore it could not claim the loyalty of Muslims. In other words, if we may translate his contention into the terms of our own argument, he was pointing out that Pakistan is not an Islamic state in sense 2, and inferred that it is not an Islamic state at all. No one could disagree with him on the former; and yet most Pakistanis were scandalized at his conclusion that it therefore deserved no moral support, even from the soldiers in the army. For publicly advancing this doctrine, he was jailed for sedition. And even though they could not counter him in argument, most Pakistani Muslims were emotionally convinced that he was wrong. Thus was presented apparently the curious spectacle that Pakistan, presumably a state founded on
religion, could not tolerate that man among its citizenry who took the religious issue most seriously, and carried it through with the most relentless logic. Yet on deeper analysis it would appear that the anomaly in this case lay not so much with the government—whose action is not difficult to defend—as in the rigidity and limitation of Mawdudi's thought, which concentrated on the Islamic state that ought to be, so much attention and feeling as to neglect and even undermine the Islamic state that is. One is, therefore, confronted with the curious spectacle of a man so exclusively devoted to an Islamic ideal as almost to become a traitor to an Islamic community. Fortunately for Pakistan, most members of that community felt instinctively, as we have said, an enthusiasm and commitment to the actual as well as to the transcendent: their allegiance was diffused between Pakistan as extant and the ultimate goal. Indeed, it was because of their profound loyalty to transcendent Islam that they stood by the actual Pakistan; more confused, perhaps, but fundamentally much sounder than a divided loyalty which in a time of crisis would let the actual state down because of its un-ideal flaws.

Pakistan can evoke and sustain the active fealty of most of its citizens because, although far from perfect, it is already, in their eyes, Islamic.

The work of a Muslim artist becomes Islamic art not by virtue of attaining a certain Muslim goal but by virtue of aiming at it. It is the ideal in the mind of the artist, his motivation and aspiration, which must be Islamic. Similarly with theology. Not every school of theological thought throughout Muslim history has given perfect intellectual expression to the faith. Probably none has. Doubtless it is impossible to attain such perfection, to put a religion adequately into words. Yet every attempt to express Islam in theoretical terms is an instance of Islamic theology. That is, any system of ideas is Islamic theology in sense (1) in so far as its author is trying to make it Islamic theology in sense (2).

The same is true of any faith: Christian, Taoist, or whatever. It is always impossible to make the transcendent actual. Yet meaning-
ful life consists in the endeavour to do so. One becomes a Buddhist not by living up to the teachings of the Buddha or the principles of Buddhism, but by undertaking to do so; one might say that that man is a Buddhist who tries to be a Buddhist. Islamic history has never been Islamic in the ideal sense—life is too complex for that. None the less it is Islamic history; and is significant because the Muslims who created it have been inspired by Islam as an ideal. Islamic history, like Christian history, has been less than ideal because of the complications of infinite factors from human greed to economic necessity, from indolence and error to environmental intractability or interference. But also like Christian and indeed all human history, however consequential these mundane factors might be, Islamic history would not have taken place at all were it not for the transcendental ideal, a formal and a final cause.

Thus, Pakistan would never have happened had it not been for the Muslim’s ideal of a religious community, the inherent striving within the heart of Islam towards social self-expression. Yet equally, its coming into existence was conditioned by the multitude of mundane, human and concrete, factors obtaining at this particular juncture in time and place. Many outside observers, failing to apprehend the former, the ideal, gave all their attention to the latter, the circumstantial agencies, the material and efficient causes. Consequently they could describe and analyse, but could hardly understand or appreciate, what was going on. The present writer speaks with involvement, since he was one of them: calling attention to the economic, sociological, and psychological causes implicated in the movement, he failed adequately to comprehend the integration of these into significantly Islamic history. One of the advantages, however, of studying contemporary rather than past history, is that one may fairly quickly learn where one is wrong. The economic, sociological, psychological, and other factors conditioning the separatist movement were there, operative and important; only, they did not add up to explain the full cataclysm of what happened in 1947, nor the vibrant stamina and creativity of Pakistan in the constructive years since. Without the specific juxtaposition
of details in the historical context of later British rule, the move towards Pakistan would not have developed as it did; just as without the propitious rise in world raw-material prices at mid-century the new dominion would doubtless not have flourished so encouragingly as an Islamic state. Such matters undoubtedly affect, and in some sense of the word determine, the course of human history. Yet it would not be human and would not even be history, let alone Islamic, were not also the transcendent immanent within that course.

The mundane factors continue, and will continue, to operate and affect. We have said that Pakistan is an actual Islamic state in so far as it is tending towards an ideal Islamic state. It is important to apprehend that presumably it will never arrive at stage (2). Such is the nature of ideals. In fact, Pakistan would cease to be an Islamic state, whatever its form, the morning its citizens ceased to strive to advance it in the light of their ideal, and sank back complacent with themselves and their social attainment. (Alternatively, of course, it would cease to be an Islamic state when they chose for themselves some other ideal; that is, ceased—in this respect, at least—to be Muslims.)

It is, therefore, an inept criticism, on the part of a Mawdudi, to observe that Pakistan is not an Islamic state in sense (2). That it will never be. The criticisms of his group and of several other groups in the country—Jama‘at-i-Islami and the like—and the theoretically right-wing generally—gain what substance and impingement they may rightly have from the degree to which, if at all, the present regime is unconcerned with the pursuit of the ideals. It would be absurd not to expect, indeed not to insist, that the objective conditions, economic and other, of current circumstance should influence policy. Any Muslim administrator who thought only in terms of some transcendent pattern would jeopardize or wreck the whole enterprise. Yet also, a Muslim may with some force urge that these conditions should not monopolize policy; that Pakistani history should be not merely the result of circumstance, the predetermined plaything of chance; nor, of course, the plaything of individual whim or
Paraphernalia of formal conformity, cloaking their administration with religious symbols, and accusing those who differed with them of being “against Islam”. Reactionaries in all societies try to make use of religion: but of its outward, static elements, not the dynamic pursuit of transcendent values. By pretending, however preposterously, that theirs is already an Islamic state in sense (2), so that opposition would be sacrilege, they try to forestall the doom which they are meanwhile incurring because in fact theirs is not even an Islamic state in sense (1). If we are right in supposing that an ideal state is by definition transcendent, then any final defence of the status quo in the name of Islam, or religion in general, is either misconceived or mischievous. The demand for an Islamic state is a demand for progress.

Instant vigilance, then, against complacency or distraction, inefficiency or corruption, is in order. Yet we have repeatedly observed that Pakistan in general and at least its central government are instinct with a drive and resolution that are striking. They can hardly be accused, as were these provincial regimes, with

---

1 From the charge against the Premier of Sind when he was dismissed from office 26-4-48 (as quoted in *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 25-2-49); cf. similar language in the proclamation about a year later dismissing the provincial government in West Punjab.
indifference to social ideals or lack of vigour in their pursuit. Yet they are, and by considerable elements in the society, accused on the score of neglecting Islam. The point in this case would be that the ideals, of which they are admittedly and not incompetently in pursuit, are, in the eyes of their critics, not correctly Islamic.

We come, then, to the second major part of our inquiry. If an Islamic state in sense (1) is an observable historical state that has a dynamic towards an Islamic state in sense (2) as an ideal, then we must ascertain the meaning of sense (2) as well. In order fully to understand either concept, we must understand both. To judge whether or not Pakistan is indeed an Islamic state (sense 1), we must know not only whether it has ideals and is moving towards them but also whether those ideals are valid.

PART II

What, then, is the ideal Islamic state? What is the meaning of the phrase in our second sense? As before, we must proceed empirically: hoping not to excogitate an answer from our own speculation, nor deducing it from classical Islamic expressions, but striving to induce an understanding from the answers actually being given by the men involved. In other words, for our present purposes our questions may be taken as signifying: What does “Islamic state”, in sense (2), actually mean to-day to Pakistani Muslims? What do they have in mind (or heart), when they say (or feel) that Pakistan ought to be an Islamic state? And since their own answers are many and divergent, and in many cases obscure, our quest will also be for an elucidation of this very divergence and of the obscurity, which in themselves seem important; as well as for a discovery, if possible, of a common denominator or common presuppositions. We may attempt to appreciate the significance not so much of each
answer as in general of the totality of aspiration.

In the first place, as we have earlier suggested, considerable confusion stems from confounding two meanings of the term 'state': the society as politically organized, and the form or instrument of its political organization. There is a well-known (and fairly questionable) proverb which might be phrased in either of two ways: "Every state tends to have the kind of government it deserves", or, "Every society tends to have the kind of state that it deserves." Both, though of quite dubious validity, can be thought of as meaning pretty much the same thing, and exemplify the two senses of our word. In the case of Pakistan, the difference turns on whether it is the country as a whole, or simply its governmental machinery, that is thought of as what ought to be made Islamic.

The drawing up of a new constitution brought to the fore one side of this dilemma, concentrating attention on the state apparatus. A considerable demand was voiced for an Islamic constitution, leading many to suppose that Islam prescribed a particular constitutional form, though on persistent inquiry it generally proved that no such form was explicitly in mind. As one of those responsible for producing the constitution put it: "I was on a train and my fellow-traveller, when he discovered that I was in the Constituent Assembly, said that the country should have an Islamic constitution. I replied that I did not know what the term meant: what did he have in mind. This question surprised and stumped him." Again: "The people generally do not understand the difference between a constitution and laws." We shall presently return to this question of laws. Concerning the structure of state, a basic ambiguity arises from the fact that even for those expressing their demand in these terms, usually the actual desideratum, it quickly appears, is, rather, an ideal community, it being tacitly felt that a perfectly of the state apparatus will automatically (or confusedly) result in an "Islamic" society. In their case too, therefore, it remains to inquire how this latter is envisaged.

There is one constitutional point, however, of prime import: the notion of Islamic state
has not led to any major suggestion of the constitution's giving privilege or exclusive power to the *ulama*. Authority, especially religious authority, is of fundamental consequence, and will come in for later consideration; at this point, suffice it to observe that an Islamic state is not for Pakistan, one which is framed by or run by the Islamic clergy. The rulers of Pakistan have made the country a democracy, and the people apparently intend to keep it so.

Whatever else the Constituent Assembly may or may not have decided, this much it has resolved: that if Pakistan is to become an Islamic state, it shall do so by the choice of its citizenry; and, moreover, according to their formula. The Pakistanis may not be quite sure in their own minds what that Islamic state at which they are aiming, is; but they are not letting out of their own hands the right and responsibility for deciding, are not turning over to the 'experts' the final task of defining the goal.

This is important, for our purposes, in that it narrows significantly the range of possibility within which the meaning of "Islamic state" must be sought. It is in this instance some kind of state which will appeal to the Muslims as a whole—and which will involve them as a whole in its operation. Democracy is a dynamic, not a static or merely formal, concept—which is why democracy cannot be imposed. To say that a people is democratic tells one something not only about the actual form of government but also about the people—namely, that they are in pursuit of a democratic ideal. It is not enough that people are free to choose their own government; to be democratic, they must have the intention, and the competence, to rule themselves.

Otherwise, they may use the democratic structure to choose for themselves a dictatorship, or—all too readily—some form of oligarchy. In the present case, the Muslims might have chosen what they call a theocracy, meaning rule by a clerical class. That they have not done so, but have chosen a democratic process—providing that they are able to maintain it—means that their state will be not Islamic and democratic, as two distinct attributes, but
Islamic via democratic. Democracy thereby becomes an aspect of its Islaminess, a part of the definition of their Islamic state. By enacting a democratic constitution, the Pakistanis have not only made democracy a part of their Islamic state in sense (1), rendering democratic their actual history; they have also made democracy a part of their Islamic state in sense (2), have integrated it into their religio-social ideal.

The importance of both these facts would be difficult to exaggerate, as developments within the history of Islam. Indeed, both are rather revolutionary: if they can be maintained and their implications not too imperfectly worked out, Islam both as a developing historical phenomenon, a tangible community, on the one hand, and as a dynamic system of ideals, a moral and religious ideology, on the other, will be seen to have embarked on a new era. On the former aspect, we may quote the observation of a brilliant and sensitive Pakistani intellectual: “Muslim dynastic rule there has been, and the like. But this is the first time that the Muslim people as such have come to power.” Some groups might demur to this judgment, saying that the Khilafat-ul-Rashidah (the first thirty years of Islamic history after the Prophet’s death) was democratic; or that modern Turkey and the Arab states are other instances. To the former point we shall subsequently return; the latter this particular speaker rejected (to put his reasons in his own terms: on the grounds, at least for the Arab countries, that the form may be democratic but that the spirit, the intent, is not; and that anyway in their case the people are not aiming at governing as Muslims). In any case, it is a relatively small matter: whether Pakistan is the only instance, or is one of the very few, the important fact is that here Islamic history has taken on a democratic form—with all the immense potentialities inherent therein.

With regard to the other aspect, the inclusion of democracy as an ideal in the social ideal of the Islamic religion, some Muslims would aver that this is nothing new, others would recognize that Islam has long inculcated social and other types of democracy but is now for the first time in a practical manner incorporating
political democracy. An outside observer reconciles this difference by noting that whether one believes the political-democracy ideal to have been all along inherent in Islam, though only now becoming explicit and generally accepted; or whether one views it as a new application of Islam to modern and novel conditions (or vice-versa); in any case the profound and significant fact is that here for the first time on a considerable scale in history, Muslims' conception of that community life to which they understand God, through Islam, to be calling them includes parliamentary democracy.

Islam, to a Muslim, does not change; but the only Islam that is available to the understanding of outsiders, namely the interpretation of it by Muslims—the outward creations and institutions, the inner convictions and ideals, of members of the faith—is a dynamic, developing process, and is unfolding in our day into unprecedented vistas.

The phrase "Islamic democracy" has puzzled some Westerners, who have wondered how it differed from other democracies, or where in classical Islamic history it is to be found. Such puzzlement is again due to the inadequacy of the question. There is a "first sense" in which Islamic democracy is simply a democratic instance in the stream of Islamic history rather than in some other tradition, such as that of the West. But Islamic democracy in a second sense, as an ideal, gains its significance from the fact that, as we have adumbrated, democracy has both a political and an ethical element: it cannot exist without the concurrence of both a governmental form and a popular ideal. This ideal, the ethical aspect, is no fortuitous ingredient: it must have content, and must have some solid basis for continuing support. A democrat must believe not only in the democratic structure of the state; he must believe also in the fundamental significance and value of the other persons in his society. An association of cynics, or of misanthropes, or even of mutually contemptuous groups, could not run a democracy. The members must, by and large, as we have repeatedly insisted, be of a certain quality and have a certain commitment to man, a certain trust in each other.
Whence comes this faith in humanity, this loyalty to equality?

For the West, it comes from two main sources: the Greek tradition, and the Judeo-Christian. It would be irrelevant for us here to pursue this beyond remarking that Western democracy is in an extremely meaningful sense Christian. With democracy as a political concept now in the twentieth century spreading around the globe, it is and will be of crucial interest to observe which peoples in other traditions are able to supply or find the ethical element which, added to the political, leads to democracy as a functioning process. In the case of Pakistan, that ethical element is, of course, Islam. The venture on which Pakistan has launched itself is one of large proportions, with reverberating potentialities. Whether Islamic democracy will prove able to do better than Western democracies have done and are doing in the always precarious and always imperfect and always unfinished task of constructing and maintaining the democratic process, remains to be seen. Certainly it is no meagre challenge.

Some Westerners carry superficiality to the point where they speak or think of “Western democracy” spreading to the Orient; failing to note that “Western democracy” is a contradiction in terms anywhere except within the West. “We are democratic; the Orient is becoming democratic, therefore, it is becoming like us,” they reason. But in so far as an Eastern nation becomes truly democratic, that is, reflecting its own nature, to that extent it becomes un-Western. Western civilization can to some degree be imposed on the East; but it can only much more slowly and fragmentarily, if at all, spread to it democratically. In so far as Pakistan is really democratic, and not merely superficially so, to that extent it will be Islamic, rather than Western. “Islamic democracy,” then, far from being an uncouth juxtaposition of ideas, is for Pakistan virtually a tautology.

Apart, then, from its being democratic, there is little precise contribution offered in the name of Islam on the form of a Constitution. And as we have observed, the concern is in any case primarily with the form rather of society. At the other extreme is the view that
Islam's function is to give form to the community and to the day-to-day living of its members, and that the state will then gradually reflect this. One youth spiritedly decried "this nonsense, that there is somewhere a hidden constitution that will solve all our problems and remedy our ills." Such men are concerned, and in their view a valid striving towards an Islamic state is concerned, primarily with Pakistan's substance, to which the form is secondary.

"The Objectives Resolution is the instinct and intuition of the people. A state can help, or hinder, but fundamentally it reflects, a way of life. When we come to be something, our state will reflect what we are." "Our state will be what we Muslims can make of it. I don't know whether we have the inner resources..." "In so far as an Islamic society is different from the status quo (socially; as distinct from personally, morally), obviously it will take a long time and a great deal of thought, effort, organization, etc., to change it. A great deal. People have not thought of this. It cannot be done overnight. And it should not be done violently; it should be done only when the people are ready for it and choose it."

Some are surprised to find many of the ulama taking a view substantially of this sort. Knowing more intimately that classical Islam which is to some degree their ideal, they are aware how far removed from this are modern conditions. "It cannot be done quickly. Compare the Prophet Muhammad himself: there was first the period in Makkah, during which there was only moral teaching and the like; and then in al-Madinah the state was built—up slowly. Our intention is to take the salaf as a model. But we shall proceed slowly. Before we introduce the classical penalty for theft, we must first preserve the entire population from hunger, nakedness, and so on and so forth. Before we punish zina with stoning, we must reform nikah, which has acquired all sorts of un-Islamic elaborations. For morals, we must teach Islam, inculcating its principles and precepts. Only then shall we be hard on immorality." Thus spoke a Mawlana.

Somewhere between these two positions is the view, moderately widespread, that the
question of an Islamic state is one of laws. Indeed, “many of those who speak of wanting an Islamic constitution I find, on pressing them, actually have in mind the quite different matter of Islamic laws.” That the laws of Pakistan should be Islamic is a proposition that, so stated, would command considerable agreement. Some Pakistani minds would make a distinction between this and stating that the law of Pakistan should be the shari'at. Others would not. In any case, soon after Pakistan’s birth there was a fairly vociferous advocacy of adopting the shari’at, with what appeared to be a fairly clear-cut controversy, for and against. Groups appeared, declared that the Constituent Assembly “should expedite the drafting of the constitution wherein it should be explicitly laid down that the Islamic shari’at shall form the inviolable basic code of all legislation in Pakistan and that all legislation which may contravene the Islamic shari’at shall be null and void and considered ultra vires”1; and asserting that this follows directly from the concept of Islamic state. A senior member of the administration, with an Oxford degree, remarked: “Certainly the law of Pakistan must be the shari’at. Otherwise there was no point in having Pakistan.

Subsequently the controversy somewhat subsided, public opinion being given rather to matters such as Kashmir. This illustrates partly, perhaps, a point on which we touched at the beginning, that Pakistanis face two problems, not only that of making their nation Islamic but also, and in a somewhat prior sense, that of making it viable. It was perhaps due, also, in part, to the fact that the shari’at issue was not so clear as it appeared. Within the contention that the laws should be Islamic there was still room, it became apparent, for difference of opinion as to what those Islamic laws are or should be. Indeed, faced with the question as to what is an Islamic state, to proclaim that it is a state with Islamic laws seemed in some cases a final answer, whether attractive or otherwise; but in other cases not an answer at all so much as a transposing of the question into other terms. It remained to be asked, what is the meaning of shari’at.

1. Statement of the Majlis-i-Shura of the Jama'at-i-Islami, in the Sind Observer, Karachi, 17-3-49.
For some, the question in these terms is fairly simple. The *shari'at*, they feel, can be pointed to: it exists, in the books. The laws of Islam, in their view, have been worked out by the *fugaha* over the centuries and have been embodied in the legal tomes. Of those who advocate that Pakistan has only to enact this accumulated corpus into legislation, some are more, some less, ready to concede that it would require some adaptation to changed modern conditions. It should be noted, however, that many of those who adopt this position, or one that amounts to this, do not in fact know what it is in these law books; apart from the further fact that most of them are not familiar in any trained way with modern conditions. The group here considered includes almost none of the *ulama* on the one hand and almost none of the governmental administration on the other. Indeed, it seems to be the view of very few serious and responsible thinkers.

Secondly, some reject the ramifications and developments of the tangible law codes over the intervening ages but feel that the fundamentals of the laws were worked out once and for all in the early golden age of Islam. In this view, it would be the task of Pakistan to apply these fundamentals to twentieth-century circumstances—a task that many admit would be of imposing proportions, demanding the highest calibre of knowledge, acumen, judgment, and devotion.

Others see the *shari'at* not as a static system but a dynamic development, a process of which the historical stages in the past are available for study and guidance, but of which the proper present and future developments are matters of creative extrapolation. This interpretation would accent continuity and revision.

Still others think of classical Islamic law as the practical expression for its own time and place of a transcendent norm for which, in the new time and place of Pakistan, a new, and perhaps quite different, expression is needed. Here again a creative task of no mean quality is involved.

The conception of *shari'at* held by some has severed all connection with any past working-out of the law by Muslims, cleaving only to the Qur'an, or even to the principles of the Qur'an.
The administrator quoted above as insisting that "certainly" the law of Pakistan must be the shari'ah and who elaborated this insistence with vigour and precision, and convincing sincerity, stated, on questioning, that "the shari'ah is the laws of the Qur'an"; asked if it did not include also the sunnah, stumbled "Well... anyway... well, that has to do with the Prophet... In any case, the Qur'an is the important thing..."

Two things emerge as common to all these interpretations except the first (which is content to take Islamic law as already extant in detail). One is the consensus that Islamic law has motility. "Every thinking Musalmman agrees now with Iqbal that fiqh is flexible. It is a process." "There is more talk of revising the law than there used to be." "Fiqh has changed, must change, and will change."

The second point, following closely from the first, is the recognition that a great creative effort is needed on the part of Pakistan, or the Muslim world, in order to produce the new adaptation or version of the law for the modern world. One might emphasize each one of the words "great", "creative", and "effort."

Even for most of those, then, who would characterize an Islamic state by Islamic law, the latter concept, like the former, is an ideal to which Pakistan ought, through the constructive diligence of its citizens, to aspire. Those who urge that Pakistan should adopt Islamic laws, and yet cannot define precisely what those laws are, are not merely acting from confusion; they are, however unconsciously, expressing the fact that those laws in mundane tangible form do not yet exist, but are something to be striven for. It is part of the Muslim faith that they do exist transcendentally—or, to use less classical terminology, that to strive for them is meaningful. It is one part of the Muslim's task, in periods of novelty and crisis and confusion such as our own, to apprehend these laws; at less creative moments in Islamic history it is his task merely to apply and practice them (or, let us say, to apply and practice such apprehensions of them as have for that moment been attained).

Continuing our survey of indications being given by Pakistanis on the question, what con-
stitutes an (ideal) Islamic state, we pass next to consider those who look for an answer not do constitutions or laws but to past history. A considerable number feel or say that Pakistan’s task is to aim at constructing its new society, guided by ideals taken from the glorious period of Islam’s community achievement in its earliest days. Perhaps particularly for the younger men, the period in question is most usually and often emphatically the Khilafat al-Rashidah: the first decades in Islamic history. (The “golden age” of Islamic culture, under the early Abbasi empire centred in Baghdad, is for these purposes not nowadays in emotional favour.)

However,—and this point is of basic importance—the conception is not that of reproducing once again an actual state of affairs that obtained in the seventh century. Not merely is the picture in these Pakistanis’ minds of the Khilafat al-Rashidah a highly idealized one, a picture embodying the legendary embellishments of a pious tradition developed gradually within subsequent Islam, and still to-day perhaps recipient of favours from devoted imaginations.

(This Khilafat al-Rashidah interpretation of the Islamic social ideal receives its ardent advocacy neither from the ulama and others carefully trained in classical Islamic learning, nor from that educated group familiar with the results of modern historical scholarship.) Not merely, further, is it a question of the inherent impossibility, not to say meaninglessness, of reproducing in one age the activities or constructions of another. Manifestly Pakistan cannot relive a segment of the history of Arabia. Even if one abstracts from the earlier history certain aspects, such as the institutions it set up, yet these—even as forms disengaged from their actual embodiments—could be applied to twentieth-century conditions only with assiduously elaborate modification.

More important, that early period, even when transformed into the most roseate of its versions, was admitttedly not perfect: as, for instance, in that three of the four Khulafa’ al-Rashidun were done violently to death. When zealous Pakistanis, therefore, speak of taking the period for model, they would seem to mean not the actualities of that remote century as a
pattern for the actualities of this. They have in mind only the good points of that period (more accurately, those points which they consider good); indeed, on questioning, the good points whether achieved or only adumbrated. In other words, they have, however confusedly, in mind, we would suggest, that a perfect Islamic state is not the actuality of the Khilafat al-Rashidah but an ideal of it. What they are advocating is that Pakistan should take as its ideal, to be expressed as fully as feasible in modern conditions and in this particular time and place, that ideal of which the beginnings of Islamic history, as they see those beginnings, were in those conditions and in that time and place the expression; and were moreover the most adequate and truest expression which that ideal has as yet found for itself.

Once again, then, for these as for others, the Islamic state to which they aspire is something transcendent.

To employ again our own terminology, the Khilafat al-Rashidah is, for these men, an Islamic state in sense (1). It was a society which its members were endeavouring to make an Islamic state in sense (2). Indeed, it is the Islamic state in sense (1) par excellence; for two reasons. Its members, and especially its leaders, stand pre-eminent above any other Muslim group since, on two scores: first, that in their endeavour to make their state approximate to the Islamic ideal, they were more successful than others have been; and second (obviously related), they had a clearer understanding of their objective, a more illumined discernment of that Islamic state (sense 2) towards which they were driving. To take the period for model, therefore, does not, on careful analysis, mean to accept as authoritative or final what its people accomplished. It means rather to respect, to derive inspiration from, their intention; and from the realism, energy, and competence with which they proceeded to implement it.

To still another group the concept signifies not a model, not a given form or pattern of state, but a dynamic morality. Many of the more sophisticated would claim that making a state Islamic means applying to it and within it moral principles—in the case of Islam, particularly the principles of equality, brother-
hood, and social justice. "The important thing to me is my feeling of Islam as a moral force in the world." "Religion rightly understood means tolerance, equality, respect for persons. Moral values: we must apply them—and must realize that it is a long-term process." "An Islamic state? The ideals preached by Islam are not so different from those preached by any democracy: peace, brotherhood, social justice."

This view has been given official status and embodiment to the extent that the Objectives Resolution of the Constituent Assembly envisages a state "wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed." Further, as we have already remarked, the first of these has been given concrete as well as normative expression in that Pakistan has in fact been given the political form of a democracy, with universal adult franchise (first implemented in the Punjab provincial elections, 1951). In other words, of the various schools of thought as to what an Islamic state is, those who interpret in terms of the above-mentioned "principles" may point to the fact that this version is the one so far to have received decisive approval on paper; and those who aver, as many do, that Islam means democracy, may and do point to the fact that that principle has been the first to be put, and at once, into effective practice.

Some men, having set it forth that Islam means certain principles, would then explicitly reject any other further interpretation; would deliberately limit the Islamic influence to this point. "I personally would say that the only system of government compatible with Islamic ideals is the democratic. And, having said that, I would go on to say, let us build the best democratic system possible." Again: "The majority are agreed that the basis of the state must be the ideals of Islam. The difference comes in the matter of where one puts one's limits on those ideals. Some say simply, "equality." Some say, "equality plus other ideals." Others include all the details as well... In my own view, it would be absolutely disastrous to [include the latter]."

A list of interpretations held in Pakistan of
the Islamic state ideal would be incomplete if it did not note the pan-Islamic version: "You cannot have an Islamic state merely in Pakistan, which is sectional; it must be for the whole Muslim world." This position is far from widely held, and indeed might virtually be dismissed as of no immediate import. The overwhelming determination of Pakistanis interested in the Islamic state is to build it in Pakistan. Friendship with other states of the Muslim community, certainly; but a friendship between groups, not a disintegration of the groupings. More representative, more significant, and presumably much more sound was the official who responded to the question: "Do you foresee a union of the Islamic countries?" with "Maybe we do not foresee it. But it is our dream."

Finally, we must conclude our survey by considering that sizable group who, though openly and perhaps insistingly favouring and Islamic state, yet do not know what they mean by it; or, more accurately, are not able to tell, to put it into words. "Of the hundreds of people who have come urging an Islamic state, most have no clear-cut notion of what from it will take." "Of those who want an Islamic state, most are confused." "What do I understand by an Islamic state? We shall divide the question into two quite distinct parts: one is your question to me, what I understand by it. The other is my question put to my fellow Pakistanis; the same question. I have put it again and again. And not one has been able to reply. "What do you mean?' I keep asking them. It is a shibboleth."

Yet it would be wrong to infer that the talk of an Islamic state is hypocrisy or vapidity. Doubtless there is a good deal of sentimentality involved in it; and doubtless Pakistan will make quicker and more definite progress if this sentimentality can be raised to genuine idealism, its intellectual confusions clarified into programmes. None the less, if our argument thus far has had any validity, the demand for an undefinable expresses a deep and in some way legitimate feeling; and the very inability to define the goal is important and can be instructive.

To sum up, then. How far has our survey elucidated for us the concept Islamic state
(sense 2)? One thing would seem established: that the essential significance of the phrase does not lie in the content of the concept. For, for various Pakistanis it has diverse content, and for some it would seem to have no specific content at all. And indeed, if we have read matters aright, almost all interpretations have this in common, that the concept transcends precise apprehension as well as transcending objective actuality. Man's duty is to discern as well as to implement; his mind too must aspire. All this gives a clue to our understanding. As a shrewd political leader put it, vividly and effectively: "Once in Cambay I saw a boy flying a kite on a misty bay, so that the kite was invisible in the fog. I asked him what fun he was having, since he could not see his kite. He replied at once: 'I cannot see it; but something is tugging.' So it is with Pakistan and the Islamic state. They cannot see it. But very surely something is tugging; and they know it. No one has a clear conception; it will yet evolve."

The Islamic state is the ideal to which Pakistan, it is felt, should aspire. It is the aspiring which is fundamental, and common; not this or that pattern of the ideal. It is an ideal not in the immediate sense of a blueprint which Muslims have only to actualize;—but an ideal in a much more ultimate sense: that to which final loyalty, in this sphere, is or should be given. Hence its relation to the divine; hence its ineffability. It is not a picture of what ought to be, but the criterion by which all pictures of what ought to be must be judged; or perhaps it is but the notion that, however inaccessible, such a criterion exists. The meaning is dynamic rather than static, moral rather than sociological; the mood is imperative rather than indicative. For Muslims, so far as the social sphere is concerned, it is not a good but The Good.

The demand that Pakistan should be an Islamic state is a Muslim way of saying that Pakistan should build for itself a good society. Not merely an independent or a strong or a wealthy or a modern society; all these things, perhaps, but also a good society.

Some opine that a good society is this, some that it is that; others will hardly venture
to say what it is, or will admit that they do not clearly know. But they can all agree, with both enthusiasm and commitment, that it is worth pursuing; and that their country's fundamental significance rests upon the extent to which it so pursues.

We may now complete our formal definition. An Islamic state in sense (1) is a state which its people are trying to make an Islamic state in sense (2). **An Islamic state in sense (2) is a state which Muslims consider to be good.**

**PART III**

"An ideal Islamic state is that state which Muslims consider to be good."

It might be protested that this analysis has settled nothing; that the definition is a mere tautology. It is true that in hoping to have ascertained and clarified the meaning of a concept, we leave undetermined what actually the Muslims, in this case Pakistan, do consider good. To leave it so is essential. For it is a fact of observation that it is undetermined. They are still in process of resolving, through both discussion and experience, what they consider good. Moreover, it is an essential part of any valid definition that it leave room for future development. Even if, *mirabile dictu*, all Pakistanis should solidly agree to-morrow, they would be free to revise their judgment the next day; as history shows that they, like other religious communities, have done in the past. It is a further fact, of another but no less important kind, that it is not the business of an outside observer, nor indeed of any theoretical analysis,
to pronounce on the outcome of the issue. History will do that. Only a Muslim has a right to expound what an Islamic state ought to be. And what in fact it will be, for Pakistan, as an ideal, even he, as an individual, can determine only in so far as he can influence the thought and action of his fellows and the policy or form of the state. He can determine it only in so far as one contribution is taken up within the welter of ideas and materialities, of objectives and limiting necessities, of internal and external pressures, that constitute historical development. Our aim has been to ascertain not the content but the meaning of his judgment. The content we may be able to discern as the future slowly unfolds itself.

And indeed it is the nature of a definition to be tautologous. If the definition is valid, it must perform not add anything to the original concept, but rather merely re-express the same idea in other terms.

Further, it might be objected that the analysis ignores elaborate particularities; that the definition is too simple. Yet any simplicity that seems to adhere is quite illusory; the concept 'good society' is anything but simple.

In the first place, there are the ponderous practical difficulties. It is not simple to build a good society anywhere—Pakistan included, which is beset by stupendous problems in the practical realms of sociology, economics, health, and the like. By the administrators, inescapably, but also by such theorists and planners as are valuable rather than merely sentimental, the concrete situation in all its immense and baffling intractability is kept firmly in mind. On the part of outsiders it is an injustice to the country, and on the part of Pakistanis themselves it is a mawkish violation of sincerity, to underestimate the enterprise on which the community embarks when it sets out in pursuit of its ideal. (Some, indeed, would deprecate the venturesomeness of the ambition, not realizing that it is only the fascination of a great ideal which has enabled the state to survive its crises at all.)

Indeed, so monumental are difficulties of every sort that it is far from simple not only to transform the state according to an ideal but even to think of doing so. It is no slight mat-
ter to perceive, in any realistic and serviceable way, what, under the complex and restive circumstances, is the good thing to do. And any perception unrelated to the circumstances is virtually gratuitous.

The theoretical difficulties are not, however, only at this level. The problem of discerning, let alone of constructing, the good society, in Pakistan or anywhere else, is not simple in that it raises the most fundamental matters of metaphysics and of ethics—matters on which the best minds of many ages have pondered, and left room still for discussion and, indeed, perplexity. We have throughout stressed the notion that the Islamic state which Pakistanis feel their country ought to become is an ideal, a transcendent norm drawing them on. Yet this in itself, although we feel that the point is in principle valid, is a vast over-simplification. For one thing, it suggests too strongly the Platonic bias (perhaps shared by many Pakistanis, particularly of the more romantic sort) that a good society is a fixed form, a pre-existing model which is good in some sense apart from the persons who constitute or pursue it. Properly to discuss the whole issue we ought first to be clear on elusive questions such as the relation between ideals and actuality, the evolving flux of always transitional history; and between ideals and words, their verbal formulations. Our terminology, let alone our perspicacity, is inadequate to the task before us; no understanding of the Pakistanis' problems can meet with even an approximate success which does not compensate for its inevitably partial apprehension with some liberating sense of the profundity of the issues that are involved.

Pakistani Muslims are not alone in finding it difficult to say just what, in terms of the developing social process, it is to which final commitment is due. Neither are they alone, at least amongst men of sensitivity, in being firmly persuaded that that social process has meaning; and that within and beyond it a final commitment is significant and necessary. Like other peoples, they may disagree amongst themselves as to the objective, and even individually in some cases falter or be confused. Yet what characterizes Pakistan is the degree to which they are agreed, over against world-denying
mystics on the one hand, and over against materialists and cynics on the other, that within historical development something is good, and must be pursued.

Moreover, in his search for that good, the Muslim is not left without guidance. In his view, God has not left humanity to grope in the dark after moral insight; He has vouchsafed to the world, especially in the religions and pre-eminently and finally in Islam, the illumination whereby man’s groping is turned to perception. A Muslim’s apprehension of goodness, like that of all the rest of us, is coloured, of course, by his environment, the pressures and complexities and limitations of his particular time and place; and by his own capacity, his moral acumen, and the sensitivity of his spirit. It is coloured also, and more uniquely, by the fact that he is a Muslim. Indeed, the acceptance of this source of knowledge concerning good and evil is what makes him a Muslim; and this, in turn, is what makes it verbally legitimate for us to call “Islamic” not this or that state in particular but in general the state that he deems good.

It is important to recognize that, even for the most pious of Muslims, the religion of Islam does not determine what is good and what is evil. God does that. For a Muslim, what the religion of Islam does is to elucidate this for him. Islam brought a revelation, not a confabulation, of truth. And of eternal truth: that is, transcendent, supernatural, never wholly within the grasp of man. A “Muslim” is one who submits, not to Islam, but to God.

Islam is, for him, the avenue rather than the goal; the form of his apprehension. Crucial, then, in his striving for the good society, is the interpretation of Islam. And this has, precisely, become the crucial intellectual and spiritual question of the Muslim world. Most Pakistani Muslims would agree that the truth about goodness is to be known through Islam; but they may and many do, disagree as to how, even within the bounds of Islam, it is to be ascertained. One finds it through the Qur’an; one through the Qur’an and the sunnah; one in the early history of the Khilafat al-Rashidah; one in the whole unfinished history of the Islamic community; some in effect find their
interpretation of Islam in Iqbal. And so on and on; as we have in part been studying.

Of course, axiology is not the only contribution of Islam. The religion provides the drive towards, as well as the epistemology of, goodness; along with intense community cohesion, and other socially significant factors. For our purposes for the moment, however, the important point is that the form of value judgments (whatever their content) is, perforce, for most Muslims, Islamic. “Islamic” in this case means derived from the historical Islamic tradition.

The significance of this is manifold.

To begin with, we may note a characteristic difference here from the corresponding situation in the West. For a Westerner, on certain matters, value judgments, even though their content be Christian, would be cast in a form derived from the Greco-Roman tradition. Westerners—and to some extent Muslims educated in Western ways—are accustomed to considering, for example, political questions by means of concepts (such as “the good society”, “democracy”), categories, and modes of thought stemming from the Greek root of Western civilization. This point, on which we shall touch again, raises issues much too broad and involute to be here pursued. Briefly, it would seem to us that the difficulty of communication between the West and Islam has fundamentally to do not only with the fact—profound enough—that the one is Christian and the other Muslim. In part, it has also to do with the further fact, perhaps equally profound, that while the cultural tradition of the one is Islamic, that of the other is both Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman. Virtually the whole of the Muslim’s civilizational heritage is, if not a religious heritage, anyway set in Islamic forms. The Westerner’s civilization, on the other hand, has comprised, whether in conflict or in uneasy tension or fused, two heritages: one recognized religious (out of the same Semitic tradition as Islam) and one otherwise.

An illustration of resultant misunderstanding is provided in the Preamble to Pakistan’s constitution, the ‘Objectives Resolution’, which

1. It would be an interesting speculation whether these facts have given the one culture more integration, the other more vitality.
was issued in both Urdu and English. The two versions are presumably equivalent. Yet in fact the Urdu text uses, for instance, terms such as الْحاَکِم العلَمِيّ (“absolute ruler”; cf. ἡ αὑτοκράτεια of the Christian Nicene creed) of God, which are commonplace and almost trite in the Islamic tradition as they are within the religious tradition of the West, whereas the English version uses terms such as sovereignty, which are from the sphere of international law and political science in the Western tradition, and which when applied to God were startling. Consequently the Resolution, with its divergent connotations, elicited applause from the Muslim populace (except a very few whose education is Western) but some astonishment and apprehension from others. Our point is not that the translation was poor, but that an act of transposing the ideas from one form of expression to the other necessarily stumbled over the obstacles which divide the weltanschauungen of the two civilizations.

Again, our defining an Islamic state as one which Muslims consider good is an attempt to re-express the concept in terms familiar or understandable to the Western-educated mind. To do this, the phraseology is transposed into one derived from the Greek tradition. Yet no suggestion is included that what the Muslims do consider good will be similar to Western concepts. What they consider good depends on them; and since they are Muslims, it therefore depends on Islam. Their ideas of a good society will reflect not the Greek tradition but the Islamic. We have already suggested that our definition does not add anything to the concept; we may now claim also that it does not leave anything out.

While observing that Muslims’ value judgments are Islamic in form, we should note one further, and important, ramification. This concerns their content. We have previously remarked that some observers tended to emphasize, or to look for in order to emphasize, the difference between an “Islamic” state and the corresponding ideals of other peoples. But we may now see that in order to have meaning, it is not necessary that an Islamic state (ideal) differ from a Christian or a liberal or a democratic state (ideal). In order to have rich and
effective meaning, it is necessary only that it differ from actuality; from the Pakistan or other objective state that is extant.

(A Hindu leader in East Bengal complained "Why do they insist on calling it Islamic and then say that this means only certain ideals, which in fact are common to all religions?" A young and enthusiastic Muslim exclaimed, on being asked about an Islamic rather than a democratic state, "What is a democratic state? And anyway, you are ignoring a very important fact. Look, for instance, at Hazrat 'Umar. Presumably there are other figures in history equally brave, equally honest, equally attractive; just as great men. But those others make no appeal to me; whereas his name and his ideal inspire me with throbbing emotion." A more mature government officer, on being asked whether Christians did not have similar ideals to those he was expounding, replied quickly, "Of course. These are revealed religions.")

That the actual state of affairs in Pakistan does differ from the ideal—from any ideal, Muslim or other—is profoundly true. Our discussion has concerned itself with the highest aspirations of the Pakistanis; it is to be hoped that giving heed to these and delving to elucidate their meaning has not seemed to imply that they have any monopoly of either attention or activity within the country. As elsewhere, there is in Pakistan much—exceedingly much—that is un-ideal.

"Things are getting worse, not better. But that is not the crucial matter. It is inevitable that they should get worse, integral in the present set-up. The crucial matter is that, despite the end of British imperialism, nothing essentially has happened. Things are just the same as they were before; except that we have had riots, and there is bribery and corruption." "Freedom? What freedom? There is no meeting of the people's need. In these rural areas, 80% of the people would welcome back the old days, but they are gone for good. Nowadays, courts are held with the magistrates having their feet on the table; and never give the poor a chance to speak. Everyone is corrupt. Corruption increases day by day." "Our edu-
cational standards are deplorably low. There is no use fooling ourselves about this. There is too much laziness; too many cheap degrees.” “Islam now stands for reaction. Anyone who differs, who has ideas, is accused of being against Islam, against the millat.” “There is vast bungling.” “Tasawwuf? To-day the move is definitely towards shari’at and away from Tasawwuf. The move, in fact, is towards materialism; and the shari’at gives a good cover for this.” “There is so much greed, so much dishonesty, so much that is anti-social going on around us; I personally do not think that any Islamic form can save us.” “These people may not take interest; but they can certainly take bribes . . .”

Pakistanis, like other people, are human; and imperfect. Pakistan, like other countries, is the scene of evil as of good; and, like other Asian countries, it is desperately poor. The immense enthusiasm of independence and Islamic brotherhood; the grim determination of the partition massacres; have been tempered with a growing restless discontent on the part of the underfed. The creative idealism was at first to some extent centred in Karachi and the newly-established, inescapably constructive, federal government and its buoyant administration; whereas the provinces, with a long tradition of decadence behind them, to some extent perpetuated the status quo and fell prey to acquisitive opportunism. As we have noted, by 1949 two of the provincial governments had been dismissed in disgrace.

In class terms, an analysis might be made that the bourgeoisie, suddenly coming to power with a brand-new state of their own to develop, have, both in the central administration and in industry and commerce, in all expansiveness undertaken with enthusiasm and skill a constructive and exhilarating, though difficult, task, meeting their challenge with energy and with the vibrant ideology of a new romantic interpretation, a la Iqbal, of what they call Islam; while other classes in society, and particularly the peasantry, are slow to benefit, if at all, from the new regime, and in fact while Islam remains for them what it was before, the state remains for them what it was before also, oppressive and distant.
Not only, moreover, do conditions, here as elsewhere, fall short of the people's own ideal. It is also true, here as elsewhere, that the ideals of some fall short of greatness. "The men at the top are fair-minded; but among the subordinate officers the outlook is narrow. Such men think it patriotism to harass the Hindus." "An Islamic state: these damned Hindus have been put in their place." Religion can all too easily be transmuted from loyalty to God or to an ideal into wild devotion to a system or a group; fidelity can give way to obscurantism, and fanaticism replace reverence.

Beyond that, it is true that not all Pakistanis, including some in responsible positions, are exempt from the human temptation to pursue objectives other than goodness. "Applications for government service are motivated in many cases by the ideal simply of earning their bread and butter." "(So-and-so) and such a man as (so-and-so), are examples of those inspired, in their day-to-day work, by the ideals of Islam, and genuinely devoted to building up a good society here. These men, and others like them, have love and respect for Islam, and a sense that it has been a great force in the past. But others—perhaps the generality—in the administrative services are simply greedy, dishonest, out for what they can get..." In saying, therefore, that an Islamic state is, ideally, what Muslims consider good, one is not guaranteeing what the Muslims of Pakistan will in fact consider good; let alone, not guaranteeing that they will attain to goodness, nor even pursue what they do value. Pakistan is not yet, by any stretch of the imagination, an ideal state.

Yet the very magnitude of its problems, rather than invalidating its ideal, brings out its value, and indeed necessity. As one careful Muslim put it, after commenting on the "fundamental weakness of our state": "But the saving feature is that any other movement would have perished by now. Muslims do have a vague idea of what they want... Eventually it must come; it has sunk deep into people's hearts, and their feelings about it are strong. Very strong. Just as they felt strongly about Pakistan, and for that reason Pakistan did come in the end." How.
ever remote the ideal may be, however vague, however distorted, the crucial matter is that it is an ideal; and an ideal is necessary.

One does not need to be a Muslim to recognize that virtually the one real hope for Pakistan is that it be an Islamic state in sense (1): that it aim at making itself an ideal Islamic state. Given the fact that it is a democracy (formally) and that the great majority of its citizens are Muslims, it must, virtually, pursue Islamic ideals or no ideals at all. For practical purposes, the alternative to the Islamic state is complacency or corruption.¹

In this connection there is one more point arising from our previous observation that the form of Muslims’ idealizations and evaluations is Islamic. It concerns non-Muslims, some of whom have especially objected to the concept of an Islamic state. Here it is fundamental to remember that the rights accorded to any minority, or other non-powerful, group in any state depend on the ideal of those in power. In a Marxist state, such as the Soviet Union, whose rulers recognize, they claim, no ideals, opposition groups have precisely no rights. It is official Marxist doctrine that a person as such, “man in general”, does not exist; a person exists only as a member of a social class. Consequently, an individual condemned as being “an enemy of the working class” is regarded in the U.S.S.R. as having literally no rights whatever, and is treated accordingly. It is difficult or even impossible for a Christian or a democratic idealist to conceive such an attitude; and difficult therefore for him to believe the stories coming out of the Soviet Union about treatment of those out of favour. Slowly, however, the outside world is beginning to discern the importance of transcendent ideals, and to realize that it is better to have ideals, even when not lived up to, than to repudiate them.

¹ Or, of course, revolution. The Communists put forward their pseudo-ideal as an alternative to the Islamic; and have some following, though they hardly hope to come to power by democratic means. It is interesting to note that the brilliant and sensitive Lahore poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, involved in a 1951 conspiracy case, had this in common with the otherwise dissimilar Mawdudi: that both men were so loyal to a vividly conceived and ardently held ideal as to become impatient with the slow process of arriving at it and finally, therefore, disloyal to the actual community.

1. Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1948: “... human nature, ... man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.” Quoted from the Authorized Indian Edition, People’s Publishing House, Bombay, 1944, p. 52.
outright. It is important that practice be good. It is equally important that, when practice lapses, good ideals be acknowledged; so that there be something to which one can appeal.

A state may be democratic in form; but unless it is democratic also in ideal, unless the majority of its citizens are actively loyal to the transcendent principles of democracy, recognizing the ideal validity of every man’s status as a man, then the arithmetic minority has, through the democratic form, no rights at all. Some Muslims of India are frightened because in that republic, though formally democratic, neither the religion nor the social philosophy of the majority, so far as they can discern, accords them secure recognition. This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the Indian situation. Nor is it within the scope or competence of our present essay to try to assess the actual position and treatment of the non-Muslim groups within Pakistan. Our purpose at this point is simply to call attention to this crucial fact, that whatever their actual situation, their only hope of improving or even maintaining it lies in the concept of the Islamic state ideal. Only in so far as the ideal of an Islamic state held by Pakistani Muslims includes (or comes to include) the notion of treating non-Muslims well—with justice, equality, or whatever—only so far have those non-Muslims any locus standi whatever. On a purely arithmetic basis, they would, as an out-voted and overpowerable minority, have no status at all.

This is the essential reason why British India as a whole could not be an unpartitioned "democracy."

The point is of major significance, and calls for more investigation than it has received. Many outsiders and several Pakistani Christians and Hindus, unhappy at the treatment actually received by non-Muslims in Pakistan or potentially to be received by them, have stated or supposed that these minorities would be better off if Pakistan were simply a "democratic" instead of an "Islamic" state. This is irresponsibly glib. For if Muslims do in fact treat non-Muslims unjustly, then a democratic framework (without the Greco-Roman and religious tradition of democracy to vitalize
it) would merely give them as a majority the constitutional authority for doing so without let or hindrance. Let us take a particular case, to illustrate. It is reported from a particular village, whose population since the partition comprises a predominance of Muslims, that the Christians are refused use of the only village well. To introduce democratic procedures into that village would do nothing whatever to improve the situation; since if the matter were put to a vote the decision would obviously merely confirm and give formal and even legal authority to an injustice. The only hope for the weak group in this community is to appeal, not to democracy, but to the Islamic conscience of the majority. The latter must be shown that, by their action, they are being bad Muslims, are running counter to the transcendental concept of an Islamic state. A Muslim community—an extant community of Muslims—may, and indeed does, behave, as do all other actual communities, with some injustice; an Islamic community, sense (2), on the other hand, is, as we have tried to show, the very embodiment of the idea of justice, in so far as those involved conceive it.

Pakistan as an Islamic State

Some critics, wittingly or not, disparaging not only the practice but the ideal of Muslims, would still contend that the only hope for the minority in the above situation lay in the introduction into the village not only of democratic procedures but also of the democratic ideal. This, besides being presumptuous, borders on the meaningless. One can hardly introduce into a Pakistani village twenty-five hundred years of the Greco-Roman-Western-European historical tradition. And it is not at all clear that by introducing the symbols of another culture or another religion, one is importing their meanings with them, or by the change enlarging an apprehension of truth. As we have insisted all along, the forms of the villagers' values, and of Pakistanis' generally, are given by their own history, are fixed, are Islamic. Everything turns on the quite unfixed matter of what, within those given forms, the values apprehended will in fact be. That Pakistan is Islamic is given; its interpretation of Islam is free.

And it will be on its interpretation that it will, by the world, be judged. The decisive
question, in the village and in the country, is, as in all villages and all countries, what do the people in fact consider good, and how effectively do they pursue it.

It is presumptuous for Christians or outsiders to object to the ideal on the ground of the practice; living, as they do, in glass houses. So long as the Islamic ideal involves treating Christians and other minorities well—as the Constitution’s preamble shows that, at least in the minds of the governing group, it does—there is a valid and indeed important question as to whether or wherein there is failure, at this as at other points, to put the ideal fully into practice. Yet the democratic ideal, which would also, ideally, treat the minorities with equality and justice, in practice also fails to get itself fully implemented. Witness Jews, negroes, and others in “democratic” societies. (From this imperfect practice arises, equally gratuitously, the Communists’ and some Asian rejection of the democratic ideal.) (Christians and democrats—in the objective sense—may treat Jews badly; but it is only in so far as they approximate to being Christian and democrat, in the ideal sense, that Jews have any hope at all of living in their societies. This was demonstrated when Germany, in Nazism, relinquished the Christian and the democratic ideals.)

We are led by this discussion to consider a significant group within Pakistan, of men, themselves Muslims, who dissent from the “Islamic state” ideology, and advocate, now that partition is accomplished and the Muslims are in de facto control, secular democracy. The group is small and not vocal, but sophisticated, able, and includes some powerful figures. (It includes also a number of minor and not at all powerful but intelligent educated individuals.) Their model is Turkey, and some also claim that Jinnah, had he lived, could have been their leader.

“...In five years, Pakistan will be a secular democratic Europeanized state; like Turkey, without the veil, etc. The religiosity, the emotion on which Pakistan was based, will disappear. It has been religiosity only, and this is the bane of our life. It was never a really religious movement.” “I would like a
Kamal Ataturk to arise here and found a modern secular state. So would some others. But it is hardly likely to happen.” “Theocracy has proved disastrous in Europe. And it will prove disastrous here.”

“My own personal view is that it is absolutely necessary to separate the church and the state. As in Turkey. I was a young man when the Turkish revolution occurred; I was thrilled with it, and felt that they were doing the right thing. Yet it was only two days ago that I read Kamal’s long six-day speech. On doing so I realized more than ever how utterly convincing his arguments were; how cogent Turkey’s reasons for [secularism] inevitably are. I am not the only one who thinks this way. Another is our (mutual) friend (...). His reason is that there are so many sects and sub-sects in Islam, there can be no peace or satisfaction unless church and state are separated. My reasons are different: mine are that I feel it impossible to create an apparatus of government to satisfy modern requirements and at the same time conform to what are considered Islamic principles. People would not allow me to say this openly: they would insist on taking the Khilafat al-Rashidah as model, insisting too that political democracy obtained at that time. This is due to an ignorance of (1) the Khilafat al-Rashidah, and (2) the structure of a modern state. Some of the cabinet know this; they say, don’t talk about it, you will merely arouse opposition. Go ahead, rather, slowly building up a democratic government.”

The Westernized intelligentsia who take this stand are prevented from pushing their argument vigorously by the fact that in Pakistan (and for that matter in India) the concept “secular democracy” is a contradiction in terms. Such countries may be secular, but in that case cannot be democratic; or they may be democratic, in which case they cannot be secular. Obviously, a state can be both secular and democratic only if a majority of its inhabitants wish it to be secular. And secularism (the word cannot be translated into any of the Islamic languages; the Turks, after disastrously experimenting with equivalents of “irreligious,” fabricated the term laik, from
the French) is a concept which, as we have previously argued, has meaning only in the Western tradition. It is a thoroughly Western-Christian notion, the counterpart of the concept “church”—which latter is alien to both Hindus and Muslims. A democracy could be secular if most of its citizens were irreligious (perhaps France is the one possible example), or if most of its citizens were, like Christians, exponents of the Caesar/God dichotomy, or, in historical terms, heirs to two separate traditions, a political and a religious, as distinct. Otherwise, either secularism must be imposed by dictatorship (as was done in Turkey) or else democracy must be free to be religious.

This is not to say that this will always remain the case. Turkey, after twenty-five years of imposed secularism, introduced democracy, in the belief that the country, having now tasted the former, would continue to choose it. Similarly that group of Pakistani Muslims who, educated in Western ideologies, favour a secular programme but have none the less chosen democracy from the start, hope that the people, free to choose, can eventually be persuaded to choose modern ways. “There are two ways of creating an ideological state. One: that those in power” (the speaker was one of these, being a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly) “decide what they want and force that on the people, willy-nilly, by ruthless totalitarian methods. This is anathema to us. The other method is to trust the people; to have this much faith, that eventually the people, if guided rightly, will choose rightly. This method is slower, certainly; and there are risks. But we think it is the better method; and it has found, and will find, acceptance in Pakistan.

“There is definitely and emphatically the danger that the mulla, making his appeal emotional, will win the day. That is a risk we run. But essentially it is like this: if the people choose a given thing, no one can stop them. Only, we are hoping that, with education, and all that is going on to-day, the people of Pakistan will choose a progressive interpretation rather than a reactionary. We are prepared, and will take all possible steps to put forward our particular interpretation; and we hope that it will prevail. But it depends on the
people. Of course, when you give the people authority to choose, you run the risk of their choosing wrongly."

To recapitulate our argument, the people of Pakistan have chosen that their state shall be Islamic; and if our analysis is at all sound, it is important that they pursue this, since it is their way of saying that it shall be good. But they have not yet chosen their interpretation of Islam; have not yet decided what they shall consider good. It is quite possible that they will grossly err in that decision; there are many enlightened Pakistanis who are seriously alarmed lest they do. "There is the nightmare of Pakistan’s going back to a rigid, backward, narrow, country"; (a listener:) "I share that nightmare." "For us, the intellectuals, the problem is that Pakistan shall not go back. That it shall not become simply an extension of Afghanistan. It is a nightmare for us." "The danger of the mullah’s coming to power is serious; it would be calamitous." "This is the terror."

In other words, the crucial question for Pakistan—more acute, more pressing, in this case; but essentially the same question as for all the Muslim world—is the interpretation of Islam. What happens in the country depends in a quite fundamental way on how the Muslims, in this new and disrupting age of ours, interpret their religion; on what visions and applications of truth and goodness they are able to rise to.

The converse is also, as always, true: that their interpretation of Islam, the visions and applications to which they will prove able to rise, depends in a fundamental way partly on what happens in the country. In this connection two developments already in operation are fundamental. One, to be considered presently, is the composition and aims of the groups actually in power. The other, on which we have previously touched, is the firm and clear decision that it shall be the people as a whole, and not merely the ulama, who shall finally interpret. The ulama, of course, may, by their prestige or their skill, persuade the people to accept their interpretation. But again, they may not. In any case it will be the people who decide.

This is what Pakistanis mean when they say,
as they stridently do say, that their state is not theocratic. By ‘theocratic’ they mean a counterpart of ‘secular’; namely, rule by a church, by priests. Since Islam has no priesthood, it cannot, they argue, have a theocratic regime. Many of the more sensitive are irritated beyond measure by Western or other non-Muslim identification of ‘Islamic state’ with ‘theocracy’. The irritation betrays a misapprehension of the word ‘theocracy’.

It is none the less significant. “I hope that by now this vicious talk of theocracy, maligning us, has been exploded. Theocracy is rule by priests, which is entirely and by essence foreign to Islam. That slander is finished now, surely.” “We in Pakistan have clearly rejected the mulla. In the Punjab there was a move-

ment; it failed. That failure is of resounding significance.” “They are a static class; and they are ignorant. They simply cannot compete; they have no future. In the next elections, there is precious little likelihood that the Muslim League will put up ulama as candidates; and ulama standing against League candidates will have no chance whatever.”

It remains, of course, to be seen whether the electorate will choose the ulama (or their interpretation of Islam). Yet in any event it is crucial that the ulama will be competing on a democratic platform. It is crucial for the development of Islam as a religion, as well as for that of Pakistan as a country. As one Muslim put it: “Ijma is not confined to the ulama, or the Assembly would not be accepted as it is. After all, the Assembly is a law-making body.”

This is going very far, and the speaker was quite without authority. The distinction between human legislation, even in an Islamic state (sense 1), and divine decree, has not yet been outmoded. Nevertheless, in applying to Pakistan’s parliament the traditional concept of ijma from Islamic jurisprudence, he had some hold of an
elusive verity. The truth is adumbrated if not consummated that Pakistan is have denied to the clergy and given to the people the right to interpret Islam. Pakistan, as we suggested at the outset, as a nation is to some degree, by the very process of constructing itself, elaborating a new twentieth-century, and authoritative, interpretation of the religion. As Pakistan gradually comes into more and more deliberate being, it will be increasingly possible to point to this new nation and to say: "This (at least for these Muslims, for to-day) is what Islam means."

Of course, the construction will never adequately portray the Islamic ideal, not even ever adequately portray the Pakistani Muslims' interpretation of it. But then, no verbal statement, even of the most erudite and pious alim, ever adequately does that, either. Usually, to be sure, it is much easier to approximate to one's apprehension of eternal verities in an expression through words than through actions. Or is it? In any case, at the present time it would seem that Pakistan is making more progress in the practical task of building up the country than in the intellectual task of explaining to itself and to others what it is doing.

The group of men to whom, however temporarily, has been committed the task of working out an interpretation of the Islamic state ideal is (not the ulama or other theorists but) the Constituent Assembly, the government, and the administrative services. These have decided that final authority shall rest with the full electorate, as we have considered; though they themselves (specifically, the Assembly) are, within limits, free to decide when elections are to be held—this is, at what point their interpretation is to be submitted to popular judgment. In the meantime, they are free to interpret—indeed, they are not free not to interpret. They cannot evade the responsibility of working out, whether in detailed application in day-to-day problems or in broadest policy, the concrete significance of their vision of the good.

It is, of course, an undertaking of immense responsibility, religious and other; as well as an undertaking, as we have observed, of immense practical difficulty. The success with which, by and large, they are discharging it redounds very
much to their credit. It has redounded to their credit throughout the rest of the world to an appreciable degree, where Pakistan's achievements are being in many instances favourably noted; it has redounded to their credit, it would seem, fairly effectively within Pakistan itself, despite a moderate amount of criticism and even open discontent. Their hope of being re-elected is presumably not groundless. (And if they succeed, it will indicate that, *pro tanto* and for immediate practical purposes, their interpretation of an Islamic state has been at least formally accepted.)

The actual aims of the administration—as distinct from their motivation, the ground and quality of their loyalty and devotion, which are in varying degrees traditionally Islamic—their actual aims, as revealed both in conversation and in their official programmes and objective accomplishments, are to build Pakistan into a prosperous, progressive, modern industrial semi-social-welfare state. The education of this class has been chiefly at Oxford and Cambridge, or on such a model; their understanding of what is good has been largely coloured by this fact.

Unlike the *ulama* their *ilm* is of the modern world.

They will probably have not too great trouble in persuading the electorate that on the whole they are more competent and reliable to implement their programme than are alternative groups. The real question will be whether they can persuade it that what they are trying to do in Pakistan is actually good. And as we have seen, this consists in part in showing that it is Islamic.

A major crisis, both within the country and within the development of Islam as a religion, would occur if any sizable group, or any sizable portion of the educated leaders, should come to feel that the modernist programme were good but not Islamic. Although perhaps at the most a handful of the secularizers, consciously or by implication, adopt such a position, there is no general indication of so seismic a development.

Otherwise, the problem is to find a means of communication between the modernists and the masses, and indeed a clarification for the modernists themselves; so that they can supple-
ment their concrete interpretation of Islamic polity, worked out in practice, with an intellectual and theological statement. The need is for an integration of the good that they see with the Islam that they know. "Yes, the intellectual problem matters; and it is urgent. For the whole foundation of the state is Islam. To my mind it is a matter of life and death for Pakistan. For if we do not make an appeal on the basis of Islam, the state will not survive. That may be a rash statement; but I feel strongly on the subject." "Pakistan is re-enacting a problem that was constant throughout all Muslim rule here: that the brains and energies of the Muslims were absorbed in administration."

It is somewhat a question whether the intellectualization of their vision is a requisite for continued Pakistani pursuit of a good society, of "the kingdom of God on earth." In any case, the fact is that that pursuit has begun. With boldness, energy, and devotion, the community has set itself to constructing a national embodiment of the vision. There is confusion and faltering, certainly, but there is also remarkable advance.

At every turn they are harassed or coaxed by the interplay of a myriad of forces, hostile, fortuitous, or fortunate, from Kashmir to dollar surpluses, threatening to disrupt or interrupt or divert, to elaborate or circumscribe. In history there is no final result; the series of interim results will be a series of intertwinnings of the multifarious circumstances that face them and of the human, moral, intellectual, and other resources that they are able to bring to bear.

The Pakistan of any moment is necessarily the child of that moment: it is one segment in the cross-section of world development at that point. Pakistanis must take their place in the phalanx of modern humanity; and one of their problems is to learn to communicate with those of their contemporaries across the world who are not Muslims (and vice versa). Yet in addition to this transverse relationship there is the onward movement of their own more individual dynamic: their particular development, from out their special past and towards their own objectives. It is this latter relationship, between a past and a potential future, that
constitutes them as Muslims, and gives meaning to the Islamic aspect of their state. To be Islamic means, for Pakistan, to take its place within the moving stream of Muslim history, coming out of a distinctive past which is given and which is accepted, and looking sub specie aeternitatis toward a future which has yet to be created. It is this stream of continuity which, if anything will, may serve to reintegrate the two senses of "Islamic state" which we have differentiated: the actual and the ideal, out of the past and towards a future. Pakistan lives, of course, always in the present, and must deal with present problems. For these purposes and in these dealings it is a modern state. Yet in so far as, with doing so, it also keeps in conscious and deliberate touch with its Islamic past and develops it by consciously reaching out towards a better future, it is, in addition, an Islamic state.

Not that this outreach is only temporal. Pakistanis can appreciate their heritage, and can strive towards a better future, because they are already, as religious men, in touch with and reaching out towards a good that now, though not mundanely, exists. The transcendent surpasses, but does not exclude, actuality.

Living in the mundane present is itself no mean task: as we have insisted, Pakistanis may not for a moment neglect the matter of making their nation viable. Yet for them, as for all men, living wholly within the mundane present is unworthy of human dignity, as well as disruptive of human history. They, as are the rest of us, are faced in the embattled world of the latter twentieth century with the massive problems of living at all. In addition, as have been all communities since the dawn of history, they are faced with the concurrent question of living well.