INTRODUCTION.

Though the following pages comprise Ranga Pillai’s Diary for the period April 1, 1750, to April 30, 1751, the matter is distributed very unevenly, for almost the whole deals with the events of the seven months April to October, 1750. So far the record is practically continuous, save for two minor lacunae from August 11 to September 1, and from September 12 to October 7. On October 29 however begins a larger and more deplorable gap, which continues until April 16 of the following year. The minor gaps mentioned above do not greatly concern us. The principal event we should have found described is Bussy’s capture of Gingee; and the diarist is seldom illuminating on military matters. The longer break is much more regrettable. We should probably have learnt a great deal, had this portion of the Diary survived, or been accessible, regarding the French negotiations with Nāṣīr Jang which were just being renewed at the close of October. We might have had clearer evidence than exists at present about the circumstances under which the French troops attacked Nāṣīr Jang’s camp in the early morning of December 16; and learnt whether the alleged mistake, under which the attack
was delivered, just at the moment when Dupleix had made peace, was genuine or false. We should certainly have had a full account of the pompous ceremonies with which Muzaﬀar Jang was received at Pondicherry, the agreements with the Pathans, and the reward secured by Dupleix himself.

But although so much of what would probably have been very valuable appears to be lost, the present instalment of the Diary contains a large amount of new and curious information. On April 1, 1750, N.S., the situation was briefly thus: Naṣīr Jang, Subahdar of the seven provinces of the South, lay encamped at Valudāvūr, some 7 miles west of Pondicherry, with a large army composed of Moghul and Maratha horse, drawn from the wide-spread districts of his rule. There was with him also an English embassy, headed by Major Lawrence, and a small and inefficient English force under the immediate command of Captain Cope. Facing them was the smaller array of Chandā Sāhib and Muzaﬀar Jang, supported by a contingent of French under d'Auteuil, much larger than that which the English had been able to spare. Orme states their numbers at 2,000 and 600 respectively.

However the French troops were unreliable, and their officers demoralised. The officers who had served in the inglorious campaign before Tanjore had succeeded in obtaining donations from Chandā Sāhib, without incurring any great risk to life or limb. Many of these had insisted, on their return to Pondicherry, that it was time they were relieved in the tour of field-duty; and those who had replaced them marched reluctantly on a service which promised harder blows and fewer rewards. However they had been placated by the advance of a month’s batta on behalf of Chandā Sāhib; and it was hoped that this would confirm their faltering courage. But the news that they would have to encounter European troops with Naṣīr Jang more than counterbalanced the good effects of this advance. They renewed their representations. Dupleix sent out Bury, the commandant of the Pondicherry garrison, to bring them to reason. He returned, professing to have done so; but on April 4, N.S., Naṣīr Jang advanced and a prolonged cannonade ensued between

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1 After the action of April 4, N. S., Cope and d'Auteuil exchanged mutual recriminations regarding the breach of peace between their nations (French Correspondence, 1750, pp. 6–7). Oddly enough, Lawrence ascribes this correspondence to himself (Cambridge, History, p. 6). No doubt he inspired Cope’s answer, but does not seem to have been in direct command, and certainly neither was addressed by d'Auteuil nor signed the answer to him.

2 Captains, 400 rupees a month; Lieutenants, 250; Sous-Lieutenants, 200; Ensigns, 175.
the two armies. Little material harm was done on either side; but that evening 13 French officers insisted on resigning their commissions and returning immediately to Pondicherry. Considering that this took place in view of the enemy, we must, I think, regard it as even more disgraceful than the mutiny of the English officers in Bengal in 1766.

The consequence of this action was considerable. The soldiers naturally regarded the position as desperate; and d'Auteuil had no alternative but to retreat hastily to Pondicherry. He moved off at four o'clock next morning; but in the darkness and confusion, abandoned not only a body of French artillery-men, but also Muzaffar Jang, who surrendered himself immediately to his uncle.

In spite of their extraordinary misconduct, Dupleix had considerable difficulty in bringing the mutinous officers to justice. Strange as it may appear, their cause was not unpopular in Pondicherry. Commissaries were named to try them, but proceeded with great laxity and partiality. The Procureur-Général communicated to the accused the most confidential documents of the Secretariat. In the long run Dupleix had to suspend the tribunal and break the accused by a resolution of the Conseil supérieur. Eleven were sent to Europe; one was allowed to go to China; and the remaining one was permitted to stay with his family in India.

Meanwhile Nāṣir Jang had to be reckoned with. On April 4, when Dupleix was not too certain of the conduct of his officers, he had already written to the Subahdar. On the 6th he wrote again, explaining with matchless impudence that he had withdrawn his troops in order to facilitate peace. A few days later messengers arrived, saying that Nāṣir Jang desired peace, but still no letter came; so Dupleix wrote yet again, saying that, as his overtures had been ignored, he was again sending out his troops.

The same day there came a messenger from Lawrence, offering to mediate with Nāṣir Jang. Nothing could have angered Dupleix more. He agrees with the diarist that it would be better to seek a sweeper’s mediation, and the messenger was dismissed with the choicest vituperation—Ranga Pillai not only repeating

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1 My principal authority for this is Dupleix’ despatch to the Company of October 3, 1750, in which he enters into great detail (Arch. des Col.). Dupleix’ word was not worth very much, and he was as capable of disguising unpleasant truths as any statesman who ever lived. It is therefore possible that the officers had some other motive than mere greed of money. But it would demand an extraordinary motive indeed to justify an officer in quitting his colours in the face of the enemy.

2 Infra, p. 10.


4 Infra, p. 32.
Dupleix’ words but adding somewhat of his own.

Meanwhile the third letter with its threat proved more persuasive than the first two; and two Company’s servants, du Bausset and Delarche, were sent as envoys to the enemy’s camp. They set out on April 19 and returned on the 23rd, for Náṣir Jang would neither release Muzaffar Jang nor give Arcot to Chandâ Sâhib. But Delarche brought back a secret message, which he whispered in Dupleix’ ear. Almost certainly this related to the intrigue which Dupleix wished to establish in the enemy’s camp, by winning over some principal supporters of Náṣir Jang, such as the Pathan Nawâbs of Cuddapah, Sávanûr, and Kurnool.

As the embassy had not procured peace, Dupleix then resolved to try the appearance of force again. When d’Auteuil had brought his shaken troops back to the Blanchisserie—a large building lying to the north of the city—Dupleix had visited them in person and endeavoured to rekindle their spirit. He seems to have succeeded, for he described a curious scene:—‘Toute la troupe fit un cercle autour de moy, et chaque soldat s’empressa à me
demander si j’étois content de luy. Les mêmes fairoient la même demande à leurs officiers, ceux-cy aux soldats; la satisfaction étoit réciproque.3” Accordingly the troops were pushed forward to Olukaraï; and on the night of April 27 a party of 300 men set out under Prévost de La Touche to beat up the Moghul camp. The attack was made two hours before dawn; and although the execution done was probably slight, it undoubtedly demoralised the enemy. It was the first of a score of such night-attacks, made by both French and English, almost all of which were equally successful. Náṣir Jang promptly resolved to withdraw to Arcot and pass the hot weather there.

Almost immediately afterwards the English marched back to Fort St. David. They had not succeeded in much. Their military advice had been ignored.4 They had performed no conspicuous military service. They had failed to obtain the grants they desired for the country lying round Madras and St. David’s. They were told that they should have these grants if they would accompany Náṣir Jang

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1 *Infra*, p. 33.
2 Ophe and other authorities give them a week.
3 *Infra*, p. 67.
4 See *Mémoire pour le sieur Godheu*, p. 28.
5 See the despatch of Dupleix cited above. It should be added that the French had behaved well in the retreat.
6 Lawrence claimed with great justice that, had Náṣir Jang placed himself between the French and Pendicherry before attacking them on April 4, not a man could have escaped.
to Arcot; but they were weary of intrigues which they could only feel without being able to follow, and departed sulkily— if Ranga Pillai's information was correct, they were dismissed with slight ceremony¹.

We are now able—I believe for the first time—to follow with tolerable accuracy the events which in the next few months centred round Arcot. The wretched Muzaffar Jang was no sooner in his uncle's hands than he longed to be out of them again; and this, it would seem, more out of sheer instability of mind than the rigour of his treatment. Indeed close imprisonment was seldom practised in India. We have already seen the latitude enjoyed by Chandâ Sâhib at Satâra. Muzaffar Jang, though probably more narrowly confined, never seems to have been at a loss for communication with his friends either in Nâsîr Jang's camp or at Pondicherry. Ranga Pillai mentions several letters to Dupleix and Chandâ Sâhib, which plainly indicate the vicissitudes of feeling through which he passed. First of all he desires his family to be sent to him. Then he decides that escape is his only means of safety, and gets 2,000 rupees for that purpose; but as usual spends them on some other end. A week later he despairs of life. He is reported to have attempted suicide. Then an attempt is made to procure his escape by cutting a hole through the wall of the house in which he was confined. Then again he is petitioning Nâsîr Jang and convinced that he may be saved if only his mother is released by Dupleix. In short the misfortune of his imprisonment, brought about as it was by his own inconstancy of mind, shows up in relief an unheroic nature placed by chance on a scene too large and exigent.

His uncle and captor, Nâsîr Jang, hardly shows to more advantage, although the contemptuous account of him afterwards given by Dupleix and repeated by Malleson does him something less than justice. Though no strategist, as is shown by his refusal to take Lawrence's advice before the action of April 4 and interpose between the French and Pondicherry, he did not lack personal bravery; and his retreat to Arcot after the action of April 28 was probably due in part to the military necessity of finding forage for his cavalry, in part to the difficulty of keeping his heterogeneous army together. The surrender of Muzaffar Jang enabled him to withdraw with a show of success. However there was one considerable difficulty in his way. His sister, the mother of Muzaffar Jang, was in Pondichery, and Dupleix would not allow her to depart. It looked, as

¹ [Footnote: Ibra, p. 115.]}
the Nawâb of Cuddapah is said to have urged upon the Subahdar, very much as if she was being detained as 'a pawn for debt in a European town.' Either Pondichery must be taken or peace be made on reasonable terms. The first was regarded as a practical impossibility—the Moghuls had always considered European forts as much too strong to be taken except by blockade, and Sirâj-ud-daulah's capture of Calcutta in 1756 was as much a surprise to himself as to the English. There remained the second plan; and in order to compel Dupleix to give better terms, it was resolved to seize the French factories to the northward, at Masulipatam and Yânâm. This was naturally done with great ease. It was indeed asserted by the French (and repeated even by so excellent a historian as the late M. Cultru) that the English at Ingeram assisted in the seizure of Yânâm; but the correspondence of the chief at Ingeram shows that the English took no part in the matter.

This provoked an entirely unexpected retort. Dupleix despatched a small expedition by sea from Pondichery, which at once captured Masulipatam—the more easily because the fâujdar lived with his peons outside the fort. Masulipatam was taken by La Tour on July 2/13.

This however was but an interlude in the negotiations and intrigues which were in fact proceeding between Arcot and Pondichery. At first Nâsîr Jang had decided to bestow the Carnatic on Muhammad 'Ali, second son of the late Nawâb Anwar-ud-din, who was strong in promises of English support; but for the sake of a settlement, Chandâ Sâhib might have Trichinopoly and Tanjore. Dupleix was not willing to accede to this arrangement, which was proposed at the end of April; but in the middle of May, when an offer was made to bestow Arcot on Chandâ Sâhib if his behaviour was satisfactory for four months, the French Governor decided that this concession was worth accepting; and although his policy was as yet entirely unformulated and shapeless, we find him sending a secret message to Nâsîr Jang that, if he will grant the French Masulipatam and the dependent country, they will send 4,000 soldiers to overthrow all his enemies and conquer the country for him as far as Delhi. The theory of legitimacy, by which he subsequently proved Nâsîr Jang to be the basest of usurpers, was of

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1 Cultru, *Dupleix*, pp. 292 and 294. The Ingeram Correspondence occurs in the *Letters to F. St. D.*, 1750.


3 *Infra*, pp. 121, etc.

4 *Infra*, pp. 145, etc.
course intended only for English consumption.

However these discussions came to nothing, although at the end of the month it was proposed (so far as the ambiguous terms employed yield a meaning) that Dupleix should conquer Tanjore for the Muhammadans, and receive in return further territory round Kârikâl. In spite of Dupleix' indignant amazement at the news, Nâsîr Jang had in fact decided to revert to his first plan, and granted the Carnatic to Muhammad 'Alî Khân. This was actually done on May 11, N.S.² But the factions, into which the darbâr seems to have been divided, prevented his receiving whole-hearted support even when he had been formally appointed. Dupleix was at once advised by the other party to seize the fort at Valudâvâr, evidently with a view to discrediting Muhammad 'Alî Khân³. Meanwhile another intrigue with a more definite purpose had sprung up. Dupleix was informed that if Saiyid Lashkar Khân could not persuade Nâsîr Jang to release his prisoner, he would rebel and imprison Nâsîr Jang himself⁴. In June came news of a serious dispute between the Subahdar and the Pathan Nawâbs, arising out of the former's claim to peshkash⁵.

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¹ _infra_, p. 194.  
² _infra_, p. 157.  
³ _infra_, p. 280.  
⁴ _infra_, p. 175.  
⁵ _infra_, p. 289.  

This was much too promising to be passed over. Within a few days Dupleix and Chandâ Sâhib were busily arranging to despatch a secret messenger to weave together the threads of revolt; and the latter was authorized to promise no less than 7 lakhs of rupees to the conspirators.¹ These however either felt too weak to attempt to overthrow Nâsîr Jang without the certain aid of European troops or else were too half-hearted to make any motion of themselves. The next news we get is of the despatch of a messenger from Arcot to Pondicherry, saying that if the French will attack Muhammad 'Alî Khân in the Ginge country, the Pathan troops under him will mutiny and murder him, and then the French and Pathans can march together on Arcot². Thus at every step this plot recalls that by which Siraj-ud-daulah was overthrown in Bengal; and the Pathans were to prove in the event only a little more resolute allies than Clive found in Mîr J'afar and his supporters.

Meanwhile, the French had been attempting to occupy that part of the country lying to the south and west of Pondicherry,—an attempt which was chiefly obstructed by the dissatisfaction of their ill-paid sepoys. In June we learn that they had at last got possession of Viliyanallûr and Tiruviti. These attempts

¹ _infra_, pp. 303, etc.  
² _infra_, pp. 343, etc.
drew down Muhammad 'Ali Khān into that part of the country; and, as he could not face the French without English help, incidentally involved the grant of those countries which in the previous April they had sought in vain from Nāṣir Jang. Almost the last official act of Charles Floyer (who ceased to be Governor on July 6/17) was the submission to his Council of Muhammad 'Ali's proposal to pay 10,000 rupees a month for English help until the Poonamallee country had been actually handed over to them. It was decided to send out a body of 600 Europeans and Topasses.

They took the field on June 30/July 11, under the luckless command of Captain James Cope, but accomplished little beyond protecting Muhammad 'Ali from French attacks. Indeed there was still at this time a marked reluctance on both sides to come to blows. Thus after some three weeks' aimless marching and countermarching, it was proposed to escalate Tiruviti, which the French had garrisoned with a sergeant's party; the Nawāb 'liked the scheme,' says Joseph Smith, who was actually serving with Cope, 'but his troops begged to be excused, so nothing was effected. The two nations having never

1 The fort at Poonamallee was occupied with Muhammad 'Ali's consent on September 13/24; but the farman for the country was received only on January 9/20, 1751, after Nāṣir Jang's death.

committed any hostilities against each other, our commandant could not begin.'

Lawrence, however, whom chance had placed for a while in sole command at St. David's as he was the only member of Council present who was continued in his functions, ordered Cope to bring the French to action. On July 21/August 1, the English marched to engage the French. They were found entrenched in a large tope with 10 guns. After a prolonged cannonade in which the English had the worst of the exchange, Cope withdrew, as the enemy's position was too strong to be attacked with the small number of Europeans at his disposal. Three weeks later he was ordered back to St. David's, as his presence in the field seemed quite useless.

This was a serious blunder, for Cope's presence in the field had constrained the French into inaction; but Lawrence, a gallant and skilful soldier, was a most indifferent politician, devoid alike of courage and imagination. Dupleix took instant advantage of his blunder. The French troops in the field were at once reinforced and ordered to attack Muhammad 'Ali. They did so on August 21/September 1 near Tiruviti. La Tour commanded the right wing, Bussy the left, and d'Auteuil the centre.

1 Orme MSS., India, II, ff. 311-312.
2 Public Despatch to England, October 24, 1750.
Their victory was complete. Muhammad 'Ali's camp and all his artillery—30 guns and 2 mortars bearing the arms of Great Britain, we are told—fell into the hands of the French. The joy in Pondichery was extreme. *A Te deum* was sung; salvos of artillery were fired; Chandâ Sâhib distributed sugar to the populace; and all the more eminent inhabitants of Pondichery assembled at a ball at Dupleix' house (on the very site where the *Gouvernement* still stands). In his exultation Dupleix assured the merchants that all the troubles were over and that now at last they would be able to trade in peace.¹

And the events of the next four months seemed with delusive prosperity to be realizing his utmost expectations. The French leaders did not halt long to enjoy their success at Tiruvitâ. Bussy with his great military talent perceived the necessity of pressing after the enemy; he inspired Dupleix with the same spirit; and Dupleix forced the inactive d'Auteuil into something like energy.² Nevertheless it was not till September 11, that Bussy with an advanced detachment arrived before Gingee, not 40 miles away. There he was attacked by a strong party of the fugitives, but beat them off with ease, and, on d'Auteuil's arrival with the main body, at once carried the fortress of Gingee by a *coup de main*. This was a feat which we hardly rivalled until 40 years later under Cornwallis we stormed certain of the rock-forts in Mysore.

After this, however, d'Auteuil seemed strangely resolved to rest on Bussy's laurels. Dupleix wrote, urging him to advance at once, in the expectation that the Pathans would seize the opportunity to overthrow Nâsîr Jâng, news of which he was expecting with great impatience.³ D'Auteuil did actually venture to push on as far as Cheâtpattu, but on hearing that Nâsîr Jâng had reached Dèsûr, (some 20 miles away), he withdrew to the neighbourhood of Gingee, alleging in his defence that the Pathan proposals must have been made only to deceive the French.⁴ About this time too this languid officer seems to have demanded his recall, complaining of sickness, of the rains (which this year began with unusual earliness and severity), and of his men's reluctance to remain in the field.⁵ Dupleix had much ado to prevent his marching his troops back to

¹ *Mémoire pour le sieur Dupleix*, p. 67.
² *Infra*, pp. 269, etc.
⁴ *Public Despatch to England, February 7, 1754*.
⁵ Dupleix to d'Auteuil, *ap. Hamont, Dupleix*, p. 130.
Pondichery\textsuperscript{1}, and forwarded to him every scrap of encouraging news that he received\textsuperscript{2}. But he felt indignant at the way in which his orders to advance had been neglected, and told the diarist towards the end of October that, had d’Auteuil only done as he was told, Nāsr Jang would already have been either a corpse or a prisoner\textsuperscript{3}.

Meanwhile the French successes at Tiruviti and Gingee had compelled Nāsr Jang to move from Arcot; but the early break of the North-East monsoon embarrassed him enormously. His artillery with great exertions could only cover four miles a day; and numbers of baggage-animals died for lack of fodder\textsuperscript{4}. By the end of October however he reached a position only a league distant from the French at Gingee\textsuperscript{5}; the two armies were separated by a river which the rains had for the time being rendered impassable.

In spite of the neighbourhood of the French troops, the Pathans still hesitated to strike, although their hostility to the Subahdar was now the common talk of the camp\textsuperscript{6}. At the beginning of October they had sent to Dupleix a man named 'Abd-ul-lah (probably the Turk who knew twelve languages, whom Ranga

\textsuperscript{1} Dupleix’ Letters ap. Hamont, Dupleix, pp. 132, 133.
\textsuperscript{2} Infra, pp. 387, etc., and 401, etc.
\textsuperscript{3} Infra, p. 415.
\textsuperscript{4} Infra, p. 401.
\textsuperscript{5} Infra, p. 420.
\textsuperscript{6} Infra, p. 420.

\textsuperscript{1} Cultru, Dupleix, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{2} Infra, p. 422.
with the Subahdar intended only to lull him into a false security until the weather would permit the French to move? My personal opinion inclines to the latter view, as being on the whole the more probable.

In any case de La Touche, who had replaced the gouty d’Auteuil in command of the French, marched on the night of December 5/16, and reached Nāṣīr Jang’s outposts at four in the morning. He attacked at once, and a lively action ensued which lasted till eight o’clock. The French pressed on into the camp, keeping off with artillery fire the swarms of horse that hung on their flanks. Nāṣīr Jang was awakened, but, before proceeding to the scene of conflict, he scrupulously performed all the Mussalman rites of prayer and purification. These finished, he rode forth on his elephant, and, finding the Pathans drawn up apart and taking no share in the battle, advanced to upbraid them for their backwardness. One of the Nawāb’s—the accounts differ as to which actually committed the deed—then shot him with a carbine; the fallen prince’s head was struck off, and carried round the camp in proof of the triumph of the conspirators; and the captive Muzaffar Jang was at once acknowledged as Subahdar. At four o’clock that afternoon the people of Pondicherry witnessed the strange sight of Chaudā Sāhib hurrying on foot to the Gouvernement. He was carrying the glad news to Dupleix.

There followed such festivities as no European settlement had ever seen, with salutes, elaborate darbārs and processions of gaily dressed horsemen and richly caparisoned elephants. The support of the French was rewarded by grants of lands round Pondicherry and Kārikāl and of the town and district of Masulipatam. Moreover, Dupleix was named Nawāb of all the country from the river Kistna to Cape Comorin. M. Cultru regarded this last as a mere honorific suzerainty, involving no powers of direct administration. But that, I think, somewhat under-estimates the significance of the grant. It is true that, when Nizām-ul-mulk conferred the title on Nāṣīr Jang, it did amount to nothing more than a general superintendence. But when made to a European, it evidently conveyed powers of almost unlimited interference, and from its very indefiniteness might have covered the exercise of complete control. In the event Dupleix (like Clive) preferred the system of dual Government.

All this was highly gratifying to French pride; but what was still more gratifying yet remained. A great part of Nāṣīr Jang’s

1 Cultru, *Dupleix*, p. 237.
treasure was saved from pillage by the efforts of La Touche, Bussy and Law, and carried into Pondichery. It was publicly announced that it included coin to the value of a crore of rupees, besides silver bullion and 18 chests of jewels. There were of course innumerable claimants. The Pathan Nawâbs had been promised a half-share; and there were considerable debts to be paid to the French Company, to Dupleix himself and to his friends. But even so, it is related that every one, from the councillor to the writer, from the captain to the private, had his share; and officers who only joined the service later looked back with regret to the happy days when a mere ensign received 60,000 rupees. Never had so much gold been seen in Pondicherry. It was comparable with the solid gains of the battle of Plassey.

Such was the brilliant success which had been secured by the good fortune and opportunism of Dupleix. It remained for him to consolidate his gains. Bussy was despatched with 300 Europeans and a body of sepoys under 'Abd-ul-rahmân to establish Muzaffar Jang in the Deccan; while another body under La Tour assisted Chandâ Sâhib to overcome all resistance in the Carnatic.

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1 Correco, de Pondichery avec Bengale, Vol. III, p. 142. The advantage of appointing the eldest brother was that he could make donations with a greater appearance of decency.
instalment of the diary closes. The French seemed everywhere successful. When their enemies the English had intervened, they had done so with neither resolution nor success. As the diarist says, they were like the jackal who burnt his skin in stripes in order to imitate the tiger, and perished in anguish. And yet Ranga Pillai had already recorded the appointment and arrival of that cold, austere and silent man, Thomas Saunders, before whose implacable hostility the successes of Dupleix were to melt away, and who before his own return to Europe was to witness the recall of his great rival and the end of one chapter of Anglo-French rivalry in India.

ÁNANDA RANGA PILLAI'S DIARY.

APRIL 1750.

Wednesday, April 1.—At seven o'clock this morning, the Governor sent for me and asked if there was any news. I replied, ‘Every one expects peace, not war. Even the people at Cuddalore and Fort St. David, who were saying that war was certain and that Mahfuz Khan had been made subahdar, now say that peace will be made, and that the Governor of Pondichery is lucky enough to make troubles high as mountains melt away like snow before the sun. They say in Fort St. David that your glory in overcoming Nāsīr Jang shines like the sun. With you, anxiety always precedes great good fortune. You have now experienced anxiety, and are about to win great glory for yourself and much territory for the Company.’ He said that God would certainly bless us.

Then Coja Sultān came and asked why the Governor wanted him. The Governor answered that he had not sent; and the chobdar and the head-peon, being questioned, also declared that they had sent no one. The Governor said some one else must have sent