INTRODUCTION

The present volume covers a somewhat longer period than those which have immediately preceded it. It opens on October 18, 1748, just after Boscawen had raised the siege of Pondichery, and concludes on March 31, 1750, when the armies of Chandâ Sâhib and Nâsir Jang had come face to face. Within this period however there are two great gaps which the student of the period cannot but regret. The first runs from November 24, 1748, to July 23, 1749; and consequently we lack all detail of the concluding negotiations between Duploix and Chandâ Sâhib of which, so far as published matter goes at present, our information is extremely vague. The second runs from July 28 to September 4, 1749; and consequently we lack the detail of the movements just before the battle of Ambûr, the battle itself, and the events immediately following. This is regrettable because, as we shall see, the Diary suggests a view of the movements of that campaign much at variance with that hitherto received.

Despite these disadvantages, the present volume is, I think, more interesting and more important than its predecessors. For one thing, no part of it has previously been published. Up to the close of the siege of Pondichery, all the more valuable passages had already appeared in the admirable selections of M. Vinson;¹ but these come to a close

¹ Les Français dans l'Inde ..., extraits du Journal d'Audain-
rangappuâli, Paris, 1894.
in October 1748, with the repulse of the English chronicled in the last volume. The present and the remaining instalments of the Diary have the freshness of unpublished matter.

In the second place our diarist has now reached an historical epoch more important and less known than that which preceded it. The early history of Pondicherry, like that of Madras, is largely parochial. It only touches occasionally and by accident on great issues. Even the war of 1744—49, the capture of Madras, and the quarrels of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, afford events of only minor importance, which in no wise affected the issues of the national contest. It is scarcely a paradox to say that the most important event of that period was the storm which shattered the fleet of La Bourdonnais; and that, not because it ruined French sea-power in Eastern waters—in no case could the great French sailor have encountered with success the armament of Boscawen—but because it added 1,200 fighting men to the garrison commanded by Dupleix. The consequences of that augmentation were really important. Without it, Dupleix probably could not have defended Pondicherry against the English, nor could he have intervened with such striking success in Indian politics. The historical importance of Pondicherry and Madras dates from the battle of Ambur.

Of the events leading up to that battle we see something in the earlier part of the following pages.

The news of Chandâ Sâhib’s liberation by the Marathas and his advance at the head of an army, had reached Pondicherry some months before the present volume opens. But the long period of inaction which had ensued had shaken the belief of Dupleix in the reality of the adventurer’s approach. He roundly says he does not believe a word of it, and refuses an offer of Razâ Sâhib’s to pledge jewels for the debt owed by Chandâ Sâhib’s family.¹ But a day or two later he begins to hedge, telling the diarist to write so as to persuade Chandâ Sâhib that his son’s forcible detention in Pondicherry was intended merely to secure the return of his mother.² Just at this point the Diary breaks off, and we do not know the details of the events by which the alliance between Chandâ Sâhib and Dupleix was again knit up. If we may believe the account given in the Company’s Memoir against Dupleix,—Dupleix himself nowhere condescends to more than vague generalities on the topic—an embassy was received towards the end of February at Pondicherry, with the result that Dupleix promised the assistance of a body of Europeans to place Chandâ Sâhib on the mazânâd of Arcot, on condition that he would at once take into his pay 2,000 French sepoys and grant the French the neighbouring district of Villiyanallâr, which they had long been asking from Nâsr Jang in exchange for Madras.

¹ See pp. 8 and 25 infra.
² pp 29-30 infra.
The movements of Chandā Sāhib during this period are yet more obscure. On reconsideration of the matter, I am inclined to think that all the historians have failed to give a correct account of them. Orme and Wilks give us legendary and fantastic stories of wars, defeats, and amazing liberations. In the absence of more explicit information, it seems probable that the year which elapsed between Chandā Sāhib's release from Satāra and his appearance in the Carnatic was spent by him in attempting to bring the Rājā of Bednūr into subjection to Muzaffar Jang as Nawāb of Bijapur—perhaps at first with the vague hope of doing there what he had almost accomplished at Trichinopoly, and establishing himself in an independent position. In the course of the Bednūr war he lost his eldest son, 'Abid Sāhib; he exacted from the Rājā a tribute of 2½ lakhs of rupees for Muzaffar Jang; and then in June 1749, they moved together towards the Carnatic.¹

Vague news of their preparations reached the old Nawāb Anwar-ud-din Khān at Arcot in the course of that month. He also had intelligence that Razā Sāhib at Pondicherry was preparing to join his father. In order to test the intentions of Duplex, he wrote demanding that Razā Sāhib should be turned out of the French settlement.²

¹ See pp. 108 and 107 infra; and also Chandā Sāhib's own brief account, pp. 288-289.
² p. 108 infra.
A day or two later came news of the precautions which the Nawâb had thought it wise to take. He had sent his family off to various places of safety, paid up the arrears of his army, and written to Muzaffar Jang to learn what terms could be got. By this time, also, Arcot was thoroughly alarmed; merchants were removing their property; and not a bullock could be had.¹ On July 10, Dupleix had news that the invaders had reached Đêvanahalli, with 14,000 horse and 15,000 foot.²

Immediately all preparations were made to despatch Râzâ Sâhib with the promised 2,000 sepoys under 'Abd-ul-rahmân and 300 European volunteers under d’Auteuil. Râzâ Sâhib was called upon to execute bonds for the payment of the troops, as had been previously agreed, and to make the promised grant for Villiyanallûr. Within a few days more, he, d’Auteuil and 'Abd-ul-rahmân had marched for Arcot.³

What follows is largely divergent from the accepted version of events. It has been usually supposed that Chandâ Sâhib advanced through the Dâmalcheruva Pass, through which the Marathas had advanced in 1740; that Anwar-ud-din lay at Ambûr; that the French and their allies effected a junction, routed Anwar-ud-din, and then occupied Arcot.⁴ But this story in itself offers considerable difficulties. Ambûr does not lie on the

¹ p. 110 infra. ² p. 128 infra. ³ pp. 111, 124, 129 and 134 infra. ⁴ Malleson, French in India, p. 287.
road which would lead an invading army from Dāmalcheruvu to Arcot. It is not apparent, then, why Anwar-ud-dīn should have taken post there, or why Chandā Sāhib should have turned aside from Arcot to meet him. Why should Anwar-ud-dīn have thus abandoned his capital, and why should his rival have neglected to seize it?

But according to the news which reached Ranga Pillai, the movements of the armies were very different. Chandā Sāhib did not enter the Carnatic from the north, but from the west, by what was called the Chengama Pass. Anwar-ud-dīn advanced to meet him and seems to have taken up a position which barred the enemy’s moving towards Pondichery. He is asserted to have had with him but a fifth of the forces that accompanied the invaders.¹

Meanwhile Razā Sāhib had moved northward, and on July 26 news came that he had reached Arcot; Chandā Sāhib was believed to be at Sahādev, and the Nawāb still at Chengama.²

In that position Ranga Pillai leaves the three armies, and does not tell us how they came to meet at Ambūr. Probably Chandā Sāhib moved towards Arcot, joined the French at Pallikonda³ and then turned back to encounter Anwar-ud-dīn moving after him. We must probably give up the traditional entrenchments which d’Auteuil had so much difficulty to storm. In any case on August 3, Anwar-ud-dīn perished there; his elder son, Mahfuz Khān, was made a prisoner; and the younger, Muhammad ‘Ali, escaped to Trichinopoly.

When the Diary reopens a month later, the victors are still at Arcot; the province has in general submitted, and the refractory kildar of Chēppattu is being coerced into making terms. The French officers, who had found Chandā Sāhib slow in rewarding their valor, were given a donation of 20,000 rupees and sent in advance towards Pondichery, whither Chandā Sāhib and Muzaffar Jang followed at the end of the month.

There they remained some time, discussing their future plans. It has been said that this delay was caused by the presence of Boscawen’s squadron on the Coast. That may well have been the case; but Orme’s belief¹ that Boscawen himself wished to intervene and was only hindered from doing so by Floyer’s refusal to make an official request to that effect, seems to me difficult to accept. The English had already decided to support Muhammad ‘Ali;² one cannot therefore suppose that they shrank from the responsibility for intervention. Moreover, in a lengthy despatch, describing the political situation on the Coast at this moment, Boscawen does not breathe a word of any wish to remain.³ He left the Coast in consequence of orders from the

² Malleson (French in India, p. 241) is mistaken in supposing that Floyer shrank from “the support of a pretender in arms”.
³ Boscawen to Bedford, May 26, 1760 (P.R.O., C.O., 77—16).
Admiralty sufficiently categorical to explain his departure even at so remarkable a crisis.

Chandā Sāhib and Muzaffar Jang then set out to replenish their purses, rather than to complete their conquests. They moved southwards, towards Tanjore, but Chandā Sāhib turned aside to exact tribute from Udayārpālaiyam. He spent about a fortnight there, and then, having received 70,000 pagodas, he rejoined Muzaffar Jang, and the two appeared before Tanjore in December 1749.

Here again Ranga Pillai shows the accepted version to be exceedingly erroneous. Malleson makes him arrive before that city on November 7, when in fact he was still in the neighbourhood of Pondichery. The same writer descants upon the mortification of Dupleix at learning that his allies had diverted from the road to Trichinopoly to attack Tanjore. Nothing could be more inaccurate. Dupleix manifests the greatest interest in the Tanjore affair. He inquires eagerly of the diarist whether Chandā Sāhib will really get from the Rājā the half-crore he talks of; and himself writes to Chandā Sāhib to express his pleasure at hearing he has settled with Udayārpālaiyam and is advancing against Tanjore.

On December 20 the news reached Pondichery that the allied troops had surrounded the city, and two days later that on December 17 the French under Duquesne had not only driven the enemy from an outpost but also captured one of the gates. The current version places the latter event on December 28, apparently by a confusion of the New and Old styles. On this the Rājā sought terms, but seems to have been so alarmed at the demands made that he suddenly attacked his enemies and is related to have driven them from the gate which they had been holding. Shortly after this he agreed to pay Chandā Sāhib 70 lakhs of rupees and to make a donation of 6,60,000 rupees apparently to 'Abd-ul-rahmān's sepoys. On this Chandā Sāhib's army withdrew to a short distance from the walls.

It has usually been supposed that Chandā Sāhib continued in the neighbourhood of Tanjore owing to the guile of the Rājā who, as far as possible, delayed the payments which he had agreed to make; and that this delay brought about the second beleaguement of the place in the month of February. The delays of the Rājā were probably considerable and intentional. But it was his old passion for conquest that held Chandā Sāhib at Tanjore and made him besiege the place again. On February 10 Dupleix interviewed a confidential messenger, charged according to oriental custom with proposals which their author preferred not to write down. The first of these was to the effect that Chandā Sāhib had only refrained from capturing

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2. pp. 313 and 321-322 infra.
Tanjore out of consideration for the Marathas; but now that news had come of the Sahu Rājā's death, he proposed capturing the place and begged the orders of Dupleix, to both the French troops and the sepoys, that they should abstain from plunder.

That Dupleix should have concurred in this singular proposal, provided it did not arouse the hostility of the Marathas, can surprise no one. He himself proposed the same thing to the French Company not long after. However he warned his ally to take the place by capitulation rather than by storm, for in the latter case he was sure the sepoys could not be restrained from plunder. Chandā Sāhib, we know, refused to allow Goupil to attack the city on February 24; and it appears then that Tanjore was saved from capture neither by the deceitful wiles of the king, nor by the panic which the approach of Nāsīr Jang was to cause, but by the fact that Chandā Sāhib was anxious to secure the treasure in the city for himself, and that he feared the consequences of a storm.

This curious incident shows that the French, no more than ourselves, had as yet converted their sepoys into a dependable force. In a previous volume the diarist has alluded to the misconduct of an English commandant of sepoys, Bikkan Khān. In the present volume he illustrates the attitude taken up by the principal French commandant, Shaikh 'Abd-ul-rahmān or Muzaffar Khān. We find him committing people to custody without authority. Razā Sāhib complains of his demands. His troops are disinclined to march. He intrigue with Chāndā Sāhib to deprive Imām Sāhib's son of his father's jaghirs and to secure them for himself. He obtains from the Rājā of Tanjore a bond for a large amount; and though several persons, including himself, admit its issue, the bond disappears and cannot be produced in spite of all Dupleix' inquiries; but Dupleix fears to punish him because of the approach of Nāsīr Jang.

This last event had been long foretold and long discredited. In November 1749, news of his preparations had almost made Muzaffar Jang abandon his enterprise and endeavour to secure his own countries by withdrawing thither and (probably) making his submission. But a month later Dupleix was still refusing to believe in the reality of the danger; he thought that Nāsīr Jang was too deeply involved in hostility with the Marathas to make so distant an excursion which would leave his northern territories exposed to their raids. Even at the close of January he and Chāndā Sāhib were buoying themselves up with the hope that Nāsīr Jang's followers would prove friends of Muzaffar Jang; not until news was received of emissaries coming from the Subahdar with offers of terms, did Dupleix

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1 pp. 362-363 infra.
2 See Vol. IV, pp. 120, etc.
really apprehend trouble, and even then he chiefly feared a settlement in which French interests would be disregarded. His message was that he, Chandā Sāhib and Muzaffar Jang were as three heads under one hat and that no peace should be made without his consent.  

The actual entrance of Nāsir Jang into the province, preceded by Morārī Rāo and a cloud of Marathas, took Dupleix by surprise. He had not credited the repeated warnings he had received, and had ascribed Muzaffar Jang’s uneasiness to discontent with the subordinate part he was playing before Tanjore. A day or two after he had learnt of the invasion, he heard that Chandā Sāhib had hastily broken up his camp and was flying for shelter towards Pondichery. La Touche, the French commandant, described the alarm of the two leaders as extreme.

At last on March 13 Chandā Sāhib reached Pondichery. He proposed to lie within shelter of the town until the great host of the enemy should have eaten up the country and be compelled to withdraw by hunger. The diarist actually feared to interpret to Dupleix his panic-stricken words, and it was with difficulty that Dupleix succeeded in reanimating his uncertain courage to the point of moving towards the invaders. His son, however, displayed a worthier spirit, asking, in reply to his mother’s prayer that he should remain in Pondichery, “What could be worse than to remain idle here while my father goes to battle?”

Nāsir Jang however was offering terms. The volume closes with reports of the offers made by his bakhshi to the two pretenders. He was, it seems, prepared to give both of them jaghirs and to repay their debt to the French. Dupleix himself expressed satisfaction and told his allies that he approved whether they decided for peace or war. Neither he nor anyone else had the least conception that they were on the eve of four years’ relentless though unacknowledged war with that nation which they had just foiled so completely both at Pondichery and Madras.

Yet there again they had had ample warning. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had restored Madras to the English. The rendition of the place was carried out in August 1749, and the old inhabitants, whom Dupleix had made every effort to bring to Pondichery, flocked back to their ruined homes as gladly as though the whole fort and town had belonged to each one of them. English prestige had been dimmed; but evidently it had not disappeared. But Dupleix looked to their total extinction. They had provoked the Tanjoreans by a very ill-judged attack in favour of Shāhji. Chandā Sāhib would appear as the French nominee for the Nawābship. So early as July 1749, in one.
of those irritable speeches which Dupleix was wholly unable to restrain, he declared that Maratha and Muslim would unite to expel the English from the Coromandel Coast.

Nor had Dupleix the prudence to conceal his designs. After the victory of Ambur, the French received grants of territory bordering on that which the English held round Fort St. David. As if that was not enough, Dupleix endeavoured to retain control over St. Thomé as a post of observation from which to watch and inconvenience the English at Madras. He procured from Razâ Sâhib an order empowering one of Madame’s relatives to seize the former amaldâr of St. Thomé. This relative was a priest named Antonio Noronha, a man of loose life and intriguing spirit, who had already acted as intelligence to Dupleix, and who was ten years later as Bishop of Halicarnassus to act as political agent to the unfortunate Lally. He was appointed amaldâr of St. Thomé by Chandâ Sâhib at Madame’s special request. But St. Thomé was also an ancient Portuguese settlement, where, although all political organization had long vanished, the half-caste Portuguese who dwelt there still claimed some shadowy rights of independence. In order to secure this additional support of his scheme, Dupleix persuaded the Viceroy of Goa to name his relative procurator of the Portuguese at St. Thomé.

These measures were hostile to the English, so intended and so understood. They retaliated. In September Boscawen seized St. Thomé under a grant from Muhammad ’Ali; Noronha’s correspondence which was discovered, proved his unfriendly intentions against the English; he was carried off to Europe by Boscawen, and the English understood how much they had to fear from Dupleix.

In September they had, as we have just seen, obtained from Muhammad ’Ali a grant of St. Thomé. That action, followed as it was by the seizure and deportation of Chandâ Sâhib’s amaldâr, was, one would have supposed, a challenge of the plainest nature. It was followed in the next month by the despatch of a body of men to Muhammad ’Ali at Trichinopoly. In fact the English learnt Dupleix’ lesson with greater promptness than they have usually been credited with. They saw at a glance the advantages which would accrue to the French from the establishment of a French Nawâb. They also saw the advantages that the English would obtain if they assisted in the overthrow of the usurper; and just as Dupleix had despatched d’Anteuil to help Chandâ Sâhib in the belief that there would be no serious fighting, so too did the Governor of St. David’s, Charles Floyer, send help to Muhammad ’Ali, confident that at Nasir Jang’s coming the rebellion would collapse with hardly a struggle. This was the motive which led them to reject the overtures which Chandâ Sâhib made to them in October, even after the affair of St. Thomé. They did all in their power to hasten the coming of Nasir Jang. They secured a further grant from Muhammad ’Ali for the lands on their boundary
where the French had set up their flags, occupied them, and pulled the flags down. 'To the angry letters which Dupleix' intrigues obtained from Goa about St. Thomé, they coolly replied that that town had long ceased to be a dependency of Portugal or to fly the flag. When Nâsîr Jang at last arrived in the Carnatic, they sent Lawrence to join him with a body of troops.

This was not what Dupleix had expected. He had hoped they would look on quietly while he established a new Nawâb in the Carnatic, and encircled their settlements with French territory. He had supposed they would swallow whole so large a mouthful as a Portuguese St. Thomé under the government of the nephew of Madame Dupleix. But with an admirable common sense, they declined to be led away into subtle discussions of international right. St. Thomé had not been Portuguese for 50 years. Chandâ Sâhib's grants were all invalid for he had become Nawâb by an act of rebellion against the existing and legitimate authorities. Dupleix, they said, could not shelter behind the technicalities of Moghul custom after himself overturning it. They stood forth therefore as the defenders of the old system against him who had subverted it. It cannot be denied that Dupleix' schemes threatened the existence of English trade; hence the justification of the resistance which they had offered by their political, and were now about to offer by their military action.

ANANDA RANGA PILLAI'S DIARY.

OCTOBER 1748.

Friday, October 18.—The Governor received the following news this morning:

The light of the burning timber, etc., at Ariyân-kuppam was seen at seven o'clock last night. I had already told the Governor when we were upstairs that the English had set fire to their camp and were retreating; and news came at six o'clock this morning that they had withdrawn to the Reddi's Choultry. The Governor at once sent five or six hundred sepoys, European troopers and Muhammadan peons, under M. Duquesne, ordering him to send word how matters stood and where the English army was. So M. Duquesne and the rest marched to Ariyân-kuppam, hoisted our flag there, and sent out scouts to find the enemy; then learning that the English were moving towards Fort St. David by way of Tâkkânâmpâkkam, they reported this to the Governor. Thereon he drove out to Ariyân-kuppam; and, when he returned at eleven o'clock, he sent for me and said: 'None of the Nayinâr's peons are there yet. Can't you send out and have it seen to? Must you wait till I give orders about everything?' Tell the Nayinâr to

1 6th Argyâî, Vikhuââ.